SAD SPECTACLE
Larry Kulp
the typical articles on this newgroup by simply walking away without
comment. She would not dignify them with response.
I am a libertarian of the "natural law" variety and have browsed this
newsgroup only a few times, but at length. I am greatly saddened by the
nastiness evinced by the contributors, whether Objectivist, libertarian, or
otherwise.
The great bulk of the articles are loaded with ad hominem attacks,
intellectual intimidation, and empty invective. Much of the debate clearly
stems from a profound lack of understanding that language is inadequate to
express philosophical ideas with the exactitude we would like.
Moreover, after reading these articles, I must surmise that most of the
writers are quite young. They express their ideas (or those of their
mentors) with a crusading passion not yet tempered with wisdom, that is,
with the sense of perspective that comes with age and experience.
My father, who was a debater of no small success, always used to say:
"Don't argue, but discuss." He even regarded the words "argue" and
"argument" with a certain distaste. But what he was getting at was that
minds cannot be changed by force. Persuasion, to be really lasting and
complete, requires substantive discourse, attuned to the points and
questions raised by the other party, and respectful of the other's attempt
to understand the world.
Most importantly, every argument from the "opposition," should be regarded
as an opportunity to question, fortify, or refine your own position, not as
an opportunity to smash the poor fellow with a brickbat.
So, let's test my perception of this newsgroup with its response to a
question I would like to posit. No doubt it has been here many times
before. It will be good test, because it challenges a fundamental premise.
Such questions usually stimulate the most emotional responses, because they
are the most difficult to prove and are therefore held dogmatically.
This question concerns one of Rand's axiomatic statements (but not one of
the Big Three), namely: Things exist external to one's own consciousness.
I challenge someone to prove that BOTH he and I exist.
To set the arena for discussion, allow me to summarize Rand's position and
to briefly state my objection to it. (But the way, I am not a solipsist. I
do believe in a world external to myself, but that is a matter of belief and
methodological certainty--not an epistemological certainty.)
Rand's Big Three Axioms are as follows: Existence, Conciousness, and
Identity. Rand defines consciousness as the faculty of perceiving that
which exists. She says that the act of grasping the axiom that "existence
exists" inescapably leads to the conclusion that SOMETHING exists which is
perceived, and that CONSCIOUSNESS exists because SOMETHING has been
perceived. So far, so good.
Here is where she loses me. She states that it is contradictory to say that
all of reality is merely a consciousness perceiving itself, because
consciousness must have content, that is, it must perceive SOMETHING. But
she also says that consciousness exists. Therefore, consciousness must be
SOMETHING. Therefore, a consciousness perceiving itself is, indeed, a
consciousness perceiving SOMETHING, and SOMETHING always has content. So,
where is the contradiction.
Granted, I know with certainty that my consciousness exists, and that it is
something. That's just a restatement of Descarte's, "I think, therefore, I
am." I also grant that there appears to be an external world, and, indeed,
I believe there is one. But I cannot prove that the external world is
anything more than a construct of my consciousness.
It is too easy to say that the existence of the external world is
self-evident. Nonetheless, Rand would say that axioms cannot be proven,
because they are first principles and are irreducible, i.e., incapable of
dissection and analysis. It is very unsatisfying, however, to say that the
existence of the external world is axiomatic and cannot be proven.
On the other hand, she says that an axiomatic concept must be employed in
any argument to disprove it. So I ask: How do I employ the axiomatic
concept of the existence of the external world by saying that nothing exists
but my own consciousness?
Now, don't say that my invitation of responses from "other people"
necessarily implies that I believe all you "other people" exist. It is
conceivable that I am playing a little game all in my own mind, with
imaginary people my consciousness conjures up for my own entertainment.
Nevertheless, I am interested in what you folks have to say, even if you
don't exist ("you folks" merely being my mind conversing with itself).
LARRY KULP
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Larry Kulp <lk...@cdeaner.com> wrote in message
news:st2tf35...@corp.supernews.com...
> Rand's Big Three Axioms are as follows: Existence, Conciousness, and
> Identity. Rand defines consciousness as the faculty of perceiving that
> which exists. She says that the act of grasping the axiom that "existence
> exists" inescapably leads to the conclusion that SOMETHING exists which is
> perceived, and that CONSCIOUSNESS exists because SOMETHING has been
> perceived. So far, so good.
>
> Here is where she loses me. She states that it is contradictory to say
that
> all of reality is merely a consciousness perceiving itself, because
> consciousness must have content, that is, it must perceive SOMETHING.
But
> she also says that consciousness exists. Therefore, consciousness must be
> SOMETHING. Therefore, a consciousness perceiving itself is, indeed, a
> consciousness perceiving SOMETHING, and SOMETHING always has content. So,
> where is the contradiction.
Ask yourself what you mean by consciousness. It means "awareness" doesn't
it?
Awareness can come into existence only after existence itself.
Without existence, there would be nothing to be aware of, (conscious of),
therefore consciousness or awareness couldn't exist.
Certainly, once one is aware of something, the awareness (consciousness)
exists, but not before.
>
> Granted, I know with certainty that my consciousness exists, and that it
is
> something. That's just a restatement of Descarte's, "I think, therefore,
I
> am." I also grant that there appears to be an external world, and,
indeed,
> I believe there is one. But I cannot prove that the external world is
> anything more than a construct of my consciousness.
What would you consider proof?
> It is too easy to say that the existence of the external world is
> self-evident. Nonetheless, Rand would say that axioms cannot be proven,
> because they are first principles and are irreducible, i.e., incapable of
> dissection and analysis. It is very unsatisfying, however, to say that
the
> existence of the external world is axiomatic and cannot be proven.
>
> On the other hand, she says that an axiomatic concept must be employed in
> any argument to disprove it. So I ask: How do I employ the axiomatic
> concept of the existence of the external world by saying that nothing
exists
> but my own consciousness?
If you understand that consciousness means awareness, you will see that it
is not possible to be conscious of nothing.
Keep the picture in mind, and don't try to fit pieces of the jigsaw based on
shape alone. There is a tendency here, to concentrate on the trees thus
getting lost in the forest.
--
Arnold
Phoenix
to
> the typical articles on this newgroup by simply walking away without
> comment. She would not dignify them with response.
You are probably right.
> I am a libertarian of the "natural law" variety and have browsed this
> newsgroup only a few times, but at length. I am greatly saddened by the
> nastiness evinced by the contributors, whether Objectivist, libertarian,
or
> otherwise.
Agreed.
> The great bulk of the articles are loaded with ad hominem attacks,
> intellectual intimidation, and empty invective. Much of the debate
clearly
> stems from a profound lack of understanding that language is inadequate to
> express philosophical ideas with the exactitude we would like.
Actually, language is perfectly adequate for this, the problem stems from
the fact that most posters here do not take a classical argumentative style
(i.e. defining their terms), but jump in assuming that all other posters
share (or at least understand) their definitions implicitly.
> Moreover, after reading these articles, I must surmise that most of the
> writers are quite young. They express their ideas (or those of their
> mentors) with a crusading passion not yet tempered with wisdom, that is,
> with the sense of perspective that comes with age and experience.
As an aside, why is it that the wisdom of age so often replaces the passion
of youth? Do you think there is an inverse relationship between wisdom and
passion? Obviously this is not always the case, but it does seem to happen
frequently, in my experience. (I am 21, BTW, so my experience is,
admittedly, not as extensive as my elders')
> My father, who was a debater of no small success, always used to say:
> "Don't argue, but discuss." He even regarded the words "argue" and
> "argument" with a certain distaste. But what he was getting at was that
> minds cannot be changed by force. Persuasion, to be really lasting and
> complete, requires substantive discourse, attuned to the points and
> questions raised by the other party, and respectful of the other's attempt
> to understand the world.
No argument here. :-)
> Most importantly, every argument from the "opposition," should be regarded
> as an opportunity to question, fortify, or refine your own position, not
as
> an opportunity to smash the poor fellow with a brickbat.
>
> So, let's test my perception of this newsgroup with its response to a
> question I would like to posit. No doubt it has been here many times
> before. It will be good test, because it challenges a fundamental
premise.
> Such questions usually stimulate the most emotional responses, because
they
> are the most difficult to prove and are therefore held dogmatically.
>
> This question concerns one of Rand's axiomatic statements (but not one of
> the Big Three), namely: Things exist external to one's own consciousness.
> I challenge someone to prove that BOTH he and I exist.
>
> To set the arena for discussion, allow me to summarize Rand's position and
> to briefly state my objection to it. (But the way, I am not a solipsist.
I
> do believe in a world external to myself, but that is a matter of belief
and
> methodological certainty--not an epistemological certainty.)
Could you please expound upon the distinction between methodological and
epistemological certainty? Is epistemology itself not a method?
> Rand's Big Three Axioms are as follows: Existence, Conciousness, and
> Identity. Rand defines consciousness as the faculty of perceiving that
> which exists. She says that the act of grasping the axiom that "existence
> exists" inescapably leads to the conclusion that SOMETHING exists which is
> perceived, and that CONSCIOUSNESS exists because SOMETHING has been
> perceived. So far, so good.
>
> Here is where she loses me. She states that it is contradictory to say
that
> all of reality is merely a consciousness perceiving itself, because
> consciousness must have content, that is, it must perceive SOMETHING.
But
> she also says that consciousness exists. Therefore, consciousness must be
> SOMETHING. Therefore, a consciousness perceiving itself is, indeed, a
> consciousness perceiving SOMETHING, and SOMETHING always has content. So,
> where is the contradiction.
I owe a debt of gratitude to Betsy Speicher for the following example:
A Chevrolet and a Ford car have a wreck:
Chevy----------->*Collision*<-----------Ford
Where does the collision exist? In the Chevy? In the Ford? No, it is a
relationship between the two. Consciousness is the same; it is a
relationship between two existants: your mind and external reality. This is,
I believe, where Rand is fundamentally different from Aristotle, who
considered consciousness to be itself an existant, or at least an aspect of
things which exist. Following Aristotle's intrinsicism, I suppose there
would be no contradiction, but under objectivism, you could not have a
relationship between entities unless the entities themselves did, in fact
exist. To continue Mrs. Speicher's example, the Ford could not have a
collision with itself; both the Chevy and the Ford must exist for there to
be a collision, just as both your mind and external reality must exist in
order for there to be consciousness.
> Granted, I know with certainty that my consciousness exists, and that it
is
> something. That's just a restatement of Descarte's, "I think, therefore,
I
> am." I also grant that there appears to be an external world, and,
indeed,
> I believe there is one. But I cannot prove that the external world is
> anything more than a construct of my consciousness.
If it were a mere construct of your consciousness, could it not be
invalidated or exterminated by a mere act of your consciousness? For
example, if I am simply a figment of your imagination, could you not simply
disbelieve me out of existence? Better yet, why doesn't wishing, hoping, or
praying for a better society bring it about? If I stick my head in the sand
will you really cease to exist?
> It is too easy to say that the existence of the external world is
> self-evident. Nonetheless, Rand would say that axioms cannot be proven,
> because they are first principles and are irreducible, i.e., incapable of
> dissection and analysis. It is very unsatisfying, however, to say that
the
> existence of the external world is axiomatic and cannot be proven.
I'm not sure why you find this so unsatisfying. I see nothing wrong with
saying "I perceive it because it is real" (note the distinction from "it is
real because I perceive it"). Perhaps this is an area we should explore
further.
> On the other hand, she says that an axiomatic concept must be employed in
> any argument to disprove it. So I ask: How do I employ the axiomatic
> concept of the existence of the external world by saying that nothing
exists
> but my own consciousness?
Because it is an impossibility, given the nature of consciousness (as a
relationship), for it to exist devoid of any external stimuli. For you to
say you are conscious means that you must be conscious of something (which
you have already pointed out). It is a logical impossibility for the
relationship between two pieces of data to be one of the pieces of
relational data itself (was that altogether clear enough, or should I
elucidate?).
> Now, don't say that my invitation of responses from "other people"
> necessarily implies that I believe all you "other people" exist. It is
> conceivable that I am playing a little game all in my own mind, with
> imaginary people my consciousness conjures up for my own entertainment.
> Nevertheless, I am interested in what you folks have to say, even if you
> don't exist ("you folks" merely being my mind conversing with itself).
Well, I can follow that line if you wish... whom is the figment of who's
imagination? This is where solipsism collapses: I am certain of the
existence of myself and my own conscious awareness. You are likewise certain
of your own existence. If solipsism were true, would this not be impossible?
You can't have it both ways; either only I exist and the rest of the world
is my own arbitrary construct, or I am the arbitrary construct of someone
else's mind (according to solipsism). But if that were the case, I would be
unable to think, my will would not be free, and independent thought and
action would be impossible to me.
- Corey Cagle
Zarathustra
> This question concerns one of Rand's axiomatic statements (but not one of
> the Big Three), namely: Things exist external to one's own consciousness.
> I challenge someone to prove that BOTH he and I exist.
At first, I thought I would take up this job. Then I realized that, given
the language you used, it's impossible.
I can not prove (with logic only) even that I exist. But I can demonstrate
it. (I am right now).
> To set the arena for discussion, allow me to summarize Rand's position and
> to briefly state my objection to it. (But the way, I am not a solipsist.
I
> do believe in a world external to myself, but that is a matter of belief
and
> methodological certainty--not an epistemological certainty.)
Ie. Pragmatism (I don't _know_ it's true, but it's usefull to think so)
> Rand's Big Three Axioms are as follows: Existence, Conciousness, and
> Identity. Rand defines consciousness as the faculty of perceiving that
> which exists. She says that the act of grasping the axiom that "existence
> exists" inescapably leads to the conclusion that SOMETHING exists which is
> perceived, and that CONSCIOUSNESS exists because SOMETHING has been
> perceived. So far, so good.
>
> Here is where she loses me. She states that it is contradictory to say
that
> all of reality is merely a consciousness perceiving itself, because
> consciousness must have content, that is, it must perceive SOMETHING.
But
> she also says that consciousness exists. Therefore, consciousness must be
> SOMETHING. Therefore, a consciousness perceiving itself is, indeed, a
> consciousness perceiving SOMETHING, and SOMETHING always has content. So,
> where is the contradiction.
The contradiction is really one not so much in logic as in time. A
conciousness concious only of itself, would be a concious concious of a
concious, but it wouldn't be a concious unless it were being concious (which
is it's identity as concious). In other words, at the time that the
proposed conciousness was looking at that thing (which just happens to be
itself), that thing is not yet a conciousness, for it has been concious of
nothing. It's a dog chasing it's own tail, that is only a dog if it catches
it's tail, otherwise it's another animal that doesn't have a tail. (If that
statement makes no sense to you ... good, for that was Rand's point.)
> Granted, I know with certainty that my consciousness exists, and that it
is
> something. That's just a restatement of Descarte's, "I think, therefore,
I
> am." I also grant that there appears to be an external world, and,
indeed,
> I believe there is one. But I cannot prove that the external world is
> anything more than a construct of my consciousness.
>
> It is too easy to say that the existence of the external world is
> self-evident. Nonetheless, Rand would say that axioms cannot be proven,
> because they are first principles and are irreducible, i.e., incapable of
> dissection and analysis. It is very unsatisfying, however, to say that
the
> existence of the external world is axiomatic and cannot be proven.
"Too easy?" By what axiom are you deducing that philosophy must be hard?
It need not be. Indeed, in many respects, philosophy is just refined common
sense. Litterally, the external world is 'self-evident' in that it, of it's
own power and vitatlity, 'evidences' 'itself' by means of imposing (directly
or though intermeadiate means) physically upon our senses.
And remember, (logical) proof isn't the only way to show something is true.
> On the other hand, she says that an axiomatic concept must be employed in
> any argument to disprove it. So I ask: How do I employ the axiomatic
> concept of the existence of the external world by saying that nothing
exists
> but my own consciousness?
"saying that" ... implies that the saying is real. All statements, by
simply being statements, make claims about the "external world" (or more
accurately, the world of all that is), and therefore presuppose it.
As Aristotle said, this can be shown if only the opponent can be induced to
say something that has both meaning for him and another.
The logic of any refution does not dis-prove it. The existence of the
refution (not logically, but as an act-in-the-world) does.
> Now, don't say that my invitation of responses from "other people"
> necessarily implies that I believe all you "other people" exist. It is
> conceivable that I am playing a little game all in my own mind, with
> imaginary people my consciousness conjures up for my own entertainment.
> Nevertheless, I am interested in what you folks have to say, even if you
> don't exist ("you folks" merely being my mind conversing with itself).
The answer to your questoin (which is thousands of years old), is that you
can't refute the basic axioms, because a refution is a statement, and
statements qua statements have certain pre-suppositions, which include the
law of non-contradiction. And refution of this law (or any other
Aristotelian axiom) would be a statement that contradicts itself (insofar as
it contradicts the presuppositions of language as such), and thus is not a
statement. It would litterally be meaningless, and as such is no refution.
And yet, this is not enough to yet to show the axiom true.
However, the above shows that if the axiom is not true, language is
impossible. Experience evidences the existence of language, and thus
provides, not proof, but demonstration, of the truth of the axiom.
At least that's how Aristotle did it.
As to my existence and your existence ... your statements and questions have
pre-suppositions, such as your implicit purpose of communication, which
presupposes the existence of the from-person and the to-person. Thus your
saying to me "You don't exist" (the saying, not the said), contradicts
itself. It's yet another case of form contradicting content, as above.
"You (the reader) don't exist" makes as much sense as "This sentence isn't
true". Both are "sound and fury, signifying nothing".
Phoenix
to
> the typical articles on this newgroup by simply walking away without
> comment. She would not dignify them with response.
You are probably right.
> I am a libertarian of the "natural law" variety and have browsed this
> newsgroup only a few times, but at length. I am greatly saddened by the
> nastiness evinced by the contributors, whether Objectivist, libertarian,
or
> otherwise.
Agreed.
> The great bulk of the articles are loaded with ad hominem attacks,
> intellectual intimidation, and empty invective. Much of the debate
clearly
> stems from a profound lack of understanding that language is inadequate to
> express philosophical ideas with the exactitude we would like.
Actually, language is perfectly adequate for this, the problem stems from
the fact that most posters here do not take a classical argumentative style
(i.e. defining their terms), but jump in assuming that all other posters
share (or at least understand) their definitions implicitly.
> Moreover, after reading these articles, I must surmise that most of the
> writers are quite young. They express their ideas (or those of their
> mentors) with a crusading passion not yet tempered with wisdom, that is,
> with the sense of perspective that comes with age and experience.
As an aside, why is it that the wisdom of age so often replaces the passion
of youth? Do you think there is an inverse relationship between wisdom and
passion? Obviously this is not always the case, but it does seem to happen
frequently, in my experience. (I am 21, BTW, so my experience is,
admittedly, not as extensive as my elders')
> My father, who was a debater of no small success, always used to say:
> "Don't argue, but discuss." He even regarded the words "argue" and
> "argument" with a certain distaste. But what he was getting at was that
> minds cannot be changed by force. Persuasion, to be really lasting and
> complete, requires substantive discourse, attuned to the points and
> questions raised by the other party, and respectful of the other's attempt
> to understand the world.
No argument here. :-)
<snip>
> To set the arena for discussion, allow me to summarize Rand's position and
> to briefly state my objection to it. (But the way, I am not a solipsist.
I
> do believe in a world external to myself, but that is a matter of belief
and
> methodological certainty--not an epistemological certainty.)
Could you please expound upon the distinction between methodological and
epistemological certainty? Is epistemology itself not a method?
<snip>
> Here is where she loses me. She states that it is contradictory to say
that
> all of reality is merely a consciousness perceiving itself, because
> consciousness must have content, that is, it must perceive SOMETHING.
But
> she also says that consciousness exists. Therefore, consciousness must be
> SOMETHING. Therefore, a consciousness perceiving itself is, indeed, a
> consciousness perceiving SOMETHING, and SOMETHING always has content. So,
> where is the contradiction.
I owe a debt of gratitude to Betsy Speicher for the following example:
A Chevrolet and a Ford car have a wreck:
Chevy----------->*Collision*<-----------Ford
Where does the collision exist? In the Chevy? In the Ford? No, it is a
relationship between the two. Consciousness is the same; it is a
relationship between two existants: your mind and external reality. This is,
I believe, where Rand is fundamentally different from Aristotle, who
considered consciousness to be itself an existant, or at least an aspect of
things which exist. Following Aristotle's intrinsicism, I suppose there
would be no contradiction, but under objectivism, you could not have a
relationship between entities unless the entities themselves did, in fact
exist. To continue Mrs. Speicher's example, the Ford could not have a
collision with itself; both the Chevy and the Ford must exist for there to
be a collision, just as both your mind and external reality must exist in
order for there to be consciousness.
> Granted, I know with certainty that my consciousness exists, and that it
is
> something. That's just a restatement of Descarte's, "I think, therefore,
I
> am." I also grant that there appears to be an external world, and,
indeed,
> I believe there is one. But I cannot prove that the external world is
> anything more than a construct of my consciousness.
If it were a mere construct of your consciousness, could it not be
invalidated or exterminated by a mere act of your consciousness? For
example, if I am simply a figment of your imagination, could you not simply
disbelieve me out of existence? Better yet, why doesn't wishing, hoping, or
praying for a better society bring it about? If I stick my head in the sand
will you really cease to exist?
> It is too easy to say that the existence of the external world is
> self-evident. Nonetheless, Rand would say that axioms cannot be proven,
> because they are first principles and are irreducible, i.e., incapable of
> dissection and analysis. It is very unsatisfying, however, to say that
the
> existence of the external world is axiomatic and cannot be proven.
I'm not sure why you find this so unsatisfying. I see nothing wrong with
saying "I perceive it because it is real" (note the distinction from "it is
real because I perceive it"). Perhaps this is an area we should explore
further.
> On the other hand, she says that an axiomatic concept must be employed in
> any argument to disprove it. So I ask: How do I employ the axiomatic
> concept of the existence of the external world by saying that nothing
exists
> but my own consciousness?
Because it is an impossibility, given the nature of consciousness (as a
relationship), for it to exist devoid of any external stimuli. For you to
say you are conscious means that you must be conscious of something (which
you have already pointed out). It is a logical impossibility for the
relationship between two pieces of data to be one of the pieces of
relational data itself (was that altogether clear enough, or should I
elucidate?).
> Now, don't say that my invitation of responses from "other people"
> necessarily implies that I believe all you "other people" exist. It is
> conceivable that I am playing a little game all in my own mind, with
> imaginary people my consciousness conjures up for my own entertainment.
> Nevertheless, I am interested in what you folks have to say, even if you
> don't exist ("you folks" merely being my mind conversing with itself).
Well, I can follow that line if you wish... whom is the figment of who's
Regnirps
>Moreover, after reading these articles, I must surmise that most of the
>writers are quite young. They express their ideas (or those of their
>mentors) with a crusading passion not yet tempered with wisdom, that is,
>with the sense of perspective that comes with age and experience.
Same impression I get. When you are 50 you can converse in a short hand you
can't even explain to a 20 year old.
Charlie Springer
Larry Kulp
this newsgroup as a hangout for flamers. At least in part, I intended to
bait the group. Nonetheless, those who responded to my tongue-in-cheek
"defense" of solipsism did so quite thoughtfully. Please accept my apology.
In spite of the baiting, my interest in proofs of objective reality is
genuine, so I appreciate the reponses. I will reply to as many as time
permits.
Larry Kulp
vanosaur
<lk...@cdeaner.com> wrote:
> In spite of the baiting, my interest in proofs of objective reality is
> genuine, so I appreciate the reponses. I will reply to as many as time
> permits.
You will wait forever. Solipsism cannot be logically disproved, because
it is internally consistent. The most one can do is heuristically appeal
to Occam's razor and state that discourse becomes much simpler if one
assumes classical realism rather than solipsism.
--
email is iordonez at columbus dot rr dot com
My sugar-free music at http://www.mp3.com/SicTransitGloria
"Music that doesn't grow old" -- ginok
Gaius Helen Mohiam
news:8r0nl6$n3a$2...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu...
> You will wait forever. Solipsism cannot be logically disproved, because
> it is internally consistent.
Ahh, what blasphemy! Do you deny that Ayn Rand, the greatest philosopher of
all times (in case you don't know), has rigorously disproven such demagogy?
Don't you know that you are trying to "divorce reason from reality" (or was
it the other way round?) when you utter such heresy? Haven't you learned by
now that this attitude will earn you rank and honor among the "evilest men
of history"? That the "objectivists", if they had their way, would just take
you out and shoot you for saying this? Beware!
In deep concern -- Helen.
David Schwartz
vanosaur wrote:
> You will wait forever. Solipsism cannot be logically disproved, because
> it is internally consistent. The most one can do is heuristically appeal
> to Occam's razor and state that discourse becomes much simpler if one
> assumes classical realism rather than solipsism.
You slight Occam's razor. It is not some marginal argument to be used
when one doesn't have a better one. It is actually vital and as
important as pretty much any other philosophical principle.
There is no point in logically disproving solipsism. One cannot reason
with someone who does not acknowledge that you are capable of reason.
DS
MATTHEWS
<...>
> In spite of the baiting, my interest in proofs of objective reality is
> genuine, so I appreciate the reponses. I will reply to as many as time
> permits.
Here is the ultimate proof of objective reality:
1. grab a stick.
2. hit head with stick.
3. repeat steps 1 and 2 as needed.
Seriously, though, there is no suich thing as a "proof" of reality, since
the process of proof entails showing a correct correspondence between a
claim and the facts of reality. To prove anything at all implies the
existence of reality.
Moreover, the rejection of objective reality (by whatever means) still has
to count on it, in the same way that (as Aristotle showed) the rejection of
the law of identity still implies its validity. IOW, there is no such thing
as evidence against the proposition that "existence exists" or "reality is
real", since evidence as such has to be a part of reality. Evidence is an
objective fact (or objective principle derived therefrom) which supports a
specific claim. "Evidence" or "reasons" showing that reality is not real
has to take the form: "Here is a reason why reality doesn't exist", or:
"Here is a part of reality proving that reality is unreal". Obviously, if
you reach the conclusion that reality is unreal, then so must your evidence
be.
Clear enough?
Ed Matthews
vanosaur
Mohiam <GMo...@bene-gesserith.org> wrote:
> Ahh, what blasphemy! Do you deny that Ayn Rand, the greatest philosopher
> of all times (in case you don't know), has rigorously disproven such
> demagogy?
> Don't you know that you are trying to "divorce reason from reality" (or
> was it the other way round?) when you utter such heresy? Haven't you learned
> by now that this attitude will earn you rank and honor among the "evilest
> men of history"? That the "objectivists", if they had their way, would just
> take you out and shoot you for saying this? Beware!
>
> In deep concern -- Helen
:-)
That's why I use a pseudonym. Hope the inquisitors don't find me!
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Fred Weiss
David Schwartz <dav...@webmaster.com> wrote:
>
> vanosaur wrote:
>
> > You...
Who?
>... will wait forever. Solipsism cannot be logically disproved,
It doesn't have to be disproven. It is self-refuting.
>because
> > it is internally consistent.
Internally vs. what?
>The most one can do ...
One vs. ?
>....is heuristically appeal
> > to Occam's razor and state...
State to whom? Occam's razor which came from where?
>... that discourse ...
Discourse with whom?
>...becomes much simpler if one
> > assumes classical realism rather than solipsism.
Classical realism which comes from where and which means what and how
would you know?
>
> You slight Occam's razor.
It is far more basic than "slighting" and far more basic than an issue
of "Occam's razor".
This is open, avowed, unabashed, blatant irrationalism.
And speaking to Dan Lind, if this "vanosaur" creature knows what he is
doing, as he surely does, how much more would Kant have, who went to
considerable extra trouble to hide his irrationalism behind an
elaborate and convoluted facade. If this creature is obvious and you
can wave him away with your hand or you shine a light on it and it
scurries under a rock, look in contrast at how many generations Kant
conned and what a seemingly impenetrable philosophical fortress he
built.
If all mankind had to contend with were the "vanosaurs", the rag-tag
sophists and sceptics who always have and always will hang around the
fringes of philosophy like flies to be swatted, the problem of
the "mindless brute" which concerns you would be minor or non-existent.
The petty con man is a little blip on the scene. You want to be armed
against him in self-protection but he doesn't affect the foundations of
a culture. It is the big time rackets (like the churches or gov't
regulation or Social Security - or wider, statism) which people are led
to believe are good for them and beneficial that wreck deep and long-
lasting havoc. In philosophy it is only a genius like Kant who could
pull it off.
Fred Weiss
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
A.Carmichael
> (snip)
> This question concerns one of Rand's axiomatic statements (but not one of
> the Big Three), namely: Things exist external to one's own consciousness.
Actually IMO "existence exists" is about "things exist external to one's own
consciousness". The opposite is (allegedly) Kant's "existence does not
exist". So I think that the object of your challenge _is_ one of the 'Big
Three'.
> (snip)
> Rand's Big Three Axioms are as follows: Existence, Conciousness, and
> Identity.
A pet peeve of mine. By what right do Objectivists say that these axioms are
Rand's? Did not any philosophers before Rand talk about consciousness and
the world of things? Did not someone before Rand say A is A? Those are the
basic foundations of all thought about existence, well defined and pondered
by philosophers and on the record for many centuries. How come all of a
sudden they are "Rand's axioms"?
The claim is that they are the foundations of Objectivism. Actually they are
the foundations of all thought and to the best of my knowledge of every
philosophical system. This unintentional fraud is perpetrated because Rand
uses those foundations to build a 'rationalistic' edifice of deductions
which she pushes with passion and charisma and which packs enormous appeal
for some people. The crucial reliance on deductions from deductions is
camouflaged behind a lethany of 'observations' about the world which makes
it appear as if it is an inductive system. Actually Rand's three great
doctrines are certainty, survival and selfishness. That is where Rand's
ideas become original and different; and where Objectivism first emerges
from generic claims. The claim that the logical transition from the original
axioms to Objectivism is seamless is what perpetuates the myth. If that were
a true claim Rand would have taken then world by storm. As it is
Objectivists console themselves with the explanation that the world does not
understand what they are priviledged to understand.
Chris Cathcart
"A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> "Larry Kulp" <lk...@cdeaner.com> wrote in message
> news:st2tf35...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> > (snip)
> > This question concerns one of Rand's axiomatic statements (but not
one of
> > the Big Three), namely: Things exist external to one's own
consciousness.
>
> Actually IMO "existence exists" is about "things exist external to
one's own
> consciousness".
That's not what "EE" says. All that it says is that what is, is, and
there is no way legitimately to treat it as saying anything more than
this. If someone takes it to mean more than this, tries to say other
things with it, or to derive any other statements from it, they are
employing some other statement besides "EE" or its equivalent. As
worded, it doesn't do any of the work that Rand wants to do in her
metaphysics, e.g., something like her concept of the primacy of
existence, or the existence of an external world. IOW, it can't be
used in any helpful way to establish metaphysical theses like the
existence of the external world, or the non-existence of God, or the
falsity of materialism and determinism.
--
Chris Cathcart
*
Rational Objectivism Resources:
Daily Objectivist - http://dailyobjectivist.com
Objectivist Center - http://objectivistcenter.org
We The Living Forums - http://wetheliving.com
Journal of Ayn Rand Studies - http://aynrandstudies.com
The ARI/Kelley Split - http://wetheliving.com/boston/ios.html
ARIan Idiocy Documented - http://jeffcomp.com/faq
Merrill on ITOE - http://members.nbci.com/cathcacr/gm.htm
Walsh on Rand and Kant -
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/objectivity/walsh1
A.Carmichael
"Chris Cathcart" <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:8r3pnc$540$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> In article <aZcB5.2120$ks6....@news-west.usenetserver.com>,
> "A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> > "Larry Kulp" <lk...@cdeaner.com> wrote in message
> > news:st2tf35...@corp.supernews.com...
> >
> > > (snip)
> > > This question concerns one of Rand's axiomatic statements (but not
> one of
> > > the Big Three), namely: Things exist external to one's own
> consciousness.
> >
> > Actually IMO "existence exists" is about "things exist external to
> one's own
> > consciousness".
>
> That's not what "EE" says. All that it says is that what is, is, and
> there is no way legitimately to treat it as saying anything more than
> this. If someone takes it to mean more than this, tries to say other
> things with it, or to derive any other statements from it, they are
> employing some other statement besides "EE" or its equivalent. As
> worded, it doesn't do any of the work that Rand wants to do in her
> metaphysics, e.g., something like her concept of the primacy of
> existence, or the existence of an external world. IOW, it can't be
> used in any helpful way to establish metaphysical theses like the
> existence of the external world, or the non-existence of God, or the
> falsity of materialism and determinism.
But what does she mean by "exists"? She must mean the opposite of "existence
does not exist" which she reportedly attributed to Kant. The point appears
to be that images in consciousness have no 'existence'. Is it not more
likely that Rand was creating a soundbyte (as contrasted to an explicit
claim) consistent with her informal non-rigorous style of exposition?
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Chris Cathcart
"A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
>
> "Chris Cathcart" <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:8r3pnc$540$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> > "A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Actually IMO "existence exists" is about "things exist external to
> > one's own
> > > consciousness".
> >
> > That's not what "EE" says. All that it says is that what is, is,
and
> > there is no way legitimately to treat it as saying anything more
than
> > this. If someone takes it to mean more than this, tries to say
other
> > things with it, or to derive any other statements from it, they are
> > employing some other statement besides "EE" or its equivalent. As
> > worded, it doesn't do any of the work that Rand wants to do in her
> > metaphysics, e.g., something like her concept of the primacy of
> > existence, or the existence of an external world. IOW, it can't be
> > used in any helpful way to establish metaphysical theses like the
> > existence of the external world, or the non-existence of God, or the
> > falsity of materialism and determinism.
>
I don't think you can define it in any more fundamental terms.
Synonymous would be terms like "is," "actuality," "being"
(=exist*ence*).
> She must mean the opposite of "existence
> does not exist" which she reportedly attributed to Kant.
Well, that would be the only denial of "EE" that I can think of, though
I don't think she actually went as far to attribute this to Kant. Not
that one couldn't "prove" something that amounts to such an
attribution: for instance, that "existence" for Kant (meaning
actuality, affirmation; distinct from necessity or possibility) is a
category of the understanding and not applicable to reality or
existence "itself" -- ergo, he denied that existence exists. Actually,
I'd say that Peikoff/Rand characterize the idealists as denying that
there is an objective existence. See Peikoff's polemics in ch. 1 of
OPAR (though blank out his earlier remark that "existence" does not
specify that a physical world exists).
> The point appears
> to be that images in consciousness have no 'existence'.
I don't see how this would follow from what you said earlier.
> Is it not more
> likely that Rand was creating a soundbyte (as contrasted to an
explicit
> claim) consistent with her informal non-rigorous style of exposition?
You mean with her statement that "EE"? I take it that she was using
this as a very important and central statement of her metaphysics; at
least a reading of Galt's speech would indicate such. But *as worded*,
it would be a sign of what you call her informal, non-rigorous style,
if she took it to be of any use in establishing anything metaphysically
profound or important. Pretty much any "mainstream, corrupt"
philosopher will tell you that it is an empty, uninformative tautology,
though "something exists" would not be. I take Rand to actually mean
the latter when she uses "EE". For instance, in summing up the first
two axioms: "Something exists, and you know it."
Fred Weiss
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> You mean with her statement that "EE"? I take it that she was using
> this as a very important and central statement of her metaphysics; at
> least a reading of Galt's speech would indicate such. But *as
worded*,
> it would be a sign of what you call her informal, non-rigorous style,
> if she took it to be of any use in establishing anything
metaphysically
> profound or important. Pretty much any "mainstream, corrupt"
> philosopher will tell you that it is an empty, uninformative
tautology,
> though "something exists" would not be. I take Rand to actually mean
> the latter when she uses "EE". For instance, in summing up the first
> two axioms: "Something exists, and you know it."
Joke of the day: Chris Cathcart - expounder on Objectivism.
"Something exists" does not at all convey the same thing. That is no
better than something Descartes could have uttered and would be
perfectly in accord with self-refuting solipsism or David Friedman's
brain-in-a-vat.
Or are you just speaking in your usual, "informal, non-rigorous style"?
As for your appeal to "mainstream" philosophers, I find that curious.
Has no one informed you that Ayn Rand was not a mainstream philosopher.
If she had been, we wouldn't be here today debating her ideas.
What's your problem with "existence exists"? Have you not eyes? Look!
Fred Weiss
Chris Cathcart
Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> In article <8r4c8c$i7r$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> > You mean with her statement that "EE"? I take it that she was using
> > this as a very important and central statement of her metaphysics;
at
> > least a reading of Galt's speech would indicate such. But *as
> worded*,
> > it would be a sign of what you call her informal, non-rigorous
style,
> > if she took it to be of any use in establishing anything
> metaphysically
> > profound or important. Pretty much any "mainstream, corrupt"
> > philosopher will tell you that it is an empty, uninformative
> tautology,
> > though "something exists" would not be. I take Rand to actually
mean
> > the latter when she uses "EE". For instance, in summing up the
first
> > two axioms: "Something exists, and you know it."
>
> Joke of the day: Chris Cathcart - expounder on Objectivism.
Well, I'm just about at the end of my line with Weiss, but I'll give it
a last shot . . .
> "Something exists" does not at all convey the same thing.
I didn't say that it did, and that was precisely my point. I said that
I took Rand to mean this -- or perhaps I should rephrase that: I took
that Rand *meant to say* this -- when she says "EE." "EE" says nothing
from which any other affirmative statement could be derived, so its
function -- as worded -- is nil in the Oist (or any other) metaphysics.
Not that I expect Weiss to understand this point, though.
> That is no
> better than something Descartes could have uttered and would be
> perfectly in accord with self-refuting solipsism or David Friedman's
> brain-in-a-vat.
It's pretty simple: there exists something -- and consciousness is the
faculty that grasps this. Right out of Galt's speech, and it states in
briefest form the first two metaphysical axioms as Rand meant to state
them. Nothing here implies Cartesianism or solipsism. You'd have to
agree, after all, since it is basic Oist metaphysics.
> As for your appeal to "mainstream" philosophers, I find that curious.
> Has no one informed you that Ayn Rand was not a mainstream
philosopher.
> If she had been, we wouldn't be here today debating her ideas.
The meaning of "mainstream" should be obvious here. It refers to "what
passes for philosophy in the profession nowadays," as ARIans are prone
to put it.
> What's your problem with "existence exists"? Have you not eyes? Look!
My eyes tell me that there exists something independent of my
consciousness. It doesn't tell me that "existence exists," which is an
empty tautology. Just ask Richard Lawrence, who some time back I
remember reducing the statement to what Rand actually meant to say:
That there exists at least one entity of which I am aware (or something
close to this). But even he'd tell you that this doesn't mean the same
thing as "existence exists." If something exists, then it exists --
what the hell is this supposed to tell me, besides bland repetition?
But given the lowly state of your philosophical understanding, I'd find
it quite expected that you think "EE" does a lot of work, and that my
calling it an empty tautology is a sign of some corruption on my part.
That would only reflect negatively on your own philosophical acumen,
however, as any intelligent observer would recognize.
A.Carmichael
> In article <8r4uku$tqm$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> > In article <8r4c8c$i7r$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> > Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> faculty that grasps this. (...) You'd have to
> agree, after all, since it is basic Oist metaphysics.
If we are to characterize this insight as "Objectivist metaphysics"
precisely how does it differ from, say, realist metaphysics?
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Chris Cathcart
Oist metaphysics *is* realist metaphysics, far as I can tell. As
opposed to what -- materialism, idealism, solipsism, etc.? If realism
is distinguished by recognizing a distinction between consciousness and
and independently existing external world, then it would qualify as
realist.
A.Carmichael
> In article <uTpB5.8753$ks6.3...@news-west.usenetserver.com>,
> "A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> >
> > "Chris Cathcart" <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> > news:8r547t$1vd$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> > > In article <8r4uku$tqm$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> > > Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> > > > In article <8r4c8c$i7r$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> > > > Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > (...) there exists something -- and consciousness is the
> > > faculty that grasps this. (...) You'd have to
> > > agree, after all, since it is basic Oist metaphysics.
> >
> > If we are to characterize this insight as "Objectivist metaphysics"
> > precisely how does it differ from, say, realist metaphysics?
>
> Oist metaphysics *is* realist metaphysics, far as I can tell. As
> opposed to what -- materialism, idealism, solipsism, etc.? If realism
> is distinguished by recognizing a distinction between consciousness and
> and independently existing external world, then it would qualify as
> realist.
My question is: what is specifically Objectivist about it? How does it
differ from all other realist metaphysical theories? What entitles us to
refer to that insight as being 'Objectivist'.
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Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> what the hell is this supposed to tell me, besides bland repetition?
That it's not a figment of your imagination.
--
Arnold
Fred Weiss
It should also tell him - which apparently it doesn't - that no matter
how much or how loudly he pouts, whines, screams, rants, or raves, it
doesn't go away. "A is A" would tell him - which apparently it doesn't -
that all his pouting, whining, screaming, ranting, or raving doesn't
change anything.
For the benefit of our lovely "academic (anti-)philosophers" residing
in their alternate universes, there is a human phenemenon which results
from the attempt to evade these facts. It is called neurosis. You could
say that it is a condition which results from denying that "existence
exists" tells them anything.
In the more severe version - you might call this the attempt to
discover if a consciousness can only be conscious of itself - it
becomes psychosis. "Existence exists" no longer tells them anything -
no matter how many times you repeat it.
So you might say that modern philosophy is the intellectual counterpart
of: psychosis.
Who do we have to thank for that - this disconnection of mind from
reality?
Tell us, Chris.
Fred Weiss
Chris Cathcart
"A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> > Oist metaphysics *is* realist metaphysics, far as I can tell. As
> > opposed to what -- materialism, idealism, solipsism, etc.? If
realism
> > is distinguished by recognizing a distinction between consciousness
and
> > and independently existing external world, then it would qualify as
> > realist.
>
> My question is: what is specifically Objectivist about it? How does it
> differ from all other realist metaphysical theories? What entitles us
to
> refer to that insight as being 'Objectivist'.
I don't think it is a specifically Objectivist metaphysical view. Just
that Oist metaphysics is a realist metaphysics.
Chris Cathcart
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
I can make any tautologous statement and the "content" would not be a
figment of my imagination, by what you say above. The existence of a
reality of which I am conscious is not made any more certain to me with
the addition of "existence exists."
"Existence exists" is presumably supposed to tell me that, really,
really, there is an existence. But all it says, is that *if* something
exists, then it really, really exists! Not all that interesting or
helpful.
Let me put it another way: does "swimmers swim" do any useful work to
tell me that swimmers are not a figment of my imagination?
Chris Cathcart
Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> trolls:
Nice try, Weiss. As I've already said, I'm done playing into your
games. Don't expect further responses from me to your inane postings.
--
Chris Cathcart
*
Rational Objectivism Resources:
Daily Objectivist - http://dailyobjectivist.com
Objectivist Center - http://objectivistcenter.org
We The Living Forums - http://wetheliving.com
Journal of Ayn Rand Studies - http://aynrandstudies.com
The ARI/Kelley Split - http://wetheliving.com/boston/ios.html
ARIan Idiocy Documented - http://jeffcomp.com/faq
Merrill on ITOE - http://members.nbci.com/cathcacr/gm.htm
Walsh on Rand and Kant -
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/objectivity/walsh1
Ken Gardner
[Regareding Objectivist metaphysics]
> > My question is: what is specifically Objectivist about it? How does it
> > differ from all other realist metaphysical theories? What entitles us
> > to refer to that insight as being 'Objectivist'.
> I don't think it is a specifically Objectivist metaphysical view. Just
> that Oist metaphysics is a realist metaphysics.
I don't think it is either. Aristotle also accepted the law of identity
and the primacy of existence, and he stated the law of identity, the law
of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle long before Rand
did.
Let me add to this list:
1. Despite Rand's and Peikoff's protestations to the contrary in ITOE
and OPAR, respectively, I don't think that Rand differed significantly
from Aristotle (other than on semantics or terminology) regarding the
nature of essences (or universals) and the rules of proper definition.
2. Assuming that "contextual certainty" was Rand's idea rather than
Peikoff's (I'm not sure that it actually was Rand's idea), I don't think
it differs significantly (other than on semantics or terminology) from
what Aristotle called "right opinion."
3. Their respective ethical systems are completely consistent with each
other. As far as I can tell, Rand's "values" is essentially identical
to Aristotle's "real and apparent goods" (with "rational values"
equating to "real goods"); Rand's life MQM is essentially identical with
Aristotle's happiness or eudaimia [sp?]; both accepted the trader
principle; both thought of virtues in terms of actions (although for
Aristotle a virtue was a settled disposition or habit to act in a
certain way); both regarded thought and the acquisition of knowledge as
man's noblest activity; both regarded pride is the crown of the virtues;
both are what I would call rational egoists. There is no Aristotelian
theory of the mean in Objectivist ethics, but I don't think that this
difference makes any _substantive_ difference in how to live well.
Indeed, all of the Objectivist virtues (rationality, independence,
integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride) are themselves
means between two extremes.
4. Even in politics, both regarded the purpose of the state to make it
possible for each individual to live well (i.e. in accordance with their
respective ethical system) and be happy.
There may be other similarities as well, but these are the ones that
come most immediately to my mind.
--
Ken
Fred Weiss
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> In article <8r6mkp$5bg$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> trolls:
>
> games. Don't expect further responses from me to your inane postings.
Chris, I believe that is now the 3rd or 4th time you've said that. You
are going to have to decide sooner or later - maybe by the 8th or 9th
time? - whether you actually mean or not.
Me, I don't care. What's the hpo experience without Chris Carthcart
ranting and raving at you?
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> >
> "Existence exists" is presumably supposed to tell me that, really,
> really, there is an existence. But all it says, is that *if* something
> exists, then it really, really exists! Not all that interesting or
> helpful.
It doesn't say "if", it says it DOES exist.
> Let me put it another way: does "swimmers swim" do any useful work to
> tell me that swimmers are not a figment of my imagination?
Yes, if thought that swimmers were like "bathers", an item of clothing.
--
Arnold
Zarathustra
Ken Gardner <kesga...@home.com> wrote in message
news:MPG.14411707fb83fd17989729@news...
> Chris Cathcart says...
>
> [Regareding Objectivist metaphysics]
>
> > > differ from all other realist metaphysical theories? What entitles us
> > > to refer to that insight as being 'Objectivist'.
>
> > that Oist metaphysics is a realist metaphysics.
>
> I don't think it is either. Aristotle also accepted the law of identity
> and the primacy of existence, and he stated the law of identity, the law
> of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle long before Rand
> did.
>
> Let me add to this list:
>
> 1. Despite Rand's and Peikoff's protestations to the contrary in ITOE
> and OPAR, respectively, I don't think that Rand differed significantly
> from Aristotle (other than on semantics or terminology) regarding the
> nature of essences (or universals) and the rules of proper definition.
The differences between Rand and Aristotle on this count are there, but they
are subtle. In a way, if you are going to say something like "despite what
he said, his philosophy isn't very different", then you are clearly saying
something odd. If we can't take Rand as saying that such and such is this
way and not that way as Aristotle said, and take that as, well, a
disaggreement between their philosophies .. then what would count?
> 2. Assuming that "contextual certainty" was Rand's idea rather than
> Peikoff's (I'm not sure that it actually was Rand's idea), I don't think
> it differs significantly (other than on semantics or terminology) from
> what Aristotle called "right opinion."
The you clearly don't know, that "right opinion" is specifically a belief
that is correct _but for the wrong (or no) reasons_ (as opposed to
knowledge, which, being for the right reasons, isn't opinion). He even goes
so far as to assocciate it in a weak sense with _chance_.
How in the world can you equate that with 'contextual certainty'?
> 3. Their respective ethical systems are completely consistent with each
> other. As far as I can tell, Rand's "values" is essentially identical
> to Aristotle's "real and apparent goods" (with "rational values"
> equating to "real goods"); Rand's life MQM is essentially identical with
> Aristotle's happiness or eudaimia [sp?]; both accepted the trader
> principle; both thought of virtues in terms of actions (although for
> Aristotle a virtue was a settled disposition or habit to act in a
> certain way); both regarded thought and the acquisition of knowledge as
> man's noblest activity; both regarded pride is the crown of the virtues;
> both are what I would call rational egoists. There is no Aristotelian
> theory of the mean in Objectivist ethics, but I don't think that this
> difference makes any _substantive_ difference in how to live well.
> Indeed, all of the Objectivist virtues (rationality, independence,
> integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride) are themselves
> means between two extremes.
In other words, their _meta-ethics_ was the same, and their specific ethics
were similar though not the same. The difference between them (as far as
such that I find) is that Rand denies any sharp distinction between sophia
and prudencia.
> 4. Even in politics, both regarded the purpose of the state to make it
> possible for each individual to live well (i.e. in accordance with their
> respective ethical system) and be happy.
Actually, that is not Aristotle's politics, for he specifically did _not_
put the word _possible_ in there. Aristotle clearly saw that the goal of
the state was not the preconditions of eudemonia, but the positive creation
thereof in it's citizens (and not of all the people in the society, but of
it's citizens, a distintion which Aristotle, being not a citizen of the city
in which he lived, was well aquainted with). The notion that the state
exists only to _protect_ eudemonia, and not to _create_ it, runs totally
counter to his belief that man has political needs, and thus participation
in the state is partually _constituent of_ eudemonia.
> There may be other similarities as well, but these are the ones that
> come most immediately to my mind.
Objectivism is both obviously, and self-conciously, a neo-Aristotelian
philosophy. But it is not re-stated Aristotelianism. There are specific
subtle differences in the meta-theories of the two philosophers, which
impact the derivations derived therefrom. However, it does take a subtle
mind to understand these differences, and if one approaches both
philosophies unsubtly, one won't see any important differences.
Ken Gardner
Welcome back to HPO.
> > 1. Despite Rand's and Peikoff's protestations to the contrary in ITOE
> > and OPAR, respectively, I don't think that Rand differed significantly
> > from Aristotle (other than on semantics or terminology) regarding the
> > nature of essences (or universals) and the rules of proper definition.
> The differences between Rand and Aristotle on this count are there, but they
> are subtle. In a way, if you are going to say something like "despite what
> he said, his philosophy isn't very different", then you are clearly saying
> something odd. If we can't take Rand as saying that such and such is this
> way and not that way as Aristotle said, and take that as, well, a
> disaggreement between their philosophies .. then what would count?
The problem is that I cannot find any evidence that Aristotle actually
believed the things regarding essences or universals that Rand
attributed to him and with which she says she disagrees. In particular,
I am unaware of any evidence that Aristotle believed that one grasps
essences or universals by "just looking" at the object -- a charge that
Rand makes on page 53 of ITOE and Peikoff repeats on pages 142-43 of
OPAR. I'm not saying that I know for a fact that Rand and Peikoff are
wrong, only that I have seen no evidence that they are right and some
evidence that they may be mistaken.
> > 2. Assuming that "contextual certainty" was Rand's idea rather than
> > Peikoff's (I'm not sure that it actually was Rand's idea), I don't think
> > it differs significantly (other than on semantics or terminology) from
> > what Aristotle called "right opinion."
> The you clearly don't know, that "right opinion" is specifically a belief
> that is correct _but for the wrong (or no) reasons_ (as opposed to
> knowledge, which, being for the right reasons, isn't opinion). He even goes
> so far as to assocciate it in a weak sense with _chance_.
That's not my understanding at all. My understanding is that Aristotle
would call an opinion -- even a correct opinion -- as mere opinion
unless it is supported by evidence. What he calls "right opinion" is a
conclusion supported by all of the known evidence even though it is
impossible to rule out the possibility of the opposite conclusion. A
right opinion becomes knowledge when the evidence supports the
conclusion and the opposite conclusion is logically impossible, i.e.
leads to a contradiction. See generally Posterior Analytics, Book I,
Chapter 33, although I may be able to dig up other supporting works as
well.
> How in the world can you equate that with 'contextual certainty'?
I think of contextual certainty as a conclusion in which the evidence
points conclusively to the conclusion and there is no known evidence
supporting the contrary conclusion, i.e. exactly the same way that I
think of Aristotle's "right opinion." If, in addition to the foregoing,
I can further show that the opposite conclusion would contradict one or
more known facts, or that the opposite conclusion is a contrary of a
statement that I know to be true, then I _know_ that the conclusion is
true and that it will hold true in any relevant context. I then say
that I _know_ that the conclusion is true, not that I am "contextually
certain" that the conclusion is true.
For example, I am contextually certain that either Gore or Bush will win
the upcoming election. However, because it is impossible to rule out
the possibility of someone else winning the election, this conclusion is
not knowledge in the Aristotelian sense, but a right opinion.
> In other words, their _meta-ethics_ was the same, and their specific ethics
> were similar though not the same. The difference between them (as far as
> such that I find) is that Rand denies any sharp distinction between sophia
> and prudencia.
I understand what you mean by metaethics, but you lost me with the last
sentence. What do you mean by sophia and prudencia? Are you talking
about Aristotle's distinction between practical knowledge and
theoretical or speculative knowledge? If so, I would agree that Rand
properly denied that any proper distinction between the two exists.
More generally, I regard their ethics as consistent with each other,
although they are certainly different in many respects.
> Objectivism is both obviously, and self-conciously, a neo-Aristotelian
> philosophy. But it is not re-stated Aristotelianism.
I think the biggest and most important difference is Rand's theory of
concepts, which has no counterpart in Aristotle or anyone else as far as
I know. The metaphysics are essentially identical as far as I can tell.
The ethical systems are different, albeit consistent with each other.
> There are specific
> subtle differences in the meta-theories of the two philosophers, which
> impact the derivations derived therefrom. However, it does take a subtle
> mind to understand these differences, and if one approaches both
> philosophies unsubtly, one won't see any important differences.
Let me make two qualifications. First, although I am currently studying
Aristotle, I know much more about Rand and Objectivism than I do about
Aristotelian philosophy. Second, notwithstanding your comment above,
which I respect, I definitely see similarities between the two
philosophies that appear to be understated or underappreciated in the
Objectivist literature, even if if the two philosophies are not
substantially identical in every respect.
--
Ken
R Lawrence
>My eyes tell me that there exists something independent of my
>consciousness. It doesn't tell me that "existence exists," which is an
>empty tautology. Just ask Richard Lawrence, who some time back I
>remember reducing the statement to what Rand actually meant to say:
>That there exists at least one entity of which I am aware (or something
>close to this).
I believe you are referring to the following exchange I had with someone
else in March 1999 (the highest and lowest levels of nesting are me):
>>>You are implying that she equivocated, which she didn't. What she did was
>>>state that for there to be an "existance," there must be something that
>>>exists, and it must exist outside of one's consciousness.
>>
>>Again, that's a reasonable thesis, but it's not the same thesis as "existence
>>exists."
>
>You are assuming Rand intends for "existence exists" to have nothing but
>the tautological meaning, and then excluding other possible meanings
>because they don't match that assumption. You seem to be forgetting Rand's
>propensity for summing up her theses in short statements (for example, "The
>fact that a living entity *is*, determines what it *ought* to do," or
>"Existence is Identity") that can only be fully understood in the light of
>the surrounding text. When you take Rand's statements on the matter
>discussed just above, and the other matters she discusses in those
>subsequent paragraphs, and use it to unpack the original statement, the
>full meaning turns out to be, "At least one entity with a specific identity
>exists outside one's consciousness and is perceivable by one's
>consciousness." I don't think this is a claim that most people would
>disagree with, but it isn't the simple tautology you make it out to be.
Rand refers to two specific ideas as "corollary axioms" of EE: 1) "that
something exists which one perceives" and 2) "that one exists possessing
consciousness." Now, it is paradoxical to refer to something as a
"corollary" and an "axiom" at the same time, so if you want to simply
dismiss Rand's ideas out of hand you may feel free to pick on that as well.
However, in the spirit of trying to actually understand the ideas she is
trying to convey, I personally recognize that Rand was not writing a text
on formal logic, so I don't try to interpret her as if she was. (The quotes
above are from Galt's speech in _Atlas Shrugged_, p. 942.) I believe the
only reasonable interpretation of Rand's statements is that these two basic
axioms ("existence and consciousness," as she refers to them a few
sentences later) are summarized by the more pithy statement that "existence
exists." Add to this the idea represented by her later as "existence is
identity," and you have what Peikoff discusses as the "three axioms" of
"existence, consciousness, and identity." (OPAR, pp. 6-12)
Back from quoting my own earlier post to quoting Mr. Cathcart:
> But even he'd tell you that this doesn't mean the same
>thing as "existence exists."
Actually, my point in the earlier post was that this *was* what Rand meant
by "existence exists." If you want to understand what someone is trying to
say, you can't just impose your own choice of meaning on that person's
phrases. You seem to already recognize that when Rand said "existence
exists" she meant something more than the tautology you keep complaining
about. So what's the gripe?
--
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com>
Visit the Objectivism Reference Center: http://www.objectivism.addr.com/
Chris Cathcart
Yes, thanks for re-posting this. I wasn't exact, but wasn't too far off.
I remember it well enough in part because Grossman replied with some rant
that your explanation represented the corrupt state of someone whose mind
is rotted out by modern philosophy. :-) (Again, not exact, but
reasonably close).
[...]
> > But even he'd tell you that this doesn't mean the same
> >thing as "existence exists."
>
> Actually, my point in the earlier post was that this *was* what Rand meant
> by "existence exists." If you want to understand what someone is trying to
> say, you can't just impose your own choice of meaning on that person's
> phrases. You seem to already recognize that when Rand said "existence
> exists" she meant something more than the tautology you keep complaining
> about. So what's the gripe?
My "gripe" is that while Rand *wanted to mean* something more expansive
than "EE," what she is saying by "EE" and what it does mean are different
than what she wanted to mean. And, of course, there is the further (and
more philosophically substantive) "gripe" that Rand thought that she
could get more out of "EE" (either in its intended or actual meaning)
than she is philosophically warranted in doing so.
In regard to the latter, I've provided a similar case in these threads to
what Rand mistakenly thought she could get out of the law of identity:
the law of causality understood in some non-tautological sense, when as
stated it is tautological, which is all you could expect to get out of
the law of identity. ("A thing is what it is, and, accordingly, behaves/
acts in accordance with its identity in any given set of circumstances"
is pretty straightforwardly tautological, no matter what Rand or Peikoff
meant to say or intended to mean.)
Chris Cathcart
I think what Ken is saying is that in its fundamental aims and methods,
Rand strives to be Aristotelian in her philosophy. (Of course, one can
adopt the view that Aristotle was, qua philosopher, immensely greater
than Rand and that the basic goodness of her approach arises from its
aiming to be fundamentally Aristotelian, rather than vice versa (i.e.,
that A's philosophy is fundamentally good in terms of how well it
approaches Oism).)
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>I believe you are referring to the following exchange I had with someone
>>else in March 1999 (the highest and lowest levels of nesting are me):
<snip>
>Yes, thanks for re-posting this. I wasn't exact, but wasn't too far off.
>I remember it well enough in part because Grossman replied with some rant
>that your explanation represented the corrupt state of someone whose mind
>is rotted out by modern philosophy. :-) (Again, not exact, but
>reasonably close).
Ah. I wasn't aware of that reply, since Grossman is one of the two people
in my hpo killfile. My discussion was with someone else. If anything useful
was said amongst the ravings of Grossman's mental disturbance, feel free to
make those points yourself.
<snip>
>> You seem to already recognize that when Rand said "existence
>>exists" she meant something more than the tautology you keep complaining
>>about. So what's the gripe?
>
>My "gripe" is that while Rand *wanted to mean* something more expansive
>than "EE," what she is saying by "EE" and what it does mean are different
>than what she wanted to mean.
If Rand had simply said, "Existence exists," with no further explanation,
and expected everyone to understand a broader meaning from that, then I
would be more sympathetic to this complaint. Some Objectivists *are* in
error when they introduce the phrase to people who haven't encountered
Rand's full explanation, and assume those people will understand it as
Objectivists do. However, Rand in fact followed the initial statement with
several paragraphs of explanation (which Peikoff expands into several pages
in OPAR). Her intended meaning has been conveyed. Wresting two words from a
much longer passage and demanding that they be understood without context
is not a reasonable approach -- regardless of whether you the one are doing
it, or someone else is.
> And, of course, there is the further (and
>more philosophically substantive) "gripe" that Rand thought that she
>could get more out of "EE" (either in its intended or actual meaning)
>than she is philosophically warranted in doing so.
Do you have any examples of this as regards the intended meaning? You have
spent a lot of effort showing that the tautology (what you call the "actual
meaning") doesn't have a lot of implications, but I don't recall seeing you
address Rand's more robust claims (other than to acknowledge that she
really did mean more than the tautology).
Chris Cathcart
R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > And, of course, there is the further (and
> >more philosophically substantive) "gripe" that Rand thought that she
> >could get more out of "EE" (either in its intended or actual meaning)
> >than she is philosophically warranted in doing so.
>
> Do you have any examples of this as regards the intended meaning? You
have
> spent a lot of effort showing that the tautology (what you call
the "actual
> meaning") doesn't have a lot of implications, but I don't recall
seeing you
> address Rand's more robust claims (other than to acknowledge that she
> really did mean more than the tautology).
Nearly anything covered in ch. 1 of OPAR falls under the alleged
attempt to show what "follows" from "EE", in either its actual or
intended meaning. I'll take Peikoff at his word here, from pp. 15-16
of OPAR:
"A corollary of an axiom . . . is, in effect, a new angle on an
established principle, which follows immediately once one grasps its
meaning and the principle on which it depends.
"Many of the most important truths in philosophy occupy this
intermediate status. They are neither axioms nor theorems, but
correlaries -- most often corollaries of axioms. In fact, the essence
of metaphysics, according to Objectivism, is he step-by-step
development of the corollaries of the existence axiom. The main
purpose of this chapter is to unravel systematically the implications
of 'Existence exists.'"
This statement occurs in the discussion of the law of causality, and I
just explained in my previous reply how this is an example of Rand and
Peikoff trying to derive substantive claims from ones that aren't all
that substantive. From A=A they purport to show that a non-
tautological law of causality follows, but their fundamental statement
of the law is tautological. Using "existence exists," specifically,
they try to show such things as the falsity of idealism or the non-
existence of God. (The latter is most obvious in Branden's discussion
of the impossibility of God's existence back in the _Newsletter_. He
invokes "existence exists" in his argument, where it has no legitimate
employment either in its tautological or substantive [Rand's intended
meaning] sense.) They characterize idealism as upholding consciousness
without existence, which is a denial of "EE". Not that this is an
accurate depiction of idealism, but it is the invoking of axioms to
systematically rule out a metaphysical position that they aren't
warrented in ruling out. Now idealism is a strange metaphysical
viewpoint, but nowhere do idealists ever profess to posit a
consciousness without existence.
Maybe the "refutation" of idealism is supportable given a systematic
enough explanation of what it means for existence to be metaphysically
primary over consciousness, as follows from "EE" construed
substantively (Rand's intended meaning). I'd have to think more on
that. The others, though, look rather suspect.
I might also mention that Peikoff in OPAR begins by equating "EE"
with "what is, is." This sense is tautological as I've been trying to
show. It does indicate that they are working with more than one sense
of "EE."
R Lawrence
>Nearly anything covered in ch. 1 of OPAR falls under the alleged
>attempt to show what "follows" from "EE", in either its actual or
>intended meaning. I'll take Peikoff at his word here, from pp. 15-16
>of OPAR:
>
>"A corollary of an axiom . . . is, in effect, a new angle on an
>established principle, which follows immediately once one grasps its
>meaning and the principle on which it depends.
>
>"Many of the most important truths in philosophy occupy this
>intermediate status. They are neither axioms nor theorems, but
>correlaries -- most often corollaries of axioms. In fact, the essence
>of metaphysics, according to Objectivism, is he step-by-step
>development of the corollaries of the existence axiom. The main
>purpose of this chapter is to unravel systematically the implications
>of 'Existence exists.'"
Peikoff's distinction of "corollaries" as opposed to "axioms" or
"theorems," doesn't appear to be followed consistently in Objectivist
texts. For example, Rand refers to "corollary axioms" in AS, while Peikoff
says, "A corollary of an axiom is not itself an axiom." (OPAR, p. 15)
Peikoff also throws in an unexplained distinction between an axiom and a
"basic axiom," when he claims that the concept of 'entity' is the former
but not the latter (OPAR, pp. 12-13). I suspect that the source of this
confusion is simply that all of these ideas ('existence', 'consciousness',
'identity', and 'entity') are all very intimately connected, so that
referring to one as a "corollary," another as a "basic axiom," etc., is a
matter of unnecessary distinctions. They are all axioms, related to one
another by being different aspects of the same fundamental understanding of
reality, which is the only understanding of reality possible to human
beings.
>This statement occurs in the discussion of the law of causality, and I
>just explained in my previous reply how this is an example of Rand and
>Peikoff trying to derive substantive claims from ones that aren't all
>that substantive. From A=A they purport to show that a non-
>tautological law of causality follows, but their fundamental statement
>of the law is tautological.
The Objectivist statement of causality does not tell us about any
particular causes -- it only tells us that an entity's nature causes its
actions, without specifying anything about that nature. So, yes, there is a
tautological element, if one specifies the nature of a things in terms of
the actions they cause (or are capable of causing). However, there is also
a key non-tautological element in this formulation: the cause of each
action is an entity, not some prior action or relation. Peikoff puts it
succinctly as, "All actions are caused by entities." (OPAR, p. 15) This
formulation is critical to understanding free will. (Although Peikoff does
not acknowledge this, understanding causality as based in entities also
allows for indeterminism outside of volition, but that's getting a bit off
the topic.)
> Using "existence exists," specifically,
>they try to show such things as the falsity of idealism or the non-
>existence of God. (The latter is most obvious in Branden's discussion
>of the impossibility of God's existence back in the _Newsletter_. He
>invokes "existence exists" in his argument, where it has no legitimate
>employment either in its tautological or substantive [Rand's intended
>meaning] sense.)
Without going back to Branden (an exercise for which I lack time at the
moment), I would note that Peikoff does not appeal directly to EE in his
discussions of the existence of God. He does appeal to some of the other
axioms, however. In some cases he is correct in doing so (some of the
attributes claimed for God make no sense under a realist metaphysics). In
other cases he picks the wrong axiom. In one broad claim -- that "Every
argument commonly offered for the notion of God leads to a contradiction of
the axiomatic concepts of philosophy" -- I think he overstates his case.
However, 'God' is such a nonsensical mishmash, with so many differing views
about what it supposedly is, that no brief treatment can address all the
variations.
What is most dubious about Peikoff's treatment, IMO, is that he takes
belief in God as an example of idealism. Commonplace theism is only partly
related to metaphysical idealism.
David Buchner
> [....] As worded, it ["existence exists"] doesn't do any of the work that
> Rand wants to do in her metaphysics, e.g., something like her concept of
> the primacy of existence, or the existence of an external world. IOW, it
> can't be used in any helpful way to establish metaphysical theses like the
> existence of the external world, or the non-existence of God, or the
> falsity of materialism and determinism.
What do you mena by the falsity of materialism? Or, I guess, what kind
of "materialism" are you referring to?
--
David
Buc...@wcta.net
Osage MN http://customer.wcta.net/buchner
A.Carmichael
"R Lawrence" <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:405C5.1660$Y5.4...@typhoon.san.rr.com...
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> >R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> If Rand had simply said, "Existence exists," with no further explanation,
> and expected everyone to understand a broader meaning from that, then I
the initial statement with
> several paragraphs of explanation (which Peikoff expands into several
pages
> in OPAR). Her intended meaning has been conveyed.
A reasonable argument but but to my knowledge it retains the pitfalls that
(to my knowledge) philosophy as a discipline tries to avoid. When an
argument is loosely worded and informally explained it remains subject to
different interpretations, no matter how vehement the presentation. To my
knowledge philosophers in their arguments advocate the need for
quasi-mathematical precision of language so that their words, in so far as
it is humanly possible can have one and only one meaning. Also, there are
other pitfalls to lack of formal precision such as the danger of hidden
logical flaws. Precision forces logical consistency or at least facilitates
the analysis for possible inconsistencies.
Fred Weiss
"A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
>
> A reasonable argument but but to my knowledge it retains the pitfalls
that
> (to my knowledge) philosophy as a discipline tries to avoid. When an
> argument is loosely worded and informally explained it remains
subject to
> different interpretations, no matter how vehement the presentation.
To my
> knowledge philosophers in their arguments advocate the need for
> quasi-mathematical precision of language so that their words, in so
far as
> it is humanly possible can have one and only one meaning. Also, there
are
> other pitfalls to lack of formal precision such as the danger of
hidden
> logical flaws. Precision forces logical consistency or at least
facilitates
> the analysis for possible inconsistencies.
This is a phoney charge. Ayn Rand was, if anything, precise - or to put
it another way, there is less issue with her as to what she meant than
with virtually any other major philosopher in history.
The real issue is that she dealt only with the essentials. In that
regard, dropping her context, one can always wish that she had written
more and anticipated every future question. But that can also be said
about virtually all major thinkers and with more reason. Ayn Rand did
far more than enough, which doesn't mean she solved every problem and
didn't leave unanswered questions
This kind of charge comes mainly from "modern" philosophers who, by
their own admission, have little or nothing to contribute to philosophy
and whom virtually nobody reads, except themselves. They can be as
safely "precise" as they care to be because they are like ants looking
up and endlessly commenting on the shoe polish of giants.
Fred Weiss
Torkel Franzen
> This is a phoney charge. Ayn Rand was, if anything, precise - or to put
> it another way, there is less issue with her as to what she meant than
> with virtually any other major philosopher in history.
I'm not sure about that - L. Ron Hubbard is much more precise.
Owl
news:vcbitr9...@beta13.sm.luth.se...
> Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> writes:
>
> > This is a phoney charge. Ayn Rand was, if anything, precise - or to
put
> > it another way, there is less issue with her as to what she meant
than
> > with virtually any other major philosopher in history.
Yeah, there's hardly ever any disagreement among Objectivists about what
Objectivism is, is there?
> I'm not sure about that - L. Ron Hubbard is much more precise.
Imprecision is quite a different thing from ambiguity. Ayn Rand usually
made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was confused
and imprecise.
A.Carmichael
"Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message news:8rgron$cdk$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net...
> Imprecision is quite a different thing from ambiguity. Ayn Rand usually
> made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was confused
> and imprecise.
Survival vs. flourishing, is that imprecision or ambiguity?
Stealing food to survive is not wrong but you still have to make it right?
To shoot or not to shoot the Eskimo?
Benevolence or compassion?
Frank O'Connor a hero?
Etc., on and on.
Fred Weiss
"A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
>
> "Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message
news:8rgron$cdk$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net...
>
usually
> > made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was
confused
> > and imprecise.
>
> Stealing food to survive is not wrong but you still have to make it
right?
> To shoot or not to shoot the Eskimo?
> Benevolence or compassion?
> Frank O'Connor a hero?
> Etc., on and on.
Ayn Rand in fact was very clear about what she thought about these
issues. But if she was not anything, she was not a "rationalist". She
repeated the importance of keeping context about a "million" times in
her writing and in her public statements. That can cause confusion, but
it is not a confusion *she* causes. It is in the nature of reality.
The irony in all of this is that it is the same people who are
constantly proclaiming that we can't be certain of anything who are now
criticizing AR for not laying down absolute principles that would apply
in every conceivable situation. They are in effect accusing of her not
being a Kantian. Well, she wasn't a Kantian.
Fred Weiss
R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> The Objectivist statement of causality does not tell us about any
> particular causes -- it only tells us that an entity's nature causes
its
> actions, without specifying anything about that nature. So, yes,
there is a
> tautological element,...
If you care to, Richard, I'd be interested in some elaboration of what
you mean by "tautological" in this context. For that matter, I'd be
interested in any wider thoughts you have about the concept and its
applications.
Torkel Franzen
> Imprecision is quite a different thing from ambiguity. Ayn Rand usually
> made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was confused
> and imprecise.
Rand clearly presented her confused and imprecise thoughts?
Stephen Grossman
<kesga...@home.com> wrote:
> 1. Despite Rand's and Peikoff's protestations to the contrary in ITOE
> and OPAR, respectively, I don't think that Rand differed significantly
> from Aristotle (other than on semantics or terminology) regarding the
> nature of essences (or universals) and the rules of proper definition.
Aristotle said essences were metaphysical and Rand said they were
epistemological, a big difference. I believe that Aristotle's view of
definition lef Rand to make an epistemological interpretation of some of
his metaphysics, ie, that part which is Platonic. There is no evidence
that Rand liked his view of essence.
=========================================================
Man's mind is his basic means of survival. AYN RAND
-------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
-------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman Fairhaven, MA, USA sdg...@att.net
A.Carmichael
"Fred Weiss" <pape...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:8rhfa2$l67$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> In article <0IVC5.4001$q9.1...@news-west.usenetserver.com>,
> "A.Carmichael" <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> >
> > "Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message
> news:8rgron$cdk$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net...
> >
> usually
> > > made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was
> confused
> > > and imprecise.
> >
> > Stealing food to survive is not wrong but you still have to make it
> right?
> > To shoot or not to shoot the Eskimo?
> > Benevolence or compassion?
> > Frank O'Connor a hero?
> > Etc., on and on.
>
> Ayn Rand in fact was very clear about what she thought about these
> issues. But if she was not anything, she was not a "rationalist". She
> repeated the importance of keeping context about a "million" times in
> her writing and in her public statements. That can cause confusion, but
> it is not a confusion *she* causes. It is in the nature of reality.
>
> The irony in all of this is that it is the same people who are
> constantly proclaiming that we can't be certain of anything who are now
> criticizing AR for not laying down absolute principles that would apply
> in every conceivable situation. They are in effect accusing of her not
> being a Kantian. Well, she wasn't a Kantian.
>
> Fred Weiss
From the above I gather that there is confusion, ambiguity and imprecission
but it is not Rand's fault; it is the fault of any one who earnestly tries
to interpret and practice what she said. Very strange! Or maybe it is just
the fault of anyone who interprets it diffently from whoever claims that it
is clear and precise?
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Owl
news:0IVC5.4001$q9.1...@news-west.usenetserver.com...
> Survival vs. flourishing, is that imprecision or ambiguity?
Well, I said that ambiguity and imprecision were different things. I
neglected to mention a third thing, different from either of those two,
which is inconsistency. I would say Rand's statements about the ultimate
value were inconsistent, not ambiguous. Also, of course, the idea of
"flourishing" is extremely vague.
Here's an example of imprecision: "The man was somewhere around 6 feet
tall." Here's an example of ambiguity: "John went to the bank", said in a
town where there is a river and a money-lending institution nearby.
> Stealing food to survive is not wrong but you still have to make it
right?
I can't parse the end of this sentence.
> To shoot or not to shoot the Eskimo?
I don't think Rand ever discussed the Eskimo. Failure to answer a question
is yet a fourth thing, different from imprecision, ambiguity, and
inconsistency.
> Benevolence or compassion?
I'm not sure what the difference is between those.
> Frank O'Connor a hero?
I didn't know Frank, so I don't know what intellectual flaw, if any, would
be involved in saying he was a hero.
Owl
> > Imprecision is quite a different thing from ambiguity. Ayn Rand
usually
> > made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was
confused
> > and imprecise.
>
Exactly.
"The man was of about average height" is a clear statement of an imprecise
proposition. "Kant thought that reality isn't real" is a clear statement
of a confused belief (confused about what Kant thought).
A.Carmichael
"Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message news:8rihqd$j8$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net...
> A.Carmichael <acar...@mail.com> wrote in message
> news:0IVC5.4001$q9.1...@news-west.usenetserver.com...
> > Survival vs. flourishing, is that imprecision or ambiguity?
>
> Well, I said that ambiguity and imprecision were different things. I
> neglected to mention a third thing, different from either of those two,
> which is inconsistency. I would say Rand's statements about the ultimate
> value were inconsistent, not ambiguous. Also, of course, the idea of
> "flourishing" is extremely vague.
>
> Here's an example of imprecision: "The man was somewhere around 6 feet
> tall." Here's an example of ambiguity: "John went to the bank", said in a
> town where there is a river and a money-lending institution nearby.
I've made a note of that. :-))
> > Stealing food to survive is not wrong but you still have to make it
> right?
>
> I can't parse the end of this sentence.
If you have to violate property rights in order to survive you must accept
just punishment, such as going to jail.
> > To shoot or not to shoot the Eskimo?
>
> I don't think Rand ever discussed the Eskimo. Failure to answer a question
> is yet a fourth thing, different from imprecision, ambiguity, and
> inconsistency.
Oh, so sorry. How careless of me.
> > Benevolence or compassion?
>
> I'm not sure what the difference is between those.
Neither are other Rand admirers. And despite whatever reservations you do
have about Rand's style of doing philosophy, you give signs of having been
influenced in a profound way by her ideas. You have impressed me as being an
intellectual beneficiary of Rand's legacy. Thus your interest in her. Not
that there is anything wrong with that....
> > Frank O'Connor a hero?
>
> I didn't know Frank, so I don't know what intellectual flaw, if any, would
> be involved in saying he was a hero.
Frank was a henpecked, cuckolded husband. Rand's heroes were strong and
independent men but she showed her appreciation by referring to him as "her
hero".
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A.Carmichael
"Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message news:8rihve$ft8$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net...> news:vcbn1gj...@beta13.sm.luth.se...
> > > Imprecision is quite a different thing from ambiguity. Ayn Rand
> usually
> > > made it clear what she thought -- even when what she thought was
> confused
> > > and imprecise.
> >
>
> Exactly.
> "The man was of about average height" is a clear statement of an imprecise
> proposition. "Kant thought that reality isn't real" is a clear statement
> of a confused belief (confused about what Kant thought).
Nonsense. If somebody gives clear signs of being confused you will say that
he is a model of clarity? The stature example is precise within a range, as
all measurents are. It is true that one can clearly convey imprecise data
_if that is his intention_. If the imprecision is unintentional, there is no
clarity. The statement is unclear.
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A.Carmichael
> > issues. But if she was not anything, she was not a "rationalist". She
> > repeated the importance of keeping context about a "million" times in
> > her writing and in her public statements. That can cause confusion, but
> > it is not a confusion *she* causes. It is in the nature of reality.
If it is in the nature of reality to be confusing to the human intellect
then Rand's basic contentions are contradicted.
Owl
> Nonsense. If somebody gives clear signs of being confused you will say
that
> he is a model of clarity?
No, I won't say he's a 'model of clarity.' But I may say that he 'made
clear what he thought.'
Owl
> If you have to violate property rights in order to survive you must
accept
> just punishment, such as going to jail.
I doubt if Rand believed that. There is an imaginary case where you are
lost in the woods and starving; you come upon a cabin, and you have to
steal some of the food in order to survive. I think Rand would agree that
you should do so, and I don't think she would say you should be sent to
jail afterwards. Do you know of some case where she said that?
A.Carmichael
"Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message news:8rldro$td3$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
> > Nonsense. If somebody gives clear signs of being confused you will say
> that
> > he is a model of clarity?
>
> No, I won't say he's a 'model of clarity.' But I may say that he 'made
> clear what he thought.'
>
in Rand's case. It is not a simple matter of condescending to Rand and that
is not what I am doing, but it is a fact that there are internal
inconsistencies that make it impossible to discern what she thought on
certain issues, including issues that she addressed, like the ethics of
emergencies.
A.Carmichael
"Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message news:8rle1i$9b6$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
It has been quoted on this board a number of times - that one must be
prepared to accept the 'just' consequences even if that means going to jail.
I quote the quoters.
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Zarathustra
> Zarathustra says...
> Welcome back to HPO.
> The problem is that I cannot find any evidence that Aristotle actually
> believed the things regarding essences or universals that Rand
> attributed to him and with which she says she disagrees. In particular,
> I am unaware of any evidence that Aristotle believed that one grasps
> essences or universals by "just looking" at the object -- a charge that
> Rand makes on page 53 of ITOE and Peikoff repeats on pages 142-43 of
> OPAR. I'm not saying that I know for a fact that Rand and Peikoff are
> wrong, only that I have seen no evidence that they are right and some
> evidence that they may be mistaken.
Actually, I didn't notice her or Peikoff saying that. I would find that
rather odd, for while one could read him as implying such if one only read
the so-called-important parts of the so-called-important works, anybody who
had read his lesser metaphysical works (on animals, on sense and sensible
objects and such) would know better than to think he held such a .. well ..
naive view. However, I didn't notice any clear part of Metaphysics where he
actually explains _how_ one can tell an essential attribute from an
accidental one, and it would no doubt be charactaristic of him to say
something like 'well, we adult humans just have a lot of experience in doing
it', ie. like with his ethics. Ie. his lack of saying just how we can tell
the difference, might lead one to think that, in his lack of explanation, he
is saying 'we just do'.
However, he is very clear in Metaphysics that there is a something special
about me that I am called a man and not an animal, and that this is in, not
you, but me (metaphysically speaking). This is expressed in the difference
between essense and accident. If you think that he does hold to the belief
that there are a subset of attributes of every object that are somehow of a
different class than the others, then you haven't done a good job of reading
him.
> > > 2. Assuming that "contextual certainty" was Rand's idea rather than
> > > Peikoff's (I'm not sure that it actually was Rand's idea), I don't
think
> > > it differs significantly (other than on semantics or terminology) from
> > > what Aristotle called "right opinion."
>
> > The you clearly don't know, that "right opinion" is specifically a
belief
> > that is correct _but for the wrong (or no) reasons_ (as opposed to
> > knowledge, which, being for the right reasons, isn't opinion). He even
goes
> > so far as to assocciate it in a weak sense with _chance_.
>
> That's not my understanding at all. My understanding is that Aristotle
> would call an opinion -- even a correct opinion -- as mere opinion
> unless it is supported by evidence. What he calls "right opinion" is a
> conclusion supported by all of the known evidence even though it is
> impossible to rule out the possibility of the opposite conclusion. A
> right opinion becomes knowledge when the evidence supports the
> conclusion and the opposite conclusion is logically impossible, i.e.
> leads to a contradiction. See generally Posterior Analytics, Book I,
> Chapter 33, although I may be able to dig up other supporting works as
> well.
My translation says "Opinion amounts to taking an immediate premise, which
is not neccessary", and ".. when we think that a fact may well vary, then we
think that we have opinion" "whereas science deals with the necessary".
I see nothing in that chapter that restricts from his understanding of
'opinion', what we call 'arbitrary'. Closest to his conception in our
language is 'belief'. For when we have a belief, we both hold that that
something is so, but that we might be wrong ... that our thinking it is so
is not _necessary_ given what we know.
Aristotle's "opinion" would be coextensive with what is commonly called
"arbitrary" conjuncted with "proponderance of the evidence" and "reasonable
certainty".
> > How in the world can you equate that with 'contextual certainty'?
>
> I think of contextual certainty as a conclusion in which the evidence
> points conclusively to the conclusion and there is no known evidence
> supporting the contrary conclusion, i.e. exactly the same way that I
> think of Aristotle's "right opinion." If, in addition to the foregoing,
> I can further show that the opposite conclusion would contradict one or
> more known facts, or that the opposite conclusion is a contrary of a
> statement that I know to be true, then I _know_ that the conclusion is
> true and that it will hold true in any relevant context. I then say
> that I _know_ that the conclusion is true, not that I am "contextually
> certain" that the conclusion is true.
>
> For example, I am contextually certain that either Gore or Bush will win
> the upcoming election. However, because it is impossible to rule out
> the possibility of someone else winning the election, this conclusion is
> not knowledge in the Aristotelian sense, but a right opinion.
Aristotle's fundamental distinction is that in knowledge, one "graps the
necessary truth in the same manner that he grasps the definitions that
mediate proof" and that in opinion one "gets to (it) through intermediate
premises". This is of course, a very difficult passage to restate in easily
understood terms, but it seems reasonable to take him as saying that if one
has to add outside premises to one's arguement, then one has opinion, if it
follows logically from the premises you give.
Seems that as literal a reading I can give is that an opinion is formed by
forming taking your given premises and then adding others too it from
outside the arguement per sae , which are not neccessarily true, and do not
constitue your corpus of evidence, ie. what we call the making of an
assumption.
But if the core if it all is what is or isn't a neccessary truth, then don't
what isn't a neccessary truth depend in some sense on chance, so that right
opinion depends in part on chance (like your election example) for it's
being right opinion as opposed to false opinion (before 'the die is thrown'
at least)?
> > In other words, their _meta-ethics_ was the same, and their specific
ethics
> > were similar though not the same. The difference between them (as far
as
> > such that I find) is that Rand denies any sharp distinction between
sophia
> > and prudencia.
>
> I understand what you mean by metaethics, but you lost me with the last
> sentence. What do you mean by sophia and prudencia? Are you talking
> about Aristotle's distinction between practical knowledge and
> theoretical or speculative knowledge? If so, I would agree that Rand
> properly denied that any proper distinction between the two exists.
Are those not the propert words in Ancient Greek for those terms?
> More generally, I regard their ethics as consistent with each other,
> although they are certainly different in many respects.
>
> > Objectivism is both obviously, and self-conciously, a neo-Aristotelian
> > philosophy. But it is not re-stated Aristotelianism.
>
> I think the biggest and most important difference is Rand's theory of
> concepts, which has no counterpart in Aristotle or anyone else as far as
> I know. The metaphysics are essentially identical as far as I can tell.
> The ethical systems are different, albeit consistent with each other.
That is of course the obvious difference, but I still see a difference in
their metaphysics, related to the denial of the essence/accident
distinction. I have allways taken, since I took the time to reflect on just
exactly what it means, that "Existence is Identity" entails what I call the
denial of the substratum. I'm beginning to wonder if I am reading my own
views into Rand here, but if I am, it's a view I arrived at as a response to
reading her.
> > There are specific
> > subtle differences in the meta-theories of the two philosophers, which
> > impact the derivations derived therefrom. However, it does take a
subtle
> > mind to understand these differences, and if one approaches both
> > philosophies unsubtly, one won't see any important differences.
>
> Let me make two qualifications. First, although I am currently studying
> Aristotle, I know much more about Rand and Objectivism than I do about
> Aristotelian philosophy. Second, notwithstanding your comment above,
> which I respect, I definitely see similarities between the two
> philosophies that appear to be understated or underappreciated in the
> Objectivist literature, even if if the two philosophies are not
> substantially identical in every respect.
To be honest, I agree. But nevertheeless, I can't fault Objectists for not
presenting their philosophy as "Aristotelianism with these 4 changes", for
that would hardly sell very well ... and everybody who's found fault with
Aristotle himself would just dismiss them out of hand. If the PC had been
marketed as just a tiny one-console mainframe ... as opposed to a 'new
invention', would it have sold as well?
I should warn you that all my studies are on a self-directed self-evaluated
self-study at an admittedly amateur level (well, I would like to think my
understand is better than 'amateur level', but the way I study it is ... I
have no formal training.) Given that, I acknowledge that nearly all of my
philosophical views are formed as a result of my reading the works written
by Rand, yet I don't consider myself an Objectivist so much as a
neo-Aristotelian. In one way, that's because it's much more respectable to
be a neo-Aristotelian than an 'Objectivist', and one is committing oneself
to less (and thus gives oneself wider room in one's search for truth). The
other reason is that I more often find myself refering to Aristotle than
Rand when dealing with the more complex issues of applying the fundamentals.
For instance, where in Rand's corpus is there anything comparable to
Aristotle's analysis of responsibility, or just what constitutes being
'forced'. When you need subtlety in you thinking, Rand falls short where
Aristotle shines through. Truth is, I'm not an "adherent" of any "-ism"
wither Objectivism or Aristotelianism. I'm just a smart guy who knows some
stuff
Ken Gardner
> > The problem is that I cannot find any evidence that Aristotle actually
> > believed the things regarding essences or universals that Rand
> > attributed to him and with which she says she disagrees. In particular,
> > I am unaware of any evidence that Aristotle believed that one grasps
> > essences or universals by "just looking" at the object -- a charge that
> > Rand makes on page 53 of ITOE and Peikoff repeats on pages 142-43 of
> > OPAR. I'm not saying that I know for a fact that Rand and Peikoff are
> > wrong, only that I have seen no evidence that they are right and some
> > evidence that they may be mistaken.
> Actually, I didn't notice her or Peikoff saying that. I would find that
> rather odd, for while one could read him as implying such if one only read
> the so-called-important parts of the so-called-important works, anybody who
> had read his lesser metaphysical works (on animals, on sense and sensible
> objects and such) would know better than to think he held such a .. well ..
> naive view.
Maybe that's the problem. <G> Their reading selections have been too,
well, selective.
> However, I didn't notice any clear part of Metaphysics where he
> actually explains _how_ one can tell an essential attribute from an
> accidental one, and it would no doubt be charactaristic of him to say
> something like 'well, we adult humans just have a lot of experience in doing
> it', ie. like with his ethics. Ie. his lack of saying just how we can tell
> the difference, might lead one to think that, in his lack of explanation, he
> is saying 'we just do'.
I am ice cold on this entire topic, but I vaguely recall that Aristotle
may have addressed it in the chapter on definitions in the Topics. But
in any event, the conclusion that "we just do" doesn't logically follow
from the mere fact that he apparently didn't address the issue of
method.
> Aristotle's "opinion" would be coextensive with what is commonly called
> "arbitrary" conjuncted with "proponderance of the evidence" and "reasonable
> certainty".
I agree.
> Aristotle's fundamental distinction is that in knowledge, one "graps the
> necessary truth in the same manner that he grasps the definitions that
> mediate proof" and that in opinion one "gets to (it) through intermediate
> premises". This is of course, a very difficult passage to restate in easily
> understood terms, but it seems reasonable to take him as saying that if one
> has to add outside premises to one's arguement, then one has opinion, if it
> follows logically from the premises you give.
I'm not sure I totally agree with you here, or even if I understand you
correctly. So let me blurt out this statement: I would think -- and
this is opinion rather than first hand knowledge <G> -- that Aristotle
would say that logically valid inferences from "known" premises would
also constitute knowledge.
> Seems that as literal a reading I can give is that an opinion is formed by
> forming taking your given premises and then adding others too it from
> outside the arguement per sae , which are not neccessarily true, and do not
> constitue your corpus of evidence, ie. what we call the making of an
> assumption.
I agree.
> But if the core if it all is what is or isn't a neccessary truth, then don't
> what isn't a neccessary truth depend in some sense on chance, so that right
> opinion depends in part on chance (like your election example) for it's
> being right opinion as opposed to false opinion (before 'the die is thrown'
> at least)?
Right opinion may certainly depend on events happening in the future
that we expect will occur (and have no reason to believe will not
occur), but cannot say with absolute certainty will occur.
> That is of course the obvious difference, but I still see a difference in
> their metaphysics, related to the denial of the essence/accident
> distinction. I have allways taken, since I took the time to reflect on just
> exactly what it means, that "Existence is Identity" entails what I call the
> denial of the substratum. I'm beginning to wonder if I am reading my own
> views into Rand here, but if I am, it's a view I arrived at as a response to
> reading her.
Can you elaborate on what you mean here by "denial of the substratum?"
> I should warn you that all my studies are on a self-directed self-evaluated
> self-study at an admittedly amateur level (well, I would like to think my
> understand is better than 'amateur level', but the way I study it is ... I
> have no formal training.) Given that, I acknowledge that nearly all of my
> philosophical views are formed as a result of my reading the works written
> by Rand, yet I don't consider myself an Objectivist so much as a
> neo-Aristotelian.
It's funny that you would put it this way. I don't consider myself a
neo-Aristotelian so much as an Objectivist. And there are many people
on this board who (over my objection) would classify me the same way you
classify yourself.
> In one way, that's because it's much more respectable to
> be a neo-Aristotelian than an 'Objectivist', and one is committing oneself
> to less (and thus gives oneself wider room in one's search for truth). The
> other reason is that I more often find myself refering to Aristotle than
> Rand when dealing with the more complex issues of applying the fundamentals.
> For instance, where in Rand's corpus is there anything comparable to
> Aristotle's analysis of responsibility, or just what constitutes being
> 'forced'.
Excellent point.
> When you need subtlety in you thinking, Rand falls short where
> Aristotle shines through. Truth is, I'm not an "adherent" of any "-ism"
> wither Objectivism or Aristotelianism. I'm just a smart guy who knows some
> stuff.
I go back to something Jim Klein has said here for years, which is that
what ultimatley counts is non-contradictory identification of the facts
of reality, even if these identifications lead to conclusions that are
contrary to any particular "ism" (including Objectivism).
--
Ken
Dave OHearn
>
> Ken Gardner <kesga...@home.com> wrote:
> > I think the biggest and most important difference is Rand's theory of
> > concepts, which has no counterpart in Aristotle or anyone else as far as
> > I know. The metaphysics are essentially identical as far as I can tell.
> > The ethical systems are different, albeit consistent with each other.
>
> That is of course the obvious difference, but I still see a difference in
> their metaphysics, related to the denial of the essence/accident
> distinction. I have allways taken, since I took the time to reflect
> on just exactly what it means, that "Existence is Identity" entails
> what I call the denial of the substratum. I'm beginning to wonder if I
> am reading my own views into Rand here, but if I am, it's a view I
> arrived at as a response to reading her.
You aren't just reading your own views into Rand. Look at IOE, page 266.
If you don't have this book, I highly recommend it:
AR: Don't take "sum" literally, no. Not in the sense that you would say
"sum of its parts." Usually when I write I say the entity *is* its
attributes. To be exact, you'd have to treat them as inseparable.
Prof A: That follows from "existence is identity"--in other words, there
can't be a "substratum" that has no identity with the attributes just
inhering in that.
AR: Exactly. You mean the Lockean idea?
--
Dave O'Hearn
George Dance
Dave OHearn <dav...@lessing.oit.umass.edu> wrote:
> Zarathustra (jeff...@deja.com) wrote:
> > That is of course the obvious difference, but I still see a
> > difference in
> > their metaphysics, related to the denial of the essence/accident
> > distinction. I have allways taken, since I took the time to reflect
> > on just exactly what it means, that "Existence is Identity" entails
> > what I call the denial of the substratum. I'm beginning to wonder
> > if I
> > am reading my own views into Rand here, but if I am, it's a view I
> > arrived at as a response to reading her.
>
> You aren't just reading your own views into Rand. Look at IOE, page
> 266. If you don't have this book, I highly recommend it:
>
> AR: Don't take "sum" literally, no. Not in the sense that you would
say
> "sum of its parts." Usually when I write I say the entity *is* its
> attributes. To be exact, you'd have to treat them as inseparable.
>
> Prof A: That follows from "existence is identity"--in other words,
> there
> can't be a "substratum" that has no identity with the attributes just
> inhering in that.
>
> AR: Exactly. You mean the Lockean idea?
As Isaiah Berlin noted, "The philosophical doctrine of substance is
ancient, complex, and not readily intelligible;" and Locke himself
admitted that "if anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of
pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at
all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such
qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us.... And
thus here ... we talk like children, who, being questioned what such a
thing is which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer,
that it is something, which in truth signifies no more, when so used, by
children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they
pretend to know and talk of is what they have no distinct idea of at
all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark." (/The Age of
Enlightenment, Berlin ed. (Mentor 1956), pp. 57,59)
Yet the theory that everything that exists is material; that an object's
properties are necessarily dependent on its matter, while its matter is
not dependent on its properties; and therefore that an object is its
matter; sounds perfectly intelligible. It is also untrue, as it was in
Locke's day, that we are "perfectly in the dark" about what matter is.
So it seems only logical, as matter corresponds exactly to "substance",
to say that every object in existence has an "essential substratum" of
matter, which is distinct from the properties of the object, and is
self-subsistent (meaning that the matter can exist without the object
and its properties, but the object and its properties cannot exist
without the matter.
Of course Locke could not identify substance with matter, as that would
have amounted to denying the existence of God.
--
- 30 -
Dave OHearn
> Yet the theory that everything that exists is material; that an object's
> properties are necessarily dependent on its matter, while its matter is
> not dependent on its properties; and therefore that an object is its
> matter; sounds perfectly intelligible. It is also untrue, as it was in
> Locke's day, that we are "perfectly in the dark" about what matter is.
>
> So it seems only logical, as matter corresponds exactly to "substance",
> to say that every object in existence has an "essential substratum" of
> matter, which is distinct from the properties of the object, and is
> self-subsistent (meaning that the matter can exist without the object
> and its properties, but the object and its properties cannot exist
> without the matter.
I don't think this is necessarily false, but I think it's outside of
philosophy to answer. Surely, in our scientific theories, we have a
separation between "stuff" and "how the stuff is put together". If you
arrange carbon atoms one way, you get ash, and if you arrange them
another way, you get diamonds, but it's still carbon. It's a useful
observation. But this falls apart if you talk about something really
fundamental like an electron. Maybe the electron can't be rearranged into
anything else.
> Of course Locke could not identify substance with matter, as that would
> have amounted to denying the existence of God.
As a general question, when philosophers say matter, do they mean
something more general than the scientific term? I don't think philsophy
has much business rationalizing about matter and energy.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Zarathustra
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:91ih1b$nun$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Yet the theory that everything that exists is material; that an object's
> properties are necessarily dependent on its matter, while its matter is
> not dependent on its properties; and therefore that an object is its
> matter; sounds perfectly intelligible. It is also untrue, as it was in
> Locke's day, that we are "perfectly in the dark" about what matter is.
Be very weary of denying Aristotle on this point, not because I say so or
because he provides a strong sylogistic proof of his case, as that this is
exactly where, in the Metaphysics, he most specifically attacks the notion
of Platonic Form - these notions are his 'big guns' in that regard, and if
you take his guns away .... he may not be able to protect you from him as
easily.
To whit, you are then reopening the question of 'participation' of
universals in particulars, are you not?
(Also, as an added aside after I wrote the rest - if you look deeply in our
'not being perfectly in the dark about what matter is' you will see that the
good old Scientists with their Quantum Mechanics have actually declared
that, in a sense that is more than just metaphor, all is number. What is
"Substance" to a physicist but an instance of the Schrodinger Equation?
They certainly aren't going to tell you that substance is matter (ie
particles), nor would they tell you that all substance is energy (ie.
waves). I would in fact, think that the notion that substance is form and
not substrate would go over well in that circle - since we are 'perfectly in
the dark', more so than ever, as to just what exactly 'matter' is - all
physicists today can say is "Well, it's like a particle, and like a wave, so
it's kinda both but really more like neither", which is to say, they have no
clue what it is, and can only say what it isn't.)
> So it seems only logical, as matter corresponds exactly to "substance",
> to say that every object in existence has an "essential substratum" of
> matter, which is distinct from the properties of the object, and is
> self-subsistent (meaning that the matter can exist without the object
> and its properties, but the object and its properties cannot exist
> without the matter.
Again, you have the whole problem of them explaining the relation between
the two.
> Of course Locke could not identify substance with matter, as that would
> have amounted to denying the existence of God.
Hmm, "But this is impossible, for it is accepted that seperability and
individuality belong especially to substance", but seperability and
individuality are not to be found in the substratum qua substratum, only in
the substratum qua joined with form. "Hence it would seem that the form and
the combination of form and matter are more truly substance than matter is."
(Quotes are Aristotle, 1029a25, middle is my interpretation of him to flesh
out the line of reasoning.).
To be less derivitive - insofar as the substratum is 'that which has things
predicated of it and not that which is predicated' ... it is a unity ... ie
it is undifferentiated and singular - it can not be the _cause_ of the
individuality in things, and it is this cause of the individuality of things
that we most consider to be 'what that individual _is_' ... ie call it's
substance or nature. So, even if there is a substrate, the substrate is not
substance, if by substance we mean the answer we give when we ask "Why?" not
in the sense of a thing predicated of something, but of something's existing
simply. Since things are allways of their nature individuals, and the
substratum can't explain individuallity, it can't explain the existence of
anything.
You see, difference is the nature of individuality, and the nature of the
substrate is lack of difference is it not?
*cough* That all does make sense right?
Then again, I could just speak of the property of being the substrate being
the property of being that which has no properties - and if a thing has the
property of having no properties, it would be a self-contradiction and thus
be non-extent, and thus, nothing has the property of being the substrate, so
what the heck would it mean to say 'the substrate exists'?
George Dance
Dave OHearn <dav...@lessing.oit.umass.edu> wrote:
> George Dance (georg...@my-deja.com) wrote:
> > ... it seems only logical, as matter corresponds exactly to
"substance",
> > to say that every object in existence has an "essential substratum"
of
> > matter, which is distinct from the properties of the object, and is
> > self-subsistent (meaning that the matter can exist without the
object
> > and its properties, but the object and its properties cannot exist
> > without the matter.
>
> I don't think this is necessarily false, but I think it's outside of
> philosophy to answer. Surely, in our scientific theories, we have a
> separation between "stuff" and "how the stuff is put together". If you
> arrange carbon atoms one way, you get ash, and if you arrange them
> another way, you get diamonds, but it's still carbon. It's a useful
> observation.
Sure; matter and form are two different concepts, and it is sensible and
informative to draw a logical distinction between them. It is less
tenable to claim a real metaphysical distinction, though. That a thing
exists means there are facts about it - ie, it exists as something in
particular. If it is material, it has an extension - a size, a shape, a
mass, a texture, even a colour (if we accept "transparent" as a possible
"colour"). While this does not explain why an object is one
thing in particular, that as you say would not be a philosophical or
metaphysical explain; metaphysics is required to show only that it must
be something in particular.
<snip>
> As a general question, when philosophers say matter, do they mean
> something more general than the scientific term? I don't think
> philsophy has much business rationalizing about matter and energy.
I'm no expert, but I'd say that the scientific term is what is meant in
general in philosophy since at least Newton's time; philosophers who
wish to avoid its implications talk of "extension" instead. But the "in
general" proviso must be added, as very few philosophers can resist
also relying on, as knowledge of matter, their own a priori speculations
as to how matter should be and behave. The most silly that I can think
of was Marx's claim that matter has a self-generating principle (i.e.,
it is capable of changing, evolving and even creating new matter) based
on the dialectical method of thesis becoming synthesis. But this is an
extreme, not an exception. Only the physicalists rule out this apriorism
on principle.