Some things about Kant you probably did not know
Robert J. Kolker
Philosopher, which is what scientists were called in his day. In 1755 he
came up with a very good guess (abducted hypothesis) about the nature of
the Milky Way. Observing how most of the matter in the solar system is
located on or near the Plane of the Ecliptic he concluded that most of
the stars would be similarly arrayed.
In addtion to hypothesizing the correct shape of our galaxy, he also
conclued that oval shaped bodies of low magnitude, barely visible were
in fact other galaxies.
Kant and LaPlace both reached the same conclusion on the origin of the
Solar System. They both hypothesized that matter formed and accretion
disk about the Sun and the matter in this disk started to clump which in
turn drew mattter into the clumps etc. etc.. This is the most held view,
today, of how the Solar System was formed.
And then he started to do metaphysics.....
The rest is history.
Bob Kolker
Frank T. DeAngelis
80...@attbi.com>...
> Before Immanual Kant got into the philosophy business, he was a Natural
> Philosopher, which is what scientists were called in his day. In 1755 he
Dear Bob,
I just don't get it. So what?
Most, if not all, philosophers -anyway, know that Kant applied his
philosophical principles and skills towards both math -per se, and
astronomy -in particular. (And most astronomers know this. It was in
my introductory astronomy class text.)
It is, however, quite erroneous and misleading to claim "Before
Immanual (sic! Immanuel) Kant got into the philosophy business..."
After all, his monumental, opus magnum, the 'First Critique' ("Kritik
der Reinen Vernunft") was originally published in 1781. It -alone,
took a proverbial lifetime just to write.
(I hope the following, condensed analysis is not so foreign or
cumbersome for you to follow:)
In any case, much of Kant is completely apropos to this particular
group, for an abundance of (other) reasons, no? For example, Kant was
instrumental in working out an 'other' consistent theory of man
self-obligatory "right" as an "autonomous," "self-legislating"
being/moral agent, along with his philosophical precision and
extension of the "Do Unto Others" principle of the Golden
Rule-->Categorical Imperative, even if he -himself, got it from the
last of the great contract theorists, J. J. Rousseau, in his "Social
Contract." His/their beginning axioms as to 'man in the state of
nature'--whether as a conceptual tool or actual, (pre-?)historical
existence, stripped of all human influences, esp., via-a-vis/of the
state--countered the Lockian notion of private property interests,
which Rand does not at all formulate (but, philosophically must)as
rigorously or far enough 'back,' logically (e.g., as self-interests,
and/as the "virtue of selfishness"); nor does Nozick ("Anarchy, State,
and Utopia"), with his prematurely ambitious, naive, overly
simplistic, and unrealistically ahistorical starting premise of
"voluntary" vs. "involuntary" acts. In other words, the latter
distinction (not as simply stated...even Aristotle, in his
"Nicomachean Ethics," distinguishes between many various shades of
voluntary and quasi-voluntary acts, not to mention the various
degrees--and problems--of responsibility and blame assigned to such
acts)is not logically sufficient as a philosophical starting point.
Ciao, for now.
Robert J. Kolker
Frank T. DeAngelis wrote:
> "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote in message news:<3CFDE142.80
> 80...@attbi.com>...
>
>>Before Immanual Kant got into the philosophy business, he was a Natural
>>Philosopher, which is what scientists were called in his day. In 1755 he
>>
>
> Dear Bob,
>
> I just don't get it. So what?
Delving the depths of metaphysics and metaethics conduce to advanced
mind rot. They did in Kant's case.
Bob Kolker
Malenor
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3CFE5685...@attbi.com...
> Delving the depths of metaphysics and metaethics conduce to advanced
> mind rot. They did in Kant's case.
>
> Bob Kolker
>
So does masturbation, but that fact doesn't seem to have stopped you.
--
Gal*n Rutl*dge's HPO Honor File --
Ac*r, J*hn Alw*y, Dav*d Friedm*n, Symm*try, Res*jinth,
Malen*r
-- Others:
JoeOrri*n, J*rge, Winst*n H, R. Leep*r
Robert J. Kolker
Malenor wrote:
>
>>
> So does masturbation, but that fact doesn't seem to have stopped you.
Nah! The worst that happens is hair grows on the palms.
In any case, once Kant started down the road toward the Critique of Pure
Reason and beyond he never did a useful day's work. What rough
philosopher, his day come, slouches toward Pure Reason?
Bob Kolker
Resijinth
2...@attbi.com>...
There is no such thing as 'pure' reasoning. There is reasoning devoid
of context and resoning within a context. Reasoning devoid of context
can only be formed as identity. Reasining within context, then,
necessarily must adhere to common principals of wisdom. These are,
then, such ones as knowing that you do not know everything, and
knowing that there are some things of which you are unceratain, and
understanding that reasoning inside a context is much more complex
than reasoning outside a context, and thus makes us prone to errors.
Both intelligence and wisdom are both necessarily virtues if you want
to know how to live through life.
-Resijinth
Ken Gardner
>It is, however, quite erroneous and misleading to claim "Before
>Immanual (sic! Immanuel) Kant got into the philosophy business..."
>After all, his monumental, opus magnum, the 'First Critique' ("Kritik
>der Reinen Vernunft") was originally published in 1781. It -alone,
>took a proverbial lifetime just to write.
Obviously leaving no time for editing. Strunk and White are still
rolling over in their respective graves over that book.
Ken
Frank T. DeAngelis
21e9...@posting.google.com>...
> "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote in message news:<3CFE5D53.60
> 2...@attbi.com>...
> > Malenor wrote:
> >
> > > So does masturbation, but that fact doesn't seem to have stopped you.
Funny, Resijinth. ("<")
> > Nah! The worst that happens is hair grows on the palms.
> >
> > In any case, once Kant started down the road toward the Critique of Pure
> > Reason and beyond he never did a useful day's work. What rough
> > philosopher, his day come, slouches toward Pure Reason?
> >
> > Bob Kolker
Not funny, Bob. Kant did a "Critique" of pure reason. Oh, by the way,
the so-called "mataphysics" of Kant, you so boldly allude
to--especially in reference to his "First Critique"--is more of a work
on/of epistemology than metaphysics.
Rather, it is the new epistemological dualism (the "epistemological
twist," or "turn," as it is called) of reasoning inseparable from a
posteriori, empirical knowledge/facts of an experiential nature. What
IS "pure," for Kant, are the supposed "categories of the mind" that we
process empirical data in and through. In other words, we experience
and grapple with the natural world of empirical data, but we "see" it,
categorize it, and make sense of it (translate it?)via the categories
and "pure intuition/s" of, e.g., space and time, cause and effect
relations, extensionality, modality, etc., etc., etc. -FOR KANT.
> There is no such thing as 'pure' reasoning. There is reasoning devoid
> of context and resoning within a context. Reasoning devoid of context
> can only be formed as identity.
I agree with your position, here (identity; e.g., A=A) except that it
is not the only game in town. Many philosophers (almost all logicians
and many mathematicians) stand by the assertion that a priori
knowledge (supposedly "pure" reason)is much more than that. (We, of
course, do not.)
frank ly
Patrick Crosby
greatest achievements in the entire history of Western Thought. If you don't
know that, it's quite possibly because you never read it.
Patrick Crosby
Patrick Crosby
greatest achievements in the entire history of Western Thought. If you don't
know that, it's quite possibly because you never read it.
Patrick Crosby
devoid of context?" Also, could you explain why symbolic logic is not an
instance of "pure reason?"
Resijinth
ieee.org>...
> Would you be so kind as to give us an example of what you mean by " reasoning
> devoid of context?" Also, could you explain why symbolic logic is not an
> instance of "pure reason?"
The concept of 'pure reason' is incoherent. When I say reasoning
devoid of context, I mean stuff like '2 = 2' or 'A cat is a cat'. This
doesn't tell me, however, that there are 2 pencils on the table or
that I'm petting the orange cat. Even so, even understanding the
concepts '2' 'pencils' 'on the' 'table' doesn't tell me that there are
2 pencils on the table. Even understanding the concepts 'I' 'petting'
'orange' and 'cat' doesn't tell me that I am petting the orange cat.
For those I require myself, my senses, an understanding of the
accuracy of my senses (For that reason, my senses could be deceiving
me or, more likely, not telling me the whole truth.) and such.
Now do you understand? The fact is, there are necessarily some
premises for any reasoning, because an infinite regress of reasoning
is truly impossible.
-Resijinth
Malenor
"Patrick Crosby" <pcr...@ieee.org> wrote in message
news:3CFFE889...@ieee.org...
> Touche' !
>
It's interesting how quickly they forget that their goddess Rand only
worked so she could support her writing, and then when she made
a fortune off the writing she stopped working. One can say evil things
about artists in general, and there was a time when such criticisms were
commonplace. To have a son grow up to be an artist or an actor was
at one time thought to bring great shame upon the family. Rand of course
must be exempted from such criticisms as she always is on this forum.
It is ironic that Rand herself generated through her writings the source
of her own destruction, a pack of anti-rational followers who believe that
a life of hard labor is more important than culture.
At least the charge wasn't leveled at me, but I am not an academician
anyway. Why not? It's not my style. It's not in my genes. Whatever the
reason, I just know that locking myself in some little room or going off in
the loneliest, dustiest corner of some huge university library is not good
for
my personality or character. I have found that too much writing here and
intellectual reading in general tends to dry out my personality immensely.
I'm certain that Rand suffered from some of this social isolationism because
of her style of writing and descriptions of her from others.
Sometimes, however, I think that if someone has something to offer the
world, and this can be accomplished only through self-isolation, then it is
worthy of the sacrifice to one's own soul, to create ideas that elevate the
souls of millions of other people. Rand made the same sacrifice, but
I think the results for the world were mixed.
If Rand had had her choice, she would not have worked a day in her life.
If she was not a victim of communism, and her bourgeois family had
been allowed their wealth, perhaps Rand would have been given
the means to create, unfettered from materialistic concerns. That was her
goal after all. It just so happens that in the case of Kant (whose
personality
was in a lot of ways similar to Rand's), he lived in a culture that
recognized
talent. Kant's talent was recognized when he was young, and he was
encouraged to do what he did for a living from almost the very beginning.
Despite that fact that I actually envy that, I would not allow the good
fortune
of living in a think-tank, granted a salary and a tenure, to take me away
from the world as it has for so many other intellectual types. But the area
of pure scholarship seems to require it, so in a way I'm really lucky *not*
to be in that position,It is a dichotomy, thought versus reality, that is
not
easily resolved intellectually, only through the real sacrifice made by
those
thinkers who must divorce themselves from the real world in order to
accomplish their intellectual goals. And among those intellectuals must
be included Ayn Rand.
Malenor
"Resijinth" <Resi...@Yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:b967c56d.02060...@posting.google.com...
> Patrick Crosby <pcr...@ieee.org> wrote in message
news:<3CFFEA77.ECA470B1@
> ieee.org>...
> > Would you be so kind as to give us an example of what you mean by "
reasoning
> > devoid of context?" Also, could you explain why symbolic logic is not an
> > instance of "pure reason?"
>
> The concept of 'pure reason' is incoherent. When I say reasoning
> devoid of context, I mean stuff like '2 = 2' or 'A cat is a cat'. This
> doesn't tell me, however, that there are 2 pencils on the table or
> that I'm petting the orange cat. [snip]
Wrong. You can't understand that there are 2 pencils on the table
without understanding first that 2 = 2, or better, that 1 + 1 = 2.
Your mind must work with an intellectual schema that allows such
understanding to take place. Without this schema, you would not
understand that there are two pencils or even two objects. Without
this schema, your intellect would consist of the matter of the senses
without form. Matter does not give you two-ness, or pencil-ness.
(Problem of universals.)
Malenor
"Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
news:1b8e1078.0206...@posting.google.com...
The key to understanding this problem is to take literally the Kantian
questions: What makes metaphysics possible? What makes mathematics
possible? These are not the "how" questions that Kant is charged with
asking, obviously, when Kant is criticized by a certain Objectivist
professor for "substituting the how for the what." Interesting how
Objectivists contradict each other: some of them hate Kant because
he did metaphysics, some hate him because he did epistemology
instead of metaphysics.
That is an understandable error, made possible by one simple fact:
Objectivists for the most part do not understand Kant. Very few of
them do. So they read and interpret him in different ways based on
the only help they get, and that help comes from various conflicting
aspects of Objectivist theory. There are anti-intellectual aspects to
Objectivism, and those aspects influence Objectivists to interpret
Kant's CPR as mere academic metaphysics of the lowest kind. The
pro-intellectual Objectivists interpret Kant as an epistemologist who
nevertheless "substituted the how for the what," a very bad thing indeed.
The truth is that Kant was more radical than either of these
interpretations.
Both interpretations tell a part of the truth, but their magic bullets
actually
miss the target by miles and miles.
Kant states outright in the CPR that if you must label him, then call his
theory a metaphysics. This, however, is inadequate as labeling it an
epistemology. On reading the CPR one gets a sense of both strains
of thought. What exactly is a "transcendental faculty"? Is it metaphysical,
epistemological? Is it a how or a what? Both, and neither. The key word
is transcendental. The faculties transcend all how-ness and what-ness,
and by doing so make them both possible.
Eudaimonus
"Malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:Z37M8.817$Pv2...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
> "Resijinth" <Resi...@Yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:b967c56d.02060...@posting.google.com...
> > Patrick Crosby <pcr...@ieee.org> wrote in message
> news:<3CFFEA77.ECA470B1@
> > ieee.org>...
> > > Would you be so kind as to give us an example of what you mean by "
> reasoning
> > > devoid of context?" Also, could you explain why symbolic logic is not
an
> > > instance of "pure reason?"
> >
> > The concept of 'pure reason' is incoherent. When I say reasoning
> > devoid of context, I mean stuff like '2 = 2' or 'A cat is a cat'. This
> > doesn't tell me, however, that there are 2 pencils on the table or
> > that I'm petting the orange cat. [snip]
>
> Wrong. You can't understand that there are 2 pencils on the table
> without understanding first that 2 = 2, or better, that 1 + 1 = 2.
> Your mind must work with an intellectual schema that allows such
> understanding to take place. Without this schema, you would not
> understand that there are two pencils or even two objects. Without
> this schema, your intellect would consist of the matter of the senses
> without form. Matter does not give you two-ness, or pencil-ness.
> (Problem of universals.)
If I may, this is factually incorrect. One can understand that there are
two pencils on the table without understanding that either 2=2 or that 1 + 1
= 2. Children, as they learn of number, addition, and equations, do come to
learn of this, but they do so in a particular order, learning earlier
concept before concepts that come later. A child could, for instance, know
what it is for there to be two of some thing in front of him, well before he
learns of the concept of addition, and will do so most certainly much before
learning of the rather advanced concept of numerical equality.
This points to one of the major problems with Kantian philosophy of mind -
the mind is considered a-historically.
blazingmuse
> greatest achievements in the entire history of Western Thought. If you
> don't know that, it's quite possibly because you never read it.
Maybe you can tell me what's wrong with my criticism of his first
Antimony of Reason then. Malenor wouldn't oblige me, but things in
general got a little ugly back then:
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=g:thl1694592855d&dq=&hl=en&lr=&selm=c69a5
fd0.0203110740.3b003379%40posting.google.com
Thank you for your time.
Resijinth
read2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> "Resijinth" <Resi...@Yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:b967c56d.02060...@posting.google.com...
> > Patrick Crosby <pcr...@ieee.org> wrote in message
> news:<3CFFEA77.ECA470B1@
> > ieee.org>...
> > > Would you be so kind as to give us an example of what you mean by "
> reasoning
> > > devoid of context?" Also, could you explain why symbolic logic is not an
> > > instance of "pure reason?"
> >
> > The concept of 'pure reason' is incoherent. When I say reasoning
> > devoid of context, I mean stuff like '2 = 2' or 'A cat is a cat'. This
> > doesn't tell me, however, that there are 2 pencils on the table or
> > that I'm petting the orange cat. [snip]
>
> Wrong. You can't understand that there are 2 pencils on the table
> without understanding first that 2 = 2, or better, that 1 + 1 = 2.
> Your mind must work with an intellectual schema that allows such
> understanding to take place. Without this schema, you would not
> understand that there are two pencils or even two objects. Without
> this schema, your intellect would consist of the matter of the senses
> without form. Matter does not give you two-ness, or pencil-ness.
> (Problem of universals.)
You don't seem to get it. If the very fact that 2 = 2 implied that
there were 2 pencils in front of me, and I didn't know what a pencil
was, then there could be 2 pencils, 2 cats, 2 elephants, 2 planets, 2
galaxies, 2 universes etc. in front of me. There could be 2 of the
entirety of existence in front of my by prooving that the very FACT
that 2=2 implies there would necessarily be 2 of ANY ONE THING in
front of me. This is false. So, necessarily, the identity law gives no
information about existence.
-Resijinth
David Schwartz
> So, necessarily, the identity law gives no
> information about existence.
So would you maintain that every state of existence is equally
consistent both with the law of identity being true and with it being
false? If not, then surely the knowledge of identity at minimum rules
out those states of existence inconsistent with it, no?
DS
malenor
.5786@sccrnsc02>...
That's true, therefore I should clarify what I wrote. On some
intellectual level, pre-mathematically, we all know that one unit plus
one unit equals two units of the same object. No mathematics, not even
language, is required to know this; yet it is still conceptual
knowledge. As adults with more advanced conceptual learning, along
with the correct concepts, we can represent this knowledge in
mathematical terms. By the same token, we all have a sense of time;
however, it takes more than a sense of time to be able to represent
time geometrically on a time-line, it requires knowledge of geometry.
Moreover, it would make knowledge impossible to expect us to be able
to represent things mathematically before we can cognize them at all.
I had, after all, expected most readers here to be familiar with
Randian epistemology in which a child is somehow expected to perceive
length and use conceptual common denominators without any knowledge of
these things. But as usual, Rand is always exempted on this forum from
the criticisms that are leveled at Kant and other thinkers.
> Children, as they learn of number, addition, and equations, do come to
> learn of this, but they do so in a particular order, learning earlier
> concept before concepts that come later. A child could, for instance, know
> what it is for there to be two of some thing in front of him, well before he
> learns of the concept of addition, and will do so most certainly much before
> learning of the rather advanced concept of numerical equality.
>
Yes, that's right, you shall take me extremely literally, while being
extremely forgiving of Rand's garbage philosophy.
> This points to one of the major problems with Kantian philosophy of mind -
> the mind is considered a-historically.
You have apparently not read the Critique of Judgment. But I have seen
no "philosophy of mind" with Kant; instead, I have seen a Critique of
various types of thinking. With Rand there is no such Critique, only
her implied assertion that analyzing her own method of thinking, which
she admits required only a half-hour of serious introspection, was the
a-historically sound method for learning epistemology. Then there is
her a-historical method of seeing her philosophy as a static monism
resting outside of history available for anyone who is not a vicious
evader to encounter through some sort of intuitive channeling. The
Truth apparently does not develop like science develops; rather, it
has been available to all humans through all time, and Rand is the
first human being honest enough to contact it due to her non-evasive
mental focus. But what makes human thinking possible to begin with?
Blank-out. A child somehow just encounters, in her example, lengthy
objects, and these objects he is somehow able to compare to other
lengthy objects, and through some conceptual common denominator that
he has no clue about, he is able to put together the concept "length"
(without, of course, any such word at this point in time to
communicate this knowledge to himself or others). But where did the
conceptual common denominator come from? Blank-out. Apparently, there
is no tabula rasa after all. Apparently, the mind starts from some
kind of content at least, an innate knowledge so to speak from which
all other knowledge springs due to life-experiences and an innate
desire to learn, a desire to put "2 and 2" together before there is
any knowledge of mathematics at all. Rand's epistemology can best
described as a "story" in the post-modernist sense, just an
explanation on a par with Ptolemaic theory (except Ptolemy was at
least consistent in his approach to cosmology). But instead of asking
her readers if they concur with Rand's introspective findings, she
just takes them for granted as absolute, and requires that all
humanity think the exact same way. It may not be a bad method at all;
however, there have been many books written on "efficient thinking"
that do not pose as epistemology and therefore do the job of advising
us much better because the works are not over the authors' heads as
the ItOE was apparently over Rand's head from page one on.
malenor
7a37...@posting.google.com>...
empirical content. It is a criticism of Rand's Law of Identity, A is
A, not to be confused with anything from Aristotle with regard to this
analytical logic.
The purpose of Rand's Law of Identity goes beyond mathematics. She
does tend to switch between math and experience, the math somehow
coming first when in fact, as Eudaimonus just pointed out, math is
learned through a process; yet somehow for Rand, math is a priori to
the experience, even in the dearth of any explicit mathematical
knowledge at all, and the implicit, innate knowledge of math somehow
enables cognition to occur. But however her thinking goes (a nice
story anyway), the Law of Identity is intended to prevent one's
thinking from drifting off into fantasy, illusion, non-context,
castles in the clouds, emotionalism, subjectivism, existentialism of
various types, and most importantly, religion. If one simply
understands Rand's motive, and ignores the paucity of her logic and
prior understanding of philosophy, then it is easy to "justify" all
her thinking by its irreligiousness and anti-existentialism (evils
which all somehow sprang from the mind of "the most evil man in
mankind's existence," Immanuel Kant). You are supposed to think the
way Ayn Rand thought, and don't even thinking of questioning it.
malenor
72008.5...@posting.google.com>...
I'm glad to see you are still honestly curious about the problem of
the antinomies. While I'd like to see Patrick's answer, here is my
take on the subject.
First, you typically resorted to name-calling with Kant's writing. His
writing is "ugly," "sticky," "painful," and "looks like complete
bilge." Then, as proof, you offered some of your own ugly, sticky,
painful writing that doesn't however look like complete bilge because
it is almost entirely incomprehensible. At least in Kant's case, the
ugliness may have been the result of a bad translation, particularly
if you used the Meiklejohn.
But let's grow beyond all the name-calling. What I think you are
offering as a challenge to the antinomy is a piece of pure mathematics
with no hint of any Critique present. You only dropped the context of
the CPR that preceded the antinomies, in other words, you dropped the
overall proof of the CPR, by placing the antinomies into a matrix of
your own choosing. This matrix is nothing more than some theory
concerning infinity (or eternity). But when Kant speaks of a
"synthesis," he is not speaking of steps in the mathematical sense,
but in the transcendental sense of that which makes empirical
experience possible.
There is, however, no element of empirical experience involved in your
theory, therefore none of the required "synthesis" for obtaining an
infinite quantity of time in experience which was to be proved. It is
just eternity held up as a static whole in the absence of how it was
obtained. This is entirely anti-Kantian in that there was no
transcendental methodology preceding the concept, only some
mathematical presumptions. *However*, that is allowable for math, no
problem there whatsoever. But with regards to actual *experience*,
such a quantity is an impossibility. With Kant's antinomy there is an
implied causal chain of experience going back perhaps to eternity,
perhaps not. But since the causal chain ends at any given *now*, there
cannot have been an eternity passed in the empirical sense. Time in
the transcendental sense, however, is represented as infinite, but in
this case it is used as speculation of the purely mathematical
variety. Eternity is a mere idea to be used by mathematicians, and
rightly so, but unfortunately by religious fanatics with delusions of
grandeur, also. These quasi-philosophical fanatics imagine they can
speak of eternity from a god's point-of-view, and Kant is thoroughly
trashing this intellectual tendency. However, he is not picking on
mathematics whatsoever.
On another note, Kant is giving a modus tollens argument: if the
universe is not eternal, then it had a beginning; or, if the universe
had no beginning, then it is eternal. In this realm of speculation
there are and can only be two choices. There is no such thing as a
beginning that lasted for eternity, at least not for our way of
thinking.
Kant is arguing that this sort of non-Critical metaphysical
speculation is futile. It is possible, on the basis of the
assumptions, to prove either pole of the antinomy. Assuming the
universe had a beginning it is necessary to cognize a first,
spontaneous cause. But how can we claim such a first cause as
knowledge? The universe must be eternal. But wait: the universe cannot
be eternal, so it must have had a beginning. But it cannot have had a
beginning...
While it is certainly possible to apply mathematics to the empirical,
it is not allowable to use mathematical models to attempt to transcend
the empirical and pretend to understand that which goes beyond any
possible *experience.* IOW, math and metaphysics don't mix.
Eudaimonus
"malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:5851837b.02060...@posting.google.com...
> That's true, therefore I should clarify what I wrote. On some
> intellectual level, pre-mathematically, we all know that one unit plus
> one unit equals two units of the same object. No mathematics, not even
> language, is required to know this; yet it is still conceptual
> knowledge. As adults with more advanced conceptual learning, along
> with the correct concepts, we can represent this knowledge in
> mathematical terms. By the same token, we all have a sense of time;
> however, it takes more than a sense of time to be able to represent
> time geometrically on a time-line, it requires knowledge of geometry.
> Moreover, it would make knowledge impossible to expect us to be able
> to represent things mathematically before we can cognize them at all.
In other words, I am correct, but you don't care to consider what I said as
having any implication for, well, any of your thoughts at all.
> I had, after all, expected most readers here to be familiar with
> Randian epistemology in which a child is somehow expected to perceive
> length and use conceptual common denominators without any knowledge of
> these things. But as usual, Rand is always exempted on this forum from
> the criticisms that are leveled at Kant and other thinkers.
Hmm ...
> > Children, as they learn of number, addition, and equations, do come to
> > learn of this, but they do so in a particular order, learning earlier
> > concept before concepts that come later. A child could, for instance,
know
> > what it is for there to be two of some thing in front of him, well
before he
> > learns of the concept of addition, and will do so most certainly much
before
> > learning of the rather advanced concept of numerical equality.
> >
> Yes, that's right, you shall take me extremely literally, while being
> extremely forgiving of Rand's garbage philosophy.
.... I am starting to gather that you have a personal dislike of this "Rand"
person ...
> > This points to one of the major problems with Kantian philosophy of
mind -
> > the mind is considered a-historically.
<Cut>
Malenor, have you ever heard of the words "tu quoque", and are you aware
that is it refers to a form of ad hominem, which is a kind of fallacy?
Eudaimonus
"malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:5851837b.02060...@posting.google.com...
> The purpose of Rand's Law of Identity goes beyond mathematics.
Funny how you keep talking about the "purposes" of philosopher's holding the
positions they do. As if it's a matter of having something you want to
achieve, and then figuring out what idea will help you get that thing - not
a matter of, well, trying to figure out the truth.
> She
> does tend to switch between math and experience, the math somehow
> coming first when in fact, as Eudaimonus just pointed out, math is
> learned through a process; yet somehow for Rand, math is a priori to
> the experience, even in the dearth of any explicit mathematical
> knowledge at all, and the implicit, innate knowledge of math somehow
> enables cognition to occur.
And here again, you impute upon what you think is some philosopher's idea,
what you take to be her purpose, in order to figure out for yourself what
she was saying.
Not supprizingly, you get it all wrong by reading in that manner.
> But however her thinking goes (a nice
> story anyway), the Law of Identity is intended to prevent one's
> thinking from drifting off into fantasy, illusion, non-context,
> castles in the clouds, emotionalism, subjectivism, existentialism of
> various types, and most importantly, religion.
The Law of Identity has no purpose - how can a metaphysical or
epistemological "law" have a purpose? Do you suppose that scientific laws
have "purposes"? What, I wonder, do you think is the "purpose" of the
second law of thermodynamics, or of the general theory of relativity?
> If one simply
> understands Rand's motive, and ignores the paucity of her logic and
> prior understanding of philosophy, then it is easy to "justify" all
> her thinking by its irreligiousness and anti-existentialism (evils
> which all somehow sprang from the mind of "the most evil man in
> mankind's existence," Immanuel Kant).
Ah, here we go. IF only we don't grant her the ligiticamy of actually
paying attention to what she said, but instead de-contruct her prose to read
between the lines, then we can figure out what she is REALLY saying?
> You are supposed to think the
> way Ayn Rand thought, and don't even thinking of questioning it.
I'm sure you find some emotional comfort in thinking that those who disagree
with you are not logic and rational being, but are being motivated purely by
sub-rational, emotional and base motives.
But pointing that out (as you do) is not any form of arguement.
Frank T. DeAngelis
idealism and materialism (actually, an "objective idealist"), we ought
to look at his ethics, theory of law and justice, etc. -esp. on this
particular postgroup.
From his "2nd Critique," and "Prolegomena (or the Grundlugen zur
Metaphysik...and PT.II: The Doctrine of Virtue)," we get a
self-obligating, theory of self-interests FROM some "Disinterested"
suspension of beliefs. What say you of the Categorical Imperative.
In my last book, a work on political economy and philosophy of law
–specifically on debt and bankruptcy, I critically analyze
Kant’s moral theory, mostly in Chapter 3, but, much more
apropos, I think, is the (and 'my')critical analysis of Kant’s
work "On Perpetual Peace," and the admonition for a League of
Nations/UN, in my upcoming work, “Terrorism as a Political
Philosophy” (from manuscript form, p.109+). The theories of a
Perpetual Peace vis-a-vis a collective world body seem to be
transcended, "aufgehoben," no?
frank
www.geo.cities.com/terrorism9112002
" " " " " " /fun_d_mental
blazingmuse
> First, you typically resorted to name-calling with Kant's writing. His
> writing is "ugly," "sticky," "painful," and "looks like complete
> bilge." Then, as proof, you offered some of your own ugly, sticky,
> painful writing that doesn't however look like complete bilge because
> it is almost entirely incomprehensible. At least in Kant's case, the
> ugliness may have been the result of a bad translation, particularly
> if you used the Meiklejohn.
Not quite. I called the business of dissecting them, ugly and sticky.
I was also puzzled that they 'looked like' complete bilge. And
stated that my experience was painful. These could all be attributed
to my inadequacies of comprehension, rather than flaws innate to the
piece. Mind you, you didn't believe I understood it in the first
place, so I suppose I'm preaching to the converted. The text is
quoted in the post, if you need to check it's translation.
> But let's grow beyond all the name-calling. What I think you are
> offering as a challenge to the antinomy is a piece of pure mathematics
> with no hint of any Critique present. You only dropped the context of
> the CPR that preceded the antinomies, in other words, you dropped the
> overall proof of the CPR, by placing the antinomies into a matrix of
> your own choosing. This matrix is nothing more than some theory
> concerning infinity (or eternity). But when Kant speaks of a
> "synthesis," he is not speaking of steps in the mathematical sense,
> but in the transcendental sense of that which makes empirical
> experience possible.
You're the third person to complain about my lack of lucidness.
perhaps I may elaborate slightly. Ahem:
>> If we assume that the world has no beginning in time, then up to
every given
>> moment an eternity has elapsed, and there has passed away in the
world an
>> infinite series of successive states of things.
Q. What are these 'states'? Who recognises them? By what criteria?
The Cosmos is not a discrete device with a clock cycle. There are no
sharply defined intervals of existence, no Chronions, no quanta of
time. What are you working on?
>> Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never
be
>> completed through successive synthesis.
I suppose that's a tolerable working definition.
>> It thus follows that it is impossible for an infinite world-series
to have
>> passed away, and that a beginning of the world is therefore a
necessary
>> condition of the world's existence. This was the first point that
called for
>> proof.
I've just experienced total logical disconnect, please try again
later. Sorry, if the Universe had a beginning in time, then the
series you refer to wasn't infinite, because it contains only a finite
succession of 'states of things.' Your attempt at proof contradicts
itself.
It is *possible* you are saying that the fact this series could not
pass way, implies that nothing passes away, so there is no series, as
in "succesive states of things." Which would be self-contradiction on
the part of the theory of an infinitely old universe, and would in
fact constitute a disproof. First of all, you are confusing the whole
with the parts. The discrete states must pass away, but the entire
sucession of them need not. Secondly, infinite series can very well
complete in infinite time. Thirdly, *infinitely* many infinite series
may complete in infinite time- I use the analogy of a surjection from
the natural to the rational numbers as an example. there are
infinitely many natural numbers, and yet infinitely many rational
numbers between each pair. So even if every step in the grand cosmic
series was itself another series, and both infinite, this wouldn't
preclude the completion of either. Certainly not until you can
explain how you recognise these states in the first place.
> There is, however, no element of empirical experience involved in your
> theory, therefore none of the required "synthesis" for obtaining an
> infinite quantity of time in experience which was to be proved.
I'm just working with the material given me. I cannot question Kant's
integrity as a logician until I see some signs or traces of it.
> It is just eternity held up as a static whole in the absence of how it was
> obtained. This is entirely anti-Kantian in that there was no transcendental
> methodology preceding the concept, only some mathematical presumptions. *
> However*, that is allowable for math, no problem there whatsoever. But with
> regards to actual *experience*, such a quantity is an impossibility. With
> Kant's antinomy there is an implied causal chain of experience going back
> perhaps to eternity, perhaps not. But since the causal chain ends at any
> given
> *now*, there cannot have been an eternity passed in the empirical sense.
Your suggesting... as far as I can make out, that the existence of
this "now" implies this 'series' has terminated. Wrong. "Now" only
needs to be a discrete state within that series, assuming you can
recognise those. And even if the series did have to terminate, I
remind you that infinite series *can* terminate, in infinite time.
> Time in the transcendental sense, however, is represented as infinite, but in
> this case it is used as speculation of the purely mathematical variety.
> Eternity is a mere idea to be used by mathematicians, and rightly so, but
> unfortunately by religious fanatics with delusions of grandeur, also. These
> quasi-philosophical fanatics imagine they can speak of eternity from a god's
> point-of-view, and Kant is thoroughly trashing this intellectual tendency.
> However, he is not picking on mathematics whatsoever.
No, he's making a botched attempt to subvert it to his own purposes.
Truth will out. Does anybody else see how patently rediculous this
is? Uh... I'm growing irritated again.
> On another note, Kant is giving a modus tollens argument: if the
> universe is not eternal, then it had a beginning; or, if the universe
> had no beginning, then it is eternal. In this realm of speculation
> there are and can only be two choices. There is no such thing as a
> beginning that lasted for eternity, at least not for our way of
> thinking.
I see absolutely, positively, no reason to burden the universe with
the inadequacies of our understanding.
Einstein proved that strange things happen to time and space in
conditions like the initial state of the Universe. Our old
conceptions need no longer apply.
> Kant is arguing that this sort of non-Critical metaphysical
> speculation is futile. It is possible, on the basis of the
> assumptions, to prove either pole of the antinomy. Assuming the
> universe had a beginning it is necessary to cognize a first,
> spontaneous cause. But how can we claim such a first cause as
> knowledge? The universe must be eternal. But wait: the universe cannot
> be eternal, so it must have had a beginning. But it cannot have had a
> beginning...
I'm sorry, but it is most patently not possible to prove each position
working from the other, at least not by Kant's methods.
> While it is certainly possible to apply mathematics to the empirical,
> it is not allowable to use mathematical models to attempt to transcend
> the empirical and pretend to understand that which goes beyond any
> possible *experience.* IOW, math and metaphysics don't mix.
Translation: Science and Religion <=> oil and water.
Malenor
"blazingmuse" <blazi...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:c69a5fd0.02061...@posting.google.com...
> Thanks for your response malenor. I think.
>
Same old BM i see. We're not going to get anywhere. I'm still waiting
for Patrick's response.
--
Gal*n Rutl*dge's HPO Genius File --
Ac*r, J*hn Alw*y, Dav*d Friedm*n, Symm*try, Res*jinth,
Malen*r, R. Kolk*r
-- Honorable mention:
JoeOrri*n, J*rge, Winst*n H, R. Leep*r - "Others",
U. Sundar*m
Malenor
"Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
news:1b8e1078.02061...@posting.google.com...
> Instead of keying in on Kant's dualist epistemology,
Not epistemology, Critique. But it is only dualist in the sense of a
dialectician looking for the solution to the duality, thus exposing
the illusion of both dialectics and dualism.
> or metaphysics of
> idealism and materialism (actually, an "objective idealist"),
No. Critical, formal, or transcendental idealist. He has used all three
titles to describe himself.
> we ought
> to look at his ethics, theory of law and justice, etc. -esp. on this
> particular postgroup.
>
That is because you have mis-categorized his Critical method in terms
that make them very unpalatable here. But it is a method, not abandoned
but used, and moreover, completed, in the later post-Critical works.
It is literally impossible to understand the later works in the absence
of the primary Critical treatise. In fact, they are meant to be read in the
sequence that they were published.
But I think what you are aiming at is the re-characterization of Kant in
terms of works in which he comes out in favor of ideas more favorable to
Randites. Even Peikoff knows that Kant was a lover of political freedom
(not to be confused with the "political freedom" of libertarians) in
defeating
autocratic government and giving the people a voice in government. But,
according to Peikoff, Kant was not consistent enough. He believes, as
you apparently do, that Kant's Critique is too Platonic, placing the mind
in some sort of subservient political situation because it is hopelessly
confused by the unknowable world around it. But this is more of a
Leibnizian spin on Kant, one which K thoroughly trashed, and rightly so.
Randites interpret Kant in as many ways as they deem necessary:
as a super-Platonist, Berkeleyan, Humean, Leibnizian/Wolffian, dogmatist,
pragmatist, religious fanatic, Hitler's-intellectual-twin. They do so on the
basis of tiny bits of Kant's writing torn out of context with the rest.
Moreover,
the entire Critical program is always associated with the Deduction of the
Categories, as if Kant wrote nothing else in the CPR. Since the Deduction
is excruciatingly difficult to understand, Randites are satisfied to
comprehend
it in their own way, by, for instance, interpreting "appearances" as
"illusion,"
or, "modification of the sensibility" as "distortion." Furthermore, they
take
their own empiricist bias, which has hardly been proven, as a given, and
proceed to place Kantian transcendentalism within that matrix.
It is certainly the case that when this is done, out pops some weird
variations
on Idealism, depending on which version of Objectivism you use to do the
interpreting.
But that is as backwards as trying to place non-Euclidean geometry within a
Euclidean interpretation. If one dogmatically accepts Euclid's postulations
as given, with no exceptions, then yes non-Euclidean geometry certainly
seems very strange, non-sensical, out of touch with reason and common sense.
But in fact we know that non-Euclidean geometry, applied to physics, leads
to relativity theory, a theory that adds to Euclidean geometry without
contradiction. Einstein did not negate Newtonian mechanics with his General
Relativity, he only built on the theories, improving their predictive
capabilities.
Transcendentalism is like non-Euclidean geometry in this sense, it builds on
empiricism without contradicting it, but improving on it by lending credence
to some of its beliefs (for instance, the law of causality). Non-Euclidean
geometry, however, is no addition to common sense, but tends to detract
from it. The same goes for transcendental idealism. At least it does so
until
one realizes that the world around us really does modify our senses, that
these modifications are what they are, and that based on this fact it just
may
be possible to prove, not only that this world consists of a coherent matrix
of events, but that truth is the correspondence of our observations and
theories
with these events in a perfectly consistent way. For what exactly is Kant's
starting point? The truth, as found in Aristotelian logic, science,
mathematics,
geometry.
And here is the Copernican turn:
If we are capable of determining truths in these areas of thought,
then why not also in metaphysics? What is so different about metaphysics
that centuries passed by with no certain set of metaphysical postulates
ever brought forth? The appropriate method for determining this science
had not yet been found. While the appropriate *grounds* for determining
truth had been found -- Kant termed this the a priori, and identified
mathematics
as a completely a priori science -- what was needed was a method that
was similarly a priori (there is no other solution) without the construction
from arbitrary postulates found in mathematics. That method, opposed to
the mathematical but relying on certain elements that makes it a success, is
known as the transcendental method.
Frank T. DeAngelis
Kant. It is hardly from a "Randite" (as you call it) perspective. You
falsely assume way-too, too much. My Kantian comments are the exact
opposite of what you go off on.
Let's take a quick look at your comments:
Malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<%RfN8.259$hm1.13@newsr
ead2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> "Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
> news:1b8e1078.02061...@posting.google.com...
> > Instead of keying in on Kant's dualist epistemology,
>
> Not epistemology, Critique. But it is only dualist in the sense of a
> dialectician looking for the solution to the duality, thus exposing
> the illusion of both dialectics and dualism.
What is this all about? Yes, Kant's "Critique" is OF pure reason (a
priori)-alone, in the knowledge game, and he resolves the dualism with
the empirical component to real knowledge.
>only dualist in the sense of a
> dialectician looking for the solution to the duality, thus exposing
> the illusion of both dialectics and dualism.
"Exposing the illusion of dialectics and dualism"? I do not think so.
He is a dialectician, but still, only in an external way (ala/compared
to Hegelian dialectics), for he posits the existence of one side due
to the ding an-sich while, on the other hand of the antinomy, posits
the other as fur sich-sein. Necessity and freedom both coexist, but at
different and SEPARATE levels of knowledge AND metaphysical existence.
> > or metaphysics of
> > idealism and materialism (actually, an "objective idealist"),
>
> No. Critical, formal, or transcendental idealist. He has used all three
> titles to describe himself.
Yes, I am well aware of that. And, I have no objection to those terms,
with "transcendental idealist" being, probably the best -and most
accurate, but my use of "objective idealist" was in a way completely
different from what you presumed. I was giving "K" credit for
collapsing and resolving the dualism between subject and object (i.e.,
subjectivism, subjective idealist vs. objectivist ala Locke,
etc.)...even if I agree with Hegel's resolution via a real INTERNAL
dialectic tracing and unfolding of concepts (so, I consider Hegel an
"objective idealist")...get it, where I am really coming from, now?
> > we ought
> > to look at his ethics, theory of law and justice, etc. -esp. on this
> > particular postgroup.
> >
> That is because you have mis-categorized his Critical method in terms
> that make them very unpalatable here. But it is a method, not abandoned
> but used, and
Whatever, but your comments are totally misdirected. Relax, at ease,
"corporeal," and don't miss the trees while looking at the
Berkeley-ian forest.
frank
blazingmuse
> >
> Same old BM i see. We're not going to get anywhere. I'm still waiting
> for Patrick's response.
I thought I had been relatively civil. I consider a blunt refusal to
address the points I make, as if unworthy of attention, the height of
derision.
Frank T. DeAngelis
Re: your comments below -at bottom, Whooa, Cowboy! Obviously a case of
mistaken identity.
From my other posts in this very thread, you should know better.
Popped off a little prematurely, did you?
(1) It is of absolute/ly extreme importance, granted, that Kant begins
the First Kritik by stating that "all knowledge begins with
experience," and/but t
(2) that I have been extremely critical of the Randian theory of
"Objectivism," calling it a theory of "naive realism (ala Hegel)."
My "beef" with both Kant and Rand (so you can all oppose me),
epistemologically, philosophically, is right there with the so-called
"Law of Contradiction" (more appropriately--and accurately--called the
"Principle of NON-Contradiction"). As Kant says, "opposites cannot
exist at the same time."
But, Kant claims that this "law" applies to "all reality," phenomena
as well as noumena. Synthetic a priori judgments/principles can only
apply to phenomena, not, e.g., independent reality such as that of the
"ding an-sich."
This, I maintain, is where the problem with the Transcendental
Dialectic begins (and AS an EXTERNAL treatment, as an EXTERNAL
dialectic, as "necessary" as it might be), and where the antinomies,
esp. the third antinomy of necessity vs. freedom, requiring a
problematic (and unacceptable) "patchwork" of fur-sich-sein, pour-soi,
vs. "ding an-sich," en-soi.
I agree, for the most part, with a great deal of Kant's transcendental
deduction, and with -therefore, his theory of the origin of a priori
concepts, being quite cognizant of the difference between a
transcendental deduction and an empirical deduction, the latter being
a method of acquiring, grasping those concepts.
However,although I whole-heartedly agree with K. that knowledge
requires a synthesis -a transcendental unity of apperception, and that
thinking is not the same as "knowing," I disagree with the
dualistically separate treatment of the ding an-sich, i.e., e.g., that
we cannot--supposedly--"know" the ding an-sich, creating the entire
problem and 2nd Kritik of separating knowing from doing, theory from
practice, in -what I would say, is totally unrealistic and, actually,
impossible. I say that the totality of appearances IS the 'real,'
"thing in-itself," as ultimate reality.**
In more specific terms, I have problems with relating the first two
critiques to the third, for "Imagination" brings us to, what I
perceive as a problem, between the functions of syntheses (and
imagination) in synthesizing the manifold. What, indeed, is the proper
place of imagination in relation to understanding and sensibility, as
syntheses of production and reproduction, where imagination is
supposed to be a function of all forms of syntheses. Hmm!
And -then, of course, we have the "separate (...but equal" ?) theory
of aesthetics, with genius and imagination--not to mention the real
dialectical "purposiveness without a purpose" (opposition ?)--in the
3rd Kritik.
** more accurately, and precisely to the point, absolute totality, as
opposed to a/the concrete totality.
Ciao, for now,
frank
www.geocities.com/terrorism9112002
http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
Malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<%RfN8.259$hm1.13@newsr
ead2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> "Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
> news:1b8e1078.02061...@posting.google.com...
> > Instead of keying in on Kant's dualist epistemology,
>
> Not epistemology, Critique. But it is only dualist in the sense of a
> dialectician looking for the solution to the duality, thus exposing
> the illusion of both dialectics and dualism.
>
> But I think what you are aiming at is the re-characterization of Kant in
> terms of works in which he comes out in favor of ideas more favorable to
> Randites. Even Peikoff knows that Kant was a lover of political freedom
> (not to be confused with the "political freedom" of libertarians) in
> defeating
> autocratic government and giving the people a voice in government. But,
> according to Peikoff, Kant was not consistent enough. He believes, as
> you apparently do, that Kant's Critique is too Platonic, placing the mind
> in some sort of subservient political situation because it is hopelessly
> confused by the unknowable world around it. But this is more of a
> Leibnizian spin on Kant, one which K thoroughly trashed, and rightly so.
>
> Randites interpret Kant in as many ways as they deem necessary:
> as a super-Platonist, Berkeleyan, Humean, Leibnizian/Wolffian, dogmatist,
> pragmatist, religious fanatic, Hitler's-intellectual-twin. They do so on the
> basis of tiny bits of Kant's writing torn out of context with the rest.
> Moreover,
> the entire Critical program is always associated with the Deduction of the
> Categories, as if Kant wrote nothing else in the CPR. Since the Deduction
> is excruciatingly difficult to understand, Randites are satisfied to
> comprehend
> it in their own way, by, for instance, interpreting "appearances" as
> "illusion,"
>
>
> Transcendentalism ...builds on empiricism without contradicting it, but i
> mproving on it ...
malenor
Trying again.
Frank T. DeAngelis <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message news:<1b8e1078.020
6111409....@posting.google.com>...
> Hi, again, with a "Pt II," so to speak,
>
> Re: your comments below -at bottom, Whooa, Cowboy! Obviously a case of
> mistaken identity.
> From my other posts in this very thread, you should know better.
> Popped off a little prematurely, did you?
>
> (1) It is of absolute/ly extreme importance, granted, that Kant begins
> the First Kritik by stating that "all knowledge begins with
> experience," and/but t
> (2) that I have been extremely critical of the Randian theory of
> "Objectivism," calling it a theory of "naive realism (ala Hegel)."
>
More sloppiness. Since when is Hegel's philosophy a naive realism?
> My "beef" with both Kant and Rand (so you can all oppose me),
> epistemologically, philosophically, is right there with the so-called
> "Law of Contradiction" (more appropriately--and accurately--called the
> "Principle of NON-Contradiction"). As Kant says, "opposites cannot
> exist at the same time."
> But, Kant claims that this "law" applies to "all reality," phenomena
> as well as noumena. Synthetic a priori judgments/principles can only
> apply to phenomena, not, e.g., independent reality such as that of the
> "ding an-sich."
>
What's with this Sartre? Are you placing Kant within some more
modernistic
framework?
> This, I maintain, is where the problem with the Transcendental
> Dialectic begins (and AS an EXTERNAL treatment, as an EXTERNAL
> dialectic, as "necessary" as it might be), and where the antinomies,
> esp. the third antinomy of necessity vs. freedom, requiring a
> problematic (and unacceptable) "patchwork" of fur-sich-sein, pour-soi,
> vs. "ding an-sich," en-soi.
>
You are an existentialist, and your treatment of Kant's CPR shows it.
> I agree, for the most part, with a great deal of Kant's transcendental
> deduction, and with -therefore, his theory of the origin of a priori
> concepts, being quite cognizant of the difference between a
> transcendental deduction and an empirical deduction, the latter being
> a method of acquiring, grasping those concepts.
>
> However,although I whole-heartedly agree with K. that knowledge
> requires a synthesis -a transcendental unity of apperception, and that
> thinking is not the same as "knowing," I disagree with the
> dualistically separate treatment of the ding an-sich, i.e., e.g., that
> we cannot--supposedly--"know" the ding an-sich, creating the entire
> problem and 2nd Kritik of separating knowing from doing, theory from
> practice, in -what I would say, is totally unrealistic and, actually,
> impossible. I say that the totality of appearances IS the 'real,'
> "thing in-itself," as ultimate reality.**
The problem of the noumena makes all else possible, including the
metaphysics and the morals.
> In more specific terms, I have problems with relating the first two
> critiques to the third, for "Imagination" brings us to, what I
> perceive as a problem, between the functions of syntheses (and
> imagination) in synthesizing the manifold. What, indeed, is the proper
> place of imagination in relation to understanding and sensibility, as
> syntheses of production and reproduction, where imagination is
> supposed to be a function of all forms of syntheses. Hmm!
> And -then, of course, we have the "separate (...but equal" ?) theory
> of aesthetics, with genius and imagination--not to mention the real
> dialectical "purposiveness without a purpose" (opposition ?)--in the
> 3rd Kritik.
>
I think you are confusing empirical imagination with transcendental
imagination.
There is no sense, as suggested by Randites, that Kant is claiming
that our ability to imagine something proves its reality. That is
their usual empiricist twist on Kant.
As for purposiveness without a purpose, it is just a projection of our
faith in
human progress. Appearances give us purposelessness and senselessness,
rather like an existentialist theory. Dead matter cannot give us
purpose, but as human we need to find a purpose because we represent
our basic self as noumenal, that is, not a product of the phenomenal
world of purposeless matter.
Frank T. DeAngelis
f45...@posting.google.com>...
> Frank T. DeAngelis <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message news:<1b8e1078.020
> 6111409....@posting.google.com>...
> > mistaken identity.
> > From my other posts in this very thread, you should know better.
> > Popped off a little prematurely, did you?
> > (1) It is of absolute/ly extreme importance, granted, that Kant begins
> > the First Kritik by stating that "all knowledge begins with
> > experience," and/but t
> > (2) that I have been extremely critical of the Randian theory of
> > "Objectivism," calling it a theory of "naive realism (ala Hegel)."
> >
> More sloppiness. Since when is Hegel's philosophy a naive realism?
If so, then the "sloppiness" is in your assumptions. Look: "naive
realism (ala Hegel)" = "naive realism," i.e., as labelled and
criticized by Hegel. ((I'm a Hegelian, you twit!))
> > My "beef" with both Kant and Rand (so you can all oppose me),
> > epistemologically, philosophically, is right there with the so-called
> > "Law of Contradiction" (more appropriately--and accurately--called the
> > "Principle of NON-Contradiction"). As Kant says, "opposites cannot
> > exist at the same time."
> > But, Kant claims that this "law" applies to "all reality," phenomena
> > as well as noumena. Synthetic a priori judgments/principles can only
> > apply to phenomena, not, e.g., independent reality such as that of the
> > "ding an-sich."
> >
> What's with this Sartre? Are you placing Kant within some more
> modernistic
> framework?
W-h-a-t is your problem? Did you take an intro. philosophy class, and
now you prematurely ejaculate home-spun webs of assumptions?
Ever since Kant, and his treatment of the "ding an-sich," most--if not
all--Continental philosophers have dealt (have had to deal) with the
perennial, mainstream philosophical terminology of for-itself and
in-itself. The German and French just happen to be (again, for the
most part) what consists of "Continental philosophy," okay? ((Please
deposit $44.95 for the history of philosophy instruction...not to
mention a lesson in reading and manners.)
> > This, I maintain, is where the problem with the Transcendental
> > Dialectic begins (and AS an EXTERNAL treatment, as an EXTERNAL
> > dialectic, as "necessary" as it might be), and where the antinomies,
> > esp. the third antinomy of necessity vs. freedom, requiring a
> > problematic (and unacceptable) "patchwork" of fur-sich-sein, pour-soi,
> > vs. "ding an-sich," en-soi.
> You are an existentialist, and your treatment of Kant's CPR shows it.
Oh, please, go soak in a hot tub. My ideas via my writing shows,
unfortunately, that you got just about everything wrong.
Sorry, but it is impossible to converse/correspond with you any more,
for you continuously pop off, prematurely, chock-full of wrong
assumptions. At first I just thought that you might be a young, eager,
and passionate student of Kant, but t...
If you are not constantly guilty of fallacious "straw man" arguments,
you are, worse, making other false assumptions and assertions. You
demonstrate an inability to just read what someone is saying. If you
assume things, ask what someone means, do not go off displaying
sophmoric, philosophical ignorance.
I did not want to make this into a personal confrontation, but you are
full of logically fallacious ad Hominem, Abusive and Circumstantial
inferential propositions and conclusions. Please pay attention to what
people are ("I am") saying, for this is the last time I will respond
to this particular thread (hopefully, in spite of your
pre-ejaculatory, inflamatory comments).
Capece?
Sorry, but I just do not need "handle with care" patience anymore, for
trolls, now that I am no longer a professor. I tried, several times,
to communicate with you, but...it's a lost cause. No need to reply.
frank
Frank T. DeAngelis
f45...@posting.google.com>...
> > This, I maintain, is where the problem with the Transcendental
> > Dialectic begins (and AS an EXTERNAL treatment, as an EXTERNAL
> > dialectic, as "necessary" as it might be), and where the antinomies,
> > esp. the third antinomy of necessity vs. freedom, requiring a
> > problematic (and unacceptable) "patchwork" of fur-sich-sein, pour-soi,
> > vs. "ding an-sich," en-soi.
> >
>
> You are an existentialist, and your treatment of Kant's CPR shows it.
Grow up, philosophically. Have you read anything, ANYTHING else
besides Kant, at all (if that)?
> > I agree, for the most part, with a great deal of Kant's transcendental
> > deduction, and with -therefore, his theory of the origin of a priori
> > concepts, being quite cognizant of the difference between a
> > transcendental deduction and an empirical deduction, the latter being
> > a method of acquiring, grasping those concepts.
> >
> > However,although I whole-heartedly agree with K. that knowledge
> > requires a synthesis -a transcendental unity of apperception, and that
> > thinking is not the same as "knowing," I disagree with the
> > dualistically separate treatment of the ding an-sich, i.e., e.g., that
> > we cannot--supposedly--"know" the ding an-sich, creating the entire
> > problem and 2nd Kritik of separating knowing from doing, theory from
> > practice, in -what I would say, is totally unrealistic and, actually,
> > impossible. I say that the totality of appearances IS the 'real,'
> > "thing in-itself," as ultimate reality.**
>
> The problem of the noumena makes all else possible, including the
> metaphysics and the morals.
"Possible" in a-nother world, a nether world, of mental masturbation
(ala Woody Allen).
> > In more specific terms, I have problems with relating the first two
> > critiques to the third, for "Imagination" brings us to, what I
> > perceive as a problem, between the functions of syntheses (and
> > imagination) in synthesizing the manifold. What, indeed, is the proper
> > place of imagination in relation to understanding and sensibility, as
> > syntheses of production and reproduction, where imagination is
> > supposed to be a function of all forms of syntheses. Hmm!
> > And -then, of course, we have the "separate (...but equal" ?) theory
> > of aesthetics, with genius and imagination--not to mention the real
> > dialectical "purposiveness without a purpose" (opposition ?)--in the
> > 3rd Kritik.
> >
> I think you are confusing empirical imagination with transcendental
> imagination.
>
> There is no sense, as suggested by Randites, that Kant is claiming
> that our ability to imagine something proves its reality. That is
> their usual empiricist twist on Kant.
Straw man. What is it with you? I'm a Hegelian, twit! (I like Kant's
refutation of the traditional philosophical arguments of "proof for
the existence of God" -whether you know it or not, a precursor to
Kierkegaardian anti-traditional logical proofs such as this.)
> As for purposiveness without a purpose, it is just a projection of our
> faith in
> human progress. Appearances give us purposelessness and senselessness,
> rather like an existentialist theory. Dead matter cannot give us
> purpose, but as human we need to find a purpose because we represent
> our basic self as noumenal, that is, not a product of the phenomenal
> world of purposeless matter.
W-h-a-t? Are you serious? Are you a beginning philosophy student, or
what? This "purposiveness without a purpose" is the quintessential
part of Kant's 3rd Kritik der Urteilskraft, of Aesthetic/s-al
judgements.
What have you been smoking? (See how fallacies work?...e.g., "complex
question," "a deceptive and illegitimate question within a question"?)
frank again
cf. www.geocities.com/terrorism
and http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
Yzerok
>I disagree with the
>> > dualistically separate treatment of the ding an-sich, i.e., e.g., that
>> > we cannot--supposedly--"know" the ding an-sich, creating the entire
>> > problem and 2nd Kritik of separating knowing from doing theory from
>> > practice, in -what I would say, is totally unrealistic and, actually,
>> > impossible.
Yes. I am becoming increasingly aware that this error (wrongly sundering
reality/appearances) is a bountiful fount for further confusions.For example,
there are those who relativise truth on the grounds that since all we "know"
is individual appearance it therefore follows that there is a different truth
for me than for you. So my specific question to you is:
Are you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from
wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?
I would be most interested in obtaining your response, should you care to give
it. YZEROK
Malenor
"Yzerok" <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020615112401...@mb-ca.aol.com...
I have a hard time getting posts into this thread for some reason. The guy
you are responding to is a complete fruitcake anyway, so it's just as
well.
But the theory you are (rightly) criticizing there is post-modernism,
not Critique. Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual
because there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in
each person. This theory carries into the morals in which the CI
is a universalizable principle.
I hope this post makes it in, because you need a lot of help with
Kantian theory. The person you are responding to is only giving Kant's
theory a modernistic spin, then knocking down the straw dog he
creates.
Frank T. DeAngelis
7...@mb-ca.aol.com>...
Hi Yzerok,
I see many perennial, philosophical problems from Kant's treatment(s)
of antinomies which plague their successful resolution, and/but can
easily lend itself to critical interpretation, and this problem--in
more modernistic terms--is certainly one of a problematic split
between "IS" and "OUGHT," also plaguing Comtian-Ayerian style
positivism(s).
It is in the 3rd Kritik, though, that the antinomies and problems with
Kant's concept of concepts (incl., e.g., "ideas" vs.
"concepts/rational ideas" -which I do accept) and of intuition,
genius, and imagination (producing) vs. taste (judging), etc., "hit
the proverbial, philosophical fan." In THAT Kritik, Kant tells us that
the antinomies in all 3 kritiks are very similar in that they "force
us against our will to look beyond the sensible and to seek in the
supersensible the point of union for all our a priori faculties..."
(Second Division, para.55). From the beautiful and/vs. morally good to
freedom and the sublime (although in a reverse order of quantity and
quality), and, most interestingly, on to the idea of a "purposiveness
without a purpose" (and the link of art between nature and ethics) I
believe, is the most profound and dialectically internal treatment, as
an 'evolutionary' kind of triadic precursor and anticipation of
Hegelian dialectics. (I find that the road from 1790 to 1812 is much
more revelatory--and interconnected--than meets the eye, at
first...you know?)
frank
Frank T. DeAngelis
Sorry, should have at least added (I prematurely hit the post button):
So, the "Is" vs. "Ought,(and, e.g., "nature" vs. "freedom"
dichotomy)"as phenomenal 'fact'" vs. "value" (supposedly of a
completely different world of "noumenal reality"--and similarly
plaguing the nagging problems created within positivism--is what I
perceive to be an untenable position. Separating fact from value is
"MORE (?) impossible" than separating perception from conception, but
Kant, nevertheless, tries to claim this, nay, he HAS TO, based upon
his two-world view, "enabling" him to attempt to resolve oppositions
and contradictions (BASED UPON THE SO-CALLED "LAWS OF THOUGHT,"
STEMMING from those of Identity and "NON-CONTRADICTION"). The 3rd
Kritik, I am claiming, comes much closer to a/the "real/-istic,"
internal dialectical resolution.
<yze...@aol.com> wrote in message news:<20020615112401.05462.00000527@mb-c
<a.aol.com>...
Yzerok
>I have a hard time getting posts into this thread for some reason. The guy
>you are responding to is a complete fruitcake anyway, so it's just as
>well.
>
>But the theory you are (rightly) criticizing there is post-modernism,
>not Critique. Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
>is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual
>because there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in
>each person. This theory carries into the morals in which the CI
>is a universalizable principle.
>
>I hope this post makes it in, because you need a lot of help with
>Kantian theory. The person you are responding to is only giving Kant's
>theory a modernistic spin, then knocking down the straw dog he
>creates.
Well, thank you, I guess, for your post. I would have enjoyed it more had you
actually said something more relevant to the question I asked; which was "Are
you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from wrongful
acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?".
On the basis of reading some of your posts, you seem to be an ardent Kantian
defender. Presumably, you therefore would have denied the premise of the
question--which is why I didnât ask it of you, in the first place.
In any case, I have no desire to intrude and engage in a discussion about
Kantian philosophy. I will let you and others continue as you see fit. YZEROK
Yzerok
>So, the "Is" vs. "Ought,(and, e.g., "nature" vs. "freedom"
>dichotomy)"as phenomenal 'fact'" vs. "value" (supposedly of a
>completely different world of "noumenal reality"--and similarly
>plaguing the nagging problems created within positivism--is what I
>perceive to be an untenable position.
Thank you for your response. You will recall that my specific question to you
was:
"Are you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from
wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?".
But, I am puzzled by your reference several times to the "nagging" problems in
positivism and specifically Ayer. Of course Ayer does not accept a dualistic
metaphysics and so whatever his views regarding the place of values in a world
of fact may be (you obviously believe his emotive explanation of value to be
inadequate), that view is not the result of his acceptance of the noumena. So
why did you bring him up?
In any case, I really didnât intend to get into the middle of your ongoing
Kantian (and Hegelian?) discussion with Malenor. I just wanted to slip in and
ask that specific narrow question I did ask, and Iâll look forward to any
clarification you would care to make. Now Iâll step back and watch you guys
throw some more rocks, if thatâs what you intend to do. YZEROK
Frank T. DeAngelis
3...@mb-ms.aol.com>...
> Frank T. DeAngelis had written:
> (snip)
>
> >So, the "Is" vs. "Ought,(and, e.g., "nature" vs. "freedom"
> >dichotomy)"as phenomenal 'fact'" vs. "value" (supposedly of a
> >completely different world of "noumenal reality"--and similarly
> >plaguing the nagging problems created within positivism--is what I
> >perceive to be an untenable position.
>
> Thank you for your response. You will recall that my specific question to you
> was:
> "Are you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from
> wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?".
In all of this, I was simply alluding to the problems of fact vs.
value, suggesting that...e.g., (1) Description, what "IS," "Fact,"
Science, cannot be separated from values (beginning with
intentionality; that is, the incentives, motives, etc., for what will
be researched -in the first place); (2) that the present empirical
existence of things does not somehow involve any direction into
morality, action, etc. (that is, what "ought" to be, ideal/s, etc.).
> But, I am puzzled by your reference several times to the "nagging" proble
> ms in
> positivism and specifically Ayer. Of course Ayer does not accept a dualistic
> metaphysics and so whatever his views regarding the place of values in a
> world
> of fact may be (you obviously believe his emotive explanation of value to be
> inadequate), that view is not the result of his acceptance of the noumena. So
> why did you bring him up?
Because I believe that Kant's scientific empirical data of IS vs.
morality, action/praxis, etc. of "OUGHT," description vs.
prescription, was the theoretical impetus to other, more recent,
theories, such as positivism -per se, regardless of the obvious
differences (e.g., the anti-metaphysical strain in logical positivism,
emotivism, etc.).
So, although the phenomena/noumena split of Kant's -in particular, has
nothing to do with A.J. Ayer, Hare, Stevenson, etc., his separation of
certain oppositions and/or distinctions most certainly do. I am just
emphasizing the identity in the difference, so to speak.
> In any case, I really didn? intend to get into the middle of your ongoing
> Kantian (and Hegelian?) discussion with Malenor. I just wanted to slip in and
> ask that specific narrow question I did ask, and I?l look forward to any
> clarification you would care to make. Now I?l step back and watch you guys
> throw some more rocks, if that? what you intend to do. YZEROK
No, not really. I didn't want to get into a/that pissing contest.
That's what I did (had to do) many years ago, in graduate school, in
philosophy colloquia and in delivering, defending, and critiquing
papers and articles.
frank
Frank T. DeAngelis
3...@mb-ms.aol.com>...
> In any case, I really didn? intend to get into the middle of your ongoing
> Kantian (and Hegelian?) discussion with Malenor. I just wanted to slip in and
> clarification you would care to make. Now I?l step back and watch you guys
> throw some more rocks, if that? what you intend to do. YZEROK
The lure and impersonal and seductive "flame" of the internet is
tempting, but I HAVE a life. Unfortunately, several of my former
colleagues and professors who began to engage in internet philosophy
discussion groups (e.g., Gene T. and Bill S., on the old philosophy
and alt.philosophy "newsgroups") were turned off by the flaming and
just abandoned the opportunity--and initial interest--to communicate
freely.
frank
Malenor
"Yzerok" <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020618063202...@mb-ms.aol.com...
> question--which is why I didnt ask it of you, in the first place.
>
> In any case, I have no desire to intrude and engage in a discussion about
> Kantian philosophy. I will let you and others continue as you see fit.
YZEROK
>
>
It would be unseeming for me to be a mere ardent defender of a faith like
the Randroids here.
Apparently I don't understand your question? Yet it is simple, and I did
answer it. What is a "wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena
distinction"? That question can be interpreted different ways. My first
impression is that you are implying that accepting the distinction is wrong,
especially when it appears in the same context of such comments as
"I am becoming increasingly aware that this error (wrongly sundering
reality/appearances) is a bountiful fount for further confusions." And
yet it is the acceptance of this "sundering" that makes the rest of the
architectonic possible.
Now, you are claiming that I did not answer the question in my first
response. Obviously, I did. One of the errors you pointed out follows
from the "sundering" was the "relativizing of experience." Yours is
therefore a subjectivist spin not intended by Kant, especially when
Kant's deduction of the categories consists of two parts, the proof
of the objective validity of the categories, and of their objective
reality. "[T]he *objective validity* of the categories, as a priori
conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards
the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case
they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because
only through them can an object of experience be thought." Then:
"And in this manner the categories as mere forms of thought receive
*objective reality*, that is, application to objects which are given
to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena; for it is only of
phenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition." This last
quote also places the necessary connection with phenomena
and reality, whereas you had implied that it is noumena and reality
that are the synonymous terms ("appearance/reality").
You say that I reject the premise of the very question you ask. Yet
you blindly accept it. But I do not blindly reject it because I know the
premise is wrong. You say you are becoming "increasingly aware"
of the confusions that result from such a sundering, and give an
example of such a confusion -- the post-modernistic spin you then
give to the distinction. But that is, again, just knocking down a
straw dog of your own fashioning.
So my response was relevant after all, in that I responded to
one of the supposed confusions developed out of your twisting
of Kant's distinctions into a confused shape.
My final task is to say, if any errors or confusions follow from
Kant's various distinctions, I do not know what they are. Just
that errors follow from inconsistently applying the distinctions,
a tendency you have aptly demonstrated.
Furthermore, I must clarify an error that people almost always
make, especially after reading some less competent interpretation
or criticism of Kant (see for instance Bennett). You interpret
"noumena/phenomena" as "reality/appearance." But that is an
ontological spin on Kant's approach that he never intended.
And not only that, but a conflation of two distinct elements of the
metaphysics (as he called it). Kant never claims that the
noumenal is the real. Reality, as a concept, is a category of
the Understanding, therefore it cannot be noumenal. You
should take Kant's words more literally and less empirically.
Given that a reader has not properly grasped the transcendental
distinction, he is almost always forced into an empiricist
interpretation of the text, as has happened with you (assuming
you even read the text). You won't get very far in a discussion
on Kant with a Kantian by saying "reality/appearance." It is
"thing-in-itself/appearance." The thing-in-itself is simply the
thing, generally speaking, considered apart from the forms of
understanding, that is, merely intellectually and constructively.
So it cannot be reality, only an idea constructed in our minds.
Appearance is the thing-in-general considered in the context
of the forms, pre-judgment. But since all our experience consists
of spontaneous judgments, there is no pre-judgment except
intellectually speaking, for purposes of transcendental argument.
So appearance itself is only an idea, and a thing-in-general
(not Kant's term but my own) is not an object of experience.
This thing in general later on, in the Analogies, becomes
"substance," the permanent substratum that underlies all
changes of states of things and makes our experience of those
changes possible. (So much for Democritus and Parmenides.)
So as you see, I not only question your premise, I question
your very understanding of Kant that led to the premise.
It's ok to be wrong, though. What's not ok is to maintain this
state forever, even in the face of evidence to the contrary.
Malenor
is the flamer and who is the flamee in this discussion.
"Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
news:1b8e1078.02061...@posting.google.com...
> The lure and impersonal and seductive "flame" of the internet is
> tempting,
A temptation that Frank easily falls for.
> but I HAVE a life. Unfortunately, several of my former
> colleagues and professors who began to engage in internet philosophy
> discussion groups (e.g., Gene T. and Bill S., on the old philosophy
> and alt.philosophy "newsgroups") were turned off by the flaming and
> just abandoned the opportunity--and initial interest--to communicate
> freely.
>
They were probably turned off by Frank's constant flame-wars.
Famous flames of Frank T. DeAngelis:
"Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
news:1b8e1078.02061...@posting.google.com...
"((I'm a Hegelian, you twit!))"
"W-h-a-t is your problem? Did you take an intro. philosophy class, and
now you prematurely ejaculate home-spun webs of assumptions?"
"Oh, please, go soak in a hot tub. My ideas via my writing shows,
unfortunately, that you got just about everything wrong."
"Sorry, but it is impossible to converse/correspond with you any more,
for you continuously pop off, prematurely, chock-full of wrong
assumptions."
"If you
assume things, ask what someone means, do not go off displaying
sophmoric [sic], philosophical ignorance."
"I did not want to make this into a personal confrontation, but you are
full of logically fallacious ad Hominem, Abusive and Circumstantial
inferential propositions and conclusions."
[Obviously personal confrontation, ad hom, and abusive and
circumstantial inferential propositions and conclusions are what Frank
lives for.]
"hopefully, in spite of your pre-ejaculatory, inflamatory comments."
[Notice how Frank was not above choosing such a pre-ejaculatory,
"inflamatory" method for himself, and after only the slightest hint of
criticism I had leveled at his silly ideas.]
"Sorry, but I just do not need "handle with care" patience anymore"
[There was never even a hint of "handling with care" from this
individual, close as he is to going off the deep end with just
the slightest push.]
Frank T. DeAngelis, who claims to be a retired professor, perfectly
illustrates why modern intellectuals have fallen into disrepute with the
general public.
Malenor
"Yzerok" <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020618065110...@mb-ms.aol.com...
> In any case, I really didnt intend to get into the middle of your ongoing
> Kantian (and Hegelian?) discussion with Malenor. I just wanted to slip in
and
> ask that specific narrow question I did ask, and I ll look forward to any
> clarification you would care to make. Now Ill step back and watch you guys
> throw some more rocks, if that s what you intend to do. YZEROK
>
You apparently missed the part where Frank arrogantly declared himself a
great scholar (a retired professor of something or other) who is above all
necessity of debate with inferior individuals such as myself.
Malenor
"Yzerok" <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020618063202...@mb-ms.aol.com...
> question--which is why I didnt ask it of you, in the first place.
>
> In any case, I have no desire to intrude and engage in a discussion about
> Kantian philosophy. I will let you and others continue as you see fit.
YZEROK
>
>
It would be unseeming for me to be a mere ardent defender of a faith like
the Randroids here.
Apparently I don't understand your question? Yet it is simple, and I did
answer it. What is a "wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena
distinction"? That question can be interpreted different ways. My first
impression is that you are implying that accepting the distinction is wrong,
especially when it appears in the same context of such comments as
"I am becoming increasingly aware that this error (wrongly sundering
Malenor
"Yzerok" <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020618065110...@mb-ms.aol.com...
> In any case, I really didnt intend to get into the middle of your ongoing
> Kantian (and Hegelian?) discussion with Malenor. I just wanted to slip in
and
Malenor
is the flamer and who is the flamee in this discussion.
"Frank T. DeAngelis" <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message
news:1b8e1078.02061...@posting.google.com...
> The lure and impersonal and seductive "flame" of the internet is
> tempting,
A temptation that Frank easily falls for.
> but I HAVE a life. Unfortunately, several of my former
> colleagues and professors who began to engage in internet philosophy
> discussion groups (e.g., Gene T. and Bill S., on the old philosophy
> and alt.philosophy "newsgroups") were turned off by the flaming and
> just abandoned the opportunity--and initial interest--to communicate
> freely.
>
Yzerok
>The lure and impersonal and seductive "flame" of the internet is
>tempting, but I HAVE a life. Unfortunately, several of my former
>colleagues and professors who began to engage in internet philosophy
>discussion groups (e.g., Gene T. and Bill S., on the old philosophy
>and alt.philosophy "newsgroups") were turned off by the flaming and
>just abandoned the opportunity--and initial interest--to communicate
>freely.
>
>frank
Well, it is too bad that your colleagues don't participate for it is always
nice to have philosophers posting about philosophy. Tell them to look in here
for despite your recent experience, you'll find most of the regulars to be
adults, however, that will not deter vigorous debate of course. There are at
least three or four professional philosophers who post here recurringly.
You would make a welcome addition for a self described Hegelian is nowadays a
rarity indeed. You don't really believe you can defend all that Hegelian stuff
do you? (No I can't debate Hegel with you for I know little of him. I was just
trying to throw you a little red meat and get the lion's competitive juices
flowing; though with your recent experiences in mind, perhaps I am overdoing it
a bit).
If you do stick around, you will find that most of the heavyweights here,
although loosely sympathetic to Rand, amuse themselves much of the time, by
tormenting the more strict and generally outgunned Randian fundamentalists. The
exchanges are often quite interesting and, at least for me, sometimes quite
insightful.
Well, I have babbled on long enough and must return to my important work.
Though I am not a professional philosopher you may be pleased to learn that I
am nevertheless on the verge of an historic philosophical breakthrough. Yes,
indeedy! I am very close to finally unraveling an ancient question which has
plagued man. Namely, "If a man speaks in the forest and there is no woman to
hear him, is he still wrong?"
BTW, didn't I see that you have a web site somewhere? Now what was that url
again please? :-) YZEROK
Frank T. DeAngelis
9...@mb-ml.aol.com>...
> Frank T. DeAngelis wrote:
> >The lure and impersonal and seductive "flame" of the internet is
> >tempting, but I HAVE a life. Unfortunately, several of my former
> >colleagues and professors who began to engage in internet philosophy
> >discussion groups (e.g., Gene T. and Bill S., on the old philosophy
> >and alt.philosophy "newsgroups") were turned off by the flaming and
> >just abandoned the opportunity--and initial interest--to communicate
> >freely.
> >
> >frank
> Well, it is too bad that your colleagues don't participate for it is always
> nice to have philosophers posting about philosophy. Tell them to look in here
> for despite your recent experience, you'll find most of the regulars to be
> adults, however, that will not deter vigorous debate of course. There are at
> least three or four professional philosophers who post here recurringly.
>
> You would make a welcome addition for a self described Hegelian is nowa
> days a
> rarity indeed. You don't really believe you can defend all that Hegelian
> stuff
> do you?
Yes, yes, of course...indeed, I do. Ha! Ha! (Even though I had taken
so-o many classes on Kant, mostly in two different graduate schools
-and from fairly well-known Kantian scholars of varying backgrounds),
I must admit, I would never claim to really know or be competent in
discussing Kant. The problem with my Hegelianizing -HERE, however, in
this group, is that it is usually not appropriately ("remotely")
relevant to the philosophy of "Objectivism" and/nor to the likes of
Locke, Rand, Nozick, etc.
(No I can't debate Hegel with you for I know little of him. I was just
> trying to throw you a little red meat and get the lion's competitive juices
> flowing; though with your recent experiences in mind, perhaps I am overdo
> ing it
> a bit).
>
> If you do stick around, you will find that most of the heavyweights here,
> although loosely sympathetic to Rand, amuse themselves much of the time, by
> tormenting the more strict and generally outgunned Randian fundamentalist
> s. The
> exchanges are often quite interesting and, at least for me, sometimes quite
> insightful.
>
> Well, I have babbled on long enough and must return to my important work.
> Though I am not a professional philosopher you may be pleased to learn that I
> am nevertheless on the verge of an historic philosophical breakthrough. Yes,
> indeedy! I am very close to finally unraveling an ancient question which has
> plagued man. Namely, "If a man speaks in the forest and there is no woman to
> hear him, is he still wrong?"
(That doesn't appeal to my academic, Germanic philosophical
background, but-t to my 'emotional and aesthetic' Italian background.)
> BTW, didn't I see that you have a web site somewhere? Now what was that url
> again please? :-) YZEROK
Check out
www.geocities.com/terrorism9112002/fun_d_mental
[then/or the basic (index) for the above site, w/o the fun_d_mental
ending]
AND http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
Wheew!
frank
Frank T. DeAngelis
"modern" philosophers with the distinction of 'analysis,' from the
Analytical tradition, and 'synthesis' (not my words) or wholistic,
organismic theories of totality (or, on a more general level, a unity
of opposites). This fundamental methodological (and metaphysical, of
course), level, I believe separates those who choose to 'analyze
down,' breaking into smaller 'atomic' units, to the smallest part--in
separation--in order to understand the world, vs. those who need to
connect the ever-relating dots of "moments" of everything
interconnected in order to understand (Zusammenhangen). Here, Reason (
as a human connection, concrete totality) Vernunft vs. Verstand is of
the most primordial level. This, I am convinced, is the 19th C.-20th
C. and on, difference between Hegel and others of the "atomistic"
methodologies; e.g., of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Comte, Russell,
Ayer, Moore, Austin, Rand, Nozick, etc., etc. etc. Kant, with his
noumena/phenomena distinction, I believe--as I stated earlier--set the
stage for such IS/OUGHT distinctions. I like, for example, Habermas'
unity, from his "Theory and Practice" and "Knowledge and Human
Interests" to his "Between Facts and Norms."
frank
> frank
Yzerok
Let me start with what is, in a sense, the most egregious, obvious and
inexcusable crap you have perpetrated; namely, where you make it look as though
you are quoting me when in fact you are quoting yourself. (Amusingly enough,
after apparently confusing yourself sufficiently so as to think, I, instead of
YOU, wrote those words you subsequently attack them, thereby ultimately
attacking yourself!). Hereâs the evidence:
In your post of 18 June 2002 (Message-ID:
<kaJP8.2784$Fv1.3...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>) YOU wrote the
following sentence:
One of the errors you pointed out follows
from the "sundering" was the "relativizing of experience."
Your use of the above quotation marks makes it appear as though I had said the
words contained within the quote marks. While I did indeed use the word
"sundering" (and therefore you are correctly quoting me to that extent), I
NEVER used the phrase "relativizing of experience" in any post whatsoever. In
fact, that phrase is YOURS! You wrote those words in your post of June 15 2002
(Message-ID: <gsQO8.229$Y43....@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>). I will
now quote the relevant sentence from YOUR above post where YOU first used that
phrase:
"Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual
because there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in
each person."
Amusingly enough, (apparently after having convinced yourself that I must have
initiated that phrase), in a subsequent post you attack those very words of
YOURS! Here I now quote YOU, from a subsequent June 18 post of YOURS,
attacking YOUR words of June 15:
"One of the errors you pointed out follows
from the "sundering" was the "relativizing of experience." Yours is
therefore a subjectivist spin not intended by Kant, especially when
Kant's deduction of the categories consists of two parts, the proof
of the objective validity of the categories, and of their objective
reality."
The above is indeed funny isnât it? BTW, the above quote is from your post,
also dated June 18, (Message-ID:
<kaJP8.2784$Fv1.3...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>).
On another subject now, let me point out to you, your apparent delusion, that
you had answered my initial question. First, here is the evidence that
establishes that you thought you had answered. I quote you from your second
June 18 post:
"Apparently I don't understand your question? Yet it is simple, and I did
answer it."
AND
"Now, you are claiming that I did not answer the question in my first response.
Obviously, I did."
The question I had initially posed (of Frank, not of you) was very straight
forward and specific. So to quote myself, here is what I had asked (of Frank,
not of you):
"So my specific question to you is:
Are you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from
wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?"
Now the above FORM of the question is very straight forward is it not? Seems to
me, if one understood the question AND had the answer, one could reasonably
respond in similarly straight forward FORM as approximately as follows:
The significant philosophical errors that flow from wrongful acceptance of the
noumena/phenomena distinction are XXX.
I use XXX, to indicate the content of whatever reply one would care to make.
Presumably, if you had indeed obviously answered my initial question, we could
substitute for XXX one of your allegedly answering sentences. So what follows
below are your sentences, taken directly from post, but I have numbered each
one so that all you need do is now tell us which numbered sentence obviously
answers the straightforward question I had posed, the answer to which again
might have been:
The significant philosophical errors that flow from wrongful acceptance of the
noumena/phenomena distinction are XXX.
1. Third try getting this posted.
2. I have a hard time getting posts into this thread for some reason.
3. The guy you are responding to is a complete fruitcake anyway, so it's just
as well.
4. But the theory you are (rightly) criticizing there is post-modernism, not
Critique.
5. Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual because
there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in each person.
6. This theory carries into the morals in which the CI
is a universalizable principle.
7. I hope this post makes it in, because you need a lot of help with Kantian
theory.
8. The person you are responding to is only giving Kant's
theory a modernistic spin, then knocking down the straw dog he creates.
So, Malenor, which of your above sentence(s) in your opinion obviously answered
my initial question?
Finally, Malenor let me say this. You have misread and misunderstood much of
what I tried to say. (Have you heard similar comments from others?) I spoke of
relativizing truth not relativizing experience. You have imputed to me
positions I donât hold and generally misconstrued my posts. I donât think
it was deliberate on your part, but I must say it is nevertheless annoying. You
seem so focused on Kant that you seem to wish to fit whatever comments I make
into, or about, the straight jacket of Kantian philosophy. Thus you wrongly
conclude that I am making comments about Kant when in fact I was studiously
attempting, for the most part, to avoid such. I have previously largely
refrained from substantive comments about Kant, but I now wish to test your
understanding just a little, but will do so in a future post, so as to avoid
obfuscating any substantive discussion with the above crap.
Lastly, for ease of reference to anyone reading this--tho I don't know why they
should--, I append, without further comment the relevant five posts in their
entirety.
1. From Yzerok to Frank, June 15.
Frank T. DeAngelis had written:
>I disagree with the
>> > dualistically separate treatment of the ding an-sich, i.e., e.g., that
>> > we cannot--supposedly--"know" the ding an-sich, creating the entire
>> > problem and 2nd Kritik of separating knowing from doing theory from
>> > practice, in -what I would say, is totally unrealistic and, actually,
>> > impossible.
Yes. I am becoming increasingly aware that this error (wrongly sundering
reality/appearances) is a bountiful fount for further confusions.For example,
there are those who relativise truth on the grounds that since all we "know"
is individual appearance it therefore follows that there is a different truth
for me than for you. So my specific question to you is:
Are you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from
wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?
I would be most interested in obtaining your response, should you care to give
it. YZEROK
2. From Malenor, June 15.
Third try getting this posted.
"Yzerok" <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020615112401...@mb-ca.aol.com...
> Frank T. DeAngelis had written:
>
> >I disagree with the
> >> > dualistically separate treatment of the ding an-sich, i.e., e.g.,
that
> >> > we cannot--supposedly--"know" the ding an-sich, creating the entire
> >> > problem and 2nd Kritik of separating knowing from doing theory from
> >> > practice, in -what I would say, is totally unrealistic and, actually,
> >> > impossible.
>
> Yes. I am becoming increasingly aware that this error (wrongly sundering
> reality/appearances) is a bountiful fount for further confusions.For
example,
> there are those who relativise truth on the grounds that since all we
"know"
> is individual appearance it therefore follows that there is a different
truth
> for me than for you. So my specific question to you is:
> Are you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from
> wrongful acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?
>
> I would be most interested in obtaining your response, should you care to
give
> it. YZEROK
>
I have a hard time getting posts into this thread for some reason. The guy
you are responding to is a complete fruitcake anyway, so it's just as
well.
But the theory you are (rightly) criticizing there is post-modernism,
not Critique. Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual
because there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in
each person. This theory carries into the morals in which the CI
is a universalizable principle.
I hope this post makes it in, because you need a lot of help with
Kantian theory. The person you are responding to is only giving Kant's
theory a modernistic spin, then knocking down the straw dog he
creates.
3. Yzerok to Malenor, June 18.
Malenor had written:
>I have a hard time getting posts into this thread for some reason. The guy
>you are responding to is a complete fruitcake anyway, so it's just as
>well.
>
>But the theory you are (rightly) criticizing there is post-modernism,
>not Critique. Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
>is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual
>because there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in
>each person. This theory carries into the morals in which the CI
>is a universalizable principle.
>
>I hope this post makes it in, because you need a lot of help with
>Kantian theory. The person you are responding to is only giving Kant's
>theory a modernistic spin, then knocking down the straw dog he
>creates.
Well, thank you, I guess, for your post. I would have enjoyed it more had you
actually said something more relevant to the question I asked; which was "Are
you able to sketch out what significant philosophical errors flow from wrongful
acceptance of the noumena/phenomena distinction?".
On the basis of reading some of your posts, you seem to be an ardent Kantian
defender. Presumably, you therefore would have denied the premise of the
question--which is why I didn ask it of you, in the first place.
In any case, I have no desire to intrude and engage in a discussion about
Kantian philosophy. I will let you and others continue as you see fit. YZEROK
4. First Malenor post, June 18
5. Second Malenor post, June 18
Yzerok
>Actually, I begin MANY OF my own categorizing differences between
>"modern" philosophers with the distinction of 'analysis,' from the
>Analytical tradition,
I vaguely remember (I don't have the resources on hand to double check) that it
may have been Whitehead himself, who made a similar distinction between the
hardheads/softheads. Naturally, Russell was the exemplar hard while Whitehead
the soft.
> and 'synthesis' (not my words) or wholistic,
>organismic theories of totality (or, on a more general level, a unity
>of opposites).
Now see Frank, I would bet that you and I could probably have a few beers
together at the local pub and we'd enjoy each other's company--for a little
while.
JUST IMAGINE. You'd find me amiable enough company till I'd insist you speak
sensible (even if by that time slightly slurred) English. In response to your
above, I might say "Aw, c'mon, there literally ainât no such thing as union
of opposites. And if your words aren't to be taken literally, then why
obfuscate, lest it be to hide from yourself and others, your real, and probably
confused meaning."
Somewhat annoyed you continue with:
>This fundamental methodological (and metaphysical, of
>course), level, I believe separates those who choose to 'analyze
>down,' breaking into smaller 'atomic' units, to the smallest part--in
>separation--in order to understand the world, vs. those who need to
>connect the ever-relating dots of "moments" of everything
>interconnected in order to understand (Zusammenhangen).
Right about now I'd be ordering you (and me of course--just to keep you
company) a double brandy to fortify yourself against my upcoming onslaught. To
wit,
"No self respecting philosopher is justified in doing philosophy on the basis
of âchoosingâ or âneedâ. One takes whatever appropriate action is
required as dictated by the logic of the situation. Psychobabble such as
âchooseâ and âneedâ are completely out of place in a serious
philosophy. As a finite human being it is impossible to grasp the "whole".
Therefore analysis of those chunk size portions which we as finite creatures
can actually deal with is the appropriate starting place. Notice that this last
piece of analysis begins with its starting point as IDENTIFICATION of what we
actually are. Once having determined that we are indeed finite beings capable
of grasping only those portions of reality presently before us,--albeit that
scope is extendable via memory--, then the logic of the situation leads us to
conclude that analysis, not some unattainable will of the wisp holism, is the
proper methodology. Were we other than what we are, i.e. finite, then other
appropriate courses of action would be open to us. Of course analysis can be
overdone and so we must avoid needless reductionism to the point of
meaninglessness."
By now, in our pub scenario, you have ordered more fortification and have told
the waitress to just leave the bottle. This you do because as a good
Californian you are environmentally conscientious. And as a philosopher you
have correctly determined that it is a useless waste of precious energy
resources for that waitress to run back and forth with those small containers
of brandy. We loudly toast to your energy saving insight as you continue:
>Here, Reason (
>as a human connection, concrete totality) Vernunft vs. Verstand is of
>the most primordial level.
"But I tell you that that is nonsense, for wisdom requires as a precondition
understanding, therefore the latter is primordial instead. Expressing it in
German doesnât lend it heft nor transmute into a truth."
Someone orders another bottle as I try to intimidate you with a little German.
"Man muss es ja erst verstanden haben ehe die vernunftigkeit sich entwickeln
kann." You seem unimpressed as you wonder why you are wasting your time
conversing with such a fool. You continue:
>This, I am convinced, is the 19th C.-20th
>C. and on, difference between Hegel and others of the "atomistic"
>methodologies; e.g., of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Comte, Russell,
>Ayer, Moore, Austin, Rand, Nozick, etc., etc. etc. Kant, with his
>noumena/phenomena distinction, I believe--as I stated earlier--set the
>stage for such IS/OUGHT distinctions.
"I agree that your classification or something similar is reasonable."
You say:
> I like, for example, Habermas'
>unity, from his "Theory and Practice" and "Knowledge and Human
>Interests" to his "Between Facts and Norms."
Your anger swells as you ruminate that I have given nought but silly arguments
and you find out I have no money to pay the check. No sooner do the words "
Haber my ass" come out of my mouth when you punch me in the nose as just reward
for my coarseness. Chastised, I nevertheless propose we have a nightcap but we
are thrown out. We wonder of whom they speak as we hear the proprietess say
"cheap pseudo-intellectual bums".
YZEROK
Acar
> I will
> now quote the relevant sentence from YOUR above post where YOU first used
that
> phrase:
>
> "Since the categories are universal in Kant's theory, there
> is absolutely no sense of relativizing experience for the individual
> because there is only one faculty of understanding, the same faculty in
> each person."
>
> Amusingly enough, (apparently after having convinced yourself that I must
have
> initiated that phrase), in a subsequent post you attack those very words
of
> YOURS! Here I now quote YOU, from a subsequent June 18 post of YOURS,
> attacking YOUR words of June 15:
>
> "One of the errors you pointed out follows
> from the "sundering" was the "relativizing of experience." Yours is
> therefore a subjectivist spin not intended by Kant, especially when
> Kant's deduction of the categories consists of two parts, the proof
> of the objective validity of the categories, and of their objective
> reality."
As I read it Malenor attacks the concept (relativizing experience) in both
quotes and in both quotes he distances Kant from the concept. You
interpreted the intention of the quote marks incorrectly.
x
x
x
x
Frank T. DeAngelis
Yzerok <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message news:<20020620044048.12141.0000115
9...@mb-ft.aol.com>...
> Frank had written:
> >Actually, I begin MANY OF my own categorizing differences between
> >"modern" philosophers with the distinction of 'analysis,' from the
> >Analytical tradition,
>
> I vaguely remember (I don't have the resources on hand to double check) t
> hat it
> may have been Whitehead himself, who made a similar distinction between the
> hardheads/softheads. Naturally, Russell was the exemplar hard while White
> head
> the soft.
Well, yes, of course. Self-explanatory. The later, post-Principia
Mathematica Whitehead wrote "Process and Reality."
> > and 'synthesis' (not my words) or wholistic,
> >organismic theories of totality (or, on a more general level, a unity
> >of opposites).
>
> Now see Frank, I would bet that you and I could probably have a few beers
> together at the local pub and we'd enjoy each other's company--for a little
> while.
"For a little while?
Understated.
> JUST IMAGINE. You'd find me amiable enough company till I'd insist you speak
> sensible (even if by that time slightly slurred) English. In response to your
> above, I might say "Aw, c'mon, there literally ain? no such thing as union
> of opposites. And if your words aren't to be taken literally, then why
> obfuscate, lest it be to hide from yourself and others, your real, and pr
> obably
> confused meaning."
Butt seriously...the unity of opposites, a foreign and supposedly
impossible--by standards of TRADITIONAL logic--notion, is the Hegelian
Principle of Contradiction, and is similar (sans the mysticism and
overriding ["primordial?] concept of conflict) to the...okay, here it
is, Asian thought of the Yin/Yang Principle, Taoism, etc., etc., etc.
-and, by the way, not too far from Bart Kosko's depiction and
presentation of 'Fuzzy Logic' in his "Fuzzy Thinking" (not to be
confused with Bush's "fuzzy math"), and "Process and Reality," I might
add (stretching it and the sentence a taddd).
> Somewhat annoyed you continue with:>
> >This fundamental methodological (and metaphysical, of
> >course), level, I believe separates those who choose to 'analyze
> >down,' breaking into smaller 'atomic' units, to the smallest part--in
> >separation--in order to understand the world, vs. those who need to
> >connect the ever-relating dots of "moments" of everything
> >interconnected in order to understand (Zusammenhangen).
>
> Right about now I'd be ordering you (and me of course--just to keep you
> company) a double brandy to fortify yourself against my upcoming onslaugh
> t. To
> wit,
> "No self respecting philosopher is justified in doing philosophy on the
> basis
> of ?hoosing?or ?eed? One takes whatever appropriate action is
> required as dictated by the logic of the situation. Psychobabble such as
> ?hoose?and ?eed?are completely out of place in a serious
> philosophy. As a finite human being it is impossible to grasp the "whole".
> Therefore analysis of those chunk size portions which we as finite creatures
> can actually deal with is the appropriate starting place. Notice that thi
> s last
> piece of analysis begins with its starting point as IDENTIFICATION of what we
> actually are. Once having determined that we are indeed finite beings capable
> of grasping only those portions of reality presently before us,--albeit that
> scope is extendable via memory--, then the logic of the situation leads us to
> conclude that analysis, not some unattainable will of the wisp holism, is the
> proper methodology. Were we other than what we are, i.e. finite, then other
> appropriate courses of action would be open to us. Of course analysis can be
> overdone and so we must avoid needless reductionism to the point of
> meaninglessness."
Hey, the methodological difference is simply, and essentially, between
arriving at truth(s) via (1) breaking everything down into its
smallest component in order to analyze, or (2) extending relevant
interconnections, grasping vis-a-
vis "Dialectical Reason ," the concrete, universal, totality. Hegels
assertion that "The truth is the whole" is a way of saying that the
more we connect the dots, the more we grasp ____.
(The word "essentially" will repeat itself -below, as drunks often
do.)
(Vernunft over, versus Verstand [also, below], is that of essence, not
pimordial order.You are right, but, on the other hand [the left one],
the German, "Vernunft," clearly solidifies--in a psychological
way--the particularly Hegelian meaning and distinction between the
two, and as being an "essential" one, I might again addddd a taddddd.
Nonetheless, you are 100% correct in astutely observing that
understanding comes before reason, esp. a la Hegel.)
> By now, in our pub scenario, you have ordered more fortification and have
> told
> the waitress to just leave the bottle. This you do because as a good
> Californian you are environmentally conscientious. And as a philosopher you
> have correctly determined that it is a useless waste of precious energy
> resources for that waitress to run back and forth with those small containers
> of brandy. We loudly toast to your energy saving insight as you continue:
>
> >Here, Reason (
> >as a human connection, concrete totality) Vernunft vs. Verstand is of
> >the most primordial level.
>
>
> "But I tell you that that is nonsense, for wisdom requires as a precondition
> understanding, therefore the latter is primordial instead. Expressing it in
> German doesn? lend it heft nor transmute into a truth."
>
> Someone orders another bottle as I try to intimidate you with a little Ge
> rman.
> "Man muss es ja erst verstanden haben ehe die vernunftigkeit sich entwickeln
> kann." You seem unimpressed as you wonder why you are wasting your time
> conversing with such a fool. You continue:
>
> >This, I am convinced, is the 19th C.-20th
> >C. and on, difference between Hegel and others of the "atomistic"
> >methodologies; e.g., of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Comte, Russell,
> >Ayer, Moore, Austin, Rand, Nozick, etc., etc. etc. Kant, with his
> >noumena/phenomena distinction, I believe--as I stated earlier--set the
> >stage for such IS/OUGHT distinctions.
>
> "I agree that your classification or something similar is reasonable."
>
> You say:
> > I like, for example, Habermas'
> >unity, from his "Theory and Practice" and "Knowledge and Human
> >Interests" to his "Between Facts and Norms."
>
> and you find out I have no money to pay the check. No sooner do the words "
> Haber my ass" come out of my mouth when you punch me in the nose as just
> reward
> for my coarseness. Chastised, I nevertheless propose we have a nightcap b
> ut we
> are thrown out. We wonder of whom they speak as we hear the proprietess say
> "cheap pseudo-intellectual bums".
>
> YZEROK
frankie goes to H____. fun in da sun.
P.S. This line is not me: "Your anger swells as you ruminate that I
have given nought but silly arguments."
Cindy
Reader_ [publisher Viking/Penguin].
I think Rand once referred to Kant as "the most evil man to ever live"
because he later wrote _A Critique of Pure Reason_. I haven't read
much of Kant yet, and am not much familiar with him, but the following
I *do* agree with [maybe he changed later in life, *after* writing the
below...]:
"What is enlightenment? Enlightenment is man's release from his
self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of
his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is
this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason, but in lack
of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another.
Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'--that is the
motto of enlightenment. Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so
great a portion of mankind, after nature has long since discharged
them from external direction, nevertheless remains under lifelong
tutelage, and why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as
their guardians...After the guardians have first made their domestic
cattle dumb and have made sure that these placid creatures will not
dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which they
are confined, the guardians then show them the danger which threatens
if they try to go alone. Actually, however, this danger is not so
great, for by falling a few times they would finally learn to walk
alone. But an example of this failure makes them timid and ordinarily
frightens them away from all further trials...But that the public
should enlighten itself is more possible; indeed, if only freedom is
granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow...For this
enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed
the most harmless among all the things to which this term can properly
be applied. It is the freedom to make public use of one's reason at
every point. But I hear on all sides, 'Do not argue!' The officer
says, 'Do not argue but drill!' The tax collector says, 'Do not argue
but pay!' The cleric says, 'Do not argue but believe!' Everywhere
there is restriction on freedom." -- Immanuel Kant, essay "What is
Enlightenment," 1784.
Yzerok
>As I read it Malenor attacks the concept (relativizing experience) in both
>quotes and in both quotes he distances Kant from the concept.
You
>interpreted the intention of the quote marks incorrectly.
Sorry, I don't get your point. Please tell me specifically what/how I
specifically misinterpreted, perhaps then I'll be able to answer you. YZEROK
Malenor
"Malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:...
Still trying again to get this past my ISP's bad news software.
> "Malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:...
> > "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> > news:D8oQ8.84685$zh2.18...@twister.neo.rr.com...
> > > As I read it Malenor attacks the concept (relativizing experience) in
> both
> > > quotes and in both quotes he distances Kant from the concept. You
> > > interpreted the intention of the quote marks incorrectly.
> > >
Perhaps it is the consensus for people in Yzerok's culture, to
misinterpret quotes?
Frank T. DeAngelis
> Yzerok <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message news:<20020620044048.12141.0000115
> 9...@mb-ft.aol.com>...
Sorry, I tried to add and edit, and add two more follow-ups, but I
tried it after I pushed the submit button, and, consequently screwed
everything up, and those two posts are now lost forever. By the way,
in response to Cindy's post ( the last one -at this point), that IS
definitely the spirit of Kant that drove him to be correctly
categorized as a leader of the Enlightenment era (regardless of his
insane, boring routine of a life that everyone said they could 'set
their watch to'...he was more than just "punctual," he was an
obsessive-compulsive).
In those two lost posts of mine, I remember addressing the points
below, in particular, with some degree of specificity:
> > piece of analysis begins with its starting point as IDENTIFICATION of w
> > hat we
> > actually are. Once having determined that we are indeed finite beings c
> > apable
> > of grasping only those portions of reality presently before us,--albeit
> > that
> > scope is extendable via memory--, then the logic of the situation leads
> > us to
> > conclude that analysis, not some unattainable will of the wisp holism,
> > is the
> > proper methodology.
A dialectical Reason requires a beginning analysis of Identity in
Difference and the Difference in Identity, which is somewhat relative,
but starting points are quintessential, PRIMORDIAL, and ESSENTIAL
(reductio absurdum, and redundant as all hell, ha, ha). It is
important not to begin in the general, but start with the concrete,
unfolding the universal (totality) within, as concrete totality, the
concrete universal. This is precisely why Heidegger--in his "Being and
Time," "An introduction to Metaphysics," etc.--does not simply begin
with "Being" "Sein," -per se, but with a uniquely profound Hegelian
"Being-there (in the midst of the world)," "DA-SEIN," and works his
way through "Existence and Being" (as another major work). Knowing
and/as Doing, Knowing and/as Being, Being and/as Doing, are
inseparable, from a dialectical standpoint, whether it be Hegel's,
Marx's, Heidegger's, Sartre's, Habermas', etc. But, what is really
telling, regarding those sets of concepts -as dialectically
inseparable, I think, is Heidegger's exposition and explication of
"Hegel's Concept of Experience," the topic and book of that title.
The starting points, hitherto -in philosophy, unfortunately, have not
gone back far enough (e.g., look at Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and
Evil," to the extent--and only to the extent--that he goes much
further back, beyond the usual presuppositions and axioms, asking, NOT
"What is the Good," but "Why be good"?, not "What is the truth," but
"Why truth"?). Hegel's care (in his 1812 "Science of Logic") with the
notion of identity, as opposed to what he calls a spurious identity of
"likeness" -is quite remarkable.
Now, in reference to identity, again, the identity part is the static,
unchanging, stable aspect of being, a thing, reality, etc. Far, far
beyond that limited and one-sided analysis--dialecticians would say,
and Hegel and I do--is the other side of the coin, where Change, i.e.,
e.g., what a thing is...as well as what it "is not" and/or "not yet,"
is of more revelatory importance. this is the crux of the principles
of logic (and, esp. dialectical logic) that turns the entire
pre-Hegelian world of "Laws" of Identity, Non-Contradiction, and
Excluded Middle, upside down. This is how and why I believe that, for
example, "Process and Reality" (from the later Whithead, as well as
the later Wittgenstein, in "The ['post'-]Philosophical
Investigations"), falls close to the multivalued logics that
eventually turned into "deviant logics" (Susan Haack) to the point of
(e.g., Kosko's ) "Fuzzy Logic"...grossly misunderstood as supposed
induction/probability. In any case, Heraclitus bothered Aristotle,
precisely on this very point, when the former said, "you can't step in
the same river twice" (sound familiar?...in Taoism, with
Lao-Tse/Lao-Zse), quite literally, when Aristotle comments, "how can
that be?" and continues to explain identity, non-contradiction, etc.
Ciao, for now,
frank
www.geocities.com/terrorism9112002
http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
(As you continued, below...okay, enough...later:)
Frank T. DeAngelis
yesterday):
In RE to what we said, far below):
> >In any case, Heraclitus bothered Aristotle, precisely on this very point
> >, > > when the former said, "you can't step in the same river twice" (so
> >und > >familiar?...in Taoism, with Lao-Tse/Lao-Tzu), quite literally, wh
> >en Aristotle > >comments, "how can that be?" and continues to explain id
> >entity, non-> >contradiction, etc.
This actually shows up in Aristotle in several choice places, but
please cf. āTopica,ā I. Xi, para. 20-5:
ā Contradiction is impossible,ā as Antisthenes saidā¦the opinion of
Heraclitus that āAll things are in a state of motionā ā¦āBeing is one,
as Melissus says; for to pay any attention when an ordinary person
sets forth views which are contrary to received opinions is foolish.
(The āsamenessā that Aristotle discusses earlier, in the āTopicsā
ā"āTopica,ā I, VIII., para. 103b, is exactly what Hegel referred to as
a āspurious identity,ā i.e., e.g., of ālikeness.) In the Loeb
Collection, cf. pp.301 and 291, respectively, in order.
Also, in the Topics, is Aās mention of H., in VIII, v, 159b32 (Loeb,
p.707), also in reference to logically technical ācontrariesā:
Heraclitusā statement that good and evil are the same thing * --refuse
to concede that it is impossible for contraries to belong to the same
thing at the same timeā¦
(* H. never says that. A. is a little like Malenor, here, the way he
misquotes.)
ā¦and, also, in Aās āMetaphysics,ā XI., vi., 18 (Loeb, p. 83), where he
discusses the logic of contradiction and contraries (in both ā"i.e., of
the former two, according to A. and traditional logic, both statements
cannot both be true [my redundancy for clarity sake]):
Thus we cannot be right in holding the views either of Heraclitus or
of Anaxagoras.
Erich Fromm, in his āArt of Lovingā (pp. 61-2) mentions this in his
own discussion of dialectical and paradoxical logic (e.g., from
Heraclitus to Hegel and Marx to Lao-Tse) vs. traditional logic, but
does not give a reference for where A. says all of this. Now I have!
But, I must say that much of this difference in principles of logic
and (my previous distinction) methodology of analysis/āatomismā vs.
āsynthesisā/totality, is further (reinforced and is problematical),
and metaphysically distinguished by the traditional, ontological
āthesis of extensionality,ā where identity separates things
artificially and somewhat arbitrarily, many (of āusā) would say.
Finitude and infinitude, as interchangeable opposites (much like,
e.g., Kierkegaard's treatment of the necessary infinitude within
finitude and vice versa, in his "The Sickness Unto Death"),
demonstrate a necessary interconnection of one coming out of the
other. Infinity, as a general, abstract mathematical symbol, is
merely--and little more than--a (Wittgensteinian) "grammatical
stopper," that Hegel, in his Science of Logic, calls a "spurious
infinity" that which does not come from the concrete, "measurable,"
quantitative and qualitative changing juxtapositioning of infinity out
of finite moments, steps. Infinity is a way of saying, "continue the
series --ad infinitum," is it not? Think about it.
frank
> > > piece of analysis begins with its starting point as IDENTIFICATION of w
> > > hat we
> > > actually are. Once having determined that we are indeed finite beings c
> > > apable
> > > of grasping only those portions of reality presently before us,--albeit
> > > that
> > > scope is extendable via memory--, then the logic of the situation leads
> > > us to
> > > conclude that analysis, not some unattainable will of the wisp holism,
> > > is the
> > > proper methodology.
>
> A dialectical Reason requires a beginning analysis of Identity in
> Difference and the Difference in Identity, which is somewhat relative,
> but starting points are quintessential...> inseparable, I think, is Heide
> gger's exposition and explication of
>
Yzerok
in the course of which you have managed to reference an array of thinkers with
whom we would all do well to be seriously acquainted. As a person interested in
ideas, I of course am, in varying degrees of detail, aware of all of them. But
as a nonacademic I am hardly in a position to comment on such a catalog in a
way that would hold your and otherâs interest. Therefore, I shan't attempt to
do so, except as below. Furthermore, I am essentially a lurker who has in this
thread, overstepped his budgeted "active participation" time and already, I
yearn and long for the safety and comfort of my well indented (in the form of a
potato of course) couch. So my following comments are meant not to further this
conversation (though I would happily read any reaction you'd care to give), nor
to initiate a new one, but are intended to be my final comments, for at least a
while. I trust you will not interpret my unflattering characterization of your
thought as any kind of challenge to your person, but rather it is my honest
assessment of those ideas, not you. One last preliminary please. I am about to
pontificate about YOUR thought on the basis of a few exchanged posts while
recognizing that such a meager amount of posts is hardly a reasonably
sufficient basis to draw a rational conclusion about your ideas. What Iâm
really about to do, therefore, is pontificate on your thought as revealed to me
by those few posts and extrapolated by admitted guesswork.
In a word, I find your allegiance to the ideas of Hegel and philosophers of
similar ilk, irrational. People, at least in part, ACT, upon the ideas they
believe true, though they rarely, if ever, are aware of just what those ideas
really are. But in the end, it is our acts, not our ideas that count. Trouble
is, if one has the wrong ideas, one commits the right acts therefrom
infrequently and only by accident, which explains why it is important to hold
true ideas about the world.
What is revealing to me about your stated catalog of thinkers is your inclusion
of Susan Haack. That tells me not just that you are abreast of contemporary
philosophical writings, but importantly that you are willing to read and
presumably take seriously contrary views. It also tells me that you are not
guilty of a major sin (which I label as self propagandizing) committed by so
many folks in either your philosophical camp or mine. For example, many folks,
loosely in my philosophical camp, and as perhaps instantiated here on HPO will
read nothing but Rand, or Aristotle, or Russell, etc. while woefully ignorant
of the other side. They take it on FAITH that the other side must be wrong! On
the other hand, I have both a niece and a nephew, with a phd and masters
degrees in philosophy respectively, who teach philosophy at an Eastern
University, and are firmly in your camp philosophically, and who it is my
distinct impression, routinely avoid contrary views and probably never would
voluntarily read Susan Haack (nor Rand) lest such "evil" burst into flames
right before their very eyes. (Perhaps I have revealed too much for one of my
reasons for remaining halfway anonymous on usenet is so that their school
superiors would never in any way punish them for having an uncle which such
peculiar, stupid and decidedly incorrect views as I.)
Because you are a scholar, I have little doubt that you probably can articulate
the arguments against your position better than I. And judging by your catalog
of thinkers, you appear sufficiently secure in your conclusions, that I glean
you are not afraid of opposing views and still open to hearing them; from which
it follows that you are therefore still perhaps redeemable! Were you within
daily proximity of me, I would, for your benefit (and mine, indirectly), make a
serious effort to convince you of such. But that would require knowing
_specifically,_ how it comes about that you hold the unwarranted views that you
do. Only thus could I cure you of your malady. :-)
Despite my intended withdrawal from this discussion, I again encourage you to
stick around and I hope others will engage you in reasonable conversation, if
not about Rand, then perhaps the illogical logic of Hegel, which, lest I am
seriously mistaken, is the Achilles heel of Hegelianism.
In any case, what comes thru to me from your posts is that you are a decent
person (in spite of, and not because of your philosophy--or so at least I
stoutly maintain) and I am very much a racist--in that regard; for there are
but two kinds of people, within the human race, the decent and the indecent. I
have enjoyed our exchange and will consider very carefully your posts. I look
forward to reading your future posts should you care to offer any.
On your latest book, it seems interesting and judging from the info on the net
it looks kind of like a combination of Velikovsky and Campbell with perhaps a
little Charoux and/or Van Daniken thrown in? What is that URL that I seem to
keep losing track of? :-)
YZEROK
PS Frank, in your last PS you wrote:
>P.S. This line is not me: "Your anger swells as you >ruminate that I have
given nought but silly arguments."
OK. I accept that! I have changed it to read:
Your anger swells as you ruminate that I have given nought but brilliant
arguments.
PPS
For your reference I append your three previous posts without further comment.
On Thursday, June 20 Frank wrote:
Subject: Re: Some things about Kant you probably did not know
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From: Frank T. DeAngelis spar...@fda.net
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Nice touch. Write this up as a short-length screenplay.
Yzerok <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message news:<20020620044048.12141.0000115
9...@mb-ft.aol.com>...
> piece of analysis begins with its starting point as IDENTIFICATION of what we
> actually are. Once having determined that we are indeed finite beings capable
> of grasping only those portions of reality presently before us,--albeit that
> scope is extendable via memory--, then the logic of the situation leads us to
> conclude that analysis, not some unattainable will of the wisp holism, is the
> proper methodology. Were we other than what we are, i.e. finite, then other
> appropriate courses of action would be open to us. Of course analysis can be
> overdone and so we must avoid needless reductionism to the point of
> meaninglessness."
Hey, the methodological difference is simply, and essentially, between
arriving at truth(s) via (1) breaking everything down into its
smallest component in order to analyze, or (2) extending relevant
interconnections, grasping vis-a-
vis "Dialectical Reason ," the concrete, universal, totality. Hegels
assertion that "The truth is the whole" is a way of saying that the
more we connect the dots, the more we grasp ____.
(The word "essentially" will repeat itself -below, as drunks often
do.)
(Vernunft over, versus Verstand [also, below], is that of essence, not
pimordial order.You are right, but, on the other hand [the left one],
the German, "Vernunft," clearly solidifies--in a psychological
way--the particularly Hegelian meaning and distinction between the
two, and as being an "essential" one, I might again addddd a taddddd.
Nonetheless, you are 100% correct in astutely observing that
understanding comes before reason, esp. a la Hegel.)
> By now, in our pub scenario, you have ordered more fortification and have
On Friday June 21, Frank wrote:
Frank T. DeAngelis <spar...@fda.net> wrote in message news:<1b8e1078.020
6201031....@posting.google.com>...
> Yzerok <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message news:<20020620044048.12141.0000115
> 9...@mb-ft.aol.com>...
Sorry, I tried to add and edit, and add two more follow-ups, but I
tried it after I pushed the submit button, and, consequently screwed
everything up, and those two posts are now lost forever. By the way,
in response to Cindy's post ( the last one -at this point), that IS
definitely the spirit of Kant that drove him to be correctly
categorized as a leader of the Enlightenment era (regardless of his
insane, boring routine of a life that everyone said they could 'set
their watch to'...he was more than just "punctual," he was an
obsessive-compulsive).
In those two lost posts of mine, I remember addressing the points
below, in particular, with some degree of specificity:
> > piece of analysis begins with its starting point as IDENTIFICATION of w
> > hat we
> > actually are. Once having determined that we are indeed finite beings c
> > apable
> > of grasping only those portions of reality presently before us,--albeit
> > that
> > scope is extendable via memory--, then the logic of the situation leads
> > us to
> > conclude that analysis, not some unattainable will of the wisp holism,
> > is the
> > proper methodology.
A dialectical Reason requires a beginning analysis of Identity in
Difference and the Difference in Identity, which is somewhat relative,
but starting points are quintessential, PRIMORDIAL, and ESSENTIAL
(reductio absurdum, and redundant as all hell, ha, ha). It is
important not to begin in the general, but start with the concrete,
unfolding the universal (totality) within, as concrete totality, the
concrete universal. This is precisely why Heidegger--in his "Being and
Time," "An introduction to Metaphysics," etc.--does not simply begin
with "Being" "Sein," -per se, but with a uniquely profound Hegelian
"Being-there (in the midst of the world)," "DA-SEIN," and works his
way through "Existence and Being" (as another major work). Knowing
and/as Doing, Knowing and/as Being, Being and/as Doing, are
inseparable, from a dialectical standpoint, whether it be Hegel's,
Marx's, Heidegger's, Sartre's, Habermas', etc. But, what is really
telling, regarding those sets of concepts -as dialectically
inseparable, I think, is Heidegger's exposition and explication of
"Hegel's Concept of Experience," the topic and book of that title.
The starting points, hitherto -in philosophy, unfortunately, have not
gone back far enough (e.g., look at Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and
Evil," to the extent--and only to the extent--that he goes much
further back, beyond the usual presuppositions and axioms, asking, NOT
"What is the Good," but "Why be good"?, not "What is the truth," but
"Why truth"?). Hegel's care (in his 1812 "Science of Logic") with the
notion of identity, as opposed to what he calls a spurious identity of
"likeness" -is quite remarkable.
Now, in reference to identity, again, the identity part is the static,
unchanging, stable aspect of being, a thing, reality, etc. Far, far
beyond that limited and one-sided analysis--dialecticians would say,
and Hegel and I do--is the other side of the coin, where Change, i.e.,
e.g., what a thing is...as well as what it "is not" and/or "not yet,"
is of more revelatory importance. this is the crux of the principles
of logic (and, esp. dialectical logic) that turns the entire
pre-Hegelian world of "Laws" of Identity, Non-Contradiction, and
Excluded Middle, upside down. This is how and why I believe that, for
example, "Process and Reality" (from the later Whithead, as well as
the later Wittgenstein, in "The ['post'-]Philosophical
Investigations"), falls close to the multivalued logics that
eventually turned into "deviant logics" (Susan Haack) to the point of
(e.g., Kosko's ) "Fuzzy Logic"...grossly misunderstood as supposed
induction/probability. In any case, Heraclitus bothered Aristotle,
precisely on this very point, when the former said, "you can't step in
the same river twice" (sound familiar?...in Taoism, with
Lao-Tse/Lao-Zse), quite literally, when Aristotle comments, "how can
that be?" and continues to explain identity, non-contradiction, etc.
Ciao, for now,
frank
www.geocities.com/terrorism9112002
http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
On Friday June 21, Frank had written:
Addition: (I think I remembered some more from the "lost posts" of
yesterday):
In RE to what we said, far below):
> >In any case, Heraclitus bothered Aristotle, precisely on this very point
> >, > > when the former said, "you can't step in the same river twice" (so
> >und > >familiar?...in Taoism, with Lao-Tse/Lao-Tzu), quite literally, wh
> >en Aristotle > >comments, "how can that be?" and continues to explain id
> >entity, non-> >contradiction, etc.
This actually shows up in Aristotle in several choice places, but
please cf. opica,I. Xi, para. 20-5:
Contradiction is impossible,as Antisthenes saidhe opinion of
Heraclitus that ll things are in a state of motionBeing is one,
as Melissus says; for to pay any attention when an ordinary person
sets forth views which are contrary to received opinions is foolish.
(The amenessthat Aristotle discusses earlier, in the opicsopica,I, VIII., para.
103b, is exactly what Hegel referred to as
a purious identity,i.e., e.g., of ikeness.) In the Loeb
Collection, cf. pp.301 and 291, respectively, in order.
Also, in the Topics, is A mention of H., in VIII, v, 159b32 (Loeb,
p.707), also in reference to logically technical ontraries
Heraclitusstatement that good and evil are the same thing * --refuse
to concede that it is impossible for contraries to belong to the same
thing at the same time
(* H. never says that. A. is a little like Malenor, here, the way he
misquotes.)
nd, also, in A etaphysics,XI., vi., 18 (Loeb, p. 83), where he
discusses the logic of contradiction and contraries (in both i.e., of
the former two, according to A. and traditional logic, both statements
cannot both be true [my redundancy for clarity sake]):
Thus we cannot be right in holding the views either of Heraclitus or
of Anaxagoras.
Erich Fromm, in his rt of Loving(pp. 61-2) mentions this in his
own discussion of dialectical and paradoxical logic (e.g., from
Heraclitus to Hegel and Marx to Lao-Tse) vs. traditional logic, but
does not give a reference for where A. says all of this. Now I have!
But, I must say that much of this difference in principles of logic
and (my previous distinction) methodology of analysis/tomismvs.
ynthesistotality, is further (reinforced and is problematical),
and metaphysically distinguished by the traditional, ontological
hesis of extensionality,where identity separates things
artificially and somewhat arbitrarily, many (of s would say.
Frank T. DeAngelis
Dear Yzerok,
The "Kant" thread needed to be changed, anyway. You know what? Hegel
isn't even my favorite philosopher, just one of several (repugnant to
you, of course). Contrary to this thread-of-members' popular belief,
Hegel's idealism is repugnant to me, and we are much, much closer,
philosophically (except for Hegel's logic),to the extent that I am an
objectivist-materialist (of some sort). But, then again, I try to show
Hegel's OBJECTIVE idealism, also indicated by some deceptively light
and deceptively non-philosophically appearing lines of aesthetical
quality. (P.S., Hope we meet up at a local pub, someday...soon! Look,
you got it wrong again, for it is not even, "Your anger swells..."
but, "Your human curiosity draws you in..." etc.)
How about an 'objectivist' kind of bent of Goethe-to-Hegel-to-____-
philosophical poetry?:
"The owl of Minerva spreads its wings, but only at the coming of the
dusk."
(Meaning of/to Goethe, as explained by Hegel und __)
"As philosophy paints its grey on grey, then has a shade of life grown
old."
"Life alone, my friend, is green, from life's golden tree. Grey are
all theories."
Philosophy comes on the scene much too late to change anything.
Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to change
it.
frank_________________________________________________________________________
Yzerok <yze...@aol.com> wrote in message news:<20020621194204.28780.0000015
2...@mb-ml.aol.com>...
> Thank you, Frank, for your interesting and particularly wide ranging comments
> in the course of which you have managed to reference an array of thinkers
> with
> whom we would all do well to be seriously acquainted. As a person interes
> ted in
> ideas, I of course am, in varying degrees of detail, aware of all of them
> . But
> as a nonacademic I am hardly in a position to comment on such a catalog in a
> way that would hold your and other? interest. Therefore, I shan't attempt to
> do so, except as below. Furthermore, I am essentially a lurker who has in
> this
> thread, overstepped his budgeted "active participation" time and already, I
> yearn and long for the safety and comfort ...