"Prof. G" asks AR about Implicit Concepts
Malrassic Park
form of awareness here which is below the level of the explicit. There
is no formulation on the part of the person involved...There seems to
be an obvious objection that the notion of "implicit concept" is a
contradiction in terms.'
AR:'It simply means just what I said. It is not yet conceptualized,
but it is available. Therefore, if you substitute the definition
"conceptualized or not" for "explicit and implicit," it will be
perfectly clear.'
(The nerve of this Prof. G to accuse Rand of dealing in a
contradiction in terms. I have a feeling that maybe there was some
screaming and slapping of Prof. G omitted from this segment of the
ITOE appendix.)
Okay, let's do as Mommy Rand advised and substitute "not
conceptualized" for "implicit." This gives us "not (or non-)
conceptualized concept."
A non-conceptualized concept?
Apparently that kind of terminology only bothers linguistic analysts
such as Prof. G (who is obviously in denial about his subconscious
premises).
acar
>
> A non-conceptualized concept?
>
Non-yellow yellowness? Perfectly clear!
.
.
.
Malrassic Park
Rand's idea is that the materials for creating the concept are
present, but the concept has yet to be formed.
This brings us back to the problem of Universals once again. The
question remains, where are those materials? Are they in
consciousness, and if so, in what form if not conceptual? Even better,
according to the brilliant linguistic analyst Prof. G - these units in
consciousness are not yet integrated: "For you to have a concept,
there must be some form of integration, and you are speaking here only
of an awareness which is avowedly not integrated..."
At this point, Prof. E pipes up comparing this issue to that of asking
about a fertilized egg: 'you would also say that it is a
self-contradiction to describe a fertilized egg in the womb as a
"potential man"...'
So should we call this non-conceptual, non-integrated unit an
embryonic concept instead of an implicit concept?
Rand doesn't tell us exactly what an implicit concept is, she merely
locates it in the process of forming a concept of various existents.
There is a concept, somwhere in that process, waiting to be born. This
process involves differentiation and/or integration of a "certain
group of concretes." (itoe2, 162)
Unfortunately, we are not told the precise manner in which this stage
of development functions prior to the conceptual level. But the
material to be integrated has to be held in the mind in some
non-conceptual form because the mind obviously cannot integrate
concrete objects.
Jim Klein
Y'know, there's nothing wrong with you taking the
yellow brick road to fantasyland, but why are you
so intent on pulling others down with you?
YOU do some explaining. YOU explain what's so
tough to understand about the idea of internal
storage mechanisms within our brain short of
phonemic representation.
I mean, it's kind of obvious that there are, isn't
it? We don't open our eyes and just start
yapping, you know. Well, at least the rest of
us didn't!
What the hell is wrong with, "It's available,"
even if it's not in phonemic conceptual form?
I told you early on why you have this problem,
and I can make it even clearer now. You can
either keep it or correct it. It's not just that
the hierarchical nature of language didn't get
through to you---it's that its REPRESENTATIONAL
nature didn't. As we build our language of its
phonetics, we learn--not directly but implicitly,
as a meta-lesson if you will--that things in
language represent other things. Sounds
represent meanings and meanings represent
referents.
You've got words representing words. Not a
terrible thing, mind you, but not really conducive
to a clear and precise analysis of THE THINGS
BEING ANALYZED.
Now when it comes to the words being analyzed,
then you can keep up with the best of 'em!
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Y'know, there's nothing wrong with you taking the
>yellow brick road to fantasyland, but why are you
>so intent on pulling others down with you?
>
>YOU do some explaining. YOU explain what's so
>tough to understand about the idea of internal
>storage mechanisms within our brain short of
>phonemic representation.
I don't believe phonemes were at issue in the entire conversation in
the Appendis, much less in that little piece Weiss participated in.
I actually think Weiss asked a good question but Rand sidestepped the
issue he was asking about. And that is, processes which occur prior to
conceptualization having to do with percept-formation. Or perhaps I
should say "alleged processes."
Jim Klein
> >YOU do some explaining. YOU explain what's so
> >tough to understand about the idea of internal
> >storage mechanisms within our brain short of
> >phonemic representation.
>
> I don't believe phonemes were at issue in the entire conversation in
> the Appendis, much less in that little piece Weiss participated in.
See, there you go. I wasn't asking about the words, but
about that to which the words refer. Hell, man, can't
you see that you can't even understand the question?
Or start simple...can you even see why it's a question
even though it's not in question form?
> I actually think Weiss asked a good question but Rand sidestepped the
> issue he was asking about. And that is, processes which occur prior to
> conceptualization having to do with percept-formation.
The only thing remotely of value here is the (hidden)
point that a trivial error on Rand's part, but an
error nonetheless, was the belief that our
conceptual division of sensation, perception and
conceptualization, means that the existential
lines are likewise just as distinct.
IOW there is a bit of over-dichotomizing (tri-
chotomizing?) on her part. Now what in the
world you might be saying, nobody can tell.
> Or perhaps I
> should say "alleged processes."
What the fuck does this mean? What, maybe
there are no processes going on? Do tell.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 16, 7:52 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> >YOU do some explaining. YOU explain what's so
>> >tough to understand about the idea of internal
>> >storage mechanisms within our brain short of
>> >phonemic representation.
>>
>> I don't believe phonemes were at issue in the entire conversation in
>> the Appendis, much less in that little piece Weiss participated in.
>
>See, there you go. I wasn't asking about the words, but
>about that to which the words refer. Hell, man, can't
>you see that you can't even understand the question?
You're right, I do not understand your statement - "YOU explain
what's so tough to understand about the idea of internal
storage mechanisms within our brain short of phonemic representation."
Reading it over again fails to produce further clarity. Telling me
that it is about that to which the words refer fails to produce
clarity about "internal storage mechanisms," whatever those are.
>Or start simple...can you even see why it's a question
>even though it's not in question form?
No?
>> I actually think Weiss asked a good question but Rand sidestepped the
>> issue he was asking about. And that is, processes which occur prior to
>> conceptualization having to do with percept-formation.
>
>The only thing remotely of value here is the (hidden)
>point that a trivial error on Rand's part, but an
>error nonetheless, was the belief that our
>conceptual division of sensation, perception and
>conceptualization, means that the existential
>lines are likewise just as distinct.
I don't understand "existential lines."
>IOW there is a bit of over-dichotomizing (tri-
>chotomizing?) on her part. Now what in the
>world you might be saying, nobody can tell.
About which part?
>> Or perhaps I should say "alleged processes."
>
>What the fuck
My my, that is such deep philosophical terminology.
> does this mean? What, maybe
>there are no processes going on? Do tell.
>
"Process" is a term best applied to machines on an assembly line, not
to human perception, and I have been given no reason to believe there
is a process going on in the brain that produces perception. Rand uses
the term "percept" to describe the products of something going on in
the brain that acts upon sensations.
Jim Klein
> I don't understand "existential lines."
I knew we could agree about something!
> "Process" is a term best applied to machines on an assembly line, not
> to human perception, and I have been given no reason to believe there
> is a process going on in the brain that produces perception.
No...you have /received/ no reason to so believe.
But I gotta know...as opposed to what? Just
spontaneously existing, maybe? Being placed
there by wild outside powers?
> Rand uses
> the term "percept" to describe the products of something going on in
> the brain that acts upon sensations.
And the something that produces these products,
may be a process or processes...or what, exactly?
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 16, 2:22 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I don't understand "existential lines."
>
>I knew we could agree about something!
>
>
>> "Process" is a term best applied to machines on an assembly line, not
>> to human perception, and I have been given no reason to believe there
>> is a process going on in the brain that produces perception.
>
>No...you have /received/ no reason to so believe.
>
>But I gotta know...as opposed to what? Just spontaneously existing, maybe?
You got Kant's answer there, by pure coincidence, maybe?
" But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never
come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already
contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of
spontaneity of the faculty of representation" (which is activity of
the Understanding).
> Being placed there by wild outside powers?
..
>> Rand uses
>> the term "percept" to describe the products of something going on in
>> the brain that acts upon sensations.
..
>And the something that produces these products,
>may be a process or processes...or what, exactly?
Time does not elapse from the moment of sensation to the moment of
perception, both moments are identical; therefore, there can be no
amount of time for a process to take place.
In that case, the existence of what Rand called an isolated sensation
(which cannot be retained in memory) is merely a conjecture. Since she
has no memory of one, and has never apparently experienced one, she
theoretically collapses perception into individual units of sensation
which then mind then automatically puts together in the form of a
percept. This theory of hers is not self-evident, only percepts are
self-evident whereas sensations are not. She then claims that the
indirectly acquired notion that sensations are components of
perception is a scientific, conceptual discovery - but cites no
science extant at the time of writing, and in fact, she could not do
so even if she tried - because none existed.
Arnold Broese
news:r7fji59nde44pdoqt...@4ax.com...
> Time does not elapse from the moment of sensation to the moment of
> perception, both moments are identical; therefore, there can be no
> amount of time for a process to take place.
>
> In that case, the existence of what Rand called an isolated sensation
> (which cannot be retained in memory) is merely a conjecture. Since she
> has no memory of one, and has never apparently experienced one, she
> theoretically collapses perception into individual units of sensation
> which then mind then automatically puts together in the form of a
> percept. This theory of hers is not self-evident, only percepts are
> self-evident whereas sensations are not. She then claims that the
> indirectly acquired notion that sensations are components of
> perception is a scientific, conceptual discovery - but cites no
> science extant at the time of writing, and in fact, she could not do
> so even if she tried - because none existed.
The senses give us our sensations, but just because you can "see", doesn't
mean you necessarily perceive. There is a case of a blind skier regaining
his sight, but his brain was unable to convert the sensation into
perception. As a result, he preferred to ski with a blindfold, relying on
the other perceptions he had developed to make up for his lack of vision.
The point being that the normal brain instantly converts sensations into
perceptions automatically, and his 'circuits' to do this, had never
developed.
Here is what Rand had to say:
The lower of the conscious species possess only the faculty of sensation,
which is sufficient to direct their actions and provide for their needs. A
sensation is produced by the automatic reaction of a sense organ to a
stimulus from the outside world; it lasts for the duration of the immediate
moment, as long as the stimulus lasts and no longer. Sensations are an
automatic response, an automatic form of knowledge, which a consciousness
can neither seek nor evade. An organism that possesses only the faculty of
sensation is guided by the pleasure-pain mechanism of its body . . .
The higher organisms possess a much more potent form of consciousness: they
possess the faculty of retaining sensations, which is the faculty of
perception. A "perception" is a group of sensations automatically retained
and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability
to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things. An animal is
guided, not merely by immediate sensations, but by percepts. Its actions are
not single, discrete responses to single, separate stimuli, but are directed
by an integrated awareness of the perceptual reality confronting it.
--
Arnold
Jim Klein
> You got Kant's answer there, by pure coincidence, maybe?
>
> " But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never
> come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already
> contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of
> spontaneity of the faculty of representation" (which is activity of
> the Understanding).
One of the few benefits of senility is that you get
to have laughs more than once over the same thing.
And what? You take this as seriously telling you
something? About anything?
> Time does not elapse from the moment of sensation to the moment of
> perception, both moments are identical;
Yeah right, and you're got a really solid grasp on
the exact referent(s) of this claim, right?
"Identical moments" Lemme get this straight--that
has solid and clear meaning to you, and indeed is
so potent an identification that you are willing to
make it some basis of subsequent identifications,
but you don't believe that in, "That table is red,"
the concept <red> necessarily has an existential
referent?
That's very, very interesting.
> therefore,
Hahahaha.
> In that case,
Hahahaha.
jk
Malrassic Park
<arnold_br...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>The senses give us our sensations, but just because you can "see", doesn't
>mean you necessarily perceive. There is a case of a blind skier regaining
>his sight, but his brain was unable to convert the sensation into
>perception. As a result, he preferred to ski with a blindfold, relying on
>the other perceptions he had developed to make up for his lack of vision.
>The point being that the normal brain instantly converts sensations into
>perceptions automatically, and his 'circuits' to do this, had never
>developed.
That's an interesting example but I'm not sure if you're arguing
against me or not. I don't know what "regaining one's sight" means in
the context of still not being able to see even with functioning eyes
and non-functioning or non-existent ocular center in the brain. I
fully grant the validity of an example in which someone with perfectly
functioning eyes loses his vision when the ocular cortex is surgically
removed.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>> therefore,
>
>Hahahaha.
Translation: Jim Klein is out of arguments.