Rand rejected Aristotle's Universals...
Malrassic Park
I thought this response to Charles was important enough to have its
own thread, so here it is.
Whether or not concepts are Universals, even if they are formed the
same way as concepts - through differentiation and integration - the
problem of Universals remains the same. The problem is whether or not
those generalities, often in the form of -ness (manness, squareness,
etc.) then refer back to particulars in external reality.
Rand has confused the manner in which they are allegedly formed in the
mind with the *actual* problem which is relating them back to
particulars.
So where is the manness in men? We formed it as a generality, yet in
man the particular it cannot be found. In individual men, the quality
of being rational (the Universal of "rationality") comes and goes, it
is relative, and it differs from individual to individual.
And where is the 2-ness in two objects? However the number 2 was
derived, its Universal form is nowhere to be found in those two
particulars.
Charles Bell
> Whether or not concepts are Universals, even if they are formed the
> same way as concepts -
Concepts are not universals. A universal is a concept, one that is
useless and serves no other purpose than to create a problem that
cannot be solved.
<< It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct
definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only
concretes exist. But [! ! ! ! ! ! ] Aristotle held that definitions
refer to metaphysical essences [! ! ! ! ! !] , which exist in
concretes as a special element or formative power, and he held that
the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of direct intuition
by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms concepts
accordingly.
<< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
it as epistemological. [! ! ! ! !] Objectivism holds that the essence
of a concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on
which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which
distinguishes these units from all other existents within the field of
man's knowledge. Thus the essence of a concept is determined
contextually [! ! ! ! !] and may be altered with the growth of man's
knowledge. The metaphysical referent of man's concepts is not a
special, separate metaphysical essence [! ! ! ! !], but the total of
the facts of reality he has observed, and this total determines which
characteristics of a given group of existents he designates as
essential. An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that
it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does
distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is
epistemological in the sense that the classification of "essential
characteristic" is a device of man's method of cognition--a means of
classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of
knowledge. >> Rand, ITOE 5. Definitions
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> Whether or not concepts are Universals, even if they are formed the
>> same way as concepts -
..
>Concepts are not universals. A universal is a concept, one that is
>useless and serves no other purpose than to create a problem that
>cannot be solved.
You mean to tell me there is a problem that man's mind cannot solve?
><< It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct
>definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only
>concretes exist. But [! ! ! ! ! ! ] Aristotle held that definitions
>refer to metaphysical essences [! ! ! ! ! !] , which exist in
>concretes as a special element or formative power, and he held that
>the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of direct intuition
>by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms concepts
>accordingly.
That depends on which interpretation you want to accept, Rand's or Ken
Gardner's. Then, to further confuse the issue, there is your
interpretation of ITOE which directly contradicts Rand's statement
that Universals are abstractions or concepts, in other words,
Universals don't exist.
The question is, Where is the man-ness in men? This man-ness is
essential to the formation of the concept "man," it is the essence of
the concept itself.
If, however, Rand denies the metaphysical theory of essences, then
these essentials are no longer necessary to the metaphysical nature of
man. In other words, you are saying that rationality and animality are
only essential to the concept "man," but not to man the entity.
That this is false hardly seems noteworthy. Obviously these are
attributes garnered from an examination of man which boils him down to
his essential "ingredients," these attributes held in the mind to form
the concept had to come from existential reality. They are also
metaphysically necessary to man the existent.
So rejecting Moderate Realism (in the traditional sense of it) does
not solve the problem of Universals. It does not get us anywhere
closer to solving the Problem.
[...]
> but the total of
>the facts of reality he has observed, and this total determines which
>characteristics of a given group of existents he designates as
>essential.
In other words, something essential to forming the concept "man" is
being observed IN REALITY, Charles.
>An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that
>it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does
>distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is
>epistemological in the sense that the classification of "essential
>characteristic" is a device of man's method of cognition--a means of
>classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of
>knowledge. >> Rand, ITOE 5. Definitions
Read your own quote, Charles. It says that metaphysical essences exist
in reality and not only in concept.
Charles Bell
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:53:23 -0800, Charles Bell
> That depends on which interpretation you want to accept, Rand's or Ken
> Gardner's.
Gardner remains too close to Aristotle for Rand, and Rand remains too
close to Aristotle for me.
> Then, to further confuse the issue, there is your
> interpretation of ITOE which directly contradicts Rand's statement
> that Universals are abstractions or concepts, in other words,
> Universals don't exist.
>
Rand does not say "Universals are abstractions." Rands retains the
word for "essence" only for epistemological concepts.
<< Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that fundamental
characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other
characteristics depend, and which distinguishes these units from all
other existents within the field of man's knowledge. >>
> So rejecting Moderate Realism (in the traditional sense of it) does
> not solve the problem of Universals. �It does not get us anywhere
> closer to solving the Problem.
Objectivism solves the so-called problem of the so-called universal by
not using the universal.
>
> [...]
>
> > but the total of
> >the facts of reality he has observed, and this total determines which
> >characteristics of a given group of existents he designates as
> >essential.
>
> In other words, something essential to forming the concept "man" is
> being observed IN REALITY, Charles.
>
Yes. That has nothing whatsoever to do with a universal.
> >An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that
> >it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does
> >distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is
> >epistemological in the sense that the classification of "essential
> >characteristic" is a device of man's method of cognition--a means of
> >classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of
> >knowledge. >> Rand, ITOE 5. Definitions
>
> Read your own quote, Charles. It says that metaphysical essences exist
> in reality and not only in concept.
No. it says an essential characteristic is epistemological (not
metaphysical). Rands does not refer to "metaphysical essences" except
in rejecting moderate realism.
Which part of this did you not understand:
<< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
it as epistemological. >> ?
1Z
> Objectivism solves the so-called problem of the so-called universal by
> not using the universal.
O-ism does not solve the problem of the universal
because it neither denies nor explains
real resemblances.
> << Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
> it as epistemological. >> ?
It may try to. But if it cannot explain similar sense data
in terms of similar sensed things, it is not remotely objective.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 22, 11:09�am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:53:23 -0800, Charles Bell
>
>> That depends on which interpretation you want to accept, Rand's or Ken
>> Gardner's.
>
>Gardner remains too close to Aristotle for Rand, and Rand remains too
>close to Aristotle for me.
I don't recall whether or not Gardner prefers the interpretation he
has over Rand's. It is only necessary to state that there is enough of
a debate over the interpretations to throw this Moderate Realism into
question as to whether Aristotle actually believed it or if his view
was something closer to the Objectivist view held by Rand. All we can
really say is that Rand rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's
position.
>> Then, to further confuse the issue, there is your
>> interpretation of ITOE which directly contradicts Rand's statement
>> that Universals are abstractions or concepts, in other words,
>> Universals don't exist.
>>
>
>Rand does not say "Universals are abstractions." Rands retains the
>word for "essence" only for epistemological concepts.
Then I'll quote her again. The "solution to the 'problem of
universals'... is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to
determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data--and to prove
the validity of scientific induction." [ITOE2, 3]
Did rand retain the word "essence" only for epistemology?
She conflated "essence" (epistemology) with "essential
characteristics":"An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense
that it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does
distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is
epistemological in the sense that the classification of "essential
characteristic..." [ITOE2, 52]
An essence is epistemological - and an essential characteristic is
also epistemological (as well as factual). "Essential characteristic"
and "essence" are essentially identical terms, for Rand.
Therefore, it could easily, from Rand's own statements, be concluded
that essences are indeed metaphysical for Rand, they constitute the
real essential characteristics upon which all the other real
characteristics depend.
THe "essence of a concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its
units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend..."
[ITOE2, 52]
The clarification of this issue in this manner makes it likely that
the turn back to Aristotle, and the turn away from Rand, can
reasonably be made.
><< Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that fundamental
>characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other
>characteristics depend, and which distinguishes these units from all
>other existents within the field of man's knowledge. >>
..
>> So rejecting Moderate Realism (in the traditional sense of it) does
>> not solve the problem of Universals. �It does not get us anywhere
>> closer to solving the Problem.
..
>Objectivism solves the so-called problem of the so-called universal by
>not using the universal.
If terms ending in -ness, -ity (reality), or -hood can be eliminated
from the English language, then you can say that Objectivism has
solved the Problem by not using them.
>> > but the total of
>> >the facts of reality he has observed, and this total determines which
>> >characteristics of a given group of existents he designates as
>> >essential.
>>
>> In other words, something essential to forming the concept "man" is
>> being observed IN REALITY, Charles.
..
>Yes. That has nothing whatsoever to do with a universal.
Where is the man-ness in men? Their essential characteristics,
rationality and animality. Those are two Universals, they exist in
reality insofar as man exists in reality.
>> >An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that
>> >it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does
>> >distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is
>> >epistemological in the sense that the classification of "essential
>> >characteristic" is a device of man's method of cognition--a means of
>> >classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of
>> >knowledge. >> Rand, ITOE 5. Definitions
>>
>> Read your own quote, Charles. It says that metaphysical essences exist
>> in reality and not only in concept.
>
>No. it says an essential characteristic is epistemological (not
>metaphysical). Rands does not refer to "metaphysical essences" except
>in rejecting moderate realism.
>
>Which part of this did you not understand:
>
><< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
>it as epistemological. >> ?
Rand contradicted herself, obviously. Are essential characteristics
non-essential to the existence of an entity such as a man? Are they
not essential to his being a rational animal, not in concept but most
importantly in reality?
The problem here is, Charles, that you have no idea what an "essence"
is. Rand merely mentioned a couple of metaphysical theories of essence
which she disagreed with, but that does not mean essences are not
metaphysical.
And so the problem remains. Rand rejected Plato and Aristotle (as far
as she understood him) on this issue, but relied on a theory of real
essential characteristics upon which real entities relied upon for
their real existence.
Charles Bell
> On 22 Dec, 21:02, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > Objectivism solves the so-called problem of the so-called universal by
> > not using the universal.
>
> O-ism does not solve the problem of the universal
> because it neither denies nor explains
> real resemblances.
>
O'ism does explain resemblances, as needed, or not, as not needed.
In classifying red tomatoes and red apples both as "fruit". "redness"
is *not* an essential characteristic (not relevant). In classifying
red delicious apples and golden delicious apples both as "delicious
apple", "redness" is an essential characteristic, but *not* an
essential characteristic for classifying both as "apple". Unlike a
universal, "redness" may or may not be essential in the entiity
itself. That is what is meant by O'ist essence being epistemological
and not metaphysical.
> > << Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
> > it as epistemological. >> ?
>
> It may try to. But if it cannot explain similar sense data
> in terms of similar sensed things, it is not remotely objective.
O'ism explains similar sense-datum in terms of similar sensed things
(or let's science freely do so) as needed, or not, as not needed.
Light of wavelength 700 nm will have a different effect on the retina
than light of wavelength 450 nm but light also of 700 nm wavelength
but from a different source (of the same intensity) will have the
same effect on the retina. How is this explanation of phenomenona
occurring similarly or differently -- that does not refer to any
universal -- "not remotely objective"?
Charles Bell
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 13:02:31 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >On Dec 22, 11:09 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:53:23 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >> That depends on which interpretation you want to accept, Rand's or Ken
> >> Gardner's.
>
> >Gardner remains too close to Aristotle for Rand, and Rand remains too
> >close to Aristotle for me.
>
> I don't recall whether or not Gardner prefers the interpretation he
> has over Rand's. It is only necessary to state that there is enough of
> a debate over the interpretations to throw this Moderate Realism into
> question as to whether Aristotle actually believed it or if his view
> was something closer to the Objectivist view held by Rand. All we can
> really say is that Rand rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's
> position.
>
This issue of how much Rand stuck to Aristotle is not germane to this
topic except as I have already repeatedly stated that any
interpretation that Objectivism included Essences that are
metaphysical (as in moderate realism) is wrong.
> >> Then, to further confuse the issue, there is your
> >> interpretation of ITOE which directly contradicts Rand's statement
> >> that Universals are abstractions or concepts, in other words,
> >> Universals don't exist.
>
> >Rand does not say "Universals are abstractions." �Rands retains the
> >word for "essence" only for epistemological concepts.
>
> Then I'll quote her again. The "solution to the 'problem of
> universals'... is:
This is a misquotation of . . .
<< As I wrote in For the New Intellectual: "To negate man's mind, it
is the conceptual level of his consciousness that has to be
invalidated. Under all the tortuous complexities, contradictions,
equivocations, rationalizations of the post-Renaissance philosophy--the
one consistent line, the fundamental that explains the rest, is: a
concerted attack on man's conceptual faculty. Most philosophers did
not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge, but its defenders did
more to destroy it than did its enemies. They were unable to offer a
solution to the 'problem of universals,' that is: to define the nature
and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts
to perceptual data--and to prove the validity of scientific
induction .... The philosophers were unable to refute the Witch
Doctor's claim that their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and
that their scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity
than his revelations. >>
> >> Read your own quote, Charles. It says that metaphysical essences exist
> >> in reality and not only in concept.
>
<< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
it as epistemological. Objectivism holds that the essence of a
concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which
the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which
distinguishes these units from all other existents within the field of
man's knowledge. Thus, the essence of a concept is determined
contextually and may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge. >>
> >. it says an essential characteristic is epistemological (not
> >metaphysical). Rands does not refer to "metaphysical essences" except
> >in rejecting moderate realism.
>
> >Which part of this did you not understand:
>
> ><< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
> >it as epistemological. >> ?
>
> Rand contradicted herself, obviously.
No, she obviously did not. She rejects that . . .
<< Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences,
which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and
he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of
direct intuition by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms
concepts accordingly. >>
> Are essential characteristics
> non-essential to the existence of an entity such as a man?
Something may or may not be "an essential characteristic" of what is
to be understood depending on the context . That one man may have a
mole on his forehead does not make a mole an essential characteristic
in "manness" for all men, but the mole *is* an essential
characteristic in a man who is suspect in a murder a witness to which
described the perpetrator as a man with a mole on his forehead. In
neither case, is it necessary to posit a universal Essence, moleness.
Charles Bell
> > >Which part of this did you not understand:
>
> > ><< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
> > >it as epistemological. >> ?
>
> > Rand contradicted herself, obviously.
>
> No, she obviously did not. �She rejects that . . .
>
I should not have injected "that" . I meant to say that Rand rejects
that below which she attributes to Aristotle.
> << Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences,
> which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and
> he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of
> direct intuition by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms
> concepts accordingly. >>
>
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 22, 5:18�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 13:02:31 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >On Dec 22, 11:09 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:53:23 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> >> That depends on which interpretation you want to accept, Rand's or Ken
>> >> Gardner's.
..
>> >Gardner remains too close to Aristotle for Rand, and Rand remains too
>> >close to Aristotle for me.
..
>> I don't recall whether or not Gardner prefers the interpretation he
>> has over Rand's. It is only necessary to state that there is enough of
>> a debate over the interpretations to throw this Moderate Realism into
>> question as to whether Aristotle actually believed it or if his view
>> was something closer to the Objectivist view held by Rand. All we can
>> really say is that Rand rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's
>> position.
..
>This issue of how much Rand stuck to Aristotle is not germane to this
>topic except as I have already repeatedly stated that any
>interpretation that Objectivism included Essences that are
>metaphysical (as in moderate realism) is wrong.
If that's what you think, then I don't know why you added the fact
that Rand remains too close to Aristotle for you ("and Rand remains
too close to Aristotle for me"). If Rand rejected his alleged theory
of essences, I don't see how she was close to Aristotle at all.
>> >> Then, to further confuse the issue, there is your
>> >> interpretation of ITOE which directly contradicts Rand's statement
>> >> that Universals are abstractions or concepts, in other words,
>> >> Universals don't exist.
..
>> >Rand does not say "Universals are abstractions." �Rands retains the
>> >word for "essence" only for epistemological concepts.
..
>> Then I'll quote her again. The "solution to the 'problem of
>> universals'... is:
..
>This is a misquotation of . . .
It is not a misquote, it is a direct quote placed in a form that is
grammatically correct. Here it is again (and again, and again)...
"They were unable to offer a solution to the 'problem of universals,'
that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine
the relationship of concepts to perceptual data--and to prove the
validity of scientific induction."
Are you lying, or are you truly unable to understand Rand's words
here, simple as they are?
><< As I wrote in For the New Intellectual: "To negate man's mind, it
>is the conceptual level of his consciousness that has to be
>invalidated. Under all the tortuous complexities, contradictions,
>equivocations, rationalizations of the post-Renaissance philosophy--the
>one consistent line, the fundamental that explains the rest, is: a
>concerted attack on man's conceptual faculty. Most philosophers did
>not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge, but its defenders did
>more to destroy it than did its enemies. They were unable to offer a
>solution to the 'problem of universals,' that is: to define the nature
>and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts
>to perceptual data--and to prove the validity of scientific
>induction .... The philosophers were unable to refute the Witch
>Doctor's claim that their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and
>that their scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity
>than his revelations. >>
That quote adds no new information to mine.
>> >> Read your own quote, Charles. It says that metaphysical essences exist
>> >> in reality and not only in concept.
..
><< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
>it as epistemological. Objectivism holds that the essence of a
>concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which
>the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which
>distinguishes these units from all other existents within the field of
>man's knowledge. Thus, the essence of a concept is determined
>contextually and may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge. >>
..
>> >. it says an essential characteristic is epistemological (not
>> >metaphysical). Rands does not refer to "metaphysical essences" except
>> >in rejecting moderate realism.
..
>> >Which part of this did you not understand:
..
>> ><< Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards
>> >it as epistemological. >> ?
..
>> Rand contradicted herself, obviously.
..
>No, she obviously did not. She rejects that . . .
She rejected her own statement at the beginning of that paragraph.
First she said essences are not metaphysical, then she changed the
wording to read "essential characteristics" upon which a real entity's
real existence depends qua real entity.
That is Rand talking around the Problem by playing word games.
><< Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences,
>which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and
>he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of
>direct intuition by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms
>concepts accordingly. >>
..
>> Are essential characteristics
>> non-essential to the existence of an entity such as a man?
..
>Something may or may not be "an essential characteristic" of what is
>to be understood depending on the context . That one man may have a
>mole on his forehead does not make a mole an essential characteristic
>in "manness" for all men, but the mole *is* an essential
>characteristic in a man who is suspect in a murder a witness to which
>described the perpetrator as a man with a mole on his forehead. In
>neither case, is it necessary to posit a universal Essence, moleness.
I am not positing anything, Rand referred to essential characteristics
in reality. Either essences exist or they don't, but please let's not
play games with words.
1Z
> Something may or may not be "an essential characteristic" of what is
> to be understood depending on the context . �That one man may have a
> mole on his forehead does not make a mole an essential characteristic
> in "manness" for all men, but the mole *is* an essential
> characteristic in a man who is suspect in a murder a witness to which
> described the perpetrator as a man with a mole on his forehead.
So "essential" just vaguely means "important" and isn't suitable
ot do any metahphsycial heavy lifting.
> �In
> neither case, is it necessary to posit a universal Essence, moleness.
...so long as an alternative explanation of resembleance is
available.
Is it?
Charles Bell
So you think it is appropriate for science to make up something -- by
fraud, if necessary -- if it does not have explanation at hand? Oh,
as a matter of fact. you do. Fudge-factor science is socialist tool,
not an Objectivist one.
1Z
> On Dec 23, 3:59 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On 22 Dec, 23:58, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > In
> > > neither case, is it necessary to posit a universal Essence, moleness.
>
> > ...so long as an alternative explanation of resembleance is
> > available.
> > Is it?
>
> So you think it is appropriate for science to make up something
Science works by positing hypotheses and testiing them
>-- by
> fraud, if necessary -- if it does not have explanation at hand? Oh,
> as a matter of fact. you do. Fudge-factor science is socialist tool,
> not an Objectivist one.
Off-topic rhetorical guff.
Charles Bell
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 15:58:35 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >> Then I'll quote her again. The "solution to the 'problem of
> >> universals'... is:
> ..
> >This is a misquotation of . . .
> Are you lying, or are you truly unable to understand Rand's words
> here, simple as they are?
>
No, I allege that you the one who is lying. Rand mentioned ONCE in
the entire body of her works this problem of the universals and only
in the context of what modern philosophers did to deny man his ability
to know anything for certain. Rand NEVER claimed at any time to be
solving this problem of the universals and explicitly denied the
existence of any alleged characteristic of any universal by denying
any metaphysical nature to any essential characteristic of an entity.
The problem of the universals goes away once the problem is removed
from the metaphysical to the epistemological. << Aristotle regarded
Charles Bell
> On 23 Dec, 10:48, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 23, 3:59 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 22 Dec, 23:58, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > So you think it is appropriate for science to make up something
>
> Science works by positing hypotheses and testiing them
>
Not by making up things that perpetually causes a problem -- that is,
are untestable.
> >-- �by
> > fraud, if necessary -- if it does not have explanation at hand? �Oh,
> > as a matter of fact. you do. Fudge-factor science is socialist tool,
> > not an Objectivist one.
>
> Off-topic rhetorical guff.
No, it explains how you believe a goal itself is adequate
justification for making stuff up.
1Z
> The problem of the universals goes away once the problem is removed
> from the metaphysical to the epistemological.
Since it is and always was a metaphsyical problem, such a "removal" is
merely
an exercise in misunderstanding the question.
Charles Bell
> On 23 Dec, 11:09, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > The problem of the universals goes away once the problem is removed
> > from the metaphysical to the epistemological.
>
> Since it is and always was a metaphsyical problem,
A metaphysical pseudo-problem,
> such a "removal" is merely
> an exercise in misunderstanding the question.
An exercise in discerning what questions are designed to do:
<< Under all the tortuous complexities, contradictions, qquivocations,
1Z
> On Dec 23, 6:19 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Since it is and always was a metaphsyical problem,
> A metaphysical pseudo-problem,
Saying it doesn't make it so
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 23, 6:19 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> On 23 Dec, 11:09, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>>
>> > The problem of the universals goes away once the problem is removed
>> > from the metaphysical to the epistemological.
>>
>> Since it is and always was a metaphsyical problem,
..
>A metaphysical pseudo-problem,
..
>> such a "removal" is merely
>> an exercise in misunderstanding the question.
..
>An exercise in discerning what questions are designed to do:
It is not a pseudo-problem if you grant that man, meaning an actual
man in particular, has, in essence, rationality and animality (two
Universals). And that these indeed describe their metaphysical nature
according to Rand's own metaphysical definition of "man" as "a
rational animal."
If the essence of man is not rationality and animality, if only the
essence of the concept "man" is rationality and animality, then those
two Univerals refer to nobody in particular.
Malrassic Park
Totally absurd. How can a quote, not pulled out of context, constitute
a lie on my part? She said that philosophers were unable to solve the
problem of Universals, WHICH IS, "to define the nature and source of
abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual
data--and to prove the validity of scientific induction." Rand claims
to have solved the first two of those three. However, none of those
three has any direct relationship to the problem of Universals.
Malrassic Park
>So "essential" just vaguely means "important" and isn't suitable
>ot do any metahphsycial heavy lifting.
Yes, except Rand stated that the metaphysical definition of "man" was
"rational animal."
Charles Bell
> Totally absurd. How can a quote, not pulled out of context, constitute
> a lie on my part?
Well, twice now you have misquoted Rand by deletion/insertion.
> She said that philosophers were unable to solve the
> problem of Universals, WHICH IS, "to define the nature and source of
> abstractions,
No, she said that "philosophers were unable to solve the problem of
the universals, that is: to define the nature and source of
abstractions . . ."
Subtle but important difference.
"Paul Simon was unable to solve the problem of Garfunkel, that is: to
create really good music . . ."
is different from
"Paul Simon was unable to solve the problem of Garfunkel which is to
create really good music."
The dependent clause "which is" ambiguously refers to "the problem of
Garfunkel" , but the transitional phrase "that is" does not refer to
the "problem of Garfunkel" but rather refers to whole of the previous
sentence. Paul Simon, being unable to solve the problem of Garfunkel,
could not create really good music.
Bearing in mind how Rand began her Forward to ITOE, it can be said is
that Rand equated "universal" with "abstraction" or even "concept" but
certainly not the metaphysical "universal" as in "the problem of the
universals." << Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical;
Objectivism regards it as epistemological.>>
> to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual
> data--and to prove the validity of scientific induction." Rand claims
that << This "problem" is a straw man, in the sense that it is a
problem only to the traditional-realist theories of universals, which
claim that concepts are determined by and refer to archetypes or
metaphysical "essences." >> ITOE, 7. The Cognitive Role of Concepts
> to have solved the first two of those three. However, none of those
> three has any direct relationship to the problem of Universals.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Jim Klein
just being a broken record?
On Dec 23, 1:52 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> It is not a pseudo-problem if you grant that man, meaning an actual
> man in particular, has, in essence, rationality and animality (two
> Universals).
He also has every other attribute, characteristic, quality
or property that he has. The "essence" refers to how
WE classify the objects. The objects are just as they are,
that's all. Is that really so tough to understand?
> And that these indeed describe their metaphysical nature
No. They describe PART of their metaphysical nature,
specifically the part that we use to classify the objects.
Is that really so tough to understand?
> according to Rand's own metaphysical definition of "man" as "a
> rational animal."
I don't know what a "metaphysical definition" is, in
this usage. For that matter, I've no idea what you
mean by "metaphysical" and I strongly suspect that
you don't either. For most Objectivists, the word
comes out roughly synonymous with "existential."
> If the essence of man is not rationality and animality, if only the
> essence of the concept "man" is rationality and animality, then those
> two Univerals refer to nobody in particular.
Sometimes it's hard for me to believe you're for real.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Are you actually interested in learning anything, or
>just being a broken record?
>
>
>On Dec 23, 1:52 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> It is not a pseudo-problem if you grant that man, meaning an actual
>> man in particular, has, in essence, rationality and animality (two
>> Universals).
>
>He also has every other attribute, characteristic, quality
>or property that he has. The "essence" refers to how
>WE classify the objects. The objects are just as they are,
>that's all. Is that really so tough to understand?
Try reading something for a change: "When a given group of existents
has more than one characteristic distinguishing it from other
existents, man must observe the relationships among these various
characteristics and discover the one on which all the others (or the
greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the fundamental
characteristic without which the others would not be possible. This
fundamental characteristic is the essential distinguishing
characteristic of the existents involved, and the proper defining
characteristic of the concept.
Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive
characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible;
epistemologically, it is the one that explains the greatest number of
others." [ITOE2, 45]
Therefore, the metaphysical approach to the problem does exist for
Rand, along with the epistemology.
The bizarre thing about all your answers is that they clearly point to
a true Conceptualist approach in that it completely detracts from
essential characteristics in reality and focuses only on conceptual
methodology of defining essentials.
>> And that these indeed describe their metaphysical nature
>
>No. They describe PART of their metaphysical nature,
>specifically the part that we use to classify the objects.
>
>Is that really so tough to understand?
You sound like a robot repeating the same lines endlessly. Obviously
essential characteristics are that part we focus on, but also, they
are the part upon which the REAL entity depends on for its REAL, not
just conceptual, existence.
"man must observe the relationships among these various [REAL]
characteristics and discover the one on which all the others (or the
greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the [REAL] fundamental
characteristic without which the others would not be possible."
>> according to Rand's own metaphysical definition of "man" as "a
>> rational animal."
>
>I don't know what a "metaphysical definition" is, in
>this usage. For that matter, I've no idea what you
>mean by "metaphysical" and I strongly suspect that
>you don't either. For most Objectivists, the word
>comes out roughly synonymous with "existential."
Yes, or as I have been saying, REAL or REALITY, which is something
you've been detracting from an awful lot lately in your responses.
Malrassic Park
You've got to understand that for Aristotle a square block of granite
ACTUALLY CONTAINS, in essence, a bust of Socrates waiting to emerge at
the hands and chisel of an artist, and that an acorn seed contains the
ACTUAL essence of tree-ness that it is to become under the right
conditions. There is no difference for Aristotle, in this example,
between the granite and the acorn seed. He did not fundamentally
distinguish between Final Causes (or ends) as man-made vs.
metaphysically given.
That is what Rand means by metaphysical essences in the Aristotlean
sense, there is no other possible explanation.
However, and perhaps in a less subjectivist light, a man actually
contains, for Aristotle, the characteristics of rationality and
animality in essence. Only, for Rand, they are not Causes in the
Formal or Final sense intended by Aristotle.
>> to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual
>> data--and to prove the validity of scientific induction." Rand claims
>
>that << This "problem" is a straw man, in the sense that it is a
>problem only to the traditional-realist theories of universals, which
>claim that concepts are determined by and refer to archetypes or
>metaphysical "essences." >> ITOE, 7. The Cognitive Role of Concepts
For Rand, there are no such Causes in the Aristotlean sense (only
efficient causes remain from the traditional four of Aristotle), but
there are still essential characteristics which are metaphysical in an
existential sense, "man must observe the relationships among these
various characteristics and discover the one on which all the others
(or the greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the fundamental
[REAL] characteristic without which the others would not be possible."
Jim Klein
> You sound like a robot repeating the same lines endlessly. Obviously
> essential characteristics are that part we focus on, but also, they
> are the part upon which the REAL entity depends on for its REAL, not
> just conceptual, existence.
What the hell does "depends" do here? A REAL entity
has REAL characteristics and that's all there is to it.
Further, it has ALL of its characteristics...the ones we
call "essential," the ones we call "not essential" and
the ones we don't know anything about.
A thing is what it is. Get it?
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 24, 10:39 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> You sound like a robot repeating the same lines endlessly. Obviously
>> essential characteristics are that part we focus on, but also, they
>> are the part upon which the REAL entity depends on for its REAL, not
>> just conceptual, existence.
..
>What the hell does "depends" do here? A REAL entity
>has REAL characteristics and that's all there is to it.
..
>Further, it has ALL of its characteristics...the ones we
>call "essential," the ones we call "not essential" and
>the ones we don't know anything about.
..
>A thing is what it is. Get it?
A man REALLY IS a rational animal. GET IT? Not just in concept, not
just in definition, but IN REALITY.
And to think you were the one who recently chided me regarding getting
real!
Charles Bell
misquotation to a side exposition about something or other about Aristotle.
This is what I meant that in my opinion Rand allowed herself to be thought
to be too close to the Aristotelian school rather than as a progenitor of a
distinctly different philosophy. In final desperation her ostensible
cognoscenti will criticize her for straying too far from Aristotle.
"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:2r27j59podaa06k22...@4ax.com...
> For Rand, there are no such Causes in the Aristotlean sense (only
> efficient causes remain from the traditional four of Aristotle), but
> there are still essential characteristics which are metaphysical in an
> existential sense,
No, they aren't. The essential characteristics are epistemic and only
epistemic in nature.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>Interesting how you went straight from misrepresenting Rand's ideas by
>misquotation to a side exposition about something or other about Aristotle.
>This is what I meant that in my opinion Rand allowed herself to be thought
>to be too close to the Aristotelian school rather than as a progenitor of a
>distinctly different philosophy. In final desperation her ostensible
>cognoscenti will criticize her for straying too far from Aristotle.
As Tom wrote, Rand has not answered the question of the metaphysical
problem of Universals.
Rand has only distanced herself from those who attempted to answer it.
She would not agree with Aristotle's essences because they are Formal
Causes - a theory that nobody in today's scientific world believes in
anyway.
Better to say that the essence of a thing is the material it is made
out of, although we have today rejected his notion of Material Cause.
Anyway, this should give you some idea of the issue with Aristotlean
essences. The idea of metaphysical essences has no scientific meaning,
it is entirely lacking in experimental value. And philosophically, it
is a dead-end.
However, that being said, Rand has substituted the idea of essentials,
the absence of which a being could not exist. Man could not exist
without a corporeal body (animal) and an incorporeal mind (reason).
That these are also the essence of man should not be a subject of
debate. And in fact, Rand considered the metaphysical definition of
man to be "rational animal."
>"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:2r27j59podaa06k22...@4ax.com...
>
>> For Rand, there are no such Causes in the Aristotlean sense (only
>> efficient causes remain from the traditional four of Aristotle), but
>> there are still essential characteristics which are metaphysical in an
>> existential sense,
>
>No, they aren't. The essential characteristics are epistemic and only
>epistemic in nature.
I want to discuss Rand's view, not yours.
Charles Bell
> As Tom wrote, Rand has not answered the question of the metaphysical
> problem of Universals.
>
Who is Tom? And why should I care what he said? And Rand addressed the
strawman problem by considering it a strawman problem.
> Rand has only distanced herself from those who attempted to answer it.
>
> She would not agree with Aristotle's essences because they are Formal
> Causes - a theory that nobody in today's scientific world believes in
> anyway.
>
It's a dead issue raised by those who wish to revive the strawman problem.
> Better to say that the essence of a thing is the material it is made
> out of, although we have today rejected his notion of Material Cause.
>
> Anyway, this should give you some idea of the issue with Aristotlean
> essences. The idea of metaphysical essences has no scientific meaning,
> it is entirely lacking in experimental value. And philosophically, it
> is a dead-end.
>
> However, that being said, Rand has substituted the idea of essentials,
> the absence of which a being could not exist. Man could not exist
> without a corporeal body (animal) and an incorporeal mind (reason).
> That these are also the essence of man should not be a subject of
> debate. And in fact, Rand considered the metaphysical definition of
> man to be "rational animal."
No, Rand did not consider "the metaphysical definition of man to be a
'rational animal'" "Man is a rational animal" is a epistemological
statement, not a metaphysical one.
>>> For Rand, there are no such Causes in the Aristotlean sense (only
>>> efficient causes remain from the traditional four of Aristotle), but
>>> there are still essential characteristics which are metaphysical in an
>>> existential sense,
>>
>>No, they aren't. The essential characteristics are epistemic and only
>>epistemic in nature.
>
> I want to discuss Rand's view
No, you don't.
> , not yours.
No, you don't.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:uk6gj5hd42l5rsrec...@4ax.com...
>
>> As Tom wrote, Rand has not answered the question of the metaphysical
>> problem of Universals.
>>
>
>Who is Tom? And why should I care what he said?
Because he got that part of his post right.
>And Rand addressed the
>strawman problem by considering it a strawman problem.
Rand only referred to the Realist version of the problem as a straw
man. [ITOE2, 74]
>> Rand has only distanced herself from those who attempted to answer it.
>>
>> She would not agree with Aristotle's essences because they are Formal
>> Causes - a theory that nobody in today's scientific world believes in
>> anyway.
>>
>
>It's a dead issue raised by those who wish to revive the strawman problem.
If this is a dead theory, then why did Rand mention it in ITOE? Stop
and think about this for just one second: If I mention a dead theory,
then it must be a straw man (which is apparently the only fallacy you
are familiar with, but only because you read it in ITOE); but if Rand
mentions a dead theory, then it is an act of great genius, correct?
It is necessary to analyze aspects of Aristotle's theory in this case
since the topic is Aristotle's essences, and you obviously do not know
what Aristotle meant by essences. Aristotle's views are a historical
fact and wishing won't make them go away. Rand's vague reference to
Aristotle's essences ("It is Aristotle who identified the fact that
only concretes exist. But Aristotle held that definitions refer to
metaphysical essences, which exist in concretes as a special element
or formative power, and he held that the process of concept-formation
depends on a kind of direct intuition by which man's mind grasps these
essences and forms concepts accordingly," ITOE2, 52) is practically
meaningless without further elucidation.
Notice that Rand referred to a "formative power." That is as close as
she comes to getting to the issue of Aristotlean Formal Causes which I
mentioned previously.
And, as I stated before, this is precisely where the issue of essences
comes into play for Rand, through the theory of Formal Causation - the
acorn contains the oak, the block of granite contains the bust of
Socrates, as I said before.
>> Better to say that the essence of a thing is the material it is made
>> out of, although we have today rejected his notion of Material Cause.
>>
>> Anyway, this should give you some idea of the issue with Aristotlean
>> essences. The idea of metaphysical essences has no scientific meaning,
>> it is entirely lacking in experimental value. And philosophically, it
>> is a dead-end.
>>
>> However, that being said, Rand has substituted the idea of essentials,
>> the absence of which a being could not exist. Man could not exist
>> without a corporeal body (animal) and an incorporeal mind (reason).
>> That these are also the essence of man should not be a subject of
>> debate. And in fact, Rand considered the metaphysical definition of
>> man to be "rational animal."
>
>No, Rand did not consider "the metaphysical definition of man to be a
>'rational animal'" "Man is a rational animal" is a epistemological
>statement, not a metaphysical one.
That was an overwhelming display of subjectivism - the idea that a
definition in your mind determines the metaphysicall given.
Are rationality and animality the nature of man, or not? Is not the
natural also the metaphysically given? "The metaphysically given
cannot be true or false, it simply is..." [The Metaphysical Versus The
Man-Made.] The fact that man is a rational animal cannot be true or
false, it simply is. The fact that man is an animal with opposable
thumbs cannot be true or false, it simply is. A man without opposable
thumbs, but having animality and rationality, is therefore still a
man.
>>>> For Rand, there are no such Causes in the Aristotlean sense (only
>>>> efficient causes remain from the traditional four of Aristotle), but
>>>> there are still essential characteristics which are metaphysical in an
>>>> existential sense,
>>>
>>>No, they aren't. The essential characteristics are epistemic and only
>>>epistemic in nature.
>>
>> I want to discuss Rand's view
>
>No, you don't.
>
>> , not yours.
>
>No, you don't.
Rand wanted to create a New Intellectual but she got a New Moron
instead.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>Gardner remains too close to Aristotle for Rand, and Rand remains too
>>close to Aristotle for me.
> I don't recall whether or not Gardner prefers the interpretation he
> has over Rand's. It is only necessary to state that there is enough of
> a debate over the interpretations to throw this Moderate Realism into
> question as to whether Aristotle actually believed it or if his view
> was something closer to the Objectivist view held by Rand. All we can
> really say is that Rand rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's
> position.
In response to your first sentence, yes I do. The one that I have (Ross) is
the one that I regard as essentially identical to Rand's (albeit with
different terminology and perhaps with less emphasis on the psychological
elements of the theory). Rand was disagreeing with the McKeon
interpretation of Aristotle, and I do as well.
For what it's worth, Mortimer Adler wrote a book called "Some Questions of
Language," which essentially explained the (Ross version of) Aristotle's
views on the nature of concepts. It reads a whole lot like ITOE.
[....]
> She conflated "essence" (epistemology) with "essential
> characteristics":"An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense
> that it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does
> distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is
> epistemological in the sense that the classification of "essential
> characteristic..." [ITOE2, 52]
>
> An essence is epistemological - and an essential characteristic is
> also epistemological (as well as factual). "Essential characteristic"
> and "essence" are essentially identical terms, for Rand.
>
> Therefore, it could easily, from Rand's own statements, be concluded
> that essences are indeed metaphysical for Rand, they constitute the
> real essential characteristics upon which all the other real
> characteristics depend.
No, the only reasonable conclusion is that she regarded essences as
epistemological. The characteristics designated as "essential" are
metaphysical (they exist in the object, as Aristotle correctly held), but
the process that leads to regarding them as essential in a given cognitive
context is entirely epistemological.
The debate here is whether Aristotle would agree with this latter point.
This, in turn, may come down to which translation is more accurate: McKeon's
or Ross's.
[...]
>>Objectivism solves the so-called problem of the so-called universal by
>>not using the universal.
Her solution was her argument that universals do not exist, that only
particular concretes exist and that concepts are our way of organizing and
classifying them in accordance with their perceived differences and
similarities with other concretes. For example, there is no such thing as
Blueness as a Universal, only concrete objects that reflect light in such a
way that we perceive them as various shades of blue that fall within the
blue range of colors. The process is objective rather than intrinsic
because it involves a specifically chosen process with specific steps
(including, in this example, the physiological process by which we perceive
various shades of the color blue). It isn't just revealed or divined or
intuited. And the process is objective rather than subjective because we
regard existents as units on the basis of similarities that exist in the
existents being conceptualized (the object) rather than shit we just make up
in your minds (the subject). We see some objects as blue because those
objects really do reflect light in such a way that we perceive them to be
blue -- regardless of whether or not we were around to perceive them.
> Where is the man-ness in men? Their essential characteristics,
> rationality and animality. Those are two Universals, they exist in
> reality insofar as man exists in reality.
Not Universals, but particular characteristics possessed by every man that
exists, has existed, or will ever exist, albeit in different measurement or
degree. Just as there is no universal Fingerprint that somehow exists apart
from the individual fingerprints of each human being. Or any universal
Blueness that exists apart from the individual shades of blue that we see in
particular concretes.
[....]
> The problem here is, Charles, that you have no idea what an "essence"
> is. Rand merely mentioned a couple of metaphysical theories of essence
> which she disagreed with, but that does not mean essences are not
> metaphysical.
The characteristics that we designate as "essential" are metaphysical, but
the designation itself -- both the process and the end result -- is
epistemological. If man ceased to exist, there would be no such thing as an
"essential."
[....]
Charles Bell
> On Sun, 27 Dec 2009 19:25:13 -0800, Charles Bell
>>Who is Tom? And why should I care what he said?
>
>
> Rand wanted to create a New Intellectual but she got a New Moron
> instead.
I think it's clear by now, after all these years on this forum, that
Malrassic Park is simply incapable of avoiding that logical fallacy known as
the ad hominem, and furthermore, his incapability is precisely due to the
fact that Immanuel Kant, his god, relied on it constantly (particularly in
the form of psychologizing) to impress his personality cult-following. (c)
Malrassic Park
Charles Bell
"Ken Gardner" <kesgar...@att.net> wrote in message
news:hh9mun$9b1$1...@vulture.killfile.org...
>
> The characteristics that we designate as "essential" are metaphysical,
No, not exactly.
> but the designation itself -- both the process and the end result -- is
> epistemological. If man ceased to exist, there would be no such thing as
> an "essential."
Therefore "essential" is not metaphysical but epistemological "Essential
characteristic" refers to real existents, which are metaphysical, but
"essential" remains a epistemic term.
Rand wrote this:
<< Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive
characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible;
epistemologically, it is the one that explains the greatest number of
others.>>
.. . . and . . .
<< An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that it does exist,
does determine other characteristics and does distinguish a group of
existents from all others; it is epistemological in the sense that the
classification of "essential characteristic" is a device of man's method of
cognition-a means of classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing
body of knowledge.>>
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Not Universals, but particular characteristics possessed by every man that
>exists, has existed, or will ever exist, albeit in different measurement or
>degree. Just as there is no universal Fingerprint that somehow exists apart
>from the individual fingerprints of each human being. Or any universal
>Blueness that exists apart from the individual shades of blue that we see in
>particular concretes.
If blueness is not a particular characteristic, then blueness and
"universal fingerprint" are words you use having no referents in
reality. And yet you use them to refer to something. Why is that?
Tim
>
> Rand wanted to create a New Intellectual but she got a New Moron
>
> - Show quoted text -
Yes indeed. And look at them! Charlie Brown, Fred Weiss, Michael
Gordge,...Peikoff!!!
Tim
> "Malrassic Park" <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
I think the only personality cult-following going on here is that of
you and your randroid ilk clinging to rand's wannabe philosophy. Never
before have I heard so many people quack "think for yourself" while at
the same time clinging to rand's words like some religious dogma. What
is clear, after all this time, is the fact that randroids really don't
have the foggiest clue as to what they are talking about. Over the
years there has been much randroid babble re. Kant, but absolutely
zero content. The above discussion of rand's itoe clearly shows how
vacuous her thought was. M. Park clearly outlines the problems and
you, Charlie Brown the loser, whine ad hom., ad hom., everywhere an ad
hom. You sure are a pathetic loser Charlie Brown; maybe you should get
some dodging lessons from jimmy boy -- he was going to proffer a
critique of Kant, but apparently he forgot everything about Kant until
rand reminded him. I guess you and jimmy boy don't have to think for
yourselves, eh Charlie Brown.
Malrassic Park
>I think the only personality cult-following going on here is that of
>you and your randroid ilk clinging to rand's wannabe philosophy.
Charlie was just imitating something I wrote here a few days ago.
Apparently it was a job well done because he's been paraphrasing it
every chance he gets.
Charles Bell
Timmy is retarded.
Tim
"Charles Bell" <cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote in message
news:0df2d6bc-c034-45d1...@e27g2000yqd.googlegroups.com...
>
> Timmy is retarded.
Charley Brown misses the ball, again, yawn.
Ken Gardner
"Charles Bell" wrote:
>> The characteristics that we designate as "essential" are metaphysical,
> No, not exactly.
Yes exactly, as you later essentially (pun partially intended) repeated what
I said:
> Therefore "essential" is not metaphysical but epistemological "Essential
> characteristic" refers to real existents, which are metaphysical, but
> "essential" remains a epistemic term.
As I was saying above....Only you said "'essential characteristic' refers to
real existents, which are metaphysical,....", while I said "the
characteristics that we designate as essential are metaphysical." I used
fewer words than you did, so there. :)
And yes, while the characteristics themselves are metaphysical (that is,
they exist in the objects), the process of designating these characteristics
as "essential" is entirely epistemological.
[....]
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> If blueness is not a particular characteristic, then blueness and
> "universal fingerprint" are words you use having no referents in
> reality. And yet you use them to refer to something. Why is that?
Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a nonsense word. There is nothing in
reality that corresponds to "blueness" or any other universal. Ditto for
"universal fingerprint." There are no universals in reality, only
particular concretes. This is why the "problem of universals" is a trick
question, although people who fall for the trick continue to use words like
"blueness" as if they actually referred to something in reality.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
..
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
..
>> If blueness is not a particular characteristic, then blueness and
>> "universal fingerprint" are words you use having no referents in
>> reality. And yet you use them to refer to something. Why is that?
..
>Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a nonsense word. There is nothing in
>reality that corresponds to "blueness" or any other universal. Ditto for
>"universal fingerprint." There are no universals in reality, only
>particular concretes. This is why the "problem of universals" is a trick
>question, although people who fall for the trick continue to use words like
>"blueness" as if they actually referred to something in reality.
..
"Blueness" is not a nonsense word, and it has a definition: "the
quality of being blue."
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a nonsense word. There is nothing in
>reality that corresponds to "blueness" or any other universal. Ditto for
>"universal fingerprint.
But you have an idea or concept of what a fingerprint is, even though
this idea has no particular shape, no whorls, loops or arches. The
"universal fingerprint" is simply your idea of what a fingerprint is.
That idea is not any particular fingerprint, or that idea would
exclude all else from being a fingerprint, for example, if your idea
of a fingerprint consists only of a whorl of a particular shape, and
no loops or arches.
Here's the problem: no particular fingerprint in reality matches your
real albeit mental idea of what a fingerprint is, although you
definitely recognize one when you see one. Its perceptual form matches
some ideal form held in your mind, and this recognition occurs without
the necessity of employing any explicit definition of "fingerprint."
Rand did not investigate the issue of perceptual recognition, so
intent was she on the easier problems of concept-formation and
definition-formation. Therefore youi have no material to draw upon,
but only limp along intellectual with the material given to you in
ITOE. But even if that information is 100% correct, the information to
solve the problem at hand is not available through any ARI
publication.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a nonsense word. There is nothing in
>reality that corresponds to "blueness" or any other universal. Ditto for
>"universal fingerprint.
But you have an idea or concept of what a fingerprint is, even though
this idea has no particular shape, no whorls, loops or arches. The
"universal fingerprint" is simply your idea of what a fingerprint is.
That idea is not any particular fingerprint, or that idea would
exclude all else from being a fingerprint, for example, if your idea
of a fingerprint consists only of a whorl of a particular shape, and
no loops or arches.
Here's the problem: no particular fingerprint in reality matches your
real albeit mental idea of what a fingerprint is, although you
definitely recognize one when you see one. Its perceptual form matches
some ideal form held in your mind, and this recognition occurs without
the necessity of employing any explicit definition of "fingerprint."
Rand did not investigate the issue of perceptual recognition, so
intent was she on the easier problems of concept-formation and
definition-formation. Therefore youi have no material to draw upon,
but only limp along intellectually with the material given to you in
Jim Klein
> "Blueness" is not a nonsense word, and it has a definition: "the
> quality of being blue."
"Look, say. See?"
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 29, 5:30 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
I see that if there is a potential problem with looking up a word in a
dictionary, then you'll find it. But only if it's me.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a nonsense word. There is nothing in
>>reality that corresponds to "blueness" or any other universal. Ditto for
>>"universal fingerprint." There are no universals in reality, only
>>particular concretes. This is why the "problem of universals" is a trick
>>question, although people who fall for the trick continue to use words
>>like
>>"blueness" as if they actually referred to something in reality.
> "Blueness" is not a nonsense word, and it has a definition: "the
> quality of being blue."
But if you define "blueness" this way, it is no longer a universal. "The
quality of being blue" simply means that the object reflects light in such a
way that we perceive its color as falling within the blue range of possible
colors. "Blueness" is nothing more or less than the blue range. It doesn't
exist as a universal quality apart from the particular concretes that
possess it.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> But you have an idea or concept of what a fingerprint is, even though
> this idea has no particular shape, no whorls, loops or arches.
Every concrete fingerprint has a particular shape or pattern, but when we
form the concept "fingerprint" we simply omit (but not exclude) the
different shapes or pattern as omitted measurements. There is no separate
Universal Fingerprint that exists apart from the particular fingerprints on
particular human beings that have existed past, present, or future.
>The "universal fingerprint" is simply your idea of what a fingerprint is.
Again, there is no universal fingerprint. My "idea of what a fingerprint
is" is my mental integration of particular fingerprints into a unit, with
their particular differences in patterns omitted.
> That idea is not any particular fingerprint, or that idea would
> exclude all else from being a fingerprint, for example, if your idea
> of a fingerprint consists only of a whorl of a particular shape, and
> no loops or arches.
No, my concept of a fingerprint covers all fingerprints (past, present, and
future), precisely because I treat the differences in different particular
fingerprints as differences in measurement and then I omit the measurements.
Put another way, measurement-omission is not measurement-exclusion but
measurement INCLUSION under the "some but any" principle: a fingerprint must
have some pattern but may have any pattern.
> Here's the problem: no particular fingerprint in reality matches your
> real albeit mental idea of what a fingerprint is, although you
> definitely recognize one when you see one. Its perceptual form matches
> some ideal form held in your mind, and this recognition occurs without
> the necessity of employing any explicit definition of "fingerprint."
It is a huge problem with the realist theories of concepts, most notably
Aristotle (under the Rand/Peikoff translation, not necessarily under the one
I have) and John Locke. But that's very different. When you correct their
mistakes, as Rand did in ITOE, and include the measurements (albeit without
specifying their quantity under the "some but any" principle), your concept
does refer to the particular fingerprints that have existed, do exist, or
will exist in reality. Incidentally, this is pretty much how I understand
Aristotle as well under the Ross translation, and it is also how Mortimer
Adler explained Aristotle's theory in his book "Some Questions about
Language."
> Rand did not investigate the issue of perceptual recognition, so
> intent was she on the easier problems of concept-formation and
> definition-formation. Therefore youi have no material to draw upon,
> but only limp along intellectual with the material given to you in
> ITOE. But even if that information is 100% correct, the information to
> solve the problem at hand is not available through any ARI
> publication.
Rand solved it in ITOE itself, and Peikoff does a pretty good job as well in
Chapter 3 of OPAR and in his essay debunking the analytic-synthetic
dichotomy.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>> Here's the problem: no particular fingerprint in reality matches your
>> real albeit mental idea of what a fingerprint is, although you
>> definitely recognize one when you see one. Its perceptual form matches
>> some ideal form held in your mind, and this recognition occurs without
>> the necessity of employing any explicit definition of "fingerprint."
>
>It is a huge problem with the realist theories of concepts, most notably
>Aristotle (under the Rand/Peikoff translation, not necessarily under the one
>I have) and John Locke. But that's very different. When you correct their
>mistakes, as Rand did in ITOE, and include the measurements (albeit without
>specifying their quantity under the "some but any" principle), your concept
>does refer to the particular fingerprints that have existed, do exist, or
>will exist in reality.
We all know that this concept refers to particulars. We also know that
it refers to them universally, thus it is a Universal.
But my question remains. How do you know - recognize - a fingerprint
when you see one, without referring to any concept or definition? How
do you recognize a fingerprint before you have formed a concept of
one? How do you know that of which you are forming a concept in the
first place? How do you even know that your *implicit* concept of a
fingerprint refers to particular fingerprints?
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Rand solved it in ITOE itself, and Peikoff does a pretty good job as well in
>Chapter 3 of OPAR and in his essay debunking the analytic-synthetic
>dichotomy.
Oh, that...that, thing, "article," or what-have-you - Peikoff acting
as a kind of Objectivist thought-police busting those who promulgated
a variation of the analytic-synthetic distinction common to the
20th-century. Then he blamed Kant for starting it, when in fact all he
did was give it a name.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
It is too easily forgotten in the discussion on this forum that the
problem of Universals is a question concerning perception and not
unperceivables such as ranges on the light spectrum, electrons,
individual light-waves, or other scientific concepts and things beyond
the range of the senses.
Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a definable concept. But nio90ot
everybody can perceive the color blue, so while it is certainly the
case that "blue" can still refer to that particular part of the light
spectrum as a measurable *quantity* on that spectrum, "blueness" can
refer to nothing in those people's perception which would count as a
*quality.*
It is not the concept of the range of blue light on the visible
spectrum, as you claim. That would be "blue," not "blueness."
You should ask yourself: "Why does this particular color appear blue?
Because (to me) it has the quality of blueness." And, "Why does this
other particular color appear blue? Because (to me) it ALSO has the
quality of blueness."
So you see, you can refer the concept "blueness" to any particular
instance of blue, thus it is a Universal.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>It is a huge problem with the realist theories of concepts, most notably
>>Aristotle (under the Rand/Peikoff translation, not necessarily under the
>>one
>>I have) and John Locke. But that's very different. When you correct
>>their
>>mistakes, as Rand did in ITOE, and include the measurements (albeit
>>without
>>specifying their quantity under the "some but any" principle), your
>>concept
>>does refer to the particular fingerprints that have existed, do exist, or
>>will exist in reality.
> We all know that this concept refers to particulars. We also know that
> it refers to them universally, thus it is a Universal.
It refers to all fingerprints that have ever existed, presently exist, or
will exist -- and every one of them is a particular rather than a Universal.
There are no Universals -- only confused realists who have attempted to
ascribe or impute to reality the unit perspective and resulting mental
integrations that actually takes place in their own minds during the process
of conceptualizing.
> But my question remains. How do you know - recognize - a fingerprint
> when you see one, without referring to any concept or definition?
By looking at it. Is this a trick question? You differentiate the
fingerprints from everything else that you see, taste, hear, touch, and
smell. Later on, you learn to conceptualize it as a fingerprint using the
exact same mental process that you learned to conceptualize other first
level concepts such as dog or man back when you were still in diapers.
[....]
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
[....]
> Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a definable concept. But not
> everybody can perceive the color blue, so while it is certainly the
> case that "blue" can still refer to that particular part of the light
> spectrum as a measurable *quantity* on that spectrum, "blueness" can
> refer to nothing in those people's perception which would count as a
> *quality.*
Well, this is a nice refutation of na�ve realism, but I'm not defending
na�ve realism. I would add that if we were all blind or color-blind, we can
still form the concept blue, but it would be a much higher level scientific
concept representing a specific range of light within the total light
spectrum rather than the relatively low level concept it is for human beings
with normal vision. It would be like "x-ray" or "ultraviolet," which are
high level scientific concepts to us but would represent low level concepts
to beings who could actually perceive these colors the same way people of
normal vision perceive "blue."
> It is not the concept of the range of blue light on the visible
> spectrum, as you claim. That would be "blue," not "blueness."
No, "blue" or "blueness" (if you insist on using that term) refers to the
entire blue range of colors, not any one particular color within that range.
For example, both indigo blue objects and sky blue objects are blue objects
and these colors are subsumed under the concept "blue", even though on the
perceptual level the colors are different.
> You should ask yourself: "Why does this particular color appear blue?
> Because (to me) it has the quality of blueness." And, "Why does this
> other particular color appear blue? Because (to me) it ALSO has the
> quality of blueness."
But the question remains: to what precisely in reality are you referring to
when you use the phrase "the quality of blueness?" And the answer is: the
blue range. Not any one particular shade of blue. You are referring to the
effect that the object reflects light in such a way that you and other
people of normal vision perceive the color as falling within the blue range.
> So you see, you can refer the concept "blueness" to any particular
> instance of blue, thus it is a Universal.
No, it is a particular shade of color with particular measurements that fall
within the blue range. There is no separate Universal attribute "blueness"
in the object or anywhere else.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>
>>>It is a huge problem with the realist theories of concepts, most notably
>>>Aristotle (under the Rand/Peikoff translation, not necessarily under the
>>>one
>>>I have) and John Locke. But that's very different. When you correct
>>>their
>>>mistakes, as Rand did in ITOE, and include the measurements (albeit
>>>without
>>>specifying their quantity under the "some but any" principle), your
>>>concept
>>>does refer to the particular fingerprints that have existed, do exist, or
>>>will exist in reality.
>
>> We all know that this concept refers to particulars. We also know that
>> it refers to them universally, thus it is a Universal.
>
>It refers to all fingerprints that have ever existed, presently exist, or
>will exist -- and every one of them is a particular rather than a Universal.
>There are no Universals -- only confused realists who have attempted to
>ascribe or impute to reality the unit perspective and resulting mental
>integrations that actually takes place in their own minds during the process
>of conceptualizing.
You are criticizing a Realist answer (one of many, many) and then
saying that a particular is not a Universal.
Is that supposed to make a light bulb come on over my head?
Come on, Ken, you're running away into merely criticizing and
straw-dogging again.
In fact, Rand did not have the answer to every problem, nor do the
answers come from simply criticizing the efforts of others.
Think outside the Randroid box, Ken Gardner, and maybe you can come up
with some of your own answers.
>> But my question remains. How do you know - recognize - a fingerprint
>> when you see one, without referring to any concept or definition?
>
>By looking at it. Is this a trick question? You differentiate the
>fingerprints from everything else that you see, taste, hear, touch, and
>smell. Later on, you learn to conceptualize it as a fingerprint using the
>exact same mental process that you learned to conceptualize other first
>level concepts such as dog or man back when you were still in diapers.
That's not a good answer because it does not touch on the problem of
Universals. In Rand's ITOE, in order to conceptualize you have to
differentiate two or more similar entities. How do you know when you
have found two or more similar entities to differentiate? How does
your conscious mind recognize similarities before you have even
conceived of the word "similar"? By looking? But looking does not
bring similarities to consciousness, it only bring entities.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>
>[....]
>
>> Strictly speaking, "blueness" is a definable concept. But not
>> everybody can perceive the color blue, so while it is certainly the
>> case that "blue" can still refer to that particular part of the light
>> spectrum as a measurable *quantity* on that spectrum, "blueness" can
>> refer to nothing in those people's perception which would count as a
>> *quality.*
>
>Well, this is a nice refutation of na�ve realism,
And Objectivism.
>but I'm not defending
>na�ve realism. I would add that if we were all blind or color-blind, we can
>still form the concept blue, but it would be a much higher level scientific
>concept representing a specific range of light within the total light
>spectrum rather than the relatively low level concept it is for human beings
>with normal vision. It would be like "x-ray" or "ultraviolet," which are
>high level scientific concepts to us but would represent low level concepts
>to beings who could actually perceive these colors the same way people of
>normal vision perceive "blue."
"I would add that"? But you didn't add a thing, you only repeated the
point I just made. Read it again. The only difference is that you made
a point of avoiding the use of the word "blueness."
Nothing you or I said about the color spectrum has to do with the
blueness of light in that part of the spectrum that is actually
perceived. And nothing you said about the science of color detracts
from the distinct quality of blueness at the basis of its very
perception.
The reason for your reticence is that the topic of qualities per se is
entirely subjective. And that as subjective, you fear it may lead down
the road to subjectivism.
It is this fear that keeps Objectivism from making progress on hard
philosophical questions.
>> It is not the concept of the range of blue light on the visible
>> spectrum, as you claim. That would be "blue," not "blueness."
>
>No, "blue" or "blueness" (if you insist on using that term)
(which you fear)
> refers to the
>entire blue range of colors, not any one particular color within that range.
>For example, both indigo blue objects and sky blue objects are blue objects
>and these colors are subsumed under the concept "blue", even though on the
>perceptual level the colors are different.
Who subsumed them? You? Your subconscious mind? Your cognitive
faculty? Let's assume the latter as a form of automatic recognition of
blueness. How does your mind know to automatically subsume the
perception of blueness under the concept "blue" when there are no
perceived measurements of light? Or to put this question another way:
which units of measurement did you use to measure your perception of
blueness? Lumens?
Rand discussed this question very briefly and broadly in ITOE: "The
existential causes of sensations can be described and defined in
conceptual terms (e.g., the wavelengths of light and the structure of
the human eye, which produce the sensations of color), but one cannot
communicate what color is like, to a person who is born blind."
[ITOE2, 41]
Yes, I agree that the question is, "What is blueness LIKE?"
And then: 'To define the meaning of the concept "blue," for instance,
one must point to some blue objects to signify, in effect: "I mean
this." Such an identification of a concept is known as an "ostensive
definition."' [ITOE2, 41]
Ok. But what is blueness LIKE?
"Ostensive definitions are usually regarded as applicable only to
conceptualized sensations. But they are applicable to axioms as well.
Since axiomatic concepts are identifications of irreducible primaries,
the only way to define one is by means of an ostensive definition
e.g., to define "existence," one would have to sweep one's arm around
and say: "I mean this." (We shall discuss axioms later.)" [ITOE2, 41]
Sure, we can discuss axioms later. But -- what is blueness LIKE?
Ayn Rand - the greatest genius who ever lived - has no answer.
>> You should ask yourself: "Why does this particular color appear blue?
>> Because (to me) it has the quality of blueness." And, "Why does this
>> other particular color appear blue? Because (to me) it ALSO has the
>> quality of blueness."
>But the question remains: to what precisely in reality are you referring to
>when you use the phrase "the quality of blueness?" And the answer is: the
>blue range. Not any one particular shade of blue. You are referring to the
>effect that the object reflects light in such a way that you and other
>people of normal vision perceive the color as falling within the blue range.
>
>> So you see, you can refer the concept "blueness" to any particular
>> instance of blue, thus it is a Universal.
>
>No, it is a particular shade of color with particular measurements that fall
>within the blue range. There is no separate Universal attribute "blueness"
>in the object or anywhere else.
Blueness is LIKE blueness, and there is no particular shade of blue
that we can point to as representing blueness per se. Or to put it
another way, there is nothing in the object (as you said) that one can
point to as representing a Universal attribute "blueness." There is
nothing in a Platonic dimension somewhere that fits the bill because
we can't know about such things.
What, then, is blueness? What is blueness LIKE?
Jim Klein
> Nothing you or I said about the color spectrum has to do with the
> blueness of light in that part of the spectrum that is actually
> perceived.
He covered that, by noting that a blind man wouldn't
see it. In the case at hand, it's a deaf man!
> And nothing you said about the science of color detracts
> from the distinct quality of blueness at the basis of its very
> perception.
Why not bone it up a bit? "Nothing you said...detracts
from the distinct and very extant quality of blueness at
the basis of its very perception and which we all know
for certain exists."
Just leave out the, "But we can know nothing for
certain" part; nobody'll notice.
> The reason for your reticence is that the topic of qualities per se is
> entirely subjective. And that as subjective, you fear it may lead down
> the road to subjectivism.
That's it..."qualities per se." Throw in a few, "qualities as
they are," and "qualities in their essence" to boot.
> It is this fear that keeps Objectivism from making progress on hard
> philosophical questions.
Yeah, this is a really tough philosophical question. "Does
the quality of blueness exist separate and apart from the
objects that are blue and the senses that are sensing them?"
Let's put everything on hold a few more thousand
years while we figure this toughie out.
> Who subsumed them? You? Your subconscious mind? Your cognitive
> faculty?
Wow, those are very good guesses!
> Let's assume the latter as a form of automatic recognition of
> blueness.
No, YOU assume it, you knucklehead. That way you'll already
know it exists before you even address the question.
Why don't you assume an "automatic recognition" that
the damn object is blue?
You mean she had no answer to YOUR question, which is,
"Assuming that there's an existent denoted as <blueness>,
then what are the attributes of this existent?"
The answer is, "<blueness> is a CONCEPT." Saying,
"That object has blueness" is NO DIFFERENT than
saying, "That object is blue." The meaning is the
REFERENCE, not the word. It's not even the definition,
which is how we try to express the reference using
other concepts (divisions, classes, comparisons,
differences) and grammar.
But you think a word means what some book says
it means, and no doubt that grammar is merely a
set of rules for how to string words together.
> Blueness is LIKE blueness, and there is no particular shade of blue
> that we can point to as representing blueness per se. Or to put it
> another way, there is nothing in the object (as you said) that one can
> point to as representing a Universal attribute "blueness." There is
> nothing in a Platonic dimension somewhere that fits the bill because
> we can't know about such things.
>
> What, then, is blueness? What is blueness LIKE?
Here, maybe you can grasp it this way. In all manners
relevant to this discussion, it's like idiocy.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Jan 1, 8:11 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> Nothing you or I said about the color spectrum has to do with the
>> blueness of light in that part of the spectrum that is actually
>> perceived.
..
>He covered that, by noting that a blind man wouldn't
>see it. In the case at hand, it's a deaf man!
Ken only said that a blind man could conceive of the scientific
bandwidths. That is merely a reference to the scientific concepts, not
to the perceptions of the sighted vs. the blind.
Now who's deaf?
>> And nothing you said about the science of color detracts
>> from the distinct quality of blueness at the basis of its very
>> perception.
..
>Why not bone it up a bit? "Nothing you said...detracts
>from the distinct and very extant quality of blueness at
>the basis of its very perception and which we all know
>for certain exists."
..
>Just leave out the, "But we can know nothing for
>certain" part; nobody'll notice.
That's not my line, you either have me confused with someone else, or
else please stop trying to put words in my mouth.
>> The reason for your reticence is that the topic of qualities per se is
>> entirely subjective. And that as subjective, you fear it may lead down
>> the road to subjectivism.
>
>That's it..."qualities per se." Throw in a few, "qualities as
>they are," and "qualities in their essence" to boot.
Same response as above.
>> It is this fear that keeps Objectivism from making progress on hard
>> philosophical questions.
..
>Yeah, this is a really tough philosophical question. "Does
>the quality of blueness exist separate and apart from the
>objects that are blue and the senses that are sensing them?"
..
>Let's put everything on hold a few more thousand
>years while we figure this toughie out.
This type of question started the philosophical ball rolling. It is
Randroids who want to end the conversation that has lasted for 2500
years by simply putting their dogmatic feet down.
That is exactly what Aristotle did, and it bought western civilization
1000 years of Dark Ages.
>> Sure, we can discuss axioms later. But -- what is blueness LIKE?
..
>> Ayn Rand - the greatest genius who ever lived - has no answer.
..
>You mean she had no answer to YOUR question, which is,
>"Assuming that there's an existent denoted as <blueness>,
>then what are the attributes of this existent?"
..
>The answer is, "<blueness> is a CONCEPT." Saying,
>"That object has blueness" is NO DIFFERENT than
>saying, "That object is blue." The meaning is the
>REFERENCE, not the word. It's not even the definition,
>which is how we try to express the reference using
>other concepts (divisions, classes, comparisons,
>differences) and grammar.
But wait, Gardner says that "blueness" is a nonsense word. Now this
weasel is saying "blueness" is a concept!
Which is it? And when are you people ever going to come together on
these issues?
The answer: never, because Ayn Rand tried to have her cake and eat it
too. By reducing Universals to concepts, she has only failed to
recognize the necessity of a positive metaphysical answer rather than
merely dogmatically dispensing with those she disagreed with.
And so you have blueness as a metaphysical attribute being regarded as
nonsense, and yet blueness is also a concept: and so you are left with
a concept that is based in nonsense.
>But you think a word means what some book says
>it means, and no doubt that grammar is merely a
>set of rules for how to string words together.
..
>> Blueness is LIKE blueness, and there is no particular shade of blue
>> that we can point to as representing blueness per se. Or to put it
>> another way, there is nothing in the object (as you said) that one can
>> point to as representing a Universal attribute "blueness." There is
>> nothing in a Platonic dimension somewhere that fits the bill because
>> we can't know about such things.
..
>> What, then, is blueness? What is blueness LIKE?
..
>Here, maybe you can grasp it this way. In all manners
>relevant to this discussion, it's like idiocy.
Idiocy is when Objectivists, Randroids, and their ilk, base their
concepts on nonsense: on metaphysical attributes that don't exist.
Jim Klein
> >Just leave out the, "But we can know nothing for
> >certain" part; nobody'll notice.
>
> That's not my line, you either have me confused with someone else, or
> else please stop trying to put words in my mouth.
Oh no, I wouldn't want to do that. So let's get you
on the record, clear as day---
Can we know anything for certain?
> >> The reason for your reticence is that the topic of qualities per se is
> >> entirely subjective. And that as subjective, you fear it may lead down
> >> the road to subjectivism.
>
> >That's it..."qualities per se." Throw in a few, "qualities as
> >they are," and "qualities in their essence" to boot.
>
> Same response as above.
What's the problem here? What does "qualities per se"
mean to you?
I don't want to misrepresent you, so maybe spit it out
plain and clear. Do you believe or do you not believe
that there exists--independently of either the object
that's blue or the consciousness that sees the blue--
the quality of blueness, and that this quality is as
it is?
[snip]
> But wait, Gardner says that "blueness" is a nonsense word. Now this
> weasel is saying "blueness" is a concept!
Who's putting words in whose mouth now? I read what he
wrote, and he was clear enough...that there is nothing "in
reality" to which the concept of <blueness> refers.
Sure, he's technically wrong about that since it's a
concept and I'm confident he'll acknowledge that
concepts exist in reality. Further, he'll likely admit
that the reference of "blueness," not as it occurs
as an attribute of objects, but as a conceptual
tool to reference one particular attribute of previous
identifications of blue instances, does indeed exist.
But he was writing this to you, and your posts are long
enough for the both of you. It's pretty clear what he
MEANT and in that he was right.
But you're the look-say guy, so you don't view meaning
as that which was intended to be referenced. The word
is a unit and as such has fully independent meaning,
with or without any intention of meaning. Right?
So if he wrote "blueness," then he must mean the same
thing that you mean when you write "blueness." Right?
> Which is it? And when are you people ever going to come together on
> these issues?
Short of Dallas playing Detroit in the Stanley Cup, probably never.
> The answer: never, because Ayn Rand tried to have her cake and eat it
> too.
No...it's because it's too tough to get to the Stanley Cup.
[snip]
> Idiocy is when Objectivists, Randroids, and their ilk, base their
> concepts on nonsense: on metaphysical attributes that don't exist.
You misunderstand, grasshopper. The attributes exist; it's
just that they don't exist separate and apart from the objects
of which they're attributes. A thing IS its attributes. Get it?
Begin at the beginning. Get that, and maybe you'll have
a fighting chance.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>> >Just leave out the, "But we can know nothing for
>> >certain" part; nobody'll notice.
..
>> That's not my line, you either have me confused with someone else, or
>> else please stop trying to put words in my mouth.
..
>Oh no, I wouldn't want to do that. So let's get you
>on the record, clear as day---
..
>Can we know anything for certain?
I know for certain you're just another usenet asshole.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> You are criticizing a Realist answer (one of many, many) and then
> saying that a particular is not a Universal.
> Is that supposed to make a light bulb come on over my head?
Like John Madden, I am the Master of the Obvious, and I love obvious answers
because they invariably cause great confusion among Kantians. How up are
you on your Sun Tzu? :)
> In fact, Rand did not have the answer to every problem, nor do the
> answers come from simply criticizing the efforts of others.
Well, she admitted that she doesn't have a solution to the problem of
induction. I'm not so sure -- I think she stumbled onto the essence of the
solution at the end of Chapter 3 of ITOE.
> Think outside the Randroid box, Ken Gardner, and maybe you can come up
> with some of your own answers.
No thanks. My Randroid box, as you call it, is one great big can of
whoop-ass when it comes to arguing with Kantians over the Internet. :)
>>By looking at it. Is this a trick question? You differentiate the
>>fingerprints from everything else that you see, taste, hear, touch, and
>>smell. Later on, you learn to conceptualize it as a fingerprint using the
>>exact same mental process that you learned to conceptualize other first
>>level concepts such as dog or man back when you were still in diapers.
> That's not a good answer because it does not touch on the problem of
> Universals.
This is like responding that Columbus's discovery that the world is round
doesn't solve the problem of how to avoid sailing off the edge of the earth.
There are no Universals and therefore no problem of Universals to "touch
upon." Abstractions, ideas, concepts, etc. are simply our human cognitive
method for organizing or classifying existents based on their differences
and similarities with other existents.
>In Rand's ITOE, in order to conceptualize you have to
> differentiate two or more similar entities. How do you know when you
> have found two or more similar entities to differentiate?
As I answered above, at first by perceptual observation. You perceive four
chairs around a table and can see right away that the chairs are similar in
shape when differentiated from the tables. Later (or perhaps
simultaneously), you begin regarding the chairs as units, integrate the
units into the concept "chair," use language (such as the word "chair") to
symbolize or denote your comments, etc. Only when you know that these
things are chairs AND -- don't forget the language component -- that the
word "chair" refers to those four chairs and all other similar objects --
have you completed the process of concept formation. You literally don't
have the concept until and unless you know what word represents it (in
whatever language you use). We aren't born with the capacity to speak any
particular language; we learn a language very early in life as we learn the
concepts symbolized by that language.
Or, let me put my point a bit more broadly. You are not born with innate
ideas or concepts such as "chair." Yes, you are born with the capacity to
conceptualize, but that's very different. You still have to learn how to
actualize that capacity -- which, fortunately, we all learn to do very young
in life as we are learning to speak. We aren't born with concepts, only
with the capacity to produce concepts through a specific mental process of
differentiation and integration (including language, which completes the
integration process).
>How does your conscious mind recognize similarities before you have even
> conceived of the word "similar"? By looking? But looking does not
> bring similarities to consciousness, it only bring entities.
Again, you can perceive similarities on the perceptual level. For that
matter, so can some other animals such as cats and dogs. What separates you
from your dog or cat is the ability to regard these similar entities as
units, which in turn enables you to learn how to form concepts, learn a
language, and thereby function on the conceptual level of awareness.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> "I would add that"? But you didn't add a thing, you only repeated the
> point I just made. Read it again. The only difference is that you made
> a point of avoiding the use of the word "blueness."
As I said previously, the concept "blueness," when referring to a Universal,
is an invalid concept because there are no Universals. I suppose that I can
use the world "blueness" to refer to the blue range of colors. That use
would be useful, but it is also confusing and unclear, especially when
conversing with (1) Realists and (2) Kantians who try to refute Objectivism
by arguing that it is a species of Realism. See, Mal, I have been on to
your real purpose all along. :)
> Nothing you or I said about the color spectrum has to do with the
> blueness of light in that part of the spectrum that is actually
> perceived. And nothing you said about the science of color detracts
> from the distinct quality of blueness at the basis of its very
> perception.
I agree. I have never denied that some objects have a quality such that
when they reflect light, we perceive it as falling within the blue range of
colors and thereby form the concept "blue."
What I disagree with is the notion that this theory of concepts is a form of
Realism. There is no Universal quality "blueness," only a particular range
of colors that we conceptualize as blue because they fall within the blue
range. This is how we can validly conceptualize a royal blue object and a
sky blue object as "blue" even though the two colors are totally different
from each other.
> The reason for your reticence is that the topic of qualities per se is
> entirely subjective. And that as subjective, you fear it may lead down
> the road to subjectivism.
Nonsense. The topic of qualities is entirely metaphysical. A blue object
would be blue -- it would reflect light in such a way that a human being
with normal vision would perceive it as falling within the blue range of
colors -- even if there were no humans around to see it as being blue. For
example, if I put a blue shirt into a drawer and then shut the drawer, it is
still blue even if neither me nor any other human being can currently see
it. This is a fact about the shirt, not about how anyone perceives that
shirt at any particular moment. Or, to use another example, the sun has far
more mass than the moon even if no one is left on Planet Earth to grasp that
particular relation. It is also much hotter. These are facts about the sun
and the moon, not about us or the workings or processes of our
consciousness. These qualities would exist in the sun and the moon even if
there wasn't a single living thing in the universe to observe or
conceptualize them.
> It is this fear that keeps Objectivism from making progress on hard
> philosophical questions.
When you use the right epistemological methods, all the "hard" problems
suddenly seem so easy (or not even real problems at all). Really, you
should try it. The problems are hard to you only because you are a victim
of Kantian epistemology. Somewhere in the lowest levels of hell, Kant is
laughing at you. How does that make you feel? :)
>>No, "blue" or "blueness" (if you insist on using that term)
>
> (which you fear)
Right. I'm shaking in my boots....
>> refers to the
>>entire blue range of colors, not any one particular color within that
>>range.
>>For example, both indigo blue objects and sky blue objects are blue
>>objects
>>and these colors are subsumed under the concept "blue", even though on the
>>perceptual level the colors are different.
> Who subsumed them? You? Your subconscious mind?
My conscious mind, through a specific process (and, on the conceptual level,
a specifically chosen process) of differentiation and integration. But I
did it not arbitrarily or subjectively, but objectively on the basis of the
facts of reality (in this case, how objects reflected or absorbed light in a
way that I and other human beings with normal vision perceive them as being
"blue"). This process, the validity and even possibility of which Kantians
deny (you know, "man is blind because he has eyes, deaf because he has
ears," yada yada yada), is how you and I can even communicate with each
other meaningfully about the concept blue in the first place.
>Your cognitive
> faculty? Let's assume the latter as a form of automatic recognition of
> blueness. How does your mind know to automatically subsume the
> perception of blueness under the concept "blue" when there are no
> perceived measurements of light? Or to put this question another way:
> which units of measurement did you use to measure your perception of
> blueness? Lumens?
You observe it. You perceive that blue objects, while different to each
other in color (e.g. sky blue is different from indigo blue), are similar to
each other in color when compared to red or yellow objects.
It is really that simple. So simple, in fact, that on the perceptual level
your big brain does this for you automatically. You don't have to know a
damn thing about light waves, light spectrums, or anything like that. My
four year old niece (the one who didn't shoot JFK) knows what "blue" refers
to. Now, you do need to know some pretty advanced science to explain how
objects absorb or reflect light in such a way that we humans perceive them
as being a color such as blue. But that's different, and not knowing the
scientific explanation does not negate our ability to see blue objects as
blue and later to form the concept "blue."
Note: but if you still insist and want to get scientific about it, an object
that emits light at a wavelength of 480 nm and 455 nm, respectively
(different shades of blue), are going to look different from each other, but
much more similar to each other than to an object emitting light at only 430
nm (red) or 525 nm (yellow).
> And then: 'To define the meaning of the concept "blue," for instance,
> one must point to some blue objects to signify, in effect: "I mean
> this." Such an identification of a concept is known as an "ostensive
> definition."' [ITOE2, 41]
> Ok. But what is blueness LIKE?
"Blue" or "blueness" (used correctly) is "like" -- or, to be much more
precise, refers to -- the color of the blue objects you are pointing to in
her example. I mean, really, is this so hard? How many blue objects must
she point to until even a Kantian finally gets what my four year old niece
already knows (and learned more than two years ago, I might add)? five?
ten? You tell me. Will it help if she does it "by the book" and makes sure
that she points to two or more blue objects and then contrasts these objects
by pointing to at least one object of a different color such as red? If
memory serves me right, this is how my niece learned her colors, using
several puzzles or games for this purpose. I suppose, again, that if you
insist on being anal about it, we can always pull out those fancy scientific
gizmos that measure wavelength or frequency intervals of light being emitted
from objects and resolve it that way. But it really shouldn't be necessary
here, ya think?
[....]
> Blueness is LIKE blueness, and there is no particular shade of blue
> that we can point to as representing blueness per se.
I certainly agree with everything after the comma (what came before the
comma is nonsensical to me). That's why Realism doesn't work. There is no
such thing as "blueness per se," only the specific shades of blue that fall
within the blue range. Everything in reality, including shades of colors,
is particular, concrete -- not Universal. To call an object "blue" is
nothing more or less than to say that its color falls within the blue range
of colors, whether that object be sky blue, indigo blue, or any other shade
of blue. But the concept is objective rather than subjective because, in
fact, the object absorbs and reflects light in such a way that a human being
with normal vision perceives it as some shade of blue. We don't just make
up shit in our own minds, we form our concepts in accordance with the facts
of reality. And it is objective rather than intrinsic because, in fact, we
form the concept "blue" through a chosen, reality-based process of
differentiation and integration (including language) -- one that we can
readily perceive and later validate scientifically.
[....]
Ken Gardner
"Jim Klein" wrote:
>> The reason for your reticence is that the topic of qualities per se is
>> entirely subjective. And that as subjective, you fear it may lead down
>> the road to subjectivism.
> That's it..."qualities per se." Throw in a few, "qualities as
> they are," and "qualities in their essence" to boot.
Damn. I thought I was the only one here who was on to what Mal was really
up to here.
[....]
> The answer is, "<blueness> is a CONCEPT." Saying,
> "That object has blueness" is NO DIFFERENT than
> saying, "That object is blue."
Right....when using "blueness" properly to refer to particular blue objects
rather than a (non-existent) Universal.
>The meaning is the REFERENCE, not the word.
AMEN, BROTHER JIM!!
[....]
>> What, then, is blueness? What is blueness LIKE?
As I told Mal, my four year old niece (who didn't shoot JFK in 1963) knows
what blue is like. If you don't know what blue is like, either you should
get your eyes checked or stop reading Kant. :)
1Z
>
> You misunderstand, grasshopper. �The attributes exist; it's
> just that they don't exist separate and apart from the objects
> of which they're attributes. �A thing IS its attributes. �Get it?
Saying it doesn't make it so
1Z
> This is like responding that Columbus's discovery that the world is round
> doesn't solve the problem of how to avoid sailing off the edge of the earth.
That is like saying there is no problem to the shape of the Earth
because it isn't flat. An alternative explanation is needed.
> There are no Universals and therefore no problem of Universals to "touch
> upon." �
>Abstractions, ideas, concepts, etc. are simply our human cognitive
> method for organizing or classifying existents based on their differences
> and similarities with other existents.
There you go again. There just are similariites, and you have
nothing to say about what they are as opposed to how they are
recognised.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Damn. I thought I was the only one here who was on to what Mal was really
>up to here.
And what would that be?
Mark N
In a related story, saying that the attributes *do* exist separate and
apart from the objects of which they're attributes doesn't make it so.
Come to think of it, that applies to most things. More often then not,
the fact that someone says that something is so doesn't make it so.
Mark
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>
>> You are criticizing a Realist answer (one of many, many) and then
>> saying that a particular is not a Universal.
>
>> Is that supposed to make a light bulb come on over my head?
>
>Like John Madden, I am the Master of the Obvious, and I love obvious answers
>because they invariably cause great confusion among Kantians. How up are
>you on your Sun Tzu? :)
That is an example of the triumphalism I referred to earlier. You
believe you have a method - call it the "Randroid Obvious" method -
which will always triumph against the "eee-vil Kantians." (Randroid
Obvious comes from the phrase Captain Obvious.)
>> In fact, Rand did not have the answer to every problem, nor do the
>> answers come from simply criticizing the efforts of others.
>
>Well, she admitted that she doesn't have a solution to the problem of
>induction. I'm not so sure -- I think she stumbled onto the essence of the
>solution at the end of Chapter 3 of ITOE.
Maybe, but I haven't read Peikoff's solution, and I don't have $200 to
spend on "fake cures."
>> Think outside the Randroid box, Ken Gardner, and maybe you can come up
>> with some of your own answers.
>
>No thanks. My Randroid box, as you call it, is one great big can of
>whoop-ass when it comes to arguing with Kantians over the Internet. :)
Triumphalism again, mixed with paranoia over eee-vil Kantians.
There is nothing obvious about the solution, or else someone would
have thought of it long, long ago.
>>>By looking at it. Is this a trick question? You differentiate the
>>>fingerprints from everything else that you see, taste, hear, touch, and
>>>smell. Later on, you learn to conceptualize it as a fingerprint using the
>>>exact same mental process that you learned to conceptualize other first
>>>level concepts such as dog or man back when you were still in diapers.
..
>> That's not a good answer because it does not touch on the problem of
>> Universals.
..
>This is like responding that Columbus's discovery that the world is round
>doesn't solve the problem of how to avoid sailing off the edge of the earth.
>There are no Universals and therefore no problem of Universals to "touch
>upon." Abstractions, ideas, concepts, etc. are simply our human cognitive
>method for organizing or classifying existents based on their differences
>and similarities with other existents.
No, it's like responding that you have not solved the problem of how
particulars are recognized on the basis of Universal forms they all
share. It is not about classifying or organizing, it is about
recognizing.
>>In Rand's ITOE, in order to conceptualize you have to
>> differentiate two or more similar entities. How do you know when you
>> have found two or more similar entities to differentiate?
..
>As I answered above, at first by perceptual observation. You perceive four
>chairs around a table and can see right away that the chairs are similar in
>shape when differentiated from the tables. Later (or perhaps
>simultaneously), you begin regarding the chairs as units, integrate the
>units into the concept "chair," use language (such as the word "chair") to
>symbolize or denote your comments, etc. Only when you know that these
>things are chairs AND -- don't forget the language component -- that the
>word "chair" refers to those four chairs and all other similar objects --
>have you completed the process of concept formation. You literally don't
>have the concept until and unless you know what word represents it (in
>whatever language you use). We aren't born with the capacity to speak any
>particular language; we learn a language very early in life as we learn the
>concepts symbolized by that language.
>
>Or, let me put my point a bit more broadly. You are not born with innate
>ideas or concepts such as "chair." Yes, you are born with the capacity to
>conceptualize, but that's very different. You still have to learn how to
>actualize that capacity -- which, fortunately, we all learn to do very young
>in life as we are learning to speak. We aren't born with concepts, only
>with the capacity to produce concepts through a specific mental process of
>differentiation and integration (including language, which completes the
>integration process).
I don't understand what you're lecturing to me for. I'm sure I have
read ITOE (both editions) as many times as you if not more, and I also
have it on Cd. And if any of it had to do with the Problem of
Universals I would be the first to sit up and take notice because I'm
the only one around here who seems to know what it is.
'Let those who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they
cannot find "manness" in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring
that they cannot find "a-ness" in 5 or in 5,000,000.'
So let me ask you this, Mr. Lecture Man: Where IS the a-ness in 5 or
5,000,000?
>>How does your conscious mind recognize similarities before you have even
>> conceived of the word "similar"? By looking? But looking does not
>> bring similarities to consciousness, it only bring entities.
..
>Again, you can perceive similarities on the perceptual level. For that
>matter, so can some other animals such as cats and dogs. What separates you
>from your dog or cat is the ability to regard these similar entities as
>units, which in turn enables you to learn how to form concepts, learn a
>language, and thereby function on the conceptual level of awareness.
You don't know that animals can't regard entities as units. And
anyway, all they have to do is grasp similarities and differences
among entities. That doesn't seem to be above the level of cats and
dogs.
You're not understanding ITOE, and yet you lecture me on it. The
epistemic stage of "entity" is simply the awareness of things, versus
the awareness of individual units. I would say, as a sort of Captain
Obvious myself, that dogs and cats do a fine job of recognizing units.
And yet your misunderstanding almost make sense, because Rand also
wrote, "The ability to regard entities as units is man's distinctive
method of cognition. " That however doesn't make sense regarding even
the most common-sense view of how dogs and cats interact with the
world around them.
What also doesn't make sense is your unwillingness to think for
yourself on this issue, thereby placing your absolute faith in Ayn
Rand, when in fact her philosophy points to the idea of Individualism
which is striking in its reliance upon only one's OWN thinking and
judgment.
Malrassic Park
>On 3 Jan, 06:17, Ken Gardner <kesgardne...@att.net> wrote:
..
>>Abstractions, ideas, concepts, etc. are simply our human cognitive
>> method for organizing or classifying existents based on their differences
>> and similarities with other existents.
..
>There you go again. There just are similariites, and you have
>nothing to say about what they are as opposed to how they are
>recognised.
Gardner has nothing to say on it because Rand had nothing to say on it
- and Miss Rand has the first and last word to say on everything for
these people.
Sad.
Ken Gardner
"1Z" wrote:
>> This is like responding that Columbus's discovery that the world is round
>> doesn't solve the problem of how to avoid sailing off the edge of the
>> earth.
> That is like saying there is no problem to the shape of the Earth
> because it isn't flat. An alternative explanation is needed.
Exactly, as I was telling Mal. There are no universals, so there is no such
valid problem as the problem of universals -- which still leaves the problem
of how concepts represent a grasp of the facts of reality.
>>Abstractions, ideas, concepts, etc. are simply our human cognitive
>> method for organizing or classifying existents based on their differences
>> and similarities with other existents.
> There you go again. There just are similariites, and you have
> nothing to say about what they are as opposed to how they are
> recognized.
No one asked me. But the answers are in ITOE, especially the first two
chapters.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>Damn. I thought I was the only one here who was on to what Mal was really
>>up to here.
> And what would that be?
To those that know (insert "that means you" here), no explanation is
necessary. To those that don't, no explanation is possible. :)
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>Well, she admitted that she doesn't have a solution to the problem of
>>induction. I'm not so sure -- I think she stumbled onto the essence of
>>the
>>solution at the end of Chapter 3 of ITOE.
> Maybe, but I haven't read Peikoff's solution, and I don't have $200 to
> spend on "fake cures."
I do, but I have better uses for my money. In any event, what I am talking
about in ITOE has nothing to do with what little I know about Peikoff's
views on this subject.
[....]
> No, it's like responding that you have not solved the problem of how
> particulars are recognized on the basis of Universal forms they all
> share. It is not about classifying or organizing, it is about
> recognizing.
That's because you don't recognize (identify) particulars on the basis of
Universal forms that they all share. You recognize (identify) particulars
and mentally integrate them into units by a methodical process of
classification or organization based on differences and similarities with
other existences. For example, you form the concept "animal" by
differentiating animals from non-living entities and from living entities
that do not possess consciousness and locomotion. You then integrate these
existents into a mental unit on the basis of these distinguishing
characteristics while omitting their particular measurements. The concept
"animal" is the end product of that process, and the word "animal" (or its
equivalent in other languages) is the visual-audio code we humans use to
symbolize or represent that concept, both in our own minds and in
communications with others.
There isn't some Universal form Animal that exists separate and apart from
particular dogs, cats, snakes, etc. Accordingly, there is no problem of
universals -- no need to explain how we are somehow able to grasp these
mystical Forms. There is, however, the separate problem of how the concept
"animal," when formed using the proper method, represents the form in which
we grasp the animals that exist in reality. For the solution, see ITOE.
[....]
> I don't understand what you're lecturing to me for. I'm sure I have
> read ITOE (both editions) as many times as you if not more, and I also
> have it on Cd. And if any of it had to do with the Problem of
> Universals I would be the first to sit up and take notice because I'm
> the only one around here who seems to know what it is.
I don't understand why you keep asking the same questions again and again,
year after year. ITOE covers all this. This specifically includes her
response to the so-called problem of universals. She frames the problem in
the Forward to the First Edition, and she gives her answer throughout the
rest of the book, most notably in Chapters 1 and 2 and near the end of
Chapter 5. Incidentally, I wouldn't spend $200 on that Peikoff lecture on
induction, but if I were you I would seriously consider spending around $80
on Binswanger's lecture series Consciousness as Identification, which also
addresses and squarely takes on the so-called "problem of universals."
> 'Let those who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they
> cannot find "manness" in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring
> that they cannot find "a-ness" in 5 or in 5,000,000.'
>
> So let me ask you this, Mr. Lecture Man: Where IS the a-ness in 5 or
> 5,000,000?
The "a-ness" is every single number that you can substitute for the variable
in an algebraic equation. Just as "blueness" is every shade of blue within
the blue range of colors.
>>Again, you can perceive similarities on the perceptual level. For that
>>matter, so can some other animals such as cats and dogs. What separates
>>you
>>from your dog or cat is the ability to regard these similar entities as
>>units, which in turn enables you to learn how to form concepts, learn a
>>language, and thereby function on the conceptual level of awareness.
> You don't know that animals can't regard entities as units. And
> anyway, all they have to do is grasp similarities and differences
> among entities. That doesn't seem to be above the level of cats and
> dogs.
Most animals can grasp similarities and differences among entities. Our
brains, senses, and nervous system do this for us automatically. But the
great cognitive divide is our human ability to regard entities as units,
which enables us to conceptualize. As far as anyone can tell, dogs and cats
don't do this. They certainly don't do it on the higher levels of
conceptualization, such as the level at which we discuss such issues as the
so-called problem of universals.
> You're not understanding ITOE, and yet you lecture me on it. The
> epistemic stage of "entity" is simply the awareness of things, versus
> the awareness of individual units. I would say, as a sort of Captain
> Obvious myself, that dogs and cats do a fine job of recognizing units.
And except for the last point about what dogs and cats recognize, I'm not
disagreeing with you here. Maybe the problem here is not my understanding
of ITOE, but yours. Anyhow, dogs and cats remember some of what they
perceive and respond according (e.g. they will remember who you are,
especially at feeding time or when they need to go take a shit or whatever),
but as far as anyone knows, regarding entities as units and forming concepts
accordingly is an entirely different process that only humans do.
> And yet your misunderstanding almost make sense, because Rand also
> wrote, "The ability to regard entities as units is man's distinctive
> method of cognition. " That however doesn't make sense regarding even
> the most common-sense view of how dogs and cats interact with the
> world around them.
It makes perfect sense. The problem here is that I don't think you
understand properly what the unit perspective is. It isn't the ability to
recognize that the entity in front of you is your dinner or the person that
feeds you and takes you outside when you need to take a dump. It is the
ability to regard that bowl of dog food as a member of a group or two or
more similar members. It is the ability to understand what it means for two
entities to be "similar" to each other even when, regarded simply as two
perceptual concrete entities, they are completely different from each other
and may not have a single identical attribute in common (e.g. one bowl is
yellow while the other is red, one bowl is filled with canned dog food while
the other is filled with dry dog food, and so on).
Or to put it this way, the dog may perceive the stuff in the bowl as beef or
dry dog food or canned dog food, but it is unable to think of that stuff as
"food," much less think about or communicate a sentence that uses the word
"food" in the subject or predicate, much less make logical inferences based
on one or more such sentences.
> What also doesn't make sense is your unwillingness to think for
> yourself on this issue, thereby placing your absolute faith in Ayn
> Rand, when in fact her philosophy points to the idea of Individualism
> which is striking in its reliance upon only one's OWN thinking and
> judgment.
What is striking to me is that after years and years and years, you simply
keep repeating yourself and never actually learn a damn thing.
Jim Klein
> Or to put it this way, the dog may perceive the stuff in the bowl as beef or
> dry dog food or canned dog food, but it is unable to think of that stuff as
> "food,"
Here's what you'll get from the scientists. The perceptually-
driven reactions ARE in response to the stimuli having the
perceptual attributes of food, and further that this amounts
to "thinking of it as food," just in a dog's way.
That's why personally, I think the line is at abstraction,
the storage of (some sort of) /reference/ to the percept.
But then the scientists will argue that even (what I call)
"direct perceptual storage" is a reference of sorts, since
they're not storing the actual smell (or whatever) itself.
My best answer is that there's a fundamental difference
between the direct storage (referentially or however) of
single instances, versus the storage of classes, particularly
with the ability to "distill out" parts of the percepts and
compare and contrast /those/ similarities and differences,
which is basically the Randian paradigm.
One thing's for sure, which Rod mentioned. The
/mechanisms/ for these actions developed over
a long evolutionary period and none of us really
know exactly what phase any particular species is in.
Clearly apes are much, much better at integration, and
perhaps some reduction, than ants or fish. Unfortunately
for some of the scientists, that really doesn't tell us
anything about whether they abstractly conceptualize or not.
> much less think about or communicate a sentence that uses the word
> "food" in the subject or predicate, much less make logical inferences based
> on one or more such sentences.
Hell, it's getting pretty tough to find any humans that can do that!
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>That's because you don't recognize (identify) particulars on the basis of
>Universal forms that they all share. You recognize (identify)
You are conflating recognition which is perceptual with identification
which is conceptual.
Jim Klein
> You are conflating recognition which is perceptual with identification
> which is conceptual.
And you are conflating our classification of that which
exists, with that which exists. You're in good company
here, though; Rand did a bit of that as well on this topic.
We identify; we recognize. Divide it up any ol' way you
want; what we're doing is still what we're doing.
jk
1Z
> "Malrassic Park" wrote:
> That's because you don't recognize (identify) particulars on the basis of
> Universal forms that they all share. �You recognize (identify) particulars
> and mentally integrate them into units by a methodical process of
> classification or organization based on differences and similarities with
> other existences.
And if the *existence* of similarities and differences is based
on universals, you still have universals, even if the psychological
process
of concept formation is not based on universals implanted in the
mind.
> There isn't some Universal form Animal that exists separate and apart from
> particular dogs, cats, snakes, etc. �Accordingly, there is no problem of
> universals -- no need to explain how we are somehow able to grasp these
> mystical Forms. �
The problem of Universals is the problem of how things ge to be
similar in
the first place, and Rand can offer no explanation. Her amateur
cognitive psychology
just assumes the existence of similarities and differences.
Malrassic Park
>> There isn't some Universal form Animal that exists separate and apart from
>> particular dogs, cats, snakes, etc. �Accordingly, there is no problem of
>> universals -- no need to explain how we are somehow able to grasp these
>> mystical Forms. �
..
>The problem of Universals is the problem of how things ge to be
>similar in
>the first place, and Rand can offer no explanation. Her amateur
>cognitive psychology
>just assumes the existence of similarities and differences.
Ken keeps hammering away at his Aristotelian and Platonic straw men. I
thought Aristotle was supposed to be a great philosopher? I guess he's
not so great after all, but he is a great source of straw men.
The problem of Universals started out as a metaphysical question. In
the 20th century it developed into a psychological question. ITOE is a
book on psychology, concept-formation is a branch of cog-sci
psychology.
The question to me is: can Objectivism itself be used to derive the
problem of Universals? Yes, all you have to do is ask yourself if A is
similar to A.
Arnold Broese
news:a0e0c9fe-daa1-43a8...@l30g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
> .... and Rand can offer no explanation. Her amateur
> cognitive psychology just assumes the existence of similarities and
> differences.
So, nothing is similar and nothing is different? Wow.
.
.
--
Arnold
1Z
> The problem of Universals started out as a metaphysical question. In
> the 20th century it developed into a psychological question.
says who?
> The question to me is: can Objectivism itself be used to derive the
> problem of Universals? Yes, all you have to do is ask yourself if A is
> similar to A.
You mean "is A is similar to B, and what does that consist of"
Mal
No, I mean is A similar to A. Similarity is subsumed by identity, if
they are
identical then they have to be similar.
However, notice that there are two A�s in the identity, whereas no two
A�s can be identical. So if these A�s are identical, they cannot be
real.
They are fictions, yet they somehow relate to entities.
The question is, How do they relate to entities? Or, how are they
similar to entities in such a way that they can be related?
1Z
> However, notice that there are two A�s in the identity, whereas no two
> A�s can be identical. So if these A�s are identical, they cannot be
> real.
There a two tokens of the one type "A".
> They are fictions, yet they somehow relate to entities.
Everything is self identical, and it is not the case
that everything is a fiction, so you have gone wrong somewhere.
Check out, for instance, the distinction between numerical and
qualitative identity.
Mal
I don't need to know the distinction, I just need to know that things
(numerically and qualitatively) don't have identity until they are
identified according to a rule. In this case, the rule of subsumption
is
A is A. This identity rule is "a given," but it is given by the mind.
The history of philosophy has not been rife with philosophers trying
to evade the facts of reality. It has been rife with philosophers who
confused the appearance with the thing-in-itself, underscoring the
fact that they failed to determine the source of such rules.
chazwin
> ....but she missed the boat on Universals.
>
> I thought this response to Charles was important enough to have its
> own thread, so here it is.
>
> Whether or not concepts are Universals, even if they are formed the
> same way as concepts - through differentiation and integration - the
> problem of Universals remains the same. The problem is whether or not
> those generalities, often in the form of -ness (manness, squareness,
> etc.) then refer back to particulars in external reality.
>
> Rand has confused the manner in which they are allegedly formed in the
> mind with the *actual* problem which is relating them back to
> particulars.
>
> So where is the manness in men? We formed it as a generality, yet in
> man the particular it cannot be found. In individual men, the quality
> of being rational (the Universal of "rationality") comes and goes, it
> is relative, and it differs from individual to individual.
>
> And where is the 2-ness in two objects? However the number 2 was
> derived, its Universal form is nowhere to be found in those two
> particulars.
You are talking about thing-in-themsleves.
The trouble with Rand is that she was a novelist trying to deal with
philosophy.
Writing novels is not the same as understanding philosophy.
She has no system by which natural law and other scientific statements
can be verified.
Whenever a Randroid pronounces an "objective" fact you can be sure
that it is nothing more than a piece of (usually American) right-wing
prejudice.
All the examples of these attempts at objectivism have been so
laughable that they give away the writer's ignorance of basic
philosophical problems.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>You are talking about thing-in-themsleves.
>The trouble with Rand is that she was a novelist trying to deal with
>philosophy.
Rand gave what epistemologists (the real ones) call a low-standard
solution to problems.
Mal
wrote:
> "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
Check out the distinction between a low-level argument
and a high-level argument. A low-level takes for granted the
things that are given, in this case, similarities and differences.
A high-level argument takes into account skeptical arguments
against the low-level argument.
That's all I have ever tried to do was to take Objectivism to
a higher level, and thus raise it out of Vulgarity.
Mal
There is no such THING as a type A token, and yet somehow
these tokens are supposed to represent real things.
Ok, I read the distinction between numerical and qualitative
identity. A is A expresses numerical identity.
However, I still SEE two A's, and you're trying to relate them
to a single THING and claim through this formula that a thing
is identical to itself. So I wasn't trying to relate two A's to
two different things.
What I am saying is that there are two different A's. And the
only way they can be identical is if they are mere fictions
as nothing in reality can be identical beyond itself.
chazwin
This is pure fluff like most Randroid nonsense.
The very assertion of the possibility of Objectivism is a verification
and valorisation of Platonic/Aristotllean ideal forms.
Rand was a Platonist in epistemological terms.
There are many other problems with her 'individual' take on
philosophical issues. The main one is her confusion of Kant with
Hegel.
Her own philosophy is no less confused than Hegel.
Another is her rejection of scientific truth because she mistakes
Kantian scepticism and covers it with false truth.
It seems a shame that in her knee-jerk re-action to totalitarianism
that she failed to identify the philosophical causes.
Maybe she should have read more books?
chazwin
> On Sat, 06 Feb 2010 10:44:13 -0800, chazwin <chazwy...@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
>
> >You are talking about thing-in-themsleves.
> >The trouble with Rand is that she was a novelist trying to deal with
> >philosophy.
>
> Rand gave what epistemologists (the real ones) call a low-standard
> solution to problems.
I'm not sure that you can have "real" epistemologists any more than
you can have True Scotsmen.
I imagine you mean by low-standard. That her solutions are only worthy
of a low standard of proof and is nothing more than
a Quotidian pragmatism?
Her solutions, she thought, only assumed the underlying 'truth' of the
Platonic Ideal.
All Objectivism is an appeal to Plato.
Jim Klein
> And if the *existence* of similarities and differences is based
> on universals,
But it isn't, hence consequent irrelevant.
So snip to the next claim...
> The problem of Universals is the problem of how things ge to be
> similar in the first place,
I suppose it is, for those who create some "problem of
Universals." Of course, that's the exact opposite of
what you wrote above.
Maybe you answered in the intervening period and I
just missed it. Sorry if so, but what is your big hangup
generally with "being similar"?
What does this mean..."get to be similar"? The point
is that they ARE similar, and THIS just means "evoking
a process in a consciousness that classifies them--IN
SOME ATTRIBUTE--as thusly similar," or something
like that.
You seem to have some great problem with this, but
for all my trying, I can't figure out what it is.
> and Rand can offer no explanation. Her amateur
> cognitive psychology just assumes the existence
> of similarities and differences.
Why do you INSIST on a dichotomy? For you, it's
either the similarity exists in the objects or it exists
in the consciousness.
Maybe you ought to check that premise. Why can't
it be that any two objects are wholly distinct (and hence
not "identical") but are able to share some attributes
or characteristics such that a consciousness is able
to classify them as "similar" with regard to that
particular characteristic?
You are using a ton of words to ignore the obvious.
jk
Jim Klein
> What I am saying is that there are two different A's. And the
> only way they can be identical is if they are mere fictions
> as nothing in reality can be identical beyond itself.
Ha...this is an example of what I was saying to Charles---
you can have false premises and still come to a true
conclusion!
Of course no two As are "identical." IMO this is one of
the keys to understanding claims of metaphysical
stochasticism, or "inherent randomness." Beyond
that, though, your self-fantasized "high level argument"
is precisely that, at least in one meaning.
It's so damn high level that it left the
Earth and is in outer space somewhere!
An "argument," and particularly a "philosophical
argument" is supposed to arrive at the truth, which
is an understanding (conscious integration) of the
facts. When the argument does something else,
like take one farther from integrating the facts, then
in a philosophical sense, it is anything but a "high
argument." That probably explains why our language
has two distinct concepts, both denoted as "high"!
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
Don't let the falsity of ITOE convince you that there are no real
epistemologists. You can search Amazon for some really good books on
true epistemological goals such as understanding the connection
between belief and knowledge.
Low-standard, in the true epistemological sense, means its a theory
that takes into account no skeptical views whatsoever. The Randroids
will say that ITOE does take them into account, however its obviously
not in such a way as to take them seriously as theories in their own
right. So I should alter the above to say that low-standard theories
(such as Objectivism) don't take them into account or take them
seriously. In ITOE Rand basically just brushes them off.
A high-standard theorist, on the other hand, thinks that skeptical
theories of epistemology make serious points worthy of response.
That's why Kantianism is a high-standard theory, it takes Hume
seriously and doesn't merely, as in Objectivism, merely attempt to
denigrate and downplay his theory of causality as confusing
metaphysics with Walt Disney. You can see Peikoff giving it a sort of
argument - argument by humiliation, or argument by humor, but not
argument by reason, not anything that appears to take Hume seriously.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
A high-standard argument does not leave the earth's atmosphere. A
high-standard argument treats skeptical arguments with all
seriousness. In other words, a high standard theorist is willing to
seriously debate with skeptics.
Objectivists are not. Objectivists do not take skeptics seriously.
Objectivists simply brush their arguments away with specious
reasonings. Objectivists bury their heads in the sand of dogmatism and
call that reality. Objectivism offers nothing more than low-standard
arguments.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
> Don't let the falsity of ITOE convince you that there are no real
> epistemologists. You can search Amazon for some really good books on
> true epistemological goals such as understanding the connection
> between belief and knowledge.
>
Knowledge is simply true belief, isn't it?
(careful, I may be baiting you :) )
Phil
Malrassic Park
<phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>Malrassic Park wrote:
..
>> Don't let the falsity of ITOE convince you that there are no real
>> epistemologists. You can search Amazon for some really good books on
>> true epistemological goals such as understanding the connection
>> between belief and knowledge.
..
>Knowledge is simply true belief, isn't it?
..
>(careful, I may be baiting you :) )
Isn't the standard of knowledge *justified* true belief?
Charles Bell
Chazwin is only half-way to a deserved death, his brain having gone
first.
Jim Klein
> A high-standard theorist,
I thought I covered this already, though I understand that
to you, the words ARE the meaning. Look, say; look, say.
You're trying to pretend that you're referring to:
"A [high-standard] theorist."
What you're really referring to, is:
"A high [standard-theorist]."
You just put that little dash in the wrong place; that's all!
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Feb 7, 11:43 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>You just put that little dash in the wrong place; that's all!
Rand has brainwashed you into cult-Randroidism in an effort to
dissuade you from considering alternative viewpoints.
But in fact, Objectivism is not a rational alternative. If you want to
learn about epistemology, read books on epistemology and not some book
on the psychology of concept-formation.
chazwin
> Chazwin is only half-way to a deserved death, his brain having gone
> first.
Great argument!
If you have a real argument why do expose it to examination?
No? -- thought not!
Jim Klein
> If you want to learn about epistemology,
> read books on epistemology...
I get it. If I just look, then I can say!
Forgive me, but I'll stick with correspondence. I look and say
too, but our difference is in what we choose to look at. Me, I'll
stick with reality. You can stick with words if that's what you
choose; no skin off my back.
Though it should be noted that I've had the additional benefit
of seeing the words too. You might want to give yourself a
likewise benefit by taking a glance at reality!
jk
Charles Bell
> On Feb 7, 5:23�pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > Chazwin is only half-way to a deserved death, his brain having gone
> > first.
>
> Great argument!
No argument at all. Only insult intended. And a sincere wish that you
and all socialists disappear off the face of the earth.
> If you have a real argument why do expose it to examination?
As though you had one. As though your intention was anything other
than insult.