Conceptualization and Animals
Brad Cadle
What Specifically is Ayn Rands Stance on whether Animals Posses
intelligence or not? I was speaking with a friend who recently
discovered Ayn Rand, and he is of the viewpoint that animals cannot
conceptualize, and hence, by his definition, do not possess
intelligence. He claims as proof that no species alive today has been
able to produce an artifact based on Abstracting from reality, and has
altered its environment. His definition of intelligence appears to be
a creature's ability to conceptualize a notion and extend that notion
passed the present. He claimed that animals behave with a
Stimulus/Response psychology.
We had a short but strong disagreement here on this notion. I
supported the belief that although animals do not possess nearly the
level of intellect that humans do, some do have a limited ability to
conceptualize. In addition, I believe most mammal's behavior is more
complex than stimulus/response. After a short discussion, we
concluded that our definitions of stimulus response were different.
He was using the term in the sense of acting only in the present. I
was using the term in the sense of a mechanical reflex with no
creativity. Nonetheless, we still disagreed with about whether or not
animals conceptualize. I sited as proof of limited conceptualization
the ability for Koko the Gorilla to learn sign Language and invent new
terms, and create new sentences from existing terms. He had not heard
of Koko but still held on to his premise.
The Discussion raises quite a few issues such as:
1) What is the nature of intelligence?
2) Can Animals Conceptualize
3) What is proof of conceptualization?
Clearly, Altering the environment may not be not be enough since a
Quadriplegic can think but cannot very well alter his/her environment.
Since I have had this discussion, I checked out the Gorilla
Foundation Web Page. On it includes Paintings produced by two of the
Gorillas. They are not very sophisticated, but the Dog painting (done
from memory) and the bird painting actually contain a resemblance to
the animals. This certainly suggests an ability to conceptualize.
So I put it to you all,
What are your answers to the question's above? (Please cite
scientific studies or case examples)
Also, Since I have not read Ayn Rands works, what is her view,
and what is it based upon?
-Brad Cadle
Mark A. Peters
The claims that apes or other animals can conceptualize, based on the fact
that they can use (in a limited fashion) sign language, rests on a
misunderstanding of concepts and what the animals are actually doing.
All these animals are doing is associating one _perceptual level_ entity
with another, e.g., using a configuration of fingers to stand for a person,
an animal, a piece of fruit, etc. This is not conceptualization, which
requires forming a mental entity (a concept) standing for an open-ended
class of other entities based on fundamental similarities between the
entities and fundamental differences from everything else, and then
associating a perceptual entity (a word) to stand for that.
True conceptualization involves the ability to form such mental entities
from previously formed concepts, leading to concepts which are many levels
removed from direct perception. Observe that all the signs these animals
use have direct, perceptual referents, and they've never used signs that
don't have such referents.
The concept "intelligence" can be used loosely to mean "facility in dealing
with reality", in which case one can talk about apes being more
"intelligent" than dogs, and dogs more "intelligent" than fish. As applied
to man, however, it means "facility in the use of concepts", which is man's
method for dealing with reality.
Mark Peters
Iván Ordóñez
In article <69g9sg$924$1...@cdshub.cdc.com>, "Mark A. Peters"
<Mark.A...@cdc.com> wrote:
[...]
> All these animals are doing is associating one _perceptual level_ entity
> with another, e.g., using a configuration of fingers to stand for a person,
> an animal, a piece of fruit, etc.
Are you making this up as you go along? What these animals do is far more
complex than that. Researchers have gone to great lengths to show that
these animals are in fact using abstract reasoning.
Why is it so difficult for some people to accept, in the face of all
available evidence, the clear fact that the difference between ourselves
and the animals is mostly one of degree?
--
Iván Ordóñez
Ordonez-...@osu.edu
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
Brad Cadle
On 13 Jan 1998 17:59:42 GMT, "Mark A. Peters" <Mark.A...@cdc.com>
wrote:
>The claims that apes or other animals can conceptualize, based on the fact
>that they can use (in a limited fashion) sign language, rests on a
>misunderstanding of concepts and what the animals are actually doing.
>
>All these animals are doing is associating one _perceptual level_ entity
>with another, e.g., using a configuration of fingers to stand for a person,
>an animal, a piece of fruit, etc. This is not conceptualization, which
>requires forming a mental entity (a concept) standing for an open-ended
>class of other entities based on fundamental similarities between the
>entities and fundamental differences from everything else, and then
>associating a perceptual entity (a word) to stand for that.
>
>True conceptualization involves the ability to form such mental entities
>from previously formed concepts, leading to concepts which are many levels
>removed from direct perception. Observe that all the signs these animals
>use have direct, perceptual referents, and they've never used signs that
>don't have such referents.
>
Is the above sentence true? I understood that Koko has
Succesfully formed new signs based on old ones and has altered the
meaning of signs to reflect moods. I will check out the research.
If Koko is capable of taking the sign for Blue and changing it to mean
sad without directly being taught to use the sign would this qualify
as conceptualization?
>Mark Peters
>
>
-Brad Cadle
Brad Aisa
In article <34bae59c...@news.earthlink.net>,
Brad Cadle <bca...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>What Specifically is Ayn Rands Stance on whether Animals Posses
>intelligence or not? I was speaking with a friend who recently
>discovered Ayn Rand, and he is of the viewpoint that animals cannot
>conceptualize, and hence, by his definition, do not possess
>intelligence. He claims as proof that no species alive today has been
>able to produce an artifact based on Abstracting from reality, and has
>altered its environment. His definition of intelligence appears to be
>a creature's ability to conceptualize a notion and extend that notion
>passed the present. He claimed that animals behave with a
>Stimulus/Response psychology.
Animals most definitely do NOT comprise a "stimulus/response" psychology.
Animals, man included, project various courses of action into the future,
chose one, then pursue it via a series of intermediary steps.
The differences are primarily the vastly expanded scope afforded by the
conceptual level of consciousness. An animal can only project so far into
the future (not very), and can only conceive of concrete, perceptually
accessible actions to achieve the goal (and its subgoals). These themselves
must be relatively simple, since they must be held as perceptual units
(remember the "crow"), and can't themselves be conceptualized.
Man can retain a detailed knowledge of the causal attributes of entities,
based on his conceptual knowledge. Animals also possess knowlege of causal
attributes, but only those they have encountered (or, for which built-in
instinct may have afforded them), and again, only at a direct, perceptible
level.
The idea that animals are some kind of automaton is seemingly quite
widespread amongst Ayn Rand fans, even amongst professional
Objectivist intellectuals. However, simple introspection and observation of
animals indicates that this can't possibly be so.
The key to dealing with this entire subject, is carefully observing
animals, and comparing them to humans, and finding the common elements,
then using your (introspectively derived) knowledge of concepts and
conceptual thinking to uncover the manner in which the two differ.
At root her, is what I believe is a highly questionable formulation of
"free will" by Rand, or at least what is expressed as this idea by her
contemtemporary scholars. This is the near codefinition of "free will" and
"reason" (or conceptual thought), with the obvious corrollary that since
animals don't have reason, they therefore can't have "free will" or
"volition", and that therefore they are s/r automatons. This is a textbook
example of RATIONALISM - the attempt to substitute long chains of
if/then/if/then deductive reasoning, for solid, fact-based inductive
reasoning.
> [...] Nonetheless, we still disagreed with about whether or not
>animals conceptualize. I sited as proof of limited conceptualization
>the ability for Koko the Gorilla to learn sign Language and invent new
>terms, and create new sentences from existing terms. He had not heard
>of Koko but still held on to his premise.
>
> The Discussion raises quite a few issues such as:
>
> 1) What is the nature of intelligence?
>
> 2) Can Animals Conceptualize
>
> 3) What is proof of conceptualization?
I think what we have here, is a species on the borderline of conceptual
ability. Keep in mind the process Rand elucidated in the formation of a
concept -- some of these are semi-automatic, and apply to animals as well
as man. For example, regarding similar entities as units, and
distinguishing them from others, is something probably shared by man and
animals. Going on to label this unit with a concrete "handle" (ie., a
word), and then being able to use this concrete in a process of thought,
seems to require specialized brain features than man has, but other animals
don't. However, it is obviously possible for animals to be able to
associate some sounds with first level unit groupings.
Mark A. Peters makes the argument in his post, that although they can make
these associations with regard to first level units, they lack the ability
to continue on into more abstract realms (abstractions from abstractions).
>
> Since I have had this discussion, I checked out the Gorilla
>Foundation Web Page. On it includes Paintings produced by two of the
>Gorillas. They are not very sophisticated, but the Dog painting (done
>from memory) and the bird painting actually contain a resemblance to
>the animals. This certainly suggests an ability to conceptualize.
Conceputalize? Not according to Rand's definition.
>
>So I put it to you all,
>
>
>
> What are your answers to the question's above? (Please cite
>scientific studies or case examples)
>
> Also, Since I have not read Ayn Rands works, what is her view,
>and what is it based upon?
You should read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. It is not
lengthy, though it is extremely dense. I would recommend trying to write
your own condensations of the material, after each chapter, as the best
study aid. Also, apply her ideas to a wide variety of sample concepts, of
various degrees of abstractness and kind, so you get a fairly good concrete
feel for how the ideas apply to real concepts.
--
Brad Aisa web archive: http://www.interlog.com/~baisa/
email (anti-spam encoded): baisa"AT SYMBOL"interlog.com
*** STOP the persecution of Bill Gates and Microsoft ***
Get the facts and sign the online petition:
http://www.capitalism.org/microsoft/
Lkennon
Iván Ordóñez <Ordonez-...@osu.edu> wrote:
>Why is it so difficult for some people to accept, in the face of
>all available evidence, the clear fact that the difference between
>ourselves and the animals is mostly one of degree?
One major problem for Objectivists is that Rand _said_ that
animals are not conceptual. I think she was confused to the
extent that she thought this was a philosophical issue, and
not primarily a scientific one.
However, having said that it would appear that human beings
go through some kind of change in their mental capacities
(well, not _every_ human being, but most) at about age two
that does appear to mark a radical change between what
humans can do and what any other animal we know of can
do.
For example, I am sure you are aware of all the studies where
chimps or gorillas (or whatever primate) have been taught
to use sign language (since they don't have the proper
apparatus for real speech). Clearly beyond any shadow of
a doubt these are conceptual beings. But they don't appear
to go through that radical change (whatever it exactly is)
that human beings do and never ever really approach the
capacities of a normal human being. If the difference between
us and animals is a matter of degree, then it appears from the
evidence that there is a very sharp "ramp up" of human
abilities at about age two that no other animal we know of
experiences. The "ramp up" is so great that it almost appears
to be a difference of kind, not just degree, but of course it
will take a lot more research and understanding of intelligence
per se before we really understand it.
regards,
lk
Iván Ordóñez
In article <34bc3425...@news.earthlink.net>, Brad Cadle
<bca...@earthlink.net> wrote:
[...] I understood that Koko has
> Succesfully formed new signs based on old ones and has altered the
> meaning of signs to reflect moods.
Yes, that's correct. She has done that and more, which remove beyond any
reasonable doubt the possibility that she is not using language the same
way we do (keeping proportions).
[...]
> If Koko is capable of taking the sign for Blue and changing it to mean
> sad without directly being taught to use the sign would this qualify
> as conceptualization?
Yes, it does. Same with other animals who have achieved equally impressive
feats, one of them being a parrot!
--
Ivan Ordonez
iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (finger for PGP public key)
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
Mark A. Peters
> I understood that Koko has
>Succesfully formed new signs based on old ones and has altered the
>meaning of signs to reflect moods. I will check out the research.
>If Koko is capable of taking the sign for Blue and changing it to mean
>sad without directly being taught to use the sign would this qualify
>as conceptualization?
Forming signs based on earlier signs isn't necessarily an act of
conceptualization. An animal with a very keen perceptual ability (like an
ape) can no doubt observe many _perceptual_ similarities and differences
between perceptual entities, including signs it has already learned. As
well, taking note of "moods" is also an act of perception, not conception,
as is learning to associate a sign with a mood.
The key test to apply to any alleged conceptual ability of an animal is to
ask: "Can this behavior be explained in purely perceptual terms, or is
possession of a conceptual faculty the only possible explanation?" Clearly,
this question cannot be answered by a researcher who doesn't himself have a
solid grasp of what a concept is and how they are formed. The ape language
research I've read about and seen in documentaries didn't include even a
cursory concern for this question.
Mark Peters
DEFanyo
Lkennon wrote:
>
> Iván Ordóñez <Ordonez-...@osu.edu> wrote:
>
> >Why is it so difficult for some people to accept, in the face of
> >all available evidence, the clear fact that the difference between
> >ourselves and the animals is mostly one of degree?
>
> One major problem for Objectivists is that Rand _said_ that
> animals are not conceptual. I think she was confused to the
> extent that she thought this was a philosophical issue, and
> not primarily a scientific one.
She _had_ to. It's part and parcel of a cluster of ideas underlying
her ideal man : man has no instincts; man is master of all he surveys
(see Genesis); all of nature is for the use of man -- and, conversely,
man is independent (Jim will make his own air...:). Man is different
in kind.
Man is defined (anciently) as a rational animal. If other animals are
rational to any degree, then "rational" is no longer identifying.
Man has no instincts, she said, categorically. That idea falsely
separates man from all other programmed or partially programmed living
things. We are indeed partially programmed.
I have been unable to decide where Rand places man in the scheme of
things; perhaps she doesn't at all, except to place him in a pinnacle,
though a pinnacle of what I don't know. To her, he's obviously not a
fallen angel, for that calls for a supernatural kingdom. On the other
hand, for her, he's not a risen ape, either. Which leaves him in
limbo -- separated and disjointed from the rest of nature.
Since man developed human language, his time sense has stretched
beyond that of any other animal. We are able to delve into the
pre-history of the human race and to see its outgrowth from all of
nature. We are able to know that, discounting a race-destroying
catastrophe, there will be a future for our children and
grand-children and great-granchildren. To deny or ignore both, to be
concerned about only now and me, is to squeeze human time-sense back
to that of my pet schnauzer.
> However, having said that it would appear that human beings
> go through some kind of change in their mental capacities
> (well, not _every_ human being, but most) at about age two
> that does appear to mark a radical change between what
> humans can do and what any other animal we know of can
> do.
Probably language, wouldn't you say? Two or three is about the age at
which a human child begins to talk in compound and complex
sentences... in other words, begins to understand and articulate
relationships. And that _is_ a big change. (Doesn't happen with
feral children.)
lawrenc...@usa.net
DEFanyo <de...@pldi.net>
>Probably language, wouldn't you say? Two or three is about the age at
>which a human child begins to talk in compound and complex
>sentences... in other words, begins to understand and articulate
>relationships. And that _is_ a big change. (Doesn't happen with
>feral children.)
As I understand it the primates that have been taught sign language
have "language". They do have language. But something (exactly
what I am not sure) happens around age two and the complexity
of
____________________________________________________________________
Get free e-mail and a permanent address at http://www.netaddress.com
Mark A. Peters
>> [ ... standard "Rand was wrong" blather deleted for space ...]
>> However, having said that it would appear that human beings
>> go through some kind of change in their mental capacities
>> (well, not _every_ human being, but most) at about age two
>> that does appear to mark a radical change between what
>> humans can do and what any other animal we know of can
>> do.
>
>Probably language, wouldn't you say? Two or three is about the age at
>which a human child begins to talk in compound and complex
>sentences... in other words, begins to understand and articulate
>relationships. And that _is_ a big change. (Doesn't happen with
>feral children.)
I truly can't fathom how some people can criticize Rand for claiming that
man is different in kind from other animals , and then turn right around and
claim themselves that man is "radically different" because of language.
For crying out loud, language is not the fundamental here - concept
formation is. Choosing a visual/auditory symbol (a word) to stand for a
mental entity is the _last step_ in concept formation. No mental entity -
nothing to attach a word to - no language. The ability to attach
pseudo-words (e.g., signs) to perceptual-level things does not imply that
there is a conceptual faculty underlying that.
The ability to form concepts is a _prerequisite_ of language. Rand said
that man is different in kind _precisely_ because he can form concepts, and
animals cannot. Given the tremendous survival value conferred by a
conceptual faculty, it is _inconceivable_ that other animals could have that
faculty, yet have never used it in the millions of years they've been on the
planet. The evidence that man has this faculty is all over the world. The
evidence that other animals have it is non-existent - literally zero.
Mark Peters
Iván Ordóñez
In article <69jfij$8ln$1...@cdshub.cdc.com>, "Mark A. Peters"
<Mark.A...@cdc.com> wrote:
> For crying out loud, language is not the fundamental here - concept
> formation is.
Language is necessary for concept formation in the way we humans (and
other animals who have acquired language) do.
> Choosing a visual/auditory symbol (a word) to stand for a
> mental entity is the _last step_ in concept formation.
On the contrary, it actually is the very first step. Read some cognitive
psychology, man. This is a scientific issue, not a philosophical one.
[...]
> The ability to form concepts is a _prerequisite_ of language.
No. Both things grow together, inextricably linked. None is a prerequisite
of the other; none is above the other.
> Rand said
> that man is different in kind _precisely_ because he can form concepts, and
> animals cannot.
Well, she was wrong, and she was arrogant when she spoke of things she
knew nothing about. ANd for such an advocate of realism, that is a mortal
sin.
> Given the tremendous survival value conferred by a
> conceptual faculty,
It is not that valuable. We evolve from simpler animals, and they survived ok.
> it is _inconceivable_ that other animals could have that
> faculty, yet have never used it in the millions of years they've been on the
> planet.
As everything in evolution, these things change gradually. Simpler animals
have the potential to develop these abilities, but only in a very
primitive form. It is valuable to them, but not as valuable as it is to
us.
> The evidence that man has this faculty is all over the world. The
> evidence that other animals have it is non-existent - literally zero.
Again, reality contradicts your words. Check your premises, man.
Lance Neustaeter
DEFanyo <de...@pldi.net> wrote:
> She _had_ to. It's part and parcel of a cluster of ideas underlying
> her ideal man : man has no instincts;
The actual position is that "instinct", as commonly used, is an
invalid concept. Man has no instincts because *no animal* has
instincts--not because of some emotional attachment to "man the
rational animal(tm)" that you are asserting. You are trying to smear
via psychologizing, which is not nice. It is even more suspicious
given the fact that I've pointed this out to you before.
> Man is defined (anciently) as a rational animal. If other animals are
> rational to any degree, then "rational" is no longer identifying.
But that is not a problem. Unless, of course, you add your unstated
yet implicit premise that Rand had some kind of emotional attachment
to "rational" necessarily being in the definition of "man". But if
you have read Rand's epistemology, you can see right there before your
eyes that her view of definitions already admits--*requires*--changing
along with one's context of knowledge. She *denied* the quest for
absolute, correct-in-all-circumstances definitions.
> Man has no instincts, she said, categorically. That idea falsely
> separates man from all other programmed or partially programmed living
> things.
That is *not* Rand's position. Repeating: The position in question is
that "instinct", as commonly used, is an invalid concept. Man has no
instincts because *no animal* has instincts. The concept is equally
invalid for (non-human) animals as it is for humans, so how can it
separate (falsely or otherwise) man from animals?
If, on the other hand, you are asserting that you think some
particular kind of animal is not only conceptual, but that concept
formation is its primary method of dealing with reality and surviving,
(the thing that, so far, actually does separate man from the others)
the burden of proof is upon you.
> I have been unable to decide where Rand places man in the scheme of
> things; perhaps she doesn't at all, except to place him in a pinnacle,
Well, a pinnacle would still be "in the scheme of things." If your
"schemes" criteria is "ability in dealing with reality" or some such,
than yes, all things considered, man should basically be at the
pinnacle. Why does this bother you? Why is "placing man in the
scheme of things" so important to you?
> though a pinnacle of what I don't know. To her, he's obviously not a
> fallen angel, for that calls for a supernatural kingdom. On the other
> hand, for her, he's not a risen ape, either. Which leaves him in
> limbo -- separated and disjointed from the rest of nature.
He's not a risen ape for Rand because she had no opinion on the
theories of origins. That is not the same as saying that she *denied*
that he was a risen ape. For Rand, man is, correctly, the rational
animal. That is neither in limbo nor at odds with the rest of nature.
All rational people do not necessarily have to have an opinion on
which theory of origins is correct--it is not a philosophical
question. Your trying to force one out of Objectivism, and that is
somewhat disingenuous.
What I'm trying to say is:
(lack of human origin theory) != (lack of philosophical categorization
and/or understanding of humans)
> Since man developed human language, his time sense has stretched
> beyond that of any other animal. We are able to delve into the
> pre-history of the human race and to see its outgrowth from all of
> nature. We are able to know that, discounting a race-destroying
> catastrophe, there will be a future for our children and
> grand-children and great-granchildren. To deny or ignore both, to be
> concerned about only now and me, is to squeeze human time-sense back
> to that of my pet schnauzer.
Right. And it is this amazing ability which would put humans at the
"pinnacle" of any kind of criteria-based ordering of organisms. Or
should I misinterpret your paragraph as stating that man is a kind of
angel because he can do this so much better than other animals?
Lance
--
The two most common things in the universe are hydrogen and stupidity.
--Harlan Ellison
Lkennon
"Mark A. Peters" <Mark.A...@cdc.com> wrote:
>I truly can't fathom how some people can criticize Rand
>for claiming that man is different in kind from other animals ,
>and then turn right around and claim themselves that man
>is "radically different" because of language.
Probably because Rand thought this was a philosophical
issue when in fact it is a scientific one. And science hasn't
come up with all the answers on the issue of the differences
between man and other animals re intellectual capabilities.
However we have Rand pontificating on the subject
as if she did have all the answers.
That is probably it.
It is unquestionably true that some higher primates can
be taught language. The scientific questions is what
happens to a 2 year old human. Is the abilities a human
aquires after 2 years of (or so) a difference only of degree,
or of kind? It is however a purely scientific issue, not a
philosophical one.
regards,
lk
Tim Starr
In article <19980116115...@ladder01.news.aol.com>,
Lkennon <lke...@aol.com> wrote:
>"Mark A. Peters" <Mark.A...@cdc.com> wrote:
>
>>I truly can't fathom how some people can criticize Rand
>>for claiming that man is different in kind from other animals ,
>>and then turn right around and claim themselves that man
>>is "radically different" because of language.
>
>Probably because Rand thought this was a philosophical
>issue when in fact it is a scientific one. And science hasn't
>come up with all the answers on the issue of the differences
>between man and other animals re intellectual capabilities.
>However we have Rand pontificating on the subject
>as if she did have all the answers.
>
>That is probably it.
>
>It is unquestionably true that some higher primates can
>be taught language.
Depends upon what you mean by "language." They can be taught some words,
but they've never been shown to form much in the way of sentences. Their
use of it pretty much consists of one or two-word answers to questions from
their trainers, at most.
"If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns. Only the police,
the secret police, the military, the hired servants of our rulers. Only the
government--and a few outlaws. I intend to be among the outlaws."
--Edward Abbey (1927-1989), _Abbey's Road,_ p.39_(Plume, 1979)
Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! Think Universally, Act Selfishly
Assistant Editor: Freedom Network News, the newsletter of The International
Society for Individual Liberty (ISIL), http://www.isil.org/
Personal home page: http://www.creative.net/~star/timstarr.htm
Liberty is the Best Policy - tims...@netcom.com
lawrenc...@usa.net
Tim Starr <tims...@netcom.com> wrote:
>Depends upon what you mean by "language." They can be
>taught some words, but they've never been shown to form
>much in the way of sentences. Their use of it pretty
>much consists of one or two-word answers to questions
>from their trainers, at most.
I have to admit that most of my information comes from
National Geographic and Reader's Digest, but I thought
that they had done a little more than that. But
nevertheless there is apparently a big "leap" that humans
do at about age two that other primates can't follow.
Is it is a difference in kind, or degree? I don't know.
But I am pretty sure that Ayn Rand was wrong in principle
to make a sharp philosophical demarcation on what appears
to me to be a purely scientific question.
Do you see it differently?
very best regards,
lk
Tim Starr
In article <199801170101...@www03.netaddress.usa.net>,
<lawrenc...@usa.net> wrote:
>Tim Starr <tims...@netcom.com> wrote:
>
>>Depends upon what you mean by "language." They can be
>>taught some words, but they've never been shown to form
>>much in the way of sentences. Their use of it pretty
>>much consists of one or two-word answers to questions
>>from their trainers, at most.
>
>I have to admit that most of my information comes from
>National Geographic and Reader's Digest, but I thought
>that they had done a little more than that.
Well, in my freshman-level linguistics class in college we studied Nim
Chimsky (yes, they made a chimp out of Chomsky, who deserves it :-), who
was the best-studied chimp to ever learn sign language. His best sentence
was something like "Orange Me Eat," repeated several times in varying syntax.
There are those that claim that Koko the gorilla learned more than that, but
I'm not familiar with the research.
>But nevertheless there is apparently a big "leap" that humans
>do at about age two that other primates can't follow.
Right.
>Is it is a difference in kind, or degree?
Differences in kind are just big differences in degree, anyways.
>I don't know. But I am pretty sure that Ayn Rand was wrong in principle
>to make a sharp philosophical demarcation on what appears
>to me to be a purely scientific question.
>
>Do you see it differently?
Not really.
Brad Cadle
On 17 Jan 1998 10:26:42 GMT, Tim Starr <tims...@netcom.com> wrote:
>In article <199801170101...@www03.netaddress.usa.net>,
> <lawrenc...@usa.net> wrote:
>>Tim Starr <tims...@netcom.com> wrote:
>>
>>>Depends upon what you mean by "language." They can be
>>>taught some words, but they've never been shown to form
>>>much in the way of sentences. Their use of it pretty
>>>much consists of one or two-word answers to questions
>>>from their trainers, at most.
>>
>>I have to admit that most of my information comes from
>>National Geographic and Reader's Digest, but I thought
>>that they had done a little more than that.
>
>Well, in my freshman-level linguistics class in college we studied Nim
>Chimsky (yes, they made a chimp out of Chomsky, who deserves it :-), who
>was the best-studied chimp to ever learn sign language. His best sentence
>was something like "Orange Me Eat," repeated several times in varying syntax.
>
>There are those that claim that Koko the gorilla learned more than that, but
>I'm not familiar with the research.
>
The case examples from the Gorilla Foundation Home page suggest short
sentences, but a few of the examples show more sophistication that the
example you gave above from Nim Chimsky. From one of the papers:
12 February 1984
Teacher:What's an insult?
Koko:Think devil dirty.
Teacher:What's a stove?
Koko:Cook with.
This example seems more sophisticated in that Koko
seems to understand the concept of insult and the concept of thinking
Ofcourse one has to be careful with the researchers interpretations of
signs.
12 July 1984
Teacher:What's an injury?
Koko:There bite (pointing to a cut on her hand).
13 July 1984
Teacher:What is crazy?
Koko:Trouble surprise.
8 February 1985
Teacher:Why do people say darn?
Koko:Work obnoxious.
21 April 1983
Teacher:What can you think of that's hard?
Koko:Rock ... work.
9 February 1984
Teacher:What's a smart gorilla?
Koko:Me.
Jim Klein
In <34c2577c...@news.earthlink.net> Brad Cadle
<bca...@earthlink.net> writes:
>21 April 1983
>
>Teacher:What can you think of that's hard?
>Koko:Rock ... work.
This right here tells me that this is a study which is NOT determining
conceptualization, or the use of language. It's undoubtedly just
another case of exceedingly complex perceptual response, already well
established in mammals.
That would be some gorilla, to associate both of those words with
"hard" based on meaning!
jk
Regnirps
You are all welcome to use the Springalian Test of Sentience. It requires that
the subject species demonstrate a perception of time by keeping a beat, self
awareness by examples of suicide, and a third item that escapes me at the
moment -- but it is in my notes somewhere. (Did my species just flunk?).
Charlie Springer
Stephen Grossman
In article <34c2577c...@news.earthlink.net>, Brad Cadle
<bca...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> The case examples from the Gorilla Foundation Home page suggest short
> sentences, but a few of the examples show more sophistication that the
> example you gave above from Nim Chimsky. From one of the papers:
The Stanford chimp "language experiments were either fraud or incompetent,
w/trainers cueing (knowingly or not) the chimps. Only humans reason. If
not, go to the jungle and bring one back. Set him ar your computer and see
if we can tell the difference.
€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€
I fought the Logos and the Logos won. ODYSSEUS
...the silly dead... HOMER
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman
Fairhaven, MA, USA
sdg...@att.net
€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€
Stephen Grossman
In article <6a06b7$f...@sjx-ixn1.ix.netcom.com>, Jim Klein
<rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> In <34c2577c...@news.earthlink.net> Brad Cadle
> <bca...@earthlink.net> writes:
>
> >21 April 1983
> >
> >Teacher:What can you think of that's hard?
> >Koko:Rock ... work.
>
> This right here tells me that this is a study which is NOT determining
> conceptualization, or the use of language. It's undoubtedly just
> another case of exceedingly complex perceptual response, already well
> established in mammals.
See Brandens Psy Self-Esteem for perceptual abstraction. Brutes can
perceptually (in front of their noses) distinguish triangles from circles.
They dont know theyre doing it, they cant conceptualize it, cant focus on,
eg, circularity itself, merely circular things. Humans can direct mental
states of things not immediately present. A beehive is not a human city.
Brutes cando no more than mindlessly react to perceptual experience. THey
cant identify and integrate. THey cant plan longrange.
>
> That would be some gorilla, to associate both of those words with
> "hard" based on meaning!
>
>
> jk