Is there an Objectivist epistemology?
Acar
because direct realism is a self-standing philosophical entity and the
epistemology of Objectivism is strictly an epistemology of direct realism.
Yes, because Objectivism is a real philosophy, and its metaphysics and
epistemology are the metaphysics and epistemology of direct realism.
To my knowledge the following aspects of Objectivism are distinctive:
1. It attempts to bring all aspects of existence under the umbrella of
materialism.
2. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
individualism.
3. It offers a revolutionary, novel and unique theory of morality.
4. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
laissez-faire capitalism.
5. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
esthetics.
6. It re-defines logic from a materialist perspective.
Imagine a man who has a favorite bench in a park. When the sun is out he is
bothered by cats. He gets a cane to poke at the cats and keep them away.
When it rains there are no cats but the man gets wet. In order to find a
unitary solution to the cats and rain problem, the man builds an umbrella
around the cane. Now he can use the umbrella to keep the cats away when the
sun is out and to protect himself when it rains.
In our anecdote the cane is analogous to an epistemology of direct realism.
Does the umbrella have an umbrella handle? Yes and no. Yes, because the
device is an umbrella and the cane is its handle. No, because a cane is a
cane, and it is not a distinctive umbrella part.
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:HJ%R8.99970$zh2.23...@twister.neo.rr.com...
Interesting stuff. But I need to know, did you get my email response from a
few days ago? Maybe a week ago now.
2/3 of my posts to this group don't seem to make it past my ISP because I
don't get any rejection notice from the bot.
Ian Campbell
r.neo.rr.com>...
> Is there such a thing as an Objectivist epistemology? Yes and no.
Don't forget about AR's theory of objective concepts. I don't fully
grok it, but it seems unique to Objectivist Epistemology. That reminds
me, time to read ITOE again...
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
Acar
"Malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:Dq2S8.4673$DQ5.2...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
I did not get an e-mail but I see your reply now. Don't want to rush an
answer so I'll wait until I have people off my back.
x
x
x
Malenor
Scott Ryan says this:
http://home.att.net/~sandgryan/essays_on_objectivism/ocr/chapter10.html
" We have seen her [Mrs. O'Connor] repeatedly try to give epistemological
answers to irreducibly metaphysical questions, and in every case we have
found that she is relying on a good deal of unacknowledged ontology. In most
of these cases we have found that ontology to be incoherent."
The question is, was Mrs. O'Connor a direct realist?
While she claimed that the senses bring us direct experience of the real
world (direct realism), her epistemology relies on the existence of
implicit concepts. That introduces into experience and into her theory
the mediation by concepts between experience and reality.
In her epistemology, you could not understand your reality without
concepts, but the concepts remain implicit until a certain inward
focus makes us aware of them -- a process Mrs. O'Connor claimed
only took her a half-hour.
Another question is: do these implicit concepts provide us with
direct experience of reality? That seems contradictory, and yet it is
what Mrs. O'Connor seems to be claiming.
By the way, in all my reading I apparently missed the materialism
of Rand's doctrine in terms of claiming that all that exists is matter.
I don't recall her ever stating anything about the substance of the
universe.
Acar
"Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
There are a number of unique features to Rand's version of realist
epistemology. In the sense that they are peculiar to Rand they are peculiar
to Objectivism, but they are still realist epistemology. The alleged
*Objectivist* revolution starts with egoism and other deductive conclusions
involving esthetics and logic.
Ian Campbell
er.neo.rr.com>...
> There are a number of unique features to Rand's version of realist
> epistemology. In the sense that they are peculiar to Rand they are peculiar
> to Objectivism, but they are still realist epistemology.
Depends on whether a cane with a sword inside is still a cane, or
whether it's a sheath.
;-)
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
Acar
spikes of the umbrella. The cane is a plain cane. Realist epistemology
without Objectivist overtones. One must distinguish between Rand's call to
trust the evidence of the senses (allegedly inductive thinking) and the
deductive conclusions that lead to individualism, egoism, etcetera.
"Existence exists", "A is A" and "consciousness is aware of A" are realist
affirmations, having nothing to do with egoism, except through a proposed
deductive process.
Ken Gardner
>Don't forget about AR's theory of objective concepts. I don't fully
>grok it, but it seems unique to Objectivist Epistemology. That reminds
>me, time to read ITOE again...
Always a good idea, and ITOE is IMO by far Rand's most important book
(and contribution to philosophy in general).
I also used to think that Rand's theory of concepts was unique to
Objectivism until I finally got around to reading Aristotle. There
are elements of Aristotle's epistemology that seem identical to Rand
except for the terminology. Instead of saying "distinguishing
characteristics" and "omitted measurements," Aristotle speaks in terms
of essence and accident. Aristotle, like Rand, had a hierarchical
view of knowledge. Their theories of definition are very close, and I
don't think Objectivism would disagree with Aristotle's five or six
basic rules for good definitions. Aristotle wrote extensively on
propositions (a subject Rand barely touches upon in ITOE or
elsewhere), and he was, of course, the father of logic. The Organon
and the Metaphysics are must reads for any real deal Objectivist, and
I wouldn't stop there.
So, by all means read ITOE -- read it several times -- but at some
point read Aristotle.
Ken
Acar
>
> "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> news:HJ%R8.99970$zh2.23...@twister.neo.rr.com...
> > Is there such a thing as an Objectivist epistemology? Yes and no.
>
> Scott Ryan says this:
> http://home.att.net/~sandgryan/essays_on_objectivism/ocr/chapter10.html
> " We have seen her [Mrs. O'Connor] repeatedly try to give epistemological
> answers to irreducibly metaphysical questions, and in every case we have
> found that she is relying on a good deal of unacknowledged ontology. In
most
> of these cases we have found that ontology to be incoherent."
Am I glad that I didn't answer right away because I was going to ask who is
Mrs. O'Connor. Then a light went on. It's Franks' wife.
I'm not sure that I'm talking about the same thing but on the very first
"Great Theft" post many months ago I complained that Ms. Rosenbaum was
talking about "properties" as if they were not epistemological attributes,
or worse yet, some properties were "metaphysical" and some were
epistemological. She describes the "metaphysical" world as if she had
information via non-epistemological means. She speaks of measurement
(epistemological) as something that we do with size (metaphysical) ignoring
the fact that "sizing" *is* measuring. I did not get very far with that
argument nor do I expect that it will fare better today, but I suspect that
it could be related to Ryan's complaint.
> > To my knowledge the following aspects of Objectivism are distinctive:
> >
> > 1. It attempts to bring all aspects of existence under the umbrella of
> > materialism.
> > 2. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
> > individualism.
I want to add one here. I had assumend that individualism assumes egoism but
of course that is not so. Therefore I would add:
2a. It attempts to provide a deductive chain leading from individualism to
egoism.
> > 3. It offers a revolutionary, novel and unique theory of morality.
> > 4. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
> > laissez-faire capitalism.
> > 5. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
> > esthetics.
> > 6. It re-defines logic from a materialist perspective.
> >
> The question is, was Mrs. O'Connor a direct realist?
>
> While she claimed that the senses bring us direct experience of the real
> world (direct realism), her epistemology relies on the existence of
> implicit concepts. That introduces into experience and into her theory
> the mediation by concepts between experience and reality.
You have in this newsgroup some people arguing that once you have seen a
table you then have a physical table inside your head, or something that
could only be understood in those terms. I think that she relied on the
achievability of correspondence which makes the concept some kind of
"extension" of the thing itself. This may also be part of what Ryan writes
about.
> In her epistemology, you could not understand your reality without
> concepts, but the concepts remain implicit until a certain inward
> focus makes us aware of them -- a process Mrs. O'Connor claimed
> only took her a half-hour.
How did she square "implicit concepts" with tabula rasa? This concept of
implicit knowledge is somewhat similar to the very convenient concept of
"potential consciousness" whereby consciousness can not be active except by
assuming that its sensations are of external origin.
> Another question is: do these implicit concepts provide us with
> direct experience of reality? That seems contradictory, and yet it is
> what Mrs. O'Connor seems to be claiming.
>
> By the way, in all my reading I apparently missed the materialism
> of Rand's doctrine in terms of claiming that all that exists is matter.
> I don't recall her ever stating anything about the substance of the
> universe.
Objectivists take reality "as is", no question asked. Call it lazy, naďve or
pragmatic. Rand awards existence status to feelings, emotions, values, etc.,
but it is all rooted on knowable atoms.
George Dance
er.neo.rr.com>...
> I'm not sure that I'm talking about the same thing but on the very first
> "Great Theft" post many months ago I complained that Ms. Rosenbaum was
> talking about "properties" as if they were not epistemological attributes,
> or worse yet, some properties were "metaphysical" and some were
> epistemological.
That's the standard Lockean distinction between 'primary' and
'secondary' properties. Primary properties inhere in the object;
secondary qualities depend on an observing consciousness.
> She describes the "metaphysical" world as if she had
> information via non-epistemological means. She speaks of measurement
> (epistemological) as something that we do with size (metaphysical) ignoring
> the fact that "sizing" *is* measuring.
Unmeasured things each have a size, which is no different if and when
they come to be measured.
> I did not get very far with that
> argument nor do I expect that it will fare better today, but I suspect that
> it could be related to Ryan's complaint.
snip
>
> You have in this newsgroup some people arguing that once you have seen a
> table you then have a physical table inside your head, or something that
> could only be understood in those terms.
That certainly is no way to 'understand' the idea of having a mental
concept of table.
> I think that she relied on the
> achievability of correspondence which makes the concept some kind of
> "extension" of the thing itself. This may also be part of what Ryan writes
> about.
I hope not. I am certainly capable of achieving correspondence: I can
decide to pour myself a cup of coffee and drink it, and lo and behold,
I find myself drinking coffee. That doesn't require any 'physical
coffee in my head' (as opposed to my stomach), and it's almost
nonsensical to describe it as implying such a thing.
> How did she square "implicit concepts" with tabula rasa?
These 'implicit concepts' (or 'axiomatic concepts') can be inferred
from experience, and (once inferred by anyone) taught.
> This concept of
> implicit knowledge is somewhat similar to the very convenient concept of
> "potential consciousness" whereby consciousness can not be active except by
> assuming that its sensations are of external origin.
Consciousness requires something to be conscious of.
Ian Campbell
er.neo.rr.com>...
> > Depends on whether a cane with a sword inside is still a cane, or
> > whether it's a sheath.
> >
> I think that the sword that you are talking about would have to be in the
> spikes of the umbrella. The cane is a plain cane. Realist epistemology
> without Objectivist overtones. One must distinguish between Rand's call to
> trust the evidence of the senses (allegedly inductive thinking) and the
> deductive conclusions that lead to individualism, egoism, etcetera.
> "Existence exists", "A is A" and "consciousness is aware of A" are realist
> affirmations, having nothing to do with egoism, except through a proposed
> deductive process.
I think maybe there is a sword in there...
I will try to describe Objectivist Epistemology as I understand.
Tasting a Lemon:
SoT = sense of taste
Representative theory:
[lemon] --SoT--> [sour taste] <- consciousness
external world internal world
Direct realism:
[sour taste] <--SoT-- consciousness
external world
Objectivism:
[lemon + SoT = sour taste] <- consciousness
external world
Objectivism is like Direct Realism in that:
- sour taste actually exists
- we directly percieve it
- it exists even in the absense of consciousness
Objectivism differs in that:
- sour taste does not exist in the absense of means of perception
In the Objectivist model, Lemon and Sense of Taste are both external
existents.
Sour Taste is a third external existent, it is the effects of the
interaction of the other two.
Sour Taste comes about inevitably, causally as a result of the
proximity of SoT and Lemon.
By virtue of the kind of existent it is (it's Identity) Sour Taste can
be percieved by consciousness. Not all existents can be percieved by
consciousness - this is because consciousness has Identity too.
Sour Taste is DIRECTLY percieved. In this sense you could say the
Objectivist model is direct realism. It still claims we directly
percieve reality, but only a selection.
However there's a bigger difference and it's in the premises (sword):
Representative Theory says that perception consists of making a copy
in your internal world. A perfect consciousness would be one that
creates a perfect copy of reality. Direct Realism says we percieve
reality directly, so there is no doubt that our perception is perfect.
Representative Theory is working from the idea that its not a
perception of reality any more if the image changes during the copy
process. Direct Realism accepts this idea and removes the copy process
to guarantee that doesn't happen.
Objectivism asks: why is it not reality any more if the image changes?
Why should accurately perceiving reality necessarily consist of a
passive sort of "just knowing?"
The image would certainly be different with an active form of
perception, but that does not automatically imply it's no longer
reality. The only way it could not be reality is if when we interact
with reality we cause it to act against its own Identity. But nothing
can act against its own Identity. So what we are seeing is an image of
reality.
We are not supernatural creatures whose very act of percieving reality
risks making reality into non-reality.
Objectivism rejects that accurate perception requires you to "simply
know." Perception is an ACTIVE process consisting of causing natural
effects to occur in reality and observing them. And in a Universe
where Existence is Identity doing so can not result in perceptions of
un-reality.
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
Ian Campbell
I went shopping today and bought a copy of the Aristotle's "The
Metaphysics" to check it out - looks interesting.
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v1LS8.116802$zh2.25...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:0ZcS8.5991$DQ5.4...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
> >
> > "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> > news:HJ%R8.99970$zh2.23...@twister.neo.rr.com...
> > > Is there such a thing as an Objectivist epistemology? Yes and no.
> >
> > Scott Ryan says this:
> > http://home.att.net/~sandgryan/essays_on_objectivism/ocr/chapter10.html
> > " We have seen her [Mrs. O'Connor] repeatedly try to give
epistemological
> > answers to irreducibly metaphysical questions, and in every case we have
> > found that she is relying on a good deal of unacknowledged ontology. In
> most
> > of these cases we have found that ontology to be incoherent."
>
> Am I glad that I didn't answer right away because I was going to ask who
is
> Mrs. O'Connor. Then a light went on. It's Franks' wife.
>
"Man defines himself relative to the universe; woman defines herself
relative
to a man." Mrs. O'Connor (the author formally known as Miss Rand), was
a woman, I assume. Was she the only exception to her rule? I am beginning
to suspect that she believed the one who makes the rules also has the right
to create the exceptions! That's why she wanted to be in charge of setting
the rules, so she could exempt herself and certain chosen followers.
> I'm not sure that I'm talking about the same thing but on the very first
> "Great Theft" post many months ago I complained that Ms. Rosenbaum was
> talking about "properties" as if they were not epistemological attributes,
> or worse yet, some properties were "metaphysical" and some were
> epistemological. She describes the "metaphysical" world as if she had
> information via non-epistemological means. She speaks of measurement
> (epistemological) as something that we do with size (metaphysical)
ignoring
> the fact that "sizing" *is* measuring. I did not get very far with that
> argument nor do I expect that it will fare better today, but I suspect
that
> it could be related to Ryan's complaint.
>
All this is brought up in Ryan's e-book, concerning Mrs. O'Connor's implicit
ontology, her implicit answer to the problem of universals. One of his best
comments concerns the fact that if measurement is the sine qua non of
concept-formation, then how did we come to form the concept of
measurement? Which measurements did we omit to form the CCD for
measurement?
> > > To my knowledge the following aspects of Objectivism are distinctive:
> > >
> > > 1. It attempts to bring all aspects of existence under the umbrella of
> > > materialism.
> > > 2. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
> > > individualism.
>
> I want to add one here. I had assumend that individualism assumes egoism
but
> of course that is not so. Therefore I would add:
>
> 2a. It attempts to provide a deductive chain leading from individualism to
> egoism.
>
That's a good one. Ryan notes that Mrs. O'Connor and her followers like
to add "riders" to their arguments, such that they try to get away with the
notion that if the "rider" is proven or disproven, then so is the rest. In
this case, she simply conflated individualism and egoism without stopping
to consider that there may be a difference. Just the same, Ryan shows
how she conflated "concept" with "universal" as if there were literally
no difference, without any argument or questioning whatsoever.
> > > 3. It offers a revolutionary, novel and unique theory of morality.
> > > 4. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
> > > laissez-faire capitalism.
> > > 5. It attempts to establish a logical link between materialism and
> > > esthetics.
> > > 6. It re-defines logic from a materialist perspective.
> > >
> > The question is, was Mrs. O'Connor a direct realist?
> >
> > While she claimed that the senses bring us direct experience of the real
> > world (direct realism), her epistemology relies on the existence of
> > implicit concepts. That introduces into experience and into her theory
> > the mediation by concepts between experience and reality.
>
> You have in this newsgroup some people arguing that once you have seen a
> table you then have a physical table inside your head, or something that
> could only be understood in those terms. I think that she relied on the
> achievability of correspondence which makes the concept some kind of
> "extension" of the thing itself. This may also be part of what Ryan writes
> about.
>
I don't know yet.
> > In her epistemology, you could not understand your reality without
> > concepts, but the concepts remain implicit until a certain inward
> > focus makes us aware of them -- a process Mrs. O'Connor claimed
> > only took her a half-hour.
>
> How did she square "implicit concepts" with tabula rasa? This concept of
> implicit knowledge is somewhat similar to the very convenient concept of
> "potential consciousness" whereby consciousness can not be active except
by
> assuming that its sensations are of external origin.
>
She begins by assuming that consciousness is an activity, but says nothing
about what gets that activity "rolling." The brain integrates sensations
into
percepts, this is an automatic process; but it would be difficult to imagine
an activity with nothing for the brain to "chew on" or process. So I would
think that the first sensations stimulate the brain into action. There is no
sense of self at this stage of the game, only raw conscious awareness,
totally external.
"Implicit concept" I have in the past interpreted to mean "intuition." We
somehow "just know" that something is an existent; later on, we may
come to provide this intuition with a conceptual label. But she avoids
nominalism by arguing that these labels are created out of a need
for cognitive efficiency. An intuition becomes an "implicit concept,"
however, only in the face of this need for cognitive efficiency; otherwise,
it remains a mere percept. "Potential concept" might have done just
as well, except perhaps Mrs. O'Connor did not want her arguments
to be confused with certain Aristotelianisms concerning potentials and
actuals.
But my question was, How did we come to understand the world
around us if it were not for implicit concepts? They are, for Mrs.
O'Connor, that factor which bridges the gap between perception
and explicit conception. We do not understand percepts, we only
experience them. But somehow we understand things without
necessarily being able to name them; this is called intuition. Mrs.
O'Connor does not grant this any special mode of consciousness,
it is all part of the grand reasoning process. She would not admit
that there may be such a thing as an intuitive faculty, there could
be no place for such an entity in her epistemological monism.
> > Another question is: do these implicit concepts provide us with
> > direct experience of reality? That seems contradictory, and yet it is
> > what Mrs. O'Connor seems to be claiming.
> >
> > By the way, in all my reading I apparently missed the materialism
> > of Rand's doctrine in terms of claiming that all that exists is matter.
> > I don't recall her ever stating anything about the substance of the
> > universe.
>
> Objectivists take reality "as is", no question asked. Call it lazy, naďve
or
> pragmatic. Rand awards existence status to feelings, emotions, values,
etc.,
> but it is all rooted on knowable atoms.
>
Mrs. O'Connor was not a reductionist, for sure; she opposed that doctrine.
Ken Gardner
>Objective concepts is something I wish I understood FAR better.
>I went shopping today and bought a copy of the Aristotle's "The
>Metaphysics" to check it out - looks interesting.
It is, especially when you get to Book IV. But the Organon is, for my
money anyway, the crown jewel of Aristotle's works.
Ken
Ian Campbell
The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern
philosophy, is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can
acquire a valid knowledge of reality, that "true" knowledge has to be
causeless, i.e., acquired without any means of cognition.
[AR, ITOE, P80]
All knowledge is processed knowledgewhether on the sensory,
perceptual or conceptual level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a
knowledge acquired without means of cognition. Consciousness (as I
said in the first sentence of this work) is not a passive state, but
an active process.
[AR, ITOE, P81]
Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
to say that.
AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
valid distinction.
We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
arbitrary or subjective.
The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
some means.
[ITOE Appendix, P279]
Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
on man's physical organs, is "out there."
[LP, OPAR, 46]
Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
function is not to create and then study an inner world that
duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
[LP, OPAR, 47]
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
George Dance
newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> "Man defines himself relative to the universe; woman defines herself
> relative
> to a man." Mrs. O'Connor (the author formally known as Miss Rand), was
> a woman, I assume. Was she the only exception to her rule? I am beginning
> to suspect that she believed the one who makes the rules also has the right
> to create the exceptions! That's why she wanted to be in charge of setting
> the rules, so she could exempt herself and certain chosen followers.
That is so-o-o bitchy!! 8)
> All this is brought up in Ryan's e-book, concerning Mrs. O'Connor's implicit
> ontology, her implicit answer to the problem of universals. One of his best
> comments concerns the fact that if measurement is the sine qua non of
> concept-formation, then how did we come to form the concept of
> measurement? Which measurements did we omit to form the CCD for
> measurement?
Primitive man probably began by comparing the lengths of some things
to the length of his hands, some things to his feet, and some things
to his stride. When he ommitted the idea of units - grasping that he
could use any of these things in any case, then he had an abstract
concept of 'measurement' (which he could later apply to other
properties than length).
> > 2a. It attempts to provide a deductive chain leading from individualism to
> > egoism.
> >
> That's a good one. Ryan notes that Mrs. O'Connor and her followers like
> to add "riders" to their arguments, such that they try to get away with the
> notion that if the "rider" is proven or disproven, then so is the rest. In
> this case, she simply conflated individualism and egoism without stopping
> to consider that there may be a difference.
Ethical individualism or moral libertarianism - the belief that every
individual can rightfully do what he chooses (providing...) - is in
fact identical to what Rand called 'rational' (and earlier
philosophers called 'enlightened') self-interest. Rand of course did
not 'simply conflate' selfishness or self-interest with "rational
selfishness," but spent quite a bit of time arguing for the latter
concept.
> Just the same, Ryan shows
> how she conflated "concept" with "universal" as if there were literally
> no difference, without any argument or questioning whatsoever.
Rand did claim specifically that: (1) properties (which is what
mind-independent universals are) are not entities; and (2) only
entities actually exist. That's a claim rather than an argument, but
it's not a mere 'conflation' either.
>
> "Implicit concept" I have in the past interpreted to mean "intuition." We
> somehow "just know" that something is an existent; later on, we may
> come to provide this intuition with a conceptual label. But she avoids
> nominalism by arguing that these labels are created out of a need
> for cognitive efficiency. An intuition becomes an "implicit concept,"
> however, only in the face of this need for cognitive efficiency; otherwise,
> it remains a mere percept. "Potential concept" might have done just
> as well, except perhaps Mrs. O'Connor did not want her arguments
> to be confused with certain Aristotelianisms concerning potentials and
> actuals.
I don't remember Rand ever using a word like 'implicit concept'.
IIRC, she referred to concepts like "Existence" as /axiomatic,/ and
declared that they were inferred from perception, or from experience -
not one word about intuitions.
> But my question was, How did we come to understand the world
> around us if it were not for implicit concepts? They are, for Mrs.
> O'Connor, that factor which bridges the gap between perception
> and explicit conception. We do not understand percepts, we only
> experience them.
We also remember them; that allows one to compare percepts that take
place in different places and times, classifying some as similar and
some as different.
> But somehow we understand things without
> necessarily being able to name them; this is called intuition.
A whole mess of things are called 'intuition': strong feelings, direct
experience, and subconscious reasoning, to name three. Using this
word can only lead to later confusion.
> Mrs.
> O'Connor does not grant this any special mode of consciousness,
> it is all part of the grand reasoning process. She would not admit
> that there may be such a thing as an intuitive faculty, there could
> be no place for such an entity in her epistemological monism.
She explicitly identified intuition (in the sense of a non-rational
process of 'knowing') with whim. Her 'epistemological monism' did not
consist of denying that people had whims and acted on them, but in
insisting that whims should be supported by reasons.
Acar
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6312c50b.02062...@posting.google.com...
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:<v1LS8.116802$zh2.25060733@twist
> er.neo.rr.com>...
>
> > I'm not sure that I'm talking about the same thing but on the very first
> > "Great Theft" post many months ago I complained that Ms. Rosenbaum was
> > talking about "properties" as if they were not epistemological
attributes,
> > or worse yet, some properties were "metaphysical" and some were
> > epistemological.
>
> That's the standard Lockean distinction between 'primary' and
> 'secondary' properties. Primary properties inhere in the object;
> secondary qualities depend on an observing consciousness.
It is impossible for an observing consciousness to make statements about
properties as they exist without being observed.
> > She describes the "metaphysical" world as if she had
> > information via non-epistemological means. She speaks of measurement
> > (epistemological) as something that we do with size (metaphysical)
ignoring
> > the fact that "sizing" *is* measuring.
>
> Unmeasured things each have a size, which is no different if and when
> they come to be measured.
I already said that sizing is measuring. Attributing size involves a mental
measurement. You can not have one without the other.
> > I did not get very far with that
> > argument nor do I expect that it will fare better today, but I suspect
that
> > it could be related to Ryan's complaint.
>
> snip
>
> >
> > You have in this newsgroup some people arguing that once you have seen a
> > table you then have a physical table inside your head, or something that
> > could only be understood in those terms.
>
> That certainly is no way to 'understand' the idea of having a mental
> concept of table.
Well, there was in the argument the denial of an intervening concept. When
the concept achieves full correspondence the concept becomes irrelevant. You
know the table itself.
> > I think that she relied on the
> > achievability of correspondence which makes the concept some kind of
> > "extension" of the thing itself. This may also be part of what Ryan
writes
> > about.
>
> I hope not. I am certainly capable of achieving correspondence: I can
> decide to pour myself a cup of coffee and drink it, and lo and behold,
> I find myself drinking coffee. That doesn't require any 'physical
> coffee in my head' (as opposed to my stomach), and it's almost
> nonsensical to describe it as implying such a thing.
You are talking about correspondence but about coherence with experience.
You have not observed yourself drinking coffee independently of your
opinions and beliefs. Based on experience you have an extremely high level
of certainty which causes you toss aside any practical consideration of
uncertainty. That is not correspondence. It is what you have described
elsewhere as "weak truth". It is a pragmatic acceptance of the usefulness of
that for which you do not expect to experience contradiction.
> > How did she square "implicit concepts" with tabula rasa?
>
> These 'implicit concepts' (or 'axiomatic concepts') can be inferred
> from experience, and (once inferred by anyone) taught.
Then they simply do not exist until they exist. Why must we call them
concepts before they actually exist?
> > This concept of
> > implicit knowledge is somewhat similar to the very convenient concept of
> > "potential consciousness" whereby consciousness can not be active except
by
> > assuming that its sensations are of external origin.
>
> Consciousness requires something to be conscious of.
Consciousness of X is the faculty of being aware of X. This is awareness,
period. Whether X it is external to consciousness is a deduction of
consciousness and subject to the same constrictions of any logical
deduction. Of course we realists believe that the stimulus is external, even
before consciousness figures it out. But idealists believe that the faculty
of imagination is capable of inventing, designing and creating images by
itself. This is not more absurd than for us to say that those imges came to
exist externally without a designer.
George Dance
951.75...@posting.google.com>...
snip
> Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> to say that.
> AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> valid distinction.
> We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> arbitrary or subjective.
> The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> some means.
> [ITOE Appendix, P279]
Here Rand appears to be ignoring three important distinctions between
length and colour:
1) The length of an object can be verified by two senses - sight and
touch - the reliability of each of capable of being tested against
and supported by the evidence from the other In contrast, perception
of colour depends on one completely unsupported source of evidence.
2) The length of objects does not vary; even changes in apparent
length appear to obey fixed laws (or perspective, eg). In contrast,
the apparent colors of objects does vary depending on other factors
such as lighting.
3) Some people do not perceive colour at all, while everyone with eyes
can perceive length.
These distinctions do not prove that length is in the object, while
colour is attributed to it by an observer; but they are plausible
indications of that, which Rand's comments do not address at all.
> Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> [LP, OPAR, 46]
Most of our beliefs about things are not perceptions, but conceptual
judgements - for example, we perceive something about an object (that
it reflects red light), and judge that it is red. Certainly the
perception - the red light - is 'out there'; but the actual redness of
the object might or might not be.
snip
Malenor
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6312c50b.02063...@posting.google.com...
> Malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<eopT8.2800$FG5.246477@
> newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
>
> > "Man defines himself relative to the universe; woman defines herself
> > relative
> > to a man." Mrs. O'Connor (the author formally known as Miss Rand), was
> > a woman, I assume. Was she the only exception to her rule? I am
beginning
> > to suspect that she believed the one who makes the rules also has the
right
> > to create the exceptions! That's why she wanted to be in charge of
setting
> > the rules, so she could exempt herself and certain chosen followers.
>
> That is so-o-o bitchy!! 8)
>
The "Rand/Branden" affair serves as an example of such exemption: when she
failed to follow her own rules, and tried to make the males in her life
her little whipping-boys or boy toys thereby reversing the laws of
human relationships handed out by reality itself, a debacle was the only
possible
outcome. Branden's great admiration for Mrs. O'Connor blinded him not only
to
her inconsistent and capricious application of the rules she handed out to
others,
but also to the incontrovertible facts of human nature.
>
> > All this is brought up in Ryan's e-book, concerning Mrs. O'Connor's
implicit
> > ontology, her implicit answer to the problem of universals. One of his
best
> > comments concerns the fact that if measurement is the sine qua non of
> > concept-formation, then how did we come to form the concept of
> > measurement? Which measurements did we omit to form the CCD for
> > measurement?
>
> Primitive man probably began by comparing the lengths of some things
> to the length of his hands, some things to his feet, and some things
> to his stride. When he ommitted the idea of units - grasping that he
> could use any of these things in any case, then he had an abstract
> concept of 'measurement' (which he could later apply to other
> properties than length).
>
I'm sure that's the way it all began, the comparison of all other things
to themselves ("man is the measure of all things"). The problem comes
when you say "he omitted the idea of units." Do you recall the definition
of "unit"?: "An existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two
or more similar members." Once you abstract away the (implicit) concept of
"unit," you have lost the ability to differentiate and integrate, to
*classify*
things (regarded as units) and form concepts. You can't have measurement
without units to measure -- but you can't have the implicit concept of
"unit" without particular measurements to omit. It's a catch 22.
> > > 2a. It attempts to provide a deductive chain leading from
individualism to
> > > egoism.
> > >
> > That's a good one. Ryan notes that Mrs. O'Connor and her followers like
> > to add "riders" to their arguments, such that they try to get away with
the
> > notion that if the "rider" is proven or disproven, then so is the rest.
In
> > this case, she simply conflated individualism and egoism without
stopping
> > to consider that there may be a difference.
>
> Ethical individualism or moral libertarianism - the belief that every
> individual can rightfully do what he chooses (providing...) - is in
> fact identical to what Rand called 'rational' (and earlier
> philosophers called 'enlightened') self-interest. Rand of course did
> not 'simply conflate' selfishness or self-interest with "rational
> selfishness," but spent quite a bit of time arguing for the latter
> concept.
>
Acar's point was: she conflated individualism with egoism (which last
is for Rand synonymous with rational selfishness). The Ayn Rand
Lexicon indicates that "individualism" is the political application
of "egoism," a moral theory. So Acar had it backwards: the deductive
chain leads from egoism to individualism (but there is a great deal
of inductive reasoning involved in this chain too, perhaps moreso than
the deductive).
> > Just the same, Ryan shows
> > how she conflated "concept" with "universal" as if there were literally
> > no difference, without any argument or questioning whatsoever.
>
> Rand did claim specifically that: (1) properties (which is what
> mind-independent universals are) are not entities; and (2) only
> entities actually exist. That's a claim rather than an argument, but
> it's not a mere 'conflation' either.
I don't recall her claiming that only entities exist and not their
properties. However, I'm not sure what that has to do with her
conflation of "concept" with "universal": "But concepts are abstractions
or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular, concrete"
(ITOE, 1).
This quote is impossible to understand because it contains one of
Mrs. O'Connor's typical "riders": an abstraction is a universal, or
an abstraction *can be* a universal, or a universal *can be* an
abstraction and not vice versa, or a concept is a universal sometimes
and an abstraction other times, or...
The point is, in so declaring the problem of universals solved (by,
I submit, declaring it a non-issue), she falls back on the same old trick
of conflating various philosophical terms without the benefit of first
defining them for her reader, and doing so in a manner that can be
interpreted, or equivocated, many different ways.
But it seems she has conflated "abstraction" with "universal" because
the rest of the book involves only the problem of concept-formation,
of abstractions from abstractions (higher concepts from lower concepts),
so it appears that she has, like I said, simply dropped the whole idea
of a "universal" and replaced it with the ideas of "concept" and
"abstraction." And both of the latter can be considered the same
idea considered from different contexts. A concept is formed by
abstraction, so apparently the mental product is also an abstraction
when seen in terms of this process, according to Mrs. O'Connor.
And the whole idea of a "universal" has been dispensed with.
> >
> > "Implicit concept" I have in the past interpreted to mean "intuition."
We
> > somehow "just know" that something is an existent; later on, we may
> > come to provide this intuition with a conceptual label. But she avoids
> > nominalism by arguing that these labels are created out of a need
> > for cognitive efficiency. An intuition becomes an "implicit concept,"
> > however, only in the face of this need for cognitive efficiency;
otherwise,
> > it remains a mere percept. "Potential concept" might have done just
> > as well, except perhaps Mrs. O'Connor did not want her arguments
> > to be confused with certain Aristotelianisms concerning potentials and
> > actuals.
>
> I don't remember Rand ever using a word like 'implicit concept'.
ITOE, page 3: "[The concept of an existent] is implicit in every percept...
and man grasps it *implicitly* on the perceptual level -- i.e., he grasps
the constituents of the concept 'existent,' the data which are later to be
integrated by that concept. It is this implicit knowledge that permits his
consciousness to develop further." ... "The (implicit) concept 'existent'
undergoes three stages of development in man's mind..." and so on.
> IIRC, she referred to concepts like "Existence" as /axiomatic,/ and
> declared that they were inferred from perception, or from experience -
> not one word about intuitions.
>
Ryan pointed out that "existence" (and the other axiomatic concepts)
are not concepts at all. They were not formed by a process of
integration and differentiation, only by integration. One integrates all
existents into one grand "concept" "existence," that subsumes all
existents -- but there is nothing to differentiate the "concept" against.
"Concepts are not and cannot be formed in a vacuum; they are formed
in a context" (ITOE, 55). Then what is the wider context of "existence"?
Furthermore, Mrs. O'Connor herself has declared that these axioms
are only implicit concepts, and must remain implicit, that is, on the
perceptual level. We cannot integrate a concept such as "existence,"
there is too much to reality. Then how does she derive the "concept"
of "existence"? She doesn't. There is no way to derive it. "[An axiomatic
concept] is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced,
* which requires no proof or explanation *, but on which all proofs or
explanations rest" (ITOE, 73; emphasis mine). Therefore, in Mrs.
O'Connor's own terms, these "axiomatic concepts" are not concepts
per se, or else something has got to change in her epistemology.
That is why I say these "axiomatic concepts" remain on the level of
intuitive knowledge. Now you are eager to point out that "intuition"
can mean many things. But I use the simplest definitions of that term
to show that Mrs. O'Connor was truly an epistemological Intuitionist.
"Intuition" is "an immediate insight or apprehension," or, "the power
or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident
rational thought and inference [i.e., 'requires no proof or
explanation,' 'directly perceived or experienced']." Or if you don't
like m-w.com, try another dictionary dot com, like dictionary.com:
"a. The act or faculty of knowing or sensing without the use of rational
processes; immediate cognition." (Sheesh, too many popups there.)
"Intuitionism" is THE only word to describe Rand's basic epistemological
stance, just as I have said for a long time now. Our most basic knowledge,
the (implicit) knowledge that makes ALL OTHER knowledge possible, is
INTUITIVE -- "it is this implicit knowledge that permits his consciousness
to develop further".
> > But my question was, How did we come to understand the world
> > around us if it were not for implicit concepts? They are, for Mrs.
> > O'Connor, that factor which bridges the gap between perception
> > and explicit conception. We do not understand percepts, we only
> > experience them.
>
> We also remember them; that allows one to compare percepts that take
> place in different places and times, classifying some as similar and
> some as different.
>
This process, when it happens to use the faculty of
remembering, that is, of intuiting in imagination, is thus still based on
these same intuitive "implicit concepts" in imagination rather than
in external perception.
> > But somehow we understand things without
> > necessarily being able to name them; this is called intuition.
>
> A whole mess of things are called 'intuition': strong feelings, direct
> experience, and subconscious reasoning, to name three. Using this
> word can only lead to later confusion.
>
I defined "intuition," and neither of the sources of these definitions
referred to strong feelings, only to "impressions" in one case. At any
rate, I am focusing on definitions that match Mrs. O'Connor's (implicit,
of course) usage of terms. The basic level of all our knowledge, in
Objectivist epistemology, is best termed "Intuition." The most important
"concepts" in her epistemology, the "axiomatic concepts," do not
even require proof or explanation. That is the book definition of
'intuition.' Mrs. O'Connor worked her way through the book on
epistemology, only to find herself back on page 3, the level of
percepts and implicit concepts. Moreover, on page 2 she declares
that one must keep these axioms in mind throughout the work to
follow. That is to say, she does not have to prove them, you must
simply accept her word. And when she finally gets to these "highest
abstractions," which are actually not abstractions at all, she only
describes what they would be if they were explicit concepts, which
they are not. They only, she claims, perform a certain role in
cognition. I have called them regulatory "concepts." I also see their
role as being disciplinary, keeping our minds focused on that which
is objective. But that "discipline" rests on authority -- her authority.
> > Mrs.
> > O'Connor does not grant this any special mode of consciousness,
> > it is all part of the grand reasoning process. She would not admit
> > that there may be such a thing as an intuitive faculty, there could
> > be no place for such an entity in her epistemological monism.
>
> She explicitly identified intuition (in the sense of a non-rational
> process of 'knowing') with whim. Her 'epistemological monism' did not
> consist of denying that people had whims and acted on them, but in
> insisting that whims should be supported by reasons.
>
If so, then she is guilty of whim-worship that somehow becomes
rational truth simply because it was on her authority, because her
implicit concepts, intuitions, are not supported by reasons ("an
axiomatic concept... requires no proof or explanations").
Acar
> Representative Theory is working from the idea that its not a
> perception of reality any more if the image changes during the copy
> process. Direct Realism accepts this idea and removes the copy process
> to guarantee that doesn't happen.
>
> Objectivism asks: why is it not reality any more if the image changes?
> Why should accurately perceiving reality necessarily consist of a
> passive sort of "just knowing?"
>
I think that it's a rubber sword. Moderate realists agree with science that
there is a strict correlation between the object and its effect on
consciousness. Direct realists also went to school and they know this. In
your explanation Objectivists say: So it's a representation but it conveys
solid information, why shouldn't it be "the last word?" I don't see a
crucial difference between that and the claims of direct realism. I am not
aware that direct realism would claim that lemons have taste in a world
without animals. Everyone agrees with the scientific facts. The difference
is in whether there is more to know, or grounds for dogmatism.
Acar
> Here are some quotes to support my position:
Since they are only assertions, I suppose that you mean that the assertions
support your opinion about what Objectivism claims, vis a vis realism.
> The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern
> philosophy, is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can
> acquire a valid knowledge of reality, that "true" knowledge has to be
> causeless, i.e., acquired without any means of cognition.
> [AR, ITOE, P80]
This is garden variety realism..
> All knowledge is processed knowledge whether on the sensory,
> perceptual or conceptual level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a
> knowledge acquired without means of cognition. Consciousness (as I
> said in the first sentence of this work) is not a passive state, but
> an active process.
> [AR, ITOE, P81]
That is also realism. And it goes along with tabula rasa. It rules out "a
priori".
> Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> to say that.
Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
> AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> valid distinction.
>
> We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> arbitrary or subjective.
> The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> some means.
> [ITOE Appendix, P279]
Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman I
would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
"metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism which
comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of direct
realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and claiming
that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
> Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> [LP, OPAR, 46]
As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says that
color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to reconcile
that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
> Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> [LP, OPAR, 47]
I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
(representation) take us?
Eudaimonus
> Everybody accepts "representation".
Quite frankly, that is just plain wishfull thinking, and factually
incorrect.
Acar
"Eudaimonus" <jwsc...@insightbb.com> wrote in message
news:C8vU8.382327$352.49739@sccrnsc02...
I usually don't respond with argument to non-argument but I should explain
myself.
In this context what I mean is that everyone is familiar with the
physiological facts. For example the ocular lens presents an inverted image
to the retina. The image is transmitted to the occiptal lobe and the
prefontal cortex straightens it out. If you loose consciousness you are not
aware of the image. Etc. Everybody knows that the experience of sound is
generated by the brain. No one disagrees that if you sever the sensory
nerves you don't experience the images. The difference is in the quantity
and quality of information which is attributed to the images.
Ian Campbell
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
> Here Rand appears to be ignoring three important distinctions between
> length and colour:
>
> 1) The length of an object can be verified by two senses - sight and
> touch - the reliability of each of capable of being tested against
> and supported by the evidence from the other In contrast, perception
> of colour depends on one completely unsupported source of evidence.
The fact that you can detect one quality with two senses and another
with only one says something about the array of senses you happen to
have, but nothing about the actual quality. I think it would be a
mistake to classify qualities as primary, secondary according to
something about yourself.
> 2) The length of objects does not vary; even changes in apparent
> length appear to obey fixed laws (or perspective, eg). In contrast,
> the apparent colors of objects does vary depending on other factors
> such as lighting.
Even if the color changes, that's just giving you more info about how
the particular object reflects light under certain conditions. It is
all info about the object and it is all good. None can contradict the
other, because the object has Identity. What you want to do is collect
as much info about the object as possible in order to form your model.
So in that sense a more complex sense such as sight is actually
helping you more than a simpler sense such as touch.
I think you may be equating consistency in sensory data with truth.
Rather, realize that it is impossible for any of it to be false, and
just collect as much as possible.
> 3) Some people do not perceive colour at all, while everyone with eyes
> can perceive length.
The light reacting with their eye produces a different sensory
representation because the eye is physically different. I don't see
how you can conclude anything about the object though. The model is:
object + means of perception = sensory representation.
> These distinctions do not prove that length is in the object, while
> colour is attributed to it by an observer; but they are plausible
> indications of that, which Rand's comments do not address at all.
Actually she talks with Prof. C about it for a few more pages but I
was only interested in the comment that all knowledge is processed to
support my position that Objectivism is different to direct realism.
[...]
> Most of our beliefs about things are not perceptions, but conceptual
> judgements - for example, we perceive something about an object (that
> it reflects red light), and judge that it is red. Certainly the
> perception - the red light - is 'out there'; but the actual redness of
> the object might or might not be.
I agree. The sensory representation and the word "redness" are both
out there in the brain - mental existents. But the word "redness" in
the brain corresponds to a concept of redness "in here" (consciousness
is identification) which may or may not be valid. This is why we need
an objective theory of concepts.
cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
Ian Campbell
er.neo.rr.com>...
> > Objectivism asks: why is it not reality any more if the image changes?
> > Why should accurately perceiving reality necessarily consist of a
> > passive sort of "just knowing?"
>
> I think that it's a rubber sword. Moderate realists agree with science that
> there is a strict correlation between the object and its effect on
> consciousness. Direct realists also went to school and they know this. In
> your explanation Objectivists say: So it's a representation but it conveys
> solid information, why shouldn't it be "the last word?" I don't see a
> crucial difference between that and the claims of direct realism. I am not
> aware that direct realism would claim that lemons have taste in a world
> without animals. Everyone agrees with the scientific facts. The difference
> is in whether there is more to know, or grounds for dogmatism.
( DR = Direct Realism, RT = Representation Theory, OBJ = Objectivism )
The difference is that DR and RT just assert that percepts are valid.
DR always and RT in the case of a perfect copy.
OBJ is not dogmatic about percepts. It starts with Existence is
Identity as an axiom and then derives their validity. It does this by
including everything involved in perception (object, means of
perception, perceptual representation, consciousness) in Existence. It
then states that since Existence is Identity, the whole process is
inevitable and immune from subjectivity.
You could say it is a rubber sword, because the only difference is the
Realist's science vs. the Objectivist's Identity. But I would say it
is a physical vs a metaphysical reason and that is a significant
difference.
It is a question of classification. How can we know who is right
without an objective theory of concepts?
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
Ian Campbell
er.neo.rr.com>...
[...]
> > The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern
> > philosophy, is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can
> > acquire a valid knowledge of reality, that "true" knowledge has to be
> > causeless, i.e., acquired without any means of cognition.
> > [AR, ITOE, P80]
>
> This is garden variety realism..
It is realism and representationalism. She is identifying both as
being mystical for thinking that when processing starts knowledge goes
out the window.
It is mysticism because to think that you would have to hold that the
Law of Identity doesn't apply to human cognition.
[...]
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
She says everything we percieve is the result of non-arbitrary
processing. You are right, concepts can be subjective, but she is not
talking about that here - only percepts.
[...]
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
In depends on how you define "in here" and "out there." In Objectivism
the line is: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.
In other words everything except concepts is out there. We are beings
of "conceptual consciousness."
So in this case the taste of the lemon (a percept) is "out there." It
is a mental existent in the brain (which is not the same as
consciousness). It got there inevitably by a process of causation
starting in nerve endings in the tounge.
P.S. You were saying "her" but the last two were Peikoff quotes.
[...]
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
David Tomlin
> "George Dance" wrote
> > Primary properties inhere in the object;
> > secondary qualities depend on an observing consciousness.
> It is impossible for an observing consciousness to make statements about
> properties as they exist without being observed.
Not all properties are directly observable. Some must be inferred.
For example, we do not directly observe magnetic fields.
We do not directly observe an object's mass. Usually, we infer mass
from heaviness (a different property, as any first year physics student
should know.)
Secondary qualities are the phenomenon. Primary qualities are the noumenon.
Acar
"David Tomlin" <Jet...@home.com> wrote in message
news:c61bab99.02070...@posting.google.com...
> Acar wrote
>
> > "George Dance" wrote
>
> > > Primary properties inhere in the object;
> > > secondary qualities depend on an observing consciousness.
>
> > It is impossible for an observing consciousness to make statements about
> > properties as they exist without being observed.
>
> Not all properties are directly observable. Some must be inferred.
> For example, we do not directly observe magnetic fields.
>
> We do not directly observe an object's mass. Usually, we infer mass
> from heaviness (a different property, as any first year physics student
> should know.)
If we can measure and manipulate them and put them in precise mathematical
equations, that comes under the general heading of "observing". We can not
be objective about the noumenon.
x
x
x
Acar
>
> The difference is that DR and RT just assert that percepts are valid.
> DR always and RT in the case of a perfect copy.
That is not what I have in mind when I think of "representationalism". Of
course I am not well up on the applicable jargon. By my understanding your
characterization of it is wrong on both counts. My concept is closer to
Kant's. The perception is valid all the time because every aspect of it
corresponds exactly to some aspect of the object. For example color
corresponds exactly to a very specific electromagnetic emission and odor
corresponds exactly to structural aspects of specific free molecules.
However a perfect copy is impossible because we can not visualize
electromagnetic emissions as such, nor molecules in terms of their
structure. This is also what Rand says in her quote, and the only difference
is the deductions that we make from such stipulations.
> OBJ is not dogmatic about percepts. It starts with Existence is
> Identity as an axiom and then derives their validity. It does this by
> including everything involved in perception (object, means of
> perception, perceptual representation, consciousness) in Existence. It
> then states that since Existence is Identity, the whole process is
> inevitable and immune from subjectivity.
You need to make a stronger case. It occurs to me that subjectivity has
identity and so do mistaken concepts. Of course I am not quite sure of what
you mean, nor I am aware that Rand explained it in those terms. What you
postulate does not follow from the quotes that you offered. Rand is quite
dogmatic about our ability to commune with reality.
> You could say it is a rubber sword, because the only difference is the
> Realist's science vs. the Objectivist's Identity. But I would say it
> is a physical vs a metaphysical reason and that is a significant
> difference.
>
> It is a question of classification. How can we know who is right
> without an objective theory of concepts?
To my knowledge OBJ does not create a dichotomy between philosophy and
science.
David Tomlin
> Note the professor's timidity.
"Prof" doesn't stand for "professor". It stands for
"professional". The participants in this symposium
were described as "professionals" of various, unnamed
fields. It appears that few, if any, were
academics.
Acar
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:<v7cU8.133421$zh2.29537382@twist
> er.neo.rr.com>...
> [...]
> > > The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern
> > > philosophy, is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can
> > > acquire a valid knowledge of reality, that "true" knowledge has to be
> > > causeless, i.e., acquired without any means of cognition.
> > > [AR, ITOE, P80]
> >
> > This is garden variety realism..
>
> It is realism and representationalism.
You misunderstood my remark. The *content of the quote* is garden variety
realism. What she attacks is the opposite of realism. Also, I do not
recognize an attack on representationalism as such in that quote.
> She says everything we percieve is the result of non-arbitrary
> processing. You are right, concepts can be subjective, but she is not
> talking about that here - only percepts.
I happen to know that sensory organs react to specific physical features of
reality in a manner that is specific and consistent. I do not know that any
subsequent step between sensation and conceptualization is equally
consistent. Furthermore I do not think that any one is entitled to affirm
that, except arbitrarily or "rationalistically".
> In depends on how you define "in here" and "out there." In Objectivism
> the line is: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.
> In other words everything except concepts is out there.
Well, that is also garden variety realism. It's all in the form of concepts
so it's all in consciousness to start. We deduce that the concepts in
consciousness correspond to something "out there". Depending on the
implications that we hang on those assumptions, we are moderate realists or
direct realists.
> We are beings
> of "conceptual consciousness."
So?
> So in this case the taste of the lemon (a percept) is "out there." It
> is a mental existent in the brain (which is not the same as
> consciousness). It got there inevitably by a process of causation
> starting in nerve endings in the tounge.
>
> P.S. You were saying "her" but the last two were Peikoff quotes.
I haven't studied either of them.
There is no taste in the brain (apart from consciousness). Give lemonade to
a person in coma. There is no taste. Taste itsef does not have a structural
formula. Tate is an experience. It's an abstraction in consciousness.
Eudaimonus
> In this context what I mean is that everyone is familiar with the
> physiological facts. For example the ocular lens presents an inverted
image
> to the retina. The image is transmitted to the occiptal lobe and the
> prefontal cortex straightens it out. If you loose consciousness you are
not
> aware of the image. Etc. Everybody knows that the experience of sound is
> generated by the brain. No one disagrees that if you sever the sensory
> nerves you don't experience the images. The difference is in the quantity
> and quality of information which is attributed to the images.
Your are, here, supposing that we "all know" that what the ocular lens
presents, in an inverted manner, to the retina, is an "image". I rather do
not "know this" I know that it is a two-dimensionally arrayed field of
photons. What I do not know, is if every array of fields of photons is an
"image".
Of course we all know the various different facts of the various different
factors that affect perception : the "bent" stick in water and such things.
What we do not "all know" is that those facts imply the representational
theory of perception.
David Tomlin
> "David Tomlin" wrote
> > Not all properties are directly observable. Some must be inferred.
> > For example, we do not directly observe magnetic fields.
> > We do not directly observe an object's mass. Usually, we infer mass
> > from heaviness (a different property, as any first year physics student
> > should know.)
> If we can measure and manipulate them and put them in precise mathematical
> equations, that comes under the general heading of "observing".
You're not reading carefully. I distinguished "direct" from "indirect"
observation.
As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
Acar
> "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> news:e4wU8.2265$CJ2.5...@twister.neo.rr.com...
> > In this context what I mean is that everyone is familiar with the
> > physiological facts. For example the ocular lens presents an inverted
> image
> > to the retina. The image is transmitted to the occiptal lobe and the
> > prefontal cortex straightens it out. If you loose consciousness you are
> not
> > aware of the image. Etc. Everybody knows that the experience of sound is
> > generated by the brain. No one disagrees that if you sever the sensory
> > nerves you don't experience the images. The difference is in the
quantity
> > and quality of information which is attributed to the images.
>
> Your are, here, supposing that we "all know" that what the ocular lens
> presents, in an inverted manner, to the retina, is an "image". I rather
do
> not "know this" I know that it is a two-dimensionally arrayed field of
> photons. What I do not know, is if every array of fields of photons is an
> "image".
Sure, the physical data is processed but you do end up with an image, don't
you? The principles of optics apply. Ask any optometrist. If you doubt that
what you see is an image take off your glasses. Someting is blurred, and it
ain't the object.
> Of course we all know the various different facts of the various different
> factors that affect perception : the "bent" stick in water and such
things.
> What we do not "all know" is that those facts imply the representational
> theory of perception.
I don't care about the bent stick argument. I think that the senses are just
fine. The "representational theory of perception" is a technical term. It is
technical jargon to identify certain thoeries about the implications of what
we have been discussing. I don't need to be told that it isn't everybody's
theory. I used the term "representation" in its colloquial meaning, to say
that everybody, with the possible exception of yourself, understands that
the brain generates images of the world.
x
x
x
x
Acar
Thanks!
x
x
Acar
>
> > "David Tomlin" wrote
>
> > > Not all properties are directly observable. Some must be inferred.
> > > For example, we do not directly observe magnetic fields.
>
> > > We do not directly observe an object's mass. Usually, we infer mass
> > > from heaviness (a different property, as any first year physics
student
> > > should know.)
>
> > If we can measure and manipulate them and put them in precise
mathematical
> > equations, that comes under the general heading of "observing".
>
> You're not reading carefully. I distinguished "direct" from "indirect"
> observation.
Sorry. My frame of reference was "direct" realism which refers to all things
that are physical.
> As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
> observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
Noted. I don't know either way.
x
x
x
x
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v7cU8.133421$zh2.29...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> > distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> > object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> > to say that.
>
> Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
> mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
According to Scott Ryan, "Prof C" is Nicholas Bykovitz, whoever
that is. (I think the last name should be "Bykovetz." Somebody by
that name has posted to the Yahoo group TEWLIP, the Theory of
Elementary Waves list.)
>
> > AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> > qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> > valid distinction.
> >
> > We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> > color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> > spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> > by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> > perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> > Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> > arbitrary or subjective.
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman
I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
>
It is not a great advance in philosophy to say that "every perception is
perceived." Then she adds that it is perceived by some means or other.
That doesn't say much either because she doesn't mention what that
means is.
Wow, gee, we're really far ahead of the rest of humanity: perception
is perceived, and perceived -- by some means!
What really gives this "stuff" any meaning? Mrs. O'Connor
tried to pass herself off as an intellectual warrior fending off and
defeating single-handedly subjectivists, platonists, kantians, etc.
But once that is abstracted out, her actual, raw claims appear to take
on much less import.
> So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
> qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
> since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
> "metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
> such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism
which
> comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of
direct
> realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and
claiming
> that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
>
The metaphysics you mention is the implicit ontology noted by Ryan.
But what is this ontology? An answer to the problem of Universals brought
up by Mrs. O'Connor on page 1. That answer is: Universals are real,
Platonic Realism.
That is not exactly direct realism. Is lengthness all in our heads, or "out
there"? My analysis reveals that, for Mrs. O'Connor, we *intuit*
lengthness. That is to say, we cognize it without any means of
cognition whatsoever. Yes, we do manage to form the concept of
length, but that is only for purposes of cognitive efficiency, or as
she said, efficacy (which is not the same thing).
On page 2 of ITOE Mrs. O'Connor emphasizes the importance of her
answer to the Problem of Universals to human survival. But what does
it boil down to but the *belief* in the necessity of cognitive efficacy,
the belief that we are not (according to her analysis) intuitionists and
Platonic Realists, but rather Aristotelian (with reservations). And in this
she means a belief that cognitive efficacy is important to human survival.
That is pragmatic compared to her (implicit) story of the actual reality
of human knowledge, and that is, we can know things, implicitly, without
any effort whatsoever. Now perhaps that knowledge is uncategorized,
unclassified, and unlabeled, perhaps it is not in the little mental file
folders that enable cognitive efficacy to occur. But it is still knowledge,
and it remains a fact that, for Mrs. O'Connors, men are intuiting beings
who are rational only out of practical necessity.
> > Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> > not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> > of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> > perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says
that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to
reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
>
Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her "stuff."
Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
"Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
(implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
> > Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> > function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> > duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> > to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> > [LP, OPAR, 47]
>
> I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
> Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
> person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
> (representation) take us?
>
The apple is still a processed apple when it attains to conscious awareness
(in its look, feel, smell, taste).
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v7cU8.133421$zh2.29...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> > distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> > object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> > to say that.
>
> Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
> mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
According to Scott Ryan, "Prof C" is Nicholas Bykovitz, whoever
that is. (I think the last name should be "Bykovetz." Somebody by
that name has posted to the Yahoo group TEWLIP, the Theory of
Elementary Waves list.)
>
> > AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> > qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> > valid distinction.
> >
> > We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> > color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> > spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> > by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> > perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> > Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> > arbitrary or subjective.
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman
I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
>
It is not a great advance in philosophy to say that "every perception is
perceived." Then she adds that it is perceived by some means or other.
That doesn't say much either because she doesn't mention what that
means is.
Wow, gee, we're really far ahead of the rest of humanity: perception
is perceived, and perceived -- by some means!
What really gives this "stuff" any meaning? Mrs. O'Connor
tried to pass herself off as an intellectual warrior fending off and
defeating single-handedly subjectivists, platonists, kantians, etc.
But once that is abstracted out, her actual, raw claims appear to take
on much less import.
> So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
> qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
> since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
> "metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
> such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism
which
> comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of
direct
> realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and
claiming
> that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
>
The metaphysics you mention is the implicit ontology noted by Ryan.
But what is this ontology? An answer to the problem of Universals brought
up by Mrs. O'Connor on page 1. That answer is: Universals are real,
Platonic Realism.
That is not exactly direct realism. Is lengthness all in our heads, or "out
there"? My analysis reveals that, for Mrs. O'Connor, we *intuit*
lengthness. That is to say, we cognize it without any means of
cognition whatsoever. Yes, we do manage to form the concept of
length, but that is only for purposes of cognitive efficiency, or as
she said, efficacy (which is not the same thing).
On page 2 of ITOE Mrs. O'Connor emphasizes the importance of her
answer to the Problem of Universals to human survival. But what does
it boil down to but the *belief* in the necessity of cognitive efficacy,
the belief that we are not (according to her analysis) intuitionists and
Platonic Realists, but rather Aristotelian (with reservations). And in this
she means a belief that cognitive efficacy is important to human survival.
That is pragmatic compared to her (implicit) story of the actual reality
of human knowledge, and that is, we can know things, implicitly, without
any effort whatsoever. Now perhaps that knowledge is uncategorized,
unclassified, and unlabeled, perhaps it is not in the little mental file
folders that enable cognitive efficacy to occur. But it is still knowledge,
and it remains a fact that, for Mrs. O'Connors, men are intuiting beings
who are rational only out of practical necessity.
> > Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> > not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> > of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> > perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says
that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to
reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
>
Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her "stuff."
Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
"Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
(implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
> > Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> > function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> > duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> > to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> > [LP, OPAR, 47]
>
> I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
> Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
> person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
> (representation) take us?
>
The apple is still a processed apple when it attains to conscious awareness
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v7cU8.133421$zh2.29...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> > distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> > object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> > to say that.
>
> Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
> mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
According to Scott Ryan, "Prof C" is Nicholas Bykovitz, whoever
that is. (I think the last name should be "Bykovetz." Somebody by
that name has posted to the Yahoo group TEWLIP, the Theory of
Elementary Waves list.)
>
> > AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> > qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> > valid distinction.
> >
> > We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> > color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> > spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> > by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> > perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> > Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> > arbitrary or subjective.
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman
I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
>
It is not a great advance in philosophy to say that "every perception is
perceived." Then she adds that it is perceived by some means or other.
That doesn't say much either because she doesn't mention what that
means is.
Wow, gee, we're really far ahead of the rest of humanity: perception
is perceived, and perceived -- by some means!
What really gives this "stuff" any meaning? Mrs. O'Connor
tried to pass herself off as an intellectual warrior fending off and
defeating single-handedly subjectivists, platonists, kantians, etc.
But once that is abstracted out, her actual, raw claims appear to take
on much less import.
> So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
> qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
> since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
> "metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
> such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism
which
> comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of
direct
> realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and
claiming
> that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
>
The metaphysics you mention is the implicit ontology noted by Ryan.
But what is this ontology? An answer to the problem of Universals brought
up by Mrs. O'Connor on page 1. That answer is: Universals are real,
Platonic Realism.
That is not exactly direct realism. Is lengthness all in our heads, or "out
there"? My analysis reveals that, for Mrs. O'Connor, we *intuit*
lengthness. That is to say, we cognize it without any means of
cognition whatsoever. Yes, we do manage to form the concept of
length, but that is only for purposes of cognitive efficiency, or as
she said, efficacy (which is not the same thing).
On page 2 of ITOE Mrs. O'Connor emphasizes the importance of her
answer to the Problem of Universals to human survival. But what does
it boil down to but the *belief* in the necessity of cognitive efficacy,
the belief that we are not (according to her analysis) intuitionists and
Platonic Realists, but rather Aristotelian (with reservations). And in this
she means a belief that cognitive efficacy is important to human survival.
That is pragmatic compared to her (implicit) story of the actual reality
of human knowledge, and that is, we can know things, implicitly, without
any effort whatsoever. Now perhaps that knowledge is uncategorized,
unclassified, and unlabeled, perhaps it is not in the little mental file
folders that enable cognitive efficacy to occur. But it is still knowledge,
and it remains a fact that, for Mrs. O'Connors, men are intuiting beings
who are rational only out of practical necessity.
> > Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> > not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> > of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> > perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says
that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to
reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
>
Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her "stuff."
Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
"Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
(implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
> > Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> > function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> > duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> > to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> > [LP, OPAR, 47]
>
> I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
> Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
> person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
> (representation) take us?
>
The apple is still a processed apple when it attains to conscious awareness
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v7cU8.133421$zh2.29...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> > distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> > object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> > to say that.
>
> Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
> mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
According to Scott Ryan, "Prof C" is Nicholas Bykovitz, whoever
that is. (I think the last name should be "Bykovetz." Somebody by
that name has posted to the Yahoo group TEWLIP, the Theory of
Elementary Waves list.)
>
> > AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> > qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> > valid distinction.
> >
> > We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> > color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> > spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> > by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> > perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> > Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> > arbitrary or subjective.
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman
I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
>
It is not a great advance in philosophy to say that "every perception is
perceived." Then she adds that it is perceived by some means or other.
That doesn't say much either because she doesn't mention what that
means is.
Wow, gee, we're really far ahead of the rest of humanity: perception
is perceived, and perceived -- by some means!
What really gives this "stuff" any meaning? Mrs. O'Connor
tried to pass herself off as an intellectual warrior fending off and
defeating single-handedly subjectivists, platonists, kantians, etc.
But once that is abstracted out, her actual, raw claims appear to take
on much less import.
> So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
> qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
> since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
> "metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
> such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism
which
> comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of
direct
> realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and
claiming
> that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
>
The metaphysics you mention is the implicit ontology noted by Ryan.
But what is this ontology? An answer to the problem of Universals brought
up by Mrs. O'Connor on page 1. That answer is: Universals are real,
Platonic Realism.
That is not exactly direct realism. Is lengthness all in our heads, or "out
there"? My analysis reveals that, for Mrs. O'Connor, we *intuit*
lengthness. That is to say, we cognize it without any means of
cognition whatsoever. Yes, we do manage to form the concept of
length, but that is only for purposes of cognitive efficiency, or as
she said, efficacy (which is not the same thing).
On page 2 of ITOE Mrs. O'Connor emphasizes the importance of her
answer to the Problem of Universals to human survival. But what does
it boil down to but the *belief* in the necessity of cognitive efficacy,
the belief that we are not (according to her analysis) intuitionists and
Platonic Realists, but rather Aristotelian (with reservations). And in this
she means a belief that cognitive efficacy is important to human survival.
That is pragmatic compared to her (implicit) story of the actual reality
of human knowledge, and that is, we can know things, implicitly, without
any effort whatsoever. Now perhaps that knowledge is uncategorized,
unclassified, and unlabeled, perhaps it is not in the little mental file
folders that enable cognitive efficacy to occur. But it is still knowledge,
and it remains a fact that, for Mrs. O'Connors, men are intuiting beings
who are rational only out of practical necessity.
> > Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> > not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> > of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> > perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says
that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to
reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
>
Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her "stuff."
Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
"Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
(implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
> > Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> > function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> > duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> > to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> > [LP, OPAR, 47]
>
> I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
> Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
> person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
> (representation) take us?
>
The apple is still a processed apple when it attains to conscious awareness
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v7cU8.133421$zh2.29...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> > distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> > object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> > to say that.
>
> Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
> mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
According to Scott Ryan, "Prof C" is Nicholas Bykovitz, whoever
that is. (I think the last name should be "Bykovetz." Somebody by
that name has posted to the Yahoo group TEWLIP, the Theory of
Elementary Waves list.)
>
> > AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> > qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> > valid distinction.
> >
> > We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> > color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> > spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> > by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> > perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> > Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> > arbitrary or subjective.
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman
I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
>
It is not a great advance in philosophy to say that "every perception is
perceived." Then she adds that it is perceived by some means or other.
That doesn't say much either because she doesn't mention what that
means is.
Wow, gee, we're really far ahead of the rest of humanity: perception
is perceived, and perceived -- by some means!
What really gives this "stuff" any meaning? Mrs. O'Connor
tried to pass herself off as an intellectual warrior fending off and
defeating single-handedly subjectivists, platonists, kantians, etc.
But once that is abstracted out, her actual, raw claims appear to take
on much less import.
> So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
> qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
> since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
> "metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
> such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism
which
> comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of
direct
> realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and
claiming
> that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
>
The metaphysics you mention is the implicit ontology noted by Ryan.
But what is this ontology? An answer to the problem of Universals brought
up by Mrs. O'Connor on page 1. That answer is: Universals are real,
Platonic Realism.
That is not exactly direct realism. Is lengthness all in our heads, or "out
there"? My analysis reveals that, for Mrs. O'Connor, we *intuit*
lengthness. That is to say, we cognize it without any means of
cognition whatsoever. Yes, we do manage to form the concept of
length, but that is only for purposes of cognitive efficiency, or as
she said, efficacy (which is not the same thing).
On page 2 of ITOE Mrs. O'Connor emphasizes the importance of her
answer to the Problem of Universals to human survival. But what does
it boil down to but the *belief* in the necessity of cognitive efficacy,
the belief that we are not (according to her analysis) intuitionists and
Platonic Realists, but rather Aristotelian (with reservations). And in this
she means a belief that cognitive efficacy is important to human survival.
That is pragmatic compared to her (implicit) story of the actual reality
of human knowledge, and that is, we can know things, implicitly, without
any effort whatsoever. Now perhaps that knowledge is uncategorized,
unclassified, and unlabeled, perhaps it is not in the little mental file
folders that enable cognitive efficacy to occur. But it is still knowledge,
and it remains a fact that, for Mrs. O'Connors, men are intuiting beings
who are rational only out of practical necessity.
> > Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> > not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> > of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> > perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says
that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to
reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
>
Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her "stuff."
Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
"Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
(implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
> > Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> > function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> > duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> > to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> > [LP, OPAR, 47]
>
> I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
> Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
> person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
> (representation) take us?
>
The apple is still a processed apple when it attains to conscious awareness
Malenor
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:v7cU8.133421$zh2.29...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> "Ian Campbell" <idcam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ac01e8f2.02062...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Prof. C: I have a question about the primary-secondary quality
> > distinction. A quality like bitterness is not an attribute of an
> > object, but it is caused by an attribute. At least I would be tempted
> > to say that.
>
> Note the pofessor's timidity. He is insecure of his opinion. The kind of
> mind that looks for a wiser person from whom to absorb.
According to Scott Ryan, "Prof C" is Nicholas Bykovitz, whoever
that is. (I think the last name should be "Bykovetz." Somebody by
that name has posted to the Yahoo group TEWLIP, the Theory of
Elementary Waves list.)
>
> > AR: I would not accept the distinction of primary and secondary
> > qualities, because it leads you into enormous pitfalls. It is not a
> > valid distinction.
> >
> > We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say the
> > color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of the
> > spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality
> > by means of the structure of the eye. But then ask yourself: don't we
> > perceive all attributes by our means of perceptionincluding length?
> > Everything we perceive is the result of our processing, which is not
> > arbitrary or subjective.
> > The primary-secondary quality distinction is a long philosophical
> > tradition which I deny totally. Because there isn't a single aspect,
> > including length or spatial extension, which is perceived by us
> > without means of perception. Everything we perceive is perceived by
> > some means.
> > [ITOE Appendix, P279]
>
>
> Unsupported assertion but I would stand up and applaud. If I were a woman
I
> would give her a standing ovulation. I do not think that there is a word
> written there with which Kant would not agree, if she did not sneak in the
> clause "...our processing, which is not...subjective". She admits that
> everything is perceived, but then she ruins it by glossing over the
> representational implications of that view and ignoring the subjectivity
> that vitiates the processing (conceptualization).
>
It is not a great advance in philosophy to say that "every perception is
perceived." Then she adds that it is perceived by some means or other.
That doesn't say much either because she doesn't mention what that
means is.
Wow, gee, we're really far ahead of the rest of humanity: perception
is perceived, and perceived -- by some means!
What really gives this "stuff" any meaning? Mrs. O'Connor
tried to pass herself off as an intellectual warrior fending off and
defeating single-handedly subjectivists, platonists, kantians, etc.
But once that is abstracted out, her actual, raw claims appear to take
on much less import.
> So you are saying that non-Objectivist direct realists believe in primary
> qualities. In away what Rand is saying is that all qualities are primary,
> since she is a realist. But in other contexts she differentiates between
> "metaphysical" properties such as size and extension and "epistemological"
> such as measurements. I think that it all boils down to direct realism
which
> comes in various flavors. There is no denying that it is some form of
direct
> realism. Of course you are making the point of distinctiveness and
claiming
> that indeed there is an Objectivist epistemology. I only asked. :-)
>
The metaphysics you mention is the implicit ontology noted by Ryan.
But what is this ontology? An answer to the problem of Universals brought
up by Mrs. O'Connor on page 1. That answer is: Universals are real,
Platonic Realism.
That is not exactly direct realism. Is lengthness all in our heads, or "out
there"? My analysis reveals that, for Mrs. O'Connor, we *intuit*
lengthness. That is to say, we cognize it without any means of
cognition whatsoever. Yes, we do manage to form the concept of
length, but that is only for purposes of cognitive efficiency, or as
she said, efficacy (which is not the same thing).
On page 2 of ITOE Mrs. O'Connor emphasizes the importance of her
answer to the Problem of Universals to human survival. But what does
it boil down to but the *belief* in the necessity of cognitive efficacy,
the belief that we are not (according to her analysis) intuitionists and
Platonic Realists, but rather Aristotelian (with reservations). And in this
she means a belief that cognitive efficacy is important to human survival.
That is pragmatic compared to her (implicit) story of the actual reality
of human knowledge, and that is, we can know things, implicitly, without
any effort whatsoever. Now perhaps that knowledge is uncategorized,
unclassified, and unlabeled, perhaps it is not in the little mental file
folders that enable cognitive efficacy to occur. But it is still knowledge,
and it remains a fact that, for Mrs. O'Connors, men are intuiting beings
who are rational only out of practical necessity.
> > Consciousness, to repeat, is a faculty of awareness; as such, it does
> > not create its content or even the sensory forms in which it is aware
> > of that content. Those forms in any instance are determined by the
> > perceiver's physical endowment interacting with external entities in
> > accordance with causal law. The source of sensory form is thus not
> > consciousness, but existential fact independent of consciousness;
> > i.e., the source is the metaphysical nature of reality itself. In this
> > sense, everything we perceive, including those qualities that depend
> > on man's physical organs, is "out there."
> > [LP, OPAR, 46]
>
> As I read it quickly, up until the last sentence it's garden variety
> realism. I love it. However in the last sentence she becomes a direct
> realist. She does not say (with physiologists) that what we experience
> corresponds to and is elicited exactly by something out there. She says
that
> color, sound, odor, taste, etc are out there. This is poetry. Philosophy
> should not contradict science. One would need a mighty argument to
reconcile
> that with the facts as they are understood by neurophysiologists.
> I do not find a difference with other forms of direct realism.
>
Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her "stuff."
Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
"Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
(implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
> > Consciousness is not a faculty of reproduction, but of perception. Its
> > function is not to create and then study an inner world that
> > duplicates the outer world. Its function is directly to look outward,
> > to perceive that which existsand to do so by a certain means.
> > [LP, OPAR, 47]
>
> I do not see anything other than direct realism in the above quotes.
> Everybody accepts "representation". Everybody knows what happens when a
> person looses consciousness. The crucial question is how far does it
> (representation) take us?
>
The apple is still a processed apple when it attains to conscious awareness
Malenor
> As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
> observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
>
The primary qualities are sight and sound. The secondary qualities are
touch, smell and taste.
Malenor
> As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
> observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
>
Malenor
> As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
> observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
>
Malenor
> As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
> observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
>
Malenor
> As I understand the matter, secondary qualities occur only in direct
> observation. Primary qualities are usually (always?) observed indirectly.
>
Ian Campbell
neo.rr.com>...
> That is not what I have in mind when I think of "representationalism". Of
> course I am not well up on the applicable jargon. By my understanding your
> characterization of it is wrong on both counts. My concept is closer to
> Kant's. The perception is valid all the time because every aspect of it
> corresponds exactly to some aspect of the object. For example color
> corresponds exactly to a very specific electromagnetic emission and odor
> corresponds exactly to structural aspects of specific free molecules.
> However a perfect copy is impossible because we can not visualize
> electromagnetic emissions as such, nor molecules in terms of their
> structure. This is also what Rand says in her quote, and the only difference
> is the deductions that we make from such stipulations.
OK - it seems I don't understand representationalism correctly.
I probably shouldn't have tried to compare OBJ to something I didn't
understand.
The original post was about whether OBJ was based on DR and I just
wanted to point out that OBJ has representations, but its own reason
for considering them valid.
I agree with Kant that we can't have perfect knowledge about an object
(omniscience is an artificial standard to apply to human beings) but
what we DO know is valid.
> You need to make a stronger case. It occurs to me that subjectivity has
> identity and so do mistaken concepts. Of course I am not quite sure of what
> you mean, nor I am aware that Rand explained it in those terms. What you
> postulate does not follow from the quotes that you offered. Rand is quite
> dogmatic about our ability to commune with reality.
Subjectivity and mistaken concepts are both "in here" - in
consciousness.
The percepts we were discussing are "out there".
I think I am interpreting Rand correctly. She says "Existence is
Identity, Consciousness is Identification"
That is, consciousness is concepts. Identifying and classifying
percepts. The actual means by which the percepts appear which
consciousness then identifies and classifies, is all "out there".
The items you see in front of you at the moment are in your brain,
which is out there. Your consciousness watches, and identifies.
The things you see are mental existents, sensory representations. Out
there with them are the primary existents - a.k.a. entities which are
interacting with your means of perception right now totally
independently from your consciousness.
If this seems wrong to you, then what is your understanding?
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
George Dance
newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> (One of these copies will surely make it)> news:6312c50b.02063...@posting.google.com...
> > > All this is brought up in Ryan's e-book, concerning Mrs. O'Connor's
> implicit
> > > ontology, her implicit answer to the problem of universals. One of his
> best
> > > comments concerns the fact that if measurement is the sine qua non of
> > > concept-formation, then how did we come to form the concept of
> > > measurement? Which measurements did we omit to form the CCD for
> > > measurement?
> >
> > Primitive man probably began by comparing the lengths of some things
> > to the length of his hands, some things to his feet, and some things
> > to his stride. When he ommitted the idea of units - grasping that he
> > could use any of these things in any case, then he had an abstract
> > concept of 'measurement' (which he could later apply to other
> > properties than length).
> >
> I'm sure that's the way it all began, the comparison of all other things
> to themselves ("man is the measure of all things"). The problem comes
> when you say "he omitted the idea of units." Do you recall the definition
> of "unit"?: "An existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two
> or more similar members." Once you abstract away the (implicit) concept of
> "unit," you have lost the ability to differentiate and integrate, to
> *classify* things (regarded as units) and form concepts.
I'm not saying that man omits the idea of using units when measuring,
just in forming an abstract concept of 'measurement' (which was Ryan's
puzzler). I'm sure that man existed for a long time, measuring the
lengths of things with his feet and the height of things with his
hands (independently of his classifying them in *other* ways).
Acquiring an abstract concept of 'measurement' would mean recognizing
that hands could be used to measure length, and feet to measure
height. Abstracting out these units does not pose the difficulty you
worry about, as those were previously abstracted in - there are no
actual feet in my dining room floor, for instance - but it is
something that has to be learned and justified by experience; most
likely those who first used their hands to measure length were
accused, by their more metaphysically-minded neighbours, of committing
a 'category error.'
> You can't have measurement
> without units to measure -- but you can't have the implicit concept of
> "unit" without particular measurements to omit. It's a catch 22.
Suppose a newborn baby has neither concept - is it possible for him to
acquire them? He does have two hands, which appear to him to be the
same and function the same. Your argument, I take it, is that in such
a case it would be impossible for the baby to ever have an idea that
(expressed in English, would be) "here are two hands", because he
cannot have the concept 'hand' without omitting the concept 'two,' and
vice versa. Is that right?
snip
> > Ethical individualism or moral libertarianism - the belief that every
> > individual can rightfully do what he chooses (providing...) - is in
> > fact identical to what Rand called 'rational' (and earlier
> > philosophers called 'enlightened') self-interest. Rand of course did
> > not 'simply conflate' selfishness or self-interest with "rational
> > selfishness," but spent quite a bit of time arguing for the latter
> > concept.
>
> Acar's point was: she conflated individualism with egoism (which last
> is for Rand synonymous with rational selfishness). The Ayn Rand
> Lexicon indicates that "individualism" is the political application
> of "egoism," a moral theory. So Acar had it backwards: the deductive
> chain leads from egoism to individualism (but there is a great deal
> of inductive reasoning involved in this chain too, perhaps moreso than
> the deductive).
Maybe we are using the word 'individualism' to mean different things.
I've given a definition informally, and don't mind making it more
explicit:
"By ethical individualism I mean the view that the proper and
appropriate goal each human being's choices and actions is his own
wellbeing." (Mack, "Individualism, Rights, and the Open Society," /The
Libertarian Alternative/, Nelson 1974, 21).
I don't see any difference myself between this concept, and Rand's
concept of 'rational selfishness'; what do you see as the differences
between them that Rand is ignoring by 'conflating' them?
> > > Just the same, Ryan shows
> > > how she conflated "concept" with "universal" as if there were literally
> > > no difference, without any argument or questioning whatsoever.
> >
> > Rand did claim specifically that: (1) properties (which is what
> > mind-independent universals are) are not entities; and (2) only
> > entities actually exist. That's a claim rather than an argument, but
> > it's not a mere 'conflation' either.
>
> I don't recall her claiming that only entities exist and not their
> properties.
"(Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the
characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities;
relationships are relationships among entities.)" (ITOE 1967, 19)
> However, I'm not sure what that has to do with her
> conflation of "concept" with "universal": "But concepts are abstractions
> or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular, concrete"
> (ITOE, 1).
> This quote is impossible to understand because it contains one of
> Mrs. O'Connor's typical "riders": an abstraction is a universal, or
> an abstraction *can be* a universal, or a universal *can be* an
> abstraction and not vice versa, or a concept is a universal sometimes
> and an abstraction other times, or...
To me the statement looks perfectly straightforward: a universal is an
abstraction - they're two words for the same thing, the general class
in which concepts belong.
It's one thing to say that the statement is not sufficiently rigorous
(in 'concepts are universals', is the 'are' the plural 'is' of
identity, or the 'is' of classification?), but yet another to infer
that Rand was aiming for ambiguity (which sounds like your complaint
here).
> The point is, in so declaring the problem of universals solved (by,
> I submit, declaring it a non-issue), she falls back on the same old trick
> of conflating various philosophical terms without the benefit of first
> defining them for her reader, and doing so in a manner that can be
> interpreted, or equivocated, many different ways.
First off, every philosopher I've read who has pronounced on what
universals are apparently believes that the problem - the question of
whether universals exist in addition to particular things - has been
solved, and that what he believes is the solution. I don't think it's
odd that Rand believed the same about her belief.
Second, I don't see that it was any part of Rand's aim to express her
beliefs so that they had to be 'interpreted, or equivocated, many
different ways." If she had so little confidence in her beliefs that
she had to deliberately equivocate about them (as Ryan comes close to
charging) or intentionally fudge them (as other philosophers like
Huemer have charged), why would she bother with expressing them in the
first place?
> But it seems she has conflated "abstraction" with "universal" because
> the rest of the book involves only the problem of concept-formation,
> of abstractions from abstractions (higher concepts from lower concepts),
> so it appears that she has, like I said, simply dropped the whole idea
> of a "universal" and replaced it with the ideas of "concept" and
> "abstraction." And both of the latter can be considered the same
> idea considered from different contexts. A concept is formed by
> abstraction, so apparently the mental product is also an abstraction
> when seen in terms of this process, according to Mrs. O'Connor.
> And the whole idea of a "universal" has been dispensed with.
Let's go back to the baby in his crib, checking out his hands. Is it
necessary, for him to believe that his two hands are similar, for him
to be aware of only two things (the hands), or must he also be aware
of a third thing? Ryan's belief is that the baby's belief that his
hands are similar requires postulating the existence of a third
mind-independent thing or entity- handness in itself - because only
that awareness of handness (whether perceptual or a priori; it wasn't
clear to me which view he supports) makes it possible for the baby to
recognize similarity in his hands.
Rand's claim was also that this perception of similarity required of a
third thing, but for her that would have been a third particular -
something that was not a hand: By seeing that his right hand is
different from his belly button, and his left hand is also different
from his belly button, and that his left hand is not different from
his left hand in the ways that it differs from his belly button, the
baby can come to believe that his hands are similar.
That does dispense with the need to hypothesize a mind-independent
thing or entity called 'handness', but not by conflation or (IOW) mere
equivocation.
> > I don't remember Rand ever using a word like 'implicit concept'.
>
> ITOE, page 3: "[The concept of an existent] is implicit in every percept...
> and man grasps it *implicitly* on the perceptual level -- i.e., he grasps
> the constituents of the concept 'existent,' the data which are later to be
> integrated by that concept. It is this implicit knowledge that permits his
> consciousness to develop further." ... "The (implicit) concept 'existent'
> undergoes three stages of development in man's mind..." and so on.
OK; Rand's claim, as I read it here, is apparently that a baby has
enough information to analytically infer the concepts of 'existent' et
al at some later date.
> > IIRC, she referred to concepts like "Existence" as /axiomatic,/ and
> > declared that they were inferred from perception, or from experience -
> > not one word about intuitions.
> >
> Ryan pointed out that "existence" (and the other axiomatic concepts)
> are not concepts at all. They were not formed by a process of
> integration and differentiation, only by integration. One integrates all
> existents into one grand "concept" "existence," that subsumes all
> existents -- but there is nothing to differentiate the "concept" against.
I don't see that at all. Certainly a child is capable of recognizing
a difference between eg the candy in his hand, and the candy that he's
just eaten: the one exists and the other does not. If he's capable of
dividing the objects of thought between 'existing' ones and
'non-existing' in this way, he already has a differentiated concept of
'existence', which he is certainly capable over time of integrating
into one of existence (or, 'all the existing things').
> "Concepts are not and cannot be formed in a vacuum; they are formed
> in a context" (ITOE, 55). Then what is the wider context of "existence"?
Experience of particular things coming into or going out of existence;
ie, existing at one time and not at another.
> Furthermore, Mrs. O'Connor herself has declared that these axioms
> are only implicit concepts, and must remain implicit, that is, on the
> perceptual level.
That sounds wrong; you just quoted her as saying that the concept was
'later integrated' and 'developed'. (Which she goes on to say is done
by 'grasping the similarities and differences of their identities'.)
> We cannot integrate a concept such as "existence,"
> there is too much to reality.
Well, we can't say much about existence beyond tautologies such
'existence exists'
> Then how does she derive the "concept"
> of "existence"? She doesn't. There is no way to derive it.
> "[An axiomatic
> concept] is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced,
> * which requires no proof or explanation *, but on which all proofs or
> explanations rest" (ITOE, 73; emphasis mine).
"Which requires no proof or explanation" does seem a bit arbitrary;
but if it's true (which it is) that proofs or explanations require
foundational axioms, then it is impossible to prove or explain the
axioms themselves (as any proof or explanation would have to be
circular). That's a generic problem of all foundationalist
epistemologies (including, I suspect, Ryan's); and Rand was a
foundationalist.
> Therefore, in Mrs.
> O'Connor's own terms, these "axiomatic concepts" are not concepts
> per se, or else something has got to change in her epistemology.
I don't see how you've shown that at all. I'm perceiving a cigarette
butt and an empty coffee cup, and remembering my perception of the
coffee that was in the cup and the cigarette previously attached to
the butt. Each of the first two is different from each of the second
two in that one has X(istence) and one does not; each of the first two
is similar to the other in that both have X; each of the second two is
similar to the other in that both do not have X. I'm inferring X from
my perceptions, in exactly the same way that I'd infer redness or
blueness from similar and different perceptions of things.
snip [sorry, oot - but I think this is a good place to break, anyway]
Acar
> Actually, it was Peikoff (LP), not Mrs. O'Connors. The statement he makes
> there is strange enough as it stands, without confusing it with her
"stuff."
>
> Note his last sentence: "In this sense, everything we perceive, including
> those qualities that depend on man's physical organs, is 'out there.'"
>
> "Qualities that depend on man's physical organs" are out there too??
> Taste is out there. Funny, I thought taste was in my mouth, or more
> precisely, on my tongue. I guess taste is out there on my tongue.
> Or is taste in my head? No. Peikoff insists on carrying on the
> (implicit) tradition of Platonic Realism.
I think that by "out there" he means "independent of consciousness". If it
were just in the tongue or even in the brain it would still be "out there".
When an alert person suddenly dies in a blue room, if the autopsy showed a
blue brain or a pertinent part of the prefrontal lobe that is blue, I might
be tempted to say that "blue" is "out there" in the brain. I'll borrow a
page from Kolker and say that the color, odor, taste, sound or tactile
sensations that a person experienced at the moment of death have never been
detected at autopsy.
Acar
five times. It looks like all of them are getting through after all.
Acar
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message >
> It's one thing to say that the statement is not sufficiently rigorous
> (in 'concepts are universals', is the 'are' the plural 'is' of
> identity, or the 'is' of classification?),
A rigorous thinker was soundly ridiculed for saying that much depends on the
meaning of "is".
:-))
malenor
is pissing me off! and you fuckers who emailed me,
Eudaimonus for instance, complaining about
flooding -- FUCK OFF!!
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6312c50b.02070...@posting.google.com...
> Malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<m9aU8.8866$FG5.728619@
> newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> > (One of these copies will surely make it)
> >
> > "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:6312c50b.02063...@posting.google.com...
>
> > > When he ommitted the idea of units - grasping that he
> > > could use any of these things in any case, then he had an abstract
> > > concept of 'measurement' (which he could later apply to other
> > > properties than length).
> > >
> I'm not saying that man omits the idea of using units when measuring,
> just in forming an abstract concept of 'measurement' (which was Ryan's
> puzzler). I'm sure that man existed for a long time, measuring the
> lengths of things with his feet and the height of things with his
> hands (independently of his classifying them in *other* ways).
> Acquiring an abstract concept of 'measurement' would mean recognizing
> that hands could be used to measure length, and feet to measure
> height. Abstracting out these units does not pose the difficulty you
> worry about, as those were previously abstracted in - there are no
> actual feet in my dining room floor, for instance - but it is
> something that has to be learned and justified by experience; most
> likely those who first used their hands to measure length were
> accused, by their more metaphysically-minded neighbours, of committing
> a 'category error.'
>
You said, "When he ommitted the idea of units... then he had an abstract
concept of measurements," but then you reiterated that this is
only done when forming an abstract concept of "measurement."
But what is omitted in the defining of "measurement" is the particular
unit of measurement (the idea of a foot or a pound), but not the idea of
units in general.
> > You can't have measurement
> > without units to measure -- but you can't have the implicit concept of
> > "unit" without particular measurements to omit. It's a catch 22.
>
> Suppose a newborn baby has neither concept - is it possible for him to
> acquire them? He does have two hands, which appear to him to be the
> same and function the same. Your argument, I take it, is that in such
> a case it would be impossible for the baby to ever have an idea that
> (expressed in English, would be) "here are two hands", because he
> cannot have the concept 'hand' without omitting the concept 'two,' and
> vice versa. Is that right?
>
Rather, is that Ryan's point? It's not my point, at any rate. I don't think
that omitting the implicit concept "two" makes any difference to the
problem.
A child doesn't know about hands until someone informs him using
the proper words, and when the child is ready for language and
forming concepts of concretes. The mother may inform the child,
"These are hands," but in the form of a game: "Where are your
hands? Where is your nose?..." Then the mother may ask,
"Where are *my* hands?" And the child may integrate the fact
through deduction that hands are hands even when they are
big mommy hands. Or perhaps the mother will have to
point out that fact, and then the child makes the connection.
Either way, the size of the hands is irrelevant relative to
the function of the hands which is determined by their form
(fingers, palm, opposable thumb, etc.). Yes, even mommies
have hands.
Ryan's point, in fact, is that in her epistemology it requires
more than one object of the same type to make the connection
and form the concept. I wrote him saying that I didn't think
this was her point at all. The child has only one nose, for instance,
but it is integrated in accordance with the concept of "parts of his
body" ("my nose, my hands, my feet...") and differentiated in
accordance with its location, form and function ("lump in the
middle of my face used for breathing through and blowing when
I have a cold").
So I disagree with Ryan on this aspect of his critique.
But then there is his point concerning measurement-omission.
This must be distinguished from the issue of counting numbers
of objects. When conceptualizing "length," the particular
measurements are omitted and only the fact of length-ness
is retained. But then Ryan asks, to paraphrase, "What was
omitted in the forming of the concept of 'measurement?'"
Surely we can comprehend and conceptualize the fact that
mommy and baby hands are still hands despite their difference
in size. How do we measure that difference? Perceptually,
that is to say, implicitly. But how do we happen to grasp the
fact that particular measurements make no difference and
thus come to form the universal concept "hand"? Blank-out.
I didn't say Mrs. O'Connor was conflating them, I only seemed to be
agreeing with Acar's idea that she did, then I argued that Acar was
wrong. For Mrs. O'Connor, ethical egoism precedes individualism,
that is, political individualism. She would have said that the latter
follows from the former, or the former entails the latter. But, unlike
libertarians, she did not conflate the two concepts.
Your quote from (Erick?) Mack is strange. "Ethical individualism"
is a phrase that clearly conflates disciplines, the ethical with the
political. But if Mack is arguing from a libertarian perspective,
I can understand that. The libertarians reduce all human life to
politics. Still, it was not Mrs. O'Connor's error, and this error
had something to do with her denunciation of libertarians.
> > > > Just the same, Ryan shows
> > > > how she conflated "concept" with "universal" as if there were
literally
> > > > no difference, without any argument or questioning whatsoever.
> > >
> > > Rand did claim specifically that: (1) properties (which is what
> > > mind-independent universals are) are not entities; and (2) only
> > > entities actually exist. That's a claim rather than an argument, but
> > > it's not a mere 'conflation' either.
> >
> > I don't recall her claiming that only entities exist and not their
> > properties.
>
> "(Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the
> characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities;
> relationships are relationships among entities.)" (ITOE 1967, 19)
>
What she was arguing against here was the Aristotelian notion that
attributes, properties (universals such as "redness") are "attached" to
entities. An entity is the sum-total of its properties, there is no "thing"
behind the properties to which the properties attach
> > However, I'm not sure what that has to do with her
> > conflation of "concept" with "universal": "But concepts are abstractions
> > or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular,
concrete"
> > (ITOE, 1).
>
> > This quote is impossible to understand because it contains one of
> > Mrs. O'Connor's typical "riders": an abstraction is a universal, or
> > an abstraction *can be* a universal, or a universal *can be* an
> > abstraction and not vice versa, or a concept is a universal sometimes
> > and an abstraction other times, or...
>
> To me the statement looks perfectly straightforward: a universal is an
> abstraction - they're two words for the same thing, the general class
> in which concepts belong.
>
> It's one thing to say that the statement is not sufficiently rigorous
> (in 'concepts are universals', is the 'are' the plural 'is' of
> identity, or the 'is' of classification?), but yet another to infer
> that Rand was aiming for ambiguity (which sounds like your complaint
> here).
>
I do not toss around the charge of "obfuscation" or some such as readily as
others. I abandoned that rhetoric after my Randroid days. It is ad hom.,
irrelevant to the actual statements which one should, according to her
own advice with regard to these issues, take very literally. But apparently
that advice was not meant to be applied back in her direction.
So does she mean that concepts are abstractions and/or universals,
or concepts are abstractions or universals, iow, "abstraction" is
synonymous with "universal." I'd guess the latter. So an abstraction
is a concept is a universal, according to Mrs. O'Connor, in terms
of identity or classification, as you will. It doesn't matter
to the argument whether "universal" is subsumed under the class
"concept," or if they are synonymous expressions. I have argued
however that "abstraction" and "concept" are just two ways of
looking at the same idea. "Abstraction" is the process which
leads to an abstraction or a concept. And Mrs. O'Connor
conflates the noun "abstraction" with the noun "universal." She
only used the term "universal" in order to contrast it with its
supposed philosophical opposite, the "particular" (or "concrete"
of perception).
Ryan asks, Does Mrs. O'Connor even understand the terms she
is applying? And that is a perfectly appropriate question to ask of
any thinker, for one should not start out assuming the other person
knows what he or she is talking about. It is best to check up on
the person's knowledge, investigate their scholarship or lack of
same.
Ryan proceeds to explain to his reader what a universal is, and then
compares this to Mrs. O'Connor's assumption that a universal
is an abstraction or a concept. "A 'universal' is any property, quality,
relation, characteristic, attribute, or what-have-you -- generally, any
'feature of reality' -- which may be identically present in diverse
contexts." He then goes on to explain the problem of universals:
whether or not these identities are really present in these diverse
contexts, or if the mind only behaves as if they are present.
Does Mrs. O'Connor bother to give us any of this information?
No. She offers her reader no background on this issue whatsoever.
She begs the question by offering a solution before she has even
spelled out the problem: a concept is an abstraction or universal.
Her preface to ITOE is more like a conclusion, a prologue,
in which she tells her reader what to believe before proving
anything -- and, as it turns out, no proof is even possible, so this
method is very understandable indeed. Simply keep those axioms
in mind (I can imagine a first-time reader thinking at that point in
the book, "what the hell are these axioms?") throughout all that
follows -- a method that works well when reading and believing
in the Bible, for instance: simply believe that the Bible is the Word
of God, because the Bible says so, and keep it in mind throughout
your reading.
That's not even to say that Mrs. O'Connor was wrong. It is only
the same old charge of dogma, a charge that sticks.
> > The point is, in so declaring the problem of universals solved (by,
> > I submit, declaring it a non-issue), she falls back on the same old
trick
> > of conflating various philosophical terms without the benefit of first
> > defining them for her reader, and doing so in a manner that can be
> > interpreted, or equivocated, many different ways.
>
> First off, every philosopher I've read who has pronounced on what
> universals are apparently believes that the problem - the question of
> whether universals exist in addition to particular things - has been
> solved, and that what he believes is the solution. I don't think it's
> odd that Rand believed the same about her belief.
>
But Mrs. O'Connor was not like other philosophers, she was the mostest
smarterest woman in mankind's history. Ask any Randroid. Ask Peikoff.
> Second, I don't see that it was any part of Rand's aim to express her
> beliefs so that they had to be 'interpreted, or equivocated, many
> different ways." If she had so little confidence in her beliefs that
> she had to deliberately equivocate about them (as Ryan comes close to
> charging) or intentionally fudge them (as other philosophers like
> Huemer have charged), why would she bother with expressing them in the
> first place?
>
Ryan is smart enough not to engage in such ad hom or polemics. Huemer,
with whom I have discussed matters in the past here on this forum (Owl),
is a far less friendly opponent of Mrs. O'Connor. But neither I nor Ryan
is claiming that Mrs. O'Connor intended to be a bad philosopher.
I see her as an uninitiated philosopher, a newbie to the field
who never matured intellectually. This hypothesis is most telling in her
claim that she solved the problem of universals, a problem that has
plagued thinkers for over 2500 years, in the space of a half-hour.
That was incredibly naive of her. It wouldn't surprise me if an 18-year-old
kid made such a claim. Amuse me perhaps, but not surprise me. But
Mrs. O'Connor was a grown woman with a college degree or two.
Even David Hume, the man with the Walt Disney metaphysics, could
have easily brushed aside her type of epistemology with a few gestures
from his skeptical perspective. But then that has been the tradition of
skepticism, to take such dogma to task.
> > But it seems she has conflated "abstraction" with "universal" because
> > the rest of the book involves only the problem of concept-formation,
> > of abstractions from abstractions (higher concepts from lower concepts),
> > so it appears that she has, like I said, simply dropped the whole idea
> > of a "universal" and replaced it with the ideas of "concept" and
> > "abstraction." And both of the latter can be considered the same
> > idea considered from different contexts. A concept is formed by
> > abstraction, so apparently the mental product is also an abstraction
> > when seen in terms of this process, according to Mrs. O'Connor.
> > And the whole idea of a "universal" has been dispensed with.
>
> Let's go back to the baby in his crib, checking out his hands. Is it
> necessary, for him to believe that his two hands are similar, for him
> to be aware of only two things (the hands), or must he also be aware
> of a third thing? Ryan's belief is that the baby's belief that his
> hands are similar requires postulating the existence of a third
> mind-independent thing or entity- handness in itself - because only
> that awareness of handness (whether perceptual or a priori; it wasn't
> clear to me which view he supports) makes it possible for the baby to
> recognize similarity in his hands.
>
Ryan is an Objective Idealist who holds that universals exist in the
mind of God. But it was not his task there to prove Objective
Idealism, only to show Mrs. O'Connor's inconsistencies, even her
own Idealism: "If I am right that Rand's explicitly 'nominalist/empiricist'
epistemology actually depends on a good deal of implicit 'objective
idealism,' then readers who reject objective idealism will have to
reject Objectivism as well." This Idealism is necessary to span the
seemingly unbridgeable gulf between perceiver and perceived, and
thus validate our knowledge as applicable to things -- thereby granting
man the cognitive efficacy Mrs. O'Connor desired.
> Rand's claim was also that this perception of similarity required of a
> third thing, but for her that would have been a third particular -
> something that was not a hand: By seeing that his right hand is
> different from his belly button, and his left hand is also different
> from his belly button, and that his left hand is not different from
> his left hand in the ways that it differs from his belly button, the
> baby can come to believe that his hands are similar.
>
In order to perceive similarity one must first have a concept of
similarity. She called such concepts "implicit." What does that really
mean? It means we perceive the units -- units? Units are conceptual.
Are we perceiving concepts or universals existing "out there"? And
how did they manage to migrate into our skulls? ("Unbridgeable gulf"
problem.)
The "implicit concept" is the bit of dogma lying at the basis of Mrs.
O'Connor's epistemology. We perceive, or, by my interpretation, we
INTUIT these concepts. How do we intuit them? Unknown. By means
of the senses? But the senses do not form concepts. What faculty of
mind is it then that intuits these concepts?
The answer is found in medieval philosophy: our ideas are in
a confused correspondence with the mind of God. (That is not my
answer; but how can Mrs. O'Connor's empiricism escape the
consequences of its own fallibility?) I say "confused" only because
we are, in Mrs. O'Connor's view, only given the raw material
for thinking, the implicit concepts, from which the rest is our own
interpretation, that is, our own seeking after the Truth which
resides in the mind of God. And no interpretation is perfect, thus
resulting in the various schools of philosophy.
But you notice how Mrs. O'Connor sweeps aside all the questions
from the old schools of thought. The problem of universals becomes
reduced to the problem of concept-formation. The problem of
"soul," an issue with endless amounts of literature surrounding it,
she sweeps aside by simply declaring, through Galt, that what you call
your soul or spirit is simply your mind. No consideration is given to
the whole debate, she has 'solved' it with a few strokes of a pen.
And yet the old questions continue to haunt those who are not
closed to them. Ryan demonstrates quite handily that Mrs. O'Connor
has swept aside nothing, except perhaps herself. She did not bother
to address the questions, she only declared them solved by her own
hand. But the problem of universals, when spelled out in its proper
form and by the use of examples, does pose a real problem not so
handily dealt with. Mrs. O'Connor can spend all day solving the
problem of conceptualization (and not very originally), and yet come
nowhere near to dealing with the very issue she brings up on page 1,
the issue that she says is so important to man's cognitive efficacy and
therefore survival.
> That does dispense with the need to hypothesize a mind-independent
> thing or entity called 'handness', but not by conflation or (IOW) mere
> equivocation.
>
So we come to the problem of how a baby (might) come to
conceive of its two hands. We must here differentiate perception
from conception, and conception from the formation of words
and language, a skill that the baby does not yet possess. What
exactly does the baby perceive? Two things? Where did the baby
get the (implicit) concept of "thing"? Does it perceive two blobs? Where did
the baby come up with the (implicit) concept of "blob"?
Mrs. O'Connor has simply projected her own adult manner of
conceiving, the fact that she already knows how to do this conceiving,
onto the mind of a child. She has taken her own concepts of things,
labeled them "(implicit) concepts," and projected them into the
mind of a child who has not yet formed them explicitly. This is
base nominalism. Then the manner we come to form the explicit
concepts -- that is just conceptualism, with a medieval twist:
Mrs. O'Connor is substituting the products of her own
conceptualization for the mind of God, and planting them into the
mind of a child as the raw material from which the rest of his
intellectual growth is to take place. That is not literally her claim,
but it is what her theory amounts to.
> OK; Rand's claim, as I read it here, is apparently that a baby has
> enough information to analytically infer the concepts of 'existent' et
> al at some later date.
>
Yet later on, you define existence in terms of non-existence. That is
quite Existentialist of you. What are the differentia for "existent"?
Non-existents? The space where an existent used to be? But no,
there is no such thing as perception without something, some
existent, to perceive. So one can speak of a particular existent
as having been removed, but not "existent" in general. And yet
it is this general form of the concept that is the concept, while
the particular form, the instantiation, of the concept, is the
perceived thing (table, chair, etc.). There is nothing in reality,
according to Mrs. O'Connor's own rules of concept-formation,
to bring us to the concept of "existent": literally, it is a concept
dependent on "nothing," or the reification of nothing, vis a vis
Existentialism.
The only way to solve this problem is to not differentiate the
concept at all, thus creating a non-concept, a word, a nominalistic
label: Existence, which is not even axiomatic except in the
loosest manner of speaking. But such looseness is not becoming
of the greatest philosopher in mankind's history. Besides, it opens
her up to criticism by those who prefer thinking to believing.
> > > IIRC, she referred to concepts like "Existence" as /axiomatic,/ and
> > > declared that they were inferred from perception, or from experience -
> > > not one word about intuitions.
> > >
> > Ryan pointed out that "existence" (and the other axiomatic concepts)
> > are not concepts at all. They were not formed by a process of
> > integration and differentiation, only by integration. One integrates all
> > existents into one grand "concept" "existence," that subsumes all
> > existents -- but there is nothing to differentiate the "concept"
against.
>
> I don't see that at all. Certainly a child is capable of recognizing
> a difference between eg the candy in his hand, and the candy that he's
> just eaten: the one exists and the other does not. If he's capable of
> dividing the objects of thought between 'existing' ones and
> 'non-existing' in this way, he already has a differentiated concept of
> 'existence', which he is certainly capable over time of integrating
> into one of existence (or, 'all the existing things').
>
Yes, Existence is conceived in terms of non-Existence, a fatal flaw
in Mrs. O'Connor's argument (such as it is).
But what we have before us, according to Mrs. O'Connor, are not
universals, but particulars, concretes (the candy, the hand). Where is
the axiomatic concept, the universal, the implicit concept?
And by "existence" Mrs. O'Connor is not referring to an attribute of
things anyway, as you imply (the candy that does not exist, i.e., has
no existence, as if existence were an attribute it possesses, and when
this attribute vanishes, so does the candy). Existence is everything that
exists, has existed, or ever will exist. Existence is the things, it is not
an attribute of things. Existence, as an "axiomatic concept," is therefore
not a universal, and by her own conflation of terms, not a concept or
an abstraction either. Nothing can come into or go out of existence,
that is to say, it cannot leave the matrix of laws that forms the universe.
It only changes its forms. But we are within that matrix of laws, and
only in thought, arbitrary thought if you will, can we pretend to
leave this matrix and conceive of such Absolute super-Ideas as
Mrs. O'Connor's axiomatic concepts by her manner of conceiving
them in terms of non-existence, that is to say, synoptically -- from
the viewpoint of God.
> > "Concepts are not and cannot be formed in a vacuum; they are formed
> > in a context" (ITOE, 55). Then what is the wider context of "existence"?
>
> Experience of particular things coming into or going out of existence;
> ie, existing at one time and not at another.
>
Things cannot come into or go out of existence. This is bordering on the
subjective -- to exist is to be perceived?
> > Furthermore, Mrs. O'Connor herself has declared that these axioms
> > are only implicit concepts, and must remain implicit, that is, on the
> > perceptual level.
>
> That sounds wrong; you just quoted her as saying that the concept was
> 'later integrated' and 'developed'. (Which she goes on to say is done
> by 'grasping the similarities and differences of their identities'.)
>
It's interesting to me how these implicit concepts permit the development
of consciousness without being brought to conscious awareness (chapter 1),
yet later on in chapter 6 she declares that there is an epistemological need
to identify them. However, reading on, she gives us no clue as to what
creates this need. It seems to me that we can get along quite well without
identifying these "cognitive integrators." Their relevance seems to be
limited
to the building of a foundational philosophy, that is, a philosophy of the
mind
in which the basic axioms are themselves grounded in *time* (temporal
measurements in general, omitting their particulars) void of space (i.e., of
spatial measurements in particular). This is nothing more than Idealism.
There is nothing in reality void of spatial measurements, there is only
our intellectual capability for abstracting them all away and reducing all
matter to the void. But this void takes on an internal reality, not
psychological but intellectual, intelligent, or perhaps Intelligent --
Existence, the sum-total of all that exists, grounded in an
all-encompassing Time in the absence of space, i.e., grounded in
nothing, in non-existence or the Ideal.
"Concepts are not and cannot be formed in a vacuum; they are
formed in a context." [ITOE, 42.]
> > We cannot integrate a concept such as "existence,"
> > there is too much to reality.
>
> Well, we can't say much about existence beyond tautologies such
> 'existence exists'
>
But it's not a tautology for Objectivism. It is an axiom designed to
protect the continuity of your concepts.
> > Then how does she derive the "concept"
> > of "existence"? She doesn't. There is no way to derive it.
>
> > "[An axiomatic
> > concept] is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or
experienced,
> > * which requires no proof or explanation *, but on which all proofs or
> > explanations rest" (ITOE, 73; emphasis mine).
>
> "Which requires no proof or explanation" does seem a bit arbitrary;
> but if it's true (which it is) that proofs or explanations require
> foundational axioms, then it is impossible to prove or explain the
> axioms themselves (as any proof or explanation would have to be
> circular). That's a generic problem of all foundationalist
> epistemologies (including, I suspect, Ryan's); and Rand was a
> foundationalist.
>
I don't know if Ryan is a foundationalist. But that which requires
no proof or explanation has traditionally been termed "dogma."
> > Therefore, in Mrs.
> > O'Connor's own terms, these "axiomatic concepts" are not concepts
> > per se, or else something has got to change in her epistemology.
>
> I don't see how you've shown that at all. I'm perceiving a cigarette
> butt and an empty coffee cup,
Ewww...
> and remembering my perception of the
> coffee that was in the cup and the cigarette previously attached to
> the butt.
Animals have the ability to remember perceptually. It is the linking
of the past and present into the *future* that is Mrs. O'Connor's
focus.
> Each of the first two is different from each of the second
> two in that one has X(istence) and one does not; each of the first two
> is similar to the other in that both have X; each of the second two is
> similar to the other in that both do not have X. I'm inferring X from
> my perceptions, in exactly the same way that I'd infer redness or
> blueness from similar and different perceptions of things.
>
Those things still have X(istence), only their form has changed.
--
Gal*n Rutl*dge's HPO Genius File --
Ac*r, J*hn Alw*y, Dav*d Friedm*n, Symm*try, Res*jinth,
Malen*r, R. Kolk*r
-- Honorable mention:
JoeOrri*n, J*rge, Winst*n H, R. Leep*r - "Others",
U. Sundar*m
malenor
Peikoff is saying that "qualities are out there." But is the red that I
experience
out there? No, light waves vibrating at a particular frequency are out
there. Is the taste of an apple out there? No, the apple is out there.
No, he does not mean "independent of consciousness": Qualities, he
says, *depend* on man's sense organs. Qualities therefore depend
on consciousness to give them reality.
Peikoff is an extraordinarily sloppy writer. He seems to want to grant
that the mind processes reality (qualities depend on the senses), then to
deny it (qualities are "out there") at the same time.
According to Scott Ryan, this is due to the Objectivists' inability to
spell out the problem of universals and give a proper answer to it.
O'Connor's ITOE tries to have it both ways: realism and nominalism
(or conceptualism, depending on where you are in the book). Ryan
points out that you also get a different answer depending on which
Objectivist you talk to, and Peikoff appears to pander to both sides,
does he not?
malenor
> By the way my reader shows your message five times and the message to Dave
> five times. It looks like all of them are getting through after all.
>
It's the moderator's fault. Blame the moderator.
Acar
When I opened this thread I was thinking of the delivery end of Objectivism
which are mainly egoism and the theory of morality. The direct realism part
appeared to be held in common with many others. However after this
discussion I am inclined to believe that Rand's approach to direct realism
is distinctive enough to be distinctively Objectivist. Therefore I no longer
question whether there is an Objectivist epistemology.
George Dance
malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0207071333.26
20a...@posting.google.com>...
> > > > > Just the same, Ryan shows
> > > > > how she conflated "concept" with "universal" as if there were
> literally
> > > > > no difference, without any argument or questioning whatsoever.
> > > >
> > > > Rand did claim specifically that: (1) properties (which is what
> > > > mind-independent universals are) are not entities; and (2) only
> > > > entities actually exist. That's a claim rather than an argument, but
> > > > it's not a mere 'conflation' either.
> > >
> > > I don't recall her claiming that only entities exist and not their
> > > properties.
> >
> > "(Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the
> > characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities;
> > relationships are relationships among entities.)" (ITOE 1967, 19)
>
> What she was arguing against here was the Aristotelian notion that
> attributes, properties (universals such as "redness") are "attached" to
> entities. An entity is the sum-total of its properties, there is no "thing"
> behind the properties to which the properties attach
That's it. Thanks to you, I've been trying to get a handle on Rand's
claims here (her argument against mind-independent universals, eg,
rather than the common-sense ones that have occurred to me; and her
claims about axiomatic concepts that we discuss later); and thanks to
you, I think I can do that.
What we've been discussing up to now is Rand's theory of concepts in
ITOE, but of course the answers are not in there; that's just her
theory of concepts, which is really just a bridge between her
metaphysics; it is the foundation for her epistemology, but in turn is
supported by the foundation of her metaphysics; and it's there we have
to look for the reasons for what she says in ITOE.
So what does Rand say in her metaphysics? Not a hell of a lot; but
enough to infer the argument. Her first claim was "Existence exists",
and her second that "Existence is identity". I'd say the first is
equivalent to the tautology, 1) "Everything that exists exists", and
the second is equivalent to two claims: 2) "Everything that exists
exists in some way" and 3) "Everything that exists in some way exists
in the way that it exists."
IOW, every fact about a thing is tautologically true of that thing, by
the Law of Identity. For example, "My wife's cat, Pixel, is black,
white, and brown," is tautologically true because Pixel *is* black,
white, and brown, so the statement is equivalent to "My wife's cat,
Pixel (which is black, white, and brown), is black, white, and brown."
In this case, the only blackness, whiteness, and brownness in evidence
are the blackness, whiteness, and brownness of Pixel; and the only
blackness, whiteness, or brownness there could ever be, would be the
the blackness, whiteness, or brownness of existing particulars or
entities. Therefore blackness, whiteness, and brownness in general
are not existing things, because they cannot be, as that would violate
the Law.)
But (I can hear Ryan et al objecting), what about the fact that
entities have not only essential properties, but accidental ones. I
go out in the sun, and my skin turns from white, to red, and finally
(I hope) to brown; how can white skin be part of my 'identity' one
day, and red part of my 'identity' the next?
I think I can infer the answer to this as well. Everything, at any
time, is exactly what it is; but it also exists in a reality, or a
state of affairs, or metaphysical context or what-have-you, that is
also exactly what it is; and the identity of everything in that state
of affairs is what determines (because it is all that can determine)
any subsequent state of affairs.
Consider, for example, this icecube in front of me. Part of its
identity is that it is solid. But it exists in a reality, a context
of other things each with their own identity - one of which is that
the room temperature is about 68F - and it is also part of the ice
cube's identity that, in an hour or so, it will not be solid but
liquid. The ice cube's identity includes both the accidental property
of being solid in this context, and liquid in the later context.
I think this is supported by (and helps make sense of, for me at
least) Rand's statement that (to paraphrase) "The Law of Causality is
the Law of Identity applied over time."
It also vindicates Peikoff's dictum that all truths are analytic as
the correct Objectivist one, by making clear that that was in fact
Rand's view of truth.
(There's a lot more in your last reply to discuss, and I'd like to
read it over; but I wanted to get this flash of insight written down
while it was fresh.)
snip
Malenor
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6312c50b.02070...@posting.google.com...
It brings a tear to my eye... *sniff* :^(
The only question is, was she truly arguing against such universals? She
does not respond to the problem there, that is, to the idea that properties
are either similar or identical between entities. She is only using a single
entity as an example.
I suppose the answer could be inferred from her example, but the point
is, she doesn't answer it.
> What we've been discussing up to now is Rand's theory of concepts in
> ITOE, but of course the answers are not in there; that's just her
> theory of concepts, which is really just a bridge between her
> metaphysics;
You didn't quite finish spanning that unbridgeable gulf. I can understand,
you were in a hurry to finish your main point.
But what does this bridge span? The relationship between concepts
and concretes. I am only arguing that this bridge is composed of
intuitions, "implicit concepts." The rest is just explaining how to make
those concepts explicit in the most efficient fashion possible.
I have never seen, however, an explanation of how these implicit
concepts make new knowledge possible.
<snip>
> Consider, for example, this icecube in front of me. Part of its
> identity is that it is solid. But it exists in a reality, a context
> of other things each with their own identity - one of which is that
> the room temperature is about 68F - and it is also part of the ice
> cube's identity that, in an hour or so, it will not be solid but
> liquid. The ice cube's identity includes both the accidental property
> of being solid in this context, and liquid in the later context.
>
> I think this is supported by (and helps make sense of, for me at
> least) Rand's statement that (to paraphrase) "The Law of Causality is
> the Law of Identity applied over time."
>
> It also vindicates Peikoff's dictum that all truths are analytic as
> the correct Objectivist one, by making clear that that was in fact
> Rand's view of truth.
>
In other words, their answer is dogmatic: truths are analytic by the
law of identity. But Peikoff fudges when he claims both that qualities
are external to us and yet dependent on our senses. Why? What
is it about their theory makes this equivocating possible? The dogma
which results from their failure to address the problem of universals.
> (There's a lot more in your last reply to discuss, and I'd like to
> read it over; but I wanted to get this flash of insight written down
> while it was fresh.)
>
I'm looking forward to it.
nednednerb
slippy descent from an altar (to crediting my reasoning ability) of
'apparent sanity.' I fought long and hard it feels of recconciling a
self- and chrono-constructed image with the -sophical gains in my
personal intellectual pursuit of philos. By yr willing, trust me now:
insight gleaned from a total war pitting my body and mind internally
against a delusional, malformed experience today really again restores
a sense of perceptual knowledge i'd thot i'd lost forever. Bear with
me, i don't know yr terminology and i use our language anyway. And
i'm still confused, as u may understand, while I rebounce up an
infinitely high cliff dropping away to my soul's 'why.'
> In our anecdote the cane is analogous to an epistemology of direct realism.
> Does the umbrella have an umbrella handle? Yes and no. Yes, because the
> device is an umbrella and the cane is its handle. No, because a cane is a
> cane, and it is not a distinctive umbrella part.
Yr words remind me of my self-enquiry. Am 'I' a part of or directly
attached to this chemical bioequilibirum in physical space acting in
obvious confluence with an underlying pattern, tho quantamechanically
spontaneous and truly absolutely a form of our guesswork (as far as
real substantiation may occur)? This is not trivial; inquiry of
consciousness seeks answers to questions vaguely similar to my
soul-wrenching conquest, especially in the issue of strict
materialist, thus direct connection from our brain->thot. So much
work for what we really are, if here at all. Disregarding absolute
determination of existence or nothing, we have and use words, so let
not the unknown deter discussion.
With yr specific analogy, i conceptualize an umbrella handle as the
shaft from which attaches or appends a climatively protective bubble
or shell. So because a cane functions according with this
selfdesignated purpose, a cane acts as an umbrella handle. Other
preconceptualizations of the cane become, to me, irrelevant in our
situational context. (given admittion that an anvil may do the trick
and we could get a handle on things or under bubbles, it hardly would
be worthwhile that way) Logically, the cane meets my umbrella handle's
requisites, thus by my license to define definite objects, the cane is
an umbrella handle. U seemed to argue that the cane, not being
designed as such and while being used for such a conceptualized
purpose, still could not BE part of the umbrella. To aimlessly
belabour the point: Techologists predesign our umbrella handles to be
efficient for mass distribution and the consumer's use (why we don't
have to attach canes or anvils to store-bought protective gear calling
our result an umbrella.) The REALITY of an umbrella handle is its
confluence to functional parameters withal the umbrella.
This may seem arbitrary, yet I feel this to reflect great importance.
Does use and result of a part not add distinction to an object,
whether designed or intended for such action?
The distinction seems to belong to yr conceptualization of categories
of knowledge.
Sorry, it gets weirder from here on out:
I implied that differentiating canes and
designed-for-umbrella-use-shafts was meaningless in an epistemological
approach. (besides in matters of use!) As far as knowing goes (not
that far observing myself, who's i guess too busy using things instead
of justifying), an object is if we deem so.
and later;
Give up yr questioning!?
ALRIGHT!! (EVERYTHING IN ITS RIGHT PLACE NOW)
ALL, RIGHT BACK INTO THE CAVE!!
U COULD HURT YRSELF OUT HERE WITH THAT!!
I suggest closing yr mind again if guestionability dissolves upon
blowing our tops.
But I'm 17, so i >local-statistically< don't have much of a clue or a
real education on these fathomously thot-out matters of unknown stuff
around me against with i tend to actively rebel anyways. (in all a
universe of planets we don't survey, still i guess i'm >probably< not
sure. i hope u can keep up.)
There could be anything u believe. That's why god is there. That's why
it awaits our entry there. That's why the big bang was there. Belief.
(concerning the exact instant of the big bang, our current equations
become impossible to reasonably and objectively solve, because of the
simultaneous intrusion of two very pesky concepts: zero((nothing)) and
infinity.) A belief corroborates yr release of doubt; i usually
subjectively assign my faith.
Is it here as well? (for now, it=Objectivist epistemology. as u
believe there is, which my subjective reasonings allow for u in a
split universe diverging from our own, the solid one)
Speaking of realism, let quantum mechanics apply. Find out about the
"sum-over-histories method," and the implications of the "double slit"
experiment that showed one thing simultaneously (while questionably)
being in two places on its journey or in one place WHEN we expect one
route. I see in these two situations an aspect of 'impossible'
plurality when not directly looking and and an aspect of decided
certainty when looking. Wheeler's newer ideas suggest to me that our
act of observing alters a sum-over-histories of any object. We
observe a certain trajectory looking and seeing an object acting in a
certain way or headed in a specific direction. When not directly
observing, it's "sum-over-histories" changes constantly because of
passage thru time (over-histories). Only within a single instant is
something certain.
Said another way, our present action unto an object alters its quantum
parameters (the WAY we perceive it real, not whether it's real).
Using a cane as an umbrella's handle alters, thru the bubble's
co-ordination with it (like observation), the cane's quantum
parameters, allowing it to become a handle. Within that single
situation (like an instant of observation,) the cane is an umbrella's
handle except as observed distinctively from the bubble. Remember
context.
Of course (like trajectory or a spontaneous sum-over-histories,) the
cane is an umbrella's handle.
Of another course (like the factory line,) the cane is NOT an
umbrella's handle.
Whether am or not, I adequately confuse u (the first goal BETWEEN
philosophers leading to more comprehensive knowledge) and hope this
hasn't totally been nonsensical and of no use to u.
Remember also I stated this discussion was meaningless, while our
words and umbrellas are not. meaningless, that is.
we can use.
Here's a poem I wrote thinking about confusing things like objectivist
epistemology:
the entities of things are like
appearances [of things] in a mirror
which do not exist there
lacking substance and form
A] These things propounded by ourselves [i.e. baseballs,etc.],
B] do not inherently exist, like a reflecta,
C] because they lack in this realm a nature of unity or plurality.
a reflecta isn't there. a surface between reflecta
and reflected stands. things r on the edg. we cant see them there, we
need 2 blur the edg n focus deepr. try a wall, u get nothing of use.
see yrself, there, from my eyes, look deep into my eyes
project nothin back ifyu can
all i want doesint compare
i need u for that, iud dy of without someone 2 bounce things off.
iul dy beside u when weir dun.
hey this is just a metaphor. i'm not really
trying to squeeze myself into yr life.
i guess it comes as a torrent of gods
2 mess this up royally!!
and make it like weir disappearing
but we can dangle, and rember we cudintiv taken it from them
i'm born again. big deal.
thanks. i forgive this now. otherwise i cant
go on.
with all my painful love,
of all (sophos) i would giv u;
we (desirers of philos) turned out
2 b more important.
this is a point i didn't
even have to make
bu nd
i sorta got confused in with a so so there.
when it didint reall e matter anymore
2 go on.
sorry, it cant be me.
lost in a word salad.
i like green.
If u wonder why i care so much about this, it's because i think u may
be hurting yrself like i did. u may not have begun questioning where
or how u fit. i find we're all that really fits. That's when we are,
that is. When we aren't, nothing with which to fit ourself really
exists. Did u know some prominent physicists think the only was to
make reality sensible is to abolish the variable and concept of
absolute time from the deeper, farther reaching equations. before and
after remain, and seconds tick by for us. but only it could never
happen because time wont begin. (see, we figured this by figuring
absolute time as a concept we developed when such a thing were
conceivable,
just like now, cos i cant know for sure anyway.
if, so.
thus, we shall continue figuring out.
why if?
be. anyway u can.
Ha! Spontaneous unbound potential!
Our choices so far: god or physical law.
Now: we cant know and aren't there to determine. Being here with no
reference or definite fate, path, reality or objectivism likely wont
become justification for annihilating useful concepts, simply because
we wont abandon our useful and cherished beliefs.
i haven't denied reality while more reasoning leans in that direction
in my attempt to show a balanced approach to objectivism. I suppose i
do object to some of modern philosophy's ideals.
We subjectively experience while objectively formalizing epistomes
into a logical framework. Whoa. Slow down.
Eudaimonus
"malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:5851837b.02070...@posting.google.com...
> I'm trying to send through Google now. This bullshit
> is pissing me off! and you fuckers who emailed me,
> Eudaimonus for instance, complaining about
> flooding -- FUCK OFF!!
For the record, this (what I mailed him) is not a complaint.
>>>>>
You are having perfect success, and posting about 3 or 4 coppies of every
post you make, all within 1-2 minutes.
You can stop now, they are getting through.
Dave O'Hearn
> You are having perfect success, and posting about 3 or 4 coppies of every
> post you make, all within 1-2 minutes.
>
> You can stop now, they are getting through.
And Malenor responds to the group:
> I'm trying to send through Google now. This bullshit is pissing me
> off! and you fuckers who emailed me, Eudaimonus for instance,
> complaining about flooding -- FUCK OFF!!
What a cheap excuse for a Kantian Malenor is. There is a CI against
lying, and any other form of misrepresentation. I don't believe being
"pissed off" allows exceptions to the CI. Does anyone care to
elaborate?
--
Dave O'Hearn
Acar
"Dave O'Hearn" <dave...@pobox.com> wrote in message
news:3e05f9e4.02071...@posting.google.com...
I do. There's a question of an excluded middle here. I've been told that
passing judgment carries a serious moral risk. If your identification is
wrong, that makes you the liar.
x
x
Malenor
"Dave O'Hearn" <dave...@pobox.com> wrote in message
news:3e05f9e4.02071...@posting.google.com...
> What a cheap excuse for a Kantian Malenor is. There is a CI against
> lying, and any other form of misrepresentation. I don't believe being
> "pissed off" allows exceptions to the CI. Does anyone care to
> elaborate?
>
Now I know who's been deliberately interfering with my ability to
post here, a deliberate attempt at censorship, followed by a lame
attempt to get others on the anti-Malenor bandwagon. And
that person is....
> --
> Dave O'Hearn
>
Malenor
"Eudaimonus" <jwsc...@insightbb.com> wrote in message
news:7x8X8.463799$352.74845@sccrnsc02...
> You are having perfect success, and posting about 3 or 4 coppies of every
> post you make, all within 1-2 minutes.
>
> You can stop now, they are getting through.
>
Hey, Eudaimonus ----
FUCK OFF!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
--
Gal*n Rutl*dge's HPO Genius File --
Ac*r, J*hn Alw*y, Dav*d Friedm*n, Symm*try, Res*jinth,
Malen*r, R. Kolk*r
-- Honorable mention:
JoeOrri*n, J*rge, Winst*n H, R. Leep*r - "Others",
U. Sundar*m
-- LOSER file:
Eudaimon*s