Moral Obligation
James E. Prescott
8:49 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
[...]
> We have a concept <obligation> which refers to a
> set of existents. As everyone involved in this
> particular discussion agrees, there is uniquely
> /one/ source for the existence of these existents
> ...specifically the free and volitional choice of
> a cognitive being. You call this a "moral
> obligation," and you readily agree that it arises
> from no source whatsoever except the conscious
> choice of an individual.
Let's back up a moment, shall we? I want to be just
as clear and precise as possible.
"Moral" (OR immoral) denotes the chosen actions of a
reason-guided being that are in accordance with (OR are
in violation of) a code of conduct that serves to guide
choices toward a long-range purpose, properly happiness.
"Obligation" denotes the actions of a reason-guided
being that are expected, relied upon and demanded by
other reason-guided beings, such that if the actions
are not performed, punishment may or should follow.
Legal obligations are defined in law. They may arise
as an imposition, by law, upon the actor for whom
they constitute the expected and demanded behavior.
"Moral obligations," by contrast, are obligations in
which the expectation, reliance and demand of others
has been elicited by oneself in the /chosen act/ of
pledging, of promising, of committing oneself.
Moral theorists, however, sometimes posit that because
moral behavior (behavior that is chosen in accord with
a code of conduct aimed at a long range purpose) may
be expected, relied upon and demanded by others, such
expectation, reliance and demand may itself logically
be called a "moral obligation" (by another word, a
duty) and serve as basis of "laws that are moral."
Such, I say, with all due credit to Ayn Rand, is a
very unfortunate, religion-based confusion of terms.
It rests on the notion that somehow morality is a thing
mystically imposed, from without, the way laws may be
imposed, as if by some Supreme Lawgiver. Such an
"obligation to behave morally" may from time to time
be imposed by human laws, but it would not be, and it
is not, the least bit sensible to call such a thing a
"moral obligation." Doing so obliterates the logical
meaning of morality under the influence of religion.
To stress this point, moral denotes that which is
of the actor's /choosing/ in accordance with a
code of conduct that serves the actor's /chosen/
purpose. Obligations may be chosen in the act of
promising, in the act of intentionally eliciting
the expectations and reliance of others, in which
case those are then and only then properly
designated as "moral obligations." (Here, the
adjective "moral" simply means /pertaining/ to
human choice that may be evaluated by reference
to a moral code. It does not mean, of course,
that every chosen obligation is morally good.)
So, by simple clarity of understanding what
morality is and is not, and what obligation
is, /of course/ there is no such thing as an
unchosen moral obligation (no such thing as
a duty). An unchosen moral obligation --
assuming one keeps the meanings of morality
and obligation in clear focus -- would be a
contradiction in terms.
But conventional moral theorists are right about
one thing. Moral obligation /ought/ to be the
foundation of law, of laws that are moral. We
/ought/ choose to craft our laws in accordance
with moral principle, which for law means, in
accordance with the principles of human /social/
conduct that are suited to the long range purpose
of human conduct in general.
As I have said so often of the "moral purpose of
law" (again, using the term moral very precisely),
it is to promote cooperation and trade to mutual
well-being by removing the vicious cycle of force,
retaliation and violence that would otherwise
stand between the actor(s) and his (their)
/happiness/. To serve that moral purpose,
the laws we craft ought enforce no more than the
obligations we each have chosen, i.e., moral
law (meaning law that is in accordance with a
proper moral code) should uphold moral obligations
(meaning obligations that are chosen by each
individual). Otherwise, law is a mere imposition
of obligation (a /compelling/ that disregards the
individual's moral purpose) and as such would
defeat the cooperation and trade which law ought
invite, and invite the retaliation and violence
which law ought defeat. The sorry history of the
world's dictatorships is undeniable proof of the
futility and irrationality of basing law on any
such thing as imposed, unchosen, merely asserted
or faith-based "moral obligation."
> [...A]n originally acknowledged essential
> attribute of obligations was that they are
> willfully chosen.
I trust that now, based on a reasonably careful
reading of the above, you can at least agree that
such is not a proposition /I/ would accept.
Obligation and moral obligation are not synonymous.
Moral obligation and legal obligation are distinct,
and moral-legal obligation denotes obligations that
are chosen by the act of promising and also happen
to be enforceable under the law (as in contract).
A faith-based approach asserts, "You are morally
obligated to do such-and-such because it serves
your fellow man."
I reply, no, I may sometimes want my fellow man
to derive benefit from my actions, and I may
recognize that your desire to see others benefit
has motivated you to craft certain laws, but if
I am "morally obligated" at all it cannot be
"because of that benefit," nor because of your
laws; it can only be because I have chosen, I
have promised, I have committed myself. There is
no other kind or meaning of moral obligation.
> [...] All I'm trying to point out is that this
> "other class of obligation" is something other
> than obligation, and all I'm asking is that you
> therefore denote it as such.
If we wanted to, we could restrict use of the term
obligation to only moral obligation, and we could
invent a new term or say only compelled by law
for legal obligation.
I'm afraid, however, that such would not promote
the clarity we all want. Obligation as it denotes
actions expected, relied upon and demanded by others
is already clear enough and is just not the source of
the confusion here. The true problem lies with the
concepts of moral and morality, not with the concept
of obligation. Or, rather, the problem is that
people tend to confuse the moral with the obligatory.
From our religious traditions we get the idea that
being moral means fulfilling the expectations of
God or society or perhaps even the programming
of some Nature, some the earth-godlike Gaia.
Such misunderstanding cannot be remedied except
head-on, if at all.
> [...A]ccording to you, the facts of reality
> make eating and drinking necessary choices for
> the choice of staying alive and following the
> law is a necessary choice if one wishes to
> instantiate the choice of living as a rational
> being. Indeed, perhaps I've done your work
> for you.
Fine work, yes, indeed. Though eating and drinking
are short-range actions, still you are getting at the
proper distinction between moral and obligatory.
If one wishes to achieve happiness, eating, drinking
and accepting the rule of law are all things that
reason and reality teach are morally proper. But there
is as yet no "obligation" there, as we have NOT YET
introduced the element of fulfilling or failing to
fulfill the expectations and demands of other human
beings. When you actually MAKE the proper moral
choice of accepting the rule of law and promising
to abide by the rule of law, THEN you are actually
entering into a moral obligation, the kind of
obligation that is the proper foundation of the
legal ones.
> [...]
> All I'm asking is that you please not call this
> an obligation until it actually becomes one.
That would leave unnamed the expectations and demands
of others that might (but /ought/ NOT) be imposed on
you regardless of your choice. It is a given that
law compels you to fulfill expectations and demands.
If we don't want to call all law good or all law evil,
we need to clearly identify law's foundation and say
that while it is /possible/ to have legal obligations
that are not grounded in moral obligation, such is not
proper to the moral purpose of law.
> [...P]lease, in the interest of clarifying your own
> position, call [the non-moral kind] something else.
I'm open to suggestions. I do realize there is confusion.
At a point someone can say, "you are obligated," meaning
that the law requires, and then you can reply, "no, I am
truly not obligated," meaning you did not choose, and
the two of you can be talking right past each other and
never appreciate what the other is trying to say.
But, again, I really don't think that's the issue here.
It ought to be easy enough for him to say, "I'm talking
about legal obligation," and for you to say, "I'm talking
about moral obligation." The problem that remains is,
does either one of you see the meaning of morality quite
clearly enough?
Best Wishes
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> > [...A]n originally acknowledged essential
> > attribute of obligations was that they are
> > willfully chosen.
>
> I trust that now, based on a reasonably careful
> reading of the above, you can at least agree that
> such is not a proposition /I/ would accept.
Sure. You wrote an essay to say, "No, Jim, I can't."
> Obligation and moral obligation are not synonymous.
Right, which is why I say it was a linguistic point. In
most cases of higher-level lingos, a modified noun
is within the set referred to by the unmodified ones.
IOW, usually tall trees are a subset of trees. It is for
you too here, but only in order to beg a question...
specifically that moral obligations and legal
obligations are subsets (whether intersecting or
not) of obligation.
Except they aren't. You're pulling this stuff out your ass.
> Moral obligation and legal obligation are distinct,
> and moral-legal obligation denotes obligations that
> are chosen by the act of promising and also happen
> to be enforceable under the law (as in contract).
>
> A faith-based approach asserts, "You are morally
> obligated to do such-and-such because it serves
> your fellow man."
Big deal. A blind-based approach asserts that
obligations can arise from somewhere other
than the choice of the actor.
And you /definitely/ have no business calling yours
any sort of Objectivist approach, as you are quite
clearly asserting that there /is/ such a thing as an
unchosen obligation.
Objectivist or not, this is the basic misidentification
you are offering. Putting the modifier "legal" in
front of it, doesn't change the referent set.
> I reply, no, I may sometimes want my fellow man
> to derive benefit from my actions, and I may
> recognize that your desire to see others benefit
> has motivated you to craft certain laws, but if
> I am "morally obligated" at all it cannot be
> "because of that benefit," nor because of your
> laws; it can only be because I have chosen, I
> have promised, I have committed myself. There is
> no other kind or meaning of moral obligation.
So what? All you're saying is, "But there are other
kinds of obligations." That's your error, or at least
one of about a kagillion.
I mean, c'mon. This is the oldest trick in the book,
insisting on the usage of one particular concept in
order to bring its "baggage" to the claim. So now
you've got obligations outside of the class of morality,
"legal" ones you call them. But maybe you forget---
that was the point you were trying to prove, that
particular moral choices give rise to particular legal
obligations. I'm not even quibbling with the point
presently...I'm just pointing out that you haven't
demonstrated in any meaningful way that those
are really obligations.
> > [...] All I'm trying to point out is that this
> > "other class of obligation" is something other
> > than obligation, and all I'm asking is that you
> > therefore denote it as such.
>
> If we wanted to, we could restrict use of the term
> obligation to only moral obligation, and we could
> invent a new term or say only compelled by law
> for legal obligation.
And how do you propose to do that if you can't
even describe the referent of the concept without
question-begging your way into it?
Spit it out and scream it loud, since this is what you
believe..."There are obligations which aren't chosen."
But you don't scream that out, do you?
> I'm afraid, however, that such would not promote
> the clarity we all want.
Precisely...you're afraid.
> Obligation as it denotes
> actions expected, relied upon and demanded by others
> is already clear enough and is just not the source of
> the confusion here.
Well, at least some of the confusion will be gone when
you scream loud and clear that many, many obligations
aren't chosen. To which I'll say, "Neat trick."
> The true problem lies with the
> concepts of moral and morality, not with the concept
> of obligation. Or, rather, the problem is that
> people tend to confuse the moral with the obligatory.
Either that, or some very confused person tends to
confuse the obligatory with that which isn't chosen.
> From our religious traditions we get the idea that
> being moral means fulfilling the expectations of
> God or society or perhaps even the programming
> of some Nature, some the earth-godlike Gaia.
>
> Such misunderstanding cannot be remedied except
> head-on, if at all.
And you mean /literally/!
> > [...A]ccording to you, the facts of reality
> > make eating and drinking necessary choices for
> > the choice of staying alive and following the
> > law is a necessary choice if one wishes to
> > instantiate the choice of living as a rational
> > being. Indeed, perhaps I've done your work
> > for you.
>
> Fine work, yes, indeed. Though eating and drinking
> are short-range actions, still you are getting at the
> proper distinction between moral and obligatory.
> If one wishes to achieve happiness, eating, drinking
> and accepting the rule of law are all things that
> reason and reality teach are morally proper. But there
> is as yet no "obligation" there, as we have NOT YET
> introduced the element of fulfilling or failing to
> fulfill the expectations and demands of other human
> beings.
Y'know, in all these years, I think this is the very first
time you have acknowledged that this is the essence
of "obligation"...what other people expect and demand.
Maybe tomorrow you'll as honestly acknowledge that this
is light years away from Rand or Objectivism.
> When you actually MAKE the proper moral
> choice of accepting the rule of law and promising
> to abide by the rule of law, THEN you are actually
> entering into a moral obligation,
"Entering into"? Sounds like a cave!
More elementary question-begging on your part---as
if a choice of a personal obligation (oops, I mean
moral obligation) involves some sort of contract
with others.
See, that used to be your "legal obligation." This is
what obfuscation is all about.
> the kind of
> obligation that is the proper foundation of the
> legal ones.
Actually, your assertion is "A is A, and obligations are
enforceable contracts with others." Lovely definition,
except that you forgot to identify reality to get there.
Just read your previous paragraph. Now you've got
"/entering/ into a moral obligation," making it along
the lines of your (previous class of) legal obligations.
Yet earlier, "entering into a moral obligation" would be
a non-starter, even for you, since the sole arisal of moral
obligations is a personal choice.
Ever heard of concept-switching?
> > All I'm asking is that you please not call this
> > an obligation until it actually becomes one.
>
> That would leave unnamed the expectations and demands
> of others that might (but /ought/ NOT) be imposed on
> you regardless of your choice.
Indeed. Never mind "ought NOT;" you can throw in your
"ought TOs" as well. They might remain unnamed because
they are nonexistent, as far as being any sort of obligation.
> It is a given that
> law compels you to fulfill expectations and demands.
> If we don't want to call all law good or all law evil,
> we need to clearly identify law's foundation and say
> that while it is /possible/ to have legal obligations
> that are not grounded in moral obligation, such is not
> proper to the moral purpose of law.
It's funny how your whole argument is suddenly collapsing,
just for want of a simple word to express what you maintain
is a simple referent set.
Maybe you forgot your own argument again. If it weren't
proper, then there wouldn't be (what you call) a "moral
obligation," to fulfill the legal obligation, would there?
But your whole thesis, is that there is. Or do you believe
that it's proper to assume improper moral obligations?
That wouldn't be too close to "A is A," would it?
Indeed, your argument basically is that the legal obligations
are just so, so proper that they trump virtually any moral
obligations. Though every once in a while, you throw in
a few undefined exceptions, which is what the "tolerable"
thing was all about in the first place.
> I'm open to suggestions. I do realize there is confusion.
> At a point someone can say, "you are obligated," meaning
> that the law requires, and then you can reply, "no, I am
> truly not obligated," meaning you did not choose, and
> the two of you can be talking right past each other and
> never appreciate what the other is trying to say.
Sounds very civil. Except every time you have a discussion
like this, you inevitably get reduced to the words and beliefs
of a simple outright thug---"But that is how it is and if you don't
want to see it, then we'll just have to beat you up until you do."
> But, again, I really don't think that's the issue here.
> It ought to be easy enough for him to say, "I'm talking
> about legal obligation," and for you to say, "I'm talking
> about moral obligation." The problem that remains is,
> does either one of you see the meaning of morality quite
> clearly enough?
The relevant question here is, "Do you," and specifically
with regard to obligation.
Yours is a lair of a priori, self-imagined knowledge. "If you
wish to live as a rational man, then you must choose the
obligation of abiding by the law..." [BTW, I find that part
relatively innocent; it's what Arnold or nearly all Objectivists
would say, even though it's still definitional for want of
identifications that really derive it] "...and once you do that,
you have assumed any and all of the obligations that are
now or ever introduced into the law."
Sure, you've got some ridiculous "intolerable" exception
that somehow never occurs, but that's not even the point
here. I haven't even started with a close look at your
argument and already there are contradictions galore.
Just for starters, you've got your so-called legal obligations
being derivative (and caused by) your so-called moral
obligations, while you have those same moral obligations
being derivative (and caused by) the legal obligations.
You're pretty explicit about that part, you know. Of course,
I suppose that makes some sense for someone who's
actually trying to derive that intricately tied up with
self-interested motivations and obligations, are whatever
bullshit others can demand of you.
This is neither moral, nor civil, nor practical. Other than that,
though, it makes an awfully convincing argument! Right
now, about all I wonder is how you can think this is in the
same universe as Objectivism. Rand made plenty of
mistakes in this arena too, including what she offered as
her founding premise...but damn, even that didn't cause
her to dive headfirst into a swamp of swill.
As always, though, you paint a pretty picture. You've got
some symbiotic relationship or something between these
moral obligations and legal obligations. That's wonderful,
and just as soon as you can point to something in reality
that implies anything even close to such a thing, maybe
you'll make some sense. Till then, I think you'll always
be reduced to the mere whining of a thug---"This is the
way it is because this is the way I say it is, and I'll mess
you up if you don't agree."
YOU are the reason men tried to instill Rule of Law in the
first place. And YOU are the reason it's doomed to failure.
jk
James E. Prescott
> On Jan 21, 4:17 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> legal obligations are subsets (whether intersecting or
> not) of obligation.
They are intersecting subsets of obligation, yes. Not
all moral obligation is legally enforceable obligation.
Not all law springs from the individual's choice, such
as to qualify as a moral obligation. That is unfortunate.
Law should reflect and be grounded in obligations taken
freely. The fact that it is not always such is a fault
that needs fixing.
> [...]
> And you /definitely/ have no business calling yours
> any sort of Objectivist approach, as you are quite
> clearly asserting that there /is/ such a thing as an
> unchosen obligation.
You have an understanding of Objectivism as skewed
as Charles and with a wonderfully amusing symmetry!
He claims to an Objectivist there are no moral
obligations, only legal obligations; you claim to
an Objectivist there are no legal obligations, only
moral obligations. Delightful! You share yet
another trait that I'll mention below, and such
kinship ought give you pause, I would think.
And, BTW, a caution that after all these years
shouldn't be needed: I would modestly suggest to
you that you'll have a better chance challenging my
moral arguments than challenging my familiarity
with Objectivism.
> [...M]aybe you forget---that was the point you
> were trying to prove, that particular moral choices
> give rise to particular legal obligations. I'm
> not even quibbling with the point presently...
> [...]
Not surprising. How could you? Of course particular
moral choices give rise to particular legal obligations.
That's what a contract is all about.
Or maybe you forget...I was, what were your words?
Kicking butt, I think, was the phrase that you used.
So how could you wish to quibble over this point
once again? Are you not still sore? ;-)
> [...S]cream it loud, since this is what you
> believe..."There are obligations which aren't
> chosen."
No need for me to shout. There are obligations
which aren't chosen. I wish there weren't.
> [...]
> Y'know, in all these years, I think this is the
> very first time you have acknowledged that this
> is the essence of "obligation"...what other people
> expect and demand.
Obligation is always to others; I have not in all
these years said otherwise.
> Maybe tomorrow you'll as honestly acknowledge
> that this is light years away from Rand or
> Objectivism.
I can't acknowledge what is not true. Ayn Rand
disapproved of unchosen obligations, as do I.
She paid her taxes, as do I. She recognized
that disapproval of something is not the same
as denying its existence. I disagree with Ayn
Rand in a great many ways, some of them closely
related to this present discussion. However,
in regard to the simple fact that legal obligations
exist, of course she knew this every bit as well
as I know it, and only somewhat better than
you yourself know it.
> > When you actually MAKE the proper moral
> > choice of accepting the rule of law and
> > promising to abide by the rule of law,
> > THEN you are actually entering into a
> > moral obligation,
> "Entering into"? Sounds like a cave!
Sounds like a contract, which it is.
> More elementary question-begging on your part---as
> if a choice of a personal obligation (oops, I mean
> moral obligation) involves some sort of contract
> with others.
If it does not, then I am at a loss to understand
what it is that YOU are referring to when you use
the word "obligation."
I have defined my terms with precision. Do me the
same courtesy. What the heck are you talking about??
> [...] Actually, your assertion is "A is A, and
> obligations are enforceable contracts with others."
There you go. You drop my words, you substitute
a straw man, and you claim to somehow "know" that what
I "actually assert" is something OTHER than what I
have asserted. A bit Charles-ish, wouldn't you say?
Obligations are as I defined them. They are not all
enforceable contracts. Some are unjustly imposed.
Some are freely accepted but not enforceable. Others
(contract) are freely accepted and consequently
enforceable (consequently, because accepting
enforceability is part of what contracting means).
> [...]
> Yet earlier, "entering into a moral obligation"
> would be a non-starter, even for you, since the
> sole arisal of moral obligations is a personal
> choice.
The personal choice is the choice to enter into a
moral obligation, to make a promise, etc. Why is
this hard for you to grasp? It shouldn't be hard.
> [...]
> Maybe you forgot your own argument again. If
> it weren't proper, then there wouldn't be (what
> you call) a "moral obligation," to fulfill the
> legal obligation, would there?
Being proper is not the issue. Being chosen is the
issue. You can choose to do something improper,
though you shouldn't. You can promise to do
something improper, though you shouldn't. If you
do foolishly make such a promise, fulfill it --
unless it's illegal, of course. A promise to
commit an illegal act is a violation of your
earlier obligation to abide by law, which
properly takes precedence in any court.
> [..D]o you believe that it's proper to assume
> improper moral obligations?
Of course not. It's improper. But that doesn't mean
you aren't accepting a moral obligation if you
promise to do something improper. It's improper
to squander all your money on gambling, drinks and
loose women, and yet you are nonetheless morally
obligated to pay your bills when you check out
and leave Vegas.
This is not rocket science, Jim. Moral obligation
pertains to the commitments you voluntarily make
to other people. It doesn't have anything to do
with whether you are behaving morally or not
(except to the extent that fulfilling these
obligations is moral, and violating them is not).
> [...] Yours is a lair of a priori, self-imagined
> knowledge. "If you wish to live as a rational
> man, then you must choose the obligation of abiding
> by the law..."
I never wrote such silliness. I wrote that if you
wish to attain happiness in life you should adopt
and abide by a proper moral code, to include making
the choice now and then to obligate yourself to
others as they obligate themselves to you, and of
course to have many of these obligations enforced
under the rule of law.
> [...]
> Sure, you've got some ridiculous "intolerable" exception
> that somehow never occurs [...]
Courts don't find it ridiculous. It occurs more often
than you might think.
> [...Y]ou've got your so-called legal obligations
> being derivative (and caused by) your so-called
> moral obligations, while you have those same
> moral obligations being derivative (and caused by)
> the legal obligations.
You're losing me here. I can't quite make out what it
is you're trying to say. Perhaps this is another case
of you substituting a different formulation to produce
some supposed contradictions.
Moral obligation (a commitment to abide by the
rule of law) rests at the base of all proper legal
obligations, and specific legal obligations /ought/
be derived from contract and from the requirements
of due process.
Not all law derives so, but it should. I have explained
why in some detail. I can do so again, if you need it
explained again. Or, you could perhaps offer up a counter-
argument.
That would be refreshing indeed!
> [...] You've got some symbiotic relationship or
> something between these moral obligations and legal
> obligations. That's wonderful, and just as soon as
> you can point to something in reality that implies
> anything even close to such a thing, maybe you'll
> make some sense.
Contract law. Criminal law. Civil law. Your word,
should you mean to keep it. These are ALL things
in reality that do more than "resemble" what I've
explained; they ARE what I've explained.
So far as I can tell, Jim, your response is to sling
abuse at me and not really try to make a case for
a contrary point of view. How on earth can you
imagine that a contract is NOT a chosen obligation
enforceable under law? I.e., a moral obligation
that is the basis of a legal obligation?
You can sneer at it all you want, but the ball is
in your court and will just go whizzing by if you
let it. A sneer never returned a volley.
> [...]
> YOU are the reason men tried to instill Rule of
> Law in the first place. And YOU are the reason
> it's doomed to failure.
Don't hold your breath waiting for it to fail.
It's forty-love already. At least take a swing.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
so just a few questions/comments for now...
On Jan 21, 1:32 pm, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Obligation is always to others; I have not in all
> these years said otherwise.
If I wish to live, I don't have an obligation to eat?
That's not an obligation?
> I can't acknowledge what is not true. Ayn Rand
> disapproved of unchosen obligations, as do I.
I don't think this was her point, and I'll try to find
a cite or two later.
This is one thing that Charles has right, and he
seems to understand it as well as anyone I've
ever read. Indeed, one might says it's his
redeeming quality!
Simply put, it's not that "unchosen obligations" are
bad; it's that they don't exist. This is a fact of reality
owing to the nature of a man, and is the reason that
I ask you to denote the set of unchosen "obligations"
as something else.
Can an appetite arise from anywhere other than within
the actor who has it? No, of course not. How about a
decision? No, neither can that. Obligations are a subset
of this latter, period.
> > More elementary question-begging on your part---as
> > if a choice of a personal obligation (oops, I mean
> > moral obligation) involves some sort of contract
> > with others.
>
> If it does not, then I am at a loss to understand
> what it is that YOU are referring to when you use
> the word "obligation."
It is the thing /I/ create when I conclude something
along the lines of, "I wish to live; therefore I must eat."
Even that's not a pre-existing obligation; it becomes
an obligation when I put the logic together.
Only /I/ can create an obligation for myself, and likewise
others for themselves. Sure, it's easy enough to understand
what you mean to say...the problem is (as usual) when the
simple lingo is turned around to imply something that
doesn't exist. Like I said, it's the oldest trick in the book.
> Some are freely accepted but not enforceable.
That's your error. They are ALL freely accepted, since they
can't come into existence any other way.
> The personal choice is the choice to enter into a
> moral obligation, to make a promise, etc. Why is
> this hard for you to grasp? It shouldn't be hard.
It's not hard. The error is in understanding WHY we
ought to keep (what you call) our obligations. It's
NOT because of some appeal to others or your law
or anything else.
It's because of the only thing it could be...an appeal
to our OWN selves. It is this error--a remnant of both
altruism and supernaturalism--that throws guys like
Arnold astray. He should keep his contracts with me
not because he gives a shit about me, but because
he gives a shit about himself.
This is what egoism is all about, even as we have to
deal with the vestiges of people serving some "higher
cause" or something, outside of themselves. For
Arnold, it's an "orderly society;" for you, it's "Rule of
Law;" for many, it's Jesus Christ; for Post-Morem
Objectivists, it's a group and a shitty epistemology.
You get the point.
Lastly, there was this...
> > [...] Yours is a lair of a priori, self-imagined
> > knowledge. "If you wish to live as a rational
> > man, then you must choose the obligation of abiding
> > by the law..."
>
> I never wrote such silliness.
Really? Three paragraphs later, you offered this...
> Moral obligation (a commitment to abide by the
> rule of law) rests at the base of all proper legal
> obligations,
Maybe it is really rocket science, and I'm just too stupid.
> and specific legal obligations /ought/
> be derived from contract and from the requirements
> of due process.
Uh, no...that's not what you're saying. You're saying
that they DO derive from contract, specifically the
contract that arose when you made the earlier
moral obligation. That's why you believe they can
be forcefully imposed justifiably.
I say they CAN'T derive from ANY source except the
willful choice of an individual, and the assertion that
they can makes them something other than obligation.
Clarify what you wish. I expect it to be quite a while
before I can sort out all the mish-mosh you offer.
I mean, prima facie the words string together nicely and
it's all very intuitive. Luckily "intuitive" doesn't translate
to "factual" and I /always/ start with identification.
jk
Phil Roberts, Jr.
> On Jan 21, 10:25 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>>On Jan 21, 4:17 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>[...You beg a question] that moral obligations and
>>legal obligations are subsets (whether intersecting or
>>not) of obligation.
>
Just to let both of you know, there is at least one
lurker out here who has found this interchange one of
the more interesting I have seen on the net in quite
some time. BOTH of you seem quite adept in defending
your respective positions.
Naturally, I have my own take on these issues, but
I can't help but be fascinated with the perspectives
you guys are bringing to this matter.
Phil
James E. Prescott
> I'm sorry, but I haven't time for a serious reply presently,
> so just a few questions/comments for now...
Whatever time you can spare is appreciated.
> On Jan 21, 1:32 pm, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Obligation is always to others; I have not in all
> > these years said otherwise.
>
> If I wish to live, I don't have an obligation to eat?
Correct.
> That's not an obligation?
Correct. It is not an obligation. An obligation is a
behavior owed to others. You cannot enter into an
"agreement" with yourself. You cannot "require"
yourself to do something. Takes two, at least. You
can, of course, do the right thing. And you should.
> [...]
> Simply put, it's not that "unchosen obligations"
> are bad; it's that they don't exist. This is a
> fact of reality owing to the nature of a man [...].
You keep saying that, but it is not true, and so
far you've offered no explanation for why you
even suppose it might be true, much less a
logical argument. Take your time!
> [...]
> Can an appetite arise from anywhere other than
> within the actor who has it? No, of course not.
If you imagine your stomach is obligating you to
eat, you might have an interesting take, but
that would not be an obligation of your choosing;
that would be an unchosen obligation. You did
not choose to suffer the pangs of hunger.
But it's irrelevant anyway. Stomachs do not
understand any promise you make to them; they
cannot expect, rely or demand. Obligation is
always and only among reason-guided beings.
> [...Obligation] is the thing /I/ create when
> I conclude something along the lines of,
> "I wish to live; therefore I must eat."
> Even that's not a pre-existing obligation;
> it becomes an obligation when I put the logic
> together.
That's better. At least now I understand what
is confusing you. You are wrong here. When you
grasp that you must do something for the sake
of something else, you have grasped a truth and
perhaps even a moral principle (for long range
purposes). You now know what you /should/ do.
But you are not obligated to anyone, so you are
not obligated. Period. Obligation means ONLY
what I expressed. It is exclusively the condition
you are in when /others/ expect, rely and demand
certain behavior from you (paying a bill, for
instance) or else, if you fail to fulfill the
obligation, they are (or feel, with power to
back it up) wronged and entitled to take action
against you.
There is no other meaning of obligation. You can
never be "obligated to yourself," or "obligated
to reality."
> [...] The error is in understanding WHY we
> ought to keep (what you call) our obligations. It's
> NOT because of some appeal to others or your law
> or anything else.
>
> It's because of the only thing it could be...an appeal
> to our OWN selves.
Oh, I agree. The only reason you should do anything
is because it contributes to your own long range
self-interest; your own happiness. I am, as I've said,
a thoroughgoing egoist. And I've always meant what
I've said. The welfare of others is of no concern to
me whatsoever EXCEPT as their welfare contributes
to MY happiness, and MY happiness alone.
I fulfill the obligations I take freely upon myself
because it is in MY selfish interest to do so, and
for no other reason.
> [...] He should keep his contracts with me
> not because he gives a shit about me, but because
> he gives a shit about himself.
There might be a more poetic way to put it, but,
yes, of course.
> This is what egoism is all about, even as we have to
> deal with the vestiges of people serving some "higher
> cause" or something, outside of themselves.
Agreed, again.
> For Arnold, it's an "orderly society;" for you,
> it's "Rule of Law;" [...]
Arnold probably agrees. I certainly don't worship
the rule of law as some sort of deity. I /prize/ the
rule of law because it serves MY happiness. You
should, too.
> > > [...] Yours is a lair of a priori, self-imagined
> > > knowledge. "If you wish to live as a rational
> > > man, then you must choose the obligation of abiding
> > > by the law..."
>
> > I never wrote such silliness.
>
> Really? Three paragraphs later, you offered this...
>
> > Moral obligation (a commitment to abide by the
> > rule of law) rests at the base of all proper legal
> > obligations,
I meant, I never wrote such as "if you wish to live as
a rational being."
You are a rational being -- that's a given -- and you
can easily live a very long time as a rational being
and be quite unhappy.
I write always, "If you wish to attain happiness in
life..."
> > and specific legal obligations /ought/
> > be derived from contract and from the requirements
> > of due process.
>
> Uh, no...that's not what you're saying.
There you go again, telling me what I'm saying.
> You're saying that they DO derive from contract,
> specifically the contract that arose when you made
> the earlier moral obligation.
And many do, as they ought. But not all of them,
as they should.
> That's why you believe they can
> be forcefully imposed justifiably.
The rules can be enforced, justifiably, when you have
pledged to abide by them. Have you ever played or
watched a game of football?
> [...]
> I mean, prima facie the words string together nicely and
> it's all very intuitive. Luckily "intuitive" doesn't translate
> to "factual" and I /always/ start with identification.
That's a good place to start. Correctly identify the
meaning of the concept obligation, and then maybe we
can make some progress.
Best Wished,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
[snip it; the specifics don't matter here]
Maybe we're finally getting somewhere. You're
just misidentifying, that's all. And I'm the guy who
can explain it to you, maybe.
You don't need to bother with dictionaries or etymologies
or any of that. I know what you're saying, and from
where it comes. You are saying "obligation" means
"to tie oneself to" something, and in the realm of social
interaction, that something is other people.
That's understandable enough, and the word doesn't
have a mysterious etymology or anything.
But that doesn't matter. As my very first sentence stated,
I /always/ start with identification. So the historic usage
of the concept means no more to me than the historic
usage of "selfish" or "ego" or even "Rule of Law."
I don't even mind stipulating that in this context, it
does mean "to someone else," if you think that'll
help you. Your problem is, it doesn't help you on
the issue of the source of obligations.
The relevant point here, is /from where/ an obligation
can arise. And on this, I am right and you are wrong.
An obligation, regardless of to whom and for what,
can /only/ arise in an individual, and only /by/ that
individual. It is a subset of "decision," which itself
is a subset of "thought."
This point is so obviously true, that I don't want to
expand too much on it. You need to think it over
and see that I am right. For the moment, we can
leave what it might do to your position generally,
aside. You've shown intellectual honesty in the
past, so I'll rely on it for the moment.
Are you able to see that the /only possible/ source
of an obligation, is an individual himself? If so,
then we can move forward. If not, then I'll try
to make it more clear to you.
jk
James E. Prescott
> On Jan 22, 5:44 pm, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Maybe we're finally getting somewhere. �[...]
> You don't need to bother with dictionaries or
> etymologies or any of that. �[...]
It's no bother, and we can skip dictionaries
perhaps, but I'm afraid we won't entirely be
freed of the need to account for and to
acknowledge usage, for a reason I'll try
to explain.
> [...]
> I don't even mind stipulating that in this context, it
> does mean "to someone else," [...]
Please, then, let's do so stipulate.
> [...]
> The relevant point here, is /from where/ an obligation
> can arise. �And on this, I am right and you are wrong.
> An obligation, regardless of to whom and for what,
> can /only/ arise in an individual, and only /by/ that
> individual. �It is a subset of "decision," which itself
> is a subset of "thought."
Well, look at that, perhaps we are now finally getting
somewhere!
This is an okay assessment of obligation as moral
commitment. Such is, indeed, just as you say, a
true subset of decision, or, as I have said, a subset
of reason-guided /choice/.
I can choose to eat a hamburger. And I can choose
to obligate myself to you, to promise to pay tomorrow.
Both are kinds of choices. The latter choice is what
"obligate" (oneself) means. It happens in the twin acts
of me choosing to say to you, "I will gladly pay tomorrow
for a hamburger today," and you accepting the promise.
It is indeed a subset of decision, of choice.
> This point is so obviously true, that I don't want to
> expand too much on it. �You need to think it over
> and see that I am right.
You are right. I don't really need to think it over too
much, Jim.
>�[...] You've shown intellectual honesty in the
> past, so I'll rely on it for the moment.
You can rely on it, I assure you.
> Are you able to see that the /only possible/ source
> of an obligation, is an individual himself?
Of what I call moral obligation, certainly. There is
no such thing as duty, no such thing as an unchosen
moral obligation. I cannot count the number of times
I have made this exact same point to you and to others.
The notion that a moral obligation can come from any
other place (God's Will, our biological natures, etc.) is
mystical nonsense, and I'm glad you and I agree
about this.
>�If so then we can move forward. �If not, then I'll try
> to make it more clear to you.
It is as clear to me, right now, as anything I can imagine.
But you should know, that is not the issue. The issue is
not whether this thing I call moral obligation is a subset
of decision (it is), but whether this "moral obligation"
is the only /kind/ of obligation, OR whether it and legal
obligation are intersecting and related subsets of something
called obligation-in-general, something that happens to
include obligations not chosen but imposed.
I think I can demonstrate the latter.
A typical agreement involves an exchange of obligations
over time, but for simplicity we can stick with just the
hamburger today for the dollar tomorrow -- a simple
exchange resulting in an obligation on just one side.
Wimpy gets to eat today. Popeye has already fulfilled
his half of the bargain, and so Popeye isn't obligated.
Only Wimpy is. But still TWO people, at least, are involved
in the twin acts of any such single obligation. One is
obligated. One is owed. The first person's act is a
promise given in exchange for something, which to be
a promise-in-exchange must be an intention meaningfully
conveyed in some such manner as can be /understood/
by the recipient of the promise. And the second person's
act is the acceptance of the promise and the giving
of the value (the burger). Acceptance and giving-in-
exchange-for-promise, likewise of course, require an
/understanding/ of the promise that was made.
For a such an obligation, which is a mental thing, of
course, an idea, a /belief/, where ultimately does the
obligation "reside," in the mind of the obligated, or in
the mind of the owed?
Both of course. But the answer is not quite equally in
both places. The hamburger is gone. Eaten. All that
remains is the obligation -- the obligation to pay for
the hamburger. Wimpy knows he has this obligation.
Or does he? What if he didn't really promise anything?
OR, what if he wrongly denies, or forgets, or simply
chooses to do nothing at all tomorrow? Wimpy has
already gotten what he wanted, he's sated, there are
no more things to obtain left on his calendar. But
Popeye still believes that Wimpy is obligated to pay
him today for the hamburger eaten yesterday.
Popeye is the one with a sought-after thing, a
must-do-today still on his calendar -- collect.
So while it may be about even, it is in the mind of
the owed, and it is /to/ the owed, that obligation
or the meaning and value of obligation are some-
what more critical, one might say. Popeye is the
one who will say something to Wimpy if the day
passes without the payment he is owed. He might
even /do/ something to Wimpy.
Is it possible to believe you are owed something
when you are not? Of course! Happens a lot. What
do people call it when they believe they are owed
something when they are not? They call it an
obligation. What do they call it when they say
you must help the poor, even though you made
no promise to do so? Such is called, by those
asserting it, an obligation, a performance just like
the payment for a burger that is expected, relied
upon and demanded of you, even though in
actual fact you did nothing, made no promise,
to incur it. (Heck, it's even possible to believe
you yourself owe something when you don't.
Church-goers see obligation in their own prayers
and penance and tithing and what-have-you every
day.)
What do we, Jim Klein and I, call such a thing?
You propose /not/ to call it obligation. To call
it something else.
Okay, let's think about that for a second. The
expectation, the reliance, the demand, and
the saying/doing something about it (doing
something about "non-fulfillment") are precisely
the same in both cases.
And importantly, how do you communicate
with those who hold such belief? Do you
anticipate an accord under which those who
expect, rely upon, and demand some behavior
"as if promised" will classify this (their own
regarding the behavior due and failure
punishable) as a thing /not/ obligation?
Can't happen. And it is a real thing. /Regarding/
behavior due and failure punishable is really,
really there, and it has the exact same effect in
reality whether Wimpy ate the burger or not,
whether God exists or not, and whether Nature
compels or not. Disapproval does not constitute
a denial of existence; the question is only what
to /call/ this unfortunate existing thing.
And importantly, those who hold such mistaken
belief cannot /not/ call it "obligation." It falls in
the class of expectation, reliance and demand
/along with/ promised behavior, and it is for
them, for the actors, for the owed or for the
purportedly owed, that the idea finds expression
as a guide to their actions, including the making
of laws.
So even if I am open to suggestion and willing
for the sake of argument to call unchosen
"obligation" unchosen "something-else"
between you and me, that wouldn't affect,
and can't possibly affect, the meaning of
the word applied by those believing they
are owed things that were not promised.
So the best we can do is to say there are
two kinds of obligation, the chosen obligations
in which the expectation, reliance and demand
is elicited by promise (moral); and the obligations
in which the expectation, reliance and demand
does indeed /exist/, but was /not/ created by a
promise (was imposed and was not chosen
by the person being obligated).
This allows us, then, to speak meaningfully
and clearly about legal obligations, about what
you are obligated to do by law.
We can say that some of these legal obligations
are moral because they spring from the choice of
people freely entering into enforceable contracts.
And, we can say that some of these obligations
are merely imposed by the state without regard to
the choices made by those who are expected to
fulfill them and who are punished if they do not.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
[some snippage]
> It is indeed a subset of decision, of choice.
That's what I thought. Love-15.
>The issue is
> not whether this thing I call moral obligation is a subset
> of decision (it is), but whether this "moral obligation"
> is the only /kind/ of obligation,
Right, or more precisely whether there are any sorts of
obligations that fall outside the realm of choice and/or
morality, that can arise from some source besides the
singular one to which you've already agreed.
> OR whether it and legal
> obligation are intersecting and related subsets of something
> called obligation-in-general, something that happens to
> include obligations not chosen but imposed.
Yes, exactly.
> I think I can demonstrate the latter.
You can't demonstrate the latter, because it doesn't
exist. All you can do is utter some words that imply
that it might...sort of like "essence."
That's why you need so many words for the demonstration!
> A typical agreement involves an exchange of obligations
> over time, but for simplicity we can stick with just the
> hamburger today for the dollar tomorrow -- a simple
> exchange resulting in an obligation on just one side.
>
> Wimpy gets to eat today. Popeye has already fulfilled
> his half of the bargain, and so Popeye isn't obligated.
You're using the word in the sense that you're trying to
prove exists. Popeye is obligated for whatever the hell
Popeye chooses to be obligated for.
Love-30.
> Only Wimpy is.
False, for the reason stated. But there can only be one
score on one bad hit.
> But still TWO people, at least, are involved
> in the twin acts of any such single obligation.
No, that would be the trade. Only one person is involved
in any act of obligation...at least as far as creating the
obligation is concerned. Or two simultaneously, which
is the most frequent case in trade scenarios.
Look, I'm not a total dunce; I understand what you're saying.
> One is obligated. One is owed.
Begs the question of the usage of the concept. Just because
we both understand what a promise is, or just because we
understand this frequent usage of "obligation," does not
make any comment on the existential nature of that
obligation. That existential nature is as I'm saying it is,
which is totally arising in a single individual.
Are you denying this?
> The first person's act is a
> promise given in exchange for something, which to be
> a promise-in-exchange must be an intention meaningfully
> conveyed in some such manner as can be /understood/
> by the recipient of the promise.
Right...exactly so. What a shame that a second person's
understanding of another person's obligation, doesn't
actually create an obligation in the first. Besides being
obvious, we also know that the /only/ source of an obligation
in the first, is a decision by the first.
Love-40
> And the second person's
> act is the acceptance of the promise and the giving
> of the value (the burger). Acceptance and giving-in-
> exchange-for-promise, likewise of course, require an
> /understanding/ of the promise that was made.
Okay.
> For a such an obligation,
Oops...that wasn't an obligation; hence the phrase "such
an obligation" is nonsensical. The "understanding of the
promise that was made" is not, nor does it create, an
obligation. Did you forget already? That's not how an
obligation can come to be. It's only how "an understanding
of an obligation" can come to be.
> which is a mental thing, of
> course, an idea, a /belief/, where ultimately does the
> obligation "reside," in the mind of the obligated, or in
> the mind of the owed?
>
> Both of course.
No...of course not. Your obligations can only reside in your
mind. The closest you can come, as you put it, is "an
understanding" of what obligations I have chosen.
Don't get me wrong. Among honest men, this understanding
can be taken to be accurate. People make book on correctly
understanding the obligations of others...as we both know,
this is the underpinning of business and capitalism.
But we're not quite that far along yet, because you still
insist on the synonymity of "being obliged" and "being
understood to be obliged." The former can only be
pursuant to a decision, which is an wholly individual action.
This, notwithstanding the fact that any number of people
might understand and/or say that the person is obligated.
I am speaking simply of the fact of the matter, and I already
said I wasn't even addressing your wider argument at this
stage. But your wider argument isn't even worth looking at,
if it depends on the claim that an obligation can actually and
literally arise from an action other than the willful action of
a singular individual.
> But the answer is not quite equally in
> both places.
Gee...I wonder why not.
> The hamburger is gone. Eaten. All that
> remains is the obligation -- the obligation to pay for
> the hamburger. Wimpy knows he has this obligation.
> Or does he? What if he didn't really promise anything?
> OR, what if he wrongly denies, or forgets, or simply
> chooses to do nothing at all tomorrow? Wimpy has
> already gotten what he wanted, he's sated, there are
> no more things to obtain left on his calendar. But
> Popeye still believes that Wimpy is obligated to pay
> him today for the hamburger eaten yesterday.
Right. "Popeye still believes..."
> Popeye is the one with a sought-after thing, a
> must-do-today still on his calendar -- collect.
Better he eats his spinach, I say. But alright...we'll
assume he's like nearly everyone else.
> So while it may be about even, it is in the mind of
> the owed, and it is /to/ the owed, that obligation
> or the meaning and value of obligation are some-
> what more critical, one might say.
Yes, one might say that and we might take a look at
that, once we understand that just because Popeye
/calls/ it an obligation on Wimpy's part, that Wimpy
did not necessarily choose to have that obligation.
I guess you really did forget. Wimpy can have an
obligation from only one source---Wimpy's decision.
> Popeye is the
> one who will say something to Wimpy if the day
> passes without the payment he is owed. He might
> even /do/ something to Wimpy.
Ya think? Is that why he should eat his spinach IYO?
I think he should eat his spinach because it's good for
him. But I guess figuring out what's good for him will
have to wait a bit, because you're still having trouble
seeing clearly what an obligation is.
> Is it possible to believe you are owed something
> when you are not? Of course! Happens a lot. What
> do people call it when they believe they are owed
> something when they are not? They call it an
> obligation.
Thanks for pointing that out and giving up this particular
game in so doing. That was very sacrificial of you.
> What do they call it when they say
> you must help the poor, even though you made
> no promise to do so? Such is called, by those
> asserting it, an obligation, a performance just like
> the payment for a burger that is expected, relied
> upon and demanded of you, even though in
> actual fact you did nothing, made no promise,
> to incur it. (Heck, it's even possible to believe
> you yourself owe something when you don't.
> Church-goers see obligation in their own prayers
> and penance and tithing and what-have-you every
> day.)
>
> What do we, Jim Klein and I, call such a thing?
> You propose /not/ to call it obligation. To call
> it something else.
That's exactly right. I propose not to call a thing
that which it is not.
> Okay, let's think about that for a second. The
> expectation, the reliance, the demand, and
> the saying/doing something about it (doing
> something about "non-fulfillment") are precisely
> the same in both cases.
Good point. That should tell you right there that it's
not based on any fact. A is not not-A.
> And importantly, how do you communicate
> with those who hold such belief?
I'm inclined toward pity and understanding, myself.
> Do you
> anticipate an accord under which those who
> expect, rely upon, and demand some behavior
> "as if promised" will classify this (their own
> regarding the behavior due and failure
> punishable) as a thing /not/ obligation?
>
> Can't happen. And it is a real thing. /Regarding/
> behavior due and failure punishable is really,
> really there, and it has the exact same effect in
> reality whether Wimpy ate the burger or not,
> whether God exists or not, and whether Nature
> compels or not. Disapproval does not constitute
> a denial of existence; the question is only what
> to /call/ this unfortunate existing thing.
Call it any ol' thing you want, but don't pretend that
it /is/ an obligation, that's all.
I mean damn, man, you pretty much proved it
right there! There should be at least two games
per set, don't you think?
> And importantly, those who hold such mistaken
> belief cannot /not/ call it "obligation." It falls in
> the class of expectation, reliance and demand
> /along with/ promised behavior, and it is for
> them, for the actors, for the owed or for the
> purportedly owed, that the idea finds expression
> as a guide to their actions, including the making
> of laws.
Indeed. If you stay on this roll, you may find yourself
making an argument for anarchy!
> So even if I am open to suggestion and willing
> for the sake of argument to call unchosen
> "obligation" unchosen "something-else"
> between you and me, that wouldn't affect,
> and can't possibly affect, the meaning of
> the word applied by those believing they
> are owed things that were not promised.
No, of course it won't affect what they mean by it.
Christians will still say that obligations arise from
a duty to do God's will, Neo-Objectivists will still
say that obligations arise from reading OPAR, and
Muslim terrorists will still say that obligations arise
from Allah's intent that all Westerners die.
Do you have some difficulty with the idea that
identification is about what things are, not what
people believe them to be?
> So the best we can do is to say there are
> two kinds of obligation,
No...that's the best YOU can do, apparently. And I for
one don't even believe that. I believe you can distinguish
between "being an obligation" and "being considered an
obligation."
If I'm wrong, could you kindly explicitly confirm that
you're not able to do that?
> This allows us, then, to speak meaningfully
> and clearly about legal obligations, about what
> you are obligated to do by law.
How about if we decide whether or not we can speak
meaningfully about that, AFTER we've come to a very
clear agreement about the simple fact that obligation
can only /actually/ arise by the willful decision of a
single individual, irrespective of how anyone else
considers it.
Are you able to clearly agree about that?
> We can say that some of these legal obligations
> are moral because they spring from the choice of
> people freely entering into enforceable contracts.
> And, we can say that some of these obligations
> are merely imposed by the state without regard to
> the choices made by those who are expected to
> fulfill them and who are punished if they do not.
Yes, we can say all that. And once we get a few of the
simple facts pinned down, we'll take a closer look at
how accurate we are, when we say that.
I understand you have a lot invested in this theory. It's
now up to you whether or not that investment is worth
the disregard of simple facts. For me, that's always a
no-brainer. For me, there's /nothing/ that's worth the
disregard of simple facts. I almost consider the very
proposition oxymoronic. It'd be like asking if anything
were worth my lungs not breathing.
jk
James E. Prescott
> On Jan 23, 4:57 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> [some snippage]
[a lot of snippage]
> [..."U]nderstanding of the promise that was made"
> is not, nor does it create, an obligation. Did you
> forget already? [...]
I haven't forgotten that you keep /saying/ so. Nor
that you and I seemed in agreement that choosing
to make a promise is what creates the obligation
of the /kind/ I call a moral obligation.
> [...] Your obligations can only reside in your
> mind. [...]
Not quite. In your mind resides merely an under-
standing, a correct remembrance, hopefully, of
the promises that you have made, and, as well,
an appreciation of the expectations regarding
your future behavior that your promises have
elicited in others, such that they rely on you
to fulfill your promises, and such that they will
demand satisfaction if you don't.
> [...] People make book on correctly understanding
> the obligations of others...as we both know,
> this is the underpinning of business and capitalism.
Certainly. Now you are beginning to understand.
So let's wrap this up and put a bow on it...
Any businessman "makes book" on others understanding
and fulfilling their own obligations. Either side
can understand wrongly. A businessman might charge
you more than you agreed to pay. That doesn't make
you obligated to pay more than you agreed. But if
you simply forgot to pay your bill (or forgot you
even went out drinking last night), that mistake,
too, doesn't mean you are not obligated to pay. The
obligation does NOT reside in your mind alone.
The /moral/ obligation IS the requirement to fulfill
what was /actually/ promised and accepted. Either
side can make a mistake about it, and they shouldn't.
Capitalism depends on each of us understanding our
own obligations toward others as well as the
obligations of others toward ourselves. When there
is misunderstanding we try to sort it out by asking,
what was /actually/ promised and accepted? But when
we can't settle it ourselves, we take it to a court
that will hear evidence and render a decision with
which all sides are /obligated/ to abide.
> [...J]ust because Popeye /calls/ it an obligation
> on Wimpy's part, that Wimpy did not necessarily
> choose to have that obligation.
Of course. And likewise, just because Wimpy, with
Jim at his side, tells Popeye it was "not an
obligation," it was, well, a yet-to-be-named-by-
Jim "something else," doesn't change anything.
> I guess you really did forget. Wimpy can have an
> obligation from only one source---Wimpy's decision.
He can have a moral obligation from only that source.
I haven't forgotten.
> > You propose /not/ to call [unchosen obligation]
> > obligation. To call it something else.
>
> That's exactly right. I propose not to call a thing
> that which it is not.
Fine. Enough with the soft lobs; I want answers from
you straight down the line. I will now repeat the
definition of obligation (the one you don't approve
of!) and I'm asking you to give me TWO things. (You
can get by with just the first thing for now, and
leave the second for later if you like.)
1) Another word we can use besides obligation to name
what the definition, below, specifies.
And, 2) Another definition we can use for the freed-
up word, obligation.
Here's the definition:
An Obligation (of "yours") is a /future
behavior/ that you do or can and ought to
recognize is expected of you and demanded
of you by others, and upon which they rely.
To help you along, the definition begs the question
of whether or not others are or are not justified in
their expectation, reliance and demand. It subsumes
behaviors that are /actually/ promised as well as
those many behaviors that others merely /believe/
they are somehow justified in expecting and demanding.
All it states is that for an "obligation" to exist
(unjustified ones as well as moral ones), others
must hold them justified and you must be capable of
understanding the relevant expectations, reliance
and demands.
So now, give me another word or phrase for this thing.
And you must not use the word obligation. For example,
don't say, "This is a thing that covers both obligations
and invalid obligations." A) Calling it a thing doesn't
give it a name, and B) "invalid obligation" is a use of
the word obligation.
If you succeed in task one, move on to task two and
offer up a different, better definition of obligation.
But you won't succeed, I confidently predict. You
should, instead, merely accede to MY usage: A moral
obligation is one based on the free choice of the
obligated person. All /other/ obligations are unchosen,
not moral, and a rational man ought to reject them,
to denounce them, and to seek to have them struck
down in our laws.
That's plain, clear, unambiguous speech that doesn't
try vainly to re-invent the English language.
> [...]
> Do you have some difficulty with the idea that
> identification is about what things are, not what
> people believe them to be?
No. I also don't have a problem with the fact that
words denote the referents that the named concepts
subsume, and that reference reflects the beliefs
of those making reference to things. This isn't a
problem. I know what /I/ mean by obligation, and I
know what "is meant" by obligation, and those two
ought to be the same, and happily in this instance
they /are/ the same.
> [...] I believe you can distinguish between "being
> an obligation" and "being considered an obligation."
Fine. I await your answers to the challenge above.
> [...] For me, there's /nothing/ that's worth the
> disregard of simple facts. I almost consider the
> very proposition oxymoronic. It'd be like asking
> if anything were worth my lungs not breathing.
So there is much we agree about! But now take a deep
breath and have a swing at the ball that's actually
in play here.
Best Wishes,
JimP.
Jim Klein
> > [...] Your obligations can only reside in your
> > mind. [...]
>
> Not quite. In your mind resides merely an under-
> standing, a correct remembrance, hopefully, of
> the promises that you have made, and, as well,
> an appreciation of the expectations regarding
> your future behavior that your promises have
> elicited in others, such that they rely on you
> to fulfill your promises, and such that they will
> demand satisfaction if you don't.
No, this is wrong. Even if we limit the object of
obligation to other people (a mistake in itself),
the expectations of others has nothing to do
with the existence of the obligation. This is
fundamental to an understanding of the nature
of what you call a "moral obligation."
So I simply must insist that you get this before we
can move on. I can wake up this morning and
decide that I have an obligation to pay you money
for your essay on recessivity. Voila...the obligation
exists, and that's that.
This is how obligations come to be and what you
think about the matter has nothing to do with it.
Do you wish to deny that this is the nature of at
least what you call "moral obligation"? Seems
to me you're obliged to admit this. See...I can
use the word both ways!
> > [...] People make book on correctly understanding
> > the obligations of others...as we both know,
> > this is the underpinning of business and capitalism.
>
> Certainly. Now you are beginning to understand.
> So let's wrap this up and put a bow on it...
>
> Any businessman "makes book" on others understanding
> and fulfilling their own obligations. Either side
> can understand wrongly. A businessman might charge
> you more than you agreed to pay. That doesn't make
> you obligated to pay more than you agreed. But if
> you simply forgot to pay your bill (or forgot you
> even went out drinking last night), that mistake,
> too, doesn't mean you are not obligated to pay. The
> obligation does NOT reside in your mind alone.
Yes it does. You are moving forward and describing
what actions ought to be done pursuant to the
obligation. That is admittedly the focus of the wider
argument. But there's not much point in widening
the focus without a very clear understanding of the
nature of the existent about which we are widening
the focus.
> The /moral/ obligation IS the requirement to fulfill
> what was /actually/ promised and accepted.
No...there is no such metaphysical "requirement." You
are adding that in order to beg your position. You'll
have the chance to do that, once you demonstrate
that you clearly understand the existent in question.
The moral obligation IS the decision to have it.
> Either
> side can make a mistake about it, and they shouldn't.
> Capitalism depends on each of us understanding our
> own obligations toward others as well as the
> obligations of others toward ourselves.
Begged assertion. Maybe it does and maybe it doesn't.
We'll take a look after I can bring you down to Earth and
get you to look at reality.
[snip]
> Fine. Enough with the soft lobs; I want answers from
> you straight down the line. I will now repeat the
> definition of obligation (the one you don't approve
> of!) and I'm asking you to give me TWO things. (You
> can get by with just the first thing for now, and
> leave the second for later if you like.)
>
> 1) Another word we can use besides obligation to name
> what the definition, below, specifies.
Sorry, that's your chore. I suppose we could stick strictly
with, "believed-to-be-obligation," but as you know, that
will make your argument look pretty funny.
You may invent a word; I don't really give a shit. What
matters is that the referent of this word is a subset of the
class of "belief" and not "obligation."
> And, 2) Another definition we can use for the freed-
> up word, obligation.
Refusing to acknowledge your misuse of the word
does not imply that the word has no use, which is
to say a referent. There are such things as thoughts,
and among that class of thoughts are decisions, and
among that class of decisions are obligations.
It's just that the set of decisions by other people does
not include the set of decisions by an actor.
> Here's the definition:
>
> An Obligation (of "yours") is a /future
> behavior/ that you do or can and ought to
> recognize is expected of you and demanded
> of you by others, and upon which they rely.
No...that's just more infantile question-begging. If
/I/ choose that I have the obligation to pay you, your
expectations don't change the nature /of that
obligation/...not a bit.
> To help you along, the definition begs the question
> of whether or not others are or are not justified in
> their expectation, reliance and demand.
Well said, but what you're not seeing is that the
justification of others has nothing to do with the
existence of the obligation. Those justifications
are among the set of "beliefs" held by others,
and NOT the set of "obligations" I've created.
> It subsumes
> behaviors that are /actually/ promised
I could have the obligation without saying a word to you.
Do you deny this? That's YOUR challenge---yes or no.
> as well as
> those many behaviors that others merely /believe/
> they are somehow justified in expecting and demanding.
Well, those will be subsumed under the new word you
invent. Or we can go with "believed-to-be-obligations."
Naturally, if you choose this last, I will be strict in its usage,
and probably quite repetitive in pointing out that "believed
to be X" does not translate to "being X."
> All it states is that for an "obligation" to exist
> (unjustified ones as well as moral ones), others
> must hold them justified and you must be capable of
> understanding the relevant expectations, reliance
> and demands.
>
> So now, give me another word or phrase for this thing.
> And you must not use the word obligation. For example,
> don't say, "This is a thing that covers both obligations
> and invalid obligations." A) Calling it a thing doesn't
> give it a name, and B) "invalid obligation" is a use of
> the word obligation.
>
> If you succeed in task one, move on to task two and
> offer up a different, better definition of obligation.
>
> But you won't succeed, I confidently predict. You
> should, instead, merely accede to MY usage: A moral
> obligation is one based on the free choice of the
> obligated person. All /other/ obligations are unchosen,
Those aren't obligations. They are believed to be obligations.
[snip]
> So there is much we agree about! But now take a deep
> breath and have a swing at the ball that's actually
> in play here.
There's no ball in play here, since you haven't thrown the
first pitch yet. Hell, you won't even admit that the ball is round!
jk
James E. Prescott
On Jan 24, 9:45 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On Jan 24, 5:51 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > [...]
> [...T]he expectations of others has nothing to do
> with the existence of the obligation.
It has everything to do with it. You cannot obligate
yourself to rocks and water. The difference is that
only humans can understand when you have made a promise
to them, and only humans can expect you to fulfill your
promises. Rocks and water can't.
True, you can wake up some morning and feel grateful
to the rain, but it won't hold you to it.
> [...]
> [...] I can wake up this morning and
> decide that I have an obligation to
> pay you money for your essay on recessivity.
> Voila...the obligation exists, and that's
> that.
Wrong. You can pay me money if you want to,
(go ahead, write me a check!) but I never asked
you for any money and you never promised to
pay any. So you are not obligated to pay me a
dime, no matter want insane impulses come over
you in the morning. You can wake up with all
the delusions imaginable and none of them
will make you obligated to anyone.
I agree with you about one thing, though.
Unless you grasp this simple truth it will
not be possible to move on from it to your
other misconceptions!
> > The /moral/ obligation IS the requirement
> > to fulfill what was /actually/ promised and
> > accepted.
>
> No...there is no such metaphysical "requirement."
You are inserting words again that I never used;
adding a silliness of your own whim. I never said
the requirement was "metaphysical," whatever the
heck that might mean.
This is a human requirement, obviously. It is what
others /require of you/ when you are obligated to
them; morally it is what they expect and demand
when you make a promise.
> [...]
> The moral obligation IS the decision to have it.
To have what? To have the obligation? That's circular.
Even you can see that, can't you?
> > Please come up with...
> > 1) Another word we can use besides obligation to
> > name what the definition, below, specifies.
>
> Sorry, that's your chore.
No, it yours. The is no other word we can use.
/You/ demand one; /I/ say it doesn't exist. You
want it? Okay. You propose it.
> I suppose we could stick strictly
> with, "believed-to-be-obligation,"
> but as you know, that will make your
> argument look pretty funny.
No, that would be perfectly fine for my
argument, except it won't work if you are
the one believing it "to be obligation."
For example, your fanciful wake-up-and-
send-Jim-a-check idea has nothing to do
with obligation, and yet I doubt you'll
agree to call it merely "believed-to-be-
obligation."
And more to the point of why you obviously
lose this argument: what about obligations
that are perfectly real? Are they not also
believed to be obligations?
Of course they are! So we're right back where
we started with moral and unchosen obligations
subsumed by the same concept, with everyone who
believes they are obligation calling them
obligations.
> You may invent a word; I don't really give
> a shit. [...]
Nice try, but you don't get off the hook that
easily.
> > And, 2) Another definition we can use for the freed-
> > up word, obligation.
>
> Refusing to acknowledge your misuse of the word
> does not imply that the word has no use, which is
> to say a referent. There are such things as thoughts,
> and among that class of thoughts are decisions, and
> among that class of decisions are obligations.
Which are, /what/? You haven't answered the question.
What distinguishes obligation from other thoughts
and decisions? /That/ is the question.
> > An Obligation (of "yours") is a /future
> > behavior/ that you do or can and ought to
> > recognize is expected of you and demanded
> > of you by others, and upon which they rely.
>
> [...]
>
> > To help you along, the definition begs the question
> > of whether or not others are or are not justified in
> > their expectation, reliance and demand.
>
> Well said, but what you're not seeing is that the
> justification of others has nothing to do with the
> existence of the obligation.
Correct, but I not only see this, I am /saying/ this.
Actual justification is irrelevant. What matters is
that they believe they are justified in expecting and
demanding that you behave in certain ways, morally
in the ways that you have /promised/ them you would
act. That's what it means when they say you are under
an obligation.
> I could have the obligation without saying a
> word to you.
Pray tell. I'm still waiting for you to define what
the heck it is you are talking about.
> Do you deny this? That's YOUR challenge---yes or no.
Yes.
Of course I deny it! Not only is it ridiculous on its
face, we've already been over this.
I wrote and you agreed that a promise "must be an
intention meaningfully conveyed in some such manner as
can be /understood/ by the recipient of the promise."
If you suggest that you can be obligated "without
promise" then /you/ are the one, not me, advocating
some mystic-metaphysical source of obligation. Can I
now demand money from you because I think you liked
my writing about recessive genes? Of course not.
I don't care a wit what you feel like in the morning,
you don't owe me a dime unless you solicited some
value from me by eliciting my expectation and
reliance on your promise to pay.
There is NO OTHER meaning of obligation, and if
you have another meaning to suggest, well, then,
just go right ahead and suggest it.
Otherwise you are only continuing to serve up soft
defensive lobs, and you've no chance of ever scoring
a point.
> [...]
> Those [the unchosen ones] aren't obligations.
> They are believed to be obligations.
And obligations, also, are believed to be
obligations.
If the unchosen obligations are NOT obligations,
then please tell me what you think obligations are,
and do it in a way that distinguishes moral, proper
legal, and improper legal "obligations" from
one another. And do it without using the word
obligation in its own definition.
Good luck! But if you'd rather not try, well, that too
is fine. Game, set, match.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
this simplest of facts, or it won't. Another way of putting this
is to say that you've either chosen an obligation to intellectual
honesty, or you haven't.
On Jan 24, 11:03 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> It has everything to do with it. You cannot obligate
> yourself to rocks and water.
Of course you can. You've already acknowledged, or so
I thought, that people obligate themselves to all sorts of
nonsense, including God and various religious principles.
> The difference is that
> only humans can understand when you have made a promise
> to them, and only humans can expect you to fulfill your
> promises. Rocks and water can't.
Are you now denying that various religionists do indeed
obligate themselves to God or Jesus or Allah?
According to you now, that doesn't and can't happen. After all,
none of those three have ever acknowledged the promise
back.
> True, you can wake up some morning and feel grateful
> to the rain, but it won't hold you to it.
No, but I can choose to be obligated to it nonetheless.
This is the whole point. An obligation--your "moral
obligation"--can ONLY arise by the free and conscious
choice of a willful individual. This seemed to cause
you no problem earlier, but now you're busy denying it.
> Wrong. You can pay me money if you want to,
> (go ahead, write me a check!) but I never asked
> you for any money and you never promised to
> pay any.
So what?
> So you are not obligated to pay me a
> dime, no matter want insane impulses come over
> you in the morning. You can wake up with all
> the delusions imaginable and none of them
> will make you obligated to anyone.
Really? Then what was this "moral obligation" of
which you spoke earlier? As I say, you seemed very
ready at the time to concede that it was completely
an individual choice, arising only with the
consciousness of the individual.
Do I need to dig up cites?
> I agree with you about one thing, though.
> Unless you grasp this simple truth it will
> not be possible to move on from it to your
> other misconceptions!
That's why we're bothering with this. We both
agree that it's fruitless to go any further without
a firm grasp on exactly the nature of this existent.
> This is a human requirement, obviously. It is what
> others /require of you/ when you are obligated to
> them; morally it is what they expect and demand
> when you make a promise.
No, that's what you want it to be because your argument
will simply fall into place then. While not a bad motivation
itself, it doesn't trump the higher goal of seeing things as
they are.
You do agree that's a higher goal, don't you?
> > The moral obligation IS the decision to have it.
>
> To have what? To have the obligation? That's circular.
> Even you can see that, can't you?
No, I can't. A thing is its attributes. The "thing" here is
an obligation. Its "attributes," at least in this context,
are those events which caused it to be.
> No, it yours. The is no other word we can use.
Hahaha...that's my point! There is no other word
because there is no other concept and there is no
other concept because there is no such existent.
There is NO other motivation of willful human action
except the willful decisions of a single human mind,
controlling a single human body.
Do you wish to deny THAT as well?
In fact, let's reduce it to this, since you obviously need
to start slowly on this. Do you at least agree with that?
> /You/ demand one; /I/ say it doesn't exist. You
> want it? Okay. You propose it.
>
> > I suppose we could stick strictly
> > with, "believed-to-be-obligation,"
> > but as you know, that will make your
> > argument look pretty funny.
>
> No, that would be perfectly fine for my
> argument, except it won't work if you are
> the one believing it "to be obligation."
Actually, it was (and is) you who are saying that
such is obligation. You are saying so explicitly.
> For example, your fanciful wake-up-and-
> send-Jim-a-check idea has nothing to do
> with obligation, and yet I doubt you'll
> agree to call it merely "believed-to-be-
> obligation."
In what manner is it not an obligation if I choose
it to be one? Explain that, and maybe I'll see. But
so far, you only offer, "because I define obligation
to be that which is acknowledged by other people."
Again, do many Christians choose to be obligated
to Christian principles? Does God acknowledge this?
> And more to the point of why you obviously
> lose this argument: what about obligations
> that are perfectly real? Are they not also
> believed to be obligations?
Asked and answered. Yes, this is a cornerstone of
trade among honest, rational men.
> Of course they are! So we're right back where
> we started with moral and unchosen obligations
> subsumed by the same concept, with everyone who
> believes they are obligation calling them
> obligations.
Except you're leaving out the believed-to-be-obligations
which are not obligations, and you already conceded
their existence.
But yes, you're right back where you started. Not a great
place for a supposedly rational being.
> > You may invent a word; I don't really give
> > a shit. [...]
>
> Nice try, but you don't get off the hook that
> easily.
I'll wait for your reply to some of the above before I
dig up cites. The good news is that as this intensifies,
and it will, it will also go slower.
This, owing to some obligations that I have. And no,
not a single person alive is aware of them in much
detail. So much for your definition.
> Which are, /what/? You haven't answered the question.
> What distinguishes obligation from other thoughts
> and decisions? /That/ is the question.
Well, decisions are a particular type of thought. But
technically, nothing distinguishes an obligation from
a decision except for the weight and nature of it that
the actor chooses to place upon it. Plus, for the
purposes here, I'm willing to limit "obligation" to those
decisions which involve actions towards other people.
But I don't do that in sacrifice of forgetting what the hell
an obligation is in the first place. That's why "an obligation
to God" may be used, even though there's no other
person named God.
> > Well said, but what you're not seeing is that the
> > justification of others has nothing to do with the
> > existence of the obligation.
>
> Correct, but I not only see this, I am /saying/ this.
Touche, but that's just making an obligation some
out-of-context concrete, much along the lines of
Gordon Sollars' interpretation of "meaning."
Why, do you believe that obligations can exist
completely without any individual around to create
them? Obviously not.
> Actual justification is irrelevant. What matters is
> that they believe they are justified in expecting and
> demanding that you behave in certain ways, morally
> in the ways that you have /promised/ them you would
> act. That's what it means when they say you are under
> an obligation.
Notice what this implies. This means that YOU can wake
up one morning and say that /I/ have an obligation to
pay you for your recessivity essay. Maybe in your wild
fantasies I did so promise.
Is this your final answer? Are you saying that whatever
imaginations other people have, can actually create
obligations of the actor?
> > I could have the obligation without saying a
> > word to you.
>
> Pray tell. I'm still waiting for you to define what
> the heck it is you are talking about.
I already said. I wake up and think to myself, "Y'know,
that essay was so good that the only moral thing I can
do, is pay Jim for it."
I haven't created an obligation as you now want to
define it, but before it was merely a "legal obligation"
that I hadn't created. Now you seem to be saying
that neither have I created a "moral obligation" in
your lingo. Again, is that your final answer?
> > Do you deny this? That's YOUR challenge---yes or no.
>
> Yes.
>
> Of course I deny it! Not only is it ridiculous on its
> face, we've already been over this.
>
> I wrote and you agreed that a promise "must be an
> intention meaningfully conveyed in some such manner as
> can be /understood/ by the recipient of the promise."
Are you now denying the existence of implicit promises?
> If you suggest that you can be obligated "without
> promise" then /you/ are the one, not me, advocating
> some mystic-metaphysical source of obligation. Can I
> now demand money from you because I think you liked
> my writing about recessive genes? Of course not.
Uh-oh, now you're wrong on TWO fundamental facts.
Of course you can do that. You can demand any ol'
thing you want. Do you wish to deny this as well?
> I don't care a wit what you feel like in the morning,
> you don't owe me a dime unless you solicited some
> value from me by eliciting my expectation and
> reliance on your promise to pay.
That wasn't your question. You asked, "Can I now
demand..." and you answered, "No, of course not."
Well yes, of course you can.
> There is NO OTHER meaning of obligation, and if
> you have another meaning to suggest, well, then,
> just go right ahead and suggest it.
>
> Otherwise you are only continuing to serve up soft
> defensive lobs, and you've no chance of ever scoring
> a point.
If points were your acknowledgement of points, that's
probably right. Luckily, they're not. In this context,
they're facts and those facts are immutable. Further,
those facts are the arbiter of the points.
> > Those [the unchosen ones] aren't obligations.
> > They are believed to be obligations.
>
> And obligations, also, are believed to be
> obligations.
It's noteworthy that you charged me circularity, and
then come up with this.
Now you've got existents arising from the mere belief
of their arisal. So do I, but in my case the belief arises
in the actor himself and these are, after all, epistemic
existents. What's your excuse?
> If the unchosen obligations are NOT obligations,
> then please tell me what you think obligations are,
> and do it in a way that distinguishes moral, proper
> legal, and improper legal "obligations" from
> one another. And do it without using the word
> obligation in its own definition.
We'll get to "moral, proper, legal and improper
obligations" just as soon as you wake up to the
fact as to what obligations are.
> Good luck! But if you'd rather not try, well, that too
> is fine. Game, set, match.
Dream on, bud. It's more like the second round of a
fifteen-rounder, with you scoring the first. But you're
seriously against the ropes in this second.
Good luck getting free again.
jk
James E. Prescott
> [..Y]ou've either chosen an obligation to intellectual
> honesty, or you haven't.
I have. I affirm it whenever I speak. My word is my bond.
> On Jan 24, 11:03 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > [...O]nly humans can understand when you have made a
> > promise to them, and only humans can expect you to
> > fulfill your promises. Rocks and water can't.
>
> Are you now denying that various religionists do indeed
> obligate themselves to God or Jesus or Allah?
Yes, I am.
Here I would come down a bit on your side, Jim, and say
they believe themselves obligated when actually they are
not. However, that's only because there is no God. My
point was that it takes /another/ holding you obligated
for you to /be/ obligated. You cannot obligate yourself to
nothing, to spirits that don't exist. You cannot even
obligate yourself to me unless I hold you obligated.
> I can choose to be obligated to [the rain] nonetheless.
No you can't. You can think you're obligated, that's all.
> [...Y]ou seemed very ready [...] to concede that it
> was completely an individual choice, arising only
> with the consciousness of the individual.
>
> Do I need to dig up cites?
Feel free to dig. You'll find not a concession but
an assertion from the very beginning that moral
obligation arises from the individual's choice
to freely enter into an obligation by making a
promise, by signing a contract, and so forth.
I never said you can make a promise to yourself
(or by some magical process only mentally "make
a promise to" someone else). It has to be /conveyed/
in some manner eliciting the reliance and the
expectation of the other person.
> You do agree [identifying facts] a higher goal,
> don't you?
Of course.
> > > The moral obligation IS the decision to have it.
>
> > To have what? To have the obligation? That's circular.
> > Even you can see that, can't you?
>
> No, I can't. A thing is its attributes. [...]
> The "thing" here is an obligation. Its "attributes,"
> at least in this context, are those events which caused
> it to be.
An obligation is not the things that caused it to be.
Define obligation.
> [...]
> In what manner is [wanting to pay] not an obligation
> if I choose it to be one? Explain that, and maybe
> I'll see. But so far, you only offer, "because I define
> obligation to be that which is acknowledged by other
> people."
Actually, I defined obligation as a future behavior
that is expected, relied upon and demanded by others.
You are absolutely correct that, by this definition,
the idea that you can unilaterally decide you are
obligated is utterly ridiculous on its face.
However, equally ludicrous is your suggestion that
must I offer you further explanation when you yourself
have offered no contrary definition of obligation and
have not even offered the slightest /argument/ for
supposing that my definition is somehow incorrect.
I can't read your mind. I can't possibly know why you
imagine that intending to pay someone is an obligation
just because you "want" it to be an obligation. Why would
you imagine such a thing? Tell me and I will answer.
> [...] I'm willing to limit "obligation" to those
> decisions which involve actions towards other people.
That's a good start.
> But I don't do that in sacrifice of forgetting what
> the hell an obligation is in the first place.
I'm still waiting. What is it?
> [...D]o you believe that obligations can exist
> completely without any individual around to create
> them? Obviously not.
Obviously not. It takes two at least. The obligated and
the owed.
> [...A]re you saying that whatever imaginations other
> people have, can actually create obligations of the
> actor?
Not moral obligations, no. To actually create a moral
obligation a promise must be made and accepted.
> [...]
> > I wrote and you agreed that a promise "must be an
> > intention meaningfully conveyed in some such manner as
> > can be /understood/ by the recipient of the promise."
>
> Are you now denying the existence of implicit promises?
No, that's why I did NOT say spoken, only "meaningfully
conveyed." Speaking is one way to make a promise. Sitting
down in a restaurant and eating what's put in front of
you is another way, an /implicit/ promise to pay before
you leave.
> > If you suggest that you can be obligated "without
> > promise" then /you/ are the one, not me, advocating
> > some mystic-metaphysical source of obligation. Can I
> > now demand money from you because I think you liked
> > my writing about recessive genes? Of course not.
>
> Uh-oh, now you're wrong on TWO fundamental facts.
>
> Of course you can do that. You can demand any ol'
> thing you want. Do you wish to deny this as well?
I was wrong in more ways than that!
I should have written, if you suggest that you can be
morally obligated "without promise" then /you/ are the
one, not me, advocating some mystic-metaphysical source
of moral obligation. Can I now morally demand money from
you because I think you liked my writing about recessive
genes? Of course not.
Yes, I can demand any ol' thing I want, and if I have
the guns to back it up, then I am /obligating/ you to
comply with my wishes. That is what "obligation" means.
However, unless you have /agreed/ to be so obligated,
then my action is wrong and you are under no /moral/
obligation. Your choice to make and be bound by a
promise is what moral obligation means
> [...]
> > And obligations, also, are believed to be
> > obligations.
>
> It's noteworthy that you charged me circularity, and
> then come up with this.
You seem to have missed the point. An obligation can
be believed such, whether it is or not. IF it is
NOT an obligation, your saying that it is "believed
to be an obligation" doesn't help your argument that
it is NOT one.
Why is an imposed obligation not an obligation? And,
if it is not, what on earth are we going to to call it
instead? It's an imposed......WHAT? WHAT? WHAT?
> [...]
> We'll get to "moral, proper, legal and improper
> obligations" just as soon as you wake up to the
> fact as to what obligations are.
Okay. Again, what are they?
> > Good luck! But if you'd rather not try, well, that too
> > is fine. Game, set, match.
>
> Dream on, bud. It's more like the second round of a
> fifteen-rounder, with you scoring the first. But you're
> seriously against the ropes in this second.
Well, maybe that's just the ol' rope-a-dope!
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> > [..Y]ou've either chosen an obligation to intellectual
> > honesty, or you haven't.
>
> I have.
Q.E.D. 0-2.
jk
Jim Klein
> > [..Y]ou've either chosen an obligation to intellectual
> > honesty, or you haven't.
>
> I have. I affirm it whenever I speak.
As I said, Q.E.D. Facts are pesky little buggers, aren't they?
> > I can choose to be obligated to [the rain] nonetheless.
>
> No you can't. You can think you're obligated, that's all.
And you can't show a distinction between "think you're
obligated" and "being obligated" without defining your
way into the matter.
That makes sense, since obligation is a willful state. Like
all willful states, there is only one source for its existence.
Now which of those do you deny---that obligation is a willful
state, or that there is a singular source for all willful states?
> I never said you can make a promise to yourself
> (or by some magical process only mentally "make
> a promise to" someone else).
It's not magic any more than any other willful state
is magic.
> It has to be /conveyed/
> in some manner eliciting the reliance and the
> expectation of the other person.
Sure, if you define it that way. The thing is, I'm
asking you to /identify/ it.
Then you can make your definitions.
> > You do agree [identifying facts] a higher goal,
> > don't you?
>
> Of course.
Your word is your bond. So do it. Identify the facts.
> An obligation is not the things that caused it to be.
> Define obligation.
Roughly, it's a state of mind wherein a person chooses
a particular action, or even perhaps a particular state of
mind. Yes, a state of mind can choose another state of
mind...isn't abstraction wonderful?
> > In what manner is [wanting to pay] not an obligation
> > if I choose it to be one? Explain that, and maybe
> > I'll see. But so far, you only offer, "because I define
> > obligation to be that which is acknowledged by other
> > people."
>
> Actually, I defined obligation as a future behavior
> that is expected, relied upon and demanded by others.
Yes, you did. And I am pointing out that this is an
invalid definition. Like /any/ state of mind, the state
of mind of obligation /does not/ rest on any action,
nor any state of mind, of others.
> You are absolutely correct that, by this definition,
> the idea that you can unilaterally decide you are
> obligated is utterly ridiculous on its face.
>
> However, equally ludicrous is your suggestion that
> must I offer you further explanation when you yourself
> have offered no contrary definition of obligation and
> have not even offered the slightest /argument/ for
> supposing that my definition is somehow incorrect.
You're dishin' out the arguments here; I'm just pointing
out the facts...at least at this stage.
> I can't read your mind. I can't possibly know why you
> imagine that intending to pay someone is an obligation
> just because you "want" it to be an obligation. Why would
> you imagine such a thing? Tell me and I will answer.
It doesn't matter why I want it, just as it doesn't matter why
a person prefers chocolate over vanilla. We can figure out
later whether it's wiser or more moral to prefer chocolate,
and we can figure out later whether or not an obligation
makes sense, or is rational or moral.
For now, we're just trying to identify the nature of that
obligation, and from where and how it arose.
Well, I presume you're trying. Me, I don't have to try; I've
already done that work.
> > [...] I'm willing to limit "obligation" to those
> > decisions which involve actions towards other people.
>
> That's a good start.
Sure...you mean it's a good start to begin falling for your
false definition. In my lingo, that would be a bad start.
> > But I don't do that in sacrifice of forgetting what
> > the hell an obligation is in the first place.
>
> I'm still waiting. What is it?
Hopefully, you're not still waiting.
> Not moral obligations, no. To actually create a moral
> obligation a promise must be made and accepted.
So you say. But who accepted your obligation to
intellectual honesty?
> I was wrong in more ways than that!
Now you're getting the hang of it!
jk
James E. Prescott
> On Jan 24, 1:00 pm, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > [A promise] has to be /conveyed/
> > in some manner eliciting the reliance and the
> > expectation of the other person.
>
> Sure, if you define it that way. The thing is, I'm
> asking you to /identify/ it.
A definition is a statement identifying the referents
of a concept.
> > Define obligation.
>
> Roughly, [...]
I didn't want "roughly," but precisely. However...
> [...] it's a state of mind wherein a person chooses
> a particular action, or even perhaps a particular
> state of mind. [...]
A definition identifies (specifies) the referents of
a concept by stating the characteristics that distinguish
those referents from other members of the same class.
"State of mind" refers to a mind's general mood or
disposition such as agitated, pleased, nervous, relaxed,
pensive, playful, irritated and so forth. States of mind
have nothing whatsoever to do with obligation.
Choosing a particular action does not distinguish
obligation from other "states of mind" for two
reasons. Obligation is not in that class; and
choosing an action or "choosing a state of mind"
(??) is too general to distinguish anything
from anything else.
An obligation is always a behavior toward others.
We've agreed to this. It is in the class of anti-
cipated future behaviors, and, specifically, an
obligation is a behavior that is expected, relied
upon and demanded by persons other than the actor
himself. That IS an identification. It is THE
identification of the referents of this particular
concept. It CORRECTLY identifies them through a
clear, specific and factually true statement about
them.
But here, I ask you for another, better definition,
and what do I get?
You give me fluff, you give me vagueness, you offer
some mish-mush about "states of mind" and the simple
act of choosing anything anyone might ever choose
(even other states of mind!, as if it were possible
to pick your mood like you pick up a pencil), and
nothing you have said has anything to do with the
subject at hand.
I know you can do better.
> [...]
> You're dishin' out the arguments here; I'm just
> pointing out the facts...at least at this stage.
Argument is a process of pointing out facts, giving
evidence in support of those facts, and showing how
those facts lead to a logical conclusion. If you were
indeed pointing out facts you /would/ be making an
argument, or at least a good start toward one.
But to suggest that obligation is a "state of mind in
which a person chooses" is about as far removed from
stating facts as you can possibly drift. It's worse
than merely vague; it so mixes up moods and choices as
to not even make any sense.
I know you can do better.
> > I can't read your mind. I can't possibly know
> > why you imagine that intending to pay someone
> > is an obligation just because you "want" it to
> > be an obligation. Why would you imagine such
> > a thing?
>
> It doesn't matter why I want it, just as it doesn't
> matter why a person prefers chocolate over vanilla.
> [...]
I didn't ask you why you want it. I asked you, why do
you imagine that "intending to give something" obligates
you to give it? You are drifting again. Wake up!
> [...] I presume you're trying. Me, I don't have to
> try; I've already done that work.
Pray, tell. If you've done the work you ought to be
able to state a simple definition. Knowing definitions
of your concepts is the very first step in the work
of the mind.
> [...]
> > I'm still waiting. What is [your definition of
> > obligation]?
>
> Hopefully, you're not still waiting.
Well, that depends. Are you done?
That mish-mush beginning with the word "roughly" --
was that really the best you can come up with?
If so, then, yes, I'm done waiting for you to
define what you're talking about, and THE correct
definition of obligation now stands as before,
unchallenged by you or so far by anyone, just as
I've expressed it all along.
> > [...] To actually create a moral obligation a
> > promise must be made and accepted.
>
> So you say. But who accepted your obligation to
> intellectual honesty?
You did, among others, and you said so yourself. You
said, repeating your earlier belief, "I will [[continue
to]] rely upon it here." I reminded you that you may do
so, always. My word is my bond.
Best Wishes
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> > Sure, if you define it that way. The thing is, I'm
> > asking you to /identify/ it.
>
> A definition is a statement identifying the referents
> of a concept.
This is nice...a point of agreement!
> > > Define obligation.
>
> > Roughly, [...]
>
> I didn't want "roughly," but precisely. However...
I often use that qualifier, because there are people
like Charles around who will nit-pick any definition
to find some trivial exception or some way of
considering it such that it's not perfectly precise.
No matter here though, since this "rough" definition
is quite sufficient to show our glaring differences.
> > [...] it's a state of mind wherein a person chooses
> > a particular action, or even perhaps a particular
> > state of mind. [...]
>
> A definition identifies (specifies) the referents of
> a concept by stating the characteristics that distinguish
> those referents from other members of the same class.
Yes, that's right.
> "State of mind" refers to a mind's general mood or
> disposition such as agitated, pleased, nervous, relaxed,
> pensive, playful, irritated and so forth. States of mind
> have nothing whatsoever to do with obligation.
Well, it's not like I stopped at "state of mind." My
definition, rough as it was, didn't define obligation
as just any state of mind.
> Choosing a particular action does not distinguish
> obligation from other "states of mind" for two
> reasons. Obligation is not in that class; and
> choosing an action or "choosing a state of mind"
> (??) is too general to distinguish anything
> from anything else.
What in the world are you going on about? THIS
was my definition:
------------------------------
Roughly, it's a state of mind wherein a person chooses
a particular action, or even perhaps a particular state of
mind.
-----------------------------
Now admittedly, this comes out--roughly--as synonymous
with "decision," and we've already been over that. And
roughly speaking, a decision is an obligation and an
obligation is a decision. I had earlier mentioned, and
maybe should've included here, that "obligation" carries
with it a certain import. But again, that import is something
created by the actor. Hence, it doesn't really change much.
And it changes nothing with regard to our particular
difference over what an obligation is.
> An obligation is always a behavior toward others.
No it isn't. Your admitted obligation to intellectual
honesty is completely your own, and has nothing
at all to do with "toward others." More in a moment.
> We've agreed to this.
In your dreams, maybe.
> It is in the class of anti-
> cipated future behaviors,
Yes, that's right. And to what class do those future
behaviors belong? They belong to the class of
future behaviors of the actor himself. To what
other class COULD they belong?
> and, specifically, an
> obligation is a behavior that is expected, relied
> upon and demanded by persons other than the actor
> himself.
That is false. Your admitted obligation to intellectual
honesty has nothing whatsoever to do with anything
demanded or expected by anyone else.
The first thing you need to do, absent actually identifying
what's going on, is to retract that admitted obligation.
According to your definition, that's not what you have.
> That IS an identification. It is THE
> identification of the referents of this particular
> concept. It CORRECTLY identifies them through a
> clear, specific and factually true statement about
> them.
Oh, this is fun. No, that IS a MIS-identification, a
failure (soon to be refusal) to correctly identify...
> But here, I ask you for another, better definition,
> and what do I get?
>
> You give me fluff, you give me vagueness, you offer
> some mish-mush about "states of mind" and the simple
> act of choosing anything anyone might ever choose
> (even other states of mind!, as if it were possible
> to pick your mood like you pick up a pencil),
This is a bit tangential, but are you now asserting that
one doesn't have the ability to pick his moods? Notice
please that "ability" doesn't translate to "always instantiates."
And it must not be fluff, because it's sure got you going!
> and
> nothing you have said has anything to do with the
> subject at hand.
Oh, please. We both know this is critical. If you'd like
to merely surrender, you can save face. But otherwise,
you're going to come to grips with what the nature of
obligation is...that it's exactly as I say it is, "a state of
mind."
You know what that'll do to your wider argument, but
the intellectually honest approach is to face the facts
anyway.
> I know you can do better.
You'd sure better hope not!
> > [...]
> > You're dishin' out the arguments here; I'm just
> > pointing out the facts...at least at this stage.
>
> Argument is a process of pointing out facts, giving
> evidence in support of those facts, and showing how
> those facts lead to a logical conclusion. If you were
> indeed pointing out facts you /would/ be making an
> argument, or at least a good start toward one.
I'm making a damn fine start as it is. You're just
starting to realize that yours is some intrinsicist
definition, as if obligations were just out there or
something, and as soon as some events happen
that fit your model of things which ought to be
enforced, then there they are.
Voila...it's just that simple according to you. I'm a
big fan of simple myself, but correspondent is even
more important.
You might take note that we haven't even yet /begun/
to address whether or not some obligations--like the
ones we make explicitly towards others--ought to
be coercively enforced.
That's how important this particular identification is,
and by all appearances you're well aware of that.
> But to suggest that obligation is a "state of mind in
> which a person chooses" is about as far removed from
> stating facts as you can possibly drift. It's worse
> than merely vague; it so mixes up moods and choices as
> to not even make any sense.
I'm not suggesting that; I'm stating it loud and clear.
That's what it is, plain and simple. I haven't even brought
out any tough questions yet, so maybe you could address
this simple one---what else COULD it be?
Did you forget? "There is no such thing as an unchosen
obligation." So where exactly do you stand on that
claim these days?
> I know you can do better.
>
> > > I can't read your mind. I can't possibly know
> > > why you imagine that intending to pay someone
> > > is an obligation just because you "want" it to
> > > be an obligation. Why would you imagine such
> > > a thing?
>
> > It doesn't matter why I want it, just as it doesn't
> > matter why a person prefers chocolate over vanilla.
> > [...]
>
> I didn't ask you why you want it. I asked you, why do
> you imagine that "intending to give something" obligates
> you to give it?
It doesn't. Sticking to your intentions is what does that.
As I intimated, it's a question of import (on the part of the
actor, of course) how close to "obligate" merely "intending"
is. For guys like me, and how you say you are, the two are
nearly synoymous.
"My word is my bond." You said that. So give me an
example of an intention you have, that you don't view
as an obligation.
Do you deny that your (so far unretracted) obligation
to intellectual honesty is born of your intention?
> You are drifting again. Wake up!
Don't take this the wrong way, but it's easy for me to
snooze on stuff this simple. I'm just killing time until
YOU wake up. Maybe then we'll both have something
to actually think about.
Though it's starting to look like you admit that if my
identification of obligation is correct, then your whole
approach goes right down the crapper.
I already acknowledged that I know how much you have
invested in it, so yes...I feel your pain. Does that help?
See, just like your gang of thugs..."I'm here to help!"
Oops, sorry...that's moving forward. I'll slow down.
> > [...] I presume you're trying. Me, I don't have to
> > try; I've already done that work.
>
> Pray, tell. If you've done the work you ought to be
> able to state a simple definition. Knowing definitions
> of your concepts is the very first step in the work
> of the mind.
Yeah well, like I said, my simple rough definition seems
to have you going pretty well.
> > > I'm still waiting. What is [your definition of
> > > obligation]?
>
> > Hopefully, you're not still waiting.
>
> Well, that depends. Are you done?
>
> That mish-mush beginning with the word "roughly" --
> was that really the best you can come up with?
I don't know. Luckily, it doesn't matter.
> If so, then, yes, I'm done waiting for you to
> define what you're talking about, and THE correct
> definition of obligation now stands as before,
> unchallenged by you or so far by anyone, just as
> I've expressed it all along.
I'm sorry; I was snoozing. Why don't you put up your
precise definition again and we'll see if it holds water?
> > > [...] To actually create a moral obligation a
> > > promise must be made and accepted.
>
> > So you say. But who accepted your obligation to
> > intellectual honesty?
>
> You did, among others, and you said so yourself. You
> said, repeating your earlier belief, "I will [[continue
> to]] rely upon it here." I reminded you that you may do
> so, always. My word is my bond.
Uh huh. So if I didn't so accept, then you no longer would
hold that obligation? What if nobody was around...would
you hold it anyway? Are you sure you don't want to retract?
These are slightly tougher questions, I know. Sorry about that,
since I don't want you to go too fast. For this stuff, guys like
you need a seat belt, since you'll feel like you're entering a
different universe at warp speed. But it's alright, I promise---
on the other side is life as a rational human and it's all good.
jk
James E. Prescott
> On Jan 25, 2:22 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > [snip to quoting Jim...]
> > > [...] it's a state of mind wherein a person chooses
> > > a particular action, or even perhaps a particular
> > > state of mind. [...]
> [...]
> What in the world are you going on about?
> THIS was my definition:
>
> ------------------------------
> Roughly, it's a state of mind wherein a person chooses
> a particular action, or even perhaps a particular state of
> mind.
> -----------------------------
>
> Now admittedly, this comes out--roughly--as synonymous
> with "decision," and we've already been over that.
That's what I was on about, of course. It comes out precisely
as nonsense,
> [...R]oughly speaking, a decision is an obligation
> and an obligation is a decision.
Nonsense. An obligation is an expected, relied upon and
demanded future behavior. A "decision" to be obligated, as
in /deciding/ to /make a promise/ of future behavior is
one way (the moral way) an obligation can be created.
> I had earlier mentioned, and maybe should've included
> here, that "obligation" carries with it a certain import.
Certain import? What is that supposed to mean? If it
means obligations are to others such that if the behaviors
are not forthcoming punishment follows, well, yeah, damn
straight you should have included it here! Failing to include
this means you haven't got a clue what you are talking.
> > An obligation is always a behavior toward others.
>
> No it isn't.
Yes, it is,
> Your admitted obligation to intellectual
> honesty is completely your own, and has nothing
> at all to do with "toward others."
I am devoted to intellectual honesty for myself,
but that has nothing whatsoever to do with any
"obligation." When I am speaking /to/ others,
/then/ there is a general moral obligation to speak
truthfully, especially when making promises about
one's future behavior.
> > It is in the class of anticipated future behaviors,
>
> Yes, that's right. And to what class do those future
> behaviors belong? They belong to the class of
> future behaviors of the actor himself.
Of course. You seem to have forgotten that you agreed
that obligations were always to others, and you claim
I am dreaming when I say that. Fortunately, the
discussions on these newsgroups are archived, so why
don't you just go back and read before eating your
words again and again and again? At least you'll know
what's on the menu.
Now, I expect you may later claim you did not just
say "Yes, that right," that obligations are in the class
of anticipated future behaviors. Being in that class
they are not in the class that your "rough" and non-
sensical non-definition claimed.
Of course they are in the class of the actor's behavior.
They are among the actor's behaviors that others anticipate
he will perform; and if he does not, they will regard him
as deserving punishment because he failed to perform an
action that was relied upon and demanded, namely, an
/obligation/.
> [...] Your admitted obligation to intellectual
> honesty has nothing whatsoever to do with anything
> demanded or expected by anyone else.
It has everything to do with that, and with only
that, as I have already explained to you.
> [...] "There is no such thing as an unchosen
> obligation." So where exactly do you stand on that
> claim these days?
I stand where I've stood. There's no such thing as
an unchosen moral obligation.
> > [...W]hy do you imagine that "intending to give
> > something" obligates you to give it?
>
> It doesn't. Sticking to your intentions is what does that.
You are begging the question. Why does sticking to your
intentions obligate you to do something?
It doesn't, of course. You are just being silly. You
don't know what you are talking about; you are embarrassed
by this; and you are being defensive. That's childish
and beneath you. Stop with the silliness of claiming to
know what you are unable to express in writing. If you
can't express what an obligation is, you are only deluding
yourself to imagine that you know anything about it.
> "My word is my bond." You said that. So give me an
> example of an intention you have, that you don't view
> as an obligation.
None of my intentions are obligations, and the behavior
I intend becomes an obligation only when and if it is
expected, relied upon and demanded of me by others.
> Do you deny that your (so far unretracted)
> obligation to intellectual honesty is born
> of your intention?
My /intention/ to be honest is not an obligation,
and I never said it was, so there is nothing to
retract. An intention is not an obligation. An
obligation exists among the behaviors one may or
may not intend to perform. If you don't intend
to fulfill the terms of the contract you signed
you are still obligated to fulfill them. My
obligation [not my "intention"] to be honest IS an
obligation, and it is born of the fact that others
expect it, rely upon it and demand it.
You, Jim, are not displaying intellectual
honesty, right now.
> I'm sorry; I was snoozing. Why don't you put
> up your precise definition again and we'll see
> if it holds water?
No.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
we can enter Round 3 tied up.
On Jan 26, 12:43 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > [...R]oughly speaking, a decision is an obligation
> > and an obligation is a decision.
>
> Nonsense.
It is not nonsense and it is accurate. Here's a bit more
brevity and precision:
An obligation is a demand of oneself.
Yep, that's it. Further, that's all it COULD be, owing
to the nature of a singular, self-motivated individual.
First, let's show you wrong:
> An obligation is an expected, relied upon and
> demanded future behavior.
Oh yeah? So when the junkie puts a gun to your
head, he has created an obligation on your part?
He expects, relies upon and demands a certain
future behavior of yours. According to what you
wrote here, you therefore have such an obligation.
Or shall you offer that this "expected, relied upon and
demanded future behavior" must be held by both
parties? Well, that would be a contract of sorts, though
naturally there's some question as to how "demanded"
a contract is.
Now take a look at my definition, and you will see
that wherever you can use "obligation," you can
properly use "demand of oneself." You have an
obligation to intellectual honesty? Then you demand
of yourself that you do it. I have an obligation to pay
my bills? Then I demand of myself that I pay them.
Here is what's throwing you off...the transitive nature
of obligation. The obligation is /to/ or /toward/ some
future action. Your obligation is /to/ intellectual
honesty and many, perhaps most, are /to/ someone
else. Yes, it is most frequently used in a social context.
But we're not talking about that. We are talking about
the source and cause of the obligation. That is, we are
trying to find its nature by investigating how it came to
be. And on that point, I am all right and you are all
wrong.
Fluffy? Vague? "Demand, expect, rely"...who is offering
fluff and vagueness here? How do you propose to
discover one person's consideration of another person's
intent? One answer might be, "by looking at the damn
contract." Well yes, but that tells us about the contract,
not the obligation.
Obligation is of the class of "intent," and intents are
something that arise in a singular class of entity---a
conceptualizing and volitional organism.
You cannot create my desires, nor my intents, nor
my obligations. This is a simple fact and the sooner
you admit this crux of the point, the better off you'll be.
You can /interpret/ my desires and obligations and you
can even subsequently act on those interpretations.
But the obligation itself, being something that can /only/
be created by a volitional consciousness, exists wholly
within the consciousness of he who creates it.
Your argument rests on what can and/or should be
done /after/ the obligation is created. That's alright,
and we can discuss that...just as soon as you can
bring yourself to identify the nature of the obligation
in the first place.
But not one damn second before then, because I'm
not going to discuss something with someone who
bases his entire "argument" on so simple a
mis-identification as this.
Do /your/ intents rest on my interpretation of them? Do
/your/ desires rest on that? Does /anything/ that you
volitionally create /within your consciousness/ rest on
that? Why no, of course not. Neither do /your/ obligations.
That's why you admitted your "obligation to intellectual
honesty." That's something /you/ volitionally created,
and /nobody's/ interpretation changes it.
Now you slow down a bit, and chew it over. You are
being emotional over this, and for good reason. I've
already acknowledged that (twice) and so you are
excused. You are under no obligation to rush, but
you are under the obligation to get it eventually.
At least according to you, you are.
> A "decision" to be obligated, as
> in /deciding/ to /make a promise/ of future behavior is
> one way (the moral way) an obligation can be created.
Technically, it's the only way. Choosing a course of
action is /always/ in the class of "decision." That's
what a decision /is/.
> Certain import? What is that supposed to mean? If it
> means obligations are to others such that if the behaviors
> are not forthcoming punishment follows, well, yeah, damn
> straight you should have included it here!
You mean, "Well, yeah, that's my whole point and is why
I'm defining it into the matter."
Yes, I understand that. But you are failing to understand
the nature of obligation.
> I am devoted to intellectual honesty for myself,
> but that has nothing whatsoever to do with any
> "obligation." When I am speaking /to/ others,
> /then/ there is a general moral obligation to speak
> truthfully,
Irrelevant. This only goes to the transitive nature of
obligation, that it must be to something.
Your claim is a damn sight more, that it rests upon
the expectations, reliances and demands of others.
You can make a case that without the object of the
transitivity, there couldn't be an obligation. I'm not
even sure that's right, but what those others /think/
has nothing--nothing whatsoever--with the existence
of that obligation within yourself.
> Of course. You seem to have forgotten that you agreed
> that obligations were always to others, and you claim
> I am dreaming when I say that. Fortunately, the
> discussions on these newsgroups are archived, so why
> don't you just go back and read before eating your
> words again and again and again? At least you'll know
> what's on the menu.
I don't need to, because I recall. I was, and still am, willing
to limit "obligation" to those obligations that are to others,.
for the purposes of this discussion. But I was also very clear
that I will not do that at the sacrifice of misidentifying what
an obligation is, and from where it arises.
IOW we can throw out your "obligation TO intellectual
honesty," because eventually this discussion will
center around obligations to other people in a
social context. But that doesn't mean that your
obligation to intellectual honesty doesn't exist; it
means it can be ignored for this discussion.
What can't be ignored, and won't be ignored, is
the source and nature of obligations. And for that,
your obligation TO intellectual honesty is very
relevant. And so it shall remain in play as will
any other obligations that we have--which means
that we CREATE--even if they're not to other
people. When you are able to admit this most
simple of identifications, then we can move on
and ignore all obligations except those to other
people. Though at this point, maybe I should
say "If you're able..."
> Now, I expect you may later claim you did not just
> say "Yes, that right," that obligations are in the class
> of anticipated future behaviors. Being in that class
> they are not in the class that your "rough" and non-
> sensical non-definition claimed.
>
> Of course they are in the class of the actor's behavior.
> They are among the actor's behaviors that others anticipate
> he will perform;
False. Your obligation to intellectual honesty--which
is starting to come under question anyway--has
nothing at all to do with what others anticipate.
Think about it, willya?
> and if he does not, they will regard him
> as deserving punishment because he failed to perform an
> action that was relied upon and demanded, namely, an
> /obligation/.
Gee, no question-begging there, eh? Well, you're wrong.
At no point, not now or then, did /I/ believe you deserve
/punishment/ for failing to be intellectually honest. Yet
according to your silly, vague and fluffy definition, that's
/all/ the existence of /your/ obligation rests upon--/my/
judgment (expectation, reliance) of it.
What a load of hooey.
> > [...] Your admitted obligation to intellectual
> > honesty has nothing whatsoever to do with anything
> > demanded or expected by anyone else.
>
> It has everything to do with that, and with only
> that, as I have already explained to you.
It has nothing to do with it and the assertion that
it does--or even could, really--is a sort of super-
naturalism that doesn't hold up under even the
most trivial of scrutiny.
ANY state of mind that YOU have, is entirely and
exclusively born of YOUR consciousness. This is
not obvious to you? Of course it is, which is why
you're trying to pretend that an obligation is
outside of that class. Your problem is, it isn't.
Where do YOU point, to show someone where an
obligation is, or where its source is? At two
people, at both of their consciousnesses?
> > [...] "There is no such thing as an unchosen
> > obligation." So where exactly do you stand on that
> > claim these days?
>
> I stand where I've stood. There's no such thing as
> an unchosen moral obligation.
Well, that would seem to leave your "moral obligations"
as all being chosen. So are you saying, explicitly, that
this choice requires two people to happen?
Are you saying that a religionist's self-imagined
obligation to God, isn't really an obligation, and it's
only not an obligation because God didn't "expect,
demand and rely"?
If you take a breath, you'll see how silly your position
is, if only because it rests upon someone else's
interpretation of what is going on in someone's head.
That's not crazy when it comes to contracts, but that's
what makes contracts a particular /subset/ of a
particular /type/ of obligation. It does not address the
/actual/ nature of obligation.
It's a state of mind and frankly, I still don't see what
else you think it COULD be. You seem ready to admit
that the religionists are "just making up" their
obligations, but not quite so ready to pronounce that
judgment upon yourself.
> You are begging the question. Why does sticking to your
> intentions obligate you to do something?
>
> It doesn't, of course.
Ha. You'd really better slow down, because you're getting
yourself tied up in knots. The whole basis of your position
is that it does.
> You are just being silly. You
> don't know what you are talking about; you are embarrassed
> by this; and you are being defensive. That's childish
> and beneath you. Stop with the silliness of claiming to
> know what you are unable to express in writing. If you
> can't express what an obligation is, you are only deluding
> yourself to imagine that you know anything about it.
Gee, that sounds sort of defensive itself.
> > "My word is my bond." You said that. So give me an
> > example of an intention you have, that you don't view
> > as an obligation.
>
> None of my intentions are obligations, and the behavior
> I intend becomes an obligation only when and if it is
> expected, relied upon and demanded of me by others.
You mean you didn't have that particular obligation
the day before you wrote it in public? Do tell.
> > Do you deny that your (so far unretracted)
> > obligation to intellectual honesty is born
> > of your intention?
>
> My /intention/ to be honest is not an obligation,
> and I never said it was, so there is nothing to
> retract. An intention is not an obligation. An
> obligation exists among the behaviors one may or
> may not intend to perform.
Really, that's quite enough to prove my point.
"An obligation exists among the behaviors one
may or may not intend to perform." IOW,
obligations are a subset of that class, right?
Well, that's exactly MY point! Now you tell me---
the class of "behaviors one may or may not
intend to perform"---what is the nature of THAT
class and where does it reside?
You will either answer honestly or start two-stepping
around the fact that you've got a subset of a class
existing outside of that class.
> If you don't intend
> to fulfill the terms of the contract you signed
> you are still obligated to fulfill them.
I thought obligations were a subset of intents.
So how could you have an obligation without
having the intent? Did you forget...your silly,
vague and fluffy definition rests not only upon
one, but at least two, interpretations of the
internal machinations of a single mind.
Now you're saying they don't even rest on one.
> My
> obligation [not my "intention"] to be honest IS an
> obligation, and it is born of the fact that others
> expect it, rely upon it and demand it.
Bullshit. Say it explicitly---"If others think I am
full of shit, then I no longer have any obligation
to intellectual honesty."
And if you do go so far as to say that, which I hope
you don't, then please explain where /all/ the
action is going on, such that you no longer have
that obligation.
> You, Jim, are not displaying intellectual
> honesty, right now.
Believe what you wish. What's important here is
that /I/ am identifying, and you are not. That's all.
jk
James E. Prescott
> Showing you wrong here will be a piece of cake. At least
> we can enter Round 3 tied up.
Well, at least below you were trying to make an argument,
I'll give you that much, and thank you for it.
> On Jan 26, 12:43 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > [...]
>
> [...]
>
> An obligation is a demand of oneself.
To demand is to "ask or call for something as due or
as necessary with peremptoriness and insistence and
often the right to make requests that are to be
regarded as /commands/, for example, <demanded payment
of the debt>" (from Webster's).
To "demand" of oneself would be a contradiction in
terms. That's, unless, of course, you care to quarrel
again with the English language.
> [...]
> > An obligation is an expected, relied upon and
> > demanded future behavior.
>
> Oh yeah? So when the junkie puts a gun to your
> head, he has created an obligation on your part?
Not a moral obligation, no. Of course he is
demanding some value from me (demanding that I
behave in a certain way -- give him my wallet,
perhaps) under threat of some harm to me, and he
may even be expecting me to comply, and relying
on me complying. I, in recognition of the
threat he intends to carry out, am the one
who must comply with the unchosen and immoral
obligation he imposes or else face deadly
consequences.
That's not moral obligation, of course, because
"moral" refers to the freely chosen acts evaluated
by reference to a code of conduct aimed at one's
own long-range purpose, and I never of my own free
will promised to give him anything for some value
or for some promise-of-his that serves my interest.
> [...]
> Or shall you offer that this "expected, relied
> upon and demanded future behavior" must be held
> by both parties?
To "expect" a behavior means to believe a person
will perform it; to "rely upon" a behavior
means to base one's decisions upon that belief,
such that if the person does not perform as he
was expected, one will lose important values that
are at stake; and, of course, to "demand" is
just as Mr. Webster defined it, above.
It wouldn't make any sense to say "I expect /me/
to perform thus, and /I/ rely on /me/ doing so,
and, by gum, if /I/ don't do as /I/ expect, I will
certainly hear of it and I will insist on getting
satisfaction from /me/!"
> [...]
> Now take a look at my definition, and you will see
> that wherever you can use "obligation," you can
> properly use "demand of oneself."
Demand of oneself doesn't make any sense. If you
believe it does make sense then you are either
seriously confused on this point or you are once
again not sharing with me some peculiar definition
of your own. If demand is not as Webster defines it,
pray tell what it means to you.
> You have an obligation to intellectual honesty?
No. I have an obligation to honesty when, by my words,
I have elicited the expectation and reliance of others,
and when they demand honesty and regard lying as an
offense against them.
Of course I /ought/ to be intellectually honest, for
my own sake, regardless of what anybody else thinks
or expects of me. But that moral truth has nothing
to do with obligations, which are to others not to
oneself.
> [...] I have an obligation to pay my bills? Then
> I demand of myself that I pay them.
You are not the one demanding payment. The company
that sent you the bill is the one demanding payment.
You are the one of whom payment is demanded. You
can pay the bill, or you can refuse to pay the bill.
But you can't "demand" that you pay it; not without
doing violence to the English language.
> We are talking about the source and cause of the
> obligation.
Yes, we are.
> [....]
> Fluffy? Vague? "Demand, expect, rely"...who is
> offering fluff and vagueness here?
If you have a problem with the words demand, expect
and rely, see their definitions, above. They are
perfectly plain, ordinary English words.
> How do you propose to discover one person's
> consideration of another person's intent?
If I am the one demanding, expecting and relying
on you to pay the bill you received from me, I will
gladly tell you about it. Oh, wait. That's why I
sent you the bill in the first place, isn't it?
> [...]
> Obligation is of the class of "intent," [...]
When you take something from a store you are
obligated to pay for it. When you take
the stand you are obligated to tell the truth,
whole truth, and nothing but. Whether you
"intend to be a thief" or "intend to commit
perjury" makes no difference at all. Obligation
is not in the class of "intent."
> [...]
> Do /your/ intents rest on my interpretation
> of them?
No. If I intend to pay a bill, or if I intend to
just tear up the bill and throw it away, makes
no difference to my obligation. Intents are not
obligations. You are obligated to pay when you
take something from a store. It doesn't matter
that you "intend to be a thief." You are still
obligated to pay.
> [...Y]ou admitted your "obligation to
> intellectual honesty." [...]
I asserted an obligation to truthful speech
and the moral value of intellectual honesty.
The moral value of intellectual honesty is
not related to obligation. The obligation
to speak truthfully to others is the fact
that others rely on it and demand it,
especially when speaking under oath.
> [...]
> Now you slow down a bit, and chew it over.
> You are being emotional over this [...]
Where did that come from? I'm not emotional
about this at all. Calm, cool reasoning and
and occasionally some good-natured fun at your
expense (sorry). If you think me upset at you,
you should know better by now.
> [...]
> ANY state of mind that YOU have, is entirely and
> exclusively born of YOUR consciousness. This is
> not obvious to you?
It's perfectly obvious, but a state of mind refers
to a mood or disposition such as being agitated,
pleased, nervous or New York. It has nothing to do
with obligation.
> [...]
> Where do YOU point, to show someone where an
> obligation is, or where its source is? At two
> people, at both of their consciousnesses?
When it comes to /moral/ obligation of you to
me (ones elicited by your own promises freely
made to me), I will point to your own words
or actions, such as your words expressed in a
contract or your actions in taking things offered
for sale in my store.
> > There's no such thing as
> > an unchosen moral obligation.
>
> Well, that would seem to leave your
> "moral obligations" as all being chosen.
Of course. Chosen is part of the meaning of
moral in this context.
> So are you saying, explicitly, that
> this choice requires two people to happen?
One to make a promise. One to accept it, to rely
upon it, and to demand that promises made be
promises kept.
One plus one is two.
> Are you saying that a religionist's self-
> imagined obligation to God, isn't really
> an obligation [...]
Yes, because God does not exist. I don't deny
a religious person thinks he is obligated. But
thinking you are obligated and actually being
obligated are not the same. God does not expect,
rely upon, or demand that anyone do anything. He
would if He existed, I suppose. But He can't
because He isn't real.
> [...], and it's only not an obligation because
> God didn't "expect, demand and rely"?
Precisely.
> If you take a breath, you'll see how silly
> your position is [...]
Hhhhhuuuff. That's me taking a very deep breath.
> [...], if only because it rests upon someone
> else's interpretation of what is going on in
> someone's head.
I don't have to guess. Obligations by their very
nature find clear expression in communication
among reasoning beings. If you are obligated to
pay more on April 15, you can rest assured that
by late May the IRS will be in touch. It wouldn't
make a lick of sense for a purported "obligation"
to just lie hidden in only one person's mind like
some subjective "intention to be honest." That
would be a silly, subjective notion unrelated to
obligation, and if you take a deep breath and
reflect for a moment, you will see that that is
the silliness you have been offering up here,
not me.
> [...]
> > [...] Why does sticking to your intentions
> > obligate you to do something?
>
> > It doesn't, of course.
>
> Ha. You'd really better slow down, because
> you're getting yourself tied up in knots. The
> whole basis of your position is that it does.
For the record, one ought intend to live up to
one's moral obligations; but intending to live up
to a moral obligation is not what creates it. What
creates a moral obligation is the expression in
word or deed of a promise to behave in a certain
manner. The obligation exists EVEN if you never
intended to fulfill the promise you made. It exists
BECAUSE those to whom you made promises expect,
rely and demand that you fulfill the promises that
you made. Simple. Simple. Simple.
But how this might relate in /your/ mind to such a
bizarre claim as "sticking to your intentions is
what creates an obligation," is well beyond com-
prehension. Explain. If you can. For my part,
I haven't a clue what you mean when you say the
basis of /my/ position is "sticking to your
intentions is what obligates you." Where have
I ever said anything so outlandish?
> [...]
> "An obligation exists among the behaviors one
> may or may not intend to perform." IOW,
> obligations are a subset of that class, right?
They are a subset of future behaviors. I can
expect you to answer this post without supposing
that you are obligated to do so. But I can also
expect you to pay your bill and, in /that/ case,
it's an obligation. Obligations are among your
anticipated behaviors, but are not all of them.
> [...]
> I thought obligations were a subset of intents.
You thought wrong. Obligations are a subset of
expected behaviors, and specifically they are
the expected behaviors that are relied upon
and demanded.
/Moral/ obligations are in turn a subset of
obligations, and specifically they are the
obligations arising when someone accepts,
relies upon and demands fulfillment of a
/promise/ that is /freely made/ by an individual
pursuing his own rational self-interest.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> Where did that come from? I'm not emotional
> about this at all. Calm, cool reasoning and
> and occasionally some good-natured fun at your
> expense (sorry). If you think me upset at you,
> you should know better by now.
That's all I need to hear, to carry us forward.
We will get to the bottom of this, and I have a
plan to assist us. Just a bit later, that's all.
Though I'm bettin' you'll be a bit emotional
before the end. Hopefully that emotion will
be gratitude. FWIW, that's what I felt when I
finally understood.
In the end, you are asserting a state of human
(intentional) existence that arises from other
than a single individual consciousness. You
may not shake in your boots over that, but
you should. We shall begin at the beginning,
just as soon as I get a break.
jk
vonvegas
> [...], and it's only not an obligation because
> God didn't "expect, demand and rely"?
James Prescott answered:
>>Precisely.
James, what do you say about the following possible scenarios:
1. You knowingly father a child whose mother dies in
childbirth. Have you any moral obligation to the baby which
didn't "expect, demand and rely"? If not, does anyone/group
have any moral obligation to the child? Who?
2. You know you have an STD which you nevertheless spread to
various sex partners without telling them of your condition
(hence they cannot "expect, demand and rely".) Were you ever
morally obligated in any way to anyone involved?
3. You recklessly go hunting with Dick Cheney and he
negligently shoots and renders you unconscious before you
can "expect, demand and rely". Is he morally obligated to
stop your bleeding or can he first sit down and eat his
lunch instead?
Thanx,
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
> Jim Klein asked about a "moral obligation:
> > [...], and it's only not an obligation because
> > God didn't "expect, demand and rely"?
>
> James Prescott answered:
> >>Precisely.
>
> James, what do you say about the following possible scenarios:
>
> 1. You knowingly father a child whose mother dies in
> childbirth. Have you any moral obligation to the baby
Obligation is never "to" someone who has not accepted
a promise or is otherwise "holding" the obligated person
as "bound to perform" in accord with expectations.
> If not, does anyone/group have any moral obligation
> to the child? Who?
Nobody has any more obligation "to the child" than there
is obligation "to mother Earth." There is none. There is,
however, an obligation to care for the child, just as
there is an obligation to care for the Earth. This
is not an obligation to the child nor to the Earth. It
is an obligation to those among us who value human life
and who value a healthy environment and who have made
it a condition of your participation in civilized society
that you will abide by laws created to protect from wanton
harm these precious natural values.
> 2. You know you have an STD which you nevertheless
> spread to various sex partners without telling them
> of your condition [...]
That is a punishable crime, in my judgement. I would
belong in prison if I did such a thing.
> (hence they cannot "expect, demand and rely".)
Of course they can. And in fact they DO expect you and
rely upon you to not behave in such a despicable manner.
They, also, through the law, demand it, and they are
within their rights to help see you punished.
> [...]
> 3. You recklessly go hunting with Dick Cheney
> and he negligently shoots and renders you
> unconscious before you can "expect, demand and
> rely". [...]
That poor fellow Cheney shot already expected more
carefulness from the V.P; anyone who goes with guns
in the company of others understands the rules and
standards of behavior. But now it might be different.
I'd demand he stay out in front of me and on higher
ground.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
(snip)
>> James, what do you say about the following possible
scenarios:
>>
>> 1. You knowingly father a child whose mother dies in
>> childbirth. Have you any moral obligation to the baby
>> [...]
>
> Obligation is never "to" someone who has not accepted
> a promise or is otherwise "holding" the obligated person
> as "bound to perform" in accord with expectations.
So it seems that for you an obligation arises only upon
fulfillment of certain contractual requirements (i.e.
promise and acceptance) and this despite the fact that your
future (implicitly) promised conduct (taking care of the
child) need be directed exclusively *to* the child and not
necessarily to those with whom you've contracted. Correct me
if I misunderstand.
>
>> If not, does anyone/group have any moral obligation
>> to the child? Who?
>
> Nobody has any more obligation "to the child" than there
> is obligation "to mother Earth." There is none. There is,
> however, an obligation to care for the child, just as
> there is an obligation to care for the Earth. This
> is not an obligation to the child nor to the Earth. It
> is an obligation to those among us who value human life
> and who value a healthy environment and who have made
> it a condition of your participation in civilized society
> that you will abide by laws created to protect from wanton
> harm these precious natural values.
What's somewhat troubling with your legalistic answer is
that this seems to allow *moral* obligations to be
*immoral*. For example, we can easily scenarionize (I doubt
that's even a word-but you know what I mean) a society
wherein there is no belief/law that anyone other than the
mother/father/family must take care of a child. (In fact
some have said that that is precisely Rand's position.) In
that case, were the father to also die, and further assuming
no extant relatives, the child in our scenario would perish,
which in our present society most of us, and perhaps you
too, would assert to in fact be immoral.
IOW, your answer appears to leave the choice of taking care
of a child or not, as a completely subjective matter. Yet it
seems that subjective laws are moral only when such laws
comply with some kind of underlying objective order. If
laws are only subjective, and I don't think that that's
really your position, then presumably the child has not the
Human Right to life (i.e.to be taken care of until it can
fend for itself.)
Or, have you signaled the grounds of objectivity in your use
of the phrase "natural values" when describing both the
earth and the child? If so, does the child's Human Right to
life stretch across various cultures/societies? Or should
"Human Rights" be more correctly renamed as "Human Rights
but limited to within our political entity" instead? IOW, do
Americans have a moral obligation to preserve say Chinese
children's life? Please clarify.
>
>> 2. You know you have an STD which you nevertheless
>> spread to various sex partners without telling them
>> of your condition [...]
>
> That is a punishable crime, in my judgement. I would
> belong in prison if I did such a thing.
>
>> (hence they cannot "expect, demand and rely".)
>
> Of course they can. And in fact they DO [...]
By your answer to this and the Cheney scenario I conclude
that you accept the notion of "tacit consent". If that's not
a ruff shorthand summary of your intended answer, then
please correct.
Vonvegas
Charles Bell
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> �ｿｽ> Nobody has any more obligation "to the child" than there
> �ｿｽ> is obligation "to mother Earth." There is none. There is,
> �ｿｽ> however, an obligation to care for the child, just as
> �ｿｽ> there is an obligation to care for the Earth. This
> �ｿｽ> is not an obligation to the child nor to the Earth. It
> �ｿｽ> is an obligation to those among us who value human life
> �ｿｽ> and who value a healthy environment and who have made
> �ｿｽ> it a condition of your participation in civilized society
> �ｿｽ> that you will abide by laws created to protect from wanton
> �ｿｽ> harm these precious natural values.
>
> What's somewhat troubling with your legalistic answer is
> that this seems to allow �ｿｽ*moral* obligations to be
> *immoral*.
Prescott believes "obligation" comes after "promise"; therefore
Prescottism is necessarily hedonistic or statist and collectivist
either way. "I delcare thee my obligation" in legalistic fashion is
the only way any bastard of his becomes any kind of obligation to him;
therefore, unless there is institutional marriage or paternity
litigation, no male human being can ever have any real paternal
obligation according to Prescottism.
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
James E. Prescott
> care of the child) need be directed exclusively *to* the
> child and not necessarily to those with whom you've
> contracted. Correct me if I misunderstand.
That's correct and typical of contract. The obligation
to another is behavior involving things of value. If
you hire me to build cars I must direct all my energy
toward the cars, though my obligation is to you.
It would be an unusual case where someone is obligated
to provide total care to a person and have it be that
person himself to whom the obligation is owed. This
is certainly not the case with infants. Infants cannot
hire babysitters or demand that parents fulfill their
roles.
> [...]
> What's somewhat troubling with your legalistic
> answer is that this seems to allow �*moral*
> obligations to be *immoral*.
They can easily be immoral. Faced with a moral choice,
a choice between good and evil, anyone can choose evil.
To say it was a moral choice is not to say either option
is moral; q
James E. Prescott
Sorry. This one got away from me....
On Jan 30, 6:54 am, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> (snip)
> [...Y]our future (implicitly) promised conduct (taking
> care of the child) need be directed exclusively *to* the
> child and not necessarily to those with whom you've
> contracted. Correct me if I misunderstand.
That's correct and typical of contract. The obligation
to another is behavior involving things of value. If
you hire me to build cars I must direct all my energy
toward the cars, though my obligation is to /you/.
It would be an unusual case where someone is obligated
to provide total care to a person and have it be that
person himself to whom the obligation is owed. This
is certainly not the case with infants. Infants cannot
hire babysitters or nurses or demand that parents fulfill
their roles.
> [...]
> What's somewhat troubling with your legalistic
> answer is that this seems to allow *moral*
> obligations to be *immoral*.
They can easily be immoral. Faced with a moral choice,
a choice between good and evil, anyone can choose evil.
To say it was a moral choice is not to say either option
is moral; quite the opposite. It is a moral choice
because one of the options is evil. A moral obligation
is simply an obligation chosen in the act of making a
promise. One might be promising to do an evil thing.
> [...Y]our answer appears to leave the choice of
> taking care of a child or not, as a completely
> subjective matter. [...]
Children are precious values. It is natural we should
want to ensure they are cared for by having laws designed
to protect them and give them into the care of loving
responsible parents. Primitive societies sometimes practiced
infanticide they way we practice abortion. There was nothing
wrong with that. Infants have no more rights than fetuses
do. It's only that in our advanced society we have the luxury
of protecting them. So we do, and we should.
> [...So t]he child has not the Human Right to life
> (i.e.to be taken care of until it can fend for itself.)
There is no such thing as a right to the unearned care of
another. Slavery was banned years ago.
> Or, have you signaled the grounds of objectivity in
> your use of the phrase "natural values" when describing
> both the earth and the child?
Natural value is in contrast to values created by human
invention and work. The latter are the property of those
who create them. Natural values are not property and so
are protected from harm by laws that reflect the generally
equal interest of all members of society. You have no
more right than I to enjoy the air we breathe, the earth,
the oceans, or the lives of newborn human beings. These
things are not property but are protected by law as values
precious to us all. Parents get special rights with respect
to children, but only if they earn those rights.
> I conclude that you accept the notion of "tacit consent".
Oh, yes. I even regard tacit consent as a more basic form
than explicit consent. In signing a contract you are explicitly
consenting to certain terms, but you are tacitly consenting
to terms of enforcement in that contract and in all legally
binding promises you make -- otherwise what is the point of
putting your name to a contract or making a promise in a
binding manner? When it comes to the law, tacit consent
precedes all other forms and all other forms rest upon it.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
> That's correct and typical of contract. The obligation
> to another is behavior involving things of value.
Once again I am having difficulty wrapping my head
around the notion that an obligation is A PHYSICAL
BEHAVIOR rather than A MENTAL COMMITMENT to behave.
The behavior is what FULFILLS the commitment, isn't
it?
Just for the hell of it, here is the def given in
my Webster's collegiate:
Obligation:
1 the action of obligating oneself to a course of
action (as by a promise or vow)
2a something (as a formal contract, a promise, or
the demands of conscious or custom) that obligates
one to a course of action
2b a debt security (as a mortgage or corporate bond)
2c a commitment (as by a government) to pay a particular
sum of money; also an amount owed under such an
obligation <unable to meet its obligations>
3a a condition or feeling of being obligated
3b a debt of gratitude
4 something one is bound to do: DUTY, RESPONSIBILITY
In all fairness, no. 4 looks like what you are advocating,
but its not the first thing that comes to mind, at least
not to my mind, when I think of an obligation. Aren't you
more or less trying to make 4 the whole enchilada?
Phil
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
> That's correct and typical of contract. The obligation
> to another is behavior involving things of value.
Rather than a commitment, perhaps an understanding, might
be a better way of expressing it. Usually, an understanding
among consenting rational beings. Yes. I wonder if that
isn't a little better. Of course, an understanding is not
something physical, but rather something that resides in
the noosphere, to borrow a term from De Chardin.
Phil
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > That's correct and typical of contract. The obligation
> > to another is behavior involving things of value.
>
> Once again I am having difficulty wrapping my head
> around the notion that an obligation is A PHYSICAL
> BEHAVIOR rather than A MENTAL COMMITMENT to behave.
> The behavior is what FULFILLS the commitment, isn't
> it?
Yes, it is, and you make a good point.
> Just for the hell of it, here is the def given in
> my Webster's collegiate:
>
> Obligation:
> 1 the action of obligating oneself to a course of
> action (as by a promise or vow)
> 2a something (as a formal contract, a promise, or
> the demands of conscious or custom) that obligates
> one to a course of action
> 2b a debt security (as a mortgage or corporate bond)
> 2c a commitment (as by a government) to pay a particular
> sum of money; also an amount owed under such an
> obligation <unable to meet its obligations>
> 3a a condition or feeling of being obligated
> 3b a debt of gratitude
> 4 something one is bound to do: DUTY, RESPONSIBILITY
>
> In all fairness, no. 4 looks like what you are advocating,
> but its not the first thing that comes to mind, at least
> not to my mind, when I think of an obligation. Aren't you
> more or less trying to make 4 the whole enchilada?
No, perhaps only the "filling"? I'm not trying change
how the word is used, and your point is valid. Obligation
does refer to an idea and to a moral and/or legal or quasi-
legal status. Such words have different uses depending
on what you are trying to say. A word like "slave"
becomes "slavery" when you switch from talking about
the person who is a slave to talking about the concept
or institution of having slaves. But always it denotes
more than just a person; it refers to the person in
relationship to others. Obligation may retain its spelling
when you switch from talking about the something you
are bound to do, to talking about the act of binding.
All the different uses are valid, and I don't mean
to be ruling out any of the others when I use the
word to describe the actions which fulfill an
obligation as being themselves "the obligation."
I'm just picking one way to use the word, and perhaps
not the best way to use it for clarity here.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
> Sorry. This one got away from me....
>
> On Jan 30, 6:54 am, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
>> (snip)
>> [...Y]our future (implicitly) promised conduct (taking
>> care of the child) need be directed exclusively *to* the
>> child and not necessarily to those with whom you've
>> contracted. Correct me if I misunderstand.
>
> That's correct and typical of contract.
No. Contracts "typically" (at least in our present society)
concern property and there is no such thing as a contract
that legitimizes the treating of children as property to
perhaps be disposed of as the owner sees fit. If you are
going to appeal to custom (as you did thruout your post and
here specifically when you speak of "typical contract") to
justify your view then you are stuck with our present
customs/legalities which as you know forbid slavery hence
the contracting of disposing/enslaving of humans.
The obligation
> to another is behavior involving things of value. If
> you hire me to build cars I must direct all my energy
> toward the cars, though my obligation is to /you/.
>
> It would be an unusual case where someone is obligated
> to provide total care to a person and have it be that
> person himself to whom the obligation is owed. This
> is certainly not the case with infants. Infants cannot
> hire babysitters or nurses or demand that parents fulfill
> their roles.
What's unusual is you thinking that one human can engage
with another to dispose of a third (the infant) human.
>
>> [...]
>> What's somewhat troubling with your legalistic
>> answer is that this seems to allow *moral*
>> obligations to be *immoral*.
>
> They can easily be immoral. Faced with a moral choice,
> a choice between good and evil, anyone can choose evil.
Yes of course anyone *can* choose evil but the ability to
choose is hardly in question here. Haven't you completely
missed the central point of ethical theory which struggles
to answer the question whether or not there is, as a matter
of fact (not mere opinion,) such a thing as right conduct
(relevantly here the discharging of obligations) and not
merely societal customs/legalities which may or may not be
moral? If I understand your approach, but perhaps I don't,
you have made moral behavior completely subjective. It is
subjective because for you an obligation arises only when at
least two subjects (presumably competent adults) agree *yet*
they may agree upon anything whatsoever including the
immoral. So for you, an obligation is completely a function
of agreement which however leaves out *the* central ethical
question of which/what agreements are indeed ethical.
If your position is ruffly as described above, then no
wonder that you write with such great confidence (I hasten
to add there is nothing wrong with *justified* confidence)
of your viewpoint. But you've managed to simplify ethical
theory to the point where it has become simplistic since all
that's required is the choosing of so called values while
completely ignoring whether or not they indeed actually are
valuable, hence moral.
> To say it was a moral choice is not to say either option
> is moral; quite the opposite. It is a moral choice
> because one of the options is evil. A moral obligation
> is simply an obligation chosen in the act of making a
> promise. One might be promising to do an evil thing.
I understand. "Moral" is ambiguous between meaning a choice
which involves either right or wrong, and meaning a right
choice. You meant the former here.
>
>> [...Y]our answer appears to leave the choice of
>> taking care of a child or not, as a completely
>> subjective matter. [...]
>
> Children are precious values.
By which you, as a matter of consistency, can only mean
that some people *consider* children as an object of value;
you do not say that they are indeed in most contexts
valuable hence should be such an object of value, right? In
fact, since you state below that there is nothing wrong with
infanticide, we can conclude that you do not believe
children to be valuable (in most contexts) such that they
necessarily should be valued, right? Yet you also say they
should be valued which is contradictory. Please explain.
It is natural we should
> want to ensure they are cared for by having laws designed
> to protect them and give them into the care of loving
> responsible parents.
Despite your use of the word "natural" you don't classify
children as natural values for else you couldn't say that
there was nothing wrong with infanticide which treats them
as disposable property, right?
Primitive societies sometimes practiced
> infanticide they way we practice abortion. There was nothing
> wrong with that. Infants have no more rights than fetuses
> do.
When, if ever, and precisely how do these children obtain
the right not to be disposed of by their parents? Is it at
the age of majority (ruffly age 18 in most jurisdictions)
which then would mean that the killing of say a 10 year old
by its parents wouldn't be murder, IYO?
>It's only that in our advanced society we have the luxury
> of protecting them.
>So we do, and we should.
>
>> [...So t]he child has not the Human Right to life
>> (i.e.to be taken care of until it can fend for itself.)
>
> There is no such thing as a right to the unearned care of
> another.
Agreed when it comes to adults. But is that necessarily so
with children since they did not agree to be here in the
first place? Yet by our action we brought (forced?) them
into being, or doesn't that matter?
>Slavery was banned years ago.
I wish you had remembered that, when you in effect argued
that infants were disposable property. So which is it?
>
>> Or, have you signaled the grounds of objectivity in
>> your use of the phrase "natural values" when describing
>> both the earth and the child?
>
> Natural value is in contrast to values created by human
> invention and work.
So your answer to my question is no, you did not signal the
grounds for objectivity. In fact you are a subjectivist, do
I have that right?
>The latter are the property of those
> who create them.
And since children are disposable property according to you,
just exactly what work did we perform to "create" them?
Intercourse? Do you think most serious people consider
intercourse to be work?
>Natural values are not property and so
> are protected from harm by laws that reflect the generally
> equal interest of all members of society. You have no
> more right than I to enjoy the air we breathe, the earth,
> the oceans, or the lives of newborn human beings. These
> things are not property but are protected by law as values
> precious to us all.
Whoops. Now you've classified children as *not* property,
but if so then we have no right to dispose of them so how
could infanticide be OK? Please resolve this contradiction.
Parents get special rights with respect
> to children, but only if they earn those rights.
>
>> I conclude that you accept the notion of "tacit consent".
>
> Oh, yes. [...]
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> >> [...Y]our future (implicitly) promised conduct (taking
> >> care of the child) need be directed exclusively *to* the
> >> child and not necessarily to those with whom you've
> >> contracted. Correct me if I misunderstand.
> >
> > That's correct and typical of contract.
>
> No. Contracts "typically" (at least in our present society)
> concern property [...]
That's true. But they may involve others things, too, besides
property.
> [...] and there is no such thing as a contract
> that legitimizes the treating of children as property to
> perhaps be disposed of as the owner sees fit. [...]
Oh, I agree!
Children are not property. No valid contract may treat
things that are not property as if they were property.
I cannot sell you the Grand Canyon, to say nothing of
the Brooklyn Bridge. To sell you something: first it
must be property; and second it must be property that
I own. A parent may not sell a child. A child is
not property.
> [...]
>
> What's unusual is you thinking that one human can engage
> with another to dispose of a third (the infant) human.
I said to protect a third. Happens a lot. Caregivers
are hired every day to protect the victims of Alzheimer's,
disease, for example, to keep them from losing or harming
themselves, and it is never (well, virtually never) the
sufferer himself who does the hiring or the paying or the
setting of terms or the enforcing. It is always someone
who is interested in protecting the sufferer. That someone
hires a protector, a nurse, typically, to watch over the
patient and provide continual care. This does not
constitute regarding the patient as "property."
> [...A]nyone *can* choose evil but the ability to
> choose is hardly in question here. [...]
But the ability to choose evil is precisely what makes a
choice fall within the realm of "moral choice."
> Haven't you completely missed the central point of
> ethical theory which struggles to answer the question
> whether or not there is, as a matter of fact (not mere
> opinion,) such a thing as right conduct (relevantly
> here the discharging of obligations) and not merely
> societal customs/legalities which may or may not be
> moral?
Ethical theory does indeed seek to show which choices are
objectively right, that's true.
Discharging one's obligations is ethically right as a
general rule, but if one entered into an obligation to
do something wrong (for example, a hit man who accepts
a large payment on the promise to do murder) you would
have then a case where the obligation itself was evil.
(And in this case illegal so not a legal obligation at
all.) And where discharging that obligation would be
/another/ objective moral wrong (the first having
been to create that obligation -- to take the money
and make the promise -- in the first place).
> If I understand your approach, but perhaps I don't,
> you have made moral behavior completely subjective.
Quite the contrary! I never said it was morally right
to fulfill a moral obligation without regard to the
moral rightness of the obligation. A "moral obligation"
is simply one /chosen/ by the obligated person, and its
moral rightness /depends/ on whether the person made a
choice that was morally right or a choice that was
morally wrong.
> It is subjective because for you an obligation arises
> only when at least two subjects (presumably competent
> adults) agree [...]
No, it is not subjective, but, yes, having agreement is
what distinguishes a moral obligation from an imposed or
a strictly legal obligation (granting that most legal
obligations are also accepted by choice, i.e., are
/also/ moral obligations, e.g., the legal obligations
that arise pursuant to specific contract).
> [...] *yet* they may agree upon anything whatsoever
> including the immoral.
Certainly. But that doesn't mean anything they agree upon
is morally right. It can't possibly mean that.
> So for you, an obligation is completely a function
> of agreement which however leaves out *the* central
> ethical question of which/what agreements are indeed
> ethical.
I say it doesn't leave it out; I say it brings it
forward; it demands we address it. Thus,
Some obligations are imposed by others. I can impose
upon you an obligation to do something morally /right/,
as when I tell you not to throw your life away by
using heroin as a recreational drug. I can threaten
to lock you up in prison if you disobey. That doesn't
mean it is morally right for me to do that, but the
fact that it is morally wrong for me to do that
doesn't mean you taking heroin is morally right,
either.
So, no, this doesn't leave aside these questions of
objective moral rightness. It calls them clearly to
our attention. It points out that the mere fact of
a thing being required by law or required by contract
says nothing whatsoever about whether the required
behavior is morally wrong or morally right.
> [...]
>
> > To say it was a moral choice is not to say either
> > option is moral; quite the opposite. It is a moral
> > choice because one of the options is evil. A moral
> > obligation is simply an obligation chosen in the act
> > of making a promise. One might be promising to do an
> > evil thing.
>
> I understand. "Moral" is ambiguous between meaning a
> choice which involves either right or wrong, and meaning
> a right choice. You meant the former here.
Yes. You have it. And it /is/ terribly ambiguous!
I know this and I regret it. What's more, I could
easily lose the ambiguity simply by switching to
"chosen obligation." The problem is, moral, here,
denotes more than mere choice. Not all choice is
moral choice. A moral choice is one that is reason-
guided and /may be evaluated/ as either morally
good or morally evil by reference to a code of values
and principles aimed at a long-range purpose (a
code of ethics, of morality).
Yes, it might suffice in this instance that obligation
itself carries the necessary connotation. However, I'm
reluctant to surrender the valid use of "moral" in
this context because I believe it is better to take the
time to explain fully the source of the ambiguity. This
is for the sake of clarity in other related issues such
as the difference between "right," and "a right," between
that which is morally right to do and that which, morally
and legally, you happen to have "the right" to do (take
heroin, for example). There is just no way to get past
the confusion unless it's met head-on, with careful
explanation.
> [...S]ince you state below that there is nothing
> wrong with infanticide, [...]
I said there was nothing wrong with infanticide in
primitive societies where it was practiced as the moral
equivalent of what we, in our society, do as abortion,
a perfectly moral and legal procedure (in the first
trimester, at least). In modern society infanticide
is murder, and properly so -- an immoral act and a very
serious punishable crime.
> [...] we can conclude that you do not believe
> children to be valuable (in most contexts) such
> that they necessarily should be valued, right?
Not right. Yes, the idea of context-less, "necessary"
or intrinsic value unrelated to the moral purposes
of those who value is mystical nonsense. So of course
I would not say that anything must be valued regardless
of whether it is valuable or not.
However, children are indeed valuable and valued in a
society even where infanticide was practiced. The
practitioners of infanticide, you ought know,
were mothers struggling to survive and escaping
the burden of new mouths to feed usually for the
sake of their children, whom they loved, and whom
did not wish to see starve to death.
Mothers who elect abortion in our society are similarly
motivated and cannot be said to somehow loathe or
dis-value children. Many women who have abortions
already have children, whom they love very dearly,
and I doubt you'll find any woman having an abortion
who would say to you that children are worthless and
should not be cherished and protected from harm.
> Yet you also say they should be valued which is
> contradictory. Please explain.
See above. I /do/ say children should be valued.
This is because they are just about the greatest
source of joy imaginable. I love my own children,
and it's hard to think of my life without them.
There is no contradiction here. I do not regard
myself as having been born with an obligation to
value children. I regard myself as having been
born with the capacity to recognize how truly
valuable and precious children really are.
> > It is natural we should want to ensure [[that
> > children]] are cared for by having laws designed
> > to protect them and give them into the care of
> > loving responsible parents.
>
> Despite your use of the word "natural" you don't
> classify children as natural values [...]
But I /do/ regard them as such.
By "natural value," I mean to distinguish children
from values such as automobiles and electric lights,
which are values created by human invention and work,
also known as "property."
A natural value is a value found in nature, like the
air we breathe, the animals in forests, the oceans,
the rivers, and so forth. Human beings /are/ such
values. They are NOT property.
Human beings are not inventions-of-the-mind belonging
to the inventor. No man can claim them as property,
at any stage in their development, from embryo to fetus
to infant to toddler to child to adolescent to adult.
Non-property values still need protection under
law, and need it every bit as much as property
needs protection. Laws protecting non-property
values are still laws protecting /rights/ (just
as all law should protect rights) even though,
in this case, the specific rights involved do not
happen to be property rights.
> for else you couldn't say that there was nothing
> wrong with infanticide which treats them
> as disposable property, right?
I do not say there is nothing wrong with
infanticide. I regard infanticide as murder
and properly punishable as such. Primitive
societies are just that, primitive. In no
way should their mystical notions of what
constitutes "disposable property" (or in most
cases, "tribal property") ever be admired or
emulated or serve as a basis for modern law.
All I meant was, there is nothing intrins-
ically wrong with infanticide such that you
would somehow be justified in morally condemning
the ancient Eskimos who practiced it.
That would, itself, be a mystical notion on your part,
and would, if you followed the "logic" of it, mean
there's nothing wrong with the modern mystics who
accuse the practitioners of abortion of committing
some "intrinsic evil" when they end a human life.
> > Primitive societies sometimes practiced
> > infanticide they way we practice abortion.
> > There was nothing wrong with that. Infants
> > have no more rights than fetuses do.
>
> When, if ever, and precisely how do these children
> obtain the right not to be disposed of by their
> parents?
The question is, when, in a proper, civilized, non-
primitive society such as ours do parents "get" the
right to dispose of their children. The answer is,
never, never, never!
In the first trimester a mother already has the
right to terminate the pregnancy, which means,
the right to kill, without any conditions limiting
her choice.
But once she waives that right by carrying the
pregnancy into the second trimester, she retains only
the right to kill the fetus for compelling medical
reasons. Thereafter, the right of others to protect
new human life from wanton harm properly takes
precedence in our laws.
> Is it at the age of majority [...].
Full adult rights begin at a certain age, yes, along
with obligations under the law, and along with being
subject to criminal sanctions in adult court.
But overall it's a gradual process recognizing that
rights and responsibilities are proportional to
moral maturity, to the ability to make reason-
guided choices, to the ability to take charge of
one's own actions. A toddler has no right to walk out
into a busy street. A child does have that right
assuming he is mature enough to know the risks and
to make a responsible choice.
> [...] which then would mean that the killing of
> say a 10 year old by its parents wouldn't be murder,
> IYO?
Say, what?!? Killing of a /ten-second/ old infant is
murder, IMO, and a parent who does that belongs in
prison for the rest of his or her life. Murder is
the immoral and illegal taking of a human life. It
is not something to be tolerated, and we have perfectly
proper laws condemning those who do it.
> > [...]
> > There is no such thing as a right to the unearned
> > care of another.
>
> Agreed when it comes to adults.
When it comes to anyone. Mere mental lack-of-capacity
does not give someone a right to be cared for.
> But is that necessarily so with children since they
> did not agree to be here in the first place? Yet by our
> action we brought (forced?) them into being, or doesn't
> that matter?
It matters in the sense that infants lack the capacity
to make a moral choice and therefore cannot be a
party to agreements among reason-guided beings
affecting their welfare. This doesn't mean those
agreements don't exist. Anyone who accepts parental
rights assumes the parental obligation to protect,
nurture, feed, clothe and educate a child. Nobody,
not even biological parents, ever gets a right to
do harm to a child or even by willful neglect to
allow harm to befall a child.
This doesn't mean a child is magically imbued with
a right of its own, or rather, with a /claim/ to the
unearned servitude of others. It only means that the
right to protect children from harm is well and properly
recognized in our laws.
> >Slavery was banned years ago.
>
> I wish you had remembered that, when you in effect
> argued that infants were disposable property. So which
> is it?
I never argued that infants were disposable property.
> >> Or, have you signaled the grounds of objectivity
> >> in your use of the phrase "natural values" when
> >> describing both the earth and the child?
> >
> > Natural value is in contrast to values created by
> > human invention and work.
>
> So your answer to my question is no, you did not signal
> the grounds for objectivity. In fact you are a subjectivist,
> do I have that right?
No, you have that wrong.
You seem to be conflating objective and intrinsic.
"Objective" means that the value of a thing is a function
of the thing's /actual/, objectively /real/ relationship
to the purposes of conscious beings.
"Subjective" means that the purported value is only
imagined, wished, a whim, a thing in your mind alone
that has no real value.
"Intrinsic" is value that is /purported/ to exist
entirely in things themselves, /irrespective/ of the
purposes of conscious beings.
Therefore, ironically, "intrinsic value" is actually of
the /subjective/ kind. It is a purely religious, mystical
notion that exists only in the confused minds of those
asserting it, and it lacks any objective validity at all.
> > The latter are the property of those
> > who create them.
>
> And since children are disposable property according
> to you, just exactly what work did we perform to
> "create" them? [...]
But I never said children are disposable property. I have
always, and only, said exactly the opposite. For example...
> > Natural values are not property and so are protected
> > from harm by laws that reflect the generally equal
> > interest of all members of society. You have no
> > more right than I to enjoy the air we breathe, the earth,
> > the oceans, or the lives of newborn human beings. These
> > things are not property but are protected by law as values
> > precious to us all.
>
> Whoops. Now you've classified children as *not* property,
> [...]
Whoops, indeed! I /never/ classified them as property
in the first place!
Go back and check if you need to, but I can assure
you that such a notion has never been suggested by
me, here, in any way.
I understand if you made the simple error of assuming
I was trying to say something of the sort, but I wasn't,
and I didn't, and I have always tried to be as careful
about this as I can. So let me explain it again.
Human beings are NOT property. /Property/, in the
general philosophical sense, is the physical or intellectual
creation of human work and invention, and it belongs to
those whose reason-guided creativity brought it into
existence.
Natural values, by contrast, are the product of nature.
Natural values can be claimed as land or other natural
resource property in the legal sense when an agreement
among reasoning beings apportions them for productive
purposes or when subsequent use-rights are purchased
from prior owners. Slaves were once considered property
in that legal sense, but that was never proper law.
The philosophical distinction I am striking at here
is that true property must be created, brought into
existence by human reason-guided effort, and then
traded for other property. You don't just stumble
effortlessly across something in nature and get
blessed by God with a right to call it "yours," and
then magically have everybody else go along with you
for no good reason.
You need to /earn/ the property rights you have by
/creating property/ or by doing trade with others
who have created it. Manna from heaven is not how
property rights come to be.
> [...] but if so then we have no right to dispose of
> them so how could infanticide be OK? Please resolve
> this contradiction.
I hope I have done so to your satisfaction.
Infanticide is NOT okay; it is murder.
Human beings are NOT property; they are the creators
and owners of property.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
>> [...] and there is no such thing as a contract
>> that legitimizes the treating of children as property to
>> perhaps be disposed of as the owner sees fit. [...]
>
> Oh, I agree!
Good.
>
> Children are not property. No valid contract may treat
> things that are not property as if they were property.
Right, it wouldn't be a valid contract and yet, if I've
properly understood, you say that an obligation nevertheless
arises upon our mere agreement (even tho that agreement may
be immoral/wrong). Thus, according to you it seems we could
have an invalid contract which nevertheless obligates us
both, right?
Of course I disagree with such a possibility for an
obligation IMO can only arise if that which we agree upon is
ethical (right conduct or if you prefer in accord with moral
law). And, btw, this is IMO precisely how you leave out (or
at the very best wrongly postpone till later) the central
ethical question (whether an action is indeed right). It is
wrong to postpone till later because by doing so it results
in the silly state of affairs that we'd have what you'd
label an obligation (because both parties have agreed) which
neither is obligated to perform (because it is immoral).
IOW, we'd have obligations to which one is not obligated!
This is either massive confusion about what obligations are
or at the very best a serious misuse and abuse of language.
> I cannot sell you the Grand Canyon, to say nothing of
> the Brooklyn Bridge. To sell you something: first it
> must be property; and second it must be property that
> I own. A parent may not sell a child. A child is
> not property.
I agree with all you say now except you have also previously
maintained that an obligation arises as a function of mere
agreement and that which we agree upon could be immoral
(such as your selling me the Grand Canyon for the bargain
price of $100). Therefore, again, according to you, via our
agreement we could have met the conditions you've laid down
to incur an obligation, yet we are not obligated to
discharge it.
BTW, just as a point for my future consideration, would I
also get the mineral rights for that $100? :-)
>
>> [...]
>>
>> What's unusual is you thinking that one human can engage
>> with another to dispose of a third (the infant) human.
>
> I said to protect a third.
Yes, but you also said more, see below.
(snip)
>
>> Haven't you completely missed the central point of
>> ethical theory which struggles to answer the question
>> whether or not there is, as a matter of fact (not mere
>> opinion,) such a thing as right conduct (relevantly
>> here the discharging of obligations) and not merely
>> societal customs/legalities which may or may not be
>> moral?
>
> Ethical theory does indeed seek to show which choices are
> objectively right, that's true.
>
> Discharging one's obligations is ethically right as a
> general rule,
Precisely, and perhaps we might even say that if we choose
life we have an *obligation* to act ethically, yes?
>but if one entered into an obligation to
> do something wrong (for example, a hit man who accepts
> a large payment on the promise to do murder) you would
> have then a case where the obligation itself was evil.
> (And in this case illegal so not a legal obligation at
> all.)
Correct. It's not really a *legal* obligation at all, but
for you nevertheless an obligation because all that's
required by you is agreement between the parties and that
gives rise to the obligation, right?
>And where discharging that obligation would be
> /another/ objective moral wrong (the first having
> been to create that obligation -- to take the money
> and make the promise -- in the first place).
Right, except that first "obligation" wasn't an obligation
at all.
>
>> If I understand your approach, but perhaps I don't,
>> you have made moral behavior completely subjective.
>
> Quite the contrary!
Oh?
>I never said it was morally right
> to fulfill a moral obligation without regard to the
> moral rightness of the obligation. A "moral obligation"
> is simply one /chosen/ by the obligated person, and its
> moral rightness /depends/ on whether the person made a
> choice that was morally right or a choice that was
> morally wrong.
Yes, you never said that but...
>
>> It is subjective because for you an obligation arises
>> only when at least two subjects (presumably competent
>> adults) agree [...]
>
> No, it is not subjective,
But why not since the parties can agree about anything
whatsoever?
Where's the objectivity? Where's the agreement to act in
accordance with objective moral law?
>but, yes, having agreement is
> what distinguishes a moral obligation from an imposed or
> a strictly legal obligation (granting that most legal
> obligations are also accepted by choice, i.e., are
> /also/ moral obligations, e.g., the legal obligations
> that arise pursuant to specific contract).
>
>> [...] *yet* they may agree upon anything whatsoever
>> including the immoral.
>
> Certainly. But that doesn't mean anything they agree upon
> is morally right. It can't possibly mean that.
Right, but that wasn't the point. Instead the point was/is
that according to you a moral (either right/wrong)
obligation is a function of mere agreement and that
agreement need not be a moral (right) act and when it isn't,
then I say there is no objectivity in either that act of
agreement or the obligation that arises therefrom or from
subsequent fulfillment of that obligation. Furthermore, you
have said that an agreement results in an obligation and yet
you also recognize, as you did above, that it is not really
an obligation.
>
>> So for you, an obligation is completely a function
>> of agreement which however leaves out *the* central
>> ethical question >
> I say it doesn't leave it out;
Then show me the objectivity, please. I say you can't.
>I say it brings it
> forward;
I don't know what your reply means exactly but clearly it is
referencing some *future* action therefore not part of any
present agreement which would result in a present
obligation. For that present agreement, your approach seems
indeed to have left out the central ethical question of
which/what agreements are indeed ethical.
> it demands we address it. Thus,
>
> Some obligations are imposed by others. I can impose
> upon you an obligation to do something morally /right/,
> as when I tell you not to throw your life away by
> using heroin as a recreational drug. I can threaten
> to lock you up in prison if you disobey. That doesn't
> mean it is morally right for me to do that, but the
> fact that it is morally wrong for me to do that
> doesn't mean you taking heroin is morally right,
> either.
Perhaps, but the point wasn't/isn't whether my actions are
so related to your actions such that if yours are immoral
that that somehow makes mine moral.
>
> So, no, this doesn't leave aside these questions of
> objective moral rightness.
It certainly does at the very least up to and thru the time
of agreement hence the incurred so called by you "obligation".
But you are irrelevantly talking about a subsequent to
agreement stage. If you want to say that what we might
initially but wrongly *call* an obligation arises upon
agreement that would be OK. But then you'd still have to
admit that what actually is an obligation requires more
(that its ethical status be in accord with moral law) than
mere agreement.
(snip)
>> [...S]ince you state below that there is nothing
>> wrong with infanticide, [...]
>
> I said there was nothing wrong with infanticide in
> primitive societies
That's not all you said. See below.
(snip)
> All I meant was, there is nothing intrins-
> ically wrong with infanticide such that you
> would somehow be justified in morally condemning
> the ancient Eskimos who practiced it.
I wonder what "intrinsically wrong" means here. Please explain?
>
> That would, itself, be a mystical notion on your part,
> and would, if you followed the "logic" of it, mean
> there's nothing wrong with the modern mystics who
> accuse the practitioners of abortion of committing
> some "intrinsic evil" when they end a human life.
Intrinsic?
>
>> > Primitive societies sometimes practiced
>> > infanticide they way we practice abortion.
>> > There was nothing wrong with that. Infants
>> > have no more rights than fetuses do.
Here's what I've been referencing with my previous "see
below" remarks. I studied your paragraph very carefully for
it did occur to me that you perhaps didn't mean what it
seems to say. But in the end, I concluded I didn't have enuf
evidence to overturn what seems to be the most natural
interpretation. You do indeed say that there *was* (past
tense) nothing wrong with infanticide. But look at the very
next sentence. It says infants *have* (present tense) no
more rights than fetuses. The question in my mind became did
you really mean to say "have" or was it perhaps an
inattentive slip of tense on your part.
I reasoned that the question was whether or not that
paragraph was primarily intended to be asserting something
about present times or the past instead. Since in the
overall context we were discussing the present time, the
evidence tilted slightly in its favor but still that was
pretty meager evidence and seemed to be not a very
charitable interpretation. I finally concluded that your use
of the word "fetus" was the clincher since primitive
societies would likely not have been making such a
distinction, All considered, I thot it more reasonable that
that last sentence which contained the word "fetus" was
indeed about present times thus straightforwardly
interpreted you were saying that infants could presently be
treated hence "aborted" just like a fetus might be.
Having now read your subsequent response, and I have no real
reason to doubt that it accurately reflects your previous
intentions, it is clear to me that you didn't mean that at
all. Anyway the upshot is that many of my criticisms had
relied on that previous interpretation and we've managed to
both therefore take a big detour in our conversation. I
trust we can now get back on track. I'll snip a great deal
of the below because it had relied on that previous
interpretation of your words.
>>
>> When, if ever, and precisely how do these children
>> obtain the right not to be disposed of by their
>> parents?
>
> The question is, when, in a proper, civilized, non-
> primitive society such as ours do parents "get" the
> right to dispose of their children. The answer is,
> never, never, never!
Well, that's one question. But what about mine? Let me ask
more clearly. Does a human child have an (presumably)
unearned right to life after all? In that case it would
have a claim upon at least its parents, right? If not how
come according to you, its parents nevertheless have an
obligation, not to the child but to complete strangers who
theoretically might never even come in any contact with it?
Doesn't your "story" as opposed to mine, sound a bit more
labored to you?
Alternatively, if you believe, as you've said you do, in
tacit consent, then why can't we stretch that notion to the
child? IOW, why can't we say that a parent incurs an
obligation to the child (by choosing the action that results
in its conception) and that were the child capable of
choosing and articulating, it would say it choses life.
Therefore there exist a tacit agreement (resulting in
obligations for both) wherein the one agrees to provide
temporary care and support while the other agrees to wish to
live, which entails that once it is fully capable it shall
follow objective moral law to engage in life sustaining actions?
>
>> > There is no such thing as a right to the unearned
>> > care of another.
>>
>> Agreed when it comes to adults.
>
> When it comes to anyone.
I'm still not convinced about children.
> Mere mental lack-of-capacity
> does not give someone a right to be cared for.
>
>> But is that necessarily so with children since they
>> did not agree to be here in the first place? Yet by our
>> action we brought (forced?) them into being, or doesn't
>> that matter?
>
> It matters in the sense that infants lack the capacity
> to make a moral choice and therefore cannot be a
> party to agreements among reason-guided beings
> affecting their welfare. This doesn't mean those
> agreements don't exist.
I get it. You think you have tacit agreements hence
obligations to uninvolved folks other than the child, which
makes no sense to me. But perhaps you have an obligation,
maybe to your parents, to follow objective moral law instead?
Perhaps placed before you is life and death and if you
choose life then there is an objective moral code of
behavior which you should follow to attain such. What's
wrong with that?
>> Whoops. Now you've classified children as *not* property,
>> [...]
>
> Whoops, indeed! I /never/ classified them as property
> in the first place!
>
> Go back and check if you need to, but I can assure
> you that such a notion has never been suggested by
> me, here, in any way.
Sorry. You are wrong about that, see above for explanation.
(snip)
>I hope I have done so to your satisfaction.
I'm too much of a scoundrel to ever be satisfied. :-)
But thank you for taking the time to answer clearly and in
such detail.
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > Oh, I agree!
>
> [...But] according to you it seems we could
> have an invalid contract which nevertheless
> obligates us both, right?
Not necessarily, or even generally. An invalid contract
such as an agreement to commit a crime is not legally
enforceable, and so, in that general sense, does not
constitute an obligation to commit the crime.
> [...] IOW, we'd have obligations to which one is
> not obligated! This is either massive confusion
> about what obligations are or at the very best a
> serious misuse and abuse of language.
To the contrary, it is a correction of a massive
misunderstanding about the nature of morality. A moral
code is not a "prescibed-by-authority' (by God or by
law) set of behaviors. A moral code is a set of
discovered values and principles used to guide a
person's actions toward fulfillment of a long-range
purpose, properly happiness. It has nothing to do
with "obligation," which refers to behaviors that
are expected, relied upon and demanded by other
human beings.
It is quite true that others /can/ expect, rely upon
and demand that you behave morally; but it is also
quite true that they can do the opposite. Therefore,
the existence of an obligation is not a standard for
what constitutes moral behavior; and moral behavior
is not an obligation when it has nothing with others.
Am I "obligated" to think clearly, to make wise
investments, to choose my friends and lovers
carefully? These are all moral behaviors, but,
if I am "obligated" to do them, you must be able
to answer the question, obligated to /whom/?
To God? There is no God.
To nature? Nature cannot expect, rely upon or
demand anything.
To myself? THAT would be a serious misuse and abuse
of language. You cannot be obligated to yourself,
not without doing serious violence to English words.
> [...Y]ou have also previously maintained that an
> obligation arises as a function of mere agreement
> [...].
Not exactly. I have said agreement, a promise, is
/one/ way obligation, specifically moral obligation,
arises. When you make a promise you purposefully
elicit in the mind of the recipient the expectation
that you will fulfill that promise, and you cause
him to rely upon you to do so, and, when it is a
legal contract, you also give him the power to enforce
the contract in court or to demand court settlement
of any dispute over the contract.
But not all apparent agreement produces even a moral
obligation. If I promise to fly you to the moon I
haven't obligated myself to do so, even if you
believe for a while that I have. In order to be
obligated the obligated person must be capable
of fulfilling the obligation, and so be liable,
be responsible for, be subject to moral or legal
sanctions if he fails to perform as expected.
> [...W]e might even say that if we choose
> life we have an *obligation* to act ethically,
> yes?
No. Obligated to whom?
> [...T]he point was/is that according to you a moral
> (either right/wrong) obligation is a function of mere
> agreement [...]
Chosen obligations are such, yes. Not all.
> [...] and that > agreement need not be a moral (right)
> act and when it isn't, then I say there is no objectivity
> in either that act of agreement or the obligation that
> arises therefrom or from subsequent fulfillment of that
> obligation. [...]
Agreement is an act of choice, and a choice can be morally
right or morally wrong. Morality is an objective thing, not
dependent on your choice. The morally right choice is to
identify the objectively proper values and principles and
be guided by them in your actions. The fact that you can
be obligated (legally, for example) to do things that are
not morally proper has no effect on the objective nature of
morality whatsoever. This is not a confusion of terms; this
is being /rigorous/ in our terms.
> [...Y]ou'd still have to admit that what actually is an
> obligation requires more (that its ethical status be in
> accord with moral law) than mere agreement.
It requires less than agreement in the case where an
obligation is merely imposed, as by laws that are
improper. But what you seem to be saying is that an
obligation can "truly" exist if /only/ a behavior is
moral, and /regardless/ of whether or not the behavior
is expected, relied upon and demanded by other human
beings.
I reject that emphatically as no more than a remnant of
religion, of mysticism. How can one possibly be obligated
to act in accord with morality? That doesn't make any
logical sense whatsoever /unless/ you mean to suppose
that God expects it of me, and that I will be put in
Hell if I don't comply with His expectations and
commandments. That might actually make some sense ...
if there were a god. But there isn't.
> > All I meant was, there is nothing intrins-
> > ically wrong with infanticide such that you
> > would somehow be justified in morally condemning
> > the ancient Eskimos who practiced it.
>
> I wonder what "intrinsically wrong" means here.
> Please explain?
It means, here, that the act is regarded as evil
"in itself" irrespective of time, place, (other)
context, motive and intention. There is only one
such behavior, the "choice not to think," and that
choice is always evil, by definition, because being
moral /means/ guiding behavior in accordance with
a reason-identified code of values and principles.
> You do indeed say that there *was* (past
> tense) nothing wrong with infanticide.
Yes.
> But look at the very next sentence. It says infants
> *have* (present tense) no more rights than fetuses.
> The question in my mind became did you really mean
> to say "have" or was it perhaps an inattentive slip
> of tense on your part.
I sometimes make inattentive slips, but not in this
case. If I were to accept the religious notion that
rights are "things we are born with," and that rights
are unearned claims upon the service of others, then
in that case, I might well be forced to say that infant-
icide was wrong, in the past, as it is wrong today. But
infants do, /today/, I insist, have no more rights than
fetuses because rights are NOT inborn things and are NOT
unearned moral claims to the service of others.
> [...] All considered, I thot it more reasonable that
> that last sentence which contained the word "fetus"
> was indeed about present times thus straightforwardly
> interpreted you were saying that infants could presently
> be treated hence "aborted" just like a fetus might be.
Conventional, rather than straightforward, describes
your interpretation. I grant you that rights are
conventionally regarded as inborn claims upon others,
as when someone says an infant is born with a right
to be fed by its parents. But what I say is, such a
notion is pure mystical nonsense and a flawed concept
of rights. A right is a protected freedom to act for
oneself in a social context, "free" meaning /without
interference/ from others. A right is not a claim
to the service of others. Infants are not born with
a "right to be kept alive," but this does not mean
someone /else/ is mystically imbued with some "right
to cause harm to an infant." That, too, would be JUST
ANOTHER INSTANCE of the very same religious nonsense
found in the /conventional/ interpretation of rights.
In other words-- to make this just as plain as I can --
when /you/ interpret /my/ saying, "infants have no
rights" as /my/ meaning, "parents have the right to
kill infants," you are /badly/ misinterpreting my words,
and the source of the confusion lies entirely in /your/
(mis)understanding of what I say is the proper definition
of rights.
Nobody has a right to harm an infant, and good and
proper laws protect the /right/ of all reason-guided
men and women to safeguard infants from harm. That,
I say, is a true and proper understanding of the
moral-legal meaning of the concept of rights. They
are freedoms arising from agreement among reason-
guided men and women, agreements that are codified
and protected in law. Any other conception of
rights, such as (dare I say it!), "endowed by their
Creator," or "from Nature and Nature's God," is merely
an unfortunate remnant of religious traditions that
have no objective moral validity.
> [...] Does a human child have an (presumably)
> unearned right to life after all?
No.
> In that case it would have a claim upon at least
> its parents, right?
It would mean that, yes, if a right were a claim upon
others rather than a freedom to act for oneself, and
if a right were a thing into which one is born.
But that's not right, I say. The parents are held to
account for their actions by the law, and the law
in this case represents the rightful intention of men
and women in society (reasoning beings) to protect
infants from harm. Infants aren't born with a claim
upon society, either. Rather, the protection they are
given is what we /rightly/ (morally, that is; as well as
of a right) provide to them /because/ they are precious
things to be cherished, not mere trifles or property-
of-parents to be discarded at a whim.
> If not how come according to you, its parents never-
> theless have an obligation, not to the child but to
> complete strangers who theoretically might never even
> come in any contact with it?
The law /is/ the obligation, so the question isn't
really, "how come they have an obligation?," the question
is actually, "why do we, most of us perfect strangers,
decide to have such laws on our books?"
The answer is, of course, TO PROTECT CHILDREN. The law
also protects the moral and legal /rights/ of any
prospective adoptive parents, people who are not at
all "theoretically perfect strangers."
> Doesn't your "story" as opposed to mine, sound a
> bit more labored to you?
I suppose it is, in a sense. Questioning the traditions
with which we were raised, and overcoming well ingrained
notions, can be very hard work sometimes. I think it
is well worth while, however. Recall the suffering that
religion has created in this world, and you may get a
better sense of what is possible in a truly free society
where rights and obligations are /all/ the products of
reason- guided, self-interested choice reflected in and
protected by civilized law.
> Alternatively, if you believe, as you've said you do,
> in tacit consent, then why can't we stretch that notion
> to the child? [...]
Well, what I mean is implied consent, where one does in
actual fact, consent. But rather than being expressed in
words, the consent is conveyed by actions that are properly
construed as such. A toddler is able to consent to things
he understands, tacitly and explicitly. An infant lacks
any understanding at all.
To say that someone would have consented had he known
is fine in many cases. But that is not really what is
happening with respect to parental rights and parental
obligations. The infant will choose, someday probably,
to be grateful to his parents for their love and care.
But the infant is not the one saying now, "if you desire
parental rights you must accept the obligation to provide
care, nurturing and education." That's the law speaking,
and the infant isn't the one offering to give something
in return for anything. "We" are. /We/, the law-abiding
citizens of Rock Ridge, are granting parental rights
to one or two people among us to the exclusion of every-
body else (usually to the biological parents, of course)
in return for those one or two people accepting and ful-
filling the requisite obligations. The infant won't be
the one complaining if they fail. A prosecutor will file,
on behalf of the State, a criminal complaint. Others
can come forward with civil actions as or on behalf of
prospective adoptive parents.
> [...] You think you have tacit agreements hence
> obligations to uninvolved folks other than the
> child, which makes no sense to me.
Uninvolved? That's not how I would describe it. People
are very deeply involved in the welfare of children,
which is precisely, of course, why and how we happen
to have these laws in the first place.
> [...] Perhaps placed before you is life and death
> and if you choose life then there is an objective
> moral code of behavior which you should follow to
> attain such. What's wrong with that?
Nothing's wrong with that. It's correct. Everyone
should behave morally, for his/her own well being.
And, in /addition/ to that, there are obligations.
> I'm too much of a scoundrel to ever be satisfied. :-)
And I'm too much of a thug, I guess, to ever stop
trying to satisfy.
> But thank you for taking the time to answer
> clearly and in such detail.
It's always a great pleasure. Thank /you/! And...
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
> On Feb 4, 6:11 am, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
>> > Oh, I agree!
>
>> [...But] according to you it seems we could
>> have an invalid contract which nevertheless
>> obligates us both, right?
>
> Not necessarily,
But I didn't say "necessarily" .
>or even generally.
Nor did I say "generally". What was said was:
"we could have..." instead. That's all that's needed to hilite
your contradiction. OTOH you've said that an (moral)
obligation arises merely as a result of agreement while
OTOH, when it's pointed out to you that that leaves out the
central moral question (right conduct) from that
definition, you do acknowledge that if the agreement is
immoral then there is no obligation after all, hence moral
obligation is *not* a function of mere agreement. So the
bottom line is that according to you, a moral obligation
both is and is not a function of mere agreement.
Please be aware that you have snipped and not addressed
several of my previous comments/points precisely in this
vein. I'd appreciate your finally acknowledging and
correcting your definition accordingly.
>An invalid contract
> such as an agreement to commit a crime is not legally
> enforceable, and so, in that general sense, does not
> constitute an obligation to commit the crime.
Right. You'll recall that that's what I insisted upon in the
first place.
>
>> [...] IOW, we'd have obligations to which one is
>> not obligated! This is either massive confusion
>> about what obligations are or at the very best a
>> serious misuse and abuse of language.
>
> To the contrary, it is a correction of a massive
> misunderstanding about the nature of morality.
Oh stop. I can't believe you are really trying to transform
into a virtue your previous mistake.
>A moral
> code is not a "prescibed-by-authority' (by God or by
> law) set of behaviors.
If you are not playing word games and "authority" has a
reasonable meaning then your proposition is false.
>A moral code is a set of
> discovered values and principles used to guide a
> person's actions toward fulfillment of a long-range
> purpose, properly happiness.
That's correct as far as it goes but it is superficial. The
key point here is the phrase "discovered values". If they
are discovered, and they indeed are, that means that they
are *not* a function of mere agreement (i.e. subjective) nor
invented principles, but rather that there is an underlying
*existing objective* set of rules/laws/order that we must
discover! It is these discoverable rules or laws or order or
whatever you wish to call them/it that are/is the
"authority" in the sense of grounds that serves as
justification for what is ethical conduct.
Down below, you in effect, without using the term
"authority" , say ruff;y the same thing, even tho here you
deny it!
>It has nothing to do
> with "obligation," which refers to behaviors that
> are expected, relied upon and demanded by other
> human beings.
Nonsense. You yourself admitted and said that an obligation
that is immoral is not an obligation after all. Just read
what you wrote, please.
>
> It is quite true that others /can/ expect, rely upon
> and demand that you behave morally; but it is also
> quite true that they can do the opposite. Therefore,
> the existence of an obligation is not a standard for
> what constitutes moral behavior;
You seem to have it slightly backwards. You yourself
admitted that a so called obligation emanating from an
invalid contract is not an obligation after all. And that
means that a moral obligation can only arise pursuant to a
valid (i.e. ethical not immoral) contract.
>and moral behavior
> is not an obligation when it has nothing with others.
I won't quibble about this because it is off point, but just
for the record
IMO all moral (right conduct) behavior is our obligation.
>
> Am I "obligated" to think clearly, to make wise
> investments, to choose my friends and lovers
> carefully? These are all moral behaviors, but,
> if I am "obligated" to do them, you must be able
> to answer the question, obligated to /whom/?
>
> To God? There is no God.
Fine.
>
> To nature? Nature cannot expect, rely upon or
> demand anything.
I gave you my answer before which was to our parents. But
whether my answer is right or wrong is of secondary
importance here. I am well known to hold peculiar views and
prior to our present conversation I've refrained from giving
any of my ethical views on this forum. Nor do I claim that I
have the answers. That's because this stuff (ethics)
genuinely confuses me and is very very difficult, much more
difficult IMO than either logic or epistemology to which
I've previously large;y limited my comments on this forum.
What's more important here at present are your views from
which I hope to learn and I also hope that some of my
criticisms will be use to you.
>
> To myself? THAT would be a serious misuse and abuse
> of language. You cannot be obligated to yourself,
> not without doing serious violence to English words.
Perhaps.
>
>> [...Y]ou have also previously maintained that an
>> obligation arises as a function of mere agreement
>> [...].
>
> Not exactly.
Yes exactly.
>I have said agreement, a promise, is
> /one/ way obligation, specifically moral obligation,
> arises.
Exactly! And if you kept context then you'll know that my
comments have been virtually all about such moral
obligations. It is tiresome to needlessly and continually
modify "obligation" with "moral" when the context makes, or
at least should make, reasonably clear what we were discussing.
>When you make a promise you purposefully
> elicit in the mind of the recipient the expectation
> that you will fulfill that promise, and you cause
> him to rely upon you to do so, and, when it is a
> legal contract, you also give him the power to enforce
> the contract in court or to demand court settlement
> of any dispute over the contract.
OK.
>
> But not all apparent agreement produces even a moral
> obligation. If I promise to fly you to the moon I
> haven't obligated myself to do so, even if you
> believe for a while that I have. In order to be
> obligated the obligated person must be capable
> of fulfilling the obligation, and so be liable,
> be responsible for, be subject to moral or legal
> sanctions if he fails to perform as expected.
Right. So why are you arguing with me? Your words are just
another version/illustration of the idea that a valid
contract is necessary to incur a moral obligation. That of
course has been my point when I accuse you of contradiction.
You started out by wrongly saying that an obligation arises
upon mere agreement but that is not so for it leaves out the
central ethical question. Also required for the existence of
such an obligation is the moral dimension, that is, the
agreement cannot be immoral, or said in legalese, it is
essential that there be a *valid* contract.
>
>> [...W]e might even say that if we choose
>> life we have an *obligation* to act ethically,
>> yes?
>
> No. Obligated to whom?
IMO, our parents.
>
>
>> [...T]he point was/is that according to you a moral
>> (either right/wrong) obligation is a function of mere
>> agreement [...]
>
> Chosen obligations are such, yes. Not all.
Fine. And I didn't say "all". One is enuf to make the point.
>
>> [...] and that > agreement need not be a moral (right)
>> act and when it isn't, then I say there is no objectivity
>> in either that act of agreement or the obligation that
>> arises therefrom or from subsequent fulfillment of that
>> obligation. [...]
>
> Agreement is an act of choice, and a choice can be morally
> right or morally wrong. Morality is an objective thing, not
> dependent on your choice. The morally right choice is to
> identify the objectively proper values and principles and
> be guided by them in your actions. The fact that you can
> be obligated (legally, for example) to do things that are
> not morally proper has no effect on the objective nature of
> morality whatsoever. This is not a confusion of terms; this
> is being /rigorous/ in our terms.
Of course I agree with all that for you are in effect saying
that the *authority*, in the sense of grounds for
justification, lies in the underlying order of moral law.
>
>> [...Y]ou'd still have to admit that what actually is an
>> obligation requires more (that its ethical status be in
>> accord with moral law) than mere agreement.
>
> It requires less than agreement in the case where an
> obligation is merely imposed, as by laws that are
> improper.
But I haven't been talking about alleged "imposed
obligations" but what you call moral obligations instead. I
agree with Jim, that your imposed alleged obligation is not
an obligation at all. In fact, it stands in complete
contradiction to what you've also said and at least
sometimes seem to recognize. Expressed in legalese you've
correctly said that absent a *valid* contract there is no
obligation. Now transfer that logic into the moral realm and
we have: absent an agreement which is ethical (objective
right conduct) there is no obligation. Now with respect to
alleged *imposed* obligations certainly some, (if you don't
accept that all) *impositions* are immoral/unethical hence
at least there are some, if not all, allegedly imposed
obligations that are not obligations at all.
But what you seem to be saying is that an
> obligation can "truly" exist if /only/ a behavior is
> moral, and /regardless/ of whether or not the behavior
> is expected, relied upon and demanded by other human
> beings.
You misunderstand. I've said nothing like "regardless of
whether or not the behavior is expected/relied/demanded".
What I've said from the git go is that your definition (that
a moral obligation is a mere function of agreement) is
faulty for it leaves out the central ethical concern. Also
required for a genuine obligation is that the agreement be
ethical (objectively right) else there is no obligation.
Expressed in legalese, there is no obligation absent a valid
contract.
>
> I reject that emphatically as no more than a remnant of
> religion, of mysticism.
But in need not be that at all.
>How can one possibly be obligated
> to act in accord with morality? That doesn't make any
> logical sense whatsoever /unless/ you mean to suppose
> that God expects it of me, and that I will be put in
> Hell if I don't comply with His expectations and
> commandments. That might actually make some sense ...
> if there were a god. But there isn't.
So for God substitute nature. You do agree that nature
exists right? So let me give you the secular version. You/I
are a creature of a specific nature and no other, and we
live in a specific environment that has whatever
characteristics it has and no other, hence if we choose to
live then there is an optimum behavior that we must engage
in to best sustain our lives. This prescribed by
circumstance (the circumstance that both we and our
environment have a specific nature) is the objective moral
law/order (use whatever terms makes you comfortable if you
don't like "moral law.")
The question remaining is to whom, if anyone, are we
obligated to perform this optimum behavior.
For you an obligation requires another person so God, nature
or moral law is out. Fine. Then the remaining choices are
yourself, other rational adults and or your parents and
you've chosen other adults. But I made a case, such as it
is, for expanding tacit agreement to the point wherein the
child/parent come to an agreement wherein the parent
provides temporary care and the child chooses to live.
Granted a child cannot consciously choose to live as might
an adult. But when the baby cries it does so because it most
likely wants/needs life sustaining sustenance and thereby it
tacitly chooses to live. Now you may not buy this story, but
I find it no less credible than yours, in fact more so
because the mutual obligations arising from such agreement
are between the directly involved parties (parents and
child) and not complete strangers who might conceivably live
on the opposite sides of the earth. But ultimately, I
consider this question of to exactly whom we are obligated
as a minor detail. Of most importance, and I think we both
have this right, is the recognition that there is such a
thing as an objective order of some kind, which we should
and must follow if we wish to live optimally.
>
>> > All I meant was, there is nothing intrins-
>> > ically wrong with infanticide such that you
>> > would somehow be justified in morally condemning
>> > the ancient Eskimos who practiced it.
>>
>> I wonder what "intrinsically wrong" means here.
>> Please explain?
>
> It means, here, that the act is regarded as evil
> "in itself" irrespective of time, place, (other)
> context, motive and intention. There is only one
> such behavior, the "choice not to think," and that
> choice is always evil, by definition, because being
> moral /means/ guiding behavior in accordance with
> a reason-identified code of values and principles.
>
>> You do indeed say that there *was* (past
>> tense) nothing wrong with infanticide.
>
> Yes.
>
>> But look at the very next sentence. It says infants
>> *have* (present tense) no more rights than fetuses.
>> The question in my mind became did you really mean
>> to say "have" or was it perhaps an inattentive slip
>> of tense on your part.
>
> I sometimes make inattentive slips, but not in this
> case. If I were to accept the religious notion that
> rights are "things we are born with,"
You know this question of rights being things we are born
with, might be just a verbal rather than substantive
dispute. To be sure, I agree with you that the man in the
sky did not literally give us our rights. But if we
substitute "nature" for "God" and are not quite so literally
minded then isn't it true that we (of a specific nature) are
born into a circumstance of a specific nature and in order
to thrive we must engage in specific behavior? This might
all be summarized by the sentence: "We are endowed by nature
(our creator) with certain inalienable rights (wherein
rights are the freedoms we must have for each of us to
engage in life sustaining actions.)
>and that rights
> are unearned claims upon the service of others,
I agree that adults have no unearned claims. As for children
I think the parents owe them something because the children
were never really given the choice to life until after the
fact - so perhaps the kids earned it in some metaphorical
sense. I dunno, but it's not something I lose a lot of sleep
over.
> then
> in that case, I might well be forced to say that infant-
> icide was wrong, in the past, as it is wrong today. But
> infants do, /today/, I insist, have no more rights than
> fetuses because rights are NOT inborn things and are NOT
> unearned moral claims to the service of others.
Perhaps you are right that rights are neither literally
inborn nor unearned. But how do we, for example, correctly
describe (I'm assuming you agree with me) that circumstances
(again our/environment specific natures) in a very real
sense *dictate* that there is an optimal path of behavior
that we must follow? It doesn't seem wrong to say that we
are born into this circumstance. Does that make it inborn
after all? I dunno. I'm confused about it and if you have
any thots along those lines I'd appreciate hearing them.
>
>> [...] All considered, I thot it more reasonable that
>> that last sentence which contained the word "fetus"
>> was indeed about present times thus straightforwardly
>> interpreted you were saying that infants could presently
>> be treated hence "aborted" just like a fetus might be.
>
> Conventional, rather than straightforward, describes
> your interpretation. I grant you that rights are
> conventionally regarded as inborn claims upon others,
> as when someone says an infant is born with a right
> to be fed by its parents. But what I say is, such a
> notion is pure mystical nonsense and a flawed concept
> of rights. A right is a protected freedom to act for
> oneself in a social context,
Look, perhaps a legitimate criticism is that your definition
doesn't by definition include children. A child, because it
is a child hence has a lack of understanding, cannot act for
itself in a social context so you've defined children out
from the git go, which seems arbitrary.
"free" meaning /without
> interference/ from others. A right is not a claim
> to the service of others. Infants are not born with
> a "right to be kept alive," but this does not mean
> someone /else/ is mystically imbued with some "right
> to cause harm to an infant." That, too, would be JUST
> ANOTHER INSTANCE of the very same religious nonsense
> found in the /conventional/ interpretation of rights.
I too reject mystical/religious nonsense but that is not
perhaps the only explanation of "endowed" rights. See below.
>
> In other words-- to make this just as plain as I can --
> when /you/ interpret /my/ saying, "infants have no
> rights" as /my/ meaning, "parents have the right to
> kill infants," you are /badly/ misinterpreting my words,
> and the source of the confusion lies entirely in /your/
> (mis)understanding of what I say is the proper definition
> of rights.
James, I'm sorry to tell you that I think you are engaging
in rationalizations here. I don't really mind taking the rap
fully and saying, were it true, that it was all my fault and
as you put it "the source of the confusion lies entirely in
/your/ (mis)understanding..."
But let me point out to you that you are wrongly accusing me
of misinterpreting your alleged words "infants have no
rights", when in fact you never said those words!
Instead, what you said was "Infants have no more rights than
fetuses do." which is a very very different proposition.
Absent a fetus' right to life, people *do* harm fetuses for
they are aborted all the time. Thus the straightforward
meaning of what you said is that infants, because they have
no more rights than a fetus, can similarly be disposed of!
I don't want to belabor this any more than we already have,
so I'll stop.
>
> Nobody has a right to harm an infant, and good and
> proper laws protect the /right/ of all reason-guided
> men and women to safeguard infants from harm. That,
> I say, is a true and proper understanding of the
> moral-legal meaning of the concept of rights. They
> are freedoms arising from agreement among reason-
> guided men and women, agreements that are codified
> and protected in law. Any other conception of
> rights, such as (dare I say it!), "endowed by their
> Creator," or "from Nature and Nature's God," is merely
> an unfortunate remnant of religious traditions that
> have no objective moral validity.
Well, the way you put it , that rights are "freedoms arising
from agreement among reason-guided men" makes me just a
little uncomfortable. I wish you'd make perfectly clear that
"reason" means correct and proper reasoning and does not
include such a thing as, for example, poor reasoning instead.
>
>> [...] Does a human child have an (presumably)
>> unearned right to life after all?
>
> No.
>
>> In that case it would have a claim upon at least
>> its parents, right?
>
> It would mean that, yes, if a right were a claim upon
> others rather than a freedom to act for oneself, and
> if a right were a thing into which one is born.
>
> But that's not right, I say. The parents are held to
> account for their actions by the law, and the law
> in this case represents the rightful intention of men
> and women in society (reasoning beings) to protect
> infants from harm. Infants aren't born with a claim
> upon society, either. Rather, the protection they are
> given is what we /rightly/ (morally, that is; as well as
> of a right) provide to them /because/ they are precious
> things to be cherished, not mere trifles or property-
> of-parents to be discarded at a whim.
Here you make it much clearer that there is *rightful*
intention which is what a reasoning being is. Good.
>
>> If not how come according to you, its parents never-
>> theless have an obligation, not to the child but to
>> complete strangers who theoretically might never even
>> come in any contact with it?
>
> The law /is/ the obligation,
No, no. First, I've been talking moral obligations not mere
legal obligations ( I don't think you meant moral law here
but are speaking of man made law instead.} I think we agree
tho that just because there is a legal law that does not
mean that it necessarily is in accord with moral law (or if
you prefer right intentions of reasoning people) and in
those cases where it is immoral, there is no genuine ethical
obligation nor is there ultimately a genuine legal
obligation (because there is no valid contract ) even tho
man made law may, contrarily to fact and wrongly, state that
there is a valid contract, hence a legal obligation, yes?
Secondly, your above "The law /is/ the obligation." seems
to contradict (because it suggests that an obligation to
inanimate law is possible) what you said earlier "How can
one possibly be obligated
to act in accord with morality? That doesn't make any
logical sense whatsoever..."
I interpret this to mean that one cannot have an obligation
to inanimate objects (morality) but only people instead. Am
I mistaken in this interpretation?
>the question isn't
> really, "how come they have an obligation?," the question
> is actually, "why do we, most of us perfect strangers,
> decide to have such laws on our books?"
>
> The answer is, of course, TO PROTECT CHILDREN.
The deeper answer tho is because it is the right thing to
do. IOW, tho we may have a *desire* to protect children,
what's important is that we have *right desire*.
>The law
> also protects the moral and legal /rights/ of any
> prospective adoptive parents, people who are not at
> all "theoretically perfect strangers."
>
>> Doesn't your "story" as opposed to mine, sound a
>> bit more labored to you?
>
> I suppose it is, in a sense. Questioning the traditions
> with which we were raised, and overcoming well ingrained
> notions, can be very hard work sometimes. I think it
> is well worth while, however.
Agreed.
> Recall the suffering that
> religion has created in this world,
Yes, but I think quite frankly, that this anti-religionism
is somewhat overdone. Islam aside, the other major religions
in this world are not nearly as dangerous/toxic as many
pretend. I'm not especially ignorant of history, so I am
somewhat familiar with the adverse effects of such
irrationalism but people often forget that most religions,
tho their ethics may indeed be flawed, nevertheless had an
ethical core, which on the whole was, or at least intended
to be benign. One wonders whether or not history would have
been even worse without such religions. I've also often
wondered whether it is actually true, as so many hostile to
religion have said, that more people have been killed in the
name of religion, than any other doctrine. When I think of
Mao, Stalin, Hitler and perhaps the worst of the bunch at
least in % of population if not in absolute numbers terms,
Pol Pot, I wonder how their butchery compares to the numbers
killed in religious strife? Has anyone ever tried to figure
this out?
>and you may get a
> better sense of what is possible in a truly free society
> where rights and obligations are /all/ the products of
> reason- guided, self-interested choice reflected in and
> protected by civilized law.
Of course I'm generally sympathetic toward your outlook.
>
>> Alternatively, if you believe, as you've said you do,
>> in tacit consent, then why can't we stretch that notion
>> to the child? [...]
>
> Well, what I mean is implied consent, where one does in
> actual fact, consent. But rather than being expressed in
> words, the consent is conveyed by actions that are properly
> construed as such. A toddler is able to consent to things
> he understands, tacitly and explicitly. An infant lacks
> any understanding at all.
Agreed, infants lack the understanding but I'm not sure it
therefore follows that it cannot/does not generate implied
consent (to live) tho I agree it does not make a conscious
decision to do so. When an infant cries, is it not signaling
that it wants/needs some kind of life sustaining action from
its parents? Isn't it wordlessly saying "feed me", or maybe
"change me" etc? So is it not therefore wordlessly
ultimately saying "I choose life", for if it remained silent
we wouldn't become aware of its needs? Or do you think I've
lost it and am stretching the notion of tacit consent well
beyond the breaking point? Frankly, once one accepts tacit
consent, and I do just as do you, then I dunno where/how one
measures the stopping point.
>
> To say that someone would have consented had he known
> is fine in many cases. But that is not really what is
> happening with respect to parental rights and parental
> obligations. The infant will choose, someday probably,
> to be grateful to his parents for their love and care.
> But the infant is not the one saying now, "if you desire
> parental rights you must accept the obligation to provide
> care, nurturing and education."
Well, my story is that the infant is agreeing to "choose"
(in the limited manner open to it) life in exchange for its
parents caretaking. Thus we have your required agreement
amongst parties, from which arises mutual obligations (the
child obligates to continue to "choose" life sustaining
actions (by crying and wailing when in need) in exchange for
temporary parental caretaking).
Again, if you tell me I'm nuts and have gotten carried away
with this tacit consent business, I really won't know how to
argue against you. This is precisely why I normally stay
away from discussions about ethics (hence also politics
which is applied ethics) because we are here in a realm that
is far from hardcore science and is dangerously close to
pure speculation and a pile of nonsense. While I consider
myself quite good at logically analyzing and finding flaws
in other's proposed theories, I must admit that I cannot
properly defend my own ethical beliefs. This makes me, with
a strong scientific bent and fidelity to reason, most
unhappy but it's the truth. Of course, I know of no
philosopher who has figured all this stuff out and can prove
it either. When I seriously contemplate this stuff it most
often just gives me a headache and little insight.
>That's the law speaking,
> and the infant isn't the one offering to give something
> in return for anything.
The infant offers to give us notice, by crying/wailing, of
its needs, which satisfaction thereof are the means whereby
it sustains its life. That is how it "chooses" life and we
parents value our children's lives, usually above all else.
"We" are. /We/, the law-abiding
> citizens of Rock Ridge, are granting parental rights
> to one or two people among us to the exclusion of every-
> body else (usually to the biological parents, of course)
> in return for those one or two people accepting and ful-
> filling the requisite obligations. The infant won't be
> the one complaining if they fail. A prosecutor will file,
> on behalf of the State, a criminal complaint. Others
> can come forward with civil actions as or on behalf of
> prospective adoptive parents.
>
>> [...] You think you have tacit agreements hence
>> obligations to uninvolved folks other than the
>> child, which makes no sense to me.
>
> Uninvolved? That's not how I would describe it. People
> are very deeply involved in the welfare of children,
> which is precisely, of course, why and how we happen
> to have these laws in the first place.
We are involved (i.e. have experiences of) with *our* own
children and perhaps the children of an ever widening circle
of immediate acquaintances. But parents are not and cannot
be similarly involved with unknown children say half way
around the world. Of course we come to know propositionally
(but not via experience) that there exist such half way
around the world children, but our interest in their
welfare, if any, is very much diminished and we have no
laws protecting them.
(snip)
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
On Feb 6, 11:12 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> [...]
> {...Y]ou do acknowledge that if the agreement is
> immoral then there is no obligation after all [...]
That's not right. I'll quote what I actually said, below.
But we seem to have a minor breakdown in communication here.
Recall our brief exchange regarding the fact that not
all choice is moral choice, meaning, of course, that not
every choice is "between good and evil," or that not every
choice is guided by a code of values and principles aimed
at a long range purpose. Choose curtain number 1, 2, or
3, for example, is such a "non-moral choice."
You wrote, "I have it," to say you understood. Well, it's
similar when distinguishing moral from imposed legal
obligations. A contract spells out a moral obligation.
Law can require you to fulfill contract, so some legal
obligations are /also/ moral obligations. But some legal
obligations are merely imposed, not chosen. Moral choice
means a choice between good and evil. And moral obligation,
I say, means obligation chosen by the making of a promise.
> [...]
> > A moral code is not a "prescibed-by-authority' (by
> > God or by law) set of behaviors.
>
> If you are not playing word games and "authority" has a
> reasonable meaning then your proposition is false.
I do not understand what you are saying here. I specified
the meaning of authority as "God" or "the law." Perhaps
you have in mind some other reasonable meaning of the word.
We'll come to that soon.
> > A moral code is a set of
> > discovered values and principles used to guide a
> > person's actions toward fulfillment of a long-range
> > purpose, properly happiness.
>
> That's correct as far as it goes but it is superficial. The
> key point here is the phrase "discovered values". If they
> are discovered, and they indeed are, that means that they
> are *not* a function of mere agreement (i.e. subjective) nor
> invented principles, but rather that there is an underlying
> *existing objective* set of rules/laws/order that we must
> discover!
Well, that's exactly what I meant. Morality is /objective/,
not merely "chosen." The choice that is objectively morally
/right/ is to choose values that are objectively worthwhile,
and to be guided by principles that objectively /do/ lead to
happiness.
> [...]
> > It has nothing to do
> > with "obligation," which refers to behaviors that
> > are expected, relied upon and demanded by other
> > human beings.
>
> Nonsense. You yourself admitted and said that an obligation
> that is immoral is not an obligation after all. Just read
> what you wrote, please.
Let's both read it. I wrote, "An invalid contract
such as an agreement to commit a crime is not legally
enforceable, and so, in that general sense, does not
constitute an obligation to commit the crime." My
wording could have been better. I did not mean it
wasn't still a moral (chosen and expected of you)
obligation; only that because it was not legally
enforceable it was not something the person who gave
you money would be legally able to demand.
> [...] You yourself admitted that a so called obligation
> emanating from an invalid contract is not an obligation
> after all. And that means that a moral obligation can
> only arise pursuant to a valid (i.e. ethical not immoral)
> contract.
I'm confident that upon reflection you'll see that such
would be quite a bizarre interpretation. For example,
some contracts are illegal even though they are perfectly
moral. You and I would both say, I'm sure, that if, for
fun, you put $100 on black at my illegal but entertaining
roulette table and the spin comes up black I am /morally/
obligated to pay you $100. The mere fact that you can't
legally enforce your demand doesn't mean I don't have a
/moral/ obligation to pay. And, on the other hand, some
contracts that are quite /immoral/ can still be legally
enforced.
Since you are obligated to fulfill the terms of a legal
contract even though you might be contracting to do an
immoral thing, AND, you are NOT legally obligated to
fulfill the terms of an illegal contract even though
you might be contracting to do something morally right,
it cannot follow (would be bizarre, indeed) that only
moral actions constitute obligations.
The problem here /seems/ to be that you've switched the
meaning of "moral obligation" to mean "an obligation
that is morally right." But what it /actually/ does is
distinguish the obligations that arise consequent
to "moral choice" from the obligations that are merely
imposed upon a person by others. And "moral choice," of
course, does NOT mean a choice that is morally right!
Moral choice means, as you yourself said you understood,
a choice /between/ things that are morally right and morally
wrong, always allowing, of course, that it is possible in
any act of moral choice to choose evil, to make the choice
that is morally wrong.
> [...]
> I won't quibble about this because it is off point,
> but just for the record IMO all moral (right conduct)
> behavior is our obligation.
Well, for the record, IMO, that's a bizarre statement
with which I do more than "quibble." I would ask again,
what does it /mean/ to say moral behavior is an obligation
-- obligation to /whom/?
> [...T]his stuff (ethics) genuinely confuses me and is
> very very difficult, much more difficult IMO than either
> logic or epistemology to which I've previously large;y
> limited my comments on this forum. What's more important
> here at present are your views from which I hope to learn
> and I also hope that some of my criticisms will be use
> to you.
Your criticisms are of great use to me. I thank you for
them, and I hope I can be of some help. These issues are
actually very simple -- no tougher than epistemology, IMO.
The trick is just to not allow yourself to become confused
by definitions that are less than explicit, and that are
less than rigorously maintained.
> [...]
> > I have said agreement, a promise, is
> > /one/ way obligation, specifically moral obligation,
> > arises.
>
> Exactly! And if you kept context then you'll know
> that my comments have been virtually all about such moral
> obligations. It is tiresome to needlessly and continually
> modify "obligation" with "moral" when the context makes,
> or at least should make, reasonably clear what we were
> discussing.
I'd agree with you, except when failing to make clear
which kind of obligation you or I are referring to
causes misunderstanding.
> [...] You started out by wrongly saying that an obligation
> arises upon mere agreement
I said a moral obligation is such. I did not say, or mean,
or imply, that a moral obligation means an obligation that
is morally right.
> [...] but that is not so for it leaves out the
> central ethical question.
As I said, it leaves open the moral question regarding
which moral obligations one /ought/ to assume.
> Also required for the existence of such an obligation is
> the moral dimension, that is, the agreement cannot be
> immoral, or said in legalese, it is essential that there
> be a *valid* contract.
A valid contract is needed for there to be a legal
obligation. Moral obligations can exist with or without
a (legally) valid contract. All that is required for you
to be morally obligated to do something, is that you
freely elect to /make a promise/ to do it, in a manner
eliciting the expectation and reliance of another person.
That is what obligation means. And it says nothing about
whether you are promising something good or something
evil. As I wrote...
> [...]
> > [...] The fact that you can be obligated (legally,
> > for example) to do things that are not morally proper
> > has no effect on the objective nature of morality
> > whatsoever. This is not a confusion of terms; this
> > is being /rigorous/ in our terms.
>
> Of course I agree with all that for you are in effect
> saying that the *authority*, in the sense of grounds for
> justification, lies in the underlying order of moral law.
Is that, then, what you meant by not playing word games
and instead having a "reasonable meaning" of *authority*?
If so, it is no wonder you would find this all very
confusing indeed! This is not a word game: Authority
means a person (or a god) who is in a position of being
such an expert as to make definitive statements about
the subject at hand, OR whose proclamations have the
force of law and must be obeyed or else punishment will
follow. Webster's is an authority regarding the
definitions of words. A judge is an authority on what
the law and your contracts require. God would be an
authority if He existed.
Grounds justifying something refers to the objective
facts of reality. These are not authorities. These
are simply the facts -- the facts with which an authority
should be familiar.
> [...] Expressed in legalese you've correctly said that
> absent a *valid* contract there is no obligation.
No legal obligation.
> Now transfer that logic into the moral realm and
> we have: absent an agreement which is ethical (objective
> right conduct) there is no obligation.
You (like Jim) are not making sense when you say this.
To prove it, I need only offer you the same challenge
I offered Jim. Define obligation. To help you along,
I can tell you what I say is the correct definition:
An obligation is a future behavior by
a reasoning being that is expected,
relied upon, and demanded of him by
other reasoning beings.
If you can offer another, better, correct definition,
by all means please do. But I should caution you at
the start that to say obligation is simply "moral
behavior" would be equivocation, not definition, and
a source of endless and needless confusion.
> > [...W]hat you seem to be saying is that an
> > obligation can "truly" exist if /only/ a behavior is
> > moral, and /regardless/ of whether or not the behavior
> > is expected, relied upon and demanded by other human
> > beings.
>
> You misunderstand. I've said nothing like "regardless of
> whether or not the behavior is expected/relied/demanded".
> What I've said from the git go is that your definition (that
> a moral obligation is a mere function of agreement) is
> faulty for it leaves out the central ethical concern.
I do know you've said that. And, as you know, my response
has always been that this central question is vital to
assessing the propriety of human conduct -- but is not
relevant to the question of whether or not an obligation
exists. Supposing it to be relevant is an example of
"fuzzy" thinking -- a vague sort of intuitive "feeling"
that obligations come from above, from God or Nature.
For example...
> So for God substitute nature. You do agree that nature
> exists right? So let me give you the secular version. You/I
> are a creature of a specific nature and no other, and we
> live in a specific environment that has whatever
> characteristics it has and no other, hence if we choose to
> live then there is an optimum behavior that we must engage
> in to best sustain our lives.
This is all true. It has nothing to do with the concept
of obligation, but it is all true. Now, we get "fuzzy"...
> This prescribed by circumstance [...]
Circumstance does not "prescribe." Authorities prescribe.
> [...] (the circumstance that both we and our
> environment have a specific nature) is the objective moral
> law/order (use whatever terms makes you comfortable if you
> don't like "moral law.")
Morality. Moral principles. You can even call them "laws"
in the sense that gravity is called a "law of nature."
Just be careful not to equivocate. Step off a cliff and
you /will/ fall. Period. End of story. You are not
"obligated to fall." That wouldn't make a lick of sense.
You can only be obligated to do things you are capable of
doing or not doing, such that if you fail to do them you
violate the expectations and demands of others.
A law, in the sense relevant to obligation, is a behavior
prescribed by authority. It is a behavior you must to do
or face punishment if you don't. You are not "obligated"
to behave morally. That wouldn't make a lick of sense.
That is no different from saying you are obligated to
fall when you step off a cliff. Behave morally and you
can achieve happiness. Be immoral and you will find only
suffering and death. That expresses mere facts of reality.
Obligation has nothing to do with it.
> [...] Of most importance, and I think we both have this
> right, is the recognition that there is such a
> thing as an objective order of some kind, which we should
> and must follow if we wish to live optimally.
Absolutely. You and I agree about that. Jim would agree,
also. Why, then, do we tie ourselves in knots of debate
with me accused of quibbling? Trust me, this is very,
very important stuff. Nothing is more important than
getting off on the right foot at the start. The equivocation
happening here (not by me!) is the same as the confusion
between that which is right and that which a person has
/the right/ to do. There is no end to bickering about
rights when they are wrongly seen as either "imbued by
Nature" or as "prescribed by Nature's God." Abortion is
just one illustration of the knots people tie themselves
into trying to figure out exactly /when/ Nature imbues a
human being with a "right to live." That whole debate is
pure silliness caused a simple failure to define terms
correctly from the start.
> [...] To be sure, I agree with you that the man in the
> sky did not literally give us our rights. But if we
> substitute "nature" for "God" and are not quite so literally
> minded [...]
Or, not quite so /careful/, perhaps...?
> [...] then isn't it true that we (of a specific nature)
> are born into a circumstance of a specific nature and
> in order to thrive we must engage in specific behavior?
It IS true. And then...
> This might all be summarized by the sentence: "We are
> endowed by nature (our creator) with certain inalienable
> rights (wherein rights are the freedoms we must have for
> each of us to engage in life sustaining actions.)
If rights are properly defined as freedoms we must have
in order to live, and in order to achieve happiness, then,
yes, you would be correct.
However, to live you must have the freedom to consume
food, but this doesn't mean you have the right to consume
my food.
It doesn't mean that because although rights may be
/described/ as freedoms needed for life, such a description
is not a definition. Wolves may be described as predator
animals, but that does not define them; if it did,
then lions would be wolves. Eating any food you see is
not a right any more than a lion is a wolf. A right,
properly defined so as to /distinguish/ it from any ol'
freedom needed for life, is a specified and protected
freedom to act without interference in a social context,
meaning a freedom that is mutually agreed upon (as in
"my food is mine, yours is yours") and then protected
by law.
> [...H]ow do we, for example, correctly describe
> (I'm assuming you agree with me) that circumstances
> (again our/environment specific natures) in a very real
> sense *dictate* that there is an optimal path of behavior
> that we must follow?
I think you have correctly described that already!
> It doesn't seem wrong to say that we are born into this
> circumstance. Does that make it inborn after all? I dunno.
> I'm confused about it and if you have any thots along those
> lines I'd appreciate hearing them.
We are born with a need for food. This is an inborn fact.
It is part of our nature. We did not choose it. We have
no choice but to eat, or to die. If we want to live, we
must eat. Eating is right.
It simply does not follow from the fact that eating is
right to the "conclusion" that one has a right to eat.
One does have a right to produce food or something else
to be traded for food, and this right is the consequence
of agreement among reasoning beings that each will
keep or trade what he or she produces. Such agreement
is where rights come from, otherwise you are guilty
of equivocating between "the morally right" and the
moral-legal concept of "a right."
> [...]
> Let me point out to you that you are wrongly accusing
> me of misinterpreting your alleged words "infants have
> no rights", when in fact you never said those words!
> Instead, what you said was "Infants have no more rights
> than fetuses do." which is a very very different
> proposition.
Well, I meant, fetuses have no rights and infants have
no rights, either. If you took it a different way, you
misinterpreted me badly, so it's nearly the same thing.
> Absent a fetus' right to life, people *do* harm
> fetuses for they are aborted all the time. Thus the
> straightforward meaning of what you said is that infants,
> because they have no more rights than a fetus, can
> similarly be disposed of!
That would be the case, I admit, if it weren't for the
fact that when I was explaining what I meant (the
absence of a right not to be harmed -- as the atmosphere
has no right not to be polluted -- does not translate
into the existence of a right to do harm) I was trying
only to show how you had misconstrued my words. Yes,
indeed, people /do/ think the reason they may abort
is because fetuses have no rights, and the reason they
may not do infanticide is that infants do. So what
you called straightforward, I called "conventional."
People do think this way. I say people are wrong.
> [...T]he way you put it , that rights are "freedoms
> arising from agreement among reason-guided men" makes
> me just a little uncomfortable. I wish you'd make
> perfectly clear that "reason" means correct and proper
> reasoning and does not include such a thing as, for
> example, poor reasoning instead.
Don't get me wrong. I'll all for proper reasoning.
But here's an example of such. Stranded on an island
with limited resources, we agree that I'll forage
for food while you'll work to build a boat out of
wet sand, and that none of us will interfere with
the other(s). That's not proper. You can't build a
proper boat that way. It won't float, but you have
the /right/ to build it. Why? Because a right is
as I've correctly defined it -- a specified freedom
of action mutually agreed upon and protected.
Now, of course, we /should/ (morally) have rights
that make sense. And we /would/ if you and I were
actually on that island. I'd insist that in return
for the food I gather for us to share, you would work
on building a proper boat. And you'd agree to this,
I'm sure.
> [...]
> [...] I interpret this to mean that one cannot have an
> obligation to inanimate objects (morality) but only
> people instead. Am I mistaken in this interpretation?
You are correct in this interpretation.
> [...] Islam aside, the other major religions
> in this world are not nearly as dangerous/toxic
> as many pretend.
Islam was once the religion of enlightenment, of
scholarship, of economic development, and, yes,
even of tolerance. That was a long time ago, when
Christianity held half the world in the Dark Ages.
> [...] Has anyone ever tried to figure [how much
> evil was done by modern dictators versus religions].
It would make an interesting study.
> [...D]o you think I've lost it and am stretching the
> notion of tacit consent well beyond the breaking point?
I think you're taking an unnecessary tack. We need not
imagine consent or demand by the infant whom we protect.
All we need know is why we choose to protect infants.
They are precious things. They are the ones who will
grow to become productive human beings just like us,
producing and trading value for value in the civilized
society we all cherish as a font of happiness. That
is more than enough to justify laws protecting infants
from harm, and entrusting them always and only to the
care of loving, responsible parents.
[...snip of rest for time and space...]
Best Wishes
Jim P.
Charles Bell
> �ｿｽ>and moral behavior
> �ｿｽ> is not an obligation when it has nothing with others.
>
> I won't quibble about this because it is off point, but just
> for the record
> IMO all moral (right conduct) behavior is our obligation.
>
This is even more unsupportable than Prescott's assertions. It leaves
open as to what or to whom. Prescott's answer is circular but he, at
least, has an answer.
> �ｿｽ>
> �ｿｽ> Am I "obligated" to think clearly, to make wise
> �ｿｽ> investments, to choose my friends and lovers
> �ｿｽ> carefully? These are all moral behaviors, but,
> �ｿｽ> if I am "obligated" to do them, you must be able
> �ｿｽ> to answer the question, obligated to /whom/?
> �ｿｽ>
See? At least, he has an answer. To all appearances, you don't.
> I gave you my answer before which was to our parents.
Really? Why?
> But
> whether my answer is right or wrong is of secondary
> importance here.
No, it isn't of "secondary importance". Why not just substitute
<Garfunkel> for <parents> and have it be of the same value?
> I am well known to hold peculiar views and
> prior to our present conversation I've refrained from giving
> any of my ethical views on this forum.
Your intellectual cowardice is duly noted.
> Nor do I claim that I
> have the answers. That's because this stuff (ethics)
> genuinely confuses me and is very very difficult, much more
> difficult IMO than either logic or epistemology to which
> I've previously large;y limited my comments on this forum.
> What's more important here at present are your views from
> which I hope to learn and I also hope that some of my
> criticisms will be use to you.
You two are just wasting bandwidth.
>
> �ｿｽ>
> �ｿｽ> To myself? THAT would be a serious misuse and abuse
> �ｿｽ> of language. You cannot be obligated to yourself,
> �ｿｽ> not without doing serious violence to English words.
>
> Perhaps.
That's all you have to say? You two are just wasting bandwidth.
This is the way you operate: find a niggling inconsequential point to
make, get a response proportionate on the merit of the point; repeat.
That goes no where.
<< Accepting no mystic "duties" or unchosen obligations, he is the man
who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The
obligation to keep one's promises is one of the most important
elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to
mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men. >>
True or false?
How does an adult person have any obligation to his parents for
anything? At least, Prescott can say: if a child borrows money from a
parent, then that child has an obligation to a parent. Maybe I missed
what you said is your reason that a child has an obligation, per se,
to a parent. Is there a reason, or is it *just so*: "IMO all moral
(right conduct) behavior is our obligation." Is this or is this not an
unchosen obligation like a mystic duty? If so, justify that, rather
than criticizing Prescott who can, at least, justify his reasons for
honoring obligations.
Charles Bell
> � � �An obligation is a future behavior by
> � � �a reasoning being that is expected,
> � � �relied upon, and demanded of him by
> � � �other reasoning beings.
>
Obligation: The acceptance of full responsibility for one's own
choices and actions.
This precedes any and all verbal or written communication in making
promises to do anything. This meaning of 'obligation' includes
obligation one can make to oneself to do certain things like to feed
and care for a pet or to simply honor and care about one's parents.
Obligations of any kind have consequences with or without society or
its rules for making contractual obligations.
Charles Bell
According to Prescott, if an obligation isn't said or written, it
isn't so. This is a massive distortion of the English language, of
course. Why would we have three distinctly different words for
obligation, promise and contract? Prescott thinks that he can get rid
of 'unchosen obligation' simply by obliterating the line between the
expressed obligation in promise or contract and the unexpressed
obligations that everyone genuinely have rather than acknowledging
that it is a fact of nature there exists no such thing in any manner,
shape or form as an 'unchosen obligation'.
Jim Klein
> "IMO all moral
> (right conduct) behavior is our obligation." Is this or is this not an
> unchosen obligation like a mystic duty?
It is not, and von was sufficiently clear in his usage to make
this obvious. He pointed out--just as you might point out--
that "moral" to him does not just mean "in the realm of
volitional behavior" but rather "that within the realm of
volitional behavior which is objectively proper."
He can defend whatever actions he says are so moral
on his own, but it seems only right (moral!) to at least
hear what the hell he's saying, rather than impute to him
illogical conclusions derived from what we imagine he's
saying. I think I mentioned earlier---you have a strong
tendency to do just that. And as I also mentioned, you
really, really need to figure out why you do that.
> If so, justify that, rather
> than criticizing Prescott who can, at least, justify his reasons for
> honoring obligations.
Feh. That would be a neat trick---justifying "reasons" for a
misidentified existent. Let's see you justify that a man
shouldn't initiate force against another man because
God commanded such an obligation.
jk
Jim Klein
> Prescott thinks that he can get rid
> of 'unchosen obligation' simply by obliterating the line between the
> expressed obligation in promise or contract and the unexpressed
> obligations that everyone genuinely have rather than acknowledging
> that it is a fact of nature there exists no such thing in any manner,
> shape or form as an 'unchosen obligation'.
Well sure, but that wouldn't fit so well with his conclusion
built of two fundamentally contradictory premises--that
law ensues from morality, as morality ensues from law.
As any "philosopher" through the ages can attest, you
need a shitload of words to do something like that!
jk
Charles Bell
> On Feb 7, 1:25 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > "IMO all moral
> > (right conduct) behavior is our obligation." Is this or is this not an
> > unchosen obligation like a mystic duty?
>
> It is not, and von was sufficiently clear in his usage to make
The sum of what he said about *his opinion* on obligation in that post
is exactly as copied above, and to an Objectivist it is incorrect. To
be be charitible, the best I can see from it is the same circular
Prescottism: one is morally obligated because it is moral, and
not . . .
> He pointed out--just as you might point out--
> that "moral" to him does not just mean "in the realm of
> volitional behavior" but rather "that within the realm of
> volitional behavior which is objectively proper."
I have never seen him say that other than indirectly by denying
subjectivism (I think), so why would I assume it so? Even so, unless
it is coming from an Objectivist, (and he is not) I would have a
problem with what he meant by "objectively proper". Actually, even
coming from an Objectivist, I have a problem with that, rather than
just saying "to hold to an obligation freely chosen is moral, but all
obligations in the first instance and in the last instance are
chosen." The statement above inverts that: holding to an obligation
itself is an obligation, and the source of the obligation is not
mentioned.
>
> He can defend whatever actions he says are so moral
> on his own, but it seems only right (moral!) to at least
> hear what the hell he's saying, rather than impute to him
> illogical conclusions derived from what we imagine he's
> saying.
He has said he does not like to talk about that stuff, but I am
opening the door wider for him to explain himself, perhaps for reasons
not related to this thread. I did that with Broese in another thread
on the same topic, and he just became defensive and shut up. I expect
vonvegas to do the same, which is just as well as I don't have much
time to explain the obvious.
Charles Bell
> hear what the hell he's saying, rather than impute to him
> illogical conclusions derived from what we imagine he's
> saying. �I think I mentioned earlier---you have a strong
> tendency to do just that. �And as I also mentioned, you
> really, really need to figure out why you do that.
>
I have a way of figuring out the direction from which one is coming by
observing his movement. Is that irrational to you?
Jim Klein
> I have a way of figuring out the direction from which one is coming by
> observing his movement. Is that irrational to you?
On its own? No, I suppose not. But your problem is more
like knowing that someone is going to the train station
even when they tell you they're going to the airport.
jk
Charles Bell
> On Feb 7, 3:10 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > I have a way of figuring out the direction from which one is coming by
> > observing his movement. �Is that irrational to you?
>
> On its own?
Not like a rock, but like a bird, but then you don't know the
difference, do you?
vonvegas, does not tell anyone anything about what he believes in, He
said so in this thread himself. He pretends to be a "neutral
observer" offering helpful advice. A "neutral observer" is like a
rock, not like a bird, but then you don't know the difference.�
Jim Klein
> Not like a rock, but like a bird, but then you don't know the
> difference, do you?
You mean, "The bird is alive and the rock isn't" translates
to "not knowing the difference"? That wouldn't be you
imputing something to me, would it?
> vonvegas, does not tell anyone anything about what he believes in,
And therefore...what?
> He
> said so in this thread himself. He pretends to be a "neutral
> observer" offering helpful advice.
Well, "helpful" would be one of those transitive concepts
again. I doubt von would be so ignorant as to imagine
that he's helping anyone who refuses to take that help.
Maybe you ought to focus on who's being helpABLE here,
rather than helpful.
> A "neutral observer" is like a
> rock, not like a bird, but then you don't know the difference.
That's odd...I don't recall every having any problem arising from
any failure of mine to distinguish a rock from a bird, and I
happens to have tons of each where I live. Why do you suppose
that is...just lucky coincidence?
You OTOH have run into a major philosophical obstacle by
imagining that a sheet of styrofoam has some advantage
over a rock. Or don't you imagine that? Either way, you've
got a philosophical obstacle which, as you've made clear,
has no resolution outside of faith.
jk
Mark N
> On Feb 6, 11:12 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>>I am well known to hold peculiar views and
>>prior to our present conversation I've refrained from giving
>>any of my ethical views on this forum.
>
> Your intellectual cowardice is duly noted.
Is "intellectual cowardice" the only reason that you can think of why a
person might have refrained from giving his ethical views on this forum?
If so, then I submit that you're probably not thinking very hard.
Mark
Jim Klein
On Feb 7, 3:07 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > He pointed out--just as you might point out--
> > that "moral" to him does not just mean "in the realm of
> > volitional behavior" but rather "that within the realm of
> > volitional behavior which is objectively proper."
>
> I have never seen him say that other than indirectly by denying
> subjectivism (I think), so why would I assume it so?
Firstly, you have little problem assuming any ol' thing
you want about what people mean regardless of what
they say, so I'm not sure why this would be an exception
for you.
Secondly, you might pay attention. Von wrote,
-------------------------------------
"Yes of course anyone *can* choose evil but the ability to
choose is hardly in question here. Haven't you completely
missed the central point of ethical theory which struggles
to answer the question whether or not there is, as a matter
of fact (not mere opinion,) such a thing as right conduct
(relevantly here the discharging of obligations) and not
merely societal customs/legalities which may or may not be
moral?"
-------------------------------------
Now I'm sure you'll have some ridiculous explanation for
why that doesn't mean how it plainly reads.
> Even so, unless
> it is coming from an Objectivist, (and he is not) I would have a
> problem with what he meant by "objectively proper".
Well, it turns out von didn't use that phrase anyway, so
that question is moot.
Of course your comment brings up the separate question of
how anyone could consider himself an Objectivist and say
something as preposterous--and ANTI-Objectivist--as this.
Do you read your own words? You explicitly declare here
that WHO says something is more relevant to you than
WHAT is said. If you don't think that's anti-Objectivist,
then you never got off the ground.
> Actually, even
> coming from an Objectivist, I have a problem with that,
How democratic of you!
> rather than
> just saying "to hold to an obligation freely chosen is moral,
So a reliable hit man is "moral" to you, eh? That's very
interesting---is that pure Objectivism, or is it an optional
principle?
Now you'll explain how a reliable hit man doesn't "hold
to an obligation freely chosen." I can hardly wait. Or
will your dodge be that you, like Rand, didn't write
what you wrote?
> but all
> obligations in the first instance and in the last instance are
> chosen." The statement above inverts that: holding to an obligation
> itself is an obligation, and the source of the obligation is not
> mentioned.
Never mind that...I wanna know the source of your current
insanity. Did you start taking drugs?
If not, maybe you should!
> He has said he does not like to talk about that stuff, but I am
> opening the door wider for him to explain himself, perhaps for reasons
> not related to this thread.
Some door...not everyone's as foolish as I sometimes am, you know.
If von has made anything clear, it's that he's not foolish.
> I did that with Broese in another thread
> on the same topic, and he just became defensive and shut up.
Gee, now why would anyone do that? You've got Rand not writing
the very words she wrote, von not being clear about something
he was perfectly clear about, and me not knowing the difference
between a rock and bird.
Meanwhile, you'll hear nothing unless it's from your sorry
imagination of what an "Objectivist" is, and you don't even
have any of the nitwits over at the Church willing to hear
your convoluted rationalizations.
AFAIK I'm about the only one around here who ever even
/understood/ what the hell you were saying about something,
and even granted you the credit for some insight.
It's a sorry state of affairs all around, Charles...for you, and
more importantly in this context, for that bastardization of
a philosophy that's being fraudulently pawned off as
"Objectivism."
> I expect
> vonvegas to do the same, which is just as well as I don't have much
> time to explain the obvious.
Trust me...for a while now, you've been plenty obvious!
jk
Charles Bell
> -------------------------------------
> "Yes of course anyone *can* choose evil but the ability to
> choose is hardly in question here. Haven't you completely
> missed the central point of ethical theory which struggles
> to answer the question whether or not there is, as a matter
> of fact (not mere opinion,) �such a thing as right conduct
> (relevantly here the discharging of obligations) and not
> merely societal customs/legalities which may or may not be
> moral?"
> -------------------------------------
>
I don't have a problem with the above, as far as it goes, but it does
not relate to the item about which I queried: "We have obligations to
do the right thing."
Why don't you pay attention? I asked him if this is some homage to a
deontological ethical system.
> Now I'm sure you'll have some ridiculous explanation for
> why that doesn't mean how it plainly reads.
Why don't you pay attention to what I actually asked?
Charles Bell
> Charles Bell wrote:
> > On Feb 6, 11:12 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
> >>I am well known to hold peculiar views and
> >>prior to our present conversation I've refrained from giving
> >>any of my ethical views on this forum.
>
> > Your intellectual cowardice is duly noted.
>
> Is "intellectual cowardice" the only reason that you can think of why a
> person might have refrained from giving his ethical views on this forum?
Yes.
Not "a person". He, specifically..
> If so, then I submit that you're probably not thinking very hard.
I notice you have not given a plausible alternative. Not thinking
very hard yourself?
vonvegas
> On Feb 6, 11:12 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>> James E. Prescott wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>
>> {...Y]ou do acknowledge that if the agreement is
>> immoral then there is no obligation after all [...]
>
> That's not right. I'll quote what I actually said, below.
> But we seem to have a minor breakdown in communication here.
>
> Recall our brief exchange regarding the fact that not
> all choice is moral choice, meaning, of course, that not
> every choice is "between good and evil," or that not every
> choice is guided by a code of values and principles aimed
> at a long range purpose. Choose curtain number 1, 2, or
> 3, for example, is such a "non-moral choice."
>
> You wrote, "I have it," to say you understood.
Well, that's not right. Instead I wrote this:
"I understand. "Moral" is ambiguous between meaning a choice
which involves either right or wrong, and meaning a right
choice. You meant the former here."
Normally I'd not even bother to comment on this, because
your characterization of what I wrote is sufficiently close
in meaning to what I actually wrote. And there's nothing at
all wrong in your characterizing, foreshortening or putting
into better words anything I may have written. But here the
presence of the quotes makes it appear as those were my
actual words when they are not! We have a situation where
misunderstandings seem to be taking place and it just wastes
time and adds to the confusion if we misquote one another.
So please be more careful and if you're gonna claim that I,
or as you wrongly did before, claim that you wrote
something, please ensure that that is indeed so.
>Well, it's
> similar when distinguishing moral from imposed legal
> obligations.
Huh? That makes no sense. To distinguish ruffly means to set
out as different. "Moral" here can mean:
1. Having the moral dimension of right or wrong. And its
antonym is "amoral".
2. Being right. And its antonym is "immoral". For clarity's
sake, from now on, I'm going to adopt the more admittedly
cumbersome but hopefully ultimately more helpful and clearer
negative locution and use the words "not amoral" and not
immoral" to mean definitions 1 and 2 respectively.
So your above sentence reads that we need differentiate
between either:
1. The not amoral from imposed legal obligations. But that
makes no sense since there could be such things as not
amoral tasks to fulfill the imposed legal obligation, right?
2. The not immoral from imposed legal obligations. But that
makes no sense since there could be such things as not
immoral imposed tasks, right?
So there's nothing to distinguish. My guess is that
confusion is going on and perhaps you were struggling to
state the tautology that imposed obligations are uhm imposed
while the unimposed are not.
>A contract spells out a moral obligation.
Well, more precisely It spells out the tasks that must be
performed to fulfill/discharge any obligation.
> Law can require you to fulfill contract, so some legal
> obligations are /also/ moral obligations.
Let's be careful here. Some *so called* (by man made law)
legal obligations may be amoral. Others may be not amoral
hence either, according to you, immoral or not immoral, right?
But suppose a so called, by man made, law obligation is
initially but wrongly deemed a product of a valid contract?
Then clearly and ultimately there was never an extant legal
obligation, right? Similarly, as a matter of morality, if
the task which fulfills the alleged obligation is immoral
then there never was an (not amoral) obligation in the first
place. This is where I think we primarily disagree. You, IMO
wrongly think that if the *task* is immoral (and being
immoral is obviously being not amoral) then the alleged
*obligation* that allegedly arises must also obviously be
not amoral. But this logic wrongly assumes that an immoral
task can give rise to an obligation (i.e. an owed and to be
performed future task) but that's not so for similar reasons
as in the legal realm.
Recall that in the legal realm, despite the fact that you
and I may come to an agreement and form a so called
contract, if the agreement requires one of us to perform an
illegal task, then there is in fact no valid contract and
hence there never was a legal obligation, even tho we may
both have wrongly *thot* there was a legal obligation.
Now a legal system ideally mirrors the objective not amoral
system in the sense that ideally, each of our laws is not
immoral! And fortunately our present legal system properly
recognizes that a contract, (which is indeed the mechanism
which as you say gives rise to legal obligations) has two
aspects.
The first aspect is the Terms of the Contract, and we
individuals are completely free to decide and agree upon
what exactly those terms are. The second aspect is the
underlying conditions that must be met in order for an
agreement to become a valid contract. About these underlying
conditions we individuals have no choice and the legal
system prescribes exactly what those underlying conditions
are (e.g. the contractual partners must be competent, there
must be intent, there must be consideration and most
relevantly here, the terms of agreement *must be legal*). If
the terms of agreement are illegal then the contract is not
valid and hence cannot give rise to a legal obligation.
I'm sure you've understood me so far and that you also
agree. And now transfer this understanding of the IMO
correct legal structure/logic over into the not amoral
realm. Then you will understand that for a not amoral
obligation to ever arise it is required that the terms of
agreement are themselves not immoral, else there cannot ever
be such an animal as a not amoral obligation in the first
place. Simply put, just as the legal system forbids us to
form, despite our agreement upon illegalities, a valid
contract, from which a legal obligation will arise, so
similarly objective moral law, despite our agreement,
forbids the arising of a not amoral obligation if the terms
of agreement are themselves immoral.
This has been my criticism of your position from the git go
when I charged that you had so simplified the matter, by
leaving out the central ethical question (Are the terms of
agreement not immoral?), that your explanation has become
simplistic.
You have not satisfactorily dealt with this charge. You
still wrongly think that a not amoral obligation can arise
irrespective of the fact that the terms of agreement are
immoral. You have shown evidence that you understand that no
legal obligation can arise if the terms are themselves
illegal. But you've failed to grasp that similarly no not
amoral obligation can arise if the terms of agreement are
themselves immoral.
Thus you wrongly believe that a not amoral obligation can
arise merely as a function of our agreement upon the terms.
But that is not so. The terms themselves must be not immoral
for a not amoral obligation to arise and this fact is a
missing piece from your faulty definition of "obligation".
For legal obligations to become extant the terms must be not
illegal and similarly for not amoral obligations to arise
the terms must be not immoral. In fact the phrase "not
amoral obligation" is a needless redundancy for if there
exists a so called not amoral obligation then its tasks are
always not immoral.
Your present position wherein you wrongly believe that not
amoral obligations can somehow arise as a mere function of
agreement is completely subjective as evidenced by the fact
that the parties are free to agree upon anything including
the immoral. I accused you of subjectivity before and all
you did was assert it wasn't so. But when I asked you to
demonstrate the objectivity you merely snipped my request
and failed to answer. You have to come to grips with this
question and adjust your present thinking accordingly.
But some legal
> obligations are merely imposed, not chosen.
Within a screwed up (i.e. immoral) legal system, yes. But
IMO, one man imposing terms upon another is always immoral
hence in an ideal legal system there would be no such thing
as imposed obligations.
>Moral choice
> means a choice between good and evil.
Fine. That's the not amoral meaning of "moral".
>And moral obligation,
> I say, means obligation chosen by the making of a promise.
False. The mere choosing by the subjects is insufficient to
make it an obligation! It has to be a not immoral choice
else no not amoral obligation exists for the reasons
articulated above.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > A moral code is not a "prescibed-by-authority' (by
>> > God or by law) set of behaviors.
>>
>> If you are not playing word games and "authority" has a
>> reasonable meaning then your proposition is false.
>
> I do not understand what you are saying here. I specified
> the meaning of authority as "God" or "the law." Perhaps
> you have in mind some other reasonable meaning of the word.
Yes. The authority is objective not amoral law which
prescribes right behavior and which we must discover, so
contrary to your above assertion, a moral code is indeed a
prescribed by not amoral law set of behaviors.
> We'll come to that soon.
>
>> > A moral code is a set of
>> > discovered values and principles used to guide a
>> > person's actions toward fulfillment of a long-range
>> > purpose, properly happiness.
>>
>> That's correct as far as it goes but it is superficial. The
>> key point here is the phrase "discovered values". If they
>> are discovered, and they indeed are, that means that they
>> are *not* a function of mere agreement (i.e. subjective) nor
>> invented principles, but rather that there is an underlying
>> *existing objective* set of rules/laws/order that we must
>> discover!
>
> Well, that's exactly what I meant. Morality
is /objective/, not merely "chosen."
OK.
>The choice that is objectively morally
> /right/ is to choose values that are objectively worthwhile,
> and to be guided by principles that objectively /do/ lead to
> happiness.
Agreed.
>> [...]
>
>> > It has nothing to do
>> > with "obligation," which refers to behaviors that
>> > are expected, relied upon and demanded by other
>> > human beings.
>>
>> Nonsense. You yourself admitted and said that an obligation
>> that is immoral is not an obligation after all. Just read
>> what you wrote, please.
>
> Let's both read it. I wrote,
>"An invalid contract
> such as an agreement to commit a crime is not legally
> enforceable, and so, in that general sense, does not
> constitute an obligation to commit the crime."
>My
> wording could have been better. I did not mean it
> wasn't still a moral (chosen and expected of you)
> obligation; only that because it was not legally
> enforceable it was not something the person who gave
> you money would be legally able to demand.
But "moral" doesn't mean the same thing as chosen and
expected, which is another thing that's not right here. That
which is chosen and expected could well be a *neutral* task
neither right or wrong hence amoral. Thus according to your
classification scheme it seems you should have imposed,
moral and a third category of obligations that are chosen,
expected but of neutral ethical value. The correct meaning
of "moral" here is either not amoral or not immoral.
In any case, the main point is that you deny that you had
agreed that an immoral alleged obligation is not a genuine
obligation after all. Fine, I'll accept that as your
position. I know you do agree that an illegal alleged
obligation is not a genuine legal obligation because you've
clearly said so. So then please explain if this is true in
the legal realm, why mutatis mutandis , it is untrue in the
realm which the legal system ideally mirrors (i.e. the not
amoral realm).
>
>> [...] You yourself admitted that a so called obligation
>> emanating from an invalid contract is not an obligation
>> after all. And that means that a moral obligation can
>> only arise pursuant to a valid (i.e. ethical not immoral)
>> contract.
>
> I'm confident that upon reflection you'll see that such
> would be quite a bizarre interpretation.
No. But I seriously added to the confusion via my misuse of
the word "valid" Please look and note that I here clearly
stated and redefined "valid" to include only contracts that
were "ethical not immoral". And it is quite correct, as I
clumsily tried to say that a not amoral obligation can only
arise from a contract if the terms are themselves not
immoral. Unfortunately for me, under the ordinary meaning of
"valid" (and I had no justification for redefining it) a
legal valid contract could be immoral as you correctly point
out below. Sorry.
>For example,
> some contracts are illegal even though they are perfectly
> moral. You and I would both say, I'm sure, that if, for
> fun, you put $100 on black at my illegal but entertaining
> roulette table and the spin comes up black I am /morally/
> obligated to pay you $100. The mere fact that you can't
> legally enforce your demand doesn't mean I don't have a
> /moral/ obligation to pay.
Right.
>And, on the other hand, some
> contracts that are quite /immoral/ can still be legally
> enforced.
Right, tho ability to enforce is irrelevant to making it a
legal obligation and what is relevant is that it not be
illegal instead.
(snip)
>
>> I won't quibble about this because it is off point,
>> but just for the record IMO all moral (right conduct)
>> behavior is our obligation.
>
> Well, for the record, IMO, that's a bizarre statement
> with which I do more than "quibble." I would ask again,
> what does it /mean/ to say moral behavior is an obligation
> -- obligation to /whom/?
Asked and answered several times already. The answer again
is that upon choosing life we have contracted with our
parents (who desire us to live) in exchange for which we
expect temporary caretaking. Again, if you tell me that I've
stretched tacit consent too far I don't know how to defend
my position except to turn it around and ask you to prove
you are right that I've stretched it too far. But I have no
illusions on this point for I recognize that at the very
best such a "defense" may only show my position can't be
*proven* wrong but since I'm the one making the assertion
(i.e. that the child tacitly contracts with its parents) I
have to admit I haven't met the normal burden of having a
good and provable reason for my belief.
>
>> [...T]his stuff (ethics) genuinely confuses me and is
>> very very difficult, much more difficult IMO than either
>> logic or epistemology to which I've previously large;y
>> limited my comments on this forum. What's more important
>> here at present are your views from which I hope to learn
>> and I also hope that some of my criticisms will be use
>> to you.
>
> Your criticisms are of great use to me. I thank you for
> them, and I hope I can be of some help. These issues are
> actually very simple
I don't know whether to laugh or to cry. I'm surprised,
disappointed and find the hubris in this statement
astounding. Much smarter folks than you and I have
struggled with ethical dilemmas for thousands of years and
no one to my knowledge, has, despite perhaps conceited
claims to the contrary, come up with an unassailable system
of ethics which should be evidence that ethics is hardly
simple. It is relatively easy for you and I to engage in an
armchair and sweeping conversation concerning broad ethical
principles and we may even discover a few truths on the way.
But the "trick" lies in applying such meager truths we might
discover to a concrete real life situation with all its
inherent enormous complexities. I've just recently had to
confront what many of us in our modern society may have to
face. The question was when to "pull the plug" on an ill
loved one. If you think such a decision is simple then I'm
not going to waste much time arguing with you, but will
instead with all the respect due such a remark, declare it
either simple minded or more likely that you just don't
understand the problem.
-- no tougher than epistemology, IMO.
> The trick is just to not allow yourself to become confused
> by definitions that are less than explicit, and that are
> less than rigorously maintained.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > I have said agreement, a promise, is
>> > /one/ way obligation, specifically moral obligation,
>> > arises.
>>
>> Exactly! And if you kept context then you'll know
>> that my comments have been virtually all about such moral
>> obligations. It is tiresome to needlessly and continually
>> modify "obligation" with "moral" when the context makes,
>> or at least should make, reasonably clear what we were
>> discussing.
>
> I'd agree with you, except when failing to make clear
> which kind of obligation you or I are referring to
> causes misunderstanding.
Fine.
>
>> [...] You started out by wrongly saying that an obligation
>> arises upon mere agreement
>
> I said a moral obligation is such.
OK. I'll not further pursue nor argue over what was said in
the past but will focus upon what I presently understand to
be your position.
>I did not say, or mean,
> or imply, that a moral obligation means an obligation that
> is morally right.
The problem, James, is that per my above, there is no such
thing as a genuine not amoral obligation that is other than
not immoral. Said in your immediately above lingo a moral
obligation is always morally right. You'll have to knock
down my above arguments/logic if you still think otherwise.
>
>> [...] but that is not so for it leaves out the
>> central ethical question.
>
> As I said, it leaves open the moral question regarding
> which moral obligations one /ought/ to assume.
False alternative for there are not two alternate "moral
obligations". You have to address the comments in my
previous post which you snipped hence ignored, to justify
your "it leaves it open" comment. I'll not waste time and
reexplain it all here. Please read my previous relevant
comments.
>
>> Also required for the existence of such an obligation is
>> the moral dimension, that is, the agreement cannot be
>> immoral, or said in legalese, it is essential that there
>> be a *valid* contract.
>
> A valid contract is needed for there to be a legal
> obligation. Moral obligations can exist with or without
> a (legally) valid contract.
Correct.
>All that is required for you
> to be morally obligated to do something, is that you
> freely elect to /make a promise/ to do it, in a manner
> eliciting the expectation and reliance of another person.
> That is what obligation means.
No. Note again that you have hereby made a not amoral
*obligation* a function of mere agreement amongst parties
hence it is completely subjective, just like the legal
system might be which is completely man made. Entirely
missing from your notion of not amoral obligation is
objectivity.
And it says nothing about
> whether you are promising something good or something
> evil. As I wrote...
Yes, you wrote that and it is still wrong because there is
no such thing as a not amoral obligation arising from
immoral tasks.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > [...] The fact that you can be obligated (legally,
>> > for example) to do things that are not morally proper
>> > has no effect on the objective nature of morality
>> > whatsoever. This is not a confusion of terms; this
>> > is being /rigorous/ in our terms.
>>
>> Of course I agree with all that for you are in effect
>> saying that the *authority*, in the sense of grounds for
>> justification, lies in the underlying order of moral law.
>
> Is that, then, what you meant by not playing word games
> and instead having a "reasonable meaning" of *authority*?
Yes.
>
> If so, it is no wonder you would find this all very
> confusing indeed! This is not a word game: Authority
> means a person (or a god) who is in a position of being
> such an expert as to make definitive statements about
> the subject at hand, OR whose proclamations have the
> force of law and must be obeyed or else punishment will
> follow. Webster's is an authority regarding the
> definitions of words. A judge is an authority on what
> the law and your contracts require. God would be an
> authority if He existed.
>
> Grounds justifying something refers to the objective
> facts of reality. These are not authorities. These
> are simply the facts -- the facts with which an authority
> should be familiar.
Unfortunately you are contradicting yourself. You previously
said:
">A moral code is not a "prescibed-by-authority' (by
> God or by law) set of behaviors."
and more clearly you also said:
"> I do not understand what you are saying here. I specified
> the meaning of authority as "God" or "the law." "
Here, you say authority need *not* be a person (when you
speak of "the law") yet you emphatically insist elsewhere
that authority must be a person. Which is it? I said that
the underlying authority is *moral law* yet you object to
that even tho you used the phrase "the law" and labeled it
as authority. I see nothing earth shatteringly wrong with
anthropomorphizing "moral law" such that it prescribes and
is authority. No harm no foul.
>
>> [...] Expressed in legalese you've correctly said that
>> absent a *valid* contract there is no obligation.
>
> No legal obligation.
Right.
>
>> Now transfer that logic into the moral realm and
>> we have: absent an agreement which is ethical (objective
>> right conduct) there is no obligation.
>
> You (like Jim) are not making sense when you say this.
> To prove it, I need only offer you the same challenge
> I offered Jim. Define obligation. To help you along,
> I can tell you what I say is the correct definition:
>
> An obligation is a future behavior by
> a reasoning being that is expected,
> relied upon, and demanded of him by
> other reasoning beings.
>
> If you can offer another, better, correct definition,
> by all means please do. But I should caution you at
> the start that to say obligation is simply "moral
> behavior" would be equivocation, not definition, and
> a source of endless and needless confusion.
Your challenge is easily met and I've already in effect
given you the answer. Arguendo, I'll accept your definition
in toto except to modify the word "behavior" with "moral" by
which I mean not immoral. If you did that, then you'd be
incorporating the necessary objectivity required for a
genuine obligation. Otherwise obligations are completely
subjective.
My actual position is that a child can and does incur an
obligation so I'd have to modify your definition with
respect to the term "reasoning" accordingly. Whatsmore, I'm
not completely sure that you are right that there cannot be
an obligation to oneself and that others are required, but I
really don't deem it very important so I won't lose much
sleep over it. The notion of the self is a very difficult
one and it is rash IMO to pontificate upon it.
>
>> > [...W]hat you seem to be saying is that an
>> > obligation can "truly" exist if /only/ a behavior is
>> > moral, and /regardless/ of whether or not the behavior
>> > is expected, relied upon and demanded by other human
>> > beings.
>>
>> You misunderstand. I've said nothing like "regardless of
>> whether or not the behavior is expected/relied/demanded".
>> What I've said from the git go is that your definition (that
>> a moral obligation is a mere function of agreement) is
>> faulty for it leaves out the central ethical concern.
>
> I do know you've said that. And, as you know, my response
> has always been that this central question is vital to
> assessing the propriety of human conduct -- but is not
> relevant to the question of whether or not an obligation
> exists. Supposing it to be relevant is an example of
> "fuzzy" thinking -- a vague sort of intuitive "feeling"
> that obligations come from above, from God or Nature.
It's not fuzzy thinking nor a vague feeling as I hope you
by now see, for I've given you argument up above. Knock it
down if you can, but even if you could find flaws in my
reasoning then please nevertheless note that I didn't arrive
at my conclusion thru "fuzzy" thinking but rather via the
arguments I presented.
>
> For example...
>
>> So for God substitute nature. You do agree that nature
>> exists right? So let me give you the secular version. You/I
>> are a creature of a specific nature and no other, and we
>> live in a specific environment that has whatever
>> characteristics it has and no other, hence if we choose to
>> live then there is an optimum behavior that we must engage
>> in to best sustain our lives.
>
> This is all true. It has nothing to do with the concept
> of obligation, but it is all true. Now, we get "fuzzy"...
>
>> This prescribed by circumstance [...]
>
> Circumstance does not "prescribe." Authorities prescribe.
Oh stop. First, it's but a quibble to object to "prescribe"
and you may use any other reasonable word or words you wish
tho I suspect you'll not be able to easily come up with a
single word but will likely need write a paragraph to get
across the intended meaning. Please remember that while you
are of course correct that an inanimate object differs from
a person, it is silly to insist upon needlessly making a
difference (i.e. changing words) if the difference doesn't
make a difference. Secondly, you yourself said "the law" was
authority, before you contradicted it, and I just modified
law with "moral" (meaning not immoral).
>
>> [...] (the circumstance that both we and our
>> environment have a specific nature) is the objective moral
>> law/order (use whatever terms makes you comfortable if you
>> don't like "moral law.")
>
> Morality. Moral principles. You can even call them "laws"
> in the sense that gravity is called a "law of nature."
> Just be careful not to equivocate. Step off a cliff and
> you /will/ fall. Period. End of story. You are not
> "obligated to fall." That wouldn't make a lick of sense.
> You can only be obligated to do things you are capable of
> doing or not doing, such that if you fail to do them you
> violate the expectations and demands of others.
Of course I've tried not to equivocate thruout and am using
the cumbersome negative locutions of "moral" to avoid any
unconscious equivocation.
>
> A law, in the sense relevant to obligation, is a behavior
> prescribed by authority.
Authority like the (man made) law and also moral law, right.
>It is a behavior you must to do
> or face punishment if you don't. You are not "obligated"
> to behave morally. That wouldn't make a lick of sense.
Yes it does make sense to be obligated to right behavior if
you wish to live optimally for it is the means to the end.
To exactly whom/how you come about this obligation is more
debatable but I ruffly, with my suggested "improvements"
accept your view.
> That is no different from saying you are obligated to
> fall when you step off a cliff.
I dunno that the analogy holds. In any case you haven't
explained how it is no different.
>Behave morally and you
> can achieve happiness. Be immoral and you will find only
> suffering and death. That expresses mere facts of reality.
Mere? Are there nonmere facts? Lemme guess, are they called
obligations?
> Obligation has nothing to do with it.
>
>> [...] Of most importance, and I think we both have this
>> right, is the recognition that there is such a
>> thing as an objective order of some kind, which we should
>> and must follow if we wish to live optimally.
>
> Absolutely. You and I agree about that. Jim would agree,
> also. Why, then, do we tie ourselves in knots of debate
> with me accused of quibbling? Trust me, this is very,
> very important stuff. Nothing is more important than
> getting off on the right foot at the start.
OK.
> The equivocation
> happening here (not by me!) is the same as the confusion
> between that which is right and that which a person has
> /the right/ to do.
I don't accept your diagnosis that I was equivocating, if
that's what you're charging. In any case, the negative
locutions should make any possible equivocations more
obvious and hopefully avoidable.
> There is no end to bickering about
> rights when they are wrongly seen as either "imbued by
> Nature" or as "prescribed by Nature's God." Abortion is
> just one illustration of the knots people tie themselves
> into trying to figure out exactly /when/ Nature imbues a
> human being with a "right to live." That whole debate is
> pure silliness caused a simple failure to define terms
> correctly from the start.
>
>> [...] To be sure, I agree with you that the man in the
>> sky did not literally give us our rights. But if we
>> substitute "nature" for "God" and are not quite so literally
>> minded [...]
>
> Or, not quite so /careful/, perhaps...?
>
>> [...] then isn't it true that we (of a specific nature)
>> are born into a circumstance of a specific nature and
>> in order to thrive we must engage in specific behavior?
>
> It IS true. And then...
>
>> This might all be summarized by the sentence: "We are
>> endowed by nature (our creator) with certain inalienable
>> rights (wherein rights are the freedoms we must have for
>> each of us to engage in life sustaining actions.)
>
> If rights are properly defined as freedoms we must have
> in order to live, and in order to achieve happiness, then,
> yes, you would be correct.
Then I rest my case on that topic.
>
> However, to live you must have the freedom to consume
> food, but this doesn't mean you have the right to consume
> my food.
Sure, and that's never been in dispute certainly for adults.
For children I gave a possible very strong mitigating reason
(that they are not given the opportunity to choose life
except after the fact). But even if you don't accept that,
by stretching tacit consent we can easily construct a
scenario wherein the child contracts to be temporarily cared
for. This would all then still be quite in keeping with your
point that no one (this time including children) has the
right to the unearned stuff of others.
>
> It doesn't mean that because although rights may be
> /described/ as freedoms needed for life, such a description
> is not a definition. Wolves may be described as predator
> animals, but that does not define them;
Well, now I could quibble. I could truthfully point out that
wolves are not objects susceptible of definition, words are.
But if I did that it would point out a difference that here
in fact makes no difference.
>if it did,
> then lions would be wolves.
Right, but whatever is the proper definition will always be
a description.
>Eating any food you see is
> not a right any more than a lion is a wolf. A right,
> properly defined so as to /distinguish/ it from any ol'
> freedom needed for life, is a specified and protected
> freedom to act without interference in a social context,
> meaning a freedom that is mutually agreed upon (as in
> "my food is mine, yours is yours") and then protected
> by law.
OK. I'm gonna snip what little remains because our most
serious/interesting differences have been amply addressed
above except this which will give me an opportunity to
summarize:
> I think you're taking an unnecessary tack. We need not
> imagine consent or demand by the infant whom we protect.
> All we need know is why we choose to protect infants.
> They are precious things.
But don't you see the big flaw in "All we need know is
why..."? It is completely subjective which means we might
agree upon the most heinous and evil doings. Yet by your
logic this would be labeled a moral (either right or wrong)
obligation which happens to be wrong. And my point of
course is that there is no *or* (as in either right or wrong
obligation) for if the alleged obligation is wrong then
there is no genuine obligation at all. So I return to my
initial criticism which was that your approach leaves out
the central ethical question of right or wrong from the git go.
Vonvegas
vonvegas
(crap snipped)
If you are really interested, most of your questions are
answered in my latest reply to James.
As for you, please don't bother addressing me for I don't
intend to directly respond to you anymore. Should you ever
get a civil tongue in your head I may reconsider my options.
Vonvegas
Charles Bell
> If you are really interested, most of your questions are
> answered in my latest reply to James.
>
Not the one I asked: do you or do you not believe in some kind of
deontological morality? If so, how can you possibly be worthy of even
addressing such as mess as Prescottism which, at least, sensibly
dismisses deontological morality.
Why does a child owe any obligation to a parent, and not in some
measure the parent (the chooser) an obligation to the child (the
consequence of the choice)?
To whom or what is there an obligation to do any moral thing?
Prescott and Broese have given the wrong answer, but you have given no
answer. Why do you think that your answer/opinion does not matter to
the discussion?
The answers to these questions relate directly to a presumption of, or
lack thereof, a duty-bound moral code.
Oh, but instead, we get from you . . .
vonvegas: Don't you mean to say "A" and not "B" .
victim: No, I mean "B".
vonvegas: By "B" you mean "A", right?
victim: No, "B".
vonvegas: All in all, are we to believe that you said "A" when you
meant "B"?
vonvegas
>> "IMO all moral
>> (right conduct) behavior is our obligation."
Sir Charles the superficial asked:
>Is this or is this not an
> unchosen obligation like a mystic duty?
Jim Klein answered:
>
> It is not, and von was sufficiently clear in his usage to
make
> this obvious...
Right, not a mystic duty.
The only unchosen obligation I recognize is that Charles is
now obligated to you for setting him straight-again. But
being the ungrateful bastard that he is, he will doubtlessly
but amply repay you in the coin of ingratitude.
Vonvegas
vonvegas
> >Charles Bell wrote:
>> Your intellectual cowardice is duly noted.
>
> Is "intellectual cowardice" the only reason that you can
think of why a
> person might have refrained from giving his ethical views
on this forum?
> If so, then I submit that you're probably not thinking
very hard.
>
> Mark
Careful Mark, your lofty expectations of Charles, to
actually consider alternatives, may result in him branding
you unwarrantedly demanding.
Vonvegas
Charles Bell
> �> On Feb 7, 1:25 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net>
Klein is here just giving you the opportunity to avoid discussion of
your assumption that morality/ethics and your stance thereon makes no
difference in a discussion on "oblligation".
What kind of "duty" if not mystic, then? "All right conduct" is an
obligation. Says who? Says you? Then who the hell are you to tell me
what *my* obligations are, and this is the point Prescott misses, even
if we have a legal agreement? Prescott's answer is statist. What is
your answer?
----
Right, tho ability to enforce is irrelevant to making it a
legal obligation and what is relevant is that it not be
illegal instead
-----
What crap!
----
there is
no such thing as a not amoral obligation arising from
immoral tasks.
----
Sheesh! What stinking crap!
----
that upon choosing life we have contracted with our
parents (who desire us to live) in exchange for which we
expect temporary caretaking.
----
A fetus "contracts" with his parents ?!?!?!?!
An obligation arises from the full acceptance of responsibility of
one's choices and actions. A fetus or an infant or a small child
cannot do that and therefore cannot be obligated to do anything.
[Real, objective, moral] Obligation ALWAYS precedes any "obligation"
you and Prescott have been talking about because an "obligation" (and
not "contract" or "promise") has no meaning whatsoever withot prior
acceptance of personal responsibility, the real obligation, which is
always, under all circumstances with or without the law, to oneself.
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > [...]
> > You wrote, "I have it," to say you understood.
>
> Well, that's not right. [...]
I misquoted you, and you're correct it wastes time
to do so, even when, as you say, the meaning is
"sufficiently close." Mea culpa.
> [...] I wrote this:
> "I understand. "Moral" is ambiguous between meaning a choice
> which involves either right or wrong, and meaning a right
> choice. You meant the former here."
Those words and this present post of yours confirm
you do indeed understand how moral can be used to denote
choices and obligations relevant to morality as opposed to
choices and obligations that are morally good. Fair
enough? Thus you adopt, here, a phrase, "(amoral) obligation"
to refer to obligations not chosen but imposed.
> [...]
> > Well, it's
> > similar when distinguishing moral from imposed legal
> > obligations.
>
> Huh? That makes no sense. To distinguish ruffly means to set
> out as different. "Moral" here can mean:
> 1. Having the moral dimension of right or wrong. And its
> antonym is "amoral".
> 2. Being right. And its antonym is "immoral".
That's correct. ("Amoral," however, has often a negative
connotation, applied disparagingly of a general disregard
for, a lack of concern with, issues of morality by
someone capable of such concern. I would say a dog's
choice to fetch a ball is a "non-moral choice" rather
than an "amoral choice"; but for our purposes here the
terms are virtually identical.)
> For clarity's
> sake, from now on, I'm going to adopt the more admittedly
> cumbersome but hopefully ultimately more helpful and clearer
> negative locution and use the words "not amoral" and not
> immoral" to mean definitions 1 and 2 respectively.
That ought to work fine. I'll try to be as clear in a similar
way. Perhaps I can say "moral (not non-moral; or, not amoral)"
where you are saying simply "not amoral."
Or, for even greater clarity here, I will simply say "chosen
obligation" /instead/ of saying "moral obligation." However,
when I do this, I must ask you to keep two things in mind.
First, I don't mean what Jim K. meant, namely, an obligation
that is an obligation simply because you choose to fulfill it.
Rather, when /I/ say "chosen obligation" I mean an obligation
that exists because you /chose/ (past tense) to /have/ the
obligation by choosing to make a promise to another person
(contract being the kind of chosen obligation that is legally
enforceable).
Second, I have reasons (stated earlier; I'll not repeat them
now for simplicity's sake) for not simply always saying chosen
obligation in the first place. (Those reasons have to do with
addressing religion-based misconceptions regarding the nature
of /morality/. They have to do with why Objectivists will or
ought say, "There is no such thing as an unchosen moral
obligation" instead of saying the tautologically unimpressive,
"There is no such thing as an unchosen chosen obligation."
But, again, I'll try not to delve into this subject here
and now, though you should glimpse it surfacing when first I
use the word, "precisely," below.)
And, I will say morally right or morally proper or morally
good where you are saying "not immoral." Double-negatives are
generally less clear, I believe, but if you and I are careful
about it, this shouldn't matter.
> So your above sentence reads that we need differentiate
> between either:
> 1. The not amoral from imposed legal obligations. But
> that makes no sense since there could be such things as
> not amoral tasks to fulfill the imposed legal obligation,
> right?
Wrong. Well, right there can be moral (not amoral) choices
you must make in deciding whether to fulfill or to defy
an imposed legal obligation.
However, this does not affect the fact that the obligation
itself was imposed upon you, rather than chosen by you.
So, no, chosen obligation ("not amoral obligation") does
indeed stand in contradistinction to imposed obligation
(legal and other such).
> 2. The not immoral from imposed legal obligations.
> But that makes no sense since there could be such
> things as not immoral imposed tasks, right?
Right. Although imposing obligations (upon adults) is,
in itself, immoral, there is no reason why one can't
(immorally) impose an obligation to do something morally
right. It is morally right not to abuse drugs; it is
morally wrong to put someone in jail for abusing drugs,
despite the fact that NOT abusing drugs is morally right.
> [...] My guess is that confusion is going on and
> perhaps you were struggling to state the tautology
> that imposed obligations are uhm imposed while the
> unimposed are not.
Well, yes and no. Yes, indeed, I was stating that very,
very simple tautology. Imposed obligations are
imposed; chosen obligations are chosen. Simple!
But, no, that was NOT the "struggle" here.
The problem, the struggle as it were, only arises when
/you/ (not I) attempt to make a case for the illogical
proposition that an unchosen, imposed obligation is
somehow NOT AN OBLIGATION, or, that an immoral
obligation (chosen, perhaps; perhaps imposed) is
somehow NOT AN OBLIGATION.
That's when the confusion over what you /mean/ by that
begins, persists, and ends. I am struggling here, not in
support of a mere tautology, but rather /against/ a fuzzy
re-defintion of obligation that tries to make a contra-
diction-in-terms seem somehow logically permissible.
> [...]
> Let's be careful here.
Yes, indeed! Let's be very, very careful!
> Some *so called* (by man made law) legal obligations
> may be amoral. Others may be not amoral hence either,
> according to you, immoral or not immoral, right?
I am perfectly willing and able, I think, to characterize
all laws as either morally proper or immoral. I believe,
as I have said, that it is immoral to simply impose
obligations upon adults (meaning, here, people who are
mentally competent to make their own moral choices). Apart
from that, however, it is a separate question whether the
law in a particular case is demanding behavior that is
(or would be, if chosen) moral or demanding behavior
that is (or would be, if chosen) immoral.
> But suppose a so called, by man made, law obligation
> is initially but wrongly deemed a product of a valid
> contract? Then clearly and ultimately there was never
> an extant legal obligation, right? Similarly, as a
> matter of morality, if the task which fulfills the
> alleged obligation is immoral then there never was
> an (not amoral) obligation in the first place. This
> is where I think we primarily disagree.
I believe you have this right. This is indeed where we
disagree.
> You, IMO wrongly think that if the *task* is immoral
> (and being immoral is obviously being not amoral) then
> the alleged *obligation* that allegedly arises must also
> obviously be not amoral.
Hmmm. You seem to be saying that, IYO, I mean to say an
immoral obligated behavior remains chosen (not amoral)
behavior, otherwise how call it immoral? Was it immoral
to fight in Vietnam instead of go to prison? If it
was morally right to choose service in 'Nam over prison,
then does that mean the war in Vietnam was morally right?
Well, I don't mean that obligating a person to "commit an
immoral act" is the contradiction it appears to be. To
say that you are faced with a legal obligation to do
something you should regard as immoral, means only to say
that the law is wrong on /two/ counts: 1. imposing any-
thing in the first place, and 2. imposing a behavior that
it /would/ be immoral for the person to choose were he
being given the opportunity to make that free choice.
> But this logic wrongly assumes that an immoral
> task can give rise to an obligation (i.e. an owed and to be
> performed future task) but that's not so for similar reasons
> as in the legal realm.
[...snip of some very good observations re:contract and
its underlying/supporting legal context...]
> I'm sure you've understood me so far and that you also
> agree.
Yes.
> And now transfer this understanding of the IMO
> correct legal structure/logic over into the not amoral
> realm. Then you will understand that for a not amoral
> obligation to ever arise it is required that the terms of
> agreement are themselves not immoral, else there cannot ever
> be such an animal as a not amoral obligation in the first
> place. Simply put, just as the legal system forbids us to
> form, despite our agreement upon illegalities, a valid
> contract, from which a legal obligation will arise, so
> similarly objective moral law, despite our agreement,
> forbids the arising of a not amoral obligation if the
> terms of agreement are themselves immoral.
Very nicely put! Now let's look at it even even more
carefully.
I've agreed, for our discussion, to say only chosen
obligation, for what I have previously referred to as
"moral obligation."
Now, you are proposing that we go a bit further still
and agree to say that obligation itself can only exist
where the behavior is morally right (not immoral), the
way a legal obligation can only truly exist when the
behavior is legal.
The idea, here, is that, IYO, morality is an underpinning
thing analogous to literal human law, upon which basis
obligations consistent with morality may be said to
actually exist, and so-called obligations inconsistent
with morality do not really exist.
That does not work, however, and is precisely the
confusion about the nature of morality and the nature
of obligation that I am struggling to make plain.
Humor me for a moment, and give a bit (as I have given),
by allowing or stipulating or accepting for the sake
of argument that two definitions of mine are correct.
1. Morality is a code of discovered values
and principles to which a man refers in
guiding his actions toward a long-range
purpose, properly happiness.
2. An obligation (referring to the behavior
one is obligated to perform) is a future
behavior by a reasoning being that is
expected, relied upon and demanded of him
by other reasoning beings.
In the first, there is no reference to others (though
of course one's behavior toward others will fall within
the sphere of what values and principles are guiding one's
actions).
In the second, there is no reference to whether the
obligated behavior is, in itself, morally right or morally
wrong, nor even whether the obligation was chosen in the
act of making a promise.
All human law "obligates" under the terms of definition
number 2 (what I claim is the meaning of obligation).
If a contract is illegal, it does indeed violate the under-
pinning source of legal obligation and so it does not
create the legal obligations that the parties to the
contract may have believed it did. All right so far?
Good. What this /means/ is, the law /prescribes/ that,
as illegal, the contracted behavior may not be performed,
or else punishment will follow; the law obligates this
party /not/ to perform the contracted illegal act. It
is in this sense that one may rightly say an illegal
contract does not create a legal obligation.
In order to draw that, as analogy, down to the moral
realm, one would have to say that morality "prescribes"
in a manner similar or analogous to the way human law
literally prescribes.
Fine. But the problem is, the expectations, reliance
and demands of other reasoning beings are inherent
in the very concept of human law, and they are
absent in the meaning of morality. OR, to /say/ "they"
(obligation) are (is) present in the meaning of morality,
one would have to suppose EITHER a Divine Reasoning Being
situated to make demands and to impose punishments OR
ELSE re-define morality such that it /entails/ the
expectations and demands of others. Bob Kolker used
to say that alone on a deserted island there is no such
thing as morality. Ayn Rand used to say that alone on
a deserted island is where a man would need morality
more than anywhere. Ayn Rand was correct.
In other words, drawing the analogy from law down to
so-called natural law or morality is precisely the
religious and/or social/collectivist misconception
about the true nature of morality. This is precisely
the thing at issue here.
So, although I am willing to say chosen obligations
are obligations of the morally good kind (provided
they are moral) and that imposed obligations are
obligations of the morally bad kind (even if they
seek to impose moral behavior), I cannot go along
with your proposal to say that a promised and legal
obligation OR an imposed and legal obligation OR
a promised ("moral") and legal but not enforceable
obligation (e.g., I promised my mistress I'd call
her when I'm away) is somehow "not really an
obligation" unless the behavior is morally right.
That proposal is simply illogical. It represents
the tired old twin-misconception that morality
is a (super)naturally imposed law that somehow
must involve /other people's/ (or God's or Nature's)
expectations and demands. Morality instructs. It
does not "obligate." Reality entails consequences.
It does not "punish." Figuratively speaking one
might say reality punishes those who violate her
laws of morality, but colorful speech is not
the same as logical argument.
> This has been my criticism of your position from the
> git go when I charged that you had so simplified the
> matter, by leaving out the central ethical question
> (Are the terms of agreement not immoral?), that your
> explanation has become simplistic.
I plead guilty to simplicity.
> You have not satisfactorily dealt with this charge.
I admit the definitions, above, are quite simple and
easy to understand. However, I must reject the
suggestion that I have not dealt with underlying moral
considerations. Should one purchase and consume addictive
narcotics for recreational purposes? No, I've said. That
is immoral. Should we have laws banning the recreational
use of addictive narcotics? No. That, too, is immoral.
Are you legally obligated to /refrain/ from the purchase
of such? Of course! Are you /not/ legally obligated to
pay if you have taken such under contract? Of course,
again!
> [...] The terms themselves must be not immoral
> for a not amoral obligation to arise and this fact
> is a missing piece from your faulty definition of
> "obligation".
You SAY this is a "fact," but you base this alleged
fact on analogy to human law, which is prescribed
behavior (prescribed by other reasoning beings and
so by definition obligation), claiming that "this must
then also" apply to "moral law," which is not such.
Well, your suggestion is easy to defeat:
Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
now is perfectly legal for you to promise the payment
of your last $10,000 tomorrow for the delivery
today of a pound of cocaine, a drug that you will
use over the next few weeks to deaden your mind
and throw away what little is left of your future
after you have bankrupted yourself. Are you morally
(excuse me! I meant, by your own CHOICE!) and
legally obligated to pay for the delivery?
Yes, of course, you are.
But by /your/ formulation, proposed above, there would
be no obligation on your part because the behavior you
are contracting to perform is immoral. That's illogical.
> [...] I accused you of subjectivity before and all
> you did was assert it wasn't so. But when I asked
> you to demonstrate the objectivity you merely snipped
> my request and failed to answer.
If I snipped something I shouldn't have, sorry. But
I did write, quite plainly, that morality is an
objective thing. It is objectively morally wrong,
I said and I say, to do such things as bankrupt
yourself by indulging in excessive gambling or
addictive narcotics. I addressed the concern head-on
by explaining that this has nothing to do with
obligation, and recognition of this fact is not
in any way a suggestion that morality is a subjective
thing.
> [...]
> > [...M]oral obligation, I say, means obligation
> > chosen by the making of a promise.
>
> False. The mere choosing by the subjects is insufficient to
> make it an obligation! It has to be a not immoral choice
> else no not amoral obligation exists for the reasons
> articulated above.
Articulated above, by you, was only an invalid analogy
to law. Articulated above, by me, was the reason your
statement obviously is false. I cited one example of
obligating oneself to commit an immoral act. I could
cite example after example after example. Or, to save
time perhaps, I can simply ask you to cite even just a
single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
act does NOT create an obligation. Go ahead. Give it a try.
> [...] That which is chosen and expected could well be
> a *neutral* task neither right or wrong hence amoral.
And it could be an immoral act, such as squandering
your pension on dice, booze and loose women. You
still are obligated to pay up when you leave Vegas.
> [...] I know you do agree that an illegal alleged
> obligation is not a genuine legal obligation because
> you've clearly said so. So then please explain if this
> is true in the legal realm, why mutatis mutandis, it
> is untrue in the realm which the legal system ideally
> mirrors (i.e. the not amoral realm).
Well, there IS a way the analogy holds (a bit). If
we stick with "morally right" as with "legally
permitted," then it would be correct to say that
just as an illegal contract creates no legal
obligation, so, too, an immoral promise creates
no "morally right obligation."
But just as legal obligation is not synonymous
with obligation, neither is morally right obligation
synonymous with obligation. I can choose to obligate myself
in ways that are not court-enforceible. I can choose
to obligate myself in ways that are not moral. And
obligations can be imposed on me (by law, etc.) without
regard to whether the behavior demanded of me is
in itself moral or immoral behavior.
> [...] Unfortunately for me, under the ordinary meaning of
> "valid" (and I had no justification for redefining it) a
> legal valid contract could be immoral as you correctly point
> out below. Sorry.
Not a problem.
> > [...] I would ask again, what does it /mean/ to say
> > moral behavior is an obligation -- obligation to /whom/?
>
> Asked and answered several times already. The answer again
> is that upon choosing life we have contracted with our
> parents (who desire us to live) in exchange for which we
> expect temporary caretaking.
I noted this at one point, but let it pass. Do you mean
to suggest that morality does not apply to an orphan,
or, say, to the children in William Golding's Lord of
the Flies, stranded forever on an island without any
parents or other adults to whom they might be obligated?
> [...]
> > These issues are actually very simple
>
> I don't know whether to laugh or to cry. [...]
I, too, have confronted some very difficult moral
questions in my life, and so I empathize with the
life-and-death problem you faced. I do not mean
to suggest that all moral issues are easy, any
more than all of mathematics is easy. But just
as the foundations of math in the self-evident
theorems of arithmetic is elementary, so the
basic principles of morality are very, very easy
to grasp. The difficulties are illusory, I say, when
they are owed to faulty definitions, to equivocation,
and/or to religious upbringing.
> [...]
> > I did not say, or mean,
> > or imply, that a moral obligation means an
> > obligation that is morally right.
>
> [...] Said in your immediately above lingo a moral
> obligation is always morally right.
A chosen obligation is NOT always morally right. You
have the ability to make an immoral choice, and you
can always choose to promise (even to contract) an
immoral thing. And, of course, an unchosen, imposed
obligation is not always morally right, and even the
act of imposition itself is a moral wrong.
> You'll have to knock down my above arguments/logic
> if you still think otherwise.
I have done just that, unless you can say how your
arguments might stand up despite my explaining why
they are mistaken, and despite my showing how they lead
to obviously absurd conclusions (e.g., that you somehow
"are not really obligated" to pay for your immoral fling
in Vegas).
> [...] Please read my previous relevant comments.
I'll go back over them presently. If I need to amend or
retract what I've written here, I'll do so within a day.
> > [...]
> > Grounds justifying something refers to the objective
> > facts of reality. These are not authorities. These
> > are simply the facts -- the facts with which an authority
> > should be familiar.
>
> Unfortunately you are contradicting yourself. You previously
> said:
>
> ">A moral code is not a "prescibed-by-authority' (by
> > God or by law) set of behaviors."
That is me saying exactly the same thing. Morality is
a set of facts (values and principles) and NOT something
prescribed by authority.
> and more clearly you also said:
>
> "> I do not understand what you are saying here. I specified
> > the meaning of authority as "God" or "the law." "
>
> Here, you say authority need *not* be a person (when you
> speak of "the law") yet you emphatically insist elsewhere
> that authority must be a person. Which is it?
"The law" refers to laws created by people. I am not talking
about "natural law," but human law. The law, heres, refers
to laws created by legislatures and enforced by police and
courts and juries. These are people.
> I said that the underlying authority is *moral law* yet
> you object to that even tho you used the phrase "the law"
> and labeled it as authority. I see nothing earth shatteringly
> wrong with anthropomorphizing "moral law" such that it
> prescribes and is authority. No harm no foul.
Anthropomorphizing is a mistake whether it shatters the
earth or not. When I say, "the law," I'm not taking an
existing non-human thing and giving it human traits.
"The law" (human) is a mere figure of speech and not
an actual thing existing apart from humans and their
statutes and enforcement procedures. Natural laws,
laws of physics, and principles of morality, on the
other hand, are existing things mistakenly anthropo-
morphized whenever they are said to be imposing
"obligations" the way human law does.
> [...]
> > Circumstance does not "prescribe." Authorities prescribe.
>
> Oh stop. First, it's but a quibble to object to "prescribe"
> and you may use any other reasonable word or words you wish
> tho I suspect you'll not be able to easily come up with a
> single word but will likely need write a paragraph to get
> across the intended meaning.
Circumstance is. Study discovers what it is. Morality
is also discovered, and, remembered, serves to guide
actions in the face of circumstances. Short paragraph,
but I need say no more than "morality guides."
> [...A] proper definition will always be a description.
Yes. But not all descriptions define.
> > [...]
> > All we need know is why we choose to protect infants.
> > They are precious things.
>
> But don't you see the big flaw in "All we need know is
> why..."? It is completely subjective which means we might
> agree upon the most heinous and evil doings.
Such would be heinous and evil, of course. "We need to know
why..." means what I referred to in the rest of that paragraph,
namely, objective facts of reality upon which are based our
proper, moral laws protecting children.
Your repeated assertion that my identifying the human ability
to choose evil constitutes a denial of objective right and wrong
is just baseless, and, well, doesn't even make sense. Of
course people /can/ agree to do evil things, and of course the
obligations arising from these agreements /can/ be heinous and
evil. This is not a denial but an affirmation of objective
morality! This is a correct /depiction/ of the /fact/ that
"moral choice" is a choice between good and evil where choosing
evil is possible.
Look evil in the face, I say, and call it what it is. Don't
pretend that when you make a "moral" (free, un-coerced, guided
by your own mind) /choice/ to promise someone that you will
do an immoral thing that you are somehow (fingers crossed
perhaps?) not creating an evil obligation /to/ that person to
/do/ that thing. That's exactly what you're doing. Calling
it evil is not a subjective evasion of morality. Claiming
it does not happen, or claiming that it does not exist,
would be precisely such.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Charles Bell
> Careful Mark, �your lofty expectations of Charles, to
> actually consider alternatives, �may result in him branding
> you unwarrantedly demanding.
>
Yeah, well, judging by your latest batch of posts to Prescott,
"crackpot" comes to mind -- David Friedman without the intelligence.
Charles Bell
>
> Meanwhile, you'll hear nothing unless it's from your sorry
> imagination of what an "Objectivist" is, and you don't even
> have any of the nitwits over at the Church willing to hear
> your convoluted rationalizations.
>
The obvious problem with your approach in allegedly defending pre-
mortem Rand is that ARI, Peikoff and whoever you want to blame for
misrepresenting Objectivism, post-mortem, do not disagree at all with
Rand on these two issues of teleology ("goal") and moral imperative
(in self-defense) in the way I have presented them (that is: there is
such a thing as non-human animate goal-orientation and there is no
such thing as a self-defense moral imperative) -- only you do. Neither
can you point to where Rand reiterated these points in any other
context. You seem quite content to make out Rand as having
contradicted herself or having made silly statements while Peikoff, et
al., and myself do not. In that way you do not defend Rand at all. As
I said elsewhere: Rand did not literally say {silly statement A} and
{silly statement B} and therefore somebody has to interpret the
silliness out of them, but rather Rand made {statement C} and
{statement D} into which you and only you are interpreting silliness
into them.
>
> It's a sorry state of affairs all around, Charles...for you, and
> more importantly in this context, for that bastardization of
> a philosophy that's being fraudulently pawned off as
> "Objectivism."
>
In the matter of non-human animate goal-orientation, you are specific
in claiming Rand is wrong. Just how is that defending Rand from a
"bastardization" of her philosophy?
In the matter of vonvegas and FWIW David Friedman, you defend not only
non-Objectivist positions but clearly anti-Objectivist positions, how
is that defending Rand from a "bastardization" of her philsoophy?
vonvegas
James, Thank you for your prompt reply but please be advised
that I can't respond as quickly as that tho I will do my
best over the next few days. I took a cursory look at your
post and am having great difficulty following because I'm
becoming confused by the multiple meanings we have for our
words which meanings seem to unfortunately be growing.
I need some clarification and would appreciate a response
from you for this present post if you can find the time.
You wrote this:
>Or, to save
> time perhaps, I can simply ask you to cite even just a
> single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
> act does NOT create an obligation. Go ahead. Give it a try.
OK. I'll give it a whack down below. You gave this scenario:
> Well, your suggestion is easy to defeat:
>
> Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
> now is perfectly legal for you to promise the payment
> of your last $10,000 tomorrow for the delivery
> today of a pound of cocaine, a drug that you will
> use over the next few weeks to deaden your mind
> and throw away what little is left of your future
> after you have bankrupted yourself. Are you morally
> (excuse me! I meant, by your own CHOICE!) and
> legally obligated to pay for the delivery?
>
> Yes, of course, you are.
Well let's take your scenario and for the $10,000 let's
substitute something that we both agree is clearly immoral,
say the killing of an innocent third party instead.
Would you still conclude that I am morally obligated?
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
> [...]
> Well let's take your scenario and for the $10,000 let's
> substitute something that we both agree is clearly immoral,
> say the killing of an innocent third party instead.
Fine, but why substitute that with a statement that we both
agree it's "clearly" immoral?
By so doing and giving /that/ as your "reason," you
appear to be only lending further substance to my
contention that the notion of morality being somehow
"social in nature" (like obligation) is at the root of the
difficulties you are having.
Why not, instead, substitute anything else at all that
does NOT involve any harm to any other person but
oneself? Could it be, just possibly, that you have a
difficult time separating morality from the idea that
/others/ are what is really morally important?
> Would you still conclude that I am morally obligated?
Obligated to whom? To the person whose money you
took when you promised that you would commit murder?
Of course! That is what being morally obligated means!
I would say the obligation is similarly evil, like sending
yourself to prison or digging your own grave. But of
course it WOULD obviously constitute a chosen
obligation, and even though it is not a legal obligation
-- and, indeed, you would be legally obligated NOT
to do such a criminal act -- the criminal scum to whom
you made that promise would say with absolutely perfect
correctness that you have entered into a merely moral
obligation /to him/ (you have promised of your own free
will to do for him something he cannot legally require of
you; therefore it is /merely/ a moral obligation and not
an enforceable obligation). Nothing but your reputation
with him, nothing but your "word of honor" (heh-heh!) is
at stake in this or any such purely moral (not legal)
transaction. You won't go to prison if you go back on
your word and prove yourself a liar. You /will/ go to prison,
perhaps be executed deservedly so, if you stick to your
word, fulfill the moral obligation you have chosen to assume,
and thereby earn the admiration of all the world's criminal
scum for your immoral behavior.
That's not far-fetched, by the way. There are gangsters
in prison today (and not yet in prison) who boast with
great self-satisfied moral pride of how they never welched
on a debt, never ratted out a friend, and never failed to follow
through on a beating or a killing they had promised to
perform. These were all moral obligations, and the pride
these gangsters have in never, ever betraying a moral
obligation was, and is. sick, sick, sick.
But don't you see? That kind of thinking is rooted
precisely in the same idea as yours, the idea that
"how you treat others" (don't lie, don't rat, don't ever
fail to kill when the boss or your buddies expect it of
you) is the only really "essential" part of what it means
to be "moral."
That whole approach is backwards. Morality is not about
fulfilling obligations to others. Morality is about living
your /own/ life in accordance with principles that effect
your own happiness. All else is secondary. It is morally
wrong to commit murder even if Tony Soprano expects
you to do it.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
> On Feb 10, 10:18 am, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
Well, James. The refutation of your present position is down
at the bottom but it's best to read this ad seriatim.
Vonvegas before:
>> Well let's take your scenario and for the $10,000 let's
>> substitute something that we both agree is clearly immoral,
>> say the killing of an innocent third party instead.
>
James:
> Fine, but why substitute that with a statement that we both
> agree it's "clearly" immoral?
First, and most obviously, to meet your challenge which
you'll recall was:
">to cite even just a
> single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
> act does NOT create an obligation"
Secondly, to thereby demonstrate the wrongness of your position.
Now let's put back up your initial scenario for we'll need
to refer to it:
"> Well, your suggestion is easy to defeat:
>
> Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
> now is perfectly legal for you to promise the payment
> of your last $10,000 tomorrow for the delivery
> today of a pound of cocaine, a drug that you will
> use over the next few weeks to deaden your mind
> and throw away what little is left of your future
> after you have bankrupted yourself. Are you morally
> (excuse me! I meant, by your own CHOICE!) and
> legally obligated to pay for the delivery?
>
> Yes, of course, you are. "
But before going further, for clarity's sake I'm going to
modify the scenario to take *me* out of it and substitute
scenario Sam instead. The reason for that is because it can
often become very confusing (especially when pronouns such
as "I" and "you" are being extensively used). Gordon and I
spent several months misunderstanding each other precisely
because of this ambiguity as to whom we were referring (we
had both of us and others in a scenario thus there was
scenario Gordon and the real deal Gordon and scenario
Vonvegas and the real deal Vonvegas etc.) This should cause
you no heartburn and I ask you to play along.
>
> By so doing and giving /that/ as your "reason,"
By "reason" I take it you mean the reason that I chose the
killing of an innocent, as a substitute provision for the
$10,000, right?
> you
> appear to be only lending further substance to my
> contention that the notion of morality being somehow
> "social in nature" (like obligation) is at the root of the
> difficulties you are having.
Please spare me. The difficulties I'm having are in
understanding *you* and not necessarily difficulties with
understanding morality. And the reason I'm having
difficulties understanding is because of your
inconsistencies and peculiar language use, in particular at
present, the word "choose" and its variants which somehow
you apparently equate with "moral", but they are hardly the
same thing by either definition of "moral. But I'll try and
puzzle out "choose" later tho it'd be nice if you *clearly*
defined it and articulate exactly how it relates/differs
from "moral" and also "imposed"..
>
> Why not, instead, substitute anything else at all that
> does NOT involve any harm to any other person but
> oneself? Could it be, just possibly, that you have a
> difficult time separating morality from the idea that
> /others/ are what is really morally important?
I have no idea what you are speculating about in the above
paragraph, but I don't think it particularly relevant. If
I'm missing something crucial, please let me know. You ask
why I substitute (the killing of an innocent for the $10,000
in the scenario) and the answer is because it makes the
point I wanted to make of course.
>
>> Would you still conclude that I [scenario Sam] am
morally obligated?
>
> Obligated to whom?
What a peculiar question and it demonstrates we are not
communicating. Look, if you had read carefully my previous
words you'd note that I modified your initial scenario by
*substituting* the killing of an innocent (i.e. murder) for
the $10,000. That means that all other provisions of your
initial scenario remain unchanged. And that in turn means
that the answer to your above question ("Obligated to
whom?") is obviously:
to whomever the initial scenario had Sam obligated.
And since in your initial scenario you had Sam obligated to
pay $10,000 to a coke dealer, my change of scenario
provision now has Sam still obligated to the coke dealer but
not for $10,000 but rather to commit murder.
>To the person whose money you
> took when you promised that you would commit murder?
Sam took no one's money. You seem to not understand your own
scenario and your repeated inconsistencies (see below for
more illustrations) make it nearly impossible to follow your
train of thot. Sam *paid* not *took* money in the initial
scenario. In my changed version Sam now has agreed to commit
murder instead of paying $10,000.
>
> Of course! That is what being morally obligated means!
>
> I would say the obligation is similarly evil, like sending
> yourself to prison or digging your own grave. But of
> course it WOULD obviously constitute a chosen
> obligation, and even though it is not a legal obligation
STOP. STOP. STOP.
In your initial scenario you had everything *legal* and yet
now you contradict it by calling it "not a legal
obligation". Here are your initial words:
"Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
> now is perfectly legal for you to promise the payment
> of your last $10,000 tomorrow for the delivery
> today of a pound of cocaine,"
Note that per your scenario the purchase of coke is
*perfectly legal*.
> -- and, indeed, you would be legally obligated NOT
> to do such a criminal act --
False of course because per scenario the transaction is
legal. But our differences have never been in the legal
realm but instead within the moral realm so that's where we
should focus.
>the criminal scum to whom
> you made that promise would say with absolutely perfect
> correctness that you have entered into a merely moral
No, not *merely* moral but also legal and that's because you
initially had the transaction as fully legal.
> obligation /to him/ (you have promised of your own free
> will to do for him something he cannot legally require of
> you;
Again, per scenario it was fully legal instead.
>therefore it is /merely/ a moral obligation and not
> an enforceable obligation).
Enforcement capacity really isn't relevant but *illegality*
is. If the transaction were per law illegal then
irrespective of whether or not the government was capable of
enforcing or not, the agreement would be declared an illegal
contract hence no legal obligation would incur. But the
exact role of enforcement in law is really a side issue.
>Nothing but your reputation
> with him, nothing but your "word of honor" (heh-heh!) is
> at stake in this or any such purely moral (not legal)
> transaction.
You call it moral by which you mean not amoral.
>You won't go to prison if you go back on
> your word and prove yourself a liar.
That depends upon what the law says. You have the provisions
of your scenario so screwed up that one has difficulty
following it. But if per initial scenario it was a legal
contract then Sam being a liar hence not fulfilling his
contract will suffer whatever punishment the law dictates
(I'm assuming that the law has all necessary enforcement
capability).
OTOH, if as you now seem to be suggesting it was an illegal
contract then indeed Sam will not be punished.
I'm gonna get to the beef and snip the rest. Here's the
situation:
Yes you are right that in my previous post I used analogy
from the legal realm to the moral realm to try to get you to
understand. This time I'll leave that argument aside, tho I
think it quite correct and persuasive.
I don't think you really have looked at the implications of
everything you're saying. You are saying that scenario Sam
has a moral (meaning not amoral) *obligation* to kill an
innocent, while at the same time you agree that objective
moral law says he *should* not kill in this circumstance.
Furthermore you say that an obligation requires a reasoning
being, meaning one that reasons properly not wrongly, and
since objective moral law prescribes that killing of
innocents should not be done in this circumstance, then a
properly reasoning being will never incur such an obligation
in the first place.
What that means is that if you happen to come upon a thug
who indeed has made an agreement as per scenario (i.e.
promises to commit murder in exchange for coke) then that is
proof that he is not competent or not fully a proper
reasoning being and a non reasoning being, by your very own
definition cannot incur an obligation.
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > [...W]hy substitute [murder] with a statement that
> > we both agree it's "clearly" immoral?
>
> First, and most obviously, to meet your challenge which
> you'll recall was:
> "> to cite even just a
> > single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
> > act does NOT create an obligation"
An agreement to kill an innocent third party is not a
legal contract, so this has very little to do with that
particular challenge.
You are avoiding the point of the question. You are
substituting murder for the legal transaction in the
original scenario because making that switch allows
you to bring in an offense against the rights of an
innocent /other/.
> [...L]et's put back up your initial scenario for
> we'll need to refer to it:
Good idea. I'll even make it Sam (and dealer Tony)
for you:
Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
now is perfectly legal for Sam to promise the payment
of his last $10,000 tomorrow for Tony delivering
today a pound of cocaine, a drug that Sam will
use over the next few weeks to deaden his mind
and throw away what little is left of his future
after he has bankrupted himself. Is he morally
(excuse me! I meant, by his own CHOICE!) and
legally obligated to pay for the delivery?
> > By so doing and giving /that/ as your "reason,"
>
> By "reason" I take it you mean the reason that I chose the
> killing of an innocent, as a substitute provision for the
> $10,000, right?
Right. The advance payment in cocaine was legal in the
original, to be repaid tomorrow with cash, also legal.
You want to make this, instead, a contract killing:
a pound of cocaine up front; for a murder tomorrow.
That's fine. I went along with you.
> [...]
> Please spare me. The difficulties I'm having are in
> understanding *you* [...].
Baloney. See below...
> You ask why I substitute (the killing of an innocent
> for the $10,000 in the scenario) and the answer is
> because it makes the point I wanted to make of course.
But the question was /why/, WHAT POINT?
You've not answered yet.
> [...] Sam *paid* not *took* money in the initial
> scenario. In my changed version Sam now has agreed
> to commit murder instead of paying $10,000.
No, Sam didn't pay. Sam /received/ cocaine worth $10,000
in exchange for a /promise to pay/, a /promise/ that left
him /obligated/ to pay.
You asked me a simple question. You asked if Sam would
/still/ be obligated (to Tony) if he promised to commit
a murder instead of paying $10,000.
Don't complain that you find this impossible to follow.
That's nonsense. That reminds me of Charles. Blaming
me for confusions, when I actually write very plainly and
very simply, is what I like to call the "jelly mode" of
argumentation. It's how punch-drunk boxers behave just
before the ref calls the fight. For example...
> STOP. STOP. STOP.
>
> In your initial scenario you had everything *legal*
> and yet now you contradict it by calling it "not a
> legal obligation".
Everything was legal until you substituted murder.
And even that is beside the point...
> [...T]he exact role of enforcement in law is really
> a side issue.
Of course it is, but that's what you choose to address
in your response. This is pure jelly here...
> [...If per initial scenario it was a legal
> contract then Sam being a liar hence not fulfilling his
> contract will suffer whatever punishment the law dictates
> (I'm assuming that the law has all necessary enforcement
> capability).
> OTOH, if as you now seem to be suggesting it was an illegal
> contract then indeed Sam will not be punished.
>
> I'm gonna get to the beef and snip the rest. [...]
Snip the rest?
In other words, first, you substitute the killing of
a third person (changing what had been simple morality
into some alleged social obligation and illegality); then,
you complain and try to blame me when I say this makes
it not a legal contract while I STILL focus on the moral
obligation that you asked me about; then, you say the
legality is not really relevant (which, of course, it
isn't); but then, you return to commenting only on the
irrelevant legal problem that you yourself introduced,
even going so far as to discard and leave unaddressed
my explanation of the moral issue!
Ah, well. I, your gracious servant, will just take what
you give me, and explain it all once again...
> [...] You are saying that scenario Sam has a moral
> (meaning not amoral) *obligation* to kill an
> innocent
Yes indeed: A moral (meaning /chosen/, not imposed)
obligation /to Tony/, to the one who accepted Sam's
promise to kill. Sam promised Tony he would do murder
in exchange for cocaine, and he was given the cocaine.
That left the obligation to Tony. This is simple and
obvious.
You shouldn't, now, introduce a different fuzzy
notion of some "unchosen obligation" (of Sam's, to
whom? blank out) to always "comply with objective
moral law." Don't you see? The whole point of this
discussion is that there is no such animal as that
religious notion of an "unchosen moral obligation"
(no such thing as a /duty/).
If you DO persist in committing such error, then I
certainly won't grant you the option of blaming ME for
the confusion that this notion of /yours/ is obviously
causing to YOU.
> [...], while at the same time you agree that
> objective moral law says he *should* not kill
> in this circumstance.
Right, but nothing much has changed. In the original
scenario, remember, I already said Sam was behaving
/immorally/, which means that objective moral law "says"
(teaches) that a person *should* NOT give his last
$10,000 to a cocaine dealer, even a legal one.
The only difference (a minor one; a side issue by
your own account) is that in the original Tony could
take Sam to court if Sam didn't pay up; in your
contract-killing scenario Sam's obligation to Tony
would be /merely/ moral (murder being illegal), with
no law to back it up. So all you've done, it seems,
is manage to confuse yourself while blaming me for
the confusion. That just won't wash.
> Furthermore you say that an obligation requires a
> reasoning being, meaning one that reasons properly
> not wrongly [...],
That's not what I said at all!
I said in every moral choice there is the possibility
of choosing evil, of reasoning wrongly, of entering
into == where the choice is to make a promise == a
"by-choice obligation" that is evil, that is morally
improper, that is objectively morally /wrong/.
> [...] and since objective moral law prescribes
> that killing of innocents should not be done in
> this circumstance, then a properly reasoning being
> will never incur such an obligation in the first
> place.
It is right to say a properly reasoning being will
not promise to commit such an immoral act in exchange
for something. It is wrong, however, to suggest that
a reasoning being is incapable of doing so, incapable
of reasoning improperly. I would never say something
so silly, and I didn't.
(And I wouldn't say objective moral law "prescribes";
this MIGHT be a needless quibble, sure; I apologize;
but on the other hand, the fuzzy idea that moral law
constitutes unchosen moral obligations has a variety
of symptoms and causes, among them the ill-defined
use of related words and concepts.)
> What that means is that if you happen to come upon
> a thug who indeed has made an agreement as per scenario
> (i.e. promises to commit murder in exchange for coke)
> then that is proof that he is not competent or not fully
> a proper reasoning being and a non reasoning being,
> by your very own definition cannot incur an obligation.
Try that reasoning on for size here: Sam has squandered
his pension, destroyed his reputation, and ruined his
marriage on the tables and drinks and loose women of
Vegas. Checking out of the hotel he returns the bill
unpaid, explaining that his utterly disgraceful behavior
"is proof that he is not competent or not fully a proper
reasoning being and [therefore] cannot incur an obligation!"
That is silly, of course. I have never suggested that a
reasoning being never incurs an immoral obligation or
never incurs an immoral chosen obligation through an
immoral promise. In fact, I have said the exact opposite.
The nature of a reasoning being is such that morality is
needed and that evil, immorality, is possible always.
A mentally incompetent or legally insane person cannot
incur an obligation, of course. But that's not what we're
talking about here. Contract killing happens quite a lot,
unfortunately, and it involves perfectly competent criminals.
That's why they go to prisons instead of hospitals.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
It figures that it would be you to do the nearly impossible,
which is show the LOGICAL inconsistency. And what this
means, is to show how the conceptualization of <obligation>
is NOT being done in a consistent manner. ALL epistemic
errors reduce finally to some manner of contradiction. I can
yap about the manifest contradiction of "Law ensues from
morality, as morality ensues from Law," but that's just the
contradictory conclusion. Intricate as it may be, what you
have done here is pointed out the source of the contradictory
conclusion, the error of capturing two referent sets of a single
concept--<obligation>--in such a manner that they do not
and cannot (which mean the same thing in this context,
of course) jibe with reality.
For clarity, I set off your conclusion from above:
------------------------------
> And now transfer this understanding of the IMO
> correct legal structure/logic over into the not amoral
> realm. Then you will understand that for a not amoral
> obligation to ever arise it is required that the terms of
> agreement are themselves not immoral, else there cannot ever
> be such an animal as a not amoral obligation in the first
> place. Simply put, just as the legal system forbids us to
> form, despite our agreement upon illegalities, a valid
> contract, from which a legal obligation will arise, so
> similarly objective moral law, despite our agreement,
> forbids the arising of a not amoral obligation if the terms
> of agreement are themselves immoral.
------------------------------
It may not be so simple, but it's simple enough. It's a clear
demonstration of the inconsistency of the application of
the concept <obligation>, in a manner which allows the
conclusions to be snuck in.
I've done my homework and now have plenty of cites of
plain and obvious contradictions from your interlocuter.
But these, once again, are just demonstrations of illogical
conclusions and if the source of these contradictions is
snuck in by way of definition, then they can all be
justified (if that's the word) by means of the original
misconceptions. That's what's so nagging about all
philosophical "arguments" that come to such ridiculous
conclusions.
My tack has been, and continues to be, that there is a
gross misidentification of the nature of obligation, in
view of the fact that properly taken, an obligation can
only arise from the willful intention of a single individual.
OTOH, any person can conceptualize any way he wishes,
using whatever terms he chooses to denote that which
he is conceptualizing. Except for opining, "Well, that's
a shit way to use that concept," my approach doesn't
in itself prove a misidentification. The only way to do
that, technically speaking, is to demonstrate an
inconsistent treatment of the chosen concept in the
mind of the person so choosing. I can say, "You have
misidentified the nature of obligation," but it's somewhat
more to say, "What you have conceptualized is
inconsistent on its own merits, regardless of what you
believe you have identified." They both go to the same
point--a misidentification--but they are two hugely
different ways of showing it.
You have managed to pinpoint the actual misconceptions
themselves and shown, which means prove, that they're
misconceptions. That's an awfully tough thing to do, and
you should know that very, very few people are up to that
particular challenge. It's a rare ability indeed and that
you're able to express it at all--regardless of the complexity
or intricacy it requires--is a remarkable feat IMO. Nice job.
> This has been my criticism of your position from the git go
> when I charged that you had so simplified the matter, by
> leaving out the central ethical question (Are the terms of
> agreement not immoral?), that your explanation has become
> simplistic.
Now there, we have a little disagreement!
jk
Charles Bell
> On Feb 9, 6:53 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
> ------------------------------> And now transfer this understanding of the IMO
> > correct legal structure/logic over into the not amoral
> > realm. Then you will understand that for a not amoral
> > obligation to ever arise it is required that the terms of
> > agreement are themselves not immoral, else there cannot ever
> > be such an animal as a not amoral obligation in the first
> > place. Simply put, just as the legal system forbids us to
> > form, despite our agreement upon illegalities, a valid
> > contract, from which a legal obligation will arise, so
> > similarly objective moral law, despite our agreement,
> > forbids the arising of a not amoral obligation if the terms
> > of agreement are themselves immoral.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> It may not be so simple, but it's simple enough. �
Simple load of crap. It *is* possible to form an obligation between
two persons the terms of which are completely immoral/amoral
irrespective of law. Only when one party wishes to withdraw from the
obligation between them does there arise the matter of the morality of
the agreement (of what is to be done -- i.e., murder, rape, steal) in
that one party can argue moral repugnance while the other will
disagree. It is then no rapprochement through moral values held in
common can be made. It is then only law has relevance. For example,
two parties could agree to buy/sell a house under restrictive covenant
that the buyer could never later sell to a person of a certain race.
Both parties made obligations and kept them until such time as the
buyer has a moral awakening or, more likely, claims to have a moral
awakening about the obligation of a restricted covenant in a desire to
sell the house to a person of the restricted race. The law may or may
not intervene depending on the standard of social conduct the
government wishes to uphold: that is, uphold all contracts as they are
made or uphold only certain contracts as they a made according to
specified criteria -- in this case should race ever be at issue in any
contract or not. This obviously would apply to upholding contracts of
a more morally repugnant nature like murder, rape or steal.
In other words, an obligation is an obligation regardless of the law
or what *any* third party has to say. However, in a social context of
government and law, law determines the extent to which a third-party
(agents of government) can use force to uphold an obligation.
> My tack has been, and continues to be, that there is a
> gross misidentification of the nature of obligation, in
> view of the fact that properly taken, an obligation can
> only arise from the willful intention of a single individual.
Period. Finito. End of story.
James E. Prescott
> On Feb 9, 6:53 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
> > [...J]ust as the legal system forbids us to
> > form, despite our agreement upon illegalities,
> > a valid contract, from which a legal obligation
> > will arise, so similarly objective moral law,
> > despite our agreement, forbids the arising of a
> > not amoral obligation if the terms of agreement
> > are themselves immoral.
> It figures that it would be you to do the nearly
> impossible, which is show the LOGICAL inconsistency.
> [...]
Good to hear from you again, Jim.
Responding to vonvegas, I have explained in my previous
post why the logical inconsistency here is not mine.
Consistent with definitions I presented, legal obligation
is truly such (is "obligation") because there you have
the expectations, reliance and demands of the human
beings who create and who enforce the law -- those who
punish any who violate the law. Thus, von, you and myself
will all agree that you cannot have an illegal legal
obligation. Such would mean that the law requires you
to do what the law forbids you to do -- a contradiction.
Vonvegas was saying, in essence, that by the exact same
token you also cannot have an immoral moral obligation.
Such would mean that morality requires you to do what
morality forbids you to do -- a contradiction. "Very
nicely put!" was my reaction to his first making this
argument, several posts ago.
So why does it fail?
Well, if you've followed the thread or any of my other
postings on this same subject (as far back as you care
to look), you'll find me taking great pains to explain
that the phrase "moral obligation" actually means an
obligation /chosen/ (and so to be evaluated as EITHER
a good OR an evil choice) in the act of making (to
someone) a /promise/ of future behavior in return for
a present value or for a reciprocal promise.
Indeed, for the sake of clarity, I even agreed to stop
saying moral obligation (for the time being) in order
that I would not be misunderstood by anyone as suggesting
an "obligation consistent with morality."
So I agreed to say "chosen obligation" instead.
(That was with the understanding, of course, that I
was not surrendering forever the valid use of the word
"moral" to mean /related/ to long-range purpose-aimed
behavior that /may/ be EVALUATED as EITHER good OR evil,
as in the phrase "moral choice.")
So then, the nicely-put vonvegas argument becomes:
Just as you cannot have an illegal legal
obligation, so, too, you cannot have an
immoral chosen obligation.
That's silly, of course, but only shows that the
argument is utterly specious and points out no
inconsistency whatsoever on MY part. The really
important point, however, is that there is indeed
a logical inconsistency happening here, only not
by me.
You and vonvegas (presumably) would at first agree
with me that morality is not a thing legislated and
"passed down" either by some Supreme Law Giver or
by the legislatures of the various States. Morality
is simply a code of discovered values and principles
adhered to for one's own sake (or ignored at one's
own peril) without regard to anything "prescribed
by" or "owed to" other human beings.
And yet in making the argument for some sort of a
(self-contradictory) "moral /obligation/ to behave
morally" you are treating morality precisely AS IF
it were laws passed by a legislature, with "obedience"
being a thing that is automatically "owed" (unchosen
"obligation"; DUTY; owed to whom? blank out).
That you'll find, also, in my reply to vonvegas,
which I commend to your attention, as I await
vonvegas' retort, if any.
As for your own argument (giving credit as you do to
vonvegas for the argument, above), you claim to know
I am mistaken based on a pre-known "fact" (a fact
according-to-Jim, one might say). And you put it
thus...
> My tack has been, and continues to be, that there is a
> gross misidentification of the nature of obligation, in
> view of the fact that properly taken, an obligation can
> only arise from the willful intention of a single
> individual. [...]
This mere re-assertion of a purported "fact" is a far
less interesting kind of argument, and it can be
disposed of, quite easily, by simply illustrating how
the purported "fact" makes no sense.
For simplicity sake, let's set aside literal laws, some
of which I would say are consistent with one's moral
choice to abide by the Rule of Law, and some of which
you and I both would say are merely imposed by "thugs
in a legislature," or by a dictator. Instead, let's
consider, separately, just two single individuals.
The first is a "thug" (me), and the second is a "moral
man" (you).
I may, as a single individual, want money. I might
even think that the money in your wallet should be
in my wallet. My own /single/ "willful intention" is
to thump you mercilessly unless you hand it over.
BUT -- and here is the key point! -- I do NOT ever
/communicate/ this intention to you in any way, shape
or form! It is an intention residing /purely/ within
my own /single/ mind.
Obviously, by any logically consistent definition of
the word "obligation," that single willful intention
of /mine/ does not give rise to any obligation of
you to do or not do anything. In order for ME
to be said to have /obligated/ YOU, I MUST in /some/
way, shape or form communicate TO you my intention
to thump unless you hand over.
So much for the thug.
Now let's consider the "moral man."
You, in your own mind, as your own /single/ willful
/intention/, decided when you got up this morning that
you would give me all the money in your wallet if you
ever ran into me on the street. BUT -- and here is the
key point! -- you did not ever /communicate/ this
intention of yours to me in any way, shape or form.
You never promised me any money; you never purchased
anything from me on credit; you never did anything at
all except wake up this morning and decide to give me
some money.
Later, you head downtown to buy yourself a brand
new Toyota with cash, and there I am, minding my
own business. Are you obligated to put off your
purchase and give me your money? Saying so logically
implies something wrong, some violation (perhaps
worthy of a thumping by me of you), with you just
changing your mind and deciding to buy the car.
Obviously, by any logically consistent definition of
the word "obligation," that single willful intention
of /yours/ did not give rise to any obligation of
you to do or not do anything. In order for YOU to be
said to have /obligated/ YOURSELF, you MUST in /some/
way, shape or form communicate TO me your intention
to give me money in the form of a /promise/ -- a
promise that I can expect you to fulfill, rely upon
you fulfilling, and demand that you fulfill.
So much for the moral man.
Thus, in NO case is it true that "obligation arises
only from the willful intention of just a single
individual." In EVERY case (whether for a thug
imposing or for a moral man assuming), obligation
is a meaningful, logically consistent concept when
it subsumes only future behaviors of at least one
reasoning being that are expected, relied upon and
demanded by at least one /other/ reasoning being,
and /both/ sides need to understand (or at least
be capable of understanding) that an obligation
exists; otherwise, it doesn't.
For you, now, to gainsay this argument of mine,
you would have to come up with another, better
and logically consistent definition of the word
"obligation" -- one that is at least minimally
consistent with the way the word is applied in
common usage.
I've asked for this before. And I'm sorry, but,
"An obligation is anything at all that any single
individual decides he intends to do" (Jim K.)
just doesn't fit the bill. That's worse than not
minimally consistent -- it's absurd.
And, "An obligation is any promised or expected
behavior that also happens to be morally proper"
(vonvegas) is a somewhat better attempt but also
fails miserably. It implies that unless it was
morally proper for you to drive off in a brand
new Toyota instead of putting food on your family's
table, then somehow you aren't obligated to pay
for it!
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> > It may not be so simple, but it's simple enough.
>
> Simple load of crap. It *is* possible to form an obligation between
> two persons the terms of which are completely immoral/amoral
> irrespective of law.
I'm sorry you couldn't follow, Charles. My argument, as well
as yours, has been the Prescott has grossly misidentified the
referent of "obligation." It's a valid argument and serves well
to demonstrate that he is defining his way into the matter.
Von's argument, at least the one I cited, was rather more in-
depth than that. Rather than just showing a misidentification
on Prescott's part, he also showed that he's not EVEN
defining his way into the matter, as HIS OWN redefinition
doesn't stand up under logical scrutiny.
I may be reading more into it than von intended--IOW I may
be doing what you've been doing for a while now--but I'm
strongly inclined to think not. And even if he didn't mean
what I believe he meant, he did it anyway!
jk
Charles Bell
> I'm sorry you couldn't follow, Charles. �My argument, as well
> as yours, has been the Prescott has grossly misidentified the
> referent of "obligation." �It's a valid argument and serves well
> to demonstrate that he is defining his way into the matter.
And my point is, in spite of some pertinent objections raised in the
beginning, that vonvegas' argument is far worse. Did you catch the
'fetus has a contract with its parents' statement?
>
> Von's argument, at least the one I cited, was rather more in-
> depth than that. �Rather than just showing a misidentification
> on Prescott's part, he also showed that he's not EVEN
> defining his way into the matter, as HIS OWN redefinition
> doesn't stand up under logical scrutiny.
And as I recall you objected to my pointing out his bullshit a long
time ago.
vonvegas
> On Feb 9, 6:53 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net>
(snip some very nice comments)
Thank you, Jim. Coming from someone like you with such a
keen intellect I'm deeply appreciative that you took the
time to comment.
Yes, I agree that the conceptualization of "obligation" is
being done by James, in an inconsistent manner. The logic of
"obligation" in the legal realm is not the same as in the
moral realm and the analysis makes that evident.
Well, for my latest response to James I got a few more i's
snd t's to dot/cross and then I can throw it out;
or should I say, "throw it up" instead? :-)
Vonvegas
vonvegas
> On Feb 10, 7:35 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
>> > [...W]hy substitute [murder] with a statement that
>> > we both agree it's "clearly" immoral?
>>
>> First, and most obviously, to meet your challenge which
>> you'll recall was:
>> "> to cite even just a
>> > single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
>> > act does NOT create an obligation"
>
> An agreement to kill an innocent third party is not a
> legal contract, so this has very little to do with that
> particular challenge.
James, please pay attention. In *your* initial scenario you
said this:
">Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
> now is perfectly legal..."
That makes it perfectly clear that contrary to our present
societal laws, your scenario laws made the buying of coke
*legal*. Get it, *legal*? The *only* provision of your
scenario I changed, to meet your challenge, was to
*substitute* for Sam's initial agreed upon task (the paying
of $10,000 for the coke) the task of killing an innocent
instead. That means James, that the killing of an innocent,
*in that scenario society* is legal. Get it *legal*? Just
like slavery was legal not so long ago.
Yet you wrongly object that it was supposedly an *illegal*
contract. Get it, *illegal*? And that is obviously incorrect
and I'm a little surprised that you'd even make such a
mistake again.
>
> You are avoiding the point of the question.
I'm not deliberately avoiding anything. If you think I've
not answered where I should, then point it out, please.
>You are
> substituting murder
Yeah, tho technically I substituted "the killing of an
innocent" and not necessarily murder, depending upon how
precisely one defines those words. I only mention this to
avoid a possible future irrelevant dispute.
>for the legal transaction in the
> original scenario because making that switch allows
> you to bring in an offense against the rights of an
> innocent /other/.
I brought it in to show the absurdity of your position. And
before I go on let me first clarify something about which
some of us are perhaps confused. The relation of the not
amoral to the not immoral is one of genus and specie. That
is to say, not amoral means that the act/task is either
right (not immoral) or wrong (immoral) but we don't know or
care which. When we do know and care about the ethical
value of a task (e.g. not immoral) then that task is known
to be of the specie right (not immoral) which belongs to the
genus not amoral. So the important thing to remember is that
a not immoral task is also a not amoral task tho I'll not
bother to make that clear each time.
Per your scenario (as modified by me) James, you are stuck
with the conclusion that scenario Sam has what you label a
not amoral obligation to commit what you and I would
actually call murder hence a not immoral/not amoral
obligation. If that doesn't alert you that there may
possibly be a problem in your logic then what will?
I conjecture that the reason you found your position
plausible is precisely because the scenarios you were mostly
contemplating were such that scenario Sam would have but a
relatively benign task to perform (such as paying 10k for
the coke) which you as a *moral* not legal matter find
relatively undisturbing. But when Sam has a so called
obligation to commit what you and I agree is murder, it
rightly shocks our sensibilities as it should. And it should
begin to dawn upon us that perhaps an alleged obligation to
commit a thoroughly despicable immoral crime like murder
doesn't make as much sense as we perhaps initially thot.
Did an ancient Aztec have a not amoral obligation to cut out
a beating heart from some poor victim, or does one man have
an obligation to enslave another, or kill a gypsy or a jew
merely cause it's legal and because he has legally
contracted with someone to do so?
If you still answer, yes, then you are free to call this
*imagined* obligation a not amoral obligation if you insist,
but you could also just call it what it actually is, not an
obligation at all, but rather contrarily, an act that he is
not immorally obligated to *refrain* from performing instead.
And why is he is not immorally obligated to refrain from
performing this heinous act even tho he has perhaps legally
contracted to do so? Hasn't he contracted with his fellow
society members to abide by their laws? No, not if their
laws are immoral! And that is because he has a higher
precedent duty/obligation which arose when he chose to live,
and that chosen duty is to abide by objective moral law.
Yes, yes, I know you are anxious to know to whom/what we
have such an obligation and we'll get to it soon.
Sure I did, when I said "to meet your challenge" which
you'll recall was:
"">to cite even just a
> single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
> act does NOT create an obligation" "
I've clearly done just that *if* you agree with me that an
obligation is something we *should* do. But I'm beginning to
suspect that we have a possible major problem here and that
you don't, probably unconsciously, really think that an
obligation is a something that carries with it the idea that
it *should* be done. I say that firstly because it is
certainly overtly absent from your definition but perhaps it
is somehow implicit. Secondly, I say it (i.e. that perhaps
you think there is no should in obligation) because of the
way you have bristled at my use of "prescription" when I
speak of moral law. I'm beginning to realize that perhaps
your objection is much more than mere anthropomorphizing of
"prescription" but additionally that that word carries with
it the idea of "should" and that is what, perhaps
unconsciously, is bothering you. Am I right? I think this is
important so please consider carefully.
For me, it is the introduction of moral law into the
definition of obligation that automatically brings into it
the idea of should. That is to say, since I choose life, and
factually the only means to that end is following the
dictates of moral law, hence precisely because I've chosen
life I *should* behave as prescribed by moral law. I think
for you, an obligation possibly is not a *should* but rather
you are wrongly treating it more like a fact, which in this
case, just expresses the fact that one has what you call an
obligation, but that the existence of such doesn't mean that
it *should* be discharged. Please comment.
Furthermore, to return to your question, as explained
above, I wanted to get it to dawn upon you that perhaps
there was something wrong somewhere and if the task was
sufficiently heinous like murder, then perhaps you'd begin
to suspect error somewhere.
>
>> [...] Sam *paid* not *took* money in the initial
>> scenario. In my changed version Sam now has agreed
>> to commit murder instead of paying $10,000.
>
> No, Sam didn't pay. Sam /received/ cocaine worth $10,000
> in exchange for a /promise to pay/, a /promise/ that left
> him /obligated/ to pay.
You are right it was an inattentive slip in tense.
But frankly James, this is the kind of seeing the mote in
another's eye while the beam goes unattended, that I would
expect from someone like Charles, for example. Tho you are
perfectly correct that I used the wrong tense, and it is
good that you call it to my attention, I'm confident you
fully know, but nevertheless did not acknowledge, that it
makes no difference at all to the much more important point
that you had misstated the provisions of your own scenario.
Furthermore, pointing out your misstatements wasn't a mere
gotcha but was to make the broader point that the various
misstatements were causing me great trouble in following you.
>
> You asked me a simple question. You asked if Sam would
> /still/ be obligated (to Tony) if he promised to commit
> a murder instead of paying $10,000.
>
> Don't complain that you find this impossible to follow.
You are misstating again. Tho I hasten to add I did say
"nearly impossible" instead. And I'll even grant that that
was perhaps a slightly exaggerated description but it was
sufficiently difficult so that at some point I essentially
gave up.
> That's nonsense.
But I didn't say it.
> That reminds me of Charles. Blaming
> me for confusions, when I actually write very plainly and
> very simply, is what I like to call the "jelly mode" of
> argumentation. It's how punch-drunk boxers behave just
> before the ref calls the fight. For example...
I'm a fight fan but I confess I don't get what "jelly mode"
means here. Exactly how do punch drunk boxers behave before
the ref calls it?
As for Charles, he loves to argue for the sake of arguing
rather than for the purpose of discovering truths and lacks
the integrity to admit his errors even on the slightest of
matters. That's why I've increasingly come to ignore him.
Did you know that Charles' presence here is a very large
reason that Agent Cooper no longer posts here? And that's a
terrible loss for us all for he's got a lot to teach us.
Well, I'd better stop because I'm violating my principle not
to speak critically of someone when they are not present.
Tho the thing with Charles is, he's so obnoxious that I
really don't care much.
>
>> STOP. STOP. STOP.
>>
>> In your initial scenario you had everything *legal*
>> and yet now you contradict it by calling it "not a
>> legal obligation".
>
> Everything was legal until you substituted murder.
And it still was legal when I substituted the killing of
innocents. it;s just that you failed and apparently still do
not properly remember your own scenario. Please see above
where I quote your words directly.
>
> And even that is beside the point...
Which point is that?
>
>> [...T]he exact role of enforcement in law is really
>> a side issue.
>
> Of course it is, but that's what you choose to address
> in your response. This is pure jelly here...
I still don't know what jelly is. And yes I indeed chose to
comment on it.
>
>> [...If per initial scenario it was a legal
>> contract then Sam being a liar hence not fulfilling his
>> contract will suffer whatever punishment the law dictates
>> (I'm assuming that the law has all necessary enforcement
>> capability).
>> OTOH, if as you now seem to be suggesting it was an illegal
>> contract then indeed Sam will not be punished.
>>
>> I'm gonna get to the beef and snip the rest. [...]
>
> Snip the rest?
>
> In other words, first, you substitute the killing of
> a third person (changing what had been simple morality
> into some alleged social obligation and illegality);
No. You have this wrong. I didn't change it into an
illegality. See above for more.
> then,
> you complain and try to blame me when I say this makes
> it not a legal contract
What did I wrongly blame you for? I assure you such was/is
not my intention. When miscommunications occur I understand
that it is rarely one sided fault tho often one side gets
the lion's share.
>while I STILL focus on the moral
> obligation that you asked me about;
Right. That is/should be our focus for I think we've both
acknowledged that in the legal realm we have no substantial
disagreement. I can't imagine what I may have said that gave
you any other impression. I think what happened is that you
somehow wrongly thot it was my intention (by introducing
killing) to switch back to a legal discussion but that is
not the case.
>then, you say the
> legality is not really relevant (which, of course, it
> isn't);
Right, presently not really relevant.
>but then, you return to commenting only on the
> irrelevant legal problem that you yourself introduced,
No. You are operating on the wrong assumption that my
introducing the killing of innocents was illegal. I didn't
intend that at all. I intended to keep your scenario as you
laid it out and merely substituted the task of killing in
lieu of money payment.
> even going so far as to discard and leave unaddressed
> my explanation of the moral issue!
If your explanation was in the part I snipped I'm truly
sorry. But I was having trouble following you and at some
point I just got tired and gave up. I didn't think it was my
job to puzzle out which of the inconsistencies I was to
accept as your genuine position.
>
> Ah, well. I, your gracious servant, will just take what
> you give me, and explain it all once again...
I get your sarcasm.
>
>> [...] You are saying that scenario Sam has a moral
>> (meaning not amoral) *obligation* to kill an
>> innocent
>
> Yes indeed: A moral (meaning /chosen/, not imposed)
Whoa. Here's where I believe you are drifting into error
again, James. All along we had agreed that "moral" had two
meanings (not amoral and not immoral) and now you want to
tell me there is a third meaning (chosen). But when I think
about it, the first two meanings describe how an *act*
relates to moral law. Either the act is neutral (amoral) or
it has a value (not amoral). If it has a value, then that
act is either right or wrong. Now additionally an act can
be either chosen or not (imposed) which is "not" as is the
case with moral, a relation of the act to moral law, but
rather a relation of an act to the *person* choosing, yet
you want to call that moral instead. IOW, you start out by
defining a single word (moral) as the relation of an act to
moral law and now you confound the word "moral" as being
*instead* the relation of act to person. This is flatly
inconsistent.
I think perhaps you might mean to say that any act has a
relation to moral law and then an *additional* relation to
the person choosing it, which would make sense. If so then
your above locution "A moral (meaning /chosen/, not
imposed)" is wrong. You should not mislead but rather leave
out the word "meaning" and instead say something like:
A moral *and* chosen...
> obligation /to Tony/, to the one who accepted Sam's
> promise to kill. Sam promised Tony he would do murder
> in exchange for cocaine, and he was given the cocaine.
> That left the obligation to Tony. This is simple and
> obvious.
>
> You shouldn't, now, introduce a different fuzzy
> notion of some "unchosen obligation"
There is no fuzzy notion. Please stop with that already. Sam
does have an obligation to act not immorally. That is not
fuzzy but arises from the fact that Sam choses life. See
below for clarification.
>(of Sam's, to
> whom?
Sam has a so called by you obligation to Tony because he's
now agreed to bump somebody off instead of paying ten grand.
But actually Sam has a genuine obligation to his parents
(perhaps even himself I'm not really sure at this point)
*not* to whack anyone. See below for more.
> blank out)
Not guilty.
>to always "comply with objective
> moral law."
Right. I place before you life and death, therefore choose
life. And life Sam indeed chose, hence his incurred
obligation to moral law.
>Don't you see?
Yes, I do.
>The whole point of this
> discussion is that there is no such animal as that
> religious notion of an "unchosen moral obligation"
And I fully agree with that.
> (no such thing as a /duty/).
Well, if you define duty as exclusively unchosen then I
agree. But the word is also used as a synonym for obligation
hence a chosen duty.
>
> If you DO persist in committing such error, then I
> certainly won't grant you the option of blaming ME for
> the confusion that this notion of /yours/ is obviously
> causing to YOU.
Pfooey. You are not listening. I have repeatedly denied that
I don't have this confusion. As for blame, I've tried to be
just with it but if you want to heap more upon me for some
reason that's OK too. Just please don't turn into Charles.
Oops, there I go again. Please strike that nasty Charles
reference from the record so that no one will ever see it. :-)
>
>> [...], while at the same time you agree that
>> objective moral law says he *should* not kill
>> in this circumstance.
>
> Right, but nothing much has changed. In the original
> scenario, remember,
Right. I only substituted the killing of an innocent instead
of the 10K.
>I already said Sam was behaving
> /immorally/, which means that objective moral law "says"
> (teaches) that a person *should* NOT give his last
> $10,000 to a cocaine dealer, even a legal one.
Right. Yet you persist in saying that Sam (in my changed
scenario) has a not amoral *obligation* (to Tony) to kill
when in fact, for that very act of killing he has a not
immoral *obligation* to refrain from it! Yes I hear you. Not
so loud please. You again wanna know to whom and how this
obligation has arisen.
But before we get into that longer explanation, can we both
agree up front that if we have a future task, in this case
the killing of a specific victim and let's just randomly
call him say Charles, and we know that act is clearly a not
amoral act, which of course means that it is either right or
wrong to kill Charles, and if we additionally know that
according to prescribed moral law it is in fact immoral to
kill Charles in this circumstance, it would at least sound
like a flat out contradiction to say that we both have and
have not an obligation to kill Charles. Agree?
Even if its not a contradiction (and I don't think its such
an easy question but I believe it is) it seems that your
theory has for a single future event (the killing of
Charles) both an obligation to kill him (per agreement with
Tony) and to not kill him (per moral law-assuming
obligations have a "should" component.)
Now the answer as to whom, if anyone, we have an obligation
to always act morally and how that arises.
I've actually given you the answer several times but
perhaps not all in one digestible place and in one big
chunk. I won't bore you with all the details but here are
the essentials:
We are creatures of a specific nature and no other, and we
live in a specific environment that has whatever
characteristics it has and no other, hence if we choose to
live then there is a necessary optimum behavior that we must
engage in in order to thrive and sustain our lives. This
prescribed by circumstance (the circumstance that both we
and our environment have a specific nature) is the objective
moral law/order. And this answers the question *why* we
must always behave morally which is that *if we choose to
live* then the means to that end is to follow prescribed
moral law which is by reason discoverable. And it also
answers how the obligation arises which is by *choosing* life.
The question remaining is to whom, if anyone, are we
obligated to act in accord with moral law. Of course I'm not
sure this is fully correct for its hardly provable, but if I
accept as much of your view as I can, James, then I
presently think that the notion of tacit consent can
legitimately be expanded to the point wherein the child and
parent come to a tacit agreement which obligates both.
Anyway that's my story and I'm sticking to it; tho I in no
way wanna rule out the possibility of such a thing as
obligation to oneself.
The parents are desirous of a child and by their action of
conception implicitly offer and obligate themselves to
provide temporary care until the child can fend for itself.
The child fulfills the parents desire by choosing to live
which entails that once fully capable it shall follow
objective moral law so as to engage in optimal life
sustaining actions leading to a full and happy life.
Granted a child cannot consciously choose in the same
manner as might an adult. But when the baby cries it does so
because it most likely wants/needs necessary sustenance and
thereby in the manner open to it it tacitly obligates itself
to its parents by choosing life.
>
> The only difference (a minor one; a side issue by
> your own account) is that in the original Tony could
> take Sam to court if Sam didn't pay up;
Right, especially if the judge were still on the payroll but
I hear that in Obama nation things have gotten so bad that
even the Mafioso have laid off more than thirty judges. :-)
>in your
> contract-killing scenario Sam's obligation to Tony
> would be /merely/ moral (murder being illegal),
No. The killing of innocents is legal in scenarioland tho
you and I would call it murder, immoral and should be illegal.
>with
> no law to back it up. So all you've done, it seems,
> is manage to confuse yourself while blaming me for
> the confusion. That just won't wash.
I'm not confused, at least not in the manner you charge.
>
>> Furthermore you say that an obligation requires a
>> reasoning being, meaning one that reasons properly
>> not wrongly [...],
>
> That's not what I said at all!
Oh? I disagree tho you did not say so specifically.
>
> I said in every moral choice there is the possibility
> of choosing evil, of reasoning wrongly, of entering
> into == where the choice is to make a promise == a
> "by-choice obligation" that is evil, that is morally
> improper, that is objectively morally /wrong/.
Yes, you said that, and it's correct but the issue is not
whether it is *possible* to reason wrongly, of course it is.
Instead, my issue is that which you've in fact agreed to
down below.
>
>> [...] and since objective moral law prescribes
>> that killing of innocents should not be done in
>> this circumstance, then a properly reasoning being
>> will never incur such an obligation in the first
>> place.
>
> It is right to say a properly reasoning being will
> not promise to commit such an immoral act in exchange
> for something.
Right. And that's what my point was.
>It is wrong, however, to suggest that
> a reasoning being is incapable of doing so, incapable
> of reasoning improperly. I would never say something
> so silly, and I didn't.
Right again. And I too would never say something
so silly, and I didn't.
>
> (And I wouldn't say objective moral law "prescribes";
> this MIGHT be a needless quibble, sure; I apologize;
> but on the other hand, the fuzzy idea that moral law
> constitutes unchosen moral obligations has a variety
> of symptoms and causes, among them the ill-defined
> use of related words and concepts.)
I understand. But please, look fairly at what I'm actually
arguing and you will see I have never argued for unchosen
moral obligations. I did briefly contemplate whether
children had an *unearned* claim upon at least their
parents. But I've since talked myself into the position that
the child *earns* his claim by (implicitly) *choosing* to
live and the parents *choose* the obligation of taking care
of the child until it can fend for itself. Anyway, if
"prescribes" still offends you please instruct me as to what
word I should use.
>
>> What that means is that if you happen to come upon
>> a thug who indeed has made an agreement as per scenario
>> (i.e. promises to commit murder in exchange for coke)
>> then that is proof that he is not competent or not fully
>> a proper reasoning being and a non reasoning being,
>> by your very own definition cannot incur an obligation.
>
> Try that reasoning on for size here: Sam has squandered
> his pension, destroyed his reputation, and ruined his
> marriage on the tables and drinks and loose women of
> Vegas. Checking out of the hotel he returns the bill
> unpaid, explaining that his utterly disgraceful behavior
> "is proof that he is not competent or not fully a proper
> reasoning being and [therefore] cannot incur an obligation!"
Well, here's a good scenario of a real life situation with
many of the complexities of real life. Of course real real
life, not scenario "real life", is even more complex, but
let's see how much of this I can get right.
Of course legally, we all know what the answer is. He's
gotta pay. But not amorally, it is a lot more complex.
My first principle, and what I've here been arguing
thruout, is that a genuine not amoral *obligation* does not
occur unless the promised task is itself not immoral.
So Sam contracted with the hotel for room, food and drinks,
which is not immoral so he's morally obligated so far. Can
he not amorally be not obligated on grounds of incompetence
or improper reasoning. No of course not because he
presumably competently and properly reasoned that he'd have
to pay and demonstrated such when as an adult he checked
into the hotel and thereby gave his tacit consent to pay.
His squandering of pension, ruining his reputation/marriage
are all presumably immoral acts but have nothing to do with
the hotel and the hotel reasonably can presumptively assume
that their guests are competent and that their source of
money is untainted.
All Sam's immoral acts have occurred in the past so there is
no obligation issue. Did Sam have a not amoral obligation to
perform those immoral acts before he actually did them? No,
in fact he had a not amoral obligation not to do them!
Did I get it all correct? This is tricky stuff and easy to
screw up, but that's my answer.
>
> That is silly, of course. I have never suggested that a
> reasoning being never incurs an immoral obligation
There ain't no such thing as an immoral obligation. Instead
you have the not immoral obligation to *not* do it.
>or never incurs an immoral chosen obligation
There ain't no such thing tho you may *call* it such but I
prefer to call it what it actually is, namely a genuine
obligation *not* to perform the action. Higher (than your
alleged obligation arising from mere agreement) moral law,
dictates your behavior (once you've chosen life) obviously
including your behavior in the societal setting wherein you
are free to make immoral agreements with others. But such an
immoral agreement does not result in a genuine obligation at
all, for you instead, have the genuine obligation not to
perform that agreed upon but immoral act.
The above logic seems to me to be consistent with common
sense (in that it avoids the situation of having to call a
clearly vile act like murder nevertheless an obligation), is
self consistent (in that it avoids the contradiction that
for the same future act we both have and have not an
obligation to perform it; and that a properly reasoning
being can reason its way to an improper (immoral)
conclusion, when an improper conclusion is proof of improper
reasoning) and finally makes consistent the meaning of
"obligation" across both the legal and moral realms.
>through an
> immoral promise. In fact, I have said the exact opposite.
Too bad.
> The nature of a reasoning being is such that morality is
> needed and that evil, immorality, is possible always.
Sure, it's possible.
>
> A mentally incompetent or legally insane person cannot
> incur an obligation, of course.
Right.
>But that's not what we're
> talking about here. Contract killing happens quite a lot,
> unfortunately, and it involves perfectly competent criminals.
> That's why they go to prisons instead of hospitals.
Yes there are contract killings. But there is no
*obligation* to do the killing, in fact there is an
obligation *not* to do the killing.
Vonvegas
.
Charles Bell
>
> Yes there are contract killings. But there is no
> *obligation* to do the killing, in fact there is an
> obligation *not* to do the killing.
>
. . . In your duty-bound universe of imperative moral law that does
not and cannot exist, of course. Just as with your mythical foetus
contracting with his mother, the "obligation not to kill" comes into
existence by magic.
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > [...]
> [...]
> James, please pay attention. In *your* initial scenario you
> said this:
>
> "> Imagine we have repealed those unjust laws and it
> > now is perfectly legal..."
I'll try to more concise this morning. I may fail!
> That makes it perfectly clear that [...] the killing of
> an innocent, *in that scenario society* is legal.
I was, and I remain, perfectly content to focus only on
the moral issue, and I said so. And I'll do so again
now.
My scenario, meanwhile, was to suppose simply another
repeal of unjust laws, like the repeal of prohibition,
in a society that is, otherwise, much like our own.
The point of this was to focus on my assertion that
the immorality of purchasing drugs does not remove the
obligation (the legal obligation, not merely moral)
to pay for what you purchase. I didn't mean this as
either fantastical or as a return-to-the-jungle sort
of scenario, though I was, and remain, willing to go
along with you on that.
You say I should have known you meant legal killing.
Okay. Maybe I should have. At least now we have
clarity.
> > You are avoiding the point of the question.
>
> I'm not deliberately avoiding anything. If you think I've
> not answered where I should, then point it out, please.
I don't think you're deliberating avoiding anything. But
the point was not about the legality of killing. The point
was that your substituting harm to an innocent third party
and calling it something you and I would regard as "heinous"
/comes from/ a regarding of morality as most crucially a
matter of things somehow (shared intuitions) "known" as
"owed" to /others/, rather than as the means of achieving
one's own health, wealth, security, happiness.
> > You are substituting murder
>
> Yeah, tho technically I substituted "the killing of an
> innocent" and not necessarily murder, depending upon how
> precisely one defines those words. I only mention this to
> avoid a possible future irrelevant dispute.
Wise of you. It avoids, not just an irrelevant dispute, but
hopefully also a potential confusing equivocation.
> [...N]ot amoral means that the act/task is either
> right (not immoral) or wrong (immoral) but we don't
> know or care which. [...A] not immoral task is also
> a not amoral task tho I'll not bother to make that
> clear each time.
Very good, again. A good moral choice and an evil moral
choice are both "moral choices." To call a thing "moral"
and /mean/ that it is "morally good" is just one of those
troublesome features of the English language that we are
stuck with. (Imagine a bobby ticketing you in London for
not driving on the right side of the road. It's a wonder
how the English ever survived.)
A philosopher's job is to be rigorously precise, and
it's nice to see you're making that effort.
> Per your scenario (as modified by me) James, you are
> stuck with the conclusion that scenario Sam has what
> you label a not amoral obligation to commit what you
> and I would actually call murder hence a not immoral/
> not amoral obligation.
He has an obligation /to Tony/, the one who gave value
now, for the promise of killing tomorrow. (Killing, not
murder, of course.) I have no problem saying this because
I have /specified/ the person /to whom/ the particular
obligation is owed (without respect to the morality of
the obligation) and I have NOT done what you seemed to,
namely, divorced the concept obligation from the question
of "to whom," and so rendered it a floating abstraction.
> [...W]hen Sam has a so called obligation to commit
> what you and I agree is murder, it rightly shocks our
> sensibilities as it should.
It does shock our sensibilities.
Please refrain, though, from saying you and I would
call it murder (in *your* scenario) unless you desire
what you yourself claim could be an irrelevant debate.
Remember, please, that legal partial-extaction abortion
kills an innocent human being and so is wrongly called
murder by many whose sensibilities are shocked. Remember,
please, that the horrific bombings of Dresden, Tokyo,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed countless thousands upon
thousands of innocent human beings and shocked the
sensibilities of the entire civilized world.
If, in your scenario, the hypothetical contract-killing
of an innocent human being is not illegal then it is not
murder. We can discuss whether it is immoral or not, and
I am happy to consider cases where it /is/ immoral as
well as cases where it is /not/ immoral.
But in either case the mere "shocking of sensibilities"
is not relevant to that discussion /unless/ you mean to
insist (and I would /welcome/ your attempting a logical
argument along these lines!) that morality is in essence
an appeal to one's feelings, just a jumble of floating
images grounded in nothing but a shared intuition that
somehow there exists a mystical "owing" to /others/.
> And it should begin to dawn upon us that perhaps
> an alleged obligation to commit a thoroughly despicable
> immoral crime like murder doesn't make as much sense
> as we perhaps initially thot.
Crime?
Well, remembering that this killing is perfectly legal we
/might/ be left with the question as to whether or not
it is despicable and immoral, were you not able to
stipulate that it is, for the purpose of our discussion.
We might even, for the time being if you desire, set
aside the perfectly valid question of WHY it is despicable
and immoral. Our shared sensibilities have nothing
whatsoever to do with that. I need not share your
sensibilities, and I certainly do not share your
regard for them as being relevant.
However, this would /still/ leave us with the present
discussion, specifically, what on earth this has to
do with the concept of obligation?
> [...D]oes one man have an obligation to enslave another,
> or kill a gypsy or a jew merely cause it's legal and
> because he has legally contracted with someone to do so?
Define obligation. You have tried, just here...
> [...]
> I said "to meet your challenge" which
> you'll recall was:
> "">to cite even just a
> > single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
> > act does NOT create an obligation" "
>
> I've clearly done just that *if* you agree with me that an
> obligation is something we *should* do.
Well, I don't, so you haven't.
I agree that as a general moral rule justifiable by how
it leads to the long-range purpose of achieving happiness
in life, one's own obligations *should* be fulfilled,
especially those that are both chosen and legal.
However, I most emphatically DO NOT AGREE either that
the definition of obligation is "something we should do"
OR that obligations to others (as all obligation involves
the expectations, reliance and demands of others) exist
"only when the obligated action is morally proper."
To say either one of those is to render the concept a
floating abstraction, a mystical notion grounded in
no logic but in mere feelings.
> But I'm beginning to suspect that we have a possible
> major problem here and that you don't, probably
> unconsciously, really think that an obligation is a
> something that carries with it the idea that
> it *should* be done.
Unconsciously? Well, remember, I have specifically offered
the definition of obligation as future behavior expected,
relied upon and demanded by other reasoning beings, and
I have said over and over that this includes chosen and
legal obligations as well as immoral and/or imposed
obligations.
Of course I believe a man *should* fulfill his /chosen/
obligations (when legal) because that serves his interest
in long-range cooperation, trade and the other social
values of civilized society.
However, I do NOT believe, obviously!, that ALL obligations
should be fulfilled, even those imposed by the laws of a
dictator or those that might be illegal (unconstitutional)
or those the fulfillment of which would destroy one's own
ability to achieve happiness.
> [...] I'm beginning to realize that perhaps
> your objection is much more than mere anthropomorphizing of
> "prescription" but additionally that that word carries with
> it the idea of "should" and that is what, perhaps
> unconsciously, is bothering you. Am I right? [..]
No, not at all. It is not any implication of rightness in
prescription that causes me to "bristle." I am concerned
simply to be very logically precise, eschewing the use
of words from human law (prescribe, crime, murder, etc.)
and the wrongful application of them to morality. Doing
so may be unintentional and a merely colorful license
with English in some cases; however it may and often is
also both a symptom and a cause of a fundamental
misapprehension concerning the nature of morality.
Morality is not a thing imposed as a limit to self-
interest but is a thing properly apprehended and adhered
to for the /sake/ of self-interest. It is THE method by
which a reasoning being can achieve his OWN happiness.
It's therefore not ever a thing "owed to others," ala
obligation, and any words that might carry such an
implication ought be carefully scrutinized.
> [...] I *should* behave as prescribed by moral law.
Above caveat noted, I agree with you.
> I think for you, an obligation possibly is not
> a *should* but rather you are wrongly treating it
> more like a fact, which in this case, just expresses
> the fact that one has what you call an obligation,
> but that the existence of such doesn't mean that
> it *should* be discharged. Please comment.
You have me right, once you drop the word "wrongly."
If you insist on characterizing my definition of
obligation as "wrong," you will need to say why.
> [...I thought] if the task was sufficiently heinous
> like murder, then perhaps you'd begin to suspect
> error somewhere.
Obligation may be used in a manner /connoting/ should.
I've nothing against that.
However, it can also be used in a manner carrying
no such connotation. It can be used to refer to
some legal obligations and some imposed obligations
that should be renounced, rejected and defied whenever
possible.
It a general moral sense, it is correct to say only
that one's "2-times moral" obligations should be
fulfilled, meaning, obligations that are so-to-speak
"moral-moral," i.e., 1. chosen for oneself in the moral-
choice act of making a promise (not amoral), and
2. fulfill-able as contribution-to not a destruction-
of one's happiness (not immoral).
However, it is NOT correct to say that in a general
moral sense all moral action is obligation, nor that
all obligation is moral action.
Therefore, make the task as heinous as you like,
there is no error to be sensed in what I have said.
> > Sam didn't pay. Sam /received/ cocaine worth $10,000
> > in exchange for a /promise to pay/, a /promise/ that left
> > him /obligated/ to pay.
>
> You are right it was an inattentive slip in tense.
> But frankly James, this is the kind of seeing the mote in
> another's eye while the beam goes unattended, that I would
> expect from someone like Charles, for example.
I'm sorry to give such an impression. It wasn't a slip
of tense that worried me, but I wanted to be clear about
who had obligation to whom, and when and why. I hope you
can continue to assume good intent on my part, and rest
assured I don't play or want to play the gotcha game.
> [...P]ointing out your misstatements wasn't a
> mere gotcha but was to make the broader point
> that the various misstatements were causing me
> great trouble in following you.
Noted, and back at'cha. I want to acknowledge my
own misstatements when they happen, And also to
clarify if I think you have misunderstood a
statement of mine. I slipped up saying Sam was
paid $10,000. You slipped up saying Sam wasn't
paid, he paid. Sam was paid in cocaine for the
promise of a future behavior. No gotcha's. Just
clarity about which "owed" what, /to/ which and
why.
> [...]
> I'm a fight fan but I confess I don't get what
> "jelly mode" means here. Exactly how do punch drunk
> boxers behave before the ref calls it?
Ah, well, I'm probably way off base with regard to
you. The jelly mode of argumentation is something
I myself have /wrongly/ been accused of. You can
go back years (see the thread on moral obligation
in February 2008, for example) and find me using
the same words as here on the same subject. Jelly
mode is when a debater "absorbs punches," so
to speak, by continually re-defining the shape of
his OWN argument, wobbling back and forth between
ill-defined and contradictory positions, like jelly,
instead of standing firm on /one/ position that
cracks under the force of logic.
A punch-drunk boxer wobbles and absorbs punches
without defending himself or even having wits
enough to throw in the towel. At some point,
you just stop throwing punches, you turn to the
ref, and you say, "For crying out loud, do your
job!" We don't have a ref, so instead we just stop
throwing punches and walk away.
I'm sure you've encountered such debaters here,
whose positions seem to suddenly and inexplicably
warp and morph from moment to moment.
You may have thought I am such. I apologize if my
being reminded of such, by you, is as unjust and
offensive, to you, as you, perhaps, being reminded
of such by me. (Hope you followed that! I'm short
on time.)
> As for Charles, he loves to argue for the sake of
> arguing rather than for the purpose of discovering
> truths and lacks the integrity to admit his errors
> even on the slightest of matters. That's why I've
> increasingly come to ignore him.
I feel the same as you regarding Charles. I still hope
he can redeem himself.
> Did you know that Charles' presence here is a very
> large reason that Agent Cooper no longer posts here?
There may be other reasons, too. I was absent for a
very long time myself, and it had nothing to do with
Charles. Whatever the reasons, I do wish Agent would
return. His absence is indeed a big loss to this forum,
I agree.
> [...] I think what happened is that you somehow
> wrongly thot it was my intention (by introducing
> killing) to switch back to a legal discussion but
> that is not the case.
I know. What I thought was, your introducing wrongful
harm to an innocent third party does not accomplish
what you intended, and is actually only cause and
symptom of a mistaken view of morality -- a view
of morality as being most crucially social and
somehow "owed to others," as with obligations.
> [...] All along we had agreed that "moral" had two
> meanings (not amoral and not immoral) and now you
> want to tell me there is a third meaning (chosen).
Not a third. "Moral" ("not amoral") describes chosen
actions that can be evaluated as good or evil by
reference to a code of values and principles serving
a long-range purpose, properly happiness. Not all
choices are moral choices (are "not amoral choices"),
but ALL that is moral (not amoral) necessarily involves
choice, with choice of evil being possible but wrong.
So when I switch to saying "chosen obligation" instead
of saying "moral obligation," I am ONLY trying to avoid
someone getting confused about what I mean. Moral modifying
obligation means what moral means when modifying choice,
namely, RELEVANT to morality, i.e., a particular choice or
a particular chosen thing that may be evaluated as good
or evil. Chosen is thus not a third meaning. It is
already a part of the meaning of moral.
> [...Y]ou start out by defining a single word (moral)
> as the relation of an act to moral law and now you
> confound the word "moral" as being *instead* the
> relation of act to person. This is flatly inconsistent.
No, that's not what I do. I /start/ with "moral" being a
relation to a code of values and principles that serves
a person's proper long-range purpose, his own happiness.
And then I STAY there. I never drift, wobble or morph
the slightest bit on that definition of morality.
> [...] You should not mislead but rather leave
> out the word "meaning" and instead say something like:
> A moral *and* chosen...
I can say "the morally right choice" and "the choice that
was made" when that is what I mean to say. However, no,
I cannot say "moral *and* chosen" when I am using moral
to mean relevant to morality, as if there could possibly
be such a thing as a moral action that is NOT a chosen
action. Moral but not chosen? If I did not choose do
do something (it was an accident, let's say) then how
could my action be called moral meaning morally right
or morally wrong? That wouldn't make sense.
> [...]
> > You shouldn't, now, introduce a different fuzzy
> > notion of some "unchosen obligation"
>
> There is no fuzzy notion. Please stop with that already.
> Sam does have an obligation to act not immorally.
If that is NOT fuzzy then you ought to be able tell
me to /whom/ and /why/ Sam has such a purported obligation,
and you should be able to define the word obligation
such that your assertion makes some sense.
> That is not fuzzy but arises from the fact that Sam
> choses life. See below for clarification.
I've seen below. We're almost there...
> [...]
> I place before you life and death, therefore choose
> life. And life Sam indeed chose, hence his incurred
> obligation to moral law.
Hence? Obligation /to/ moral law? That's doesn't make
sense. It's fuzzy emotive-speak, I say. If I am wrong,
define obligation for me. Tell me how one can have an
obligation to an insentient thing, and to not even a
being but to a code of values and principles. Here,
you should define your terms.
> [...]
> > The whole point of this
> > discussion is that there is no such animal as that
> > religious notion of an "unchosen moral obligation"
>
> And I fully agree with that.
Choosing life, or choosing happiness, is one thing.
Attaining that goal requires a particular method,
morality and adherence to the values and principles
of a moral code.
You propose to call this requirement "obligation."
I say that such is a fuzzy misapplication of a word
that literally denotes actions expected, relied upon
and demanded by other reasoning beings. To have an
obligation you must be able to logically answer the
questions, obligation to /whom/ and arising from
/what/ (from a promise, from a debt, from a law
imposed as by God or legislation?).
To say an obligation to do "A" exists if you simply
need "A" to reach "B" then you have dissolved
obligation into meaning nothing other than need.
Need means need, and does not relate to fulfilling
the expectations and demands of others. Obligation to
oneself makes no sense. Obligation to nature makes
no sense. If you wish to say that it is /necessary/
to adhere to moral principles if you wish to attain
happiness, just say that. I say it, too.
> [...] You again wanna know to whom and how this
> obligation has arisen.
Yes.
> [...I]f we [...] know that according to prescribed
> moral law it is in fact immoral to kill Charles in
> this circumstance, it would at least sound like a
> flat out contradiction to say that we both have and
> have not an obligation to kill Charles. Agree?
It would BE a flat out contradiction to say we have
and have not an obligation. I haven't said he has
not an obligation.
I have said Sam was obligated to Tony. I have NOT
said Sam *should* kill Charles. I have said Sam
should not have taken $10,000 worth of cocaine on
a promise to kill Charles, and I say, now, he should
*not* kill Charles. This does NOT mean, of course,
that Tony, based on Sam's promise, is not expecting
and relying upon Sam to keep the promise. (Maybe
he isn't. If not, the supposed obligation isn't
there at all.)
I do not say Sam is "obligated" (to whom?) not to
kill Charles, any more than he was obligated to take
or to not take cocaine on a promise (to whom would
he have been so obligated?). He /ought/ to behave
morally, for his own sake, not for Charles' sake,
or for anything else.
> [...H]ere are the essentials:
> We are creatures of a specific nature and no other,
> and we live in a specific environment that has whatever
> characteristics it has and no other, hence if we choose
> to live then there is a necessary optimum behavior that
> we must engage in in order to thrive and sustain our
> lives.
"Necessary." Very good!
> This prescribed by circumstance (the circumstance
> that both we and our environment have a specific nature)
> is the objective moral law/order.
(Same problem as before with prescription, but..)
Very good, again!
> And this answers the question *why* we
> must always behave morally which is that
> *if we choose to live* then the means to
> that end is to follow prescribed moral law
> which is by reason discoverable.
Absolutely.
> And it also answers how the obligation arises
> which is by *choosing* life.
What obligation? Where did that come from? There was
no mention of obligation in anything there. You are
"slipping it in" (not unnoticed, BTW.)
> The question remaining is to whom, if anyone, are
> we obligated to act in accord with moral law. Of
> course I'm not sure this is fully correct for its
> hardly provable, but if I accept as much of your
> view as I can, James, then I presently think that
> the notion of tacit consent can legitimately be
> expanded to the point wherein the child and
> parent come to a tacit agreement which obligates
> both.
You are right, though restricting to parent and child
is unnecessary. There is indeed tacit agreement to
certain standards of social conduct, which constitutes
then a chosen obligation (what I call "moral obligation,"
never an unchosen thing).
I've no problem with this, so long as it is not
meant either A) as a generalized formula for all
obligation (there are also imposed obligations,
though there shouldn't be) OR B) as a generalized
formula for morality, which does NOT relate to
obligation, but to one's own moral purpose.
> Anyway that's my story and I'm sticking to it [...]
Well said. Your sense of humor is appreciated. It is
a delight discussing things with you. Now I must snip
quickly to an end. The points you raise further on
are largely repetitive of the above discussion.
If I'm wrong on that, please correct me.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
> Vonvegas was saying, in essence, that by the exact same
> token you also cannot have an immoral moral obligation.
> Such would mean that morality requires you to do what
> morality forbids you to do -- a contradiction. "Very
> nicely put!" was my reaction to his first making this
> argument, several posts ago.
Thanks for the "Very nicely put", James.
>
> So why does it fail?
Sorry, James. It does not fail. Your argument is logically
incorrect because you are equivocating on "meaning". I tried
to explain it to you in my previous post but apparently
(I've briefly glanced at your latest response) I didn't
explain it well.
The bottom line is that your argument would be sound if it
were true that "moral obligation" *means* the same thing as
"chosen obligation" but that is false!
I don't have the time to invent a new and better way to say
it right now and unhappily I really expect to be back to my
much slower usual pace of responding. I hope that'll not
frustrate you too much.
But I've been here for years and am not going anywhere, so
be patient please.
Vonvegas
Jim Klein
> . . . In your duty-bound universe of imperative moral law that does
> not and cannot exist, of course. Just as with your mythical foetus
> contracting with his mother, the "obligation not to kill" comes into
> existence by magic.
Charles, don't take this the wrong way, but von's argument is
flying light years over your head.
There's nothing wrong with what you say here, and I for one
agree with it. You are pointing out misidentifications, which
is a classic, valid tack. But von, at least as I read him, is
offering an /epistemological/ argument---not merely that
Prescott is misidentifying the nature of reality (which point
BTW is a piece of cake to prove) but that his internal
conceptualization of the matter is /in itself/ incoherent.
The best retort you could give IMO is, "Well, any misidentification
is evidence of internally inconsistent conceptualization." Well yeah,
that's right but it's still worthwhile to be able to pinpoint exactly
where that conceptualization fails, separate and apart from its
lack of correspondence.
It may be that von himself has an internally incoherent system
of morality, which is what you're saying here. I doubt it since
he goes to record lengths not to be inconsistent, but it just
isn't relevant here and IIRC, he explicitly stated that he wasn't
bringing his own view into the matter.
This is NOT a case of von saying (like you or I might), "Jim, you
are misidentifying the nature of obligation and legalobligations
and I am identifying them correctly, and so therefore you're
wrong." It's him saying, "You are being inconsistent in your
conceptualization of the matter and so therefore you MUST
be wrong, irrespective of what the truth might be."
I haven't time today to read either of their posts, but this
explanation is repetitive and just wasting bandwidth. Whether
you recognize it or not, you are witnessing an epistemological
feat of extreme accomplishment IMO, and you should treat it
as Rand said you should treat it in her explicit declaration of
what the philosophy of Objectivism IS.
IOW, let the man operate. Your arguments against or for von's
morality are entirely off-topic and you can take them up with
him another time...if he's so willing, of course, which would
shock the shit out of me!
jk
Charles Bell
> On Feb 13, 5:44 am, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > . . . In your duty-bound universe of imperative moral law that does
> > not and cannot exist, of course. �Just as with your mythical foetus
> > contracting with his mother, the "obligation not to kill" comes into
> > existence by magic.
>
> Charles, don't take this the wrong way, but von's argument is
> flying light years over your head.
>
> There's nothing wrong with what you say here, and I for one
> agree with it. �You are pointing out misidentifications, which
> is a classic, valid tack. �But von, at least as I read him, is
> offering an /epistemological/ argument---
No he isn't, and he is not offering (deliberately so) the specifics of
his metaphysical assumptions behind whatever gibberish he is
offering. When you can get him to explain where the "contract" of a
fetus with its parents comes from (epistemologically), then you may
have something to criticize me for.
----
Right, tho ability to enforce is irrelevant to making it a
legal obligation and what is relevant is that it not be
illegal instead
-----
----
there is
no such thing as a not amoral obligation arising from
immoral tasks.
----
----
that upon choosing life we have contracted with our
parents (who desire us to live) in exchange for which we
expect temporary caretaking.
----
These are not epistemological anything. They are gibberish.
> I haven't time today to read either of their posts, but this
> explanation is repetitive and just wasting bandwidth. �Whether
> you recognize it or not, you are witnessing an epistemological
> feat of extreme accomplishment IMO,
Then you like eating shit for breakfast.
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> �> Vonvegas was saying, in essence, that by the exact same
> �> token you also cannot have an immoral moral obligation.
> �> Such would mean that morality requires you to do what
> �> morality forbids you to do -- a contradiction.
> �> So why does it fail?
>
> Sorry, James. It does not fail.
It does fail, badly, and I carefully explained why.
> [....Y]our argument would be sound if it were true
> that "moral obligation" �*means* the same thing as
> "chosen obligation" [...].
It doesn't mean exactly the same thing, or else I wouldn't
say moral obligation to begin with. I would only say
chosen obligation.
But that difference has nothing to do with this.
Your argument fails, Von, simply because it equates
"illegal legal" (a contradiction) with "immoral choice
(chosen)" a /necessary possibility/ in any moral choice.
Any argument that calls a necessary thing an impossible
thing is obviously hopelessly confused. But I explained
this all very thoroughly in that very response to Jim.
Just take another look!
> [...] I've been here for years and am not going any-
> where, so be patient please.
No problem. And take your time. I've a many good years left,
and hope you do as well...
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Arnold Broese
news:18d9c1b0-c954-40f6...@x22g2000yqx.googlegroups.com...
>
> Very good, again. A good moral choice and an evil moral
> choice are both "moral choices." To call a thing "moral"
> and /mean/ that it is "morally good" is just one of those
> troublesome features of the English language that we are
> stuck with.
Why not just refer to these as choices involving the realm of morality?
.
.
.
.
--
Arnold
James E. Prescott
wrote:
> "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote in messagenews:18d9c1b0-c954-40f6...@x22g2000yqx.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Very good, again. A good moral choice and an evil moral
> > choice are both "moral choices." To call a thing "moral"
> > and /mean/ that it is "morally good" is just one of those
> > troublesome features of the English language that we are
> > stuck with.
>
> Why not just refer to these as choices involving the realm of morality?
You could do that. And for political choice, romantic choice,
artistic choice, dietary choice and recreational choice you could
say choices involving the realm of politics, choices involving
the realm of romance, choices involving the realm of art, choices
involving the realm of diet, and choices involving the realm of
recreation.
But why go to all that trouble? Is there anything particularly
difficult to understand about moral choice and moral obligation?
No, of course not! Not in the real world of everyday usage.
Ordinary people already understand that moral choice does
not mean a choice that is morally good and that moral obligation
does not mean an obligation that is morally proper. An immoral
moral choice is NOT a contradiction. Even folks of rather low
IQ understand this perfectly well.
Only here in HPO (or more generally with philosophers and
philosophy students) must one"dumb-it-down," so to speak, or
else encounter endless debate over matters that are really very
simple.
But it's fun, and a lot of other things get illuminated along
the way.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> >But von, at least as I read him, is
> > offering an /epistemological/ argument---
>
> No he isn't, and he is not offering (deliberately so) the specifics of
> his metaphysical assumptions
He doesn't need any metaphysical assumptions, at least not
any about the topic. I already told you, this is light years over
your head; sorry.
> behind whatever gibberish he is offering.
Q.E.D. You are only able to interpret it as "gibberish."
If inability to understand were some standard of gibberish,
then you'd be guilty of offering the most gibberish of
anyone here, since virtually nobody understands you,
and never has. Notice who the sole exception is. That
might give you a bit of pause.
> When you can get him to explain where the "contract"
> of a fetus with its parents comes from (epistemologically), then you may
> have something to criticize me for.
I told you once already, twice by implication---THIS HAS
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MATTER. I understand that
you don't get that, and I only requested that you "let
the man operate."
So this is thrice. You're a child at a symphony, screaming
that the orchestra isn't playing your tune.
> > I haven't time today to read either of their posts, but this
> > explanation is repetitive and just wasting bandwidth. Whether
> > you recognize it or not, you are witnessing an epistemological
> > feat of extreme accomplishment IMO,
>
> Then you like eating shit for breakfast.
Hey, maybe I took your advice from way back when!
All I'm asking now, is that you please take mine. But
it's alright---those children usually don't stop whining
either.
jk
Jim Klein
wrote:
> > Very good, again. A good moral choice and an evil moral
> > choice are both "moral choices." To call a thing "moral"
> > and /mean/ that it is "morally good" is just one of those
> > troublesome features of the English language that we are
> > stuck with.
>
> Why not just refer to these as choices involving the realm of morality?
Because that won't get him to where he wants to go.
I still haven't read the current relevant posts, but notice that
a legal legalobligation is an obligation in this weird lingo, but
an illegal legalobligation isn't. Yet somehow a moral
moralobligation is an obligation, AND so is an immoral
moralobligation. I took von's point to be that there is
therefore an inequivalence in the genus and it is hence
invalid. Roughly, anyway; I'm confident he can explain
the point better than I can...probably because he
understands it better than I do!
jk
James E. Prescott
> On Feb 13, 3:55 pm, Arnold Broese <arnold_broeseREM...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > > Very good, again. A good moral choice and an evil moral
> > > choice are both "moral choices." To call a thing "moral"
> > > and /mean/ that it is "morally good" is just one of those
> > > troublesome features of the English language that we are
> > > stuck with.
>
> > Why not just refer to these as choices involving the realm of morality?
>
> Because that won't get him to where he wants to go.
No, it's perfectly fine to say what Arnold suggests. Means
the same, as I explained in my own reply to him.
> I still haven't read the current relevant posts [...].
Obviously.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Charles Bell
> On Feb 13, 10:48 am, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > >But von, at least as I read him, is
> > > offering an /epistemological/ argument---
>
> > No he isn't, and he is not offering (deliberately so) the specifics of
> > his metaphysical assumptions
>
> He doesn't need any metaphysical assumptions, at least not
> any about the topic. �I already told you, this is light years over
> your head; sorry.
>
This comment coming from someone whose animism predates the ancient
Greeks is not something I care about.
> > behind whatever gibberish he is offering.
>
> Q.E.D. �You are only able to interpret it as "gibberish."
>
Ha Ha! You think the following isn't gibberish:
Charles Bell
>
> > . . . In your duty-bound universe of imperative moral law that does
> > not and cannot exist, of course. �Just as with your mythical foetus
> > contracting with his mother, the "obligation not to kill" comes into
> > existence by magic.
>
> Charles, don't take this the wrong way, but von's argument is
> flying light years over your head.
>
You can pretend you know what is being said all you want, but until he
can explain his gibberish in the form of answering a simple question
with a simple answer, he is an intellectual fraud who pastes words
together only well enough to fool you.
> isn't relevant here and IIRC, he explicitly stated that he wasn't
> bringing his own view into the matter.
Of course, his gods are speaking through him without his will, right?
He is a direct conduit to Truth, is that what you believe?
> I am identifying them correctly, and so therefore you're
> wrong." �It's him saying, "You are being inconsistent in your
> conceptualization of the matter and so therefore you MUST
> be wrong, irrespective of what the truth might be."
If he procedes with any kind of assumption that morality is
deontological (which requires metaphysical statement about the
universe which justifies that assumption), everything he says is
always wrong, no matter what epistemological statements he wishes to
make about morality. And it does matter if he is wrong. Truth is never
arrived at by "pointing out inconsistencies" in another person's
argument, and as far as Prescott's argument, I did that over a year
ago and it took less words and time that you and vonvegas have taken,
but I would not claim by that alone the truth of "obligation" was
arrived at, only that Prescott has nothing interesting to say in
addition to or improvement upon what Rand has said very simply and
directly.
.
vonvegas
James, For readability's sake, I had initially snipped all
our *preceding* remarks to what follows. But if you want
fuller context, then for your convenience, I've restored
those preceding remarks, out of order down below after the
XXXX's.
> Your argument fails, Von, simply because it equates
> "illegal legal" (a contradiction) with "immoral choice
> (chosen)"
Wrong. Instead it equates "illegal legal" with "immoral
moral", (moral means not immoral) both of which are
contradictory.
a /necessary possibility/ in any moral choice.
Sure, choosing is necessary for any choice, and that's
tautological, so what? You are confused here. What you
instead need is for choosing to be necessary for being moral
(not immoral). But you haven't got that, for were it true
that choosing were necessary for being not immoral, then the
same act, under the different circumstances of being chosen
and not being chosen, would be both moral and not moral (not
immoral and not not immoral).
So again, bottom line is that you contradict yourself when
you speak of
immoral moral.
XXXXXXXXXXX
>> > Vonvegas was saying, in essence, that by the exact same
>> > token you also cannot have an immoral moral obligation.
>> > Such would mean that morality requires you to do what
>> > morality forbids you to do -- a contradiction.
>
>> > So why does it fail?
>>
>> Sorry, James. It does not fail.
>
> It does fail, badly, and I carefully explained why.
>
>> [....Y]our argument would be sound if it were true
>> that "moral obligation" *means* the same thing as
>> "chosen obligation" [...].
>
> It doesn't mean exactly the same thing, or else I wouldn't
> say moral obligation to begin with. I would only say
> chosen obligation.
Since you are acknowledging that they don't mean exactly the
same thing, then you cannot justifiably merely substitute
"chosen" for "moral" as you did. Instead, what you need to
show is that such difference between "chosen" and "moral"
that may exist, makes no difference and not merely declare
it so. You haven't and can't do that.
>
> But that difference has nothing to do with this.
I disagree. A moral act is one that has a certain relation
(compliance) to moral law. A chosen act is one that has a
certain relation to a chooser instead. They are hardly
equivalent.
>
> Any argument that calls a necessary thing an impossible
> thing is obviously hopelessly confused.
Sure, the necessary cannot be the impossible
(snip)
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > Your argument fails, Von, simply because it
> > equates "illegal legal" (a contradiction)
> > with "immoral choice (chosen)"
>
> Wrong. Instead it equates "illegal legal" with "immoral
> moral", (moral means not immoral) both of which are
> contradictory.
Well, yeah, obviously it wouldn't fail as an attack
on my argument if, by "immoral moral," I was saying
"morally wrong obligations that are morally right
obligations."
However, by your OWN admission, that is NOT what I
said. Whatever you might now wish to mean by immoral
moral isn't relevant to assessing whether you have
succeeded in showing any flaw in MY reasoning.
I'll spell it out again for you, so there's no
mistaking it.
Moral (not amoral, in your terminology) obligations
are obligations entered into freely in the making
of a promise (as opposed to imposed or some legal
obligations where you had no choice). Immoral
"moral obligations" are /therefore/ simply obligations
arising from freely made promises that the obligated
person was /morally wrong/ to have made, but which
he did in fact make.
It is morally wrong for me to promise all of my
savings to Tony in exchange for the legal addictive
drugs I crave; but if I've done that, then I've
entered into a "moral (not amoral; aka chosen)
obligation" to Tony, albeit an immoral one.
Illegal legal obligation, too, can, somewhat
dubiously, be seen as not contradictory when
the legal obligation is /unconstitutional/,
i.e., illegal. An illegal legal obligation
survives only until the unconstitutional law
is struck down.
> a /necessary possibility/ in any moral choice.
>
> Sure, choosing is necessary for any choice, and that's
> tautological, so what? You are confused here.
No. You the one confused, I'm afraid.
Just look here...
> What you instead need is for choosing to be
> necessary for being moral (not immoral).
If the word moral in moral obligation meant
"morally right" instead of "chosen-not-imposed"
then you would have a valid point.
But you cannot pull a "Jim Kleiner" on me and
simply TELL me that /I/ was the one who MEANT
an illogical thing instead of a tautological
thing.
If you wish to play fair, then /I/ am the one
who gets to tell /you/ what /I/ mean.
And /you/ are the one who gets to tell /me/
what /you/ mean.
If /you/ mean that /I/ meant immoral moral
obligation is a contradiction, well, then you
are simply WRONG. Period. This is not an
argument -- it is simply you asking me what
I meant, and me telling you. I know what I
meant, I explained to you what I meant, and you
understood what I meant. Immoral moral obligation
is not a contradiction BECAUSE the word moral
in moral obligation does NOT mean "morally right."
PERIOD. Let's move on.
> [...]
>
> So again, bottom line is that you contradict
> yourself when you speak of immoral moral.
False. If I were contradicting myself, I would know it.
You are simply twisting my words, changing moral
/from/ relevant-to-morality /to/ morally-right and
then /saying/ immoral moral is /thus/ contradictory.
Of course it's contradictory if I let you get away
with that switch. But why should I?
> > [Chosen] doesn't mean exactly the same thing
> > [as moral], or else I wouldn't say moral obligation
> > to begin with. I would only say chosen obligation.
>
> Since you are acknowledging that they don't mean
> exactly the same thing, then you cannot justifiably
> merely substitute "chosen" for "moral" as you did.
I explained the difference between chosen and moral
when I first made the switch. And I explained this
again afterwards. Choice is implicit in all things
moral but not all choice is moral choice, and moral
connotes able to be evaluated as good OR evil, and,
also, I'll add now, moral obligation is a very
commonly used expression to describe obligations
that are not necessarily backed up by law. "I gave
him my word." "He can't enforce that promise in court;
it isn't legal or even morally right for you to do
as you promised you would." "I know this now, but
still I have a /moral/ obligation here. I am not a
liar, you know, and I deeply prize my reputation as
an honest man."
> Instead, what you need to show is that such
> difference between "chosen" and "moral"
> that may exist, makes no difference and not
> merely declare it so. You haven't and can't
> do that.
I have done that and I'll do it again right now.
Choice is implicit in all things moral; moral
obligation /means/ an obligation freely entered
into in the moral-choice act of making of a
promise; /therefore/ switching to chosen obligation
from moral obligation loses some of the merit
of the word moral ("relevant to morality") but
changes /nothing/ insofar as my argument was
concerned.
> I disagree. A moral act is one that has a certain
> relation (compliance) to moral law.
By that logic, a moral law is a law that has a
relationship of compliance with moral law which
is a law that has a relationship of compliance
with moral law which is a law that has a
relationship of compliance with moral law...and
so on ad infinitum.
Instead, a morally /right/ act is an act that
has a certain relation (compliance) to moral
law. And a moral law is a law in the realm
of morality. Period.
> A chosen act is one that has a
> certain relation to a chooser instead.
> They are hardly equivalent.
Tell me how you can say a morally right act
is NOT a chosen act?
You can't, not without contradicting yourself.
They are /equivalent/ WHEN the relevant choice
is a choice between good and evil. Otherwise, you
are engaging in a contradiction when you talk
about moral actions.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
> A philosopher's job is to be rigorously precise, and
> it's nice to see you're making that effort.
Thanks for promotion to philosopher. Does a pay raise come
with that?
>
>> Per your scenario (as modified by me) James, you are
>> stuck with the conclusion that scenario Sam has what
>> you label a not amoral obligation to commit what you
>> and I would actually call murder hence a not immoral/
>> not amoral obligation.
>
> He has an obligation /to Tony/, the one who gave value
> now, for the promise of killing tomorrow. (Killing, not
> murder, of course.) I have no problem saying this because
> I have /specified/ the person /to whom/ the particular
> obligation is owed (without respect to the morality of
> the obligation) and I have NOT done what you seemed to,
> namely, divorced the concept obligation from the question
> of "to whom," and so rendered it a floating abstraction.
Are you listening? Every time you've asked your "to whom"
question I've answered. And never have I rendered it a
floating abstraction. Show me one of my quotes that supports
your mischaracterization or please, puhleeze stop
mischaracterizing.
Believe me, I make enuf mistakes all on my own so that you
don't have to mischaracterize and add to them.
>
>> [...W]hen Sam has a so called obligation to commit
>> what you and I agree is murder, it rightly shocks our
>> sensibilities as it should.
>
> It does shock our sensibilities.
>
> Please refrain, though, from saying you and I would
> call it murder (in *your* scenario) unless you desire
> what you yourself claim could be an irrelevant debate.
OK. No more murder references.
>
> Remember, please, that legal partial-extaction abortion
> kills an innocent human being and so is wrongly called
> murder by many whose sensibilities are shocked. Remember,
> please, that the horrific bombings of Dresden, Tokyo,
> Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed countless thousands upon
> thousands of innocent human beings and shocked the
> sensibilities of the entire civilized world.
>
> If, in your scenario, the hypothetical contract-killing
> of an innocent human being is not illegal then it is not
> murder. We can discuss whether it is immoral or not, and
> I am happy to consider cases where it /is/ immoral as
> well as cases where it is /not/ immoral.
>
> But in either case the mere "shocking of sensibilities"
> is not relevant to that discussion
I agree that it's not logically relevant I was just trying
to get you to start thinking along a different pathline.
I'll speak no more of it.
(snip similar comments)
>> I said "to meet your challenge" which
>> you'll recall was:
>
>> "">to cite even just a
>> > single case where a legal contract to perform an immoral
>> > act does NOT create an obligation" "
>>
>> I've clearly done just that *if* you agree with me that an
>> obligation is something we *should* do.
>
> Well, I don't, so you haven't.
Aha. This is a major point of disagreement between us then,
that is in need of future discussion. Would you at least
agree that, if an obligation were something we should do
after all, then I would have met your above challenge?
>
> I agree that as a general moral rule justifiable by how
> it leads to the long-range purpose of achieving happiness
> in life, one's own obligations *should* be fulfilled,
> especially those that are both chosen and legal.
OK.
>
> However, I most emphatically DO NOT AGREE either that
> the definition of obligation is "something we should do"
> OR that obligations to others (as all obligation involves
> the expectations, reliance and demands of others) exist
> "only when the obligated action is morally proper."
>
> To say either one of those is to render the concept a
> floating abstraction, a mystical notion grounded in
> no logic but in mere feelings.
Really? Despite your present disagreement I could show you
numerous quotes wherein you said/implied that an obligation
is something we should do. Do you want to think about this
some more before I throw up a bunch of quotes?
>
>> But I'm beginning to suspect that we have a possible
>> major problem here and that you don't, probably
>> unconsciously, really think that an obligation is a
>> something that carries with it the idea that
>> it *should* be done.
>
> Unconsciously? Well, remember, I have specifically offered
> the definition of obligation as future behavior expected,
> relied upon and demanded by other reasoning beings, and
> I have said over and over that this includes chosen and
> legal obligations as well as immoral and/or imposed
> obligations.
Yes you've said all that. And now you've made clear to me
that "should" is not even implicitly part of obligation. Got it.
>
> Of course I believe a man *should* fulfill his /chosen/
> obligations (when legal) because that serves his interest
> in long-range cooperation, trade and the other social
> values of civilized society.
And shouldn't a man also fulfill all his chosen not immoral
obligations for ruffly the same reason (i.e. because it's
in his interest to do so)?
And I think down below, if I understand properly, you in
fact say that he should.
>
> However, I do NOT believe, obviously!, that ALL obligations
> should be fulfilled, even those imposed by the laws of a
> dictator or those that might be illegal (unconstitutional)
> or those the fulfillment of which would destroy one's own
> ability to achieve happiness.
OK.
>
>> [...] I'm beginning to realize that perhaps
>> your objection is much more than mere anthropomorphizing of
>> "prescription" but additionally that that word carries with
>> it the idea of "should" and that is what, perhaps
>> unconsciously, is bothering you. Am I right? [..]
>
> No, not at all. It is not any implication of rightness in
> prescription that causes me to "bristle." I am concerned
> simply to be very logically precise, eschewing the use
> of words from human law (prescribe, crime, murder, etc.)
> and the wrongful application of them to morality. Doing
> so may be unintentional and a merely colorful license
> with English in some cases; however it may and often is
> also both a symptom and a cause of a fundamental
> misapprehension concerning the nature of morality.
OK.
>
> Morality is not a thing imposed as a limit to self-
> interest but is a thing properly apprehended and adhered
> to for the /sake/ of self-interest. It is THE method by
> which a reasoning being can achieve his OWN happiness.
> It's therefore not ever a thing "owed to others," ala
> obligation, and any words that might carry such an
> implication ought be carefully scrutinized.
>
>> [...] I *should* behave as prescribed by moral law.
>
> Above caveat noted, I agree with you.
Sorry, after that answer I'm confused again.Let me back
track a bit and make sure I've got this right.
For you there are two types of obligations, the chosen and
the imposed. And the chosen could be amoral or not amoral,
and if not amoral then either right or wrong. And any of the
foregoing could be legal or not. Is that right so far?
And that seems to leave the imposed; with exactly what kind
of moral status, please?
And now you say that in none of the above obligations is
there a should, right? And yet we should discharge those
obligations anyway, right? So whence comes this should?
>
>> I think for you, an obligation possibly is not
>> a *should* but rather you are wrongly treating it
>> more like a fact, which in this case, just expresses
>> the fact that one has what you call an obligation,
>> but that the existence of such doesn't mean that
>> it *should* be discharged. Please comment.
>
> You have me right, once you drop the word "wrongly."
OK.
>
> If you insist on characterizing my definition of
> obligation as "wrong," you will need to say why.
In the first instance, I'm just pointing out that you have
contradictorily said both, that we should and should not,
discharge our obligations so I know your view is not right.
As to my view that an obligation is a something that we
should perform, I think it obvious that an obligation that
we need not perform, loses the whole point of an obligation.
At the moment I have no other specific arguments to offer
but after we discuss it perhaps I can do better.
>
>> [...I thought] if the task was sufficiently heinous
>> like murder, then perhaps you'd begin to suspect
>> error somewhere.
>
> Obligation may be used in a manner /connoting/ should.
> I've nothing against that.
>
> However, it can also be used in a manner carrying
> no such connotation. It can be used to refer to
> some legal obligations and some imposed obligations
> that should be renounced, rejected and defied whenever
> possible.
>
> It a general moral sense, it is correct to say only
> that one's "2-times moral" obligations should be
> fulfilled, meaning, obligations that are so-to-speak
> "moral-moral," i.e., 1. chosen for oneself in the moral-
> choice act of making a promise (not amoral), and
> 2. fulfill-able as contribution-to not a destruction-
> of one's happiness (not immoral).
>
> However, it is NOT correct to say that in a general
> moral sense all moral action is obligation, nor that
> all obligation is moral action.
I think all obligation is moral else it's not an obligation.
> I know. What I thought was, your introducing wrongful
> harm to an innocent third party does not accomplish
> what you intended, and is actually only cause and
> symptom of a mistaken view of morality -- a view
> of morality as being most crucially social and
> somehow "owed to others," as with obligations.
I hope It's clearer that I don't think morality is crucially
social etc.
>
>> [...] All along we had agreed that "moral" had two
>> meanings (not amoral and not immoral) and now you
>> want to tell me there is a third meaning (chosen).
>
> Not a third. "Moral" ("not amoral") describes chosen
> actions that can be evaluated as good or evil by
> reference to a code of values and principles serving
> a long-range purpose, properly happiness.
Note that you are simply dictating or defining "moral" as
being chosen without supporting argument anywhere that I can
see.
> Not all
> choices are moral choices (are "not amoral choices"),
> but ALL that is moral (not amoral) necessarily involves
> choice, with choice of evil being possible but wrong.
Again note that you are just asserting and providing no
evidence for those assertions.
>
> So when I switch to saying "chosen obligation" instead
> of saying "moral obligation," I am ONLY trying to avoid
> someone getting confused about what I mean.
I think you are confusing yourself and me needlessly. Why
don't you just stick to our originally agreed meanings? And
if you want to argue how choice relates to moral, then do so
by providing evidence please.
>Moral modifying
> obligation means what moral means when modifying choice,
> namely, RELEVANT to morality, i.e., a particular choice or
> a particular chosen thing that may be evaluated as good
> or evil. Chosen is thus not a third meaning. It is
> already a part of the meaning of moral.
False. Instead 'All that is moral is also chosen.' may well
be true, but 'All that is chosen is also moral.' is a
falsehood, and this latter is the meaning of your above
sentences (i.e. The chosen is part of the meaning of moral.)
A counter example for you would be the choosing to perform
any amoral act, which then obviously, since that's what
amoral means, is not moral.
What would have been correct, had you said it, would be:
'Some of the chosen is part of the meaning of moral.' But
that would be insufficient for your purpose because to avoid
contradiction (your immoral not immoral) you are trying to
*equate* in the relevant manner, the chosen with the not
immoral, which can't be done. The one is a relation of act
to moral law, while the other is relation of act to chooser.
>
>> [...Y]ou start out by defining a single word (moral)
>> as the relation of an act to moral law and now you
>> confound the word "moral" as being *instead* the
>> relation of act to person. This is flatly inconsistent.
>
> No, that's not what I do.
I disagree so let's look.
>I /start/ with "moral" being a
> relation to a code of values and principles that serves
> a person's proper long-range purpose, his own happiness.
Fine, but this again is a difference that makes no
difference. I say "moral law " and you instead say "code of
values..." but they're the same referent! So you have no
justification for saying no to my proposition which I'll
reword more clearly to:
1. 'A not amoral act is one that has a certain relation (of
compliance or not) with moral law.'
>
> And then I STAY there. I never drift, wobble or morph
> the slightest bit on that definition of morality.
False. Why don't you look at your own definition right above
and notice that nowhere does it say anything about chosen
which you want to *add*.
>
>> [...] You should not mislead but rather leave
>> out the word "meaning" and instead say something like:
>> A moral *and* chosen...
>
> I can say "the morally right choice" and "the choice that
> was made" when that is what I mean to say.
OK.
> However, no,
> I cannot say "moral *and* chosen" when I am using moral
> to mean relevant to morality,
>as if there could possibly
> be such a thing as a moral action that is NOT a chosen
> action.
False, the way you mean it. Suppose contrary to your wishes
(choosing) the state forced you to commit the moral act of
supporting your child (say under penalty of death if you
did not support it). Now you might wrongly argue that after
the state's death threat you succumbed and "chose" to
support your child after all. But that would not be a real
choice but a sham instead, and it would further imply that
all conscious actions were "chosen".
>Moral but not chosen? If I did not choose do
> do something (it was an accident, let's say) then how
> could my action be called moral meaning morally right
> or morally wrong? That wouldn't make sense.
You don't literally mean "be called" (because it could be
wrongly called) but rather you mean "is". Nevertheless your
assertion is false. When you choose life, that choice
obligates you to comply with objective moral law which moral
law, you'll remember, prescribes the optimal behavior a
rational being must perform (such optimal behavior is the
means to the end) in order to properly live. Therefore, if
you fail to willfully choose, when you should, per moral law
have chosen, then you will have done wrong, and doing wrong
is of course a not amoral act.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > You shouldn't, now, introduce a different fuzzy
>> > notion of some "unchosen obligation"
>>
>> There is no fuzzy notion. Please stop with that already.
>> Sam does have an obligation to act not immorally.
>
> If that is NOT fuzzy then you ought to be able tell
> me to /whom/ and /why/ Sam has such a purported obligation,
> and you should be able to define the word obligation
> such that your assertion makes some sense.
Asked and answered. See below for another round.
>
>> That is not fuzzy but arises from the fact that Sam
>> choses life. See below for clarification.
>
> I've seen below. We're almost there...
>
>> [...]
>
>> I place before you life and death, therefore choose
>> life. And life Sam indeed chose, hence his incurred
>> obligation to moral law.
>
> Hence? Obligation /to/ moral law?
Oh, I see the ambiguity here. I meant Sam has an obligation
to *comply* with moral law. I guess I shouldn't leave out
"comply" cause it causes confusion. Sorry.
Sam has the obligation to his *parents* as I've said umpteen
times already. Said more clearly, Sam has an obligation to
his parents to comply with objective moral law. And
arguendo, my use of "obligation" is your definition with my
single modification that an act must be not immoral.
With respect to "hence", the obligation to his parents to
comply with moral law arises when Sam chooses life. And to
attain that end (life), he must logically accept the means
whereby that end can come to fruition, and that means is
moral law. And since moral law prescribes the optimum
behavior for attaining a fully flourishing happy life, he is
obligated to comply with it.
I hope this clears it up once and for all and that you will
refrain from asking me over and over to whom one has an
obligation and that you'll
stop wrongly accusing me of being some kind of touchy feely
mystic or something.
That's doesn't make
> sense. It's fuzzy emotive-speak, I say. If I am wrong,
> define obligation for me. Tell me how one can have an
> obligation to an insentient thing, and to not even a
> being but to a code of values and principles. Here,
> you should define your terms.
Your "code of values..." is equivalent to my moral law.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > The whole point of this
>> > discussion is that there is no such animal as that
>> > religious notion of an "unchosen moral obligation"
>>
>> And I fully agree with that.
>
> Choosing life, or choosing happiness, is one thing.
> Attaining that goal requires a particular method,
> morality and adherence to the values and principles
> of a moral code.
Right. Adherence to moral law.
>
> You propose to call this requirement "obligation."
> I say that such is a fuzzy misapplication of a word
> that literally denotes actions expected, relied upon
> and demanded by other reasoning beings. To have an
> obligation you must be able to logically answer the
> questions, obligation to /whom/ and arising from
> /what/ (from a promise, from a debt, from a law
> imposed as by God or legislation?).
If you've read my above I hope you''ll soon be able to stop
wrongly accusing me of fuzziness, please. If you need
further clarification, please ask.
>
> To say an obligation to do "A" exists if you simply
> need "A" to reach "B" then you have dissolved
> obligation into meaning nothing other than need.
Listen, neither you nor I nor Rand can violate the laws
(facts) of the universe. And one of those facts is the means
end relationship which dictates that in order to attain a
certain end, I suppose dumb luck aside, you must employ a
certain means. You can accept this or not but you can't
violate it. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed.
>
> Need means need, and does not relate to fulfilling
> the expectations and demands of others.
What you call a need is an unalterable fact of reality. Get
used to it.
>
Obligation to
> oneself makes no sense.
I'm not sure you're right about that but arguendo I've
accepted it.
>Obligation to nature makes
> no sense.
Same answer.
>If you wish to say that it is /necessary/
> to adhere to moral principles if you wish to attain
> happiness, just say that. I say it, too.
I have, several times, in several different ways. I hope
it's clearer now.
>
>> [...] You again wanna know to whom and how this
>> obligation has arisen.
>
> Yes.
>
>> [...I]f we [...] know that according to prescribed
>> moral law it is in fact immoral to kill Charles in
>> this circumstance, it would at least sound like a
>> flat out contradiction to say that we both have and
>> have not an obligation to kill Charles. Agree?
>
> It would BE a flat out contradiction to say we have
> and have not an obligation.
OK.
> I haven't said he has
> not an obligation.
???
>
> I have said Sam was obligated to Tony.
Yes, you've wrongly said that.
>I have NOT
> said Sam *should* kill Charles.
I'm not so sure if that's right because you've said
contradictory things about "should". Anyway, an obligation
that one should not keep sounds unusual. Kinda makes you
wonder what the point of an obligation is, doesn't it?
>I have said Sam
> should not have taken $10,000 worth of cocaine on
> a promise to kill Charles, and I say, now, he should
> *not* kill Charles. This does NOT mean, of course,
> that Tony, based on Sam's promise, is not expecting
> and relying upon Sam to keep the promise. (Maybe
> he isn't. If not, the supposed obligation isn't
> there at all.)
>
> I do not say Sam is "obligated" (to whom?)
Sam's parents.
>not to
> kill Charles, any more than he was obligated to take
> or to not take cocaine on a promise (to whom would
> he have been so obligated?).
Same answer.
>He /ought/ to behave
> morally, for his own sake, not for Charles' sake,
> or for anything else.
What exactly does "sake" mean here.
>
>> [...H]ere are the essentials:
>
>> We are creatures of a specific nature and no other,
>> and we live in a specific environment that has whatever
>> characteristics it has and no other, hence if we choose
>> to live then there is a necessary optimum behavior that
>> we must engage in in order to thrive and sustain our
>> lives.
>
> "Necessary." Very good!
>
>> This prescribed by circumstance (the circumstance
>> that both we and our environment have a specific nature)
>> is the objective moral law/order.
>
> (Same problem as before with prescription, but..)
> Very good, again!
>
>> And this answers the question *why* we
>> must always behave morally which is that
>> *if we choose to live* then the means to
>> that end is to follow prescribed moral law
>> which is by reason discoverable.
>
> Absolutely.
>
>> And it also answers how the obligation arises
>> which is by *choosing* life.
>
> What obligation?
The obligation to comply with moral law.
>Where did that come from?
When Sam chose to live he obligated himself to his parents,
and since reality is what it is, that therefore means he
thereby accepted the means to that end (a good life) thus he
should comply with moral law.
>There was
> no mention of obligation in anything there. You are
> "slipping it in" (not unnoticed, BTW.)
The obligation is to the parents. I've said that over and
over and over...
>
>> The question remaining is to whom, if anyone, are
>> we obligated to act in accord with moral law. Of
>> course I'm not sure this is fully correct for its
>> hardly provable, but if I accept as much of your
>> view as I can, James, then I presently think that
>> the notion of tacit consent can legitimately be
>> expanded to the point wherein the child and
>> parent come to a tacit agreement which obligates
>> both.
>
> You are right,
Finally.
>though restricting to parent and child
> is unnecessary. There is indeed tacit agreement to
> certain standards of social conduct,
I object to that because that makes those standards
completely subjective. Unless those standards comply with
objective moral law, there is no objectivity in your system.
I have suggested to you that you could introduce objectivity
by insisting that your "reasoning beings" means that they
are *proper* reasoning beings thus they can discover the
proper code of values (moral law), but you rejected that.
And that rejection makes your system completely subjective
again. And it is no good to argue, as you tried to do, that
the objective dimension could somehow be introduced later
after obligation formation, because then it would make no
sense for us to accept or reject a possible future
obligation, at least on grounds of moral value, precisely
because at that time, we don't know what is objectively
moral. Anyway, the central point is you are a subjectivist;
show proof if you still believe you are not.
>which constitutes
> then a chosen obligation (what I call "moral obligation,"
> never an unchosen thing).
I accept that obligations must be chosen, but the choosing
element is for me, introduced at the time the agent chooses
life.
>
> I've no problem with this, so long as it is not
> meant either A) as a generalized formula for all
> obligation (there are also imposed obligations,
> though there shouldn't be)
I reject imposed obligations because they are immoral hence
no obligation at all.
>OR B) as a generalized
> formula for morality, which does NOT relate to
> obligation, but to one's own moral purpose.
That's confusing you've got perhaps too many negatives in
there and I'm not sure of your meaning of "moral purpose".
Rather than guess, I'll let you clarify it if you wish my
future comment.
(snip)
Vonvegas
Jim Klein
on and I prefer to savor your posts (like a symphony),
so I /still/ haven't read some of the more recent ones.
I just wanna know if I'm getting the gist of the
epistemological point, which I think I caught early on.
It seems that you're saying there is a necessary
inconsistency because we have a genus--obligation--
with two species---call 'em legalobligation and
moralobligation---and that in addition to the differentia
which distinguishes the species (moral/legal), there
is a distinction between the two that would carry to
the genus. Specifically, a legalobligation must be
legal to qualify, whereas a moralobligation (supposedly)
doesn't need to be moral. This would go to an inherent
contradiction in the genus obligation.
Is that close? It would be like saying the genus "pants"
is an article of clothing with two legs and there are two
species, redpants and bluepants, but bluepants only
have one leg, thereby demonstrating the invalidity of
the conceptualized genus.
I'd still say that irrespective of any of that, there is a clear
misidentification going on, but I also caught early on that
this is a useless point to "argue." Anyway, did I get the
gist of your point correctly? TIA.
jk
James E. Prescott
[a lot of very interesting things!]
I regret I've not time to answer today.
I will tomorrow. For now, just this...
> Are you listening? Every time you've asked
> your "to whom" question I've answered. And
> never have I rendered it a floating abstraction.
> Show me one of my quotes that supports your
> mischaracterization or please, puhleeze stop
> mischaracterizing.
I haven't been sufficiently clear. When I say
the obligation is "to Tony," my use of the
word obligation is not a floating abstraction.
BUT, this is not just because I have thrown up
any old answer, "to whom?" Mine is not a floating
abstraction because it was indeed Tony to whom
the promise was made!
If we make even a tacit promise to our parents
to "behave morally" in return for something
(e.g. "you two nurture and educate me from
infancy and in return I promise you, mom and
dad, that someday I'll go to college on my own
dime," or some such similar pledge), then yours
would in that case not be a floating abstraction;
otherwise it is.
for example, I've asked about orphans and the
children in Lord of the Flies. Does morality
have no application to them? I don't think
you've answered yet, but perhaps you have.
I'll go over the rest tomorrow.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
> Von---I've been terribly busy while all this is going
> on and I prefer to savor your posts (like a symphony),
> so I /still/ haven't read some of the more recent ones.
>
> I just wanna know if I'm getting the gist of the
> epistemological point, which I think I caught early on.
>
> It seems that you're saying there is a necessary
> inconsistency because we have a genus--obligation--
> with two species---call 'em legalobligation and
> moralobligation---and that in addition to the differentia
> which distinguishes the species (moral/legal), there
> is a distinction between the two that would carry to
> the genus. Specifically, a legalobligation must be
> legal to qualify, whereas a moralobligation (supposedly)
> doesn't need to be moral. This would go to an inherent
> contradiction in the genus obligation.
>
> Is that close?
It's spot on. My way of saying it was that the "logic" of
definition over the two realms (legal and moral) are
different. Thus the legal definition dictates that if an act
deemed legal is in fact illegal then no valid contract
exists hence there cannot be an obligation. But in the moral
realm, this logic doesn't apply, for according to James'
definition, a deemed moral (not immoral) act but in fact an
immoral act, nevertheless results in an obligation.
Formally expressed between the two obligations we have:
an asymmetrical relation so that what holds true of one
member of a class (the class of all obligations) in one
order (legal) is untrue in the opposite order (moral).
That's flatly inconsistent and it's perhaps worth adding
that it is all the more unforgivable when we, who love
objectivity, know that the inherent subjectivity of the
legal system can only be elevated by mirroring the objective
moral system (i.e. all our man made laws should be moral).
It would be like saying the genus "pants"
> is an article of clothing with two legs and there are two
> species, redpants and bluepants, but bluepants only
> have one leg, thereby demonstrating the invalidity of
> the conceptualized genus.
Very good example and it makes the point vividly.
>
> I'd still say that irrespective of any of that, there is
a clear
> misidentification going on, but I also caught early on that
> this is a useless point to "argue."
I've not dwelled but have moved on to another peculiarity if
not outright inconsistency, namely the role of the chosen.
But this is more murky for me as I've not yet figured out
precisely what the problem is.
Anyway, did I get the
> gist of your point correctly? TIA.
On the button.
Thanks for your interest, Jim. And I'd request that once you
feel you've heard enuf about my ethical views, such as they
are, that you'd render an appraisal.
But no laffing allowed. ;-)
From some of your previous comments I fear I'm gonna get
slammed. But that's OK cause I'd much rather get slammed
then remain blissfully oblivious.
BTW, I've already missed too much of the Olympics and
haven't got enuf time to even read anywhere near all that's
being posted. So don't expect much, if anything out of me
till afterwords.
Vonvegas
Jim Klein
> Thanks for your interest, Jim. And I'd request that once you
> feel you've heard enuf about my ethical views, such as they
> are, that you'd render an appraisal.
> But no laffing allowed. ;-)
>
> From some of your previous comments I fear I'm gonna get
> slammed. But that's OK cause I'd much rather get slammed
> then remain blissfully oblivious.
It's funny you say that, because I was going to beseech
the same of you. I recognize that I get emotional over
thuggery, and particularly political thuggery, but I would
plead that these emotions /follow/ from my identifications
rather than cause them.
But like you, I'd prefer to be demonstrated an asshole in
virtue of the facts than continue being one in evasion of
them. As I think we agree, that's what rationality is all
about. Enjoy the Olympics; you've left more than enough
music for me to bide the time I have for this.
jk
vonvegas
(snip)
> Enjoy the Olympics; you've left more than enough
> music for me to bide the time I have for this.
Btw, I previously failed to mention that your line to
Charles: "You're a child at a symphony, screaming that the
orchestra isn't playing your tune."
was absolutely hilarious.
It's not just a great put down (which I'll file away and
steal for future use) but perfectly captured Charlie's
clueless comments.
Now I gotta really go and get ready for some quality
Olympics time.
Vonvegas
James E. Prescott
>
> > On Feb 12, 9:16 pm, vonvegas <vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
> >
> (snip stuff we agree on and preliminaries)
>
> > A philosopher's job is to be rigorously precise, and
> > it's nice to see you're making that effort.
>
> Thanks for promotion to philosopher. Does a pay raise
> come with that?
Not normally. Better keep your day job.
> [...]
> >> [...]
> >> >"to cite even just a single case
> >> > where a legal contract to perform
> >> > an immoral act does NOT create an
> >> > obligation"
> >>
> >> I've clearly done just that *if* you agree
> >> with me that an obligation is something we
> >> *should* do.
> >
> > Well, I don't, so you haven't.
>
> Aha. This is a major point of disagreement between us then,
> that is in need of future discussion. Would you at least
> agree that, if an obligation were something we should do
> after all, then I would have met your above challenge?
That's a puzzling question. I'll make it easy for you.
The task is X. It's immoral but perfectly legal. To
your parents, you have YOUR understanding of an obligation
not to do it. (Heck, it doesn't have to be merely tacit
for our purposes. I least, I don't think so. Your
parents may have given you an interest-free student
loan in return for you promising you will never, never
never do X. X might be get drunk, or associate with
communists, or sleep with prostitutes, or kill Charles,
or anything at all so long as it is perfectly /legal/
to do it -- sorry, Charles.)
Does your moral obligation (your tacit OR your explicit
promise to your parents) constitute a /legally binding
contract/? We can leave this question hanging for the
moment but I want you to know right up front that I
will say, NO, it is NOT legally binding, otherwise
you, Von, would be backtracking on the premise of the
challenge, which was that X, while clearly immoral, is
NOT to be imagined, by you or by me, as ever being a
thing contrary to the law.
Now then, by the terms of the challenge, you need to
show a case (ANY case) where a legally enforceable
promise that is made, written down and signed by you
(a /contract/, with "Tony," someone is NOT your parent)
to do X does NOT obligate you to do X.
I say it obligates you, to Tony, to do X, and because
it is a legal contract, you can even bring your parents
with you into court and you'll just hear the judge say,
"Sorry, Von. You broke your promise to your parents
when you contracted with Tony to do X, and I even agree
with your parents both that X is immoral and that
you breaking your promise is immoral. But the contract
you made with Tony, while immoral beyond question, is
legal and legally binding in spite of all that."
I see no way for you to meet this challenge. But if
you still think you can, as I said, have at it: X is
immoral but legal. You contract to do X. Show me a
"case X" where a legal contract to do X does not
constitute an obligation (to the other contracting
party) to do X. (I won't dispute you had a prior
obligation to your parents, if that's indeed your
tack. I'll only say it is an obligation you failed
to fulfill.)
> [...] Despite your present disagreement I could
> show you numerous quotes wherein you said/implied
> that an obligation is something we should do.
I certainly DO believe we should fulfill ALL of our
moral (ooops! excuse me! our CHOSEN) obligations
to others. If you promise your parents that you
won't drink alcohol at school, then you shouldn't
drink alcohol at school, and it goes without
saying that you therefore shouldn't enter into a
contract with Tony that requires you to drink
alcohol. And, of course, if you participate
in a free society you should abide by ALL of
the society's constitutional and tolerable laws.
> Do you want to think about this some more before
> I throw up a bunch of quotes?
Throw them up! Maybe I'm wrong about what I've said
or implied. I'm not perfect. Help me out here. (Same
request I have of Jim.)
Now, just below, you are puzzling me to no end...
> > Of course I believe a man *should* fulfill his
> > /chosen/ obligations (when legal) because that
> > serves his interest in long-range cooperation,
> > trade and the other social values of civilized
> > society.
>
> And shouldn't a man also fulfill all his chosen not
> immoral obligations for ruffly the same reason (i.e.
> because it's in his interest to do so)?
"Ruffly" the same?
Look again. I say, "A should do all B for the
sake of C."
You reply to me, "Aha! But shouldn't A /also/ do
/ALL/ B, /including/ all B that is done for the
sake of C, for /ruffly/ the same reason as doing
B for the sake of C?"
Can't you see why that puzzles me? It isn't ruffly
the same. It's exactly the same.
> And I think down below, if I understand properly,
> you in fact say that he should.
Duh!
> [...]
> [...] Let me back track a bit and make sure
> I've got this right. For you there are two
> types of obligations, the chosen and the
> imposed. And the chosen could be amoral or
> not amoral [...]
Choice in general can be "amoral," as in choosing
chocolate over strawberry. But when it comes to a
choice to make a promise, especially a legally
binding promise, you can't really step outside
the realm of morality because you've already
entered the realm of "long-range considerations"
(it is /future/ behavior that you are promising)
in which morality is your proper guide.
> [...], and if not amoral then either right or
> wrong.
Yes, and I would say (as just above) that as a
general rule the promises you make are either
morally right or morally wrong. There may be a
case where a promised behavior ("I promise I'll
eat chocolate next time") is itself morally
neutral, but the mere fact of promising it touches
the moral issue of the rightness of fulfilling
one's promises.
> And any of the foregoing could be legal or not.
> Is that right so far?
Caveats noted, yes.
> And that seems to leave the imposed; with exactly
> what kind of moral status, please?
I believe it is morally wrong to impose obligations
upon people, for precisely (not "ruffly") the same
reason given above but stated now in the negative:
Attempting to force others to do things
they have NOT chosen does NOT serve your
"interest in long-range cooperation, trade
and the other social values of civilized
society."
The obligated behavior might even be morally right,
as not using heroin is morally right. Still, the
legal obligation to never consume heroin as a
recreational drug is morally wrong. That law should
be repealed.
> And now you say that in none of the above
> obligations is there a should, right? And
> yet we should discharge those obligations
> anyway, right? So whence comes this should?
I haven't said we should discharge ALL obligations,
whether imposed or not, whether moral or not. I
believe and I have stated all along that a person
should live up to all his CHOSEN obligations, and
I already have said why he should do this. Another
reason for living up to his /legal/ obligations
is that he will be punished if he doesn't. (And
he'll deserve punishment in most cases -- most
legal obligations being also chosen obligations.)
So, "whence comes this should" is yet another
puzzling question. I'm just not sure what more
you are asking of me.
> [...Y]ou have contradictorily said both, that
> we should and should not, discharge our obligations
> so I know your view is not right.
What are you talking about? Where have I said we
should and should not discharge an obligation? Do you
"know" my view of alcohol is not right because I
say you both should /and/ should not drink it (should
at home to relax and enjoy; should not when driving
a motor vehicle)? Is that what you are suggesting?
> [...Y]ou are simply dictating or defining "moral"
> as being chosen without supporting argument anywhere
> that I can see.
Open your eyes. I have said that calling an action
morally right or morally wrong implies that it was
a chosen action. Are you disagreeing with that?
Are you saying that's an arbitrary assertion? What
are you trying to say?
> [...I]f you want to argue how choice relates to
> moral, then do so by providing evidence please.
Jesus. Morality is a code of values and principles
to which a man refers in guiding his actions toward
attainment of a long-range purpose, properly happiness.
I have said this to you so many times I'm losing count.
If what I have said is wrong, tell me how. If what I
have said is right, then choosing is OF COURSE! involved
because that's what "guiding his actions" MEANS; it
MEANS /choosing/ one action instead of another because
one CHOICE is morally right and the other CHOICE is
morally wrong.
What other argument or evidence do you require? Tell
me how a man's action when NOT chosen can be called
"immoral"?
You'll try my patience, Von, if you decline this
new challenge and just ask me again and again to
explain the exact same thing over and over!
> > Chosen is [...] already a part of the meaning
> > of moral.
>
> False. [...] A counter example for you would be
> the choosing to perform any amoral act [...].
I did not say moral is a part of the meaning of
chosen. I said chosen is a part of the meaning
of moral. Not all chosen acts are "either moral or
immoral." Some are morally neutral. But all moral
or immoral acts are chosen.
> [...Y]ou are trying to *equate* in the relevant
> manner, the chosen with the not immoral [...].
No I'm not and never have.
> [...Y]ou have no justification for saying no to
> my proposition which I'll reword more clearly to:
> 1. 'A not amoral act is one that has a certain
> relation (of compliance or not) with moral law.'
I haven't said no to that. I agree with it.
> > And then I STAY [with the definition of morality]
> > I never drift, wobble or morph the slightest bit
> > on that definition of morality.
> False. Why don't you look at your own definition right
> above and notice that nowhere does it say anything about
> chosen which you want to *add*.
See above. I don't "add" chosen. Guiding his actions
MEANS choosing one course for himself over another.
Chosen is thus already there, and you know this perfectly
well. Be honest. Stop saying you don't. Puleeese!
> > I cannot say "moral *and* chosen" when I am using
> > moral to mean relevant to morality, as if there
> > could possibly be such a thing as a moral action
> > that is NOT a chosen action.
> False, the way you mean it. Suppose contrary to your wishes
> (choosing) the state forced you to commit the moral act of
> supporting your child (say under penalty of death if you
> did not support it). Now you might wrongly argue that after
> the state's death threat you succumbed and "chose" to
> support your child after all. But that would not be a real
> choice but a sham instead, and it would further imply that
> all conscious actions were "chosen".
This doesn't make sense, but I leave it un-snipped and
invite you to explain what the heck you're talking about
here. What do you mean by an unchosen conscious act? What
is the relavance to the morality of my action if I am
forced to do something by the state against my will?
And, most importantly perhaps, where do you come off
telling /me/ what /I/ mean and then offering as an
"example of what you mean" something that I don't even
understand, much less see the relevance of?????
> > Moral but not chosen? If I did not choose do
> > do something (it was an accident, let's say) then how
> > could my action be called moral meaning morally right
> > or morally wrong? That wouldn't make sense.
> [...] When you choose life, that choice obligates you
> to comply with objective moral law which moral
> law, you'll remember, prescribes the optimal behavior a
> rational being must perform (such optimal behavior is the
> means to the end) in order to properly live.
Obligates you "to your parents." My parents are
dead.
> Therefore, if you fail to willfully choose, when you
> should, per moral law have chosen, then you will have
> done wrong, and doing wrong is of course a not amoral
> act.
You are saying yourself that choice is involved. Prove
it, prove it, prove it! :-)
Okay. Now that you have conceded my point, you have
inserted without argument or evidence that some
"obligation" (to parents) is involved in moral
behavior. So let's look at your "next round"...
> [...]
> Sam has the obligation to his *parents* as I've
> said umpteen times already. Said more clearly,
> Sam has an obligation to his parents to comply
> with objective moral law. [...]
My parents are deceased so I've no obligation
to behave morally. You and I are in agreement.
Hallelujah!
> [...]
> Your "code of values..." is equivalent to my moral law.
It's exactly the same. You and I agree. Hallelujah!
Let's move on to other subjects. Epistemology perhaps?
> [...]
> > If you wish to say that it is /necessary/
> > to adhere to moral principles if you wish
> > to attain happiness, just say that. I say it, too.
>
> I have, several times, in several different ways. I hope
> it's clearer now.
It is. We agree! There is no obligation to behave
morally unless you promised your parents that
you would.
For myself, I don't recall ever making such a
promise to my parents, and they died many, many
years ago anyway, so the point is moot.
I should behave morally simply because morally
is good for me and immorally is bad for me, and
I have no obligation to do so, to anyone or to
anything, living or dead.
You and I agree, FINALLY, about morality and
obligation, though for you, perhaps, you
happen to have living parents to whom you
made some such promise when you were a
baby (well, let's just say sometime after
the first trimester anyway!).
I didn't and I don't have parents, but if you
will concede that I am still a moral man we
can finally declare ourselves in total agreement
and simply move on.
> [...]
> > He /ought/ to behave
> > morally, for his own sake, not for Charles' sake,
> > or for anything else.
>
> What exactly does "sake" mean here.
It's a Japanese libation. But not here.
Here, for the sake of, means, in order to promote
the interest of. It's a common English expression.
I do like that Japanese drink, though. It's very
soothing, and legal, too.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
vonvegas
(snip)
> I say it obligates you, to Tony, to do X, and
because
> it is a legal contract, you can even bring
your parents
> with you into court and you'll just hear the
judge say,
> "Sorry, Von. You broke your promise to your
parents
> when you contracted with Tony to do X, and I
even agree
> with your parents both that X is immoral and that
> you breaking your promise is immoral. But the
contract
> you made with Tony, while immoral beyond
question, is
> legal and legally binding in spite of all that."
Sigh. You wrongly have us (it's better to say
scenario Sam instead of "us") back in the
courtroom with some judge deciding, but judges
don't decide moral questions - and moral, not
legal, questions is what we're discussing.
Please pay closer attention so you can know what
we are talking about. The court is irrelevant
here cause we (James/Vonvegas) have no
significant legal dispute. Please try to retain
context.
> I see no way for you to meet this challenge.
I agree you don't see it.
>But if
> you still think you can, as I said, have at it:
Already done. Again, it is your initial scenario
with, at that time, the sole modification that
instead of paying 10 grand for Tony's cocaine,
Sam will whack Charles instead.
>X is
> immoral but legal. You contract to do X. Show
me a
> "case X" where a legal contract to do X does not
> constitute an obligation (to the other
contracting
> party) to do X.
We both accepted long ago that the scenario law
says there is a legal obligation to Tony.
Our dispute is whether there is a scenario moral
obligation to Tony, and that was your challenge.
> (I won't dispute you had a prior
> obligation to your parents, if that's indeed your
> tack.
I guess we've now explicitly added to the
scenario that Sam indeed had a prior moral
obligation to his parents not to whack innocents.
> I'll only say
> it is an obligation you failed
> to fulfill.)
More precisely, it is an obligation that Sam
will fail to fulfill if he executes the contract
by executing Charles, but Sam hasn't done that
yet at the point of interest and relevant to our
present discussion.
On the assumption that obligations *should* be
discharged, the problem for you is that if you
say that Sam has a not immoral obligation (to
Tony) and simultaneously acknowledge that he
also has a not immoral obligation to (in my case
his parents; in your case to his fellow members
in the society?), then that is obviously
contradictory. Nor can contradiction be avoided
by declaring that Sam's obligation to Tony is
really an immoral obligation because then we
still have the problem that for the single
possible future act of whacking, we have the
parent obligation saying it should not be done
while the Tony obligation says it should be done.
The only way out of this seems to be by denying
that an obligation is a should, which indeed is
what you have/must do. But there seem to be two
problems with that which require adequate
explanation. First, an obligation that doesn't
require it be fulfilled seems to be pointless
(see below for more detail). Secondly, you
nevertheless correctly IMO, speak of shoulds,
and if there are such things as shoulds yet not
arising from obligations, then you must
adequately answer from where/how do they come about?
So, unless you have persuasive solutions to the
two problems I've raised here, then I think
you're logically forced to admit that your
challenge has successfully been met, and then
your system collapses.
>
>> [...] Despite your present disagreement I could
>> show you numerous quotes wherein you
said/implied
>> that an obligation is something we should do.
>
> I certainly DO believe we should fulfill ALL
of our
> moral (ooops! excuse me! our CHOSEN) obligations
> to others. If you promise your parents that you
> won't drink alcohol at school, then you shouldn't
> drink alcohol at school, and it goes without
> saying that you therefore shouldn't enter into a
> contract with Tony that requires you to drink
> alcohol. And, of course, if you participate
> in a free society you should abide by ALL of
> the society's constitutional and tolerable laws.
And the source of all those "shoulds" is ???
>
>> Do you want to think about this some more before
>> I throw up a bunch of quotes?
>
> Throw them up! Maybe I'm wrong about what
I've said
> or implied. I'm not perfect. Help me out
here. (Same
> request I have of Jim.)
There's no need just yet for me to go hunting
for other quotes because I'm not really
interested in gotcha and besides you just said:
">I certainly DO believe we should fulfill ALL
of our
> moral (ooops! excuse me! our CHOSEN) obligations
> to others."
which itself *seems* to suggest that obligations
are shoulds. But apparently you'll say that they
are somehow not shoulds but we nevertheless, for
reasons you've not yet given, should fulfill
them anyway. And if so, then the two previous
points mentioned, still need be addressed:
First, an obligation that doesn't require it be
fulfilled seems to be pointless. Why in the
world would someone enter into a contractual
relationship if, as your definition puts it, if
there were no *expectation* that his partner's
obligation would be fulfilled? Doesn't a
contracting partner *rely* that his
counterpart's obligation will be fulfilled?
Secondly, you nevertheless, correctly IMO speak
of obligations, and also situations wherein
you'd say there is no obligation to anyone (e.g.
the repeal of an unjust law) that nevertheless
*should* be fulfilled( i.e. repealed); but
wherefrom, if not obligation, does that should
arise?
> Now, just below, you are puzzling me to no end...
And you are quibbling and wasting both our times
on irrelevancies.
But since you bring this kind of unimportant
crap up, I guess we'll have to go thru it. The
bottom line is that you apparently want to
change my word "ruffly" to "exactly" - big deal.
And if you nevertheless insist upon such a minor
change then you could have very simply said
something like "not ruffly but exactly" instead
of making a big production out of it and writing
a bunch of unnecessary stuff.
>
>> > Of course I believe a man *should*
fulfill his
>> > /chosen/ obligations (when legal) because
that
>> > serves his interest in long-range
cooperation,
>> > trade and the other social values of
civilized
>> > society.
>>
>> And shouldn't a man also fulfill all his
chosen not
>> immoral obligations for ruffly the same
reason (i.e.
>> because it's in his interest to do so)?
>
> "Ruffly" the same?
Yes, ruffly.
> Look again. I say, "A should do all B for the
> sake of C."
No you didn't. So you look again.
> You reply to me, "Aha!
There was no "Aha!" reply, that's a complete
fabrication. Just look. This is a continuing
problem as you've repeatedly misquoted me.
And my question was straightforward and reasonable.
>But shouldn't A /also/ do
> /ALL/ B, /including/ all B
Your mischaracterization is just annoying
baloney and it tells me you aren't paying much
attention to what you write and that you're
beginning to turn into Charles. Now let me call
attention to what you actually initially wrote
(which you can verify by looking up above, but
I'll quote it again for you) which was
"/chosen/ obligations (when legal)". You see
that qualifying phrase "when legal"? That means
that you are excluding something, perhaps the
non legal and/or illegal obligations, so
contrary to what you claim, you never did say
"All B" nor did I therefore say the silly "All B
including all B". Instead I asked you, quite
properly, if it weren't the case that all not
immoral obligations, both legal and otherwise
should be done for the articulated reason.
>that is done for the
> sake of C, for /ruffly/ the same reason as doing
> B for the sake of C?"
> Can't you see why that puzzles me?
No. And can you see why I'm annoyed?
>It isn't ruffly
> the same. It's exactly the same.
Big deal. If that was indeed your point, why
didn't you just say "exactly" instead of all the
foregoing? And btw so that you fully understand,
the reason I used "ruffly" was because for all I
knew you had perhaps slightly different reasons
for different types of situations/obligations, see?
>
>> And I think down below, if I understand
properly,
>> you in fact say that he should.
>
> Duh!
Yeah, duh Sherlock.
Look, let's please stop this kind of nit
picking, for nothing of importance stands on
whether it's ruffly or exactly, and i'll be
happy to accept your exactly. Let us please not
allow this conversation to deteriorate into
childish nonsense. We've been having a real
exchange of ideas here and tho I won't presume
to speak for you, I'm learning a lot.
(snip your clarifications of what an obligation
actually is)
Sorry, I still don't fully get it and I smell
another problem here, tho perhaps I just don't
understand your position. I'm now struggling to
more clearly understand the very basic skeletal
structure of the universe of all possible
obligations, according to you.
We have a variety of theoretically possible
types of obligations. The relevant variables
seem, within your system, to relate to one
another in a non straightforward way which I
think is the source of my present confusion.
Anyway, the relevant variables apparently are:
chosen, imposed, amoral, immoral, not immoral,
legal, nonlegal, and illegal. I think that's it,
right?
Would you please, using those specific variables
as descriptors, identify all possible *types* of
obligations (e.g. chosen immoral legal, imposed
immoral legal, etc) so I can get them straight,
and see if they make sense, once and for all.
>
> The obligated behavior might even be morally
right,
> as not using heroin is morally right. Still, the
> legal obligation to never consume heroin as a
> recreational drug is morally wrong. That law
should
> be repealed.
Should be repealed? Why, is of course the
question. To what exactly are you appealing when
you say "should" in this case? There obviously
is no obligation to *anyone* to repeal this law;
and anyway, for you, as you've said, an
obligation doesn't entail a should, as it does
for me. But nevertheless you say we "should"
repeal this law without stating the reason for
this should. Is it moral law after all, to
which, I say, we have an obligation (to our
parents) to comply with all it prescribes?
If it is ultimately moral law, to which you
appeal for our shoulds, (and way down below, if
I understand rightly, you say that that's indeed
your position) then I throw back to you your
very own arguments/questions i.e. How can an
inanimate object like moral law "teach" or "say"
or "tell us" or "be the authority of" or
"prescribe" what we *should* do? I've previously
answered these questions to my satisfaction but
last I heard you were still uncomfortable with
my responses. If so, then what are your better
answers?
And keep in mind that when I previously said we
had an obligation (and also please remember that
for me obligation entails should) to comply with
moral law you called it no less than bizarre.
Yet ultimately you argue, just as do I, that
our shoulds arise from moral law. This apparent
contradiction needs explanation.
>
>> And now you say that in none of the above
>> obligations is there a should, right? And
>> yet we should discharge those obligations
>> anyway, right? So whence comes this should?
>
> I haven't said we should discharge ALL
obligations,
> whether imposed or not, whether moral or not. I
> believe and I have stated all along that a person
> should live up to all his CHOSEN obligations, and
> I already have said why he should do this.
Then I missed it. Please refresh my memory and
tell me again to what you are appealing when you
say a person *should* live up to all his chosen
obligations.
>Another
> reason for living up to his /legal/ obligations
> is that he will be punished if he doesn't. (And
> he'll deserve punishment in most cases -- most
> legal obligations being also chosen obligations.)
Not legal but moral obligations is what we're
disputing about. Please address that instead.
>
> So, "whence comes this should" is yet another
> puzzling question. I'm just not sure what more
> you are asking of me.
I am asking you the reason for performing the
tasks of an obligation (particularly a moral
obligation) when that obligation, according to
you, doesn't entail should? Obviously I
disagree with you and would maintain that an
obligation gives rise to a should and in fact is
the central point of an obligation. Further,
there are situations (like your below mentioned
repealing of a law where there doesn't seem to
be an obligation to anyone) which you
nevertheless say we *should* do, but you don't
say why we should?
Anyway, many times, even in this latest post of
yours you've written ruffly "We should..." which
raises the question why? Why, for example should
we not do the opposite or perhaps ignore the
supposed should?
For me, the answer is simple, namely, we should
take an action because it is so prescribed by
moral law, with which we have an obligation (to
our parents) to comply. But you've *both*
apparently rejected that, when you labeled my
notion that we are obligated to comply with
moral law as bizarre; while ultimately
apparently accepting my answer and appealing to
it to explain the existence of should (but
perhaps you'll provide a different/better answer
when you clarify from whence the should arise.)
I do understand, that you say obligations
don't give rise to should either, yet somehow
you nevertheless, broadly speaking, say that we
should keep most of our obligations etc. but
there seems to be no good reason for doing so in
your system. So that's the question. What
exactly is the reason for our should, whether
obligations or not, IYO? To what if not moral
law or at least chosen obligations are you
appealing when you say "should"?
>
>> [...Y]ou have contradictorily said both, that
>> we should and should not, discharge our
obligations
>> so I know your view is not right.
>
> What are you talking about? Where have I said we
> should and should not discharge an obligation?
OK. I'll withdraw the charge that you've
contradicted yourself pending your full answer
on should. But I presently think you've said it
indirectly by implication, but maybe I don't
understand. You just a moment ago again said
that there is no should in obligation and
previously when I had said that we were
obligated to comply with the prescriptions of
moral law you called that bizarre and said that
moral law cannot "prescribe" etc. Given the
foregoing, I see no source of a should
anywhere, which would by implication therefore
mean that we need *not* discharge our
obligations nor any other alleged should. Of
course elsewhere you've clearly stated we should
discharge obligations etc. Ultimately, I cannot
imagine how you can reasonably avoid saying
that we must comply with the prescriptions of
moral law. but perhaps you have a good reply.
Unless you can satisfactorily answer from where
these shoulds emanate you'll be stuck with
saying both we should and yet there is no no
reason to discharge our obligations or any
alleged should.
> Do you
> "know" my view of alcohol is not right because I
> say you both should /and/ should not drink it
(should
> at home to relax and enjoy; should not when
driving
> a motor vehicle)? Is that what you are
suggesting?
No. This is not a question of context but rather
that there seems to be no grounds for any kind
of a should in your system. Frankly, as I've
repeatedly now said, I do not understand how you
can reasonably deny that the source of should is
moral law. In some detail, I'll again remind
that my logic goes something like this:
Because we are creatures of a specific kind,
living in an environment of a specific kind, it
is a fact that there therefore is an optimum set
of behavior to attain whatever end we desire.
This prescribed set of behavior is moral law
which we *should* follow if and when we chose
life. This is how should arises for me and you
sometimes seem to agree.
>
>> [...Y]ou are simply dictating or defining
"moral"
>> as being chosen without supporting argument
anywhere
>> that I can see.
>
> Open your eyes. I have said that calling an
action
> morally right or morally wrong implies that
it was
> a chosen action. Are you disagreeing with that?
Of course I disagree (not that you said it, but
rather that what you said is true; it isn't).
Obviously, just cause an act is right or wrong
doesn't imply it has yet been chosen.
Contrariwise, one may choose to ultimately
perform, an as yet presently unchosen act,
precisely because such an act is right, and that
is exactly what you yourself acknowledge a
little down below.
> Are you saying that's an arbitrary assertion?
It's an untrue and crucially important
assertion; I dunno about arbitrary.
>What are you trying to say?
That you have no legitimate grounds for
declaring that an action that has a specific
ethical value (e.g. right) implies it was
therefore chosen. What gives an act ethical
value is its relation to a moral standard/law
not whether it has additionally been chosen or not.
What is true, hence a fact, is that the subject
(we) must have the capability to choose between
alternatives, else it would make no sense to
speak of his actions as having an ethical value
of either right or wrong (i.e. there'd be no
such thing as morality absent the capability of
our ability to choose). But from that it
doesn't follow that each specific action, from
the universe of possible actions, must be chosen
in order for that action to have an ethical
value - and I think you wrongly believe that it
somehow does follow, which is why you wrongly
think that an action being right means that it
therefore was chosen.
But what actually happens is this. When we
*choose* (which choosing thereby demonstrates
that we indeed have the capability to choose)
life, we have thereby chosen the moral
*standard* (i.e. the by reality prescribed set
of actions which are the necessary means to
achieve our desired end of a good life) against
which all future possible actions are judged as
either compliant (hence right) or not (hence
wrong or neutral) with that standard. Not
required is that a right action, in order to be
right, be by us also chosen. We are perfectly
free to violate our initial choice (life) and
for any possible individual action choose wrongly.
Simply said for any act, being right is a
relation of act to standard whereas being chosen
is a relation of act to chooser.
>
>> [...I]f you want to argue how choice relates to
>> moral, then do so by providing evidence please.
>
> Jesus. Morality is a code of values and
principles
> to which a man refers in guiding his actions
toward
> attainment of a long-range purpose, properly
happiness.
I accept that and it's part of what I call
"moral law" for short. But if you think your
above adequately describes the relation of
choosing to the not amoral, then you are mistaken.
> I have said this to you so many times I'm
losing count.
> If what I have said is wrong, tell me how.
It's not wrong, but inadequate for explaining
the relation of the chosen to the moral. Here's
the situation. You (implicitly) claim relevant
equivalence for "moral" and "chosen", which
equivalence then permits you to *substitute* for
"moral" the "chosen"; thus you transform the
contradiction "immoral moral" into the
noncontradictory "immoral chosen", thereby
defeating the "Immoral Moral Argument" (see
below for more). But that which is right is not
necessarily that which is chosen, at a minimum
for the reason that that which is right, is
right because it has a certain relation to moral
law, not to the person choosing; furthermore
that which is chosen is not necessarily right,
at a minimum for the reason that that which is
chosen, may be chosen merely because it has
appeal to the chooser, irrespective of being
right or wrong. So "moral" and "chosen" are not
equivalent!
Additionally, to choose, ruffly means to select
one or more things, from a collection of *prior
existing* things. And that means that a, for
example, *right action*, was right *before* it
was chosen, and did not become right, in virtue
of being chosen.
If you instead want to insist that the required
(to enable a choosing) prior existent was merely
an action, without any ethical value (i.e. right
or wrong), then you could otherwise consistently
do so. But the problem then becomes that that
would contradict your definition of morality
which, as you know, is a code from which one
seeks *guidance*, but there cannot be guidance
if the act is not known to be either right or
wrong, prior to it being chosen. Absent, prior
to choosing ethical value, the whole enterprise
(morality) would be completely subjective for
that which would be chosen would be right,
merely because it had been chosen by the subject.
> If what I
> have said is right, then choosing is OF
COURSE! involved
Yes, but the word "involved" is very
vague/ambiguous hence nearly meaningless unless
we specify precisely in which way choosing is
involved. Obviously, the tautology 'Choosing is
involved in the act of choosing.' is true. But
the important question here is the truth status
of the following two propositions:
1. 'An action that is right implies that it is
chosen.'
2. 'An action chosen is right, precisely because
it has been chosen.'
Both propositions are false and yet their
implied acceptance ( by arguing they are
equivalent hence substitutable, as in your reply
to the "Immoral Moral Argument" (see next
paragraph) seems to underlie much of your
erroneous thinking.
In particular that erroneous thinking manifested
itself when you tried to avoid the argument that
says that just as there cannot be an illegal
legal obligation, so similarly there cannot be
an immoral moral obligation, by insisting "the
phrase "moral obligation" actually means an
obligation /chosen/ ". You would be correct to
*substitute* "chosen" for "moral" if and only
if, they were relevantly synonymous. However,
"moral" and "chosen" are not relevantly (i.e. in
terms of ethical value) equivalent hence they
are not interchangeable as the above
considerations should now have made clear,
hopefully even to you. And that all means, that
you haven't successfully defended against the
"Immoral Moral Argument", via your wrongful
substitution maneuver, at all.
And finally, I suspect your error comes about
because you equivocate on the word "means" (as
in your ' "moral obligation" actually means an
obligation /chosen/ " ') The word "means" can
here mean either relevantly equivalent, in which
case you'd indeed be justified to substitute
"chosen for "moral" in your defense against the
"Immoral Moral Argument". However, "means" can
also mean that the one (moral) entails the other
(chosen) but in that case they are not
equivalent in meaning, hence not legitimately
substitutable. My guess is that you've
confounded the latter meaning of mean with the
former, hence you didn't recognize that
substitution was illegitimate.
> because that's what "guiding his actions"
MEANS; it
> MEANS /choosing/ one action instead of
another because
> one CHOICE is morally right and the other
CHOICE is
> morally wrong.
Yes, here you have it right, IMO and we note
that this contradicts the "it's right because
its chosen idea". Apparently you understood and
never overtly argued that the chosen was the
moral; but by attempting to substitute the one
for the other you thereby in effect assert they
are relevantly equivalent hence relevantly, the
moral is the chosen and the chosen is the moral,
which is untrue.
>
> What other argument or evidence do you
require? Tell
> me how a man's action when NOT chosen can be
called
> "immoral"?
It is immoral because it doesn't comply with
moral law. An example would be the killing of
innocents. If you would now wrongly retort with
something like:
Don't be silly, Vonvegas, that which has *not*
been chosen can have no ethical value then, as
noted above, let's remember, as you've
acknowledged and yourself asserted, that that
which is at present not chosen, can nevertheless
have an ethical value of say right, and may,
precisely because its preexisting (to choosing)
ethical value is one of being right, guide us
and be the grounds for subsequently choosing it.
>
> You'll try my patience, Von, if you decline this
> new challenge and just ask me again and again to
> explain the exact same thing over and over!
I've no wish to try your patience, James. But
some of your explanations have been
contradictory, illogical and inadequate.
>
>>> Chosen is [...] already a part of the meaning
>>> of moral.
>> False. [...] A counter example for you would be
>> the choosing to perform any amoral act [...].
>
> I did not say moral is a part of the meaning of
> chosen. I said chosen is a part of the meaning
> of moral.
I disagree for you said both; the one overtly,
as you acknowledge, and the other implicitly
when you attempted the substitution maneuver. To
legitimately substitute one word for another, is
to assert they are relevantly equivalent, else
not suitable for substitution.
>
>> [...Y]ou are trying to *equate* in the relevant
>> manner, the chosen with the not immoral [...].
>
> No I'm not and never have.
How can you reasonably deny it when you clearly
*substituted* the one for the other (in your
defense against the Immoral Moral Argument). To
substitute in that manner is to relevantly
*equate* them, else you've no legitimate grounds
for that substitution.
>
>> [...Y]ou have no justification for saying no to
>> my proposition which I'll reword more
clearly to:
>
>> 1. 'A not amoral act is one that has a certain
>> relation (of compliance or not) with moral law.'
>
> I haven't said no to that. I agree with it.
Well, that's good. Thank you.
>
>> > And then I STAY [with the definition of
morality]
>> > I never drift, wobble or morph the
slightest bit
>> > on that definition of morality.
>
>> False. Why don't you look at your own
definition right
>> above and notice that nowhere does it say
anything about
>> chosen which you want to *add*.
>
> See above.
What? Where?
>I don't "add" chosen.
Damnit you do too. Just LOOK at you definition
and you'll not find the word "chosen" anywhere
within it.
>Guiding his actions
> MEANS choosing one course for himself over
another.
Yes, I can see where "guiding" might entail
choosing.
> Chosen is thus already there, and you know
this perfectly
> well.
The word "moral" in your usage, might indeed
implicitly entail the chosen, but that still
doesn't mean they are relevantly equivalent,
hence substitutable-and that's the real point.
>Be honest. Stop saying you don't. Puleeese!
And I similarly politely ask you to be
intellectually honest and recognize that
"equivalence" and "entailment" are quite
different, and it is the former which you need
in order to substitute.
I take it you think I implicitly, for I didn't
overtly, say that there was such a thing as an
unchosen conscious act. OK. It would be an act
(e.g. paying child support) that we were
consciously aware of performing, and yet we
hadn't really *chosen* of our own free will to
perform it, but rather under say penalty of
death threat "chose" it, but such under threat
"choosing" is not choosing at all. For genuine
choosing to occur there must exist a *real* (not
under threat) alternative.
If you understand this present answer, then you
can understand what I am talking about in the
above paragraph which you wrongly assert doesn't
make sense. If my present answer still doesn't
illuminate then let me know, please.
>What
> is the relavance to the morality of my action
if I am
> forced to do something by the state against
my will?
My view is that the mere fact that an act may
have been forced upon us does not change the
ethical value of the act. Thus child support,
whether freely or forcedly paid would be a right
action (under otherwise normal circumstances).
> And, most importantly perhaps, where do you
come off
> telling /me/ what /I/ mean
If we wish to understand each other, we have no
choice but to try to figure out what the other
means (refer). There is no other way. So don't
become upset if I feed back to you my
understanding. If I've misunderstood, then
simply correct it.
I don't question that you mean (intend) well, so
I'm not attacking you personally.
As for my writings, I always intend them to be
crystal clear, fabulously brilliant, and
completely error free; should you ever encounter
otherwise, you can be assured that some imposter
authored them instead ;-)
>and then offering as an
> "example of what you mean" something that I
don't even
> understand, much less see the relevance of?????
I hope I've now made it clear.
>
>> > Moral but not chosen? If I did not choose do
>> > do something (it was an accident, let's
say) then how
>> > could my action be called moral meaning
morally right
>> > or morally wrong? That wouldn't make sense.
>
>> [...] When you choose life, that choice
obligates you
>> to comply with objective moral law which moral
>> law, you'll remember, prescribes the optimal
behavior a
>> rational being must perform (such optimal
behavior is the
>> means to the end) in order to properly live.
>
> Obligates you "to your parents." My parents are
> dead.
So are mine, but they contracted with me that I
would lead a full and lengthy life, and not just
until their demise. Such is the wish of nearly
all parents.
>
>> Therefore, if you fail to willfully choose,
when you
>> should, per moral law have chosen, then you
will have
>> done wrong, and doing wrong is of course a
not amoral
>> act.
>
> You are saying yourself that choice is
involved. Prove
> it, prove it, prove it! :-)
>
> Okay. Now that you have conceded my point,
I've not *conceded* your point, whatever you
were unclearly trying to say. My view is that
absent a real choice (e.g. a threat to kill),
the so called choice to comply with the
threatener's demand is at least morally neutral
(if not right) but the specific underlying act
that is demanded (e.g. paying child support)
either violates moral law or not. Are you, in
your thinking, wrongly running together the act
of choosing to meet a demand with the act of
performing the act demanded?
>you have
> inserted without argument or evidence that some
> "obligation" (to parents) is involved in moral
> behavior. So let's look at your "next round"...
OK.
>
>> [...]
>
>> Sam has the obligation to his *parents* as I've
>> said umpteen times already. Said more clearly,
>> Sam has an obligation to his parents to comply
>> with objective moral law. [...]
>
> My parents are deceased so I've no obligation
> to behave morally. You and I are in agreement.
> Hallelujah!
No. Your parents most likely wished for you a
lengthy happy life which they expected you to
lead, long after they were gone.
Amen!
>
>> [...]
>
>> Your "code of values..." is equivalent to my
moral law.
>
> It's exactly the same. You and I agree.
Hallelujah!
Yes, on that point we agree.
> Let's move on to other subjects. Epistemology
perhaps?
Nah. I think there's much to be resolved here.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > If you wish to say that it is /necessary/
>> > to adhere to moral principles if you wish
>> > to attain happiness, just say that. I say
it, too.
>>
>> I have, several times, in several different
ways. I hope
>> it's clearer now.
>
> It is. We agree! There is no obligation to behave
> morally
Yes there is at the precise moment when you
chose life.
>unless you promised your parents that
> you would.
But the child (baby) does "promise" in the only
way open to it. When the child matures to
adulthood, then and only then can he make the
kind of overt *promise* that you now wrongly
seem to demand to create an obligation. You,
yourself agreed somewhere that *behavior* was
implicit consent, right? If so, then an overt
promise is not required.
>
> For myself, I don't recall ever making such a
> promise to my parents,
Your recollection is not required to incur the
obligation to behave morally (not immoral). This
is precisely one reason why I accuse you of
being a subjectivist, because apparently, at
least sometimes, unless you overtly promise and
recall, you need not behave morally (not
immoral). Such a view translates into the false
proposition:
1. ' If I chose it, and *only* because I chose
it, is it a moral (both not amoral and not
immoral) act.'
whereas the true proposition is:
2. 'If I chose life *and* it complies with
resultant moral law, then it's a moral (both not
amoral and not immoral) act.'
>and they died many, many
> years ago anyway, so the point is moot.
As I said, IMO, you obligated yourself to live
beyond their years for you tacitly agreed to
meet their nearly universal parental desire that
you live beyond their demise.
>
> I should behave morally simply because morally
> is good for me and immorally is bad for me,
No, not *simply*. That's a subjectivist view
tantamount to saying the moral equates to what's
"good" for me even if that were to mean say the
killing of innocents. Instead, we should behave
morally, hence comply with moral law, because it
is an objective fact, that all that is moral is
good, but not all that is "good" for us is moral.
>and
> I have no obligation to do so, to anyone or to
> anything, living or dead.
You are obligated to your parents, IMO. What's
wrong with my view?
>
> You and I agree, FINALLY, about morality and
> obligation,
Hardly. Our major disagreements are:
1. There's IMO a fatal asymmetry between your
views of legal and moral obligation. You
acknowledge the asymmetry but somehow don't seem
to see the contradiction.
2. Your defense against the Immoral Moral
argument fails probably because you equivocate
on "means", thereby *equating* acts that are
"moral/chosen" when in fact they are two
entirely different relations; the former of act
relating to moral law and the latter of act to
chooser.
3. Your challenge to show a case X" where a
legal contract to do X does not constitute a
moral obligation, was successfully met, by Sam,
trading for Tony's cocaine, Sam's promise to
whack Charles.
4. You say I've not done #3 because an
obligation is not a should. That makes no sense
to me at all. If an obligation to perform an act
doesn't entail should, then the only difference
between an obligated act and that same act not
under obligation, is the empty ceremony of
promise. It is empty because if there's no
should, that promise need not be kept; just as
is the case when that act is not under
obligation. IOW if there's no should, then
there's no essential difference between an
obligated and unobligated act, save the empty
ceremony which commits one to nothing.
Furthermore, IAW your definition of
"obligation", it is difficult to see why anyone
else would *rely* and *expect* an obligation to
be discharged, absent a should. Simply said, an
obligation without should, is pointless.
Lastly, you nevertheless speak of shoulds
without IMO providing an adequate explanation of
how these should arise.
5. Finally, for me, the obligation (a should) to
comply with objective moral law occurs at the
time of (tacit) choosing of life. Therefore
moral law is an objective fact (prescribed code
of behavior) that we must by reason discover.
And that prescribed behavior includes the right
choices we should make in the future; which is
what I think your system ignores/lacks.
For you, as best as I understand it, the only
time an act has ethical value (say right) is
when you choose it. But that, IMO, at the worst,
translates into either the subjectivist notion
that an act is right, merely in virtue of being
chosen, which is wrong. At best it doesn't
recognize that an unchosen act, that per moral
law should have been chosen, is a failure to
comply with the prescription of moral law, which
is also wrong. Thus I still think you are at
root a subjectivist but I cannot make this
criticism any clearer or decisive at the moment;
perhaps when you answer my request for an
exhaustive list of types of obligations, this
will become more evident.
The role of choice in morality is IMO ruffly the
following. Morality is not merely a function of
our subjective choice. Rather it is a product of
our choice coupled with the objective fact of
reality that for creatures of our kind, there is
an optimal set of behavior which is the means to
the chosen end (here a good life). That optimal
set of behavior (prescription for how to lead a
good life) is the moral *standard* (moral law)
by which all our other specific future acts,
subsequently chosen or not, are judged to be
either in compliance with that standard (hence
right) or not (hence wrong).
Your erroneous premise, that the right always is
chosen, overlooks the fact that once we've made
the fundamental choice (to live well) the
resulting moral law that arises therefrom, by
declaring certain specific acts as right acts,
thereby prescribes a whole host of those
specific right actions that we should perform to
attain our goal of living well. But we are
completely free to not choose or ignore/delay
any of those specifically prescribed acts, and
when we do, those are precisely examples of
unchosen acts that nevertheless are right but we
wrongly neglected to perform them.
>though for you, perhaps, you
> happen to have living parents to whom you
> made some such promise when you were a
> baby (well, let's just say sometime after
> the first trimester anyway!).
My parents are deceased as well.
>
> I didn't and I don't have parents, but if you
> will concede that I am still a moral man we
> can finally declare ourselves in total agreement
> and simply move on.
Whether you are moral or not is not a question
of my conceding it to be so, but rather an
objective function of whether your actions
comply with moral law. There's no reason to
doubt you so if you say so, I can easily accept
that you are a moral person.
>
>> [...]
>
>> > He /ought/ to behave
>> > morally, for his own sake, not for
Charles' sake,
>> > or for anything else.
>>
>> What exactly does "sake" mean here.
>
> It's a Japanese libation. But not here.
LOL.
>
> Here, for the sake of, means, in order to promote
> the interest of. It's a common English
expression.
>
> I do like that Japanese drink, though. It's very
> soothing, and legal, too.
Please just ensure that you partake of it
*after* you've written your response, cause I've
got enuf trouble understanding normal english.
No, I take that back. Instead I'll be sure to
imbibe plenty before I read your response, then
all will be clear, no matter what you write. :-)
Vonvegas
vonvegas
> On Feb 15, 1:42 am, vonvegas
<vonve...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>> James E. Prescott wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>> > Your argument fails, Von, simply because it
>> > equates "illegal legal" (a contradiction)
>> > with "immoral choice (chosen)"
>>
>> Wrong. Instead it equates "illegal legal"
with "immoral
>> moral", (moral means not immoral) both of
which are
>> contradictory.
>
> Well, yeah, obviously it wouldn't fail as an
attack
> on my argument if, by "immoral moral," I was
saying
> "morally wrong obligations that are morally right
> obligations."
Right, it wouldn't fail.
>
> However, by your OWN admission, that is NOT
what I
> said.
Right. You did not *say* that but the problem
James is that you sometimes *say* things that
are contradictory and more to the present point,
what you *say* is not necessarily what *is* the
case. And ultimately we both should be
interested not only in what each of us may *say*
but rather that which we *say* and indeed *is*.
Just as you never presumably mean (intend) to
contradict yourself, so you never say, nor
apparently *mean* (i.e. intend), that "moral"
(in immoral moral) means not immoral; yet that
is what I say, and what it in fact would mean
were you *consistently* following the logic
(which we both agree upon) of the legal realm
and were applying it to the moral realm. But you
think you have good reasons to not apply it in
the moral realm.
And I tell you that those alleged good reasons,
whatever they are, are irrelevant, and cannot
change nor justify the basic fact that there is
an asymmetry in the meaning of obligation as you
define it in both domains. When what holds true
of one member of a class (the class of all
obligations) in one order (legal) is untrue in
the opposite order (moral), that is a
definitional contradiction. Period.
You don't actually deny that this asymmetry
exists rather you don't seem to see the problem,
thus you argue that this state of affairs is
somehow OK.
But all the foregoing, tho quite true, is not
immediately our present dispute.
>Whatever you might now wish to mean by immoral
> moral
Here's our immediate dispute. Which one of us is
changing the definition of "moral"? And I am not
the one attempting a definitional change and all
you need do is *look* at the record of all our
posts to prove it. Instead you are trying to
change it by now claiming moral *means* (i.e. is
relevantly equivalent to (hence they are
substitutable) chosen, when "moral* has never
meant such and instead means ruffly what we
initially said it means (i.e. not amoral hence
having an ethical value of right or wrong; or
not immoral hence having the ethical value of
right).
What is true is that you have, I believe since
at or near the beginning, said that a specific
type of obligation (a moral obligation) is one
that is chosen. But that doesn't mean that the
chosen is the say right, nor vice versa. Any
choosing, in this case choosing an action,
cannot and does not, in virtue of the choosing,
change the preexisting character, in this case,
ethical value (either right or wrong), of that
which is chosen. This should be even more
evident once we realize that to chose, is a
relation of an act, in this case the act of
choosing, to a person; contrariwise, an ethical
value of say right, is a relation of act to a
standard, in this case moral law.
Furthermore, to choose means to select one or
more objects from a collection of *preexisting*
objects, which in turn means that the
preexisting object, in this case a right action,
has the property of being right *before* it was
chosen. In fact, as you yourself acknowledge
somewhere, we may sometimes ultimately choose a
specific action precisely because it has the
ethical value (right) it has.
So the important point of all the foregoing is
to make very clear that the "moral" (the right)
is not synonymous with the "chosen". And if they
are not synonymous then you cannot merely
*substitute* the one (chosen) for the other
(moral) and by that substitution maneuver
thereby attempt escape from the Immoral Moral
Argument.
>isn't relevant to assessing whether you have
> succeeded in showing any flaw in MY reasoning.
irrelevant because your premise (that I'm
attempting redefinition) is false.
>
> I'll spell it out again for you, so there's no
> mistaking it.
OK.
>
> Moral (not amoral, in your terminology)
obligations
> are obligations entered into freely in the making
> of a promise (as opposed to imposed or some legal
> obligations where you had no choice).
But here's you blatantly again redefining by
introducing the phrase "entered into freely",
which redefinition, you deny and accuse me of
instead. But *look* at our previous posts and
our agreed upon usage of "moral" and you'll see
it said nothing about chosen, hence you are
redefining. And once you've satisfied yourself
that our initial usage did not reference chosen,
then tell me honestly, who is therefore
attempting redefinition by trying to make
"moral" and "chosen" relevantly synonymous hence
substitutable?
Look, we from the git go ruffly said that moral
is ambiguous between having the dimension of
right or wrong, and being right. That was our
initial agreed usage and I daresay would comport
with nearly universal meaning of that term, for
whatever that's worth. The relation of act to
chooser is a completely different relation than
of act to a standard of value, and I'd never
agree that they meant the same thing, and
neither should you. And I conjecture you'd
normally never equate them if you didn't so
desperately need that to avoid contradiction,
which seems to be blinding you to reality.
>Immoral
> "moral obligations" are /therefore/ simply
obligations
> arising from freely made promises that the
obligated
> person was /morally wrong/ to have made, but
which
> he did in fact make.
That's how you are dictating (i.e. by defining)
what properties obligations, which you label as
moral, have. But that still doesn't mean that
moral means chosen and you *in effect* actually
acknowledge such; lemme see if I can prove that
to you. Immediately above, you say that the
person was morally wrong (immoral). But why was
he immoral? Because he chose an underlying
immoral act, is the answer. But the fact that
the underlying act was chosen, in no way
changes/alters the ethical value (i.e. wrong) of
that underlying act and it still remains
immoral; simply put, the choosing does not
change the ethical value (either right or wrong)
therefore "moral" and "chosen" cannot be
synonymous, hence substitutable.
> It is morally wrong for me to promise all of my
> savings to Tony in exchange for the legal
addictive
> drugs I crave; but if I've done that, then I've
> entered into a "moral (not amoral; aka chosen)
> obligation" to Tony, albeit an immoral one.
OK except for "aka chosen" which again attempts
to wrongly equate chosen with moral.
>
> Illegal legal obligation, too, can,
If "can" means *is possible* then sure, anything
can be *wrongly* judged. But I don't think
that's what you mean here. Instead you mean
something like "legitimately can" or "properly
can" instead.
>somewhat dubiously,
No, not somewhat dubiously but wrongly instead.
>be seen as not contradictory when
> the legal obligation is /unconstitutional/,
> i.e., illegal.
If it is deemed legal, then the deemer is wrong.
>An illegal legal obligation
> survives only until the unconstitutional law
> is struck down.
Right. But this again is a *legal* discussion
and not *moral* hence off present topic. Our
dispute is in the moral domain.
>
>> a /necessary possibility/ in any moral choice.
>>
>> Sure, choosing is necessary for any choice,
and that's
>> tautological, so what? You are confused here.
>
> No. You the one confused, I'm afraid
In what way?
>
> Just look here...
>
>> What you instead need is for choosing to be
>> necessary for being moral (not immoral).
>
> If the word moral in moral obligation meant
> "morally right" instead of "chosen-not-imposed"
> then you would have a valid point.
Right. And the fact that an obligation has been
chosen, if it has, doesn't alter its ethical
value (e.g. right).
>
> But you cannot pull a "Jim Kleiner" on me and
> simply TELL me that /I/ was the one who MEANT
> an illogical thing instead of a tautological
> thing.
>
> If you wish to play fair, then /I/ am the one
> who gets to tell /you/ what /I/ mean.
Yes, I accept you mean (intend) to not
contradict yourself and instead provide a
consistent view, but unfortunately that doesn't
mean it *is* so.
>
> And /you/ are the one who gets to tell /me/
> what /you/ mean.
Sure. But if I assert two things that are in
fact contradictory, I cannot defend myself on
grounds that I mean *not* to contradict myself,
right? That is essentially what you are doing,
but rather than directly asserting contradictory
things about something or other, you are instead
*defining* "obligation" contradictorily, and
then insisting that you don't mean (intend) to
contradict yourself. I accept you don't intend
contradiction but what *is* the case is
something other than what you intend.
>
> If /you/ mean that /I/ meant immoral moral
> obligation is a contradiction, well, then you
> are simply WRONG. Period.
You are equivocating on "mean". I can accept
that you don't mean (intend) a contradiction,
but unfortunately, that *is* what is the case.
>This is not an
> argument -- it is simply you asking me what
> I meant, and me telling you. I know what I
> meant,
Yes, you *intended* to not contradict.
>I explained to you what I meant, and you
> understood what I meant.
Yes, I understood.
>Immoral moral obligation
> is not a contradiction BECAUSE the word moral
> in moral obligation does NOT mean "morally
right."
> PERIOD.
But it *does* mean (refers) morally right, were
you consistent in the moral realm with your
logic in the legal realm. The fact that you are
inconsistent between the two realms
(legal/moral) is a problem; but that
inconsistency permits you to argue that "moral"
doesn't mean right, but means chosen instead,
which overlooks the fact that just cause it was
a chosen act, the act of choosing doesn't
affect/alter its underlying ethical value of
right, which shows they are not equivalent in
meaning.
>Let's move on.
See my other post for more, please.
>
>> [...]
>>
>> So again, bottom line is that you contradict
>> yourself when you speak of immoral moral.
>
> False. If I were contradicting myself, I
would know it.
And humility is one of your greatest virtues, right?
>
> You are simply twisting my words, changing moral
> /from/ relevant-to-morality /to/
morally-right and
> then /saying/ immoral moral is /thus/
contradictory.
Here you are arguing that "moral" doesn't mean
chosen but means not amoral instead, hence it is
not contradictory. But that's wrong and
overlooks the fact that a not amoral act must
have an ethical value of either immoral or not
immoral. And in those cases where its value is
the latter, you have immoral not immoral, which
is a flat out contradiction. See?
>
> Of course it's contradictory if I let you get
away
> with that switch. But why should I?
I'm not switching. It's you who started out
saying that "moral" meant not amoral, which
neglects the relation of genus not amoral to
species immoral or species not immoral. In
short, immoral and not immoral acts are also not
amoral.
And this overlooks the distinction between
equivalent and entailment. And to justify a
switch in meaning the switchees must be
equivalent and not merely that "moral" entails
"chosen" or vice versa. See my other post for
more please.
>
>> Instead, what you need to show is that such
>> difference between "chosen" and "moral"
>> that may exist, makes no difference and not
>> merely declare it so. You haven't and can't
>> do that.
>
> I have done that and I'll do it again right now.
>
> Choice is implicit in all things moral;
Yes, in the sense that when we choose life,
reality prescribes our code of behavior (moral
law) that we must follow to attain that good
life. But you seem to be overlooking the fact
that this moral law (which is the standard of
what is right/wrong), by declaring certain
specific acts as right, thereby prescribes a
whole list of specific acts that we should
perform (to meet that chosen goal of life,) and
yet for each of those specific acts, we are free
to choose them or not.
moral
> obligation /means/ an obligation freely entered
> into in the moral-choice act of making of a
> promise; /therefore/ switching to chosen
obligation
> from moral obligation loses some of the merit
> of the word moral ("relevant to morality") but
> changes /nothing/ insofar as my argument was
> concerned.
You're just wrongly decreeing all this and
apparently also overlooking the fact that a not
amoral act must have an ethical value of some
kind (either immoral or not immoral) and when
its value is not immoral the act of choosing it,
doesn't/can't change that ethical value. So when
the ethical value is not immoral, the Immoral
Moral Argument bites.
>
>> I disagree. A moral act is one that has a
certain
>> relation (compliance) to moral law.
>
> By that logic, a moral law is a law that has a
> relationship of compliance with moral law which
> is a law that has a relationship of compliance
> with moral law which is a law that has a
> relationship of compliance with moral law...and
> so on ad infinitum.
Sorry. There's no infinite regress here that I
can see. Moral Law "arises" when we first choose
life for it is the prescribed by reality means
to our end, thus we should follow it to attain
that good life; that moral law then becomes the
*standard* by which all subsequent actions,
chosen or not are judged.
>
> Instead, a morally /right/ act is an act that
> has a certain relation (compliance) to moral
> law. And a moral law is a law in the realm
> of morality. Period.
I guess that's right except for the "instead".
>
>> A chosen act is one that has a
>> certain relation to a chooser instead.
>> They are hardly equivalent.
>
> Tell me how you can say a morally right act
> is NOT a chosen act?
As you yourself said, we may chose to perform a
specific act, precisely because it is right
(i.e. in accord with moral law), which then
means that its rightness existed *prior* to our
choosing that specific act. There's an example.
>
> You can't, not without contradicting yourself.
I did and I didn't.
Show me where I contradicted myself, please.
>
> They are /equivalent/ WHEN the relevant choice
> is a choice between good and evil. Otherwise, you
> are engaging in a contradiction when you talk
> about moral actions.
No. Again, a moral act is a relation of act to
moral standard; while a chosen act is a relation
of act to chooser.
Vonvegas
Jim Klein
> Thanks for your interest, Jim. And I'd request that once you
> feel you've heard enuf about my ethical views, such as they
> are, that you'd render an appraisal.
> But no laffing allowed. ;-)
Okay, I finally read over the missing posts. Naturally, to me
the most interesting part is the formal proof of a contradiction
in Jim P.'s conceptualization of "obligation." I think my
encapsulation of the point was indeed spot on as you noted,
and to me, at least speaking epistemically, it's sufficient.
I also couldn't help but note that as long as your posts were
(and mostly due to extensive citing), Jim's were even longer
containing /his/ various dodges to this singular point. IOW it
usually took you a single paragraph to say what you were
saying, while it took him endless paragraphs strung together
to deny this most obvious of points.
Any way you cut it, his moralobligation and legalobligation
/cannot/ be two differing species of the same genus. On that
basis alone, his entire argument fails and so I reiterate that it
was quite a remarkable job on your part, even if nobody else
understands it. I said from the very beginning that I just /knew/
that his was a giant reductio ad absurdum to me. It's pretty
neat to actually pinpoint the contradiction at the very beginning
as you have. Of course, that's not to imply that there aren't
about a zillion other contradictions along the way!
It's such a simple point too, and really does travel throughout
his so-called "argument." A legalobligation has to be legal to
qualify, but a moralobligation doesn't have to be moral. This
readily explains why so many of the legalobligations that he
pretends are ultimately based in morality, simply aren't. Period.
As to your ethical views, I found nothing laughable, but that's
probably because I'm pretty good at understanding what
people really mean. This would be as opposed to you-know-who,
who delights not only in not doing that, but gets some sort of
charge of /insisting/ that everyone must mean exactly as he
imagines they mean.
The really funny part to me is that you're both coming from
basically the same POV, which largely is consistent with the
classic Objectivist Ethics, both pre- and post-mortem. And
that, of course, is that there /is/ such a thing as objective
morality, or IOW that "is" does imply "ought." You use the
phrase "moral law," which historically can imply a morality
that is handed down from some higher or mystic authority.
Naturally, I recognize that you mean no such thing...you mean
a "law" similar to the "law of immutability" which we might
prescribe to reality...realizing of course that we're not technically
"prescribing" anything by such a usage. We /describe/ reality
and in that same fashion, you /describe/ what you call moral law.
I think this carries to your "contract" and "obligation" stuff with
regard to children and parents. To the degree they're choosing
anything at all, it's to keep living...the rest is using the concepts
at your avail to capture this in an obligation/contractual type
of context. At least I think that's what you're doing and if so, I
don't see any fundamental error there at all.
The only thing I might disagree with about that, which is what
Charles is trying to express I think, is that you /may/ be forcing
the action into a context that simply doesn't apply. Like Charles,
I'm awfully hard-pressed to imagine either contracts or obligations
that are not fully and consciously chosen. OTOH I also understand
your desire to capture the action with the concepts we have, and in
a social interactive context, that tends to come down to those sorts
of concepts. OTOOH, that amounts to epistemic pragmatism!
As tiny a sub-topic as this is, I think the ramifications are huge.
I've
said for a long time now that /easily/ the most troublesome aspects
of a genuinely free society are various ramifications on children.
It's
nearly impossible to say, at least with regard to a baby, that an
adult
may do as he wishes with that baby and it's nobody's business but
his own. We revulse at the mere suggestion, but there are some
fundamental contradictions that arise with any other perspective.
Luckily, the moral being the practical, Greg Swann has resolved this
particular issue intelligently in his recent FAQ. By staying
consistent
with reality--with what our nature /is/--he points out that of course
any
person will do as he wishes with regard to any particular situation,
/and/ live with the consequences. That's quite enough IMO to resolve
the issue of both the monsters that may be out there, as well as the
decent folks who will choose to stop monsters.
For my money, and speaking only from my perspective, once a baby
is able to understand the he himself IS alive and IS a self, that's
quite
sufficient for me to decide to help and/or protect him, and I would
act accordingly. And, of course, suffer or pleasure at the
consequences.
Further, from my POV that happens at a /very/ young age, well before
a child can express it. But interestingly, in Swann's take, even a
day-old
baby could be protected from monster parents...it's just that he
realizes that such a decision is ultimately an individual decision and
so the individual will suffer or enjoy the consequences.
Charles /says/ he understands this, and in large part he does, but
I doubt he'd be willing to carry this understanding--of the /facts/
of the matter--to their logical conclusions.
As far as your opting to make it all some sort of contractual and/or
obligatory context, I can see the point even as I think it may be a
mischaracterization. It reminds me of a point Kolker once made,
how even the most independent and capitalistic of businessmen,
or all of us really, must compromise /some/ principles just to keep
living day-to-day. You're no pragmatist, but you're trying to
conceptualize something critically important with all that you have
with which to work. I think you've got half of the eqation right--the
child, by his nature, /does/ choose to live--but there's some question
as to whether he's thereby conceptualizing this choice into the
further conceptualization of contract and/or obligation.
Still, it gets us where we want to go, so for theoretical purposes,
I don't see anything wrong with it. And it's a damn sight better
than what Charles /says/ he believes...that everyone ought to be
only a slave to the vote of their neighbors anyway. I'd bet my
bottom dollar that he doesn't really believe that in his soul, but
that he's just so focussed on classical options to political
problems, that he simply can't dream up anything else.
jk
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> What is true is that you have, I believe since
> at or near the beginning, said that a specific
> type of obligation (a moral obligation) is one
> that is chosen. But [...] a right action,
> has the property of being right *before* it was
> chosen.
Again, you switch meanings and blame me for your
mistake. I /never/ said (go back and look) that
an obligation is right if it is chosen. I said
only that a chosen obligation can be right /or/
wrong, and is referred to as a moral obligation.
> [...]
> Look, we from the git go ruffly said that moral
> is ambiguous between having the dimension of
> right or wrong, and being right. [...]
Correct. And I adhere to it when I say an immoral/
unethical "moral obligation" is not a contradiction
in terms. When you reply that moral in "moral
obligation" means morally right, /you/ are the one
making the mistake, not me.
> [...S]imply put, the choosing does not
> change the ethical value (either right or wrong)
> therefore "moral" and "chosen" cannot be
> synonymous, hence substitutable.
Correct, IF moral means "being right." But that is
YOUR mistake entirely and has nothing to do with
me or my argument. When moral is used to mean "of
or pertaining to morality/moral choices," then
of course chosen is part of what it means because
morality means chosen by reason, aimed at long range
purpose, and able to be evaluated as good or evil
by reference to a code of values and principles
serving that purpose.
> But it *does* mean (refers) morally right [...]
No, it doesn't.
> [...] were
> you consistent in the moral realm with your
> logic in the legal realm. The fact that you are
> inconsistent between the two realms
> (legal/moral) is a problem [...]
I was not the one being inconsistent. You were.
I never made any such argument as to say that
there are no such things as unconstitutional
laws. YOU introduced that argument yourself;
NOT me. YOU claimed "an illegal law is a
contradiction" so /therefore/ an immoral
chosen obligation must likewise be a contra-
diction. I never said such a thing. Go back
and look.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Jim Klein
> Again, you switch meanings and blame me for your
> mistake. I /never/ said (go back and look) that
> an obligation is right if it is chosen. I said
> only that a chosen obligation can be right /or/
> wrong, and is referred to as a moral obligation.
What, you really don't see the point? So can a
legalobligation be legal /or/ not legal? No, it can't.
You can change your moralobligation to "chosen
obligation," as you basically do here, but then your
whole "argument" falls apart. You NEED that moral.
Go ahead. Make 'em legalobligations and
chosenobligations, and see what happens.
jk
Charles Bell
> It's not just a great put down (which I'll file away and
> steal for future use) but perfectly captured Charlie's
> clueless comments.
>
It is also notable that you are an intellectual fraud, as all
crackpots are, who does not have the balls enough to confront me with
IDEAS rather than insults. Klein and I, after a lengthy contretemps,
can do both from time to time, and at least some exchange of ideas
does come about in the mix, as against you where nothing but a waste
of time comes about.
Charles Bell
> For my money, and speaking only from my perspective, once a baby
> is able to understand the he himself IS alive and IS a self, that's
> quite
> sufficient for me to decide to help and/or protect him, and I would
> act accordingly. �And, of course, suffer or pleasure at the
> consequences.
> Further, from my POV that happens at a /very/ young age, well before
> a child can express it. �But interestingly, in Swann's take, even a
> day-old
> baby could be protected from monster parents...it's just that he
> realizes that such a decision is ultimately an individual decision and
> so the individual will suffer or enjoy the consequences.
>
> Charles /says/ he understands this, and in large part he does, but
> I doubt he'd be willing to carry this understanding--of the /facts/
> of the matter--to their logical conclusions.
>
To the contrary, I have the facts on my side. That is why I do not
trust idealizations of either (1) a child is property of the parents
or (2) it takes a village to raise a child, but forced into a choice,
(2) is to me more *natural* for mankind, while at the same time, I
understand the value of Local Democracy in that I and my immediate
neighbors can respond to challenges of orphaned, abandoned, neglected
children without having to involve people remote from the problem and
the consequences of solutions to the problem.
Moreover, there is NO FACT to the superstition that a fetus can by
magic impose an obligation on parents.
.
>
> Still, it gets us where we want to go, so for theoretical purposes,
> I don't see anything wrong with it. �And it's a damn sight better
> than what Charles /says/ he believes...that everyone ought to be
> only a slave to the vote of their neighbors anyway. �
Right, and you believe that I should be a slave to what someone else
-- whom I do not know, will never know, and probably do not care to
know -- has written down on a piece of paper sprinkled with faery dust
that is called RULE OF LAW enforced by Priests of Law who can only
know better than I.