Oh I get it, you want me to come back with some kind of rejoinder such
as: Is that your contextual absolute certainty? Or is it absolute
contextual certainty?
Absolute=makes sense but doesn't exist
Contextual=exists, but isn't really certainty.
You're implying that all certainty is absolute, and that "contextual
certainty" is a misnomer.
"Certainty" is one of those difficult-to-define words that are often
tossed around on this forum in order to stump the opposition. (The
term "objective" is often used without any idea of its different
meanings.)
In the case of "certainty," there is the psychological trait of being
certain versus epistemologically certain knowledge.
> In the case of "certainty," there is the psychological trait of being
> certain versus epistemologically certain knowledge.
There's feeling certain and being certain.
But anyone can feel or believe anything.
Feeling certain ain't much.
> In the case of "certainty," there is the psychological trait of being
> certain versus epistemologically certain knowledge.
This is one of those annoying, dumb ideas that gets tossed around here
from time to time. Unless one is talking about encyclopedic (social,
common store) versus personal (individual experience) knowledge of
facts, there is no difference between epistemology and gaining
knowledge personally and thus being epistemologically certain and
psychologically certain. *Psyche* is that which is responsible for
one's thoughts and feelings which is nothing other than that which can
be gained epistemologically and not magically by other means, as I
suppose kantians would believe.
Except in cases where you also have epistemic certainty. Why shouldn't
you then feel psychological certainty?
> Except in cases where you also have epistemic certainty. Why shouldn't
> you then feel psychological certainty?
You might, but then you feel psychologically certain so
often when you are not epistemically certain. The feeling
doesn't signal much.
>On Jan 2, 3:02�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> In the case of "certainty," there is the psychological trait of being
>> certain versus epistemologically certain knowledge.
..
>This is one of those annoying, dumb ideas that gets tossed around here
>from time to time. Unless one is talking about encyclopedic (social,
>common store) versus personal (individual experience) knowledge of
>facts, there is no difference between epistemology and gaining
>knowledge personally and thus being epistemologically certain and
>psychologically certain. *Psyche* is that which is responsible for
>one's thoughts and feelings which is nothing other than that which can
>be gained epistemologically and not magically by other means, as I
>suppose kantians would believe.
..
You don't know what a Kantian believes. Strange though that you say
feelings are nothing other than that which can be gained
epistemologically.
> ..
> You don't know what a Kantian believes.
Judging by the fact that I have whipped you in every debate when
kantian blather is the focus, anyone would say that I do.
> Strange though that you say
> feelings are nothing other than that which can be gained
> epistemologically.
"Feelings" as distinct from "emotions". Intuition [*] is
unconsciously recognized truth (at least, as perceptual memories not
brought to active consciousness) in a non-specific form. The
emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
etc./
[*] "I have a feeling that woman would make a good mother."
[**] "I lust after that woman and would like to try to make babies
with her."
You are an idiot, a legend nowhere but in your own shallow mind. You
wouldn't know Kant if he came up to you and laughed in your face for
missing the ball, again.
You're saying there is a disconnect between reason and feeling, in
that one can possess epistemic certainty without the psychological.
But then I have to ask: how do you know when you're certain?
>On Jan 2, 5:33�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> ..
>> You don't know what a Kantian believes.
>
>Judging by the fact that I have whipped you in every debate when
>kantian blather is the focus, anyone would say that I do.
Certainly, when you start such a "debate" with a slant toward
triumphalism, that is, the theory that Rand, in this case, is
absolutely right and Objectivism will eventually triumph. With such a
slant, you are guaranteed to *never* lose a debate.
But of course, every participant in a debate believes he or she has
won. That's why there are impartial judges who don't care either way.
You, on the other hand, are not inclined to being objective toward
yourself. Nobody really is.
>> Strange though that you say
>> feelings are nothing other than that which can be gained
>> epistemologically.
..
>"Feelings" as distinct from "emotions". Intuition [*] is
>unconsciously recognized truth (at least, as perceptual memories not
>brought to active consciousness) in a non-specific form. The
>emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
>instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
>something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
>etc./
>
>[*] "I have a feeling that woman would make a good mother."
>[**] "I lust after that woman and would like to try to make babies
>with her."
See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
supersensible faculty. There is only one supersensible faculty, and it
is hypothesized to belong ONLY to God, assuming there such a being.
Indeed, human intuition is sensible according to Kant, just the very
opposite of what you claim.
See for example:
http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/INTUIT.HTM
[quote]
Kant held that human intuition is sensible. That is, the objects of
intuition are "given" to the mind, which is "affected" by them.
Sensibility is the faculty of the mind which is affected by objects.
"Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object,
and is threfore possible only if the subjects' faculty of
representation is affected by that object. . . . It is derivative
(intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitus originarius) , and,
therefore not an intellectual intuition" (B72).
[/unquote]
"Intellectual intuition" means "supersensible intuition."
You obviously haven't the slightest inkling of anything Kant wrote on
any subject, Charles.
As for the rest of the stuff you wrote on intuition, that is also
hypothetical and you have shown no connection with epistemology.
I'd debate you and your randroid clan into the ground any day
chuckles. Most of you losers are too scared to come back and debate.
And the best you can do is call me retarded, hah, you randroids sure
are a pathetic spineless bunch of wankers
>On Jan 2, 6:22�pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> On Jan 2, 5:33�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> > You don't know what a Kantian believes.
..
>> Judging by the fact that I have whipped you in every debate when
>> kantian blather is the focus, anyone would say that I do.
..
>You are an idiot, a legend nowhere but in your own shallow mind. You
>wouldn't know Kant if he came up to you and laughed in your face for
>missing the ball, again.
That wasn't very nice considering that Weiss doesn't seem to be around
nowadays to come to Charles' rescue as usual.
As per usual, you claim that [???] says thus and so, and you are
forced to back down when presented what [???] has actually said,
whether [???] be Rand or Kant.
> >The
> >emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
> >instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
> >something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
> >etc./
> See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
> supersensible faculty.
No, I made a claim as to what Kant said that *emotion* is (of two
kinds, of course) Section 29 of Judgment . . .
<< But even impetuous movements of the mind be they allied under the
name of edification with ideas of religion, or, as pertaining merely
to culture, with ideas involving a social interest no matter what
tension of the imagination they may produce, can in no way lay claim
to the honour of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind
them a temper of mind which, though it be only indirectly, has an
influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and
resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it pure
intellectual finality (the supersensible). For, in the absence of
this, all these emotions belong only to motion, which we welcome in
the interests of good health. >>
You see: the sublime kind of emotion and the down and dirty kind of
emotion (which we welcome in the interests of good health, of
course!). Whereas I make the claim, not speaking for Objectivism,
that emotion is of one kind (not in any way dichotomous) but of
different contributing components, none of which are "supersensible"
> Indeed, human intuition is sensible according to Kant, just the very
> opposite of what you claim.
>
I made no claim as to intuition and Kant.
> "Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object,
> and is threfore possible only if the subjects' faculty of
> representation is affected by that object. . . . It is derivative
> (intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitus originarius) , and,
> therefore not an intellectual intuition" (B72).
> [/unquote]
>
> "Intellectual intuition" means "supersensible intuition."
>
In that Kant has his dichotomous treatment of intuition is consistent
with his dichotomous treatment of emotion (and just about everything
else): the real one, the "derived" one, and the made-up fantasy, the
"intellectual" one.
>On Jan 2, 8:34�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Sat, 02 Jan 2010 15:22:45 -0800, Charles Bell
>>
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >On Jan 2, 5:33�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> ..
>> >> You don't know what a Kantian believes.
>>
>> >Judging by the fact that I have whipped you in every debate when
>> >kantian blather is the focus, anyone would say that I do.
>>
>> Certainly, when you start such a "debate" with a slant toward
>> triumphalism, that is, the theory that Rand, in this case, is
>> absolutely right and Objectivism will eventually triumph. With such a
>> slant, you are guaranteed to *never* lose a debate.
>>
>
>As per usual, you claim that [???] says thus and so, and you are
>forced to back down when presented what [???] has actually said,
>whether [???] be Rand or Kant.
The sad thing is that Randroids think to gain absolute certainty from
Rand while at the same time claiming to believe only their contextual
certainty assertion.
>> >The
>> >emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
>> >instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
>> >something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
>> >etc./
>
>
>> See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
>> supersensible faculty.
>
>No, I made a claim as to what Kant said that *emotion* is (of two
>kinds, of course) Section 29 of Judgment . . .
>
> << But even impetuous movements of the mind be they allied under the
>name of edification with ideas of religion, or, as pertaining merely
>to culture, with ideas involving a social interest no matter what
>tension of the imagination they may produce, can in no way lay claim
>to the honour of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind
>them a temper of mind which, though it be only indirectly, has an
>influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and
>resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it pure
>intellectual finality (the supersensible). For, in the absence of
>this, all these emotions belong only to motion, which we welcome in
>the interests of good health. >>
Thank you for the excellent quote, Charles. I agree that only emotions
bring with them the SENSE of finality or certainty that can only be
intellectually won by a hypothetical intellectual or supersensible
intuition. And, by implication, the intellect does not bring final or
absolute intellectual certainty because there is no such human faculty
as that of intellectual or supersensible intuition.
The entire Critique of Pure Reason, by its very title, suggests that
the book was designed to wage war on the very idea of intellectual
intuition as a possible human intellectual faculty. That we may
emotionally FEEL absolute certainty is another issue which Kant saved
for the Critique of Judgment. But this feeling should not be confused
with intellectual certainty, and its source is no special faculty of
intuition but, in fact, the harmony of relationship between the
various faculties which creates the representation of finality. It is
easy to confuse the feeling produced by intellectual harmony with
final or absolute certainty.
>You see: the sublime kind of emotion and the down and dirty kind of
>emotion
A preposterous interpretation on your part.
> (which we welcome in the interests of good health, of
>course!).
The feeling of the sublime is a disharmony striving toward harmony, it
is a feeling produced by the conflict of reason and imagination
resulting in a temporary shock to the intellectual faculty in general.
Disharmony is not a virtue designed to elicit good health, but the
theory of the sublime indicates that harmony rather than disharmony is
a goal of reason.
> Whereas I make the claim, not speaking for Objectivism,
>that emotion is of one kind (not in any way dichotomous) but of
>different contributing components, none of which are "supersensible"
Nobody said they were, and Rand's theory of subconscious premises is
yet another preposterous invention.
>> Indeed, human intuition is sensible according to Kant, just the very
>> opposite of what you claim.
>I made no claim as to intuition and Kant.
Fine. It was easy to read your term "Aesthetic," which you mentioned
in the context of intuition, as pointing to the first part of the CPR.
>> "Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object,
>> and is threfore possible only if the subjects' faculty of
>> representation is affected by that object. . . . It is derivative
>> (intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitus originarius) , and,
>> therefore not an intellectual intuition" (B72).
>> [/unquote]
..
>> "Intellectual intuition" means "supersensible intuition."
..
>In that Kant has his dichotomous treatment of intuition is consistent
>with his dichotomous treatment of emotion (and just about everything
>else): the real one, the "derived" one, and the made-up fantasy, the
>"intellectual" one.
You want to label Kant's treatment as 'dichotomous' because of Leonard
Peikoff's famous essay containing the word "dichotomy" and leveling
some unwarranted charges against Kant. But if anything is a made-up
fantasy, that would certainly be Peikoff's essay or any given
treatment of Kant made by any Randroid, mostly definitely including
you.
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> Which is it?
Contextual. Is this a trick question?
> >You see: the sublime kind of emotion and the down and dirty kind of
> >emotion
>
> A preposterous interpretation on your part.
>
The bit about getting a Turkish massage -- for one's health, of course
-- didn't give you a hint as to Kant's emotional preferences?
> The sad thing is that Randroids
I think it's clear by now, after all these years on this forum, that
Malrassic Park is simply incapable of avoiding that logical fallacy
known as the ad hominem, and furthermore, his incapability is
precisely due to the fact that Immanuel Kant, his god, relied on it
constantly (particularly in the form of psychologizing) to impress his
personality cult-following. (c) Malrassic Park
>
> I think it's clear by now, after all these years on this forum, that
> Malrassic Park is simply incapable of avoiding that logical fallacy
> known as the ad hominem, and furthermore, his incapability is
> precisely due to the fact that Immanuel Kant, his god, relied on it
> constantly (particularly in the form of psychologizing) to impress his
> personality cult-following. �(c) Malrassic Park
You are an idiot, a legend nowhere but in your own shallow mind. You
>On Jan 3, 6:44�am, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
..
>> I think it's clear by now, after all these years on this forum, that
>> Malrassic Park is simply incapable of avoiding that logical fallacy
>> known as the ad hominem, and furthermore, his incapability is
>> precisely due to the fact that Immanuel Kant, his god, relied on it
>> constantly (particularly in the form of psychologizing) to impress his
>> personality cult-following. �(c) Malrassic Park
..
>You are an idiot, a legend nowhere but in your own shallow mind. You
>wouldn't know Kant if he came up to you and laughed in your face for
>missing the ball, again.
..
Charles can't discuss.
..
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
..
>> Which is it?
..
>Contextual. Is this a trick question?
What was the context for your answer?
Or, what is the context of contextual certainty? Surely not absolute
certainty?
And because of that he's one hell of a randroid!
> Charles can't discuss.
What's there to discuss when it has been amply demonstrated on
anything Rand or Kant, you always lose the debate and resort to the
"Randroid" ad-hom attacks. In this latest example, you claim that
Kant did not include reference to the "supersensible" in his
definition of emotion, and I present to you in black and white that he
did, and you retort with "Randroid!"
Me: The emotional component of a psyche is a complex nexus of human
instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic judgment, 10, 29,
etc./
"emotional component . . . is . . not of something else as Kant's
supersensible"
You: See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
supersensible faculty
IOW: "I am ignoring what you said about 'emotion' and I will misdirect
the discussion -- not on 'emotion' and what Kant said about 'emotion'
-- but over to 'intuition' "
Me: Discussion over, you weasle.
> And because of that he's one hell of a randroid!
I think it's clear by now, after all these years on this forum, that
Retarded Timmy is simply incapable of avoiding that logical fallacy
known as the ad hominem, and furthermore, his incapability is
precisely due to the fact that Krusty the Clown, his god, relied on it
>On Jan 3, 1:32�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> Charles can't discuss.
..
>What's there to discuss when it has been amply demonstrated on
>anything Rand or Kant, you always lose the debate and resort to the
>"Randroid" ad-hom attacks. In this latest example, you claim that
>Kant did not include reference to the "supersensible" in his
>definition of emotion, and I present to you in black and white that he
>did, and you retort with "Randroid!"
If you're such a big debate winner, then why do you have to reinvent
reality?
>Me: The emotional component of a psyche is a complex nexus of human
>instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
>something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic judgment, 10, 29,
>etc./
..
>"emotional component . . . is . . not of something else as Kant's
>supersensible"
..
>You: See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
>supersensible faculty
You are lying. I quoted you a from page in which it was stated that
intuition is NOT supersensible.
If you're such a big debate winner, etc.
>IOW: "I am ignoring what you said about 'emotion' and I will misdirect
>the discussion -- not on 'emotion' and what Kant said about 'emotion'
>-- but over to 'intuition' "
>
>Me: Discussion over, you weasle.
Let's see if I have "grasped," "retained," and "integrated" the
pattern here - I correct you on the spelling of "weasle," then you say
you wrote "weasel," then you'll say I was wrong in my spelling
correction.
Like I said, Charles can't discuss - or spell.
Cite?
=======On Jan 2, 8:34 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote
>M> Strange though that you say
>M> feelings are nothing other than that which can be gained
>M> epistemologically.
..
CB>"Feelings" as distinct from "emotions". Intuition [*] is
CB>unconsciously recognized truth (at least, as perceptual memories
not
CB>brought to active consciousness) in a non-specific form. The
CB>emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
CB>instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
CB>something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10,
29,
CB>etc./
CB>[*] "I have a feeling that woman would make a good mother."
CB>[**] "I lust after that woman and would like to try to make babies
CB>with her."
See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
supersensible faculty. There is only one supersensible faculty, and
it
is hypothesized to belong ONLY to God, assuming there such a being.
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
>On Jan 3, 4:17�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> You are lying. I quoted you a from page in which it was stated that
>> intuition is NOT supersensible.
>>
>
>Cite?
[quote]
Indeed, human intuition is sensible according to Kant, just the very
opposite of what you claim.
[/unquote]
[I messed up on the what I thought Charles was claiming, thus giving
him an excuse to bail on the convo - to which he has now returned.]
[/quote]
See for example:
http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/INTUIT.HTM
[/quote]
[That is the page I cited.]
I then quoted from the page:
[quote]
Kant held that human intuition is sensible. That is, the objects of
intuition are "given" to the mind, which is "affected" by them.
Sensibility is the faculty of the mind which is affected by objects.
"Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object,
and is threfore possible only if the subjects' faculty of
representation is affected by that object. . . . It is derivative
(intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitus originarius) , and,
therefore not an intellectual intuition" (B72).
[/unquote]
It is a powerful quote, putting to an end certain claims made by
Randroids, albeit in this case unrelated to Charles' point at the
time.
The rest I snipped because it is just Charles making a huge deal over
my getting his point wrong to begin with. If I knew this was going to
turn into a cry-baby fest I wouldn't have bothered responding at
length.
Charlie Brown is a ditto head randroid. Charlie Brown thinks for
himself, thinking being anything that ayn rand said.
> But of course, every participant in a debate believes he or she has
> won. [...]
Does this mean that no one ever changes his mind about anything as a
result of participating in a debate?
Mark
>Malrassic Park wrote:
..
>> But of course, every participant in a debate believes he or she has
>> won. [...]
..
>Does this mean that no one ever changes his mind about anything as a
>result of participating in a debate?
Not so far.
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>Contextual. Is this a trick question?
> What was the context for your answer?
Everything I know. Is this a tri.....uh, never mind.
[....]