A Reply to Huemer on Ethics [long]
R Lawrence
Michael Huemer (who is commonly known on the internet as "Owl") is the
author of a lengthy essay, "Why I Am Not An Objectivist." The following
essay is a response to some of the issues he raises.
Prefatory Note:
Huemer's lengthy essay covers a variety of topics, but I will be confining
my comments to a small subset of his arguments -- specifically, issues from
Section 5 ("More on Ethics") -- and spending no more time on any of them
than I think they warrant with regard to Objectivism per se. This leads to
me giving short shrift to some sections that I don't think have much in the
way of implications for Objectivism. These are mostly minor items that have
little direct impact as criticisms of Objectivism, since for the most part
it does not make the claims that Huemer addresses at length in those
portions of his essay. Also, to keep the length of my own essay more
reasonable, I have limited the amount of quoting that I do from Huemer's
essay. The original is readily accessible, so I don't think this should be
a major issue. My responses are broken up using the section headers from
Huemer's essay.
>5.1. THE VALUE OF LIFE
In this section, Huemer argues at length that merely defining "good" as
"promotes (my) life" is not a sufficient defense of egoism. For the most
part, I consider this to be an extended proving of the obvious -- although
I do think it could lead some to incorrectly infer that the definition of
the term "good" (or some equivalent) is irrelevant to ethical
argumentation. Overall, though, I see little direct relevance to
Objectivism here, although Huemer is evidently attempting to be as thorough
as possible in his arguments against egoism in general. (Here and elsewhere
in this response, when I refer to "egoism" unmodified, I mean ethical
egoism, and I presume Huemer does as well.)
>5.2. RAND'S DERIVATION (?) OF EGOISM
This is another section about which there is little to say, because in it
Huemer says little about Objectivism. Although he says in section 3.3 that
he cannot follow Rand's basic meta-ethical argument (which leads directly
to her argument for egoism), he declares here that, "As far as I know, no
ethical egoist has ever offered any non-question-begging argument for the
conclusion that we ought only to promote our own interests ...." His
criticism of Rand in section 3.3 can be summarized as, "I don't understand
her argument, but it must be in error, because all arguments of this type
are in error." In the circumstance, it would seem that nothing short of a
recasting of "The Objectivist Ethics" to achieve Huemer's understanding
would suffice to address that sort of "objection," and that might not even
be enough. I not going to attempt this within the time and length
limitations I have for this essay.
The remainder of this section is similar to (and may simply be a rehash of)
the straw man version of Rand presented by James Rachels in The Elements of
Moral Philosophy (cf. Chapter 6 of that book). Huemer at least has
sufficient understanding to say only that Rand "comes close to offering"
this argument, rather than attributing it to her outright. Absent some
effort by Huemer to claim that this argument really is one intended by Rand
in support of egoism, I see no need to consider it further.
>5.3. IS EGOISM SELF-EVIDENT?
Well, no, it isn't, and an Objectivist who made such a claim would be
undercutting his own supposed philosophy. As Huemer puts it in a
parenthetical: "I am not saying an Objectivist egoist would appeal to
self-evidence; I am just considering the possibility." Since such a claim
would fly in the face of Rand's own explicit arguments for egoism, this
portion of the essay is not directly relevant as an argument against
Objectivism. However, Huemer's positioning of egoism as supposedly
self-evident in the eyes of its supports has an impact on later portions of
his critique.
At this point, an odd thing happens to the outline of Huemer's arguments.
The next six sections are numbered 5.3.1 to 5.3.6, and are introduced as
follows:
>How do we resolve a dispute when one person says that p is self-evident,
>and another says that the denial of p is self-evident? [...] One way is to
>test the principle in specific cases. [...] Another way would be to draw
>out the logical relations of the principle to other principles that we
>hold. [...]
>
>Both of these methods may be applied to the issue of egoism. As far as I
>know, they are the only ways to test the thesis of ethical egoism.
The implication of the outline and Huemer's comments would seem to be that
the discussions in the next six sections are all oriented towards disputing
the idea that egoism is self-evident. But since Objectivism does not
include such a claim, that interpretation would make a large portion of
Huemer's ethical discussion irrelevant to the ostensible topic of his
essay! I believe his arguments are intended to have a broader effect than
that. Arguments against egoism would presumably be acceptable even if
egoism is not held to be self-evident -- indeed, they would appear to be
even more relevant in that case. Therefore, although a dismissal on grounds
of irrelevance would a great way to save time and verbiage, I will consider
each section in its turn.
>5.3.1. THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, Huemer argues in favor of "the use of hypothetical
examples to test moral principles." Although Objectivism per se does not
inveigh against hypotheticals, Huemer correctly notes that many
Objectivists object to them. The most common objection is "that the
hypothetical examples do not represent reality," an objection that is
"vaguely felt by many who object to thought experiments in philosophy in
general" -- i.e., not just by Objectivists and not only in regard to
ethics.
Huemer argues that this objection is in error. He correctly argues the
following:
>You can validly deduce a categorical proposition from hypothetical
>premises. For example:
>
>A -> (B -> C).
>
>B -> not-C.
>
>Therefore, not-A.
>
>is a valid form of inference, where the "->" stands for the "if ... then"
>relation (i.e. "If x were true, y would be true")
Insofar as this argument is applicable, it shows that it is not valid to
object to a hypothetical simply because the example is not true in reality.
However, as the examples Huemer himself uses later show, there can be other
grounds for objecting to arguments based on hypotheticals. Huemer has
understated the possible motivations for the "vaguely felt" dislike of
hypotheticals.
The simple example that Huemer gives for this type of argument in action
immediately shows one of those other objections:
>The typical form of thought-experiment-based arguments in moral philosophy
>is as follows: "If moral theory T were true, then in situation S, it would
>be right to do A. But in situation S, it would surely be wrong to do A.
>Therefore, T is false." Notice that this form of argument is perfectly
>valid: the conclusion deductively follows from its premises (it's a
>variant on modus tollens).
Taking Huemer's model (the symbolic argument quoted earlier) and expressing
it in this sample argument shows an important difference between symbolic
models and real disputes. The difference lies in the affirmation of the
equivalent of the "not-C" from Huemer's model. In the model, we can simply
postulate that "B -> not-C" is true. But when the example argument says,
"in situation S, it would surely be wrong to do A," then we are just as
"surely" justified in asking why A would "surely be wrong." Huemer's sample
is admirably true to the usual course of such arguments: it offers no
evidence for that assertion. In the model, "B -> not-C" is a *premise*, and
that is exactly what it is in the sample argument as well (and Huemer
identifies it as such, although he does not emphasize the point). As is
obvious from his arguments elsewhere, Huemer's ultimate defense for such
premises in these arguments is an appeal to moral intuitions. I will touch
on that issue again later, but for now I think it is sufficient to point
out that the mere expression of such a premise is hardly enough to make the
argument sound.
>5.3.2. THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVIST
Huemer next provides a more detailed hypothetical example that is supposed
to serve as an argument against egoism. But far from being a good argument,
this example serves as a showcase for the shortcomings of certain types of
hypotheticals. Since there are several problems to discuss, I have broken
the discussion into subsections.
Problem 1 -- The Case of the Complex 'B'
First, his example shows the misleading nature of representing such
arguments as simply as "A -> (B -> C)." The "A" is supposed to be egoism,
which Huemer claims is supportive of "B -> C," where "B" is his
hypothetical scenario and "C" is the conclusion that one should kill
strangers on the street. Of course, "B" is hardly a simple premise -- it is
a scenario that includes several different assumptions, both about ordinary
factual circumstances and about the nature of human psychology, social
relations, etc. A better representation would be "A -> ((B1 & B2 & B3 &
B4 ...) -> C)."
Far from denying this complexity, Huemer embraces it: "The creator of the
counter-example gets to stipulate what goes on in the example. So I get to
stipulate, by fiat, that, in the hypothetical situation, I do not receive
reprisals for my action, et cetera." It is with these stipulations that
Huemer is able to cash in (for the first, but by no means the last, time)
on the background of assuming that egoism is supposed to be self-evident.
If egoism is not grounded in any facts of reality (beyond its own
"self-evidence"), then Huemer can demand that it apply to any stipulations
of unreality as well.
Huemer apparently believes the use of stipulations is essentially
unlimited. "The only thing that I do not get to stipulate is the verdict on
the example," he declares. But if that is his belief, he is wrong. The
creators of hypotheticals can and do sometimes stipulate themselves into
irrelevance. They do this in one of two ways: 1) stipulating contradictory
or incompatible premises, or 2) stipulating premises that make the theory
they are testing inapplicable to the example.
It is easy enough to understand the problem with (1) -- inconsistent
premises can be held to imply any conclusion one wishes, and thus imply
nothing in particular -- but (2) probably requires more explanation. An
example might be stipulating that the sole character in the example is a
robot with no ability for moral choice, in a hypothetical case that is
intended to test which of two choices is right. Such a stipulation renders
the example useless, because the claim to be tested is only relevant in a
situation where moral choice exists. To put it another way, the existence
of moral choice is a foundational requirement of the claim being tested,
and any example used as a test will only be relevant if it does not
contradict that foundational requirement. Similarly, if the purpose of
Huemer's example is to test a particular theory of egoism, he cannot create
a situation where the foundational requirements of that theory are not
present. This is why his use of "self-evident" egoism as the standard is
critically important.
Since neither Ayn Rand nor any other Objectivist that I know of ever
claimed that her moral theories were self-evident, Huemer's stipulations
must be examined for the possibility that one or more of them contradict
foundational requirements of her moral claims. Unfortunately that is not
possible, because Huemer has not specified all of his stipulations, and
probably doesn't even know what all of them would be. He has simply rested
on the idea that he can make unlimited stipulations with impunity, which is
in fact not true.
Problem 2 -- Who Says A -> (B -> C)?
Unfortunately for Huemer's argument, not being able to freely stipulate
creates another problem, one which he already recognizes (and which
explains why he needed to defend unlimited stipulation in the first place):
For a given set of realistic circumstances, a particular egoistic theory
might not lead to the conclusion Huemer says it does. In the typical
pattern for such examples (which he follows), the conclusion that "B -> C"
is not one that was made beforehand by supporters of theory 'A'. Instead,
it the conclusion that an opponent of the theory has drawn up as part of
the effort to refute it. The actual supporters of the theory (in this case,
egoism) are not committed beforehand to this analysis, and may very well
disagree with it. If they have a good case that egoism does not lead to "B
-> C," then Huemer's argument against egoism falls apart.
This possibility is supposed to be made moot by Huemer's unlimited
stipulations:
>But even if the egoist is able to think of some very plausible harm that I
>would be likely to suffer from killing another person, I will just modify
>the example to remove it.
However, if unlimited stipulations are not allowed -- and they cannot be,
for the reasons discussed above -- then objections of the type described
dismissed by Huemer can be fatal to particular examples (assuming they
haven't already fallen prey to Problem 1 above). That doesn't mean that
Huemer can't try, of course, but it does mean that he cannot appeal the
blanket idea that he could come up with an example where "A" does imply
"B -> C," if he simply added in enough stipulations.
Problem 3 -- Hurray for C!
As Huemer notes, an alternative possibility to Problem 2 is for egoists to,
in his words, "Reject the intuition." That is, they could accept that it is
true that "A -> (B -> C)", but say that there is nothing wrong with that --
that "C" is actually a morally acceptable outcome in situation "B". When
the outcome is one that would normally be considered immoral and even
horrifying -- in one of Huemer's examples, killing a homeless man, in
another the deaths of four million people -- then people are often
reluctant to take such a stance. However, it is not clear that such
reluctance is justified. The scenarios typically set up to lead to such
conclusions are far from commonplace situations, and thus there is often no
reason to think that any ethical evaluations made in such a hypothetical
situation have implications for real-world situations. For his more
detailed example, Huemer finds it necessary to equip himself with a
disintegrator gun, as well as making several dubious stipulations about
social conditions and human psychology.
Why should any ethical analysis for such a way-out situation, however
repulsive the conclusion may seem, affect our acceptance of one ethical
theory versus another? Imagine that Huemer got Objectivists to agree that
if rat poison were safe and nutritious for human beings, it would be
acceptable to sell it as food. It would be very misleading for him to turn
around and say, "Objectivists think it is sometimes OK to sell rat poison
as food! They're evil!" To develop a hypothetical filled with assumptions
that are not true in the real world, and which probably never will be true
in the real world, and then denounce a moral theory for the conclusions it
draws from it, is no less inappropriate than the rat poison example.
Huemer's position that such denunciations are warranted is based on his
acceptance of ethical intuitionism -- the belief that, as he describes it
later in his essay, "some moral principles are self-evident" and that these
can be known through the "direct awareness that reason provides us." On the
basis of this intuition, Huemer can declare that evilness of certain
outcomes is self-evident. For those who choose to dispute his claims,
Huemer moves quickly to what is the ultimate resort of all intuitionists --
what Rand called the Argument from Intimidation:
If someone says this, then I have nothing further to say. One who would say
this is either insincere or morally corrupt.
Rand explicitly (and correctly) rejected this type of response as "a means
of forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement." Later in the
same essay, she writes, "[A] moral judgement must always follow, not
precede (or supersede) the reasons on which it is based .... [T]o condemn
without giving reasons is an act of irresponsibility, a kind of moral
'hit-and-run' driving ...." ("The Argument from Intimidation" in _The
Virtue of Selfishness_)
Now, Huemer would undoubtedly object to this characterization. He has a
"reason" for denouncing anyone who endorses "C": his "direct awareness" of
the supposed moral facts. For non-intuitionists, however, it is clear that
despite his protests to the contrary, all this so-called awareness amounts
to is "an inarticulate sense of something caused by one's experience with
similar situations" (to use a description that he says does *not* apply).
In other words, Huemer feels that "C" must be wrong. An Objectivist is
likely to wonder why Huemer's feelings, even if they are shared by many
others, are supposed to outweigh Rand's arguments for egoism.
At this point Huemer's use of the idea that egoism is supposed to be
"self-evident" rears its ugly head again. If egoism is supposed
self-evident, then there would be no arguments for it, so we might have
less compunction about rejecting it based on a contrary feeling. Rand, on
the other hand, did not claim that egoism was self-evident, and did offer
arguments for her ethical beliefs, so Objectivists are on much sturdier
ground if they decide to reject Huemer's intuitions.
Problem 4 -- Is This Objectivism?
Despite the opportunity provided by Problem 3, most Objectivists probably
would not embrace the idea of disintegrating the homeless man, much less
killing four million people. In fact, the obvious response that would be
made by most Objectivists is one which Huemer completely ignores: that it
would be wrong to kill the homeless man, because it would violate his
rights.
Huemer does go on in his next section to claim, without reference to his
previous examples, that rights and egoism are inconsistent. That claim is
discussed further below. For the time being, however, I will simply say
that if the Objectivist ethics incorporates rights as a side constraint,
all of Huemer's examples "refuting" egoism on the grounds that it might
justify the wanton murder of innocents are irrelevant to Objectivism. Once
again, the idea of a generic egoism that is claimed as self-evident is a
poor match for the philosophy that Huemer is supposed to be criticizing.
Summary of the Problems with Huemer's Example
The upshot of all this is that it is by no means clear that the "A -> (B ->
C)" claim is true for this example, or if it is true, whether the "A"
correctly represents Objectivism as it is understood in our universe. Even
if both of these could be conclusively demonstrated, Huemer has not offered
any legitimate reasons for using this as a grounds for rejecting
Objectivism.
>5.3.3. EGOISM VS. RIGHTS
In this section, Huemer argues that egoism is inconsistent with rights
"properly so called." To be "properly so called," he says, rights must be
viewed as "side constraints." Side constraints are incompatible with egoism
because egoism is consequentialist. This argument is to some extent
correct: side constraints are incompatible with pure consequentialism.
However, there are two significant problems with Huemer's approach.
First, although Huemer correctly attributes the description of rights as
side constraints to Robert Nozick (specifically his _Anarchy, State and
Utopia_), he fails to note that Nozick does not offer any convincing
argument for why rights must be viewed this way. Nozick argues at some
length that viewing rights as side constraints is not irrational, and he
suggests some positive aspects of viewing rights this way, but these is not
the same thing as showing why they must be so viewed. In _Anarchy, State
and Utopia_, the idea that rights could be portrayed as something other
than side constraints is fobbed off to an arcane footnote that doesn't
actually address the issue. Huemer does not make up for Nozick's omission
with any arguments of his own, so the claim that only side constraints can
be "properly so called" as rights comes to us as an assertion without
supporting argument. (This is not to say that arguments, perhaps even
successful ones, cannot be given for the claim that rights must be viewed
as side constraints -- only that none is provided in Huemer's essay or in
the source cited.)
Second, even if we accept the idea of rights as side constraints, Huemer
has not shown anything about Objectivism per se in this section. Instead,
the generic "self-evident" egoism with which he started the section is the
only theory in play. Huemer has not shown that Rand's ethics are purely
consequentialist, so that side constraints would be incompatible. Now,
Huemer might respond by saying that if Rand's ethical theories are not
purely consequentialist then they should not be called 'egoism', so that
this term can be reserved for theories that are. However, such an argument
would be one of terminology and classification, not any sort of refutation
of Objectivism. In any case, a strong argument can be made that a theory
which combines self-interest with a rights side constraint should still be
described as a form of egoism -- perhaps with some modifier, such as
"rights-constrained egoism."
Whether Objectivism is best described in this way is not entirely clear.
Rand did not directly address the issue of whether rights as defined in
Objectivism are side constraints or not. Leonard Peikoff's _Objectivism:
The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, which is supposed to represent Rand's views,
also does not directly address the issue, although the descriptions and
derivations that Peikoff provides do give the impression that rights are
treated as side constraints. If anyone reading this knows of an explicit
position statement on this issue by any major Objectivist intellectual, I
would love to receive information on it.
>5.3.4. EGOISM VS. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
The problems of this section are essentially similar to those of the
previous section. The "intrinsic value of the individual," as portrayed by
Huemer, is not argued for, and Huemer's self-evident straw man stands in
for Objectivism. Enough said.
>5.3.5. ARE THERE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN RATIONAL PEOPLE?
Why this particular topic is part of section 5.3 is something of a mystery,
since it has nothing to do with whether egoism is self-evident of not, or
even with whether egoism is a correct moral theory. But ironically, this is
one part of Humer's arguments that actually applies directly to
Objectivism, making it more relevant than most of the section.
Before I address Humer's arguments on this subject, I want to offer a side
note on an issue which I believe Huemer understands, but which is a common
misunderstanding among other people who comment on Rand's position on this
issue The Objectivist idea that there are no conflicts of men's interests
does not refer to the type of situation that is commonly know as a
"conflict of interest," such as when a judge has to excuse himself from a
case because he knows one of the parties. That type of situation is one in
which an individual has two or more conflicting motives. The issue being
discussed by Rand, Huemer, and me, is that of conflicts between the
interests of different individuals. These are different subjects, although
the terms are very similar. That said, let us get on to Huemer's arguments.
Huemer begins somewhat inauspiciously by saying, "I do not understand how
Objectivists are able to maintain that there are no conflicts of interest
in a rational society ..." Apparently he really doesn't understand what the
argument for the Objectivist position is, because he follows almost
immediately with an example that raises issues which Rand addressed in her
primary article on the subject ("The 'Conflicts' of Men's Interests" in
_The Virtue of Selfishness_).
Huemer offers the following example:
>Suppose I own a store, a small market. Across from the street there is
>another store of the same kind, owned by Bill. When a customer comes down
>the street, it is in my interests for the customer to enter my store. It
>is in Bill's interest for the customer to enter Bill's store. The customer
>will not enter both stores; if he goes to my store, he will not go to
>Bill's, and if he goes to Bill's store, he will not go to mine: a conflict
>of interests, pure and simple.
Presumably Huemer means to imply a situation where the customer is going to
make some type of transaction that would be exclusive to one or the other
store. The example continues:
>Since the result that Bill's and my interests have come into conflict
>follows from just three propositions, there are only three ways for an
>Objectivist to counter this argument. The Objectivist would have to argue:
>
>(1) That it is not in my interests for the customer to enter my store.
>
>But this is highly implausible. [reason omitted -- I'll come back to it]
>
>(2) That it is not in Bill's interests for the customer to enter his
>store.
>
>This is implausible for the same reason.
Why does Huemer think (1) and (2) are implausible? He argues that:
>If it isn't in a store-owner's interests for a customer to enter his
>store, why do they spend money on advertising, try to offer a wider
>selection or lower price than competitors, et cetera?
First, even assuming Bill and I both engage in the behavior Huemer
indicates, this reasoning does nothing to show that it is in my or Bill's
interests to have this particular customer come in at this particular time.
It simply indicates that we want customers to come in, generally speaking.
As Rand points out in her essay, conflicts of desire are easy to come by.
That doesn't mean conflicts of interests exist. Rand made this point as her
first major consideration in the essay: Reality. A rational egoist seeks to
determine what really is in his interests, not simply what he desires.
Huemer has missed one of Rand's fundamental points right off the bat.
Second, I don't find either (1) or (2) to be "highly implausible," even if
one did substitute 'desire' for 'interest.' Huemer may, but that is because
he is ignoring the second major consideration Rand gives in her essay:
Context. (Non-Objectivist readers who dislike the term 'context' should
feel free to substitute equivalent terminology that they find less
offensive, such as 'circumstances.')
Let me explain in more detail for this particular example: Like most
hypothetical scenarios, the one offered here by Huemer does not detail
every single element of the situation. To do so would make the description
of the hypothetical excruciatingly long, and probably impossible.
Therefore, people naturally add in their own presumptions about the
elements that aren't specified. In the circumstances that most people would
automatically add into Huemer's hypothetical, it might seem implausible
that I wouldn't want a customer to come into my store. But there are many
possible circumstances (contexts) in which I might not want that,
including:
* If my store is already busier than I can handle, so that any new customer
would only dilute my ability to serve other customers;
* If the customer was deciding which of two items he should return for a
refund;
* If the customer was a notorious shoplifter who planned to take $100 in
goods along with his $5 purchase;
* If the customer was a smelly wino who would drive my other customers out
of the store;
* Etc.
Now, I realize that Huemer could construct a more detailed hypothetical
that ruled out these specific situations. These concrete examples are
simply intended as illustrations of the idea that there is an unmentioned
context to the example. My point is more general than these examples:
Huemer's assertion of implausibility is itself plausible only if one
ignores the context in which these supposed interests occur. That context
goes well beyond the sorts of concrete items I listed above. It also
includes the wider moral context in which my specific interests are formed.
The Objectivist ethics includes a belief in a hierarchy of values. Some
potential interests are more important than others, and if a less important
value is incompatible with a more important one, then the less important
value is not in my interests, no matter how "implausible" that may seem to
Huemer.
In short, Huemer can only assert that that (1) and (2) are "highly
implausible" by conflating desire and interest, and by ignoring the
possibility of contexts in which they would be true.
Finally, whatever Huemer may think is "implausible," this argument does not
demonstrate that (1) and (2) are false. In fact, at least one of them is
true (in some circumstances, both may be true). Huemer's hypothetical
scenario does not provide enough information to determine which of them is
true, but that doesn't make them false.
What information is needed to determine which is true? Answer: knowledge of
what the customer's rational choice is. It is in both my interest and
Bill's that the customer act as a rational free agent. If he doesn't, one
of us might have a short-term desire met -- the desire for a customer --
but more important values would be damaged -- the values of living among
and interacting with rational free agents. Depending on the specifics,
other important values could be in jeopardy (e.g., if the customer was not
free to choose between us, then it is likely that our freedoms are also
restricted). These broader, more important interests -- part of the context
missing from Huemer's hypothetical -- are what makes one of the two
possibilities true. If the customer's rational choice is to go into Bill's
store, then it is not in my interest for him to come into mine. Thus, in
that case, (1) would be true.
Unlike the concrete examples of context I raised above, these broader
interests cannot be waved away by changing the hypothetical. They are
universal to anyone who has the opportunity to live in a free society. This
is Rand's major point in her discussion of "Context" in her essay.
Now let us go back to Huemer's point about storeowners and their
competitive practices. If Bill and I are rational and realize that it
cannot simultaneously be in both our interests for the customer to enter
our respective stores, then why spend money on better selections, etc.? The
answer lies in Rand's last two considerations: Responsibility and Effort.
In order to match my desires and my interests -- or if you prefer, to keep
my apparent specific interests in line with my broader, long-term interests
-- it is my responsibility to create a context in which the customer's
rational choice matches my desires. In other words, if I want the customer,
I have to work to get him. And wishing is not work -- I have to make the
actual effort that is needed to accomplish that goal. Because I keep
reality in mind, I know that my desire still might not be achieved, but
that's OK, as long as I retain the context of my broader interests and
don't start making efforts that undermine them in pursuit of that desire.
I will not address Huemer's possible argument (3). It is irrelevant, since
either (1) or (2) is true (even if in some circumstances we do not know
which).
And, lest someone (possibly including Huemer) want to come forth with yet
another example of the same objection, let me note that the general
reasoning applied to the example above can be applied to any other specific
example. As long as one follows along with Rand's four considerations --
Reality, Context, Responsibility and Effort -- any such apparent conflict
will resolve itself by reference to the actors' more important interests.
All of which was of course the point of Rand's essay, which Huemer says he
does not understand. I can only hope that I have been able to clarify the
matter for him in some way.
5.3.6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF EGOISM
Huemer quotes a well-known criticism of egoism:
>G.E. Moore identified the following as the fundamental contradiction of
>egoism (Principia Ethica, section 59): The egoist says that each person
>ought rationally to hold, "My own happiness is the sole good": "What
>egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole good -
>that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing
>there is - an absolute contradiction!"
This argument is little more than a facile misrepresentation of any theory
of egoism, including Objectivism. Egoistic ethical theories, Objectivism
explicitly included, are agent-relative (this term should not be confused
with "relativism," which is something different). That is, "the good" is
that which is good for a given person -- it is that which serves that
person's interests. Egoistic theories do not claim that there is such a
thing as "the sole good" that is held in common by all individuals.
If one accepts that what is good is agent-relative, then any well-formed
statement about something being good should specify to whom that thing is
good. Not doing so creates an ambiguous statement, which can lead to
fallacious inferences, such as Moore's claim above. "My own happiness is
the sole good, and your own happiness is the sole good," sounds like a
contradiction when you use the ambiguous phrasing, but "My own happiness is
the sole good for me, and your own happiness is the sole good for you," is
less problematic. (To prevent any confusion, I should note that the
phrasing Moore uses, "My happiness is the sole good," does not match Rand's
terminology. Rand expresses the issue of agent-relativity in terms of
value-- "The concept 'value' ... presupposes an answer to the question: of
value to _whom_ and for _what_?" -- and refers to each individual's
achievement of own happiness as his "highest moral purpose." ["The
Objectivist Ethics" in _The Virtue of Selfishness_, emphasis in original])
The "fundamental contradiction" turns out to be a fundamental red herring.
5.4. MY ETHICS
In this final subsection of his Section 5, Huemer briefly describes his own
ethical intuitionism, and addresses some possible objections to it. This
section does nothing to directly critique Objectivism. Therefore, I will
not address it here. Readers can refer to my comments on intuitionism in my
response to subsection 5.3.2 for a little more insight into my thoughts on
the matter. Suffice it to say that Objectivism is certainly not compatible
with ethical intuitionism, and I do not find intuitionist claims at all
convincing.
--
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com>
Visit the Objectivism Reference Center: <http://www.objectivism.addr.com/>
Owl
news:8dbn30$m8e$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net...
> A Reply to Huemer on Ethics
Thanks for this message. I'll try to respond in the next couple of days.
I had a response in progress, but my computer crashed and I lost it.
Blame it on Bill Gates.
--o
R Lawrence
In case anyone cares, I've given my reply to Mr. Huemer a home on the web,
at <http://www.objectivism.addr.com/personal/essays/huemer.html>. Since he
has his essay on the web, it seemed only fair. I may make revisions from
time to time if that seems warranted by future responses. (If I ever get
any responses, that is. I know Mr. Huemer says he is working on his, but
feedback from others is welcomed as well ...)
For any pathetic whiners who use RemarQ, that address was:
http://www.objectivism.addr.com/personal/essays/huemer.html
Tym Parsons
> Second, even if we accept the idea of rights as side constraints,
> Huemer has not shown anything about Objectivism per se in this
> section. Instead, the generic "self-evident" egoism with which he
> started the section is the only theory in play. Huemer has not shown
> that Rand's ethics are purely consequentialist, so that side
> constraints would be incompatible.
As indeed Rand's ethics are NOT consequentialist. They are
teleological. Objectivist Tara Smith's book _Moral Rights and Political
Freedoms_ gives a good exposition of the difference between the two
characterisations.
<snip>
> Rand did not directly address the issue of whether rights as defined
> in Objectivism are side constraints or not. Leonard Peikoff's
> _Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, which is supposed to
> represent Rand's views, also does not directly address the issue,
> although the descriptions and derivations that Peikoff provides do
> give the impression that rights are treated as side constraints.
Could you give us a cite please, Richard?
> If anyone reading this knows of an explicit position statement on this
> issue by any major Objectivist intellectual, I would love to receive
> information on it.
I'd think it would be obvious that Rand considered rights as
_instrumentive_. To speak of "side constraints" implies that there are
values other than one's own life that need to be taken into account. As
Richard has already pointed out himself, Rand emphasised that values are
agent-relative. Objectivism says that respecting other people's rights
is a profoundly selfish thing to do.
Tym Parsons
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Owl
relevant and well thought-out response to section 5 of my essay.
Second, just to clarify something that Lawrence has said more than once:
he has said that I admit to not understanding Rand's argument in "The
Objectivist Ethics" but I criticize her ethics anyway. The reason I said
that, was that there are multiple interpretations of Rand that I have
heard from Objectivists, and I don't know which of them (if any) is
correct. However, note that (a) I have read through the essay; (b) I did
not mean that I have no understanding of it; as will become clear below (I
hope), I have enough understanding of it to rule out certain
interpretations of it; (c) I think Rand's argument would be invalid on any
of the interpretations I have heard; and (d) I criticized some things that
I am certain Rand said; e.g., I am certain that she asserted egoism, and
that she claimed to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' - my lack of
understanding did not extend so far that I admit she might not have said
those things.
I didn't make the case for (c), because I thought it would be simpler to
give general arguments against, for example, any attempt to derive an
'ought' from an 'is', rather than trying to address every possible attempt
at such a derivation separately.
I turn now to Lawrence's specific remarks:
> >5.2. RAND'S DERIVATION (?) OF EGOISM
...
> His
> criticism of Rand in section 3.3 can be summarized as, "I don't
understand
> her argument, but it must be in error, because all arguments of this
type
> are in error." In the circumstance, it would seem that nothing short of
a
> recasting of "The Objectivist Ethics" to achieve Huemer's understanding
> would suffice to address that sort of "objection," and that might not
even
> be enough.
Two things to note here:
First, my claim was that, in general, one cannot validly derive an 'ought'
from an 'is' - so, one thing you could do would be to respond to my
arguments there, and explain why I was wrong to say that. If my general
logical claim there is correct, then it would indeed follow that, as you
say, "all arguments of this type are in error" - so I don't see what fault
you find with my method of argument.
Second, the examples I gave of failed attempts at such a derivation were
not randomly selected - all of them corresponded (roughly) to things I
have heard people say, and the ones about wanting to live and choosing to
live were obviously related to Rand's argument, on one common
interpretation of the argument. You might favor a different
interpretation of the argument, but then you should say at least something
about that.
So, I think you would have to say more about why I'm wrong here, in order
to have answered my argument.
> >5.3. IS EGOISM SELF-EVIDENT?
(We agree that it isn't.)
> >5.3.1. THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES
I gave an example:
> >A -> (B -> C).
> >B -> not-C.
> >Therefore, not-A.
showing that an argument with hypothetical premises can lead to a
categorical conclusion. We agree that one can't object to an argument
using a hypothetical example *merely* because the example isn't an actual
situation.
> But when the example argument says,
> "in situation S, it would surely be wrong to do A," then we are just as
> "surely" justified in asking why A would "surely be wrong." Huemer's
sample
> is admirably true to the usual course of such arguments: it offers no
> evidence for that assertion. In the model, "B -> not-C" is a *premise*,
and
> that is exactly what it is in the sample argument as well (and Huemer
> identifies it as such, although he does not emphasize the point).
All I can get from this is that you're objecting to my argument on the
grounds that it uses a premise. I'm sure you don't think it's generally
wrong to use a premise, but I don't see you pointing to anything else that
I've done that's supposed to be wrong.
If that is what you're doing, see my other message on "'Prove it'
skepticism & foundationalism."
> >5.3.2. THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVIST
> Huemer next provides a more detailed hypothetical example that is
supposed
> to serve as an argument against egoism.
(The example was one in which I said an egoist would disintegrate a
homeless guy to save time, because he was late for work and didn't want to
have to walk around the homeless guy.)
> Problem 1 -- The Case of the Complex 'B'
...
> Huemer apparently believes the use of stipulations is essentially
> unlimited. "The only thing that I do not get to stipulate is the verdict
on
> the example," he declares. But if that is his belief, he is wrong. The
> creators of hypotheticals can and do sometimes stipulate themselves into
> irrelevance. They do this in one of two ways: 1) stipulating
contradictory
> or incompatible premises, or 2) stipulating premises that make the
theory
> they are testing inapplicable to the example.
Fair enough, but I didn't do (1) - or, if you think I did, you'll have to
explain how. Let's see if I did (2), then.
> An
> example might be stipulating that the sole character in the example is a
> robot with no ability for moral choice, in a hypothetical case that is
> intended to test which of two choices is right. Such a stipulation
renders
> the example useless, because the claim to be tested is only relevant in
a
> situation where moral choice exists.
True, but I didn't do that. Of course, you're not saying I did - but
then, what similar thing did I do?
> Huemer's stipulations
> must be examined for the possibility that one or more of them contradict
> foundational requirements of her moral claims. Unfortunately that is not
> possible, because Huemer has not specified all of his stipulations, and
> probably doesn't even know what all of them would be.
With all due respect, this sounds like a cop-out. I described a fairly
specific hypothetical situation, such that most people would have a pretty
clear picture in their mind. Admittedly, I didn't specify it in 100%
complete detail. But you should be able to at least give me *some idea*
of how the situation might be rendering the theory (of ethical egoism)
inapplicable.
Above, you gave the example of a hypothetical situation in which a person
has no free will - in which case, moral principles wouldn't apply. That's
fine; my situation wasn't like that. Now, is there some *other* condition
required for moral principles to apply, such that my situation violated
this other condition? You haven't even suggested any such condition.
I will help: I assert that, according to Rand, the only conditions
required for morality to apply are that one be alive, and that one have
free will. Further: both of those conditions were satisfied in my
example. If you disagree, I think you have the burden to identify some
other condition (or explain how those conditions don't hold in my
example). Otherwise, how am I supposed to respond to this?
> Problem 2 -- Who Says A -> (B -> C)?
...
> In the typical
> pattern for such examples (which he follows), the conclusion that "B ->
C"
> is not one that was made beforehand by supporters of theory 'A'.
Right - in my example, I'm pretty sure that most people, including
Objectivists, would think "B -> C" was wrong. That's why the argument has
some force against A, after all.
> >But even if the egoist is able to think of some very plausible harm
that I
> >would be likely to suffer from killing another person, I will just
modify
> >the example to remove it.
>
> However, if unlimited stipulations are not allowed -- and they cannot
be,
> for the reasons discussed above -- then objections of the type described
> dismissed by Huemer can be fatal to particular examples (assuming they
> haven't already fallen prey to Problem 1 above). That doesn't mean that
> Huemer can't try, of course, but it does mean that he cannot appeal the
> blanket idea that he could come up with an example where "A" does imply
> "B -> C," if he simply added in enough stipulations.
Ok, but so far this is academic, because no one has actually put forward
one of the objections that we're talking about. This becomes relevant
only when someone puts forward an objection showing why it's not in the
egoist's interests to destroy the homeless guy, and then I modify the
example, and then you show me why the modified example violates one of the
conditions required for ethics to apply - but we're not even at the first
stage of that so far.
> Problem 3 -- Hurray for C!
>
> As Huemer notes, an alternative possibility to Problem 2 is for egoists
to,
> in his words, "Reject the intuition." That is, they could accept that it
is
> true that "A -> (B -> C)", but say that there is nothing wrong with
that --
> that "C" is actually a morally acceptable outcome in situation "B".
...
> The scenarios typically set up to lead to such
> conclusions are far from commonplace situations, and thus there is often
no
> reason to think that any ethical evaluations made in such a hypothetical
> situation have implications for real-world situations. For his more
> detailed example, Huemer finds it necessary to equip himself with a
> disintegrator gun, as well as making several dubious stipulations about
> social conditions and human psychology.
But I thought we already agreed that one cannot object to a hypothetical
example solely on the grounds that the situation doesn't actually obtain.
It sounds like that's what you're doing. Granted, disintegrator rays
don't exist, and granted, the social and psychological conditions I
described don't actually obtain in our society. But so what?
> Why should any ethical analysis for such a way-out situation, however
> repulsive the conclusion may seem, affect our acceptance of one ethical
> theory versus another?
Same comment here.
Let me ask you a parallel question. Suppose someone had a theory which
implied a similarly repulsive-seeming conclusion, about an *actual*
situation. For instance, someone gives an argument that it's OK to kill
your next door neighbor, in actual fact. Would you be so nonchalant in
that case about accepting the conclusion? If not, why not? After all,
what you're cheerfully suggesting here is, "Well, your moral judgement
about that case is just wrong." So, why couldn't our moral judgement
about an *actual* case be just as fallible? And so, why shouldn't we
receive theories that imply repulsive conclusions about *actual* cases,
just as unconcernedly as you do those that imply repulsive conclusions
about hypothetical cases?
> Imagine that Huemer got Objectivists to agree that
> if rat poison were safe and nutritious for human beings, it would be
> acceptable to sell it as food. It would be very misleading for him to
turn
> around and say, "Objectivists think it is sometimes OK to sell rat
poison
> as food! They're evil!"
But I didn't do that. In that situation, any normal person would agree
with the conclusion - that if rat poison were good for humans to eat, it
would be ok to sell it as food. So I couldn't construct any argument
against Objectivism there.
The opposite holds with my hypothetical example: almost any normal person
would agree that if you could benefit in some minor way from doing so, it
would NOT be okay to kill a person.
Thus, the difference between your 'rat poison' example and my example, is
that the 'rat poison' case is one in which the Objectivist position does
not seem at all repugnant, and the 'homeless guy' example is one in which
the Objectivist position seems completely repugnant (to almost all normal
people, including most Objectivists).
> Huemer's position that such denunciations are warranted is based on his
> acceptance of ethical intuitionism --
Well, no, it is based on my acceptance of the view that it would be wrong
to kill someone to obtain a minor benefit. Anyone who accepts *that* -
regardless of whether they accept the intuitionist account of how we know
that - would have to agree that I refuted egoism.
> For those who choose to dispute his claims,
> Huemer moves quickly to what is the ultimate resort of all
intuitionists --
> what Rand called the Argument from Intimidation:
>
> If someone says this, then I have nothing further to say. One who would
say
> this is either insincere or morally corrupt. [quoting me]
>
> Rand explicitly (and correctly) rejected this type of response as "a
means
> of forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement."
I can think of four things that you might be objecting to here:
1) Perhaps you're objecting to the fact that I call people with a certain
view morally corrupt.
But I don't see how you could object to that. Do you agree with
Peikoff's concept of "inherently dishonest ideas"? If so, I am simply
applying his idea. If not, is it your view that no one is corrupt? Or
that whether someone is corrupt can never be determined from what they
believe?
2) Perhaps you're objecting that I'm using the fact that certain people
are corrupt to support some philosophical conclusion (that doesn't follow
from it).
But of course, I'm not. I never said, "Those people are corrupt;
therefore, ..." I just said they are corrupt.
3) Perhaps you're objecting to my using this as a reason to decline debate
with such people.
But what could be wrong with that? Would you be interested in having a
debate with Charles Manson, on the subject of whether mass murder is good?
Well, perhaps you would, but surely I could be excused for declining the
opportunity. If I decline the debate with Manson on the goodness of
murder, am I "forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement"?
4) Or, perhaps you're objecting that I didn't prove that the people are
corrupt.
If so, please see my other message about "Prove it skepticism".
Another question about Manson. If someone says that he doesn't want to
debate with Manson, because Manson is evil, would you object that he
hasn't proved Manson to be evil?
Now, you might think that my comparison with Manson is unfair - are the
people I'm talking about really evil like *that*? Well, I don't think
they're *that* evil, since they probably haven't actually killed anyone.
However, nor is my comparison a complete stretch: after all, we're talking
about people who would endorse murdering an innocent homeless guy,
provided that you would get a minor benefit from doing so. And that's
really not that far away from the views that Manson probably has. It's
not like I'm using the "moral corruption" accusation frivolously.
> Later in the
> same essay, she writes, "[A] moral judgement must always follow, not
> precede (or supersede) the reasons on which it is based .... [T]o
condemn
> without giving reasons is an act of irresponsibility, a kind of moral
> 'hit-and-run' driving ...."
I wonder if she had in mind making moral judgements about people who
endorse murder. Let's say that someone says that Manson is evil. To
prove this, they bring up all the evidence that Manson was involved in
mass murders, and then rest their case. And now *in that context* imagine
Rand, acting as Manson's lawyer, saying: "You haven't given any reasons
for condemning Manson, because you haven't proven that murder is wrong.
To condemn without giving reasons is an act of irresponsibility, a kind of
moral 'hit-and-run' driving." Good defense?
> An Objectivist is
> likely to wonder why Huemer's feelings, even if they are shared by many
> others, are supposed to outweigh Rand's arguments for egoism.
First, "feelings" is being used as a term of abuse here, which was the
sort of thing I thought you opposed. You know that the issue isn't about
feelings.
Second, I showed earlier in the essay why you couldn't validly derive an
'ought' from an 'is', so given that, the answer to your question is
"because Rand's argument is invalid."
Third, what you're really saying is: Why should we prefer the claim that
*murdering someone to get a minor benefit would be wrong* over the claim
that *we should always act in our own interests*, given that they
conflict? I mean, that's what we're really talking about. It's not like
I picked some bizarre, idiosyncratic moral view of mine. Now, even if you
think you have an argument for the latter claim, I still think that if we
ask: "why should we prefer the belief that *murdering someone to get a
minor benefit would be wrong* over the belief that *your argument is
correct*" - that has pretty much the opposite effect of the rhetorical
question you posed. And that is the more accurate way of phrasing the
issue.
> At this point Huemer's use of the idea that egoism is supposed to be
> "self-evident" rears its ugly head again. If egoism is supposed
> self-evident, then there would be no arguments for it, so we might have
> less compunction about rejecting it based on a contrary feeling. Rand,
on
> the other hand, did not claim that egoism was self-evident, and did
offer
> arguments for her ethical beliefs, so Objectivists are on much sturdier
> ground if they decide to reject Huemer's intuitions.
First, are you saying that if someone gave an argument for something, then
it has to be right?
Second, are you saying that we should hold on to an argument, no matter
what absurd or repugnant conclusions it leads to?
Third, you've skillfully avoided answering this question so far, so let's
be explicit:
*Are YOU saying* that in my situation, it is okay to kill the homeless
man?
> Problem 4 -- Is This Objectivism?
> Despite the opportunity provided by Problem 3, most Objectivists
probably
> would not embrace the idea of disintegrating the homeless man, much less
> killing four million people.
So what was the preceding discussion about? If most Objectivists
(including you?) would agree with my premise (that it is wrong to kill the
homeless guy), then why did I just spend all that time responding to what
appear to be objections to that premise?
Or is it that while *most* Objectivists would agree with my premise, you
wouldn't? If that's the case, please say so. If your view is that in my
situation, it is morally acceptable to kill the homeless person, I think
our readers should know that up front.
...
> For the time being, however, I will simply say
> that if the Objectivist ethics incorporates rights as a side constraint,
> all of Huemer's examples "refuting" egoism on the grounds that it might
> justify the wanton murder of innocents are irrelevant to Objectivism.
Then for the time being, I will say that I think Objectivism does not
incorporate rights as a side constraint.
> Once
> again, the idea of a generic egoism that is claimed as self-evident is a
> poor match for the philosophy that Huemer is supposed to be criticizing.
The idea of egoism claimed as self-evident did not appear in this section,
so I don't know what is meant by this remark.
> >5.3.3. EGOISM VS. RIGHTS
...
> Huemer does not make up for Nozick's omission
> with any arguments of his own, so the claim that only side constraints
can
> be "properly so called" as rights comes to us as an assertion without
> supporting argument.
The remarks below seem to me to support the claim that rights function as
side constraints:
<begin quote>
The principles of individual rights are side constraints - they do not
say, for instance, "Do not steal someone else's property, unless it's in
your interests to do so." They just say, "Do not steal." That is why it
is not an adequate defense, if you are brought on trial for theft, to
explain that you expected to benefit by taking the victim's property.
Courts do not even listen to that kind of 'defense', nor should they.
Again, the non-initiation of force principle does not say, "Exercise force
if and only if you can get some benefit by doing so." Rather, whatever
benefits you are seeking for yourself, you have to do it within the
constraints imposed by other people's rights.
Now, one might maintain that the principles of individual rights are just
like rules of thumb designed for helping you to promote your interests -
the Objectivist says "Don't steal" because he has found, as a general
rule, that stealing hinders one's own interests. This makes it consistent
with consequentialism, but it has the result that such principles are not
absolute: you should violate them whenever, in the particular
circumstances, you find that violating them furthers your interests.
Furthermore, in order to show that you yourself have a right to do A, this
would mean that you have to show that allowing you to do A serves
*everyone else's* interests. If in a particular case, seizing your
property benefits others, then your right to property is in abeyance,
because it no longer functions as a side constraint, on the present view.
Thus, eminent domain cases are in principle justifiable.
An Objectivist will try to argue that in most or all actual cases, it does
not benefit others to seize my property. I will not take that up now,
since it is very difficult to determine. I will only say that it seems to
me that at this point the basic idea of our having *rights* has been
abandoned - if my use of my property has to be justified by the usefulness
to others of allowing it, then it is no longer being said that I have a
right to property.
<end quote>
It's true that someone could just reject the premises about rights that
I'm using (e.g., someone could just say that my having rights *does*
depend on saying that allowing me to exercise them serves others). But,
first, you can *always* do that. You can always just reject someone
else's premises. Second, the sorts of things I say about rights in that
passage are just the sort of things I would expect an Objectivist to agree
with in other contexts (e.g., rejecting eminent domain, etc.)
So again, I think you would have to say more in order to have responded to
me adequately.
> Huemer has not shown that Rand's ethics are purely
> consequentialist, so that side constraints would be incompatible.
True, I did not. I did not anticipate that anyone would question it, but
I'll discuss it below, since someone has.
> Now,
> Huemer might respond by saying that if Rand's ethical theories are not
> purely consequentialist then they should not be called 'egoism', so that
> this term can be reserved for theories that are.
That's right. I would also say that Rand probably knew the meaning of
"egoism" and would not have used a misleading term for her position. But
let's turn to more direct evidence:
> Rand did not directly address the issue of whether rights as defined in
> Objectivism are side constraints or not. Leonard Peikoff's _Objectivism:
> The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, which is supposed to represent Rand's
views,
> also does not directly address the issue, although the descriptions and
> derivations that Peikoff provides do give the impression that rights are
> treated as side constraints. If anyone reading this knows of an explicit
> position statement on this issue by any major Objectivist intellectual,
I
> would love to receive information on it.
I don't. However, I know that the consequentialist version is the only
one consistent with Rand's meta-ethics. Rand said that the concepts of
good, bad, right, and wrong, all derive from 'life'. She said that life
is the only ultimate standard of value. Furthermore, she interpreted this
to mean that *your life* is the only ultimate standard of value *for you*.
What promotes your life is good (for you); what hinders it is bad (for
you). That's why she was an egoist at all (as opposed to thinking that
you should promote all life in general). 'Rights', therefore, cannot be
treated as independent moral axioms (that would be like 'duty', which she
rejects) -- they must be derived from the principle of life (*your* life)
as the standard of value. That's why there is no room in this system for
arguing that anything trumps self-interest.
So, rights can only be understood as *means* of the pursuit of
self-interest, not as *constraints* on the pursuit of self-interests.
> >5.3.4. EGOISM VS. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
>
> The problems of this section are essentially similar to those of the
> previous section. The "intrinsic value of the individual," as portrayed
by
> Huemer, is not argued for,
First, I refer you again to my "Prove it skepticism" message.
Second, I don't have to argue for the intrinsic value of the individual,
since that's an *Objectivist* notion (even though they don't use exactly
those words). An Objectivist isn't going to say, "Oh no, individuals have
no intrinsic worth; they're just means to the good of society" or whatever
(fill in anything else for "good of society").
> and Huemer's self-evident straw man stands in
> for Objectivism. Enough said.
This was another section where I said nothing about self-evidence, so your
remark puzzles me.
> >5.3.5. ARE THERE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN RATIONAL PEOPLE?
(I had an example in which a customer can go into either my store or
Bill's.)
> >The Objectivist would have to argue:
> >(1) That it is not in my interests for the customer to enter my store.
[or]
> >(2) That it is not in Bill's interests for the customer to enter his
> >store.
...
> >If it isn't in a store-owner's interests for a customer to enter his
> >store, why do they spend money on advertising, try to offer a wider
> >selection or lower price than competitors, et cetera?
>
> First, even assuming Bill and I both engage in the behavior Huemer
> indicates, this reasoning does nothing to show that it is in my or
Bill's
> interests to have this particular customer come in at this particular
time.
> It simply indicates that we want customers to come in, generally
speaking.
> As Rand points out in her essay, conflicts of desire are easy to come
by.
> That doesn't mean conflicts of interests exist. Rand made this point as
her
> first major consideration in the essay: Reality. A rational egoist seeks
to
> determine what really is in his interests, not simply what he desires.
> Huemer has missed one of Rand's fundamental points right off the bat.
This is an extremely uncharitable interpretation of my example. Of
course, I did not at all miss the fact that 'interests' are objective for
Rand, and that Rand distinguished between rational desires and irrational
desires. Rather, I did not anticipate that any Objectivist would claim
that the desire to make a profit by selling products to customers was an
irrational desire. I thought it was obvious that this was a paradigm of a
normal, rational desire, and that this is not like the cases where, e.g.,
a drug addict desires a 'fix' even though it isn't good for him. Nor have
you given any reason so far for thinking it isn't rational. Now, it's
true that I didn't explicitly say this -- I didn't explicitly mention the
difference between rational and irrational desires -- but given the
principle of charity in interpretation, there was no reason to interpret
me as thinking that desires are the same as interests, and in fact I did
not think that.
...
> In the circumstances that most people would
> automatically add into Huemer's hypothetical, it might seem implausible
> that I wouldn't want a customer to come into my store. But there are
many
> possible circumstances (contexts) in which I might not want that,
> including:
>
> * If my store is already busier than I can handle, so that any new
customer
> would only dilute my ability to serve other customers;
> * If the customer was deciding which of two items he should return for a
> refund;
> * If the customer was a notorious shoplifter who planned to take $100 in
> goods along with his $5 purchase;
> * If the customer was a smelly wino who would drive my other customers
out
> of the store;
I did not intend my example to include any of the above sorts of
situations - assume conditions are normal in the example (unless otherwise
specified).
> These concrete examples are
> simply intended as illustrations of the idea that there is an
unmentioned
> context to the example.
Granted.
> My point is more general than these examples:
> Huemer's assertion of implausibility is itself plausible only if one
> ignores the context in which these supposed interests occur.
Okay, let's see why.
> The Objectivist ethics includes a belief in a hierarchy of values. Some
> potential interests are more important than others, and if a less
important
> value is incompatible with a more important one, then the less important
> value is not in my interests
Of course. So let's see what the more important value is here.
> It is in both my interest and
> Bill's that the customer act as a rational free agent. If he doesn't,
one
> of us might have a short-term desire met -- the desire for a customer --
> but more important values would be damaged -- the values of living among
> and interacting with rational free agents. Depending on the specifics,
> other important values could be in jeopardy (e.g., if the customer was
not
> free to choose between us, then it is likely that our freedoms are also
> restricted). These broader, more important interests -- part of the
context
> missing from Huemer's hypothetical -- are what makes one of the two
> possibilities true. If the customer's rational choice is to go into
Bill's
> store, then it is not in my interest for him to come into mine.
The argument seems to be this:
1) It is in my interests to live among rational, free people, in general.
2) This interest is more important than the interest in making this
particular sale.
3) Therefore, if the interests in (1) and (2) conflict, then it is not in
my interests to make this sale.
4) If the person buys from me even when it would be better (more rational)
for him to buy from Bill, then he is not acting as a free & rational
agent.
5) Thus, if it is better for the customer to buy from Bill, then there is
a conflict between my interest in selling to him, and my interest in
living with rational & free agents.
6) Thus, if it is better for the customer to buy from Bill, then it is not
in my interests to make this particular sale.
So, what do I say about this? I agree with 1, 2, and 3. However:
a.
Richard's argument depends on assuming that it is *either* better for the
customer to buy from me, or better for him to buy from Bill. But what if
Bill and I are selling the same product, at the same price? This is not
uncommon in reality. Thus, even if (6) is true, the argument won't
prevent there from being a conflict of interests.
b.
It also might be (even more likely) that it is not rational for the
customer to invest the time and effort of determining which store is the
better one to buy from, in view of the likely amount of difference between
the 2 stores.
In this case, the customer might be acting freely and rationally,
regardless of whether he went into Bill's store or mine. Thus, again, the
assumption of a uniquely rational decision fails, so one can't use it to
argue that it's in both of our interests for the customer to make the
(unique) rational choice.
c.
Anyway, the bigger problem is that (5) doesn't follow from (4). Even if
we assume (4) is true, it is still extremely unlikely that whether I live
with free and rational people will depend on whether this customer buys
from me on this occasion.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: Assume that I am presently living among people who are, for the
most part, free and rational. In that case, if this one customer makes an
irrational decision on this occasion, I will still be living among people
who are, for the most part, free and rational. This event won't change
the overall character of society. So, it is false to say that it would
conflict with my interest in living in a generally free and rational
society.
Case 2: Assume that I am not presently living in a generally free and
rational society. Then this one person's making a free and rational
decision on this occasion will not alter that, either. I already don't
have the value of a free & rational society, and I still won't have it.
But this sort of thing has already been beaten to death in the 'prudent
predator' threads.
> 5.3.6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF EGOISM
> >G.E. Moore identified the following as the fundamental contradiction of
> >egoism (Principia Ethica, section 59): The egoist says that each person
> >ought rationally to hold, "My own happiness is the sole good": "What
> >egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole
good -
> >that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing
> >there is - an absolute contradiction!"
>
> This argument is little more than a facile misrepresentation of any
theory
> of egoism, including Objectivism. Egoistic ethical theories, Objectivism
> explicitly included, are agent-relative (this term should not be
confused
> with "relativism," which is something different).
...
I discuss this in the "logical form of value facts" thread.
Thanks again for your response. This is just the sort of serious
discussion hpo needs.
--o
Owl
> In case anyone cares, I've given my reply to Mr. Huemer a home on the
web,
> at <http://www.objectivism.addr.com/personal/essays/huemer.html>. Since
On that page, you might want to update your link to mine to
http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand.htm
George Dance
R Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> In case anyone cares, I've given my reply to Mr. Huemer a home on the
web,
> at <http://www.objectivism.addr.com/personal/essays/huemer.html>.
Since he
> has his essay on the web, it seemed only fair.
I am glad you have done this. Your essay was a good read, but too long
to digest in one sitting or to store on my small drive. I appreciate
the opportunity to reread and refer to it.
> I may make revisions from
> time to time if that seems warranted by future responses. (If I ever
get
> any responses, that is. I know Mr. Huemer says he is working on his,
but
> feedback from others is welcomed as well ...)
I have written a bit on Huemer; feel free to use whatever you want.
As well, I would suggest reposting your essay to the group whenever that
other essay appears here.
> For any pathetic whiners who use RemarQ, that address was:
>
> http://www.objectivism.addr.com/personal/essays/huemer.html
>
--
- 30 -
R Lawrence
for a usenet post and there are multiple (albeit related) issues being
discussed. Also, I'm pressed for time and don't want to leave the thread
for dead until I can complete a reply to everything.
This sub-thread is about issues realted to the hypothetical examples.
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>>>5.3.1. THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES
>>But when the example argument says,
>>"in situation S, it would surely be wrong to do A," then we are just as
>>"surely" justified in asking why A would "surely be wrong." Huemer's
>>sample is admirably true to the usual course of such arguments: it offers
>>no evidence for that assertion. In the model, "B -> not-C" is a
>>*premise*, and that is exactly what it is in the sample argument as well
>>(and Huemer identifies it as such, although he does not emphasize the
>>point).
>
>All I can get from this is that you're objecting to my argument on the
>grounds that it uses a premise. I'm sure you don't think it's generally
>wrong to use a premise, but I don't see you pointing to anything else that
>I've done that's supposed to be wrong.
>
>If that is what you're doing, see my other message on "'Prove it'
>skepticism & foundationalism."
The point was the one I gave at the end of the paragraph you (partially)
quoted above: "the mere expression of such a premise is hardly enough to
make the argument sound." You have pointed to Rand's "check your premises"
slogan yourself. Despite your contrary claims in the "Prove it" thread, a
request for explanation or defense of a premise is not necessarily a
prelude to global skepticism. If as an intuitionist, your claim is that the
second premise ("B -> not-C") is self-evident or known by "direct
awareness," then we would have to compare that claim to the one you are
opposing. Suppose the opposing claimant says, "I don't think your position
is self-evident, and I have a substantial argument in favor of my position,
which is ... (argument follows, or is referred back to if given
previously)." Why should we believe you instead of him? Because your
position is more comfortable or familiar? Because you will call him a
scoundrel and refuse to debate him anymore? I haven't seen you offer any
argument more substantive than these two, and I don't consider either to be
adequate.
Now, it is entirely possible that the "B -> not-C" premise will be entirely
acceptable in a given argument, and no one will question it. That's fine.
But if it comes down to a disagreement, appealing to your intuition of
"B -> not-C" is only going to be considered a good defense if your reader
is an intuitionist (either explicitly or implicitly). I'm not. As far as
I'm concerned, you might as well be arguing that your premise came from a
dream, or that it was carved on stone tablets by God. I'm not going to ask
you to "prove it." But I'm also not going to accept that you've proven your
point, or even given a good argument for it.
>> >5.3.2. THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVIST
I think there has been some misunderstanding about what I do and do not
claim about your argument in this section. I think I'm largely to blame for
that misunderstanding, by not being clear. I was responding not only to the
particulars of your use of the example as an argument against Objectivism,
but also to your general defense of using hypothetical examples. Although I
agree that hypotheticals can be used legitimately, I think it is important
to understand what their limitations are. What I listed as Problems 1 and 2
are real issues for this type of hypothetical, but they are not the primary
weaknesses in the particular context of this argument. It's primary
weaknesses are those pointed out in Problems 3 and 4: it relies on the
Argument from Intimidation rather than any valid logic, and the conclusions
which supposedly follow from Objectivism (according to the hypothetical) do
not follow from it at all. (There is more about Problem 3 in my responses
below. Problem 4 is tied up with the discussion of rights, which I will
push off into a different post.)
>>Problem 3 -- Hurray for C!
>>The scenarios typically set up to lead to such conclusions are far from
>>commonplace situations, and thus there is often no reason to think that
>>any ethical evaluations made in such a hypothetical situation have
>>implications for real-world situations. For his more detailed example,
>>Huemer finds it necessary to equip himself with a disintegrator gun, as
>>well as making several dubious stipulations about social conditions and
>>human psychology.
>
>But I thought we already agreed that one cannot object to a hypothetical
>example solely on the grounds that the situation doesn't actually obtain.
>It sounds like that's what you're doing. Granted, disintegrator rays
>don't exist, and granted, the social and psychological conditions I
>described don't actually obtain in our society. But so what?
The logic of the example may not be affected, but the rhetorical force of
the example is greatly blunted when you realize that it has nothing to do
with real life, even though there may be some superficial similarities
(streets, homeless people, etc.). Since I hold the view that your use of
these examples as a refutation is powered by nothing more than emotional
agreement with the contrary premise (the "B -> not-C" premise), this is
well worth pointing out. (I hold this view because I don't believe in your
supposed intuitions, so you needn't bother telling me that you believe it
is actually supported by this "awareness".) People share your reaction not
because they care about the fate of nonexistent homeless people on some
nonexistent pseudo-world, but because they don't believe in the murder of
real people on this world. If instead of a homeless man and yourself, the
victim and killer were sentient insects from another galaxy, the emotional
resonance of the example would drop like a rock. So pointing out how
outlandish the example is -- indeed, how outlandish all such examples are
-- is quite to the point.
>>Why should any ethical analysis for such a way-out situation, however
>>repulsive the conclusion may seem, affect our acceptance of one ethical
>>theory versus another?
>
>Same comment here.
Same response.
>Let me ask you a parallel question. Suppose someone had a theory which
>implied a similarly repulsive-seeming conclusion, about an *actual*
>situation. For instance, someone gives an argument that it's OK to kill
>your next door neighbor, in actual fact. Would you be so nonchalant in
>that case about accepting the conclusion? If not, why not?
Someone has to come up with a good argument for the underlying moral
position first, *and* then the response has to be not a competing argument,
but moral conclusion claimed as self-evident fact. Far from being
"nonchalant," I personally think it is offensive to claim that the latter
is all philosophy has to offer in response to murderers.
>>Imagine that Huemer got Objectivists to agree that
>>if rat poison were safe and nutritious for human beings, it would be
>>acceptable to sell it as food. It would be very misleading for him to
>>turn around and say, "Objectivists think it is sometimes OK to sell rat
>>poison as food! They're evil!"
>
>But I didn't do that. In that situation, any normal person would agree
>with the conclusion - that if rat poison were good for humans to eat, it
>would be ok to sell it as food. So I couldn't construct any argument
>against Objectivism there.
What would be wrong with your behavior in the rat poison example not
related whether you have the crowd on your side or not. It is the fact that
you skewed the emotional reaction to the claim by omitting the fact that it
does not refer to this earth, but to a hypothetical scenario that is far
removed from normal expectations. In effect, you told a half-truth.
>The opposite holds with my hypothetical example: almost any normal person
>would agree that if you could benefit in some minor way from doing so, it
>would NOT be okay to kill a person.
.. on some netherworld where human society and psychology are completely
different from the way they are in reality. It just doesn't sound as
forceful when you add in all that extra verbiage, does it? And at its root,
the emotional force is what it is all about, because you have no argument
backing your position on this particular issue -- it's supposed to be
self-evidently right.
>>Huemer's position that such denunciations are warranted is based on his
>>acceptance of ethical intuitionism --
>
>Well, no, it is based on my acceptance of the view that it would be wrong
>to kill someone to obtain a minor benefit. Anyone who accepts *that* -
>regardless of whether they accept the intuitionist account of how we know
>that - would have to agree that I refuted egoism.
That agreement is what makes the argument effective as a rhetorical tool.
For the logic of the approach you are actually using to be correct, you
have to accept intuitionism -- otherwise you would have to offer a defense
of the "B -> not-C" premise. Which is why I, a non-intuitionist, think the
example is all emotionally appealing rhetoric and zero effective argument.
>>For those who choose to dispute his claims, Huemer moves quickly to what
>>is the ultimate resort of all intuitionists -- what Rand called the
>>Argument from Intimidation:
>>
>>>If someone says this, then I have nothing further to say. One who would
>>>say this is either insincere or morally corrupt.
>>
>>Rand explicitly (and correctly) rejected this type of response as "a
>>means of forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement."
>
>I can think of four things that you might be objecting to here:
<wannabes snipped>
>3) Perhaps you're objecting to my using this as a reason to decline debate
>with such people.
> But what could be wrong with that? Would you be interested in having a
>debate with Charles Manson, on the subject of whether mass murder is good?
>Well, perhaps you would, but surely I could be excused for declining the
>opportunity. If I decline the debate with Manson on the goodness of
>murder, am I "forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement"?
All this reply shows is that the flip side of the Argument from
Intimidation is a good old fashioned Ad Hominem. We aren't talking about
declining in advance an opportunity for debate because you doubt that it
will be productive, or because you don't want to associate with the other
person. We're talking about how one responds to an argument already made
and listened to. *If* Charles Manson presented a reasonable argument that
mass murder is good, or for any other conclusion, it would be worthy of
consideration. Who presented it is irrelevant to the validity or soundness
of an argument. Ad Hominem is not a logical response and it does not
undermine the logic of the opposing position. It just attempts to sway
people by appealing to their emotions.
In a similar fashion, the Argument from Intimidation is not a logical
response and it does not undermine the logic of the opposing position. It
is simply a rhetorical move designed to sway people by exploiting their
lack of confidence (plus make the intimidator feel self-righteous). It also
brings a previously meaningful debate to a grinding halt, on no grounds
other than that you are hostile to the other person's conclusion. (This is
distinct from your "prove it" situation, where two people who disagree
about a foundational claim might mutually stop debate on an "agree to
disagree" basis.)
>Now, you might think that my comparison with Manson is unfair - are the
>people I'm talking about really evil like *that*? Well, I don't think
>they're *that* evil, since they probably haven't actually killed anyone.
>However, nor is my comparison a complete stretch: after all, we're talking
>about people who would endorse murdering an innocent homeless guy,
.. on some netherworld where human society and psychology are completely
different from the way they are in reality ...
>provided that you would get a minor benefit from doing so. And that's
>really not that far away from the views that Manson probably has.
.. in the real world that we live in. See what I mean by "half-truth"?
>>Later in the
>>same essay, she writes, "[A] moral judgement must always follow, not
>>precede (or supersede) the reasons on which it is based .... [T]o
>>condemn without giving reasons is an act of irresponsibility, a kind of
>>moral 'hit-and-run' driving ...."
>
>I wonder if she had in mind making moral judgements about people who
>endorse murder. Let's say that someone says that Manson is evil. To
>prove this, they bring up all the evidence that Manson was involved in
>mass murders, and then rest their case. And now *in that context* imagine
>Rand, acting as Manson's lawyer, saying: "You haven't given any reasons
>for condemning Manson, because you haven't proven that murder is wrong.
>To condemn without giving reasons is an act of irresponsibility, a kind of
>moral 'hit-and-run' driving." Good defense?
We are talking about a debate over what is or is not the correct basis for
morality, not a debate over how to judge someone from a context of
agreed-upon moral standards. The analogy fails to be relevantly similar.
>Third, you've skillfully avoided answering this question so far, so let's
>be explicit:
>*Are YOU saying* that in my situation, it is okay to kill the homeless
>man?
No, I'm not saying that at all. Whether I agree with the claimed result is
irrelevant to the logical validity of your method of arguing against it. A
theory could lead to the conclusion that obliterating the universe on a
whim was moral, and your method of argument in this section wouldn't touch
it on a logical level. It would just be about pulling out an emotional
response from the reader. Intuitionist arguments based on hypothetical
moral cases always end up appealing to either the Argument from
Intimidation ("you're evil if you disagree") or the Argumentum ad Populum
("most of us agree that this is wrong"), or both.
Just one final comment on a reply you made to something I wrote under
Problem 4:
>>Once
>>again, the idea of a generic egoism that is claimed as self-evident is a
>>poor match for the philosophy that Huemer is supposed to be criticizing.
>
>The idea of egoism claimed as self-evident did not appear in this section,
>so I don't know what is meant by this remark.
The point is that you set up this entire section (of which the discussion
of the hypothetical is just a sub-section) by talking about a purely
speculative possibility that someone -- certainly it would not be an
Objectivist! -- might declare egoism to be self-evident. That puts you in a
better position than you would otherwise be in, because in a war between
"self-evident" claims, you don't have to rebut any substantive arguments
for your opponent's position. Nor would your opponent be able to criticize
your intuitionist claims on the grounds that their "self-evidence" is
actually an unsupported appeal to emotions. Real Objectivists have not
given up these advantages. Moreover, since there are variants on egoism,
you get to pick which one you use as this speculated "self-evident" version
-- and apparently you picked some sort of unprincipled act-egoism. As I
suggested in another post, you might as well have written a refutation of
Nietzsche and claimed that as a refutation of Objectivism. Whether you
directly mentioned the idea of egoism being self-evident in a given
sub-section doesn't change any of this.
Owl
> >If that is what you're doing, see my other message on "'Prove it'
> >skepticism & foundationalism."
>
> The point was the one I gave at the end of the paragraph you (partially)
> quoted above: "the mere expression of such a premise is hardly enough to
> make the argument sound."
It also doesn't make it not sound. So do you have any reason for thinking
it wasn't sound?
If your objection was not, "You haven't given an argument for that
premise," then what was it? That is, what did I do or fail to do, that
was bad?
Why wouldn't your objection here -- if it is an objection -- apply to
absolutely anything anyone could say in print? That is, you could just
identify the premises of any argument and say, "The mere expression of
such a premise is hardly enough to make the argument sound." So, why
isn't this just a universal response to everything?
> You have pointed to Rand's "check your premises"
> slogan yourself. Despite your contrary claims in the "Prove it" thread,
a
> request for explanation or defense of a premise is not necessarily a
> prelude to global skepticism.
You're right, it's not -- the person might have a further defense to give.
However, a request for defense of one's *ultimate*, or starting premises,
is a prelude to global skepticism. Or if it's not, then you'll have to
explain to me why it isn't.
> If as an intuitionist, your claim is that the
> second premise ("B -> not-C") is self-evident or known by "direct
> awareness," then we would have to compare that claim to the one you are
> opposing. Suppose the opposing claimant says, "I don't think your
position
> is self-evident, and I have a substantial argument in favor of my
position,
> which is ... (argument follows, or is referred back to if given
> previously)." Why should we believe you instead of him?
I really think that this sort of thing is answered in the 'prove it
skepticism' thread. Keep in mind, in particular, the second point I made
there:
A proof requires premises.
Now, I gave an argument, which had certain premises, to show that egoism
is false. My opponent gives another argument, which has different
premises, to show that egoism is true. That's the situation so far.
There's no such thing as an argument without premises (ignoring
uninteresting cases). You're talking as if, somehow, your egoist is
giving arguments without any premises, and I'm giving premises without any
arguments. That's wrong -- the logical structure of both our positions is
the same: premises followed by conclusions. We just have different
premises.
Now, obviously if someone just rejects my starting premises, I can't
convince him. But it's not like I've committed some dialectical foul, and
the same is true of anyone else: if someone rejects *your* starting
premises, it's also true that you can't convince him.
Lastly, to answer your question: how should we decide which of two
arguments to accept? The answer is by comparing the starting premises of
the one argument to the starting premises of the other. The argument
whose starting premises seem *more certain* (prior to the argument) is the
better one.
G. E. Moore discusses this in his responses to skepticism in "Proof of an
External World" and "Hume's Theory Examined".
> your
> position is more comfortable or familiar? Because you will call him a
> scoundrel and refuse to debate him anymore? I haven't seen you offer any
> argument more substantive than these two, and I don't consider either to
be
> adequate.
This is really unfair -- almost an argument by intimidation, one might
say. I have not said either of those things, and I would have thought you
knew that. While we're juggling names of informal fallacies here, how
about, "attacking a straw man"?
> Now, it is entirely possible that the "B -> not-C" premise will be
entirely
> acceptable in a given argument, and no one will question it. That's
fine.
> But if it comes down to a disagreement, appealing to your intuition of
> "B -> not-C" is only going to be considered a good defense if your
reader
> is an intuitionist (either explicitly or implicitly). I'm not. As far
as
> I'm concerned, you might as well be arguing that your premise came from
a
> dream, or that it was carved on stone tablets by God. I'm not going to
ask
> you to "prove it." But I'm also not going to accept that you've proven
your
> point, or even given a good argument for it.
I really do not see how what you're saying is different from "prove it."
It sounds like you're sort of saying: "I'm not asking you to prove it.
I'm just saying that since you didn't prove it, it's unacceptable." Well,
the second sentence pretty much contradicts the first.
> The logic of the example may not be affected, but the rhetorical force
of
> the example is greatly blunted when you realize that it has nothing to
do
> with real life, even though there may be some superficial similarities
> (streets, homeless people, etc.). Since I hold the view that your use of
Maybe you're right about the rhetorical effect. But, logically, the
question comes down to: is B -> ~C true? And if it is, does it follow
from that that egoism is false? I claim that a rational person can see
that the answers to both questions are "yes."
Now, your point about the example being unreal would undermine this if and
only if you are arguing that our judgement is unreliable about unrealistic
situations. But why would it be unreliable about those situations, and
yet reliable about realistic situations?
If you're saying that people would be unduly swayed by emotions, wouldn't
that be *more* true if I was talking about an example close to home, e.g.
about something that had actually happened to some of us?
The other thing you seem to be doing is accusing me of misrepresenting
what my premise is, or at least not making it completely clear. So: I
hereby declare that my premise is about what one should do in the
hypothetical situation I described; and it is that, *if* you could gain a
minor benefit by doing so, and *if* egoism were true, then you should kill
a homeless person. I'm making those "if"s very explicit. And I still
think the premise seems clearly true. The reader will have to judge for
himself whether my emphasis on the "if" removes their sense that the
proposition is true.
> >Let me ask you a parallel question. Suppose someone had a theory which
> >implied a similarly repulsive-seeming conclusion, about an *actual*
> >situation. For instance, someone gives an argument that it's OK to
kill
> >your next door neighbor, in actual fact. Would you be so nonchalant in
> >that case about accepting the conclusion? If not, why not?
>
> Someone has to come up with a good argument for the underlying moral
> position first, *and* then the response has to be not a competing
argument,
> but moral conclusion claimed as self-evident fact.
I hate to keep harping on this, but it seems to me as if the points from
the "prove it" thread keep being relevant. Again, imagine you have 2
people with arguments, and both of them are, let's say, logically sound;
they just start from incompatible premises. Keep in mind:
-- A proof requires premises.
I'm sure you know this, but you're writing as if it were otherwise -- as
if we're talking about a person who has arguments with no premises, versus
a person with just statements and no arguments.
It seems to me that this is pretty much what your message is about -- I
made a moral statement which I claimed as self-evident, and I didn't prove
it. You imply, at various points, that the statement must be purely
emotional, or that I must be relying on 'intimidation', because of this;
you further imply that my defense is much worse than that of someone else
who gives an argument. So let me make a couple more general
epistemological points about this.
1. The fact that P is supported by an argument does NOT make P better
justified, or more certain, than something not supported by an argument.
In fact, the conclusion of an argument will normally be *less* certain
than the premises (if you're not certain if the premises are true, then
they can't possibly make the conclusion true). As you go from premises to
conclusions, and then further conclusions from those, your rational degree
of certainty that (you haven't made an error) *decreases*. Thus, the
*most certain of all* things are things which *cannot* be proved -- i.e.,
the ultimate starting points. (This does not mean, of course, that *all*
things that can't be proved are certain.)
2. Sometimes, arguments are wrong.
This is closely related to (1). Sometimes, even arguments that look
perfectly good to you are wrong -- even if you're a smart person! Take
any paradox as an example, or any miscalculation. In fact, we can say
something even stronger:
3. Sometimes, arguments are wrong, *even after you've checked them over.*
Of course, this does not mean that you should always suspect your
arguments are wrong--not without reason; that would lead to skepticism.
However,
4. Sometimes, you find out your argument is wrong *because it led to an
absurd conclusion.*
This is what you seem to be denying.
> >Well, no, it is based on my acceptance of the view that it would be
wrong
> >to kill someone to obtain a minor benefit. Anyone who accepts *that* -
> >regardless of whether they accept the intuitionist account of how we
know
> >that - would have to agree that I refuted egoism.
>
> That agreement is what makes the argument effective as a rhetorical
tool.
> For the logic of the approach you are actually using to be correct, you
> have to accept intuitionism -- otherwise you would have to offer a
defense
> of the "B -> not-C" premise.
Well, my response to this is really the same as what I said above: No, my
argument is sound as long as the premise is true -- regardless of how we
know it is true, or what makes it true. Two people who disagree about why
it's true, but agree that it IS true, should agree with my conclusion.
Therefore, if you agree with me that the premise is true, then although we
*could* go into some further argument about why it is true, we don't need
to -- we should then just focus on what follows from it.
> All this reply shows is that the flip side of the Argument from
> Intimidation is a good old fashioned Ad Hominem. We aren't talking about
> declining in advance an opportunity for debate because you doubt that it
> will be productive, or because you don't want to associate with the
other
> person. We're talking about how one responds to an argument already made
> and listened to.
First, to clarify "ad hominem": "Ad Hominem" does not mean insulting
someone. Nor does it mean condemning someone. Nor does it mean refusing
to talk to someone. Etc., etc. Rather, it refers to a kind of *error in
reasoning* -- namely, that of concluding the falsehood of a proposiiton
from characteristics of a person who says it, in cases where those
personal characteristics are not relevant to the truth of the proposition.
With that understood, it should be clear that I offered no 'ad hominem'
arguments. All I did was to declare that certain sorts of people are
morally corrupt; that is not a fallacy. Nor does it become a fallacy when
I conclude from this that I wouldn't want to debate with those people --
not debating with someone isn't a 'fallacy.' And nor, finally -- to come
to your point above -- does it become a fallacy if I *previously* debated
with those people, and I decide to *stop*.
Nor is it unreasonable, either. Say you're debating with someone about an
ordinary issue, say, whether abortions should be outlawed. Suppose that
you argue that abortion is murder. Then this person says, "Murder is a-ok
with me! Yep, burning babies is good too." Then, I think, that's when
you say, "Goodbye." Why? Because you just found out, what you did not
know before (else you wouldn't have talked to him in the first place),
that this person has evil moral views.
I am surprised that I have to argue this point to an Objectivist -- I
would have thought an Objectivist would be the first person to recognize
it.
> .. on some netherworld where human society and psychology are completely
> different from the way they are in reality ...
>
> >provided that you would get a minor benefit from doing so. And that's
> >really not that far away from the views that Manson probably has.
>
> .. in the real world that we live in. See what I mean by "half-truth"?
I think you are using "netherworld" and "completely different" for
rhetorical effect. I know that I never said anything about netherworlds,
and if my situation was one where human society and psychology are
"completely different", that hasn't been shown. (I grant they were
somewhat different.) In any case, *my* statement of the premise was
completely accurate: "If egoism is true, then if you could obtain a minor
benefit by killing someone, you should do it." Which one of us is taking
advantage of rhetorical flourishes?
> >*Are YOU saying* that in my situation, it is okay to kill the homeless
> >man?
>
> No, I'm not saying that at all.
Good, so you agree with my premise?
So let's move along and stop debating it.
> Whether I agree with the claimed result is
> irrelevant to the logical validity of your method of arguing against it.
True, but the validity of my method of 'arguing' for a premise is also
irrelevant to the soundness of the argument, if the premise is true. If
we agree that X is true, and X entails Y, then we don't need to find out
whether I, personally, have the correct reasons for believing X, in order
to figure out whether Y is true.
> The point is that you set up this entire section (of which the
discussion
> of the hypothetical is just a sub-section) by talking about a purely
> speculative possibility that someone -- certainly it would not be an
> Objectivist! -- might declare egoism to be self-evident.
I grant that the labelling of the sections was misleading. The reason for
it was that at the end of 5.3, I say that since egoism isn't self-evident,
we need to look at arguments for and against it, and then I proceed to
arguments against it -- if egoism were self-evident, then we wouldn't need
to do this. You seem to have interpreted it to mean that all of these
arguments were directed specifically against the thesis that egoism is
self-evident, which wasn't my intention.
Owl
addressed the philosophically central issue. So let me just cut to the
chase. I give the following argument against ethical egoism:
1. If egoism is true, then if you could get a net benefit equal to a dime
by torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it.
2. It is not the case that, if you could get a net benefit equal to a dime
by torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it.
3. Egoism is not true.
Now, I have three questions for Lawrence or any other Objectivist:
Is 1 true?
Is 2 true?
Does 3 follow from 1 and 2?
That's all I want to know. If you could just answer those "yes" or "no",
then maybe we could get somewhere.
Kyle Bennett
"Owl" <a@a.a> wrote in message
news:8e8a29$oip$1...@slb3.atl.mindspring.net...
No
Yes
Yes
I'll start by saying that 3. does indeed follow from 1. and 2.. So
the question is whether 1. and 2. are true. Let's start with 2, its
a little easier. In Objectivism, 2. is true, but it is derived at
least in part, from rational egoism. I wonder how you would propose
to validate that statement otherwise?
#1 is untrue for two closely related reasons. The conditional
statement included in the premise cannot be true. Or, to make a
slightly less absolute statement, it cannot be known with enough
certainty to act on. Even if some omniscient being could determine
all the factors involved and determine it to be true, a finite
consciousness could not.
Moral principles are meant to be a summation of a number of
"practical" considerations when the number is too large to analyze
individually. I see it as analogous to a mathematical summation,
such as PI = 4 - 1 + 1/2 - 1/4 + 1/8 ... This series does
represent the exact value of PI, even though it can never be
calculated fully.
I see utilitarian calculations as having the same problem. The
number of possible factors involved in such an evaluation is
impossible to ever analyze fully. Instead, we have a moral principle
that sums those calculations. Any argument here about how those
considerations weigh in such a calculation is doomed to failure, so I
don't want to even go in that direction. (This is why the PP threads
went on forever, there was an infinite number of factors to consider)
But to give you an idea of the kinds of things that must be
considered, they include the chances of getting caught, the emotional
consequences to the perpetrator, the loss of the future value of the
500 people, etc.
I would say there is never a situation, even an imaginary one, where
the sum effect of all the factors could be known to be a net gain.
So the conditional in premise 1. is an arbitrary statement. It is
similar to saying that "If there are unicorns, the moral principle is
this", and supporting the premise by saying "How do you know there
are no unicorns?"
And as I've said above, only egoism can fully validate #2, which
means that #1 is contradictory. The underlying principle
invalidating #1 is that the individual mind is the essence of man qua
man, it is his defining characteristic. And force is wrong because
it negates the mind, therefore contradicts the nature of man --
including the nature of the perpetrator. And this principle is the
summation of the impossible utilitarian calculations needed for the
conditional in premise 1.
--Kyle Bennett
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>The point was the one I gave at the end of the paragraph you (partially)
>>quoted above: "the mere expression of such a premise is hardly enough to
>>make the argument sound."
>
>It also doesn't make it not sound. So do you have any reason for thinking
>it wasn't sound?
In the section in which this point originally appeared, we were talking
about a *symbolic* argument. The objections to the *actual* argument were
in a subsequent section. I am very familiar with the tactic of treating a
long essay as if every paragraph and sentence is a completely
self-contained argument, and I won't indulge it.
>>You have pointed to Rand's "check your premises"
>>slogan yourself. Despite your contrary claims in the "Prove it" thread,
>>a request for explanation or defense of a premise is not necessarily a
>>prelude to global skepticism.
>
>You're right, it's not -- the person might have a further defense to give.
>However, a request for defense of one's *ultimate*, or starting premises,
>is a prelude to global skepticism. Or if it's not, then you'll have to
>explain to me why it isn't.
I can easily disbelieve someone else's claimed "ultimate" premises without
being a global skeptic. If you claimed the existence of God as an ultimate
premise, I would not suddenly accept that God existed. I do not accept your
claims of intuitional knowledge, either.
> You're talking as if, somehow, your egoist is
>giving arguments without any premises, and I'm giving premises without any
>arguments. That's wrong -- the logical structure of both our positions is
>the same: premises followed by conclusions. We just have different
>premises.
Suppose you produce a lengthy display of scientific evidence that the earth
is not flat. I respond by telling you that I have "direct awareness" of the
fact that it *is* flat. I such a situation, is it your contention that the
only logical difference between our arguments is that we just have
different premises?
>Lastly, to answer your question: how should we decide which of two
>arguments to accept? The answer is by comparing the starting premises of
>the one argument to the starting premises of the other. The argument
>whose starting premises seem *more certain* (prior to the argument) is the
>better one.
This is exactly the sort of argument that I was referring to when I said
that you asked that we accept your position because it is "more comfortable
or familiar." We are asked which of two claims is "more certain," with no
argument in favor of one or the other allowed. Since your "intution" is
non-existent as a sensory mechanism, the result cannot be anything other
than acting on feeling such as those I describe.
>>your
>>position is more comfortable or familiar? Because you will call him a
>>scoundrel and refuse to debate him anymore? I haven't seen you offer any
>>argument more substantive than these two, and I don't consider either to
>>be adequate.
>
>This is really unfair -- almost an argument by intimidation, one might
>say.
Is this last bit of innuendo supposed to be a positive claim of some sort?
If you believe I have committed the argument from intimidation, as it is
described in Rand's essay on the subject, point out how. Otherwise, you are
just producing distractions.
> I have not said either of those things, and I would have thought you
>knew that. While we're juggling names of informal fallacies here, how
>about, "attacking a straw man"?
The exact quote from you regarding how you would react to someone who
"rejects the intuition" in your example is:
>If someone says this, then I have nothing further to say. One who would
>say this is either insincere or morally corrupt.
I do not see how this substantively differs from "call him a scoundrel and
refuse to debate him anymore." Later on in your response you explicitly
defend such a course of action.
>I really do not see how what you're saying is different from "prove it."
>It sounds like you're sort of saying: "I'm not asking you to prove it.
>I'm just saying that since you didn't prove it, it's unacceptable." Well,
>the second sentence pretty much contradicts the first.
See my example above about what I would do if you claimed the existence of
God as a self-evident "ultimate premise." I'm not asking you to "prove it,"
but that doesn't mean I have to believe it myself. There is no
contradiction in that, only the recognition that asking you for proof is
not likely to be productive, since you are openly admitting that you don't
have any.
> But why would [moral judgement] be unreliable about [unrealistic]
>situations, and yet reliable about realistic situations?
For the same reason that deaf people aren't good singers: they have the
theoretical capability, but they lack any feedback to determine whether
they are getting it right. You see, I believe that judgement requires input
from observation, not just the "intuiting" of answers.
>It seems to me that this is pretty much what your message is about -- I
>made a moral statement which I claimed as self-evident, and I didn't prove
>it. You imply, at various points, that the statement must be purely
>emotional, or that I must be relying on 'intimidation', because of this;
This is not why I said you used the argument from intimidation. I said you
used that argument because you did.
>1. The fact that P is supported by an argument does NOT make P better
>justified, or more certain, than something not supported by an argument.
>
>In fact, the conclusion of an argument will normally be *less* certain
>than the premises (if you're not certain if the premises are true, then
>they can't possibly make the conclusion true).
The premise of a given argument may be more certain than the conclusion of
that argument, but it does not follow that the conclusion of a given
argument is less certain than the premises of *another* argument.
>4. Sometimes, you find out your argument is wrong *because it led to an
>absurd conclusion.*
>
>This is what you seem to be denying.
I deny that you can conclude that a moral claim is "absurd" simply by
"intuiting" the opposite. *That* is the heart of this particular
disagreement. I do not ask that you prove any of your supposed intuitions,
since that is obviously impossible. You can't even show that intuitions
themselves have any validity in the first place.
> All I did was to declare that certain sorts of people are
>morally corrupt; that is not a fallacy. Nor does it become a fallacy when
>I conclude from this that I wouldn't want to debate with those people --
>not debating with someone isn't a 'fallacy.' And nor, finally -- to come
>to your point above -- does it become a fallacy if I *previously* debated
>with those people, and I decide to *stop*.
When the only answer you have to someone's argument -- even if they are not
personally present to offer that argument -- is to say that they are
morally corrupt and thus not worth responding to, that *is* a fallacy. You
are refusing to address the argument, not just refusing to debate with the
arguer. You proposed a particular line of argument *yourself* -- that
a hypothetical someone might "reject the intuition" -- and then offered no
response to that argument other than saying anyone who said that would be
"insincere or morally corrupt." You cannot possibly be refusing to debate
with yourself on the grounds of moral corruption, so why you didn't respond
to the substance of the argument instead?
>>>*Are YOU saying* that in my situation, it is okay to kill the homeless
>>>man?
>>
>>No, I'm not saying that at all.
>
>Good, so you agree with my premise?
>So let's move along and stop debating it.
In this particular branch of the argument (which is hardly the whole of
our disagreement), we aren't debating this particular premise per se. We
are debating whether it is appropriate to accept such a premise with no
support for it other than your claim of intuition. If it is an acceptable
form of argument that you simply assume that an appeal to intuition is
valid, then the whole discussion of ethics is pointless. You can simply
"intuit" all of the answers, and that's that.
Owl
news:OUSN4.832$bf4....@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
> > 1. If egoism is true, then if you could get a net benefit equal to
> a dime
> > by torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it.
> > 2. It is not the case that, if you could get a net benefit equal to
> a dime
> > by torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it.
> > 3. Egoism is not true.
> #1 is untrue for two closely related reasons. The conditional
> statement included in the premise cannot be true. Or, to make a
> slightly less absolute statement, it cannot be known with enough
> certainty to act on.
Which are you saying, then: it *cannot* be true, or you can't be certain
that it is true?
> Even if some omniscient being could determine
> all the factors involved and determine it to be true, a finite
> consciousness could not.
Could a finite conscious determine it *not* to be true?
> Moral principles are meant to be a summation of a number of
> "practical" considerations when the number is too large to analyze
> individually. I see it as analogous to a mathematical summation,
> such as PI = 4 - 1 + 1/2 - 1/4 + 1/8 ... This series does
> represent the exact value of PI, even though it can never be
> calculated fully.
Pursuing the analogy, we might say that it is possible to prove that the
series in question approaches pi as you add more terms. Is it possible to
prove, with any reasonable degree of assurance, that the moral principles
you subscribe to even approximate the correct value?
...
> Instead, we have a moral principle
> that sums those calculations. Any argument here about how those
> considerations weigh in such a calculation is doomed to failure, so I
> don't want to even go in that direction. (This is why the PP threads
> went on forever, there was an infinite number of factors to consider)
This seems to imply that the answer to my last question is "no". If so,
then why should we take the moral principles?
> I would say there is never a situation, even an imaginary one, where
> the sum effect of all the factors could be known to be a net gain.
Is there a situation where they could be known not to be a net gain? If
not, then why isn't the proper conclusion that we simply have no way of
knowing what to do?
> So the conditional in premise 1. is an arbitrary statement.
I think that your above remarks, even if correct, are not an objection to
(1). Rather, you seem to be saying that we cannot know that the second
antecedent in (1) is true. I.e., we cannot know:
"you could gain a net benefit equal to a dime by torturing and killing 500
people."
But there's two things wrong here. First, saying we cannot know it
doesn't show it isn't true; and it seems to be equally true, by your
reasoning, that we cannot know the opposite.
Second, that isn't even what (1) says. (1) contains two "if"s in it:
"If egoism is true, then if you could get a net benefit equal to a dime by
torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it."
Saying that you're not sure that one of the antecedents holds doesn't
imply that you're not sure that *if* it holds, then the consequent holds.
In other words, you haven't made clear why you don't agree that if egoism
is true, and *if* you could gain a net benefit of a dime, etc., then you
should do it.
> And as I've said above, only egoism can fully validate #2, which
> means that #1 is contradictory. The underlying principle
> invalidating #1 is that the individual mind is the essence of man qua
> man, it is his defining characteristic.
According to Rand, there are no metaphysical essences, only
epistemological 'essences'. So what this really means is that the
property of having a mind is the most convenient one for us to use in a
definition of "man", in order to hold together many of the characteristics
of men in a perspicuous fashion. I don't think an interesting conclusion
is going to follow from that.
> And force is wrong because
> it negates the mind, therefore contradicts the nature of man --
> including the nature of the perpetrator.
I think you need to insert some variables or names here, instead of just
talking about 'force' and 'the mind' as if they were entities. Do you
mean:
For any action, A, and any mind, M, if A is an act force, then if anyone
does A, then M is negated.
? In that case, what does "negate" mean anyway? Destroy? Does this mean
that if an act of force is performed, then no one will have a mind any
more?
> And this principle is the
> summation of the impossible utilitarian calculations needed for the
> conditional in premise 1.
Since no one knows what the sum of these impossible calculations is, I
don't see how you could know that it comes out the same as the result of
this principle you state.
Now, since you have said that my premise 1 is false, I will here give a
further argument for it. It is easiest to use 'conditional proof':
1a. Assume egoism is true.
1b. The only ultimately relevant consideration in determining what you
should do is your self-interest. (from 1, def. of "egoism")
1c. You should perform an action whenever the benefits to you exceed the
costs (including opportunity costs). (from 1b)
1d. If the net benefit to you of performing an action is +1 dime, you
should do it. (from 1c)
1e. If the net benefit to you of performing an action is +1 dime and 500
people are also tortured and killed, you should do it. (from 1d)
1f. Therefore, if egoism is true, then if the net benefit to you of
performing an action is +1 dime and 500 people are also tortured and
killed, you should perform the action. (from 1a-1e, by conditional proof)
Note that statements 1c, 1d, and 1e are all universal generalizations:
that is, they are all of the form, "For *any* action A, if such-and-such
is true of A, then you should do A."
Owl
> Suppose you produce a lengthy display of scientific evidence that the
earth
> is not flat. I respond by telling you that I have "direct awareness" of
the
> fact that it *is* flat.
Compare the following three exchanges.
Dialogue A:
Smith: The shortest path between any two points is a straight line.
Jones: How do you know that?
Smith: That is self-evident.
Dialogue B:
Brown: There are purple unicorns on Venus.
Jones: How do you know that?
Brown: That is self-evident.
Dialogue C:
Owl: It would be wrong to murder someone just to obtain a minor benefit.
Lawrence: How do you know that?
Owl: That's self-evident.
The question is, is dialogue C more similar to A, or to B? I think it is
more similar to A. Now, is Smith, from dialogue A, logically committed to
endorsing Brown's views in dialogue B? I think not. Nor, then, is Owl
from C logically committed to endorsing Brown's views.
Owl
criticisms of egoism, which response has focused on my 'intuitionism'.
First, a story.
You are in a bar, arguing with someone about socialism. He says it is
good for all sorts of reasons. You systematically refute all of his
factual claims, with empirical evidence. You prove, let us say, that
socialist regimes lead to poverty, that they do not produce brotherhood,
or equality, or freedom. It seems that you have won the argument. But
the socialist has an ace up his sleeve. "Well, it's all a matter of
opinion anyway," he says. Now what?
Now, if you concede the point, the other fellow can go away still
feeling that he (and socialism) hasn't lost; it's just a stalemate, since
it's only a matter of opinion anyway. On the other hand, if you want to
go ahead and claim the victory you thought you were entitled to--that you
refuted socialism--first you're going to have to prove that everything
isn't a matter of opinion, that there's an objective reality, that it's
possible to know something. And that's going to take you a long time.
Stephen Hicks says that this is what has happened with the modern
academic left--they were losing all the arguments about socialism, so they
decided to turn to irrationalism, skepticism, subjectivism, or whatever.
Now, what does this have to do with egoism?
I gave a very simple and valid deductive argument against egoism. The
premises are obvious to almost any person of normal mental capacity. It
is almost impossible for the defender of egoism to argue against these
premises and still retain any semblance of credibility. It looks like
he's about to lose the argument. What to do?
Easy. Divert the argument, from the truth of those premises, to the
much murkier, more abstract question of the adequacy of the meta-ethical
theory of the person stating those premises. Now, in order to claim
victory, I have to refute moral skepticism and solve the is-ought problem.
And that's going to take me a long time.
This is a clever move. We divert the argument from a very simple,
clear matter that practically everyone agrees on, into much murkier
territory, where we all know that debate can go on forever without
resolving it. Now, in order to be allowed to say that torturing and
killing 500 people is wrong, I first have to prove that you can know what
'wrong' is, and that a particular theory of how that works is correct.
Thus, we have another technique (in addition to the 'fudge words') for
isolating ethical egoism from ever being tested. As soon as a
counter-example is raised, the defender of egoism can immediately bog down
the debate into meta-ethical issues that we know will never be resolved in
our lifetimes to the satisfaction of most people. This is a frequent use
for "How do you know?" type questions.
ScheetzBrian
>premises are obvious to almost any person of normal mental capacity. It
>is almost impossible for the defender of egoism to argue against these
>premises and still retain any semblance of credibility. It looks like
>he's about to lose the argument. What to do?
> Easy. Divert the argument, from the truth of those premises, to the
>much murkier, more abstract question of the adequacy of the meta-ethical
>theory of the person stating those premises. Now, in order to claim
>victory, I have to refute moral skepticism and solve the is-ought problem.
In a very similar vein, you expect Rand to prove conclusively that inanimate
objects don't experience value.
Owl seems to want it both ways: his moral premises don't have to be proven,
because they're self-evident, but Rand cannot claim self-evidency for
statements like "Only living things face alternatives" or "The concept of value
presupposes the existence of an entity capable of evaluation".
Someone once wrote, in referring to BF Skinner, that he was in the unusual
position of being a psychologist who denied the existence of a psyche. Owl is
placing himself in the odd position of being a moral philosopher who is denying
the applicability of philosophy to morality.
>Now, in order to be allowed to say that torturing and
>killing 500 people is wrong, I first have to prove that you can know what
>'wrong' is, and that a particular theory of how that works is correct.
Well, no. In the context in which I saw it being discussed, what you weren't
being allowed to say is that the statement "torturing and killing 500 people is
wrong" is inconsistent with rational egoism. Everyone was in agreement about
its wrongness. We were in disagreement about your assertion that it wouldn't
be wrong from the rational egoist perspective.
>This is a frequent use
>for "How do you know?" type questions.
Who started that? It would seem that it is Objectivists who end up devoting
the most ink to arguing with people who want to deny:
1. that existence exists
2. that it has identity
3. that man is conscious
4. that man is capable of using his senses and his reason to perceive reality.
[Actually, #4 is what is most typicallly denied outright, to make
epistemological room for different varieties of "intuitionism"]
So please, if you want to complain about people asking frivolous questions that
they don't really want to hear answered - I have to tell you that we're already
working that side of the street.
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>Suppose you produce a lengthy display of scientific evidence that the
>>earth is not flat. I respond by telling you that I have "direct awareness"
>>of the fact that it *is* flat.
>
>Compare the following three exchanges. <snip>
The examples you give don't address the simple question I asked in my
previous post: In such a situation, is it your contention that the
only logical difference between our arguments is that we just have
different premises?
>The question is, is dialogue C more similar to A, or to B? I think it is
>more similar to A. Now, is Smith, from dialogue A, logically committed to
>endorsing Brown's views in dialogue B? I think not. Nor, then, is Owl
>from C logically committed to endorsing Brown's views.
I don't know who (other than you in this last post) was asking those
questions. It definitely wasn't me. I asked the question indicated above.
R Lawrence
>Richard Lawrence gave a long response to me, but, in my opinion, he never
>addressed the philosophically central issue. So let me just cut to the
>chase. I give the following argument against ethical egoism:
>
>1. If egoism is true, then if you could get a net benefit equal to a dime
>by torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it.
>2. It is not the case that, if you could get a net benefit equal to a dime
>by torturing and killing 500 people, you should do it.
>3. Egoism is not true.
>
>Now, I have three questions for Lawrence or any other Objectivist:
>
>Is 1 true?
In the contrived double-hypothetical way you worded it, yes.
>Is 2 true?
In the same contrived double-hypothetical way, no.
>Does 3 follow from 1 and 2?
Yes.
This, BTW, is the sort of thing I was talking about when I used the
example of condemning someone for saying it would be OK to eat rat poison,
*IF* rat poison were healthy, nutritious food. The fact that rat poison is
not food, and that one cannot benefit by torturing and killing 500
(presumably innocent) people, makes this sort of example a very odd choice
-- unless you want to use misleading emotional appeals.