Objectivism: naive bollocks or a worthy philosophy.
chazwin
After spending a little time looking at some of the contributions on
this NG, and occasionally having the temerity to contribute once or
twice myself: I am forced into the position of seeking clarification.
So, at the risk of being attacked (again) I would like to offer those
proponents of Objectivism to put their case. If we can leave aside
the religious and political offerings of Miss Rand and concentrate on
the epistemological aspects please.
So what is the epistemological position of Objectivism.?
Charles Bell
Chazwin: stupid commie fuck or stupid nazi fuck.
. . . who can't figure a way to buy a copy of Rand's Introduction to
Objectivist Epistemology because he believes he has an automatic and
immediate right to other people's stuff.
Arnold Broese
news:e6803e83-c58b-417d...@u37g2000vbc.googlegroups.com...
I am surprised at this question. It's like asking if the Pope is a man of
faith or reason.
Objectivist epistemology regards reality as something that cannot be
understood through faith or revelation Man has to use reason to understand
it. Such reasoning is based on three axioms.1) That what exists, does in
fact exist. 2) Because we are conscious of it, consciousness exists, and 3)
that if something exists, it has to exist as something - it's identity. It
is the law of identity that lies at the basis of logic. A thing cannot be,
and not be, at the same instance in the same manner. Thus if all men are
mortal, and Socrates is a man, he is also mortal. To deny this, is to claim
Socrates is both a man and not a man - a denial of the law of identity.
--
Arnold
chingang
wrote:
If electrons are attracted to protons do they have a priori
"knowledge"? Is the electron moving towards the proton on its own
power or is the proton pulling the electron? Which one is resisting
the other to produce a valence bond?
The way you put the question puts proponents in a libelous situation.
If you accuse another of libel, the defendant in most cases has to
prove they did not libel the accuser. Such is the manner of your
question. You leave wide open the debate for lack of clarification of
your terminilogy, plus the fact that you make a claim that you are a
proponent of subjectivism by mentioning that you have been attacked by
others with opposite views.
State you question again, and provide some evidence of your view on it
followed by some proofs that might enhance your view, otherwise you
seem to be trying to setup a "counter-attack" on those who have
villified you in the past.
I call that "suckering in" someone for devious intents and purposes.
1Z
the contentious claims are
1) the senses are incapable of error
2) certainty is attainable
3) humans have no apriori knowledge (althought there is something
almost identical
to an apriori pricniple called an "axiom")
4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction--everything is
synthetic aposteriori, including logic
5) there is no Humean problem of induction
6) something or other about context.
7) "Knowledge is based on the senses" doesn;t mean science has any
special role. Science is wrong
if it contradicts the Prophetess.
Rand, Reason and Premature Cognitive Climax
Rand's philosophy is far from the only one to promote reason. It's
Unique Selling Point is more the promotion of a kind of execessive
self confidence about reasoning.
Randians believe, almost uniquely in the 21st century, that it is
possible to come to certain conclusions on the basis of limited
information. Rand's heir Leonard Peikoff has an amusing term for this:
cognitive climax.
Rand herself was able to conclude that Quantum Mechanics was wrong
without performing any experiments to disprove it.
It is perhaps hardly surprising: the need for early cognitive closure
is linked to conservative beliefs by psychologists
Rand and Science
Rand endorses one of the pillars of science, whilst rejecting
another. She is a firm advocate of using the Evidence of the Senses,
but the reivsability of scientific theories, their openness to
refutation is alien to here. Once she has made up her mind what her
senses are telling her, that is that.
She is not better on individual scientific discoveries either. She was
doubtful about Evolution (it conflicted with her aproiri assumptions
about the superiority of Man to other animals). She also argued
against quantum mechanics. Apriorily, of course.
The Muddle over Axioms
Objectivists believe all knowledge comes from the senses. This would
make them (in terminology they choose not to employ) empiricists and a-
posteriorists. By the standard approach (which they reject) it would
forbid them from making an apriori statement. (An apriori statement is
something you can tell is true without looking, bascially). By the
standard account it would also forbid them from from making
necessarystatements -- statements that are absolutely guaranteed to be
true, since, by the standard account, these have to be apriori and non-
empirical.
The axioms are variously stated as
Existence exists.
Consciousness exists
Existence is Identity.
A=A -- the law of identity.
Rand describes axioms as statements which are (a) observed facts of
reality, which (b) must always apply. Her grounds are that any attempt
to deny the Axioms must confirm them. This is clearly true in the case
of "Existence exists". Whoever says "Existence does not
exist"...exists. It is plausible in the case of the second axiom -- to
deny something you presumably have to be conscious. It is unclear how
it supposed to support the third Axiom, which is unclear anyway. It
may even be empirically contradicted by Quantum Mechanics, which
suggests that thigs are basically fuzzy and vague about their
identity.
Rand describes axioms as statements which are (a) observed facts of
reality, which (b) must always apply. Since we are not capable of
observing facts applying always and everywhere, how is (b) justified ?
To take Rand's soundest Axiom "existence exists" as an example, we
cannot of course imagine any circumstances in which it can be said to
be false. The soundness of "existence exists" is not itself in
question; what I am questioning is the claim that we observe --
empirically, aposteriori -- its universality and certainty. The
process of trying to imagine circumstances in which it is false, and
failing, is a classically apriori process.
The Evidence of the Senses
Objectivists believe that all knowledge is based on the senses, that
he senses are necessary for knowledge. Or that the senses are by
themsleves sufficient for all knowledge. As we shall see, the claims
are not the same.
The reliance on the senses in one form or other is accepted by most
people nowadays.
Most people also think that it implies that certainty is hard to come
by -- since the senses are prone to error and finite sensory data
cannot support universal statements. Objectivists don't. Some of them
The claim seems to have started with Rand' follower Leonard Peikoff.
He claims the sense are "Necessarily valid." Their validity is
axiomatic because any argument used to undercut them ultimately relies
on them. "Proof consists in reducing an idea back to the data provided
by the senses."
He seems to be in a muddle about what "necessarily valid" means.
The claim that the senses are invalid in all cases could well be
undercut by the argument he gives. Our belief that a stick in water is
not really bent depends on other experiences of sticks. But the
experience of the bent stick is an illusion, it is invalid. So it
looks as though his argument only establishes that the senses are not
invalid all the time -- they are invalid some or none of the time.
And it looks like they are invalid some of the time, not none of the
time. Peikoff's claims that we use (further) evidence of the senses to
correct inaccurate perceptions is surely based on real examples --
examples of inaccurate perceptions! After all, if it were not it would
be a mere hypothesis, and hypotheses are frowned on in Objectivism.
So what does Peikoff's "necessary" mean ? Does he mean every time the
senses are employed, they are guaranteed to be valid; or that it is
necessarily the case that the senses are more-or-less valid in a good-
enough way ? Unfortuantely, it seems to be the former.
Peikoff has another string to his bow. He also bases his claim of the
necesary validity of the senses on the nebulous Axiom of Identity.
Consider a stick that looks bent in the water. The stick is really
straight. That is part of its identity. It looks bent. The sense-
perception or impression created is one of bentness. That is part of
its own identity. That both are self-identical is guaranteed by the
law of identity, such as it is. Peikof thinks identity guarantess the
validity of the preception, but how? What matters in valid perception
is that the right impression is created, that the sense-data match the
reality. That is a third relationship, a relationship between sense-
datum and perceived object, in addition to the self-identity of both
of them. But the only thing the Law of Identity can guarantee about
that relationship is that it is self-identical. If it is a
relationship of correspondence or matching, it is a self-identical
one. and if it is a relationship of mismatching and failure to
correspond, it will be self-identical too.
Peikoff also claims the bent stick "illusion" is not really an
illusion because that is how sticks are supposed to look in water. One
interpretation of this is that when Peikoff says perceptions are
valid, what he mean by "valid" is "in accordance with the laws of
nature". That would give him his necessity, but otherwise it is simply
changing the subject. The only thing that would then constitute an
invalid perception is a miracle. But people who believe in invalid
perceptions don't think they are miracles!
Another interpretation of "that is how sticks are supposed to look in
water" is that, given a knowledge of optics, you can "reverse out" the
distorting effects of the water and judge correctly that the stick is
sraight.
You can. Given a knowledge of the laws of optics.
But where is the necessity ? You might not know the laws of optics.
And where are the senses ? You seem to be employing some high-level
reasoning to pull of the trick. After, animals have as good or better
senses than humans, yet they are demonstrably fooled by some
illusions, taking their own reflection for a rival, for instance.
Their posession of senses does not gurantee that they perceive
validly.
This brings us back to the ambiguity mentioned at the beginning. The
senses may be necessary for all knowledge, but they are hardly
sufficient. That is how we humans are able to make better use of our
inferior senses.
They often fail us, but we can use reason to understand how and why.
The fallibility of the senses is part of the corpus of human
knowledge. Which makes it a pretty strange thing to deny.
"It is therefore quite correct to say the senses do not err, not
because the always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at
all." -- I Kant -- Transcendental Logic, Trancendental Dialectic.
"Knowledge is Contextual"
"Certainty is contextual". Certainty here means making the best
jdugement on the available evidence. Such "certainty" can fall short
of truth, which is counterintuitive. We already have a word for making
the best judgement on the available evidence to an individual, it is
honesty. But honesty is something less thant truth, wehre certainty is
something more. Sentences/propositions are only meaningful in the
context of the mind. Outside a "context" in this sense, a sentence has
no truth because it has no meaning. However, this does not show that
truth values can vary with changes in context, since it does not
follow that the meaning of statement is the same accross changes of
context. If the context supplies the meaning, a different context
supplies a different meaning and therefore changes of context generate
different propositions, not the same propositions with differing truth
values.
Jim Klein
> > So what is the epistemological position of Objectivism.?
>
> the contentious claims are
This is complete and utter bullshit. I'm not reading
through this novel since the point is to prove that
these are the claims of objectivism, Objectivism,
Objectivists, whatever.
I don't think you've got a single one right.
> 1) the senses are incapable of error
Find one Objectivist anywhere, who says that,
like that.
It so happens that I sometimes say that, but
I'm no Objectivist. And when I say it, I explain
what I mean...that the referent of <error>
doesn't apply to what the sensory system is doing.
> 2) certainty is attainable
Poppycock. Rand basically didn't address this
issue at all and the Post Mortems use "certainty"
just as everyone else does---to mean psychological
certainty as opposed to epistemic certainty.
Their only twist is in how loudly they deny it! Half
the faithful follow Peikoff and think the whole
issue is resolved by declaring that "certainty" is
synonymous with "conclusive." The other half
don't bother to think about it and just know they're
right because they can claim to have used the
proper method, and that's profoundly proper
leading automatically to certain conclusions.
There's always the "Bookmark Speicher" threads
for a full and complete analysis of this plain ol',
plain ol' psychological certainty and where it leads.
Oddly, once again I'm one of the few that actually
DOES declare this outright. I say that certainty--
full-blown, undeniable, 100% absolutely sure
certainty--DOES arise, and does so frequently.
But it's a narrow set and one has to grasp what
I mean--meaning to what I refer--when I
use those words.
> 3) humans have no apriori knowledge (althought there is something
> almost identical
> to an apriori pricniple called an "axiom")
Nonsense. The "tabula rasa" point is completely
distinct from the development of axioms.
> 4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction--everything is
> synthetic aposteriori, including logic
Why do you not say, "Or, everything is analytic owing
to its non-contradictory nature, including logic."
> 5) there is no Humean problem of induction
There isn't. There's just a bunch of people who
find it easy and convenient to overthink and
over-analyze concepts, rather than do the
work to discover about the referents of the
concepts.
> 6) something or other about context.
Doesn't sound very contentious.
> 7) "Knowledge is based on the senses" doesn;t mean science has any
> special role. Science is wrong
> if it contradicts the Prophetess.
Getting a little emotional here, eh?
> Rand, Reason and Premature Cognitive Climax
> Rand's philosophy is far from the only one to promote reason. It's
> Unique Selling Point is more the promotion of a kind of execessive
> self confidence about reasoning.
Derivatively, maybe. I think the main point has to do with
being alive as a person.
But according to all the great thinkers, we can't
even be sure that we ARE alive.
Let's see that survive the marketplace!
jk
1Z
> I don't think you've got a single one right.
>
> > 1) the senses are incapable of error
>
> Find one Objectivist anywhere, who says that,
> like that.
I have had extensive arguments on the point
on this NG
It's also state, with citatins, on the WP page
"Rand considered the validity of the senses to be axiomatic and
claimed that purported arguments to the contrary all commit the
fallacy of the "stolen concept"[20] by presupposing the validity of
concepts that, in turn, presuppose the validity of the senses.[21] She
thought that perception, being physiologically determined, is
incapable of error. So optical illusions, for example, are errors in
the conceptual identification of what is seen, not in the seeing
itself.[22]"
> It so happens that I sometimes say that,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
>but
> I'm no Objectivist. And when I say it, I explain
> what I mean...that the referent of <error>
> doesn't apply to what the sensory system is doing.
>
> > 2) certainty is attainable
>
> Poppycock. Rand basically didn't address this
> issue at all
I've had extensive argumetns here about that too.
It's also explictly stated by Peikoff
http://www.philelmore.com/objectivism/certainty.htm
>and the Post Mortems use "certainty"
> just as everyone else does---to mean psychological
> certainty as opposed to epistemic certainty.
Not eveyone uses certainty that way. The PoMo's
realist opponents don't.
> Their only twist is in how loudly they deny it! Half
> the faithful follow Peikoff and think the whole
> issue is resolved by declaring that "certainty" is
> synonymous with "conclusive." The other half
> don't bother to think about it and just know they're
> right because they can claim to have used the
> proper method, and that's profoundly proper
> leading automatically to certain conclusions.
That passage is very far from a claim
that Objectivist holds nothing about certainty.
> > 3) humans have no apriori knowledge (althought there is something
> > almost identical
> > to an apriori pricniple called an "axiom")
>
> Nonsense. The "tabula rasa" point is completely
> distinct from the development of axioms.
How about saying what the distinction is?
> > 4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction--everything is
> > synthetic aposteriori, including logic
>
> Why do you not say, "Or, everything is analytic owing
> to its non-contradictory nature, including logic."
Because O-ists don';t say that.
> > 5) there is no Humean problem of induction
>
> There isn't. There's just a bunch of people who
> find it easy and convenient to overthink and
> over-analyze concepts, rather than do the
> work to discover about the referents of the
> concepts.
That is a defence of the standard O-ist claim argument induction --
that to know one is to know all.
> > 6) something or other about context.
>
> Doesn't sound very contentious.
There is no agreement at all about how this
works, but it is also called on to do
some very heavy liifing (eg in the defence
of certainty).
> > 7) "Knowledge is based on the senses" doesn;t mean science has any
> > special role. Science is wrong
> > if it contradicts the Prophetess.
>
> Getting a little emotional here, eh?
Is it an accurate rendition of the O-ist attitude or
not?
You kicked off saying that every point was wrong. Then
you conceded most of them. Now you seem to have
run out of steam entriely.
Must try harder.
chazwin
> Chazwin: stupid commie fuck or stupid nazi fuck.
Hello. Look everyone it's the love-child of Michael Gordge!
You forgot to call me knuckle-dragging.
chazwin
wrote:
> "chazwin" <chazwy...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:e6803e83-c58b-417d...@u37g2000vbc.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > After spending a little time looking at some of the contributions on
> > this NG, and occasionally having the temerity to contribute once or
> > twice myself: I am forced into the position of seeking clarification.
> > So, at the risk of being attacked (again) I would like to offer those
> > proponents of Objectivism to put their case. �If we can leave aside
> > the religious and political offerings of Miss Rand and concentrate on
> > the epistemological aspects please.
> > So what is the epistemological position of Objectivism.?
>
> I am surprised at this question. It's like asking if the Pope is a man of
> faith or reason.
I don't think it is.
> Objectivist epistemology regards reality as something that cannot be
> understood through faith or revelation
Such is true of Locke, Hume, Kant and most others.
Man has to use reason to understand
> it. Such reasoning is based on three axioms.1) That what exists, does in
> fact exist.
A=A. Umm - not much there so far.
2) Because we are conscious of it, consciousness exists,
Descartes
and 3)
> that if something exists, it has to exist as something - it's identity.
Is this an inferred position or is it axiomatic?
And where is this identity?
It
> is the law of identity that lies at the basis of logic. A thing cannot be,
> and not be, at the same instance in the same manner. Thus if all men are
> mortal, and Socrates is a man, he is also mortal. To deny this, is to claim
> Socrates is both a man and not a man - a denial of the law of identity.
Aristotle.
But there is NOTHING distinctive about what you say.
And it does not amount to an epistemology.
>
> --
> Arnold
chazwin
> On Wed, 16 Dec 2009 11:31:01 -0800, chazwin <chazwy...@yahoo.com>
I find your response completely incomprehensible.
What is the epistemological position of Objectivism?
I am not asking whether Objectivism exists, but what is its
methodological position used to determine questions of knowledge.
I can't state it anymore clearly.
If you want me to state what it is so that you can say I'm wrong that
would be an invitation to conflict.
My question is reasonable.
You seem too scared to stick your neck out.
Charles Bell
Source Uncited in Quotation = Suq.
Suq [1] writes:
> the contentious claims are
> 1) the senses are incapable of error
No. The senses are objective. The senses are to be taken for granted
ever as much as anything in the universe is, as in the axiom:
Existence exists.
Perception is a different matter; however, Rand herself never claimed
that perception was incapable of error. She said that percepts, like
the senses, are a given, as they are automatically processed of the
senses in the brain, but she did not say that percepts were "incapable
of error." As a matter of fact, she mentioned a limitation on
perception by there being either a wider or narrower range of
perception.
> She
>thought that perception, being physiologically determined, is
> incapable of error.
No. They are a *given* -- being physiologically determined -- but not
"incapable of error".
> 2) certainty is attainable
Scientific induction with statistical limits on certainty due to error
in observations is well within Objectivism, and, as a matter of fact,
handled very poorly or not at all by other philosophies.
> 3) humans have no apriori knowledge
Yes, intrinsicism -- a form of mysticism -- is invalid.
> (althought there is something
> almost identical
> to an apriori pricniple called an "axiom")
Axioms are not "a priori". Weird this "something" called axiom! A
dictionary will define it as proposition in logic that is not
susceptible of proof or disproof, the truth of which is assumed to be
self-evident. And so it is in Objectivism. Weird! An axiom is not
something which exists as a priori knowledge but is either learnt or
deduced.
> 4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction
There is no analytic-synthetic dichotomy.
> --everything is
> synthetic aposteriori, including logic
No. Not even sure what this means, but nothing like this statement
came from Rand.
> 5) there is no Humean problem of induction
Right. See response to (2).
> 6) something or other about context.
It looks like Suq cannot read to the bottom of this screed to find
what "something or other" might be. Does Suq[1] also think Aristotle
wrote something or other about logic?
> 7) "Knowledge is based on the senses"
Not something Objectivism proposes, so the rest is invalid.
> doesn;t mean science has any
> special role. Science is wrong
> if it contradicts the Prophetess.
>
Suq [2] writes:
> Randians believe, almost uniquely in the 21st century, that it is
> possible to come to certain conclusions on the basis of limited
> information.
Within the context of their formulation and in the range of
observations available. It looks like Suq [2] cannot read to the
bottom of this screed before commenting on something he knows nothing
about.
> Rand herself was able to conclude that Quantum Mechanics was wrong
Rand only concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation was wrong.
Objectivism is actually the only philosophy that can describe how
Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and Classical Physics can simultaneously
and not paradigmatically be correct and that the elusive Theory of
Everything (one might have supposed it to be M-theory) is to be
expected and *necessarily* include elements of all three.
> without performing any experiments to disprove it.
No one has to disprove QM to object to the Copenhagen Interpretation
on the implications of complementarity and the obvious problems with
respect to causality. Does Suq [2] complain that Einstein, Podolsky,
or Rosen thought QM was wrong or at least incomplete without
performing a single experiment?
> It is perhaps hardly surprising: the need for early cognitive closure
> is linked to conservative beliefs by psychologists
>
What? Wow! From Dr. Bohr to Dr. Phil in one sentence.
Suq [3] writes:
> Rand and Science
> Rand endorses one of the pillars of science, whilst rejecting
> another. She is a firm advocate of using the Evidence of the Senses,
> but the reivsability of scientific theories, their openness to
> refutation is alien to her.
Well, looks like Suq [3] also cannot find himself to learn the meaning
of Context in Objectivism.
> Once she has made up her mind what her
> senses are telling her, that is that.
Boy is Suq[3] just plain stupid!
Suq [4] writes:
>
> The Muddle over Axioms
> Objectivists believe all knowledge comes from the senses.
No.
Why bother with the rest when the initial premise is wrong?
> The axioms are variously stated as
> Existence exists.
Yes.
> Consciousness exists
Yes.
> Existence is Identity.
No (?)
> A=A -- the law of identity.
Yes.
> Rand describes axioms as statements which are (a) observed facts of
> reality, which (b) must always apply. Her grounds are that any attempt
> to deny the Axioms must confirm them. This is clearly true in the case
> of "Existence exists". Whoever says "Existence does not
> exist"...exists. It is plausible in the case of the second axiom -- to
> deny something you presumably have to be conscious.
Fairly correct.
> It is unclear how
> it supposed to support the third Axiom,
The third Axiom is not Objectivist, and an axiom does not support
another in any case.
> which is unclear anyway.
Sure.
> It
> may even be empirically contradicted by Quantum Mechanics, which
> suggests that thigs are basically fuzzy and vague about their
> identity.
"May even contradict. . . " Whatever. This is wasted time. QM does
not do that exactly.
Suq [5] writes:
> Rand describes axioms as statements which are (a) observed facts of
> reality, which (b) must always apply. Since we are not capable of
> observing facts applying always and everywhere, how is (b) justified ?
> To take Rand's soundest Axiom "existence exists" as an example, we
> cannot of course imagine any circumstances in which it can be said to
> be false.
Yes, move along.
>The soundness of "existence exists" is not itself in
> question;
Yes.
> what I am questioning is the claim that we observe --
> empirically, aposteriori -- its universality and certainty.
Who cares? An axiom is a self-evident truth. Move along.
> The
> process of trying to imagine circumstances in which it is false, and
> failing, is a classically apriori process.
Whatever. Move along.
Suq [6] writes
>
> The Evidence of the Senses
> Objectivists believe that all knowledge is based on the senses,
Wrong. Rest deleted for irrelevancy after the fact of incorrect
initial premise.
Suq [7] writes:
> "Knowledge is Contextual"
> "Certainty is contextual". Certainty here means making the best
> jdugement on the available evidence. Such "certainty" can fall short
> of truth, which is counterintuitive.
Only if truth is defined differently than it is in Objectivism: the
recognition of reality. Knowledge of truth, being contextual, is not
infallible or from or by an omniscient consciousness.
>We already have a word for making
> the best judgement on the available evidence to an individual, it is
> honesty.
Concept-shifting from epistemology to morality. Rest deleted for this
reason.
> Sentences/propositions are only meaningful in the
> context of the mind. Outside a "context" in this sense, a sentence has
> no truth because it has no meaning. However, this does not show that
> truth values can vary with changes in context,
Yes, it does, unless one supposes the existence of an infallible and
omniscient mind.
> since it does not
> follow that the meaning of statement is the same accross changes of
> context.
Yes, that is what, in part, is the meaning of contextual
understanding.
> If the context supplies the meaning,
No, context may alter by abridgment or elongation the meaning, by
subsuming simple concepts into more complex ones, or finer abstraction
through more precise definitions, but it does not "supply" the
meaning.
> a different context
> supplies a different meaning and therefore changes of context generate
> different propositions, not the same propositions with differing truth
> values.
This is incomprehensible but certainly irrelevant as the premise
("context supplies the meaning") is incorrect.
1Z
> Suq [1] writes:
> > the contentious claims are
> > 1) the senses are incapable of error
>
> No.
That is sourced to Kelly in the WParticle, and it says
*perception* is incapable of error. Either you or he
are a revisionist.
>The senses are objective. The senses are to be taken for granted
> ever as much as anything in the universe is, as in the axiom:
> Existence exists.
doesn't really mean anything
> Perception is a different matter; however, Rand herself never claimed
> that perception was incapable of error.
Plenty of O-ists here believe in the no-error theory. The sense/
perception
split doesn't add up to anything. If we have no conscious access to
the
supposedly infallible part of the process, there is no epistemological
upshot.
> > 2) certainty is attainable
>
> Scientific induction with statistical limits on certainty due to error
> in observations is well within Objectivism,
Irrelevant. Plenty of O'ists here have
argued for certainty. So does Peikoff.
>and, as a matter of fact,
> handled very poorly or not at all by other philosophies.
Dubious
> > 3) humans have no apriori knowledge
>
> Yes, intrinsicism -- a form of mysticism -- is invalid.
Ah, your favourite form of argument--simply
saying something is wrong.
Innate knowledge is taken fairly for granted in
zoology, but if Rand says it's wrong...
> > (althought there is something
> > almost identical
> > to an apriori pricniple called an "axiom")
>
> Axioms are not "a priori".
The negation of an axiom is held to be impossible.
That is one of the definitions of the apriori.
>Weird this "something" called axiom! A
> dictionary will define it as proposition in logic that is not
> susceptible of proof or disproof, the truth of which is assumed to be
> self-evident. And so it is in Objectivism.
And logical axioms are also frequently held to be apriori.
>Weird! An axiom is not
> something which exists as a priori knowledge but is either learnt or
> deduced.
A logical axiom is never deduced as a matter of definition.
It is not incompatible with some definitions of the apriori
that apriori truths have to be deduced or realised.
> > 4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction
>
> There is no analytic-synthetic dichotomy.
You're doing it again.
Peikoff's argument seems to be the only
justification for this claim, and it is
a terrible exercise in question begging.
> > --everything is
> > synthetic aposteriori, including logic
>
The terms come from Kant whom you have evidently
rejected without studying.
> but nothing like this statement
> came from Rand.
> > 5) there is no Humean problem of induction
>
> Right. See response to (2).
Becuase there is a Cognitive Climax ,
or becaue waffle-waffle-context?
> > 6) something or other about context.
>
> It looks like Suq cannot read to the bottom of this screed to find
> what "something or other"
The o-ist theory is vague. I don't believe tow individual
o-ists have eve agreed on what "context" is.
> > 7) "Knowledge is based on the senses"
>
> Not something Objectivism proposes,
!!!!!
"Objectivist epistemology maintains that all knowledge is ultimately
based on perception."
WP
>so the rest is invalid.
> Suq [2] writes:
> > Randians believe, almost uniquely in the 21st century, that it is
> > possible to come to certain conclusions on the basis of limited
> > information.
>
> Within the context of their formulation and in the range of
> observations available.
Oh right. waffle-waffle-context. This is just
verbal flim--flam. Making the best judgement you can
under conditions of limited knowledge
just ins't certainty, any more than memorising
one encyclopedia is omniscience. The words
just don't function that way.
> Objectivism is actually the only philosophy that can describe how
> Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and Classical Physics can simultaneously
> and not paradigmatically be correct and that the elusive Theory of
> Everything (one might have supposed it to be M-theory) is to be
> expected and *necessarily* include elements of all three.
!!!!!!
The Nobel's in the post, I dare say.
> > without performing any experiments to disprove it.
>
> No one has to disprove QM to object to the Copenhagen Interpretation
> on the implications of complementarity and the obvious problems with
> respect to causality.
You just illustratedmy point beautifully there. Objectivist
somehow "know" there is a strict law of cuaslity having thrown
their rattles out of their prams a couple of times, and if some
scientists come along with a much more sophisticated
account according to which there isn't, the scientists are wrong.
(NB "No stric cusality" does not mean "no causality at all")
> Does Suq [2] complain that Einstein, Podolsky,
> or Rosen thought QM was wrong or at least incomplete without
> performing a single experiment?
EP&R were proved wrong BY an experiment.
> Well, looks like Suq [3] also cannot find himself to learn the meaning
That's "meanings"
> of Context in Objectivism.
> > The Muddle over Axioms
> > Objectivists believe all knowledge comes from the senses.
>
> No.
If it doens't, it's apriori and you rejected
that too. You are not even making sense.
> > Existence is Identity.
>
> No (?)
'Objectivism states that "Existence exists" and "Existence is
Identity." '--WP
> > It
> > may even be empirically contradicted by Quantum Mechanics, which
> > suggests that thigs are basically fuzzy and vague about their
> > identity.
>
> "May even contradict. . . " Whatever. This is wasted time. QM does
> not do that exactly.
It doesn't clealry not do that. However,
O-ists are insisting that somehting which
is currently being debated is an inescapable law of thought:
they are ignoiring the empircal evidene as to what an inescapable
law of thought is.
> > what I am questioning is the claim that we observe --
> > empirically, aposteriori -- its universality and certainty.
>
> Who cares? An axiom is a self-evident truth. Move along.
If "self evidence" isn't observed, it is apriori,
contradicting what you say elsewhere.
> > The
> > process of trying to imagine circumstances in which it is false, and
> > failing, is a classically apriori process.
>
> Whatever. Move along.
Don't "whatever". Rand says that there is not apriori
truth,. and then come up with somethign that walks
and quacks eactly like apriori truth.
> > The Evidence of the Senses
> > Objectivists believe that all knowledge is based on the senses,
>
> Wrong.
only according to you
> Only if truth is defined differently than it is in Objectivism: the
> recognition of reality. Knowledge of truth, being contextual, is not
> infallible or from or by an omniscient consciousness.
I couldn't agree more. O-ism just redefines "truth" and "certainty"
It therefore does not solve any existing problem regarding truth and
certainty. It's all verbal flim-flam.
> >We already have a word for making
> > the best judgement on the available evidence to an individual, it is
> > honesty.
>
> Concept-shifting from epistemology to morality.
You have just admitted to redefinition.
> > Sentences/propositions are only meaningful in the
> > context of the mind. Outside a "context" in this sense, a sentence has
> > no truth because it has no meaning. However, this does not show that
> > truth values can vary with changes in context,
>
> Yes, it does, unless one supposes the existence of an infallible and
> omniscient mind.
That follows from the assumption that
"truth" means "best guess under the circumstances". Judgements
will obviously vary with context, but truth does not if truth
is taken to mean correspondence with reality. (Ironically,
what you say above is in almost exact agreement with tendency
of postmodernist philospophes such as Rorty to define truth
as an optimal kind of judgement. The Randian claim seems
wrong from the perspective of a modern *realist* philosopher).
> > If the context supplies the meaning,
>
> No, context may alter by abridgment or elongation the meaning, by
> subsuming simple concepts into more complex ones, or finer abstraction
> through more precise definitions, but it does not "supply" the
> meaning.
uh-huh. So can you translate an isolated sentence
from an unknown language?
Charles Bell
> �18 Dec, 00:25, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > Suq [1] writes:
> > > the contentious claims are
> > > 1) the senses are incapable of error
>
> > No.
>
> That is sourced to Kelly in the WParticle, and it says
> *perception* is incapable of error. Either you or he
> are a revisionist.
>
Oh, did I forget to mention that anyone would require someone less
stupid than you and the Suq's to have a fruitful discussion over these
matters?
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
1Z
Business as ususal. Charlie get caught out, charlie gets rude.
Charles Bell
> > Suq [1] writes:
> > > the contentious claims are
> > > 1) the senses are incapable of error
^^^^^^^^
> > > That is sourced to Kelly in the WParticle, and it says
> > > *perception*
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.
> > Oh, did I forget to mention that anyone would require someone less
> > stupid than you and the Suq's to have a fruitful discussion over these
> > matters?
>
> Business as ususal. Charlie get caught out, charlie gets rude.
You use the word "sense" and "perception" interchangably, and *I* am
the one who gets caught out? No scientist or philosopher, Objectivist
or not, would do that. Only ignorant and near-impossibly stupid people
do that.
Moreover, what is the point of a senance with you as a medium between
me and Wiki Suq's?
1Z
> On Dec 18, 6:25 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > Suq [1] writes:
> > > > the contentious claims are
> > > > 1) the senses are incapable of error
>
> ^^^^^^^^> > > That is sourced to Kelly in the
> WParticle, and it says
> > > > *perception*
>
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> .
>
> > > Oh, did I forget to mention that anyone would require someone less
> > > stupid than you and the Suq's to have a fruitful discussion over these
> > > matters?
>
> > Business as ususal. Charlie get caught out, charlie gets rude.
>
> You use the word "sense" and "perception" interchangably,
Yes, that's standard. You attempted distinction doesn't
add up to anything.
>and *I* am
> the one who gets caught out?
Yes, because if perception is infallible,
the sense can't be any less infallible, given
the distinction you are trying to draw
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Aristotle.
>
>But there is NOTHING distinctive about what you say.
>And it does not amount to an epistemology.
True, Arnold is discussing a bit of metaphysics there.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 16, 11:41�pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> Chazwin: stupid commie fuck or stupid nazi fuck.
>
>Hello. Look everyone it's the love-child of Michael Gordge!
Gordge and who else? Hitlery?
Jim Klein
you're not interested in understanding what any
of this is about. However, since you seem fully
sincere in most other respects, I'll proceed through
this one post as if you were. And that article you
posted up was typical modern bullshit--meaning
FALSITIES--though I admit it was a good read. I
started a detailed review, but scratched it.
Maybe I'll get to it later, like much later. BTW, that
was a female Kelly, yes?
I already gained from it, since I haven't felt so good
about leaving school in quite a while!
On Dec 17, 9:28 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> On 17 Dec, 14:12, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> > I don't think you've got a single one right.
>
> > > 1) the senses are incapable of error
>
> > Find one Objectivist anywhere, who says that,
> > like that.
>
> I have had extensive arguments on the point
> on this NG
What, you can't find one or two in the archives?
And don't be like those Objectivists, citing up
stuff that says something else but "must mean
this" or that. It's a simple statement and you've
had extensive arguments about it. So it should
be a piece of cake to come up with the cite,
"The senses are incapable of error" from an
Objectivist.
Let's see and maybe you'll turn out right.
> It's also state, with citatins, on the WP page
What's WP?
> "Rand considered the validity of the senses to be axiomatic and
> claimed that purported arguments to the contrary all commit the
> fallacy of the "stolen concept"[20] by presupposing the validity of
> concepts that, in turn, presuppose the validity of the senses.[21] She
> thought that perception, being physiologically determined, is
> incapable of error. So optical illusions, for example, are errors in
> the conceptual identification of what is seen, not in the seeing
> itself.[22]"
Look, you wrote, "the senses are incapable of error,"
as an example of some contentious belief that
Objectivism or Objectivists hold. Let's not get
into what someone else said and what THEY must
mean. For myself, I readily acknowledge that I
believe, "The senses are incapable of error," but
that's because I think the referent of <error> is
one that doesn't apply to the referent of <sense>.
IOW I think it's a category error.
This too looks like a reasonable take, and I
don't see what's so contentious. The important
point is that you're being disingenuous by using
this particular phrase. The way it's taken by
most people, Objectivists DON'T believe that
the senses are incapable of error.
Nobody believes that, not even me (when it
carries the meaning you intend).
> > It so happens that I sometimes say that,
>
> !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
>
> >but
> > I'm no Objectivist. And when I say it, I explain
> > what I mean...that the referent of <error>
> > doesn't apply to what the sensory system is doing.
>
> > > 2) certainty is attainable
>
> > Poppycock. Rand basically didn't address this
> > issue at all
>
> I've had extensive argumetns here about that too.
> It's also explictly stated by Peikoff
>
> http://www.philelmore.com/objectivism/certainty.htm
If any of that is from OPAR, especially Chapters 4 or
5, then it has nothing to do with anything except to
point out what a numbskull Peikoff became Post-Mortem.
And it least of all would it have anything to do with
Objectivism, except to point out what a Perfect
Inversion of it might say.
> >and the Post Mortems use "certainty"
> > just as everyone else does---to mean psychological
> > certainty as opposed to epistemic certainty.
>
> Not eveyone uses certainty that way. The PoMo's
> realist opponents don't.
>
> > Their only twist is in how loudly they deny it! Half
> > the faithful follow Peikoff and think the whole
> > issue is resolved by declaring that "certainty" is
> > synonymous with "conclusive." The other half
> > don't bother to think about it and just know they're
> > right because they can claim to have used the
> > proper method, and that's profoundly proper
> > leading automatically to certain conclusions.
>
> That passage is very far from a claim
> that Objectivist holds nothing about certainty.
Whaddya want? I already said that if you're just
talking about "psychological certainty," then of
course they have that, and in spades to boot.
If OTOH you're talking about any sort of certainty
worth talking about, like an epistemological state
that necessarily corresponds with reality, then
Rand didn't take that up much at all, beyond the
obvious basis for the whole paradigm, which is
the necessary correspondence of sensations.
> > > 3) humans have no apriori knowledge (althought there is something
> > > almost identical
> > > to an apriori pricniple called an "axiom")
>
> > Nonsense. The "tabula rasa" point is completely
> > distinct from the development of axioms.
>
> How about saying what the distinction is?
Axioms are cognitive elements. As such, there is
no way a system which holds with "tabula rasa"
would also hold that they're a priori.
This tells us there's something you're missing.
> > > 4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction--everything is
> > > synthetic aposteriori, including logic
>
> > Why do you not say, "Or, everything is analytic owing
> > to its non-contradictory nature, including logic."
>
> Because O-ists don';t say that.
THIS was the line where I realized what the problem
is here. Like nearly everyone else, you think that
what you see most loudly proclaimed as Objectivism,
is Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. The blame for
this rests squarely, though by now not wholly, on
Leonard Peikoff.
There's a reason he was put in his position, you
know. Rand was very big on epistemology, as
any philosopher must be, and Leonard Peikoff,
PRE-Mortem, was an epistemologist extraordinaire.
IOW Rand had good, even great, reasons to think
he could be trusted with her charge. Oh, did I
digress? Well, you see, you have no idea what
Objectivism is, or why it's important. It's important
because of the insights it can offer us.
It has been my view for many, many years now that
the SINGLE greatest--meaning most important, most
revealing, most buildable, whatever--insight to be
garnered from Objectivism wasn't even written by Rand.
It was written by Peikoff and it's _The Analytic-
Synthetic Dichotomy_ in ITOE. I've gone at length
on this because of what you wrote and what you
may discover by understanding that essay.
Simply put, you could not have written anything more wrong.
> You kicked off saying that every point was wrong.
Yes...accurate prediction is a hobby of mine!
> Then
> you conceded most of them.
Sorry, I must've missed that. Did I write it in
invisible ink?
> Now you seem to have
> run out of steam entriely.
If your opinions haven't changed a drop--about
Objectivism and more importantly about philosophy--
after reading A-S D, then I probably will then. But
that'll be okay, since then I'll have the time to make
mince-meat out of that drone analysis of Rand.
> Must try harder.
I think that's basically part of being a human too. So
don't worry about me, pal. Take care of yourself.
jk
Charles Bell
> On 18 Dec, 11:38, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > You use the word "sense" and "perception" interchangably,
>
> Yes, that's standard.
Standard for what? Sloppy, imprecise use of the language?
>
> Yes, because if perception is infallible,
> the sense can't be any less infallible,
The issue to the Objectivist is whether the senses are necessarily
*valid* (objectively occurring), not *infallible* . Perception is the
way the brain grasps the evidence of the senses and begins a
patterning, integrating and storing process. By this, if a sense is
not valid then a percept is also not valid, and Objectivism holds that
senses are necessarily valid. The only way the word "infallible"
would apply is to say tautologically that sensations, and thus
perception, is infallible in sensing (and thus perceiving), for what
else would they be doing?
Tim
> Business as ususal. Charlie get caught out, charlie gets rude.
Charlie Brown always misses the ball.
1Z
>�BTW, that
> was a female Kelly, yes?
David Kelley, the prominent Objectivist
> > > > 1) the senses are incapable of error
>
> > > Find one Objectivist anywhere, who says that,
> > > like that.
>
> > I have had extensive arguments on the point
> > on this NG
>
> What, you can't find one or two in the archives?
You mean I have to prove it? Since it was about 8 months
ago, and you were involved, I assumed you would remember.
> And don't be like those Objectivists, citing up
> stuff that says something else but "must mean
> this" or that. �It's a simple statement and you've
> had extensive arguments about it. �So it should
> be a piece of cake to come up with the cite,
> "The senses are incapable of error" from an
> Objectivist.
Already answered. David Kelley. And Peikoff. Plus all the people I
was arguing with in the "still an objectivist" thread
> Let's see and maybe you'll turn out right.
>
> > It's also state, with citatins, on the WP page
>
> What's WP?
Wikipedia
> Look, you wrote, �"the senses are incapable of error,"
> as an example of some contentious belief that
> Objectivism or Objectivists hold. �Let's not get
> into what someone else said and what THEY must
> mean. �For myself, I readily acknowledge that I
> believe, "The senses are incapable of error," but
> that's because I think the referent of <error> is
> one that doesn't apply to the referent of <sense>.
> IOW I think it's a category error.
I don't know why you are making such
heavy weather of the issue of whether O-ists
hold the infallible senses theory when *you* do.
As I pointed out in our previous debate, if "error" doesn't
categorially apply to "sense" neither does "non-error".
So the category-error argument doesn't give you
infallible senses.
> This too looks like a reasonable take, and I
> don't see what's so contentious. �
Well, I've told you repeatedly.
>The important
> point is that you're being disingenuous by using
> this particular phrase. �The way it's taken by
> most people, Objectivists DON'T believe that
> the senses are incapable of error.
Yes they do. I have several quotes from Peikoff
on the subject.
> >http://www.philelmore.com/objectivism/certainty.htm
>
> If any of that is from OPAR, especially Chapters 4 or
> 5, then it has nothing to do with anything except to
> point out what a numbskull Peikoff became Post-Mortem.
Your theory that Peikoff does not represent Objectivism
is idiosyncratic. I am not wrong just because I am
in disagreement with your idiosyncratic theories.
> If OTOH you're talking about any sort of certainty
> worth talking about, like an epistemological state
> that necessarily corresponds with reality, then
> Rand didn't take that up much at all, beyond the
> obvious basis for the whole paradigm, which is
> the necessary correspondence of sensations.
I have quotes that say othewise. I am not interested
in internecine battles about which sect are the
True Objetivists. (The Wee Free Marketeers?)
> Nonsense. �The "tabula rasa" point is completely
> > > distinct from the development of axioms.
>
> > How about saying what the distinction is?
>
> Axioms are cognitive elements. �As such, there is
> no way a system which holds with "tabula rasa"
> would also hold that they're a priori.
There is no way a *consistent* system would. You don;t get to
assert Rand's consistency dogmatically. I have found an inconsistency,
so that is that.
> THIS was the line where I realized what the problem
> is here. �Like nearly everyone else, you think that
> what you see most loudly proclaimed as Objectivism,
> is Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. �The blame for
> this rests squarely, though by now not wholly, on
> Leonard Peikoff.
Whatever. I don't care.
> IOW Rand had good, even great, reasons to think
> he could be trusted with her charge. �Oh, did I
> digress? �Well, you see, you have no idea what
> Objectivism is, or why it's important. �It's important
> because of the insights it can offer us.
I have no idea about which sect you are backing
and I don't care either.
> It has been my view for many, many years now that
> the SINGLE greatest--meaning most important, most
> revealing, most buildable, whatever--insight to be
> garnered from Objectivism wasn't even written by Rand.
>
> It was written by Peikoff and it's _The Analytic-
> Synthetic Dichotomy_ in ITOE. �I've gone at length
> on this because of what you wrote and what you
> may discover by understanding that essay.
As I have pointed out before, I think it's crap.
Here is an example of the standard he is falling short
of -- conveniently enough, on the same subject
http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
> Simply put, you could not have written anything more wrong.
Oh, please. All you have said throughout this
entire post is that I have not got objectivism-as-defined
by you right. SO what? You can define it any way you like,
it's meaningless.
> If your opinions haven't changed a drop--about
> Objectivism and more importantly about philosophy--
> after reading A-S D, then I probably will then. �But
> that'll be okay, since then I'll have the time to make
> mince-meat out of that drone analysis of Rand.
Much of what I wrote wsa my own crtique of Peikoff's work.
You really need counter-argue, not come out with "read yo' Baahble and
you
too will belieeeeve"
1Z
> On Dec 18, 6:46 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On 18 Dec, 11:38, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > You use the word "sense" and "perception" interchangably,
>
> > Yes, that's standard.
>
> Standard for what? �Sloppy, imprecise use of the language?
Nothing follows from the claim that there is some automatic,
infallible element to perception. There is no epistemic upshot.
> > Yes, because if perception is infallible,
> > the sense can't be any less infallible,
>
> The issue to the Objectivist is whether the senses are necessarily
> *valid* (objectively occurring),
"Valid" doesn't mean "objectively occuring". "Valid" is
normative, a value judgement. It indicates something is occuring
correctly.So the argument you have outlined is an attempt
to sneak in an "ought" on the back of an "is"
> not *infallible* . �Perception is the
> way the brain grasps the evidence of the senses and begins a
> patterning, integrating and storing process. By this, if a sense is
> not valid then a percept is also not valid, and Objectivism holds that
> senses are necessarily valid. �The only way the word "infallible"
> would apply is to say tautologically that sensations, and thus
> perception, is infallible in sensing (and thus perceiving), for what
> else would they be doing?
Misperceiving, as in sensory error, optical illusion etc.
Charles Bell
> On 19 Dec, 00:27, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 18, 6:46 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 18 Dec, 11:38, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > > You use the word "sense" and "perception" interchangably,
>
> > > Yes, that's standard.
>
> > Standard for what? �Sloppy, imprecise use of the language?
>
> Nothing follows from the claim that there is some automatic,
> infallible element to perception. There is no epistemic upshot.
>
And your point being? Is this supposed to have something to do with
Objectivism? You used senses and percepetion interchangably, and even
when this obvious mistake has been pointed out to you twice, you
refuse to acknowledge the mistake. You are not only stupid, but
stubbornly stupid.
> > > Yes, because if perception is infallible,
> > > the sense can't be any less infallible,
>
> > The issue to the Objectivist is whether the senses are necessarily
> > *valid* (objectively occurring),
>
> "Valid" doesn't mean "objectively occuring".
Yes it does here.
> "Valid" is
> normative, a value judgement.
No, it does not mean that here. Valid can mean, as it does here,
"grounded in truth." That which is objectively occurring is per se
grounded in truth.
Jim Klein
> > BTW, that
> > was a female Kelly, yes?
>
> David Kelley, the prominent Objectivist
I was asking about the writer of the essay, and
Kelly was the first name.
[snip to the end]
> > Simply put, you could not have written anything more wrong.
>
> Oh, please. All you have said throughout this
> entire post is that I have not got objectivism-as-defined
> by you right. SO what? You can define it any way you like,
> it's meaningless.
That's not the point, and this isn't that tough to follow.
You wrote,
> > > 4) there is no analytical/synthetic distinction--everything is
> > > synthetic aposteriori, including logic
demonstrating a clear misunderstanding of the topic at hand.
To point this out, I wrote,
> > Why do you not say, "Or, everything is analytic owing
> > to its non-contradictory nature, including logic."
to which you responded,
> Because O-ists don';t say that.
So like I say, you haven't even the least inkling of what
is being said...by Rand, by Objectivism, by the Pre-Mortem
Peikoff, or even by me.
This very point was brought up in that very essay, and
it is very clear that what you wrote is wrong. So either
bone up or shut up.
Further, it's a critical point. I'd say it's a cornerstone, but
there seem to be a lot of Objectivists who don't get it, so
I guess I'm wrong about that technically.
On the "senses are infallible" point, I said that in the way
you mean, nobody believes it, least of all Objectivists.
This too is accurate for if you were right, then Objectivists
would deny the existence of optical illusions. But I don't
believe you'll find a single Objectivist, or even a single
breathing human, who actually believes that.
In summary, you don't know what the hell you're saying
about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, nor about the
sense being infallible...at least not with regard to what
anyone coming from an Objectivist perspective believes.
Hence you have no business itemizing what you believe
to be "contentious issues," since you fail to understand
at least half of the contentions.
jk
Arnold Broese
news:43303362-5f6c-4d31...@r1g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
>
> On the "senses are infallible" point, I said that in the way
> you mean, nobody believes it, least of all Objectivists.
> This too is accurate for if you were right, then Objectivists
> would deny the existence of optical illusions. But I don't
> believe you'll find a single Objectivist, or even a single
> breathing human, who actually believes that.
The senses accurately report what they encounter. The illusions are the
result of processing of the information. Our brains apply their program of
perspective (such as smaller is father away), which can be confused in
certain circumstances. Illusions would not work if the brain did not work
the senses in a definite known way. The argument that the senses are not to
be trusted is undercut by the fact that all evidence for such proof must,
come in via the senses. Illusions work BECAUSE the senses work.
--
Arnold
1Z
wrote:
> "Jim Klein" <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
>
> news:43303362-5f6c-4d31...@r1g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > On the "senses are infallible" point, I said that in the way
> > you mean, nobody believes it, least of all Objectivists.
> > This too is accurate for if you were right, then Objectivists
> > would deny the existence of optical illusions. �But I don't
> > believe you'll find a single Objectivist, or even a single
> > breathing human, who actually believes that.
>
> The senses accurately report what they encounter. The illusions are the
> result of processing of the information.
Wrong and pointless. Some sensory errors such as the "blind spot"
errors
occur in the sense organs themselves.
> Our brains apply their program of
> perspective (such as smaller is father away), which can be confused in
> certain circumstances. Illusions would not work if the brain did not work
> the senses in a definite known way. The argument that the senses are not to
> be trusted
Surely you should be talking about wheteht perceptions should be
trusted since
we have no access to unprocessed sense data
>is undercut by the fact that all evidence for such proof must,
> come in via the senses.
Yes. However, there are 3 arguments here, not 2. They are
1 the senses should never be trusted (scepticism)
2 the senses are infallible (O'ism)
3 the senses are fallible but still generally trustworthy (everyone
else)
> Illusions work BECAUSE the senses work.
Illusions are illusions because sensory or perceptual failure has
occurred
1Z
> On the "senses are infallible" point, I said that in the way
> you mean, nobody believes it, least of all Objectivists.
> This too is accurate for if you were right, then Objectivists
> would deny the existence of optical illusions. �But I don't
> believe you'll find a single Objectivist, or even a single
> breathing human, who actually believes that.
Of course they don't deny the existence of optical illusions.
They deny that they are sensory (using a pointless and artifical
definition
of "sense") or they deny that they are illusions ("Sticks are supposed
to look bent in water").
> In summary, you don't know what the hell you're saying
> about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy
Saying it doesn't make it so.
1Z
> On Dec 20, 1:07�pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On 19 Dec, 00:27, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Dec 18, 6:46 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On 18 Dec, 11:38, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > Nothing follows from the claim that there is some automatic,
> > infallible element to perception. There is no epistemic upshot.
> And your point being? �Is this supposed to have something to do with
> Objectivism?
Yes. O-ism strenuously argues for something
that isn't true, and does so in a way that is ultimately
pointless.
> > > The issue to the Objectivist is whether the senses are necessarily
> > > *valid* (objectively occurring),
> > "Valid" doesn't mean "objectively occurring".
> Yes it does here.
That's because "here" is a fallacy of equivocation
> > "Valid" is
> > normative, a value judgement.
> No, it does not mean that here. Valid can mean, as it does here,
> "grounded in truth." That which is objectively occurring is per se
> grounded in truth.
That's hopelessly vague.
Arnold Broese
news:22969451-f40b-47e2...@21g2000yqj.googlegroups.com...
> On 21 Dec, 01:41, Arnold Broese <arnold_broeseREM...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> The senses accurately report what they encounter. The illusions are the
>> result of processing of the information.
>
> Wrong and pointless. Some sensory errors such as the "blind spot"
> errors occur in the sense organs themselves.
You confuse limitations with accuracy. We can't see in the dark either. The
issue is whether the senses can supply accurate information, not whether
they have limits or wrong interpretations.
>> Our brains apply their program of
>> perspective (such as smaller is father away), which can be confused in
>> certain circumstances. Illusions would not work if the brain did not work
>> the senses in a definite known way. The argument that the senses are not
>> to
>> be trusted
>
> Surely you should be talking about wheteht perceptions should be
> trusted since we have no access to unprocessed sense data
Perceptions can be trusted in that an illusion is accurately perceived as an
illusion. The *interpretation* of perceptions (illusions) can be mistaken,
but that is another matter.
>>is undercut by the fact that all evidence for such proof must,
>> come in via the senses.
>
> Yes. However, there are 3 arguments here, not 2. They are
>
> 1 the senses should never be trusted (scepticism)
> 2 the senses are infallible (O'ism)
> 3 the senses are fallible but still generally trustworthy (everyone
> else)
4) Perceptions are accurate, but can be misunderstood. Bent stick in water
is an accurate perception - the light is refracted just as perceived.
The fault of concluding the stick is bent, is not the fault of perception
which showed light bent.
>
>> Illusions work BECAUSE the senses work.
>
> Illusions are illusions because sensory or perceptual failure has
> occurred
No, because perception works in a certain way, it reliably makes illusions
work consistently.
--
Arnold
1Z
wrote:
> "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:22969451-f40b-47e2...@21g2000yqj.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Wrong and pointless. Some sensory errors such as the "blind spot"
> > errors occur in the sense organs themselves.
>
> You confuse limitations with accuracy.
No I am not
Inaccuracy is limited accuracy.
>We can't see in the dark either. The
> issue is whether the senses can supply accurate information, not whether
> they have limits or wrong interpretations.
In the case of blind spot errors, the information is coming in to the
lens but
not makign it further than the retina. Thus the eye is not accurately
reporting what it encounters.
> > Surely you should be talking about wheteht perceptions should be
> > trusted since we have no access to unprocessed sense data
>
> Perceptions can be trusted in that an illusion is accurately perceived as an
> illusion.
That makes no sense.
>The *interpretation* of perceptions (illusions) can be mistaken,
> but that is another matter.
According to the hallowed sense-perception distinction,
perceptions are *already* interpreted.
> > 1 the senses should never be trusted (scepticism)
> > 2 the senses are infallible (O'ism)
> > 3 the senses are fallible but still generally trustworthy (everyone
> > else)
>
> 4) Perceptions are accurate, but can be misunderstood. Bent stick in water
> is an accurate perception - the light is refracted just as perceived.
It is innacurate because the stick is not bent. The human
visual systems can automatically compensate for some
optical effects but not others. Hence (3) not (2)
> The fault of concluding the stick is bent, is not the fault of perception
> which showed light bent.
No, perception does not "show light". It would be useless
if it did. Perception is there to give us an accurate impression
of the environment so we can find food and avoid danger; it
is not there to give us lessons in optics.
> >> Illusions work BECAUSE the senses work.
>
> > Illusions are illusions because sensory or perceptual failure has
> > occurred
>
> No, because perception works in a certain way, it reliably makes illusions
> work consistently.
"consistently" does not mean "correctly"
Charles Bell
> On 21 Dec, 01:41, Arnold Broese <arnold_broeseREM...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > "Jim Klein" <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
>
> >news:43303362-5f6c-4d31...@r1g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
>
> > > On the "senses are infallible" point, I said that in the way
> > > you mean, nobody believes it, least of all Objectivists.
> > > This too is accurate for if you were right, then Objectivists
> > > would deny the existence of optical illusions. �But I don't
> > > believe you'll find a single Objectivist, or even a single
> > > breathing human, who actually believes that.
>
> > The senses accurately report what they encounter. The illusions are the
> > result of processing of the information.
>
> Wrong and pointless. Some sensory errors such as the "blind spot"
> errors
> occur in the sense organs themselves.
>
All you are making is the trivial observation that human senses cannot
detect everything in existence as for example the eye cannot see EMR
that is not visible light or that visible light is defined as EMR
which the eye can detect. Your trivial observation does not
contradict the statement: "Senses accurately report what they
encounter".
> > Our brains apply their program of
> > perspective (such as smaller is father away), which can be confused in
> > certain circumstances. Illusions would not work if the brain did not work
> > the senses in a definite known way. The argument that the senses are not to
> > be trusted
>
You are making the stupid man's confusion of the senses over the
perceptions.
> 2 the senses are infallible (O'ism)
O'ism does not make this claim.
Charles Bell
> On 20 Dec, 20:21, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > > > On 18 Dec, 11:38, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > Nothing follows from the claim that there is some automatic,
> > > infallible element to perception. There is no epistemic upshot.
> > And your point being? �Is this supposed to have something to do with
> > Objectivism?
>
> Yes. O-ism strenuously argues for something
> that isn't true, and does so in a way that is ultimately
> pointless.
>
Saying so does not make it so.
> > > > The issue to the Objectivist is whether the senses are necessarily
> > > > *valid* (objectively occurring),
> > > "Valid" doesn't mean "objectively occurring".
> > Yes it does here.
>
> That's because "here" is a fallacy of equivocation
>
No "here" means that there is more than one meaning of "valid", and
here "valid" means "grounded in reality."
> > > "Valid" is
> > > normative, a value judgement.
> > No, it does not mean that here. Valid can mean, as it does here,
> > "grounded in truth." That which is objectively occurring is per se
> > grounded in truth.
>
> That's hopelessly vague.
To a stupid person like you, of course. You do not get to confine a
discussion to words that work for simpletons.
valid: "well-grounded or justifiable : being at once relevant and
meaningful". Valid implies being supported by objective truth [M-W
Online definition]
Deal with it, dipshit!
Charles Bell
> In the case of blind spot errors, the information is coming in to the
> lens but
> not makign it further than the retina. Thus the eye is not accurately
> reporting what it encounters.
>
You are still confusing accuracy with limitation. No one is claiming
the eye can report without limitation everything in existence.
Jim Klein
> > > Wrong and pointless. Some sensory errors such as the "blind spot"
> > > errors occur in the sense organs themselves.
>
> > You confuse limitations with accuracy.
>
> No I am not
>
> Inaccuracy is limited accuracy.
Sure, and anything is everything and slavery is
freedom and yes is no.
> > 4) Perceptions are accurate, but can be misunderstood. Bent stick in water
> > is an accurate perception - the light is refracted just as perceived.
>
> It is innacurate because the stick is not bent.
Then that explains it. You think the light waves reflecting
and refracting as they do, automatically means
that the stick is bent.
Well, dig buddy. That's YOU, not the stick. There
is nothing "inaccurate" or "subject to error" in
what is happening out there.
That leaves you to argue that either our concepts
and thoughts and statements are not built of
these components (in whatever general and
unspecified manner that might mean, which
means that might be), or that there's some
"Third Thing" which somehow influences these
units and what ultimately manifests. And then,
you might as well mention why.
Oh, never mind. They did that already!
jk
1Z
> On Dec 21, 3:46 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
ll you are making is the trivial observation that human senses cannot
> detect everything in existence as for example the eye cannot see EMR
> that is not visible light or that visible light is defined as EMR
> which the eye can detect. Your trivial observation does not
> contradict the statement: "Senses accurately report what they
> encounter".
yes it does. My cornea encounters some photons that it
doesn't report.
> > > Our brains apply their program of
> > > perspective (such as smaller is father away), which can be confused in
> > > certain circumstances. Illusions would not work if the brain did not work
> > > the senses in a definite known way. The argument that the senses are
> > > not to
> > > be trusted
> You are making the stupid man's confusion of the senses over the
> perceptions.
That wasn't me.
Arnold, I think.
> > 2 the senses are infallible (O'ism)
> O'ism does not make this claim.
it does according to
sources more authoritative than
you.
1Z
> > Yes. O-ism strenuously argues for something
> > that isn't true, and does so in a way that is ultimately
> > pointless.
>
> Saying so does not make it so.
I hae already given the arguemnt: having an infallible
*stage* in the total perceptual process is of no benefit if
I cannot access it seperately from the fallible stages.
> No "here" means that there is more than one meaning of "valid", and
> here "valid" means "grounded in reality."
That's another pointless vague and rhetorical phrase.
1Z
> > > 4) Perceptions are accurate, but can be misunderstood. Bent stick in
> > > water
> > > is an accurate perception - the light is refracted just as perceived.
>
> > It is innacurate because the stick is not bent.
>
> Then that explains it. You think the light waves reflecting
> and refracting as they do, automatically means
> that the stick is bent.
No. But it looks bent, and it isn't. Hence
it is a misperception.
> Well, dig buddy. That's YOU, not the stick. There
> is nothing "inaccurate" or "subject to error" in
> what is happening out there.
No. It is a misperception. My visual
system can't correct for that
quirk of optics, in the way it can
for perspective.
> That leaves you to argue that either our concepts
> and thoughts and statements are not built of
> these components
Not even remotely. You have fallen
for the false dichotomy again. I don;t
have to believe the senses are invariably
unreliable just because I don't think they are
infallible.
Charles Bell
> > > 2 the senses are infallible (O'ism)
> > O'ism does not make this claim.
>
> it does according to
> sources more authoritative than
> you.
Which you fail to quote and cite.
Charles Bell
> On 21 Dec, 12:23, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > Yes. O-ism strenuously argues for something
> > > that isn't true, and does so in a way that is ultimately
> > > pointless.
>
> > Saying so does not make it so.
>
> I hae already given the arguemnt: having an infallible
> *stage* in the total perceptual process is of no benefit if
> I cannot access it seperately from the fallible stages.
>
You are allleging that O'ism is making an argument for something that
is not true, but the only "something" to which you have have referred
is not something O'ists have made an argument for. There is no O'ist
"infallible stage" of the senses. There is only your assertion of an
O'ist infallible stage. The senses are considered necessarily valid,
against which statement you also fail to have anything to offer.
> > No "here" means that there is more than one meaning of "valid", and
> > here "valid" means "grounded in reality."
>
> That's another pointless vague and rhetorical �phrase.
Saying something is so does not make it so. You are simply a very
stupid person who pretends to many things.
Arnold Broese
>
> No. But it looks bent, and it isn't. Hence
> it is a misperception.
No, it is supposed to look that way in the water. The fault is to conclude
it should look as if is in the air. Straight sticks look bent when half in
the water, and that is just how you perceive it. You perceive the bent light
just as it is. If you saw the stick as straight, you would have to get your
eyes checked.
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese
> Not even remotely. You have fallen
> for the false dichotomy again. I don;t
> have to believe the senses are invariably
> unreliable just because I don't think they are
> infallible.
So, when you see your reflection in a mirror, this proves your senses have
failed you, because that is not a real person standing there even if it look
as if there is? Or, is it more likely the case that you interpret your
perception in the context?
--
Arnold
Jim Klein
wrote:
> > No. But it looks bent, and it isn't. Hence
> > it is a misperception.
>
> No, it is supposed to look that way in the water.
LOL...right!
> The fault is to conclude
> it should look as if is in the air. Straight sticks look bent when half in
> the water, and that is just how you perceive it. You perceive the bent light
> just as it is. If you saw the stick as straight, you would have to get your
> eyes checked.
Right again. Don't these guys wonder why we /always/
see the stick as bent!
jk
Jim Klein
> > That leaves you to argue that either our concepts
> > and thoughts and statements are not built of
> > these components
>
> Not even remotely. You have fallen
> for the false dichotomy again. I don;t
> have to believe the senses are invariably
> unreliable just because I don't think they are
> infallible.
Is this just another way of saying, "It's conjecture,
all the way down," in Gordon's classic verbiage?
It's either that, or you're just taking the other choice,
that there's some "Third Thing" that somehow
separates the factual from the non-factual.
Me, I think existence does a fine job of that.
jk
1Z
wrote:
> "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:c810c084-12d4-4844...@d20g2000yqh.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > No. But it looks bent, and it isn't. Hence
> > it is a misperception.
>
> No, it is supposed to look that way in the water.
It is supposed to look how it is.
> The fault is to conclude
> it should look as if is in the air.
It should look as it is under all circumsntances
> Straight sticks look bent when half in
> the water, and that is just how you perceive it.
That's how I misperceive it since they are not bent
> You perceive the bent light
My eyes are supposed to report
on external objects, not on the behaviour of liht.
1Z
wrote:
> So, when you see your reflection in a mirror, this proves your senses have
> failed you, because that is not a real person standing there even if it look
> as if there is?
They have failed to compensate for what is going
on optically. That can be useful under some circusmtance,
eg. micorscopes and telescopes.
>Or, is it more likely the case that you interpret your
> perception in the context?
I can compensate for misperceptions cognitevely, yes.
They are still misperceptions.
1Z
> Right again. Don't these guys wonder why we /always/
> see the stick as bent!
Misperceptions can be produced quite
regulary and reliably. So what? That just
means they are objective pehnomena.
Which in turn means there si no inference
from "occurs objectively" to "is valid"
1Z
>
> Is this just another way of saying, "It's conjecture,
> all the way down," in Gordon's classic verbiage?
Not even remotely.
> It's either that, or you're just taking the other choice,
> that there's some "Third Thing" that somehow
> separates the factual from the non-factual.
"factual" doesn't mean "certain", "infallible", etc.
There's 100% reliable, 99% reliable, 98% reliable...
Jim Klein
> > It's either that, or you're just taking the other choice,
> > that there's some "Third Thing" that somehow
> > separates the factual from the non-factual.
>
> "factual" doesn't mean "certain", "infallible", etc.
>
> There's 100% reliable, 99% reliable, 98% reliable...
Around here "fact" is usually used to reference the
existential state, rather than the integration of the
existential state by a consciousness.
Thus "certain," "fallible" and the like don't apply to
facts. They just are. My point stands.
jk
1Z
> > There's 100% reliable, 99% reliable, 98% reliable...
> Around here "fact" is usually used to reference the
> existential state, rather than the integration of the
> existential state by a consciousness.
> Thus "certain," "fallible" and the like don't apply to
> facts. They just are. My point stands.
Sig.h...there is a third thing that is neirther infallbility nor
uniform uslessness, and if you think that has nothing
to do with facts, fine. ***My*** point stands as well.
O-ists don't have to put forward the silly theories
of infallibility and certainty to defeat sceptics.
Sceptics are best defeated by common-sense.
Charles Bell
> On 22 Dec, 13:31, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> O-ists don't have to put forward the silly theories
> of infallibility
O'ists don't put forward theories of infallibility. You have yet to
cite and quote anything to that effect.
1Z
"She thought that perception, being physiologically determined, is
incapable of error. So optical illusions, for example, are errors in
the conceptual identification of what is seen, not in the seeing
itself.[22]" (WP)
[22] Kelley, David (1986). The Evidence of the Senses: A Realist
Theory of Perception. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State
University
Charles Bell
> On 22 Dec, 21:05, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 22, 9:27�am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On 22 Dec, 13:31, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> > > O-ists don't have to put forward the silly theories
> > > of infallibility
> > O'ists don't put forward theories of infallibility. �You have yet to
> > cite and quote anything to that effect.
>
> "She thought that perception, being physiologically determined, is
> incapable of error. So optical illusions, for example, are errors in
> the conceptual identification of what is seen, not in the seeing
> itself.[22]" (WP)
Nevertheless this is what the Wiki Suq says that Kelley says and not
what Rand said:
<< A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and
integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of
percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends
reality. When we speak of "direct perception" or "direct awareness,"
we mean the perceptual level. Percepts, not sensations, are the given,
the self-evident. The knowledge of sensations as components of
percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a
scientific, conceptual discovery. >> ITOE 1. p5
Where are the words "infallible" or "incapable of error" or those
meanings in the above? "Self-evident" does not mean infallible --
begging the question of what is a percept to be error-free? The most
that can be said about being "incapable of error" is that perception
is infallible at doing what perception does -- it is a given.
Moreover, what Rand said here certainly directly contradicts what you
have asserted about Objectivism claiming that the senses are
infallible in that she says sensations are later apprehended by man in
conceptual discovery. Any "fallibilty" exists far later than in the
physiological stimulation of sensation.
Moreover, with respect to the sensations, Kelley is quoted as saying:
"Optical illusions, for example, are errors in the conceptual
identification of what is seen, not in the seeing itself." Is this
not true? The optical illusion is not produced by the sensation of
seeing but in later mental apprehension of what has been seen.
1Z
> Moreover, with respect to the sensations, Kelley is quoted as saying:
> "Optical illusions, for example, are errors in the conceptual
> identification of what is seen, not in the seeing itself."�Is this
> not true? �
They are not errors in the conscious identification of what
is seen or it would be possible to consciously un-see them
>The optical illusion is not produced by the sensation of
> seeing but in later mental apprehension of what has been seen.
There is an important class of illusions, such as the bent stick,
which essentially occur before light has even encountered the eye.
The error lied in the visuals systems inability to compensate for some
optical effects as
it can for others.
Charles Bell
> On 23 Dec, 01:45, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > Moreover, with respect to the sensations, Kelley is quoted as saying:
> > "Optical illusions, for example, are errors in the conceptual
> > identification of what is seen, not in the seeing itself."�Is this
> > not true? �
>
> They are not errors in the conscious identification of what
> is seen or it would be possible to consciously un-see them
>
Yes, they are exactly errors in the conscious identification of what
is seen rather than of what is actually seen and that is exactly why
they cannot be un-seen but rather apprehended differently than as
seen.
> >The optical illusion is not produced by the sensation of
> > seeing but in later mental apprehension of what has been seen.
>
> There is an important class of illusions, such as the bent stick,
> which essentially occur before light has even encountered the eye.
> The error lied in the visuals systems inability to compensate for some
> optical effects as
> it can for others.
What is important in this line of the discussion is that you made a
stupid statement that O'ists believe in the infallibiliy of the senses
and that you cannot provide any proof of that but merely point out
errors in visual systems assuming your false assertion is true. You
are trying to discredit something no Objectivist ever claimed.
Moreover, "an inability to compensate for some optical effects" is not
outside the assertion in my statement that a later mental apprehension
is responsible for the optical illusion, not that the optical illusion
is real. The reality of the stick not in optical illusion, that is,
not "bent" as seen, is apprehendable by man.
1Z
>. They are not errors in the conscious identification of what
> > is seen or it would be possible to consciously un-see them
>
> Yes, they are exactly errors in the conscious identification of what
> is seen rather than of what is actually seen and that is exactly why
> they cannot be un-seen but rather apprehended differently than as
> seen.
That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
If they are conscious cognitive errors, they wouldn't be
perceptual errors.
> What is important in this line of the discussion is that you made a
> stupid statement that O'ists believe in the infallibiliy of the senses
> and that you cannot provide any proof of that but merely point out
> errors in visual systems assuming your false assertion is true.
I have plenty of proof. You seem to think Rand never said
that. Whatever. Plenty of objectivists beliave it.;
> You
> are trying to discredit something no Objectivist ever claimed.
Arnold is claiming it in this very thread, you silly man.
Charles Bell
> On 23 Dec, 10:32, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> >. They are not errors in the conscious identification of what
> > > is seen or it would be possible to consciously un-see them
>
> > Yes, they are exactly errors in the conscious identification of what
> > is seen rather than of what is actually seen and that is exactly why
> > they cannot be un-seen but rather apprehended differently than as
> > seen.
>
> That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
> errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
>
> If they are conscious cognitive errors,
Refracted light is not a conscious cognitive error. It is what it is,
and the perception from the sensation of the bent stick is
physiologically what it is: a manifestation of refracted light.
Objectivism denies that a perception of a thing is the same as the
thing perceived but rather acknowledges that a perception is a given
in human cognition.
> > What is important in this line of the discussion is that you made a
> > stupid statement that O'ists believe in the infallibiliy of the senses
> > and that you cannot provide any proof of that but merely point out
> > errors in visual systems assuming your false assertion is true.
>
> I have plenty of proof. You seem to think Rand never said
> that.
Rand never said that, and, as I have provided, wrote against your
allegation that sensation is infallible.
> Whatever. Plenty of objectivists beliave it.;
No Objectivist believes that the senses are infallible.
>
> > You
> > are trying to discredit something no Objectivist ever claimed.
>
> Arnold is claiming it in this very thread, you silly man.
Broese never claimed that the visual sensation of the "bent stick" is
infallible.
1Z
> On Dec 23, 6:08 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
> > errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
>
> > If they are conscious cognitive errors,
>
> Refracted light is not a conscious cognitive error.
i didn't say it was. I said the way the visual system handles
that particular optical effect amounts to an error,. since
the stick is not in fact bent.
>It is what it is,
> and the perception from the sensation of the bent stick is
> physiologically what it is: a manifestation of refracted light.
Flim-flam. The job of the senses is to report on the environment,
not on the physics of light.
> Objectivism denies that a perception of a thing is the same as the
> thing perceived but rather acknowledges that a perception is a given
> in human cognition.
Irrelevant waffle.
> No Objectivist believes that the senses are infallible.
Disproved below.
> > > You
> > > are trying to discredit something no Objectivist ever claimed.
>
> > Arnold is claiming it in this very thread, you silly man.
>
> Broese never claimed that the visual sensation of the "bent stick" is
> infallible.
He says it is in fact accurate. As part of an arguemnt that the senses
never fail to repoert, they just occasionally switch to reporitng on
somehting
other that what you want them to report on. The same, very silly,
argument
you give above.
Anyway, here he is sayign what you say he hasn't said:-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------
1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:22969451-f40b-47e2-ba15-
b6862b...@21g2000yqj.googlegroups.com...
> On 21 Dec, 01:41, Arnold Broese <arnold_broeseREM...@hotmail.com>
[snip]
4) Perceptions are accurate, but can be misunderstood. Bent stick in
water
is an accurate perception - the light is refracted just as perceived.
The fault of concluding the stick is bent, is not the fault of
perception
which showed light bent.
Jim Klein
>
> >. They are not errors in the conscious identification of what
> > > is seen or it would be possible to consciously un-see them
>
> > Yes, they are exactly errors in the conscious identification of what
> > is seen rather than of what is actually seen and that is exactly why
> > they cannot be un-seen but rather apprehended differently than as
> > seen.
>
> That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
> errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
I don't see the phrase "conscious perceptual errors" in there.
What the hell is your point anyway? Are you saying that with
a functional human, blue light waves can strike the sensory
system and cause physical reactions as if they were red
light waves?
I never really could understand this, "The senses may fail"
assertion on the physical level. That hardly means that
everything that goes on with the data acquisition is
infallible or anything like that, but I still don't get what
the assertion of "fallible" is supposed to mean with
regard to the senses.
Clearly the conclusion that the stick is (or is not)
bent, is something that happens well after (or
pursuant to) the acquisition of the sensory
stimuli.
"Sensing" is the reaction of various cells in reaction
to various physical (and/or chemical) stimuli, is it
not? In a functional human, what is there about this
that is subject to failure IYO? Do you think there are
rods and cones (or whatever) that react to red
light waves as if they were blue, and vice versa?
jk
1Z
> On Dec 23, 6:08 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On 23 Dec, 10:32, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > >. They are not errors in the conscious identification of what
> > > > is seen or it would be possible to consciously un-see them
>
> > > Yes, they are exactly errors in the conscious identification of what
> > > is seen rather than of what is actually seen and that is exactly why
> > > they cannot be un-seen but rather apprehended differently than as
> > > seen.
>
> > That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
> > errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
>
> I don't see the phrase "conscious perceptual errors" in there.
No. I was exploring the possible meanings of Bell's vaguely
worded passage.
> What the hell is your point anyway?
1) That to say atuomatic functioning is infallible, youi have to pin
the errors on volition
2) Perceputal errors such as optical illusions are not volitional.
> Are you saying that with
> a functional human, blue light waves can strike the sensory
> system and cause physical reactions as if they were red
> light waves?
Not even remotely
> I never really could understand this, "The senses may fail"
> assertion on the physical level.
> That hardly means that
> everything that goes on with the data acquisition is
> infallible or anything like that, but I still don't get what
> the assertion of "fallible" is supposed to mean with
> regard to the senses.
It means that sensory/perceptual errors occasionaly occur.
> Clearly the conclusion that the stick is (or is not)
> bent, is something that happens well after (or
> pursuant to) the acquisition of the sensory
> stimuli.
OK. But the inital, prima-facie evidence from the senses/perceptions
is that the
stick *is* bent, when it turns out it is not. Hence perceptual error.
> "Sensing" is the reaction of various cells in reaction
> to various physical (and/or chemical) stimuli, is it
> not? In a functional human, what is there about this
> that is subject to failure IYO?
Outside of O-ism
Sensory error refers to perceptions as they are
presented to us in consciousness.
Sayign that there is some primitive
stage of the process which is infallbile
buys you nothing since that stage is inaccessible
separately from eveything else. It does not,
for instance, refute the sceptic.
Charles Bell
> On 23 Dec, 12:54, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 23, 6:08 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
> > > errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
>
> > > If they are conscious cognitive errors,
>
> > Refracted light is not a conscious cognitive error.
>
> i didn't say it was. I said the way the visual system handles
> that particular optical effect amounts to an error,. since
> the stick is not in fact bent.
>
The eye is seeing exactly what it sees: a manifestation of refracted
light. The sense is valid. The possibility of a conscious cognitive
error comes later in an apprehension that the stick is bent. No
Objectivist claims that one can see infallibily a stick in refracted
light that would *not* be bent, for seeing the stick as though it were
not in refracted light (when it is) would itself be an error; thus you
are requiring in your error-free sensation for the eye to see
something that is not as it is -- in refracted light. Your error-free
sensation is actually in error. Do you also desire an error-free
sense in a lightless room to see things as they actually are or as
they can only be -- not visible? O'ist sensation requires only that a
sense can sense as it can. Your sensation requires that a sense can
sense as a sense cannot sense in a dubiously infallible way.
> >It is what it is,
> > and the perception from the sensation of the bent stick is
> > physiologically what it is: a manifestation of refracted light.
>
> Flim-flam. The job of the senses is to report on the environment,
> not on the physics of light.
>
"The job of the senses. . . " Ha Ha! You're an idiot.
. . . can't see "the physics of light" Ha Ha! You're an idiot.
> > Broese never claimed that the visual sensation of the "bent stick" is
> > infallible.
>
.
>
> Anyway, here he is sayign what you say he hasn't said:-
>
> 4) Perceptions are accurate, but can be misunderstood. Bent stick in
> water
> is an accurate perception - the light is refracted just as perceived.
> The fault of concluding the stick is bent, is not the fault of
> perception
> which showed light bent.
Ha Ha! You're an idiot. I said that Broese never claimed that visual
sensation is infallible and you show that Broese did not claim that
visual sensation is infallible.
1Z
> On Dec 23, 8:56�am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On 23 Dec, 12:54, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Dec 23, 6:08 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > That makes no sense. If they were conscious perceptual
> > > > errors, it would be possible to consciously perceive differently.
>
> > > > If they are conscious cognitive errors,
>
> > > Refracted light is not a conscious cognitive error.
>
> > i didn't say it was. I said the way the visual system handles
> > that particular optical effect amounts to an error,. since
> > the stick is not in fact bent.
>
> The eye is seeing exactly what it sees: a manifestation of refracted
> light.
THat a thing does what it does in not how success is defined.
Success is meeting some standard. objective or requirement
> �The sense is valid.
"valid" has no fixed meaning
>�The possibility of a conscious cognitive
> error comes later in an apprehension that the stick is bent.
Whilst I can believe the stick to be un-bent,
there is nothing I can do to make the stick seem un-bent, so the
error is in fact unconscious and perceptual.
> �No
> Objectivist claims that one can see infallibily a stick in refracted
> light that would *not* be bent, for seeing the stick as though it were
> not in refracted light (when it is) would itself be an error;
No it wouldn't. The job of the sense is to report on the environment,
not
to report on the behaviour of light. Your argument is profoundly
silly. It
is like saying that if your car fails to start, it is really
succeeding in stalling.
Cars are supposed to start. End of.
>thus you
> are requiring in your error-free sensation for the eye to see
> something that is not as it is -- in refracted light. �
I am requiring an error-free perception to show things as they are
--unbent sticks as unbent. I am not expecting my visual systems
to report on how they are getting the in information. How is
that going to help me find food and avoid predators? The fact that
errors are physically accountable does not make them non-errors.
>Your error-free
> sensation is actually in error. �Do you also desire an error-free
> sense in a lightless room to see things as �they actually are or as
> they can only be -- not visible?
Error is falling short of a standard. Standards can be set so high
that everything
trivially fails or so low that everything trivially succeeds. The
latter is exactly
what is going on in the "sticke are supposed to look bent" argument.
The
normative standard "supposed to" is tied to the actual situation.
Setting
standards unreasonably high is *not* the only alternative. THat
constitutes
a false dichotomy argument.
>�O'ist sensation requires only that a
> sense can sense as it can.
>�Your sensation requires that a sense can
> sense as a sense cannot sense in a dubiously infallible way.
The approach of common sense and science is that if a perception
cannot do in one situation what it can do in another, that is failure.
You car sometimes fails to start because it sometimes succeeds.
Failure is not doing the impossible, and success is not whatever
is actual.
> Ha Ha! You're an idiot. I said that Broese never claimed that visual
> sensation is infallible and you show that Broese did not claim that
> visual sensation is infallible.
The point of the bent stick argument is to show that
what everyone regards as an error isn't, according to O-ism,
That is, the point is to shore up the infallibility argument
Charles Bell
> On 24 Dec, 02:41, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > The eye is seeing exactly what it sees: a manifestation of refracted
> > light.
>
> THat a thing does what it does in not how success is defined.
Irrelevant. The eye is seeing a manifestation of refracted light.
You are requiring the eye *not* see the manifestaion of refracted
light. Why is that? Do you also require the eye to see the atoms that
make up an object? Seeing a manifestation of refracted light is what
an eye *can* see; seeing the atoms is something that an eye cannot
possibly see, so your "requirement" for success is an impossibilty,
and your "requirement" for failure is success in seeing what an eye
ought to see. Why is that?
> Success is meeting some standard. objective or requirement
>
As you have stated, your standard for success is failure and your
standard for failure is success.
> > �ｿｽThe sense is valid.
>
> "valid" has no fixed meaning
>
"Has" no fixed meaning. "No" has no fixed meaning. "Fixed" has no
fixed meaning. "Meaning" has no fixed meaning. Either address your
argument to what an O'ist may actually posit without trying to define
away the meaning of words already clearly defined for you, or go
away.
valid : well-grounded or justifiable; being at once relevant and
meaningful; implies being supported by objective truth.
> >�ｿｽThe possibility of a conscious cognitive
> > error comes later in an apprehension that the stick is bent.
>
> Whilst I can believe the stick to be un-bent,
> there is nothing I can do to make the stick seem un-bent, so the
> error is in fact unconscious and perceptual.
A statement the details of which do in no way support your assertion
that O'ists believe the senses are inafllible.
>
> > �ｿｽNo
> > Objectivist claims that one can see infallibily a stick in refracted
> > light that would *not* be bent, for seeing the stick as though it were
> > not in refracted light (when it is) would itself be an error;
>
> No it wouldn't. The job of the sense is to report on the environment,
> not
> to report on the behaviour of light. Your argument is profoundly
> silly. It
> is like saying that if your car fails to start, it is really
> succeeding in stalling.
> Cars are supposed to start. End of.
>
> >thus you
> > are requiring in your error-free sensation for the eye to see
> > something that is not as it is -- in refracted light. �ｿｽ
>
> I am requiring an error-free perception
A requirement that in no way supports your assertion that O'ist
believe that the senses are infallible.
Again, from Rand,
"The valdity of the senses must be taken for granted. [. . . ] The
knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is
acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery."
Address your assertions to the above statements, something which
O'ists *do* say, or go away.
Jim Klein
> Outside of O-ism
> Sensory error refers to perceptions as they are
> presented to us in consciousness.
Uh huh. So what are you saying, that the light
waves "presented to us" by the bent stick, are
something other than they appear to be at the
moment of their "presentation"?
I find that claim both remarkable and absurd.
> Sayign that there is some primitive
> stage of the process which is infallbile
> buys you nothing since that stage is inaccessible
> separately from eveything else.
Take it up with the pragmatists; that doesn't
interest me.
> It does not,
> for instance, refute the sceptic.
It establishes that there is a necessarily
correspondent base at the foundation of
our conceptual hierarchy, which does a lot
to defeat run-of-the-mill skepticism.
As far as the skepticism you see around here
or in academic circles, there's nothing that
could possibly "defeat" it since it doesn't
even take "A is A" as necessarily true, when
examined closely. Hell, the skeptic doesn't
even take his own existence as self-evidently
true for crissakes; maybe he's a brain in a vat.
jk
1Z
> Irrelevant. �The eye is seeing a manifestation of refracted light.
The eye is failing to correctly see an external object
> You are requiring the eye *not* see the manifestation of refracted
> light. Why is that?
Because the job of the senses is to inform me about the
environment, not about the behaviour of light.
>�Do you also require the eye to see the atoms that
> make up an object?
That is setting the standard too high
> Seeing a manifestation of refracted light is what
> an eye *can* see;
It is still an error in this case. "Error" is not
a synonym for impossibility
>seeing the atoms is something that an eye cannot
> possibly see, so your "requirement" for success is an impossibilty,
I never said that was my standard for success, please stop
lying.
> and your "requirement" for failure is success in seeing what an eye
> ought to see. �Why is that?
The eye ought not to report on light refraction, it ought
to report on external objects. The stick is reported as bent when it
is straight,
hence the report is in error.
> > Success is meeting some standard. objective or requirement
> As you have stated, your standard for success is failure and your
> standard for failure is success.
Nonsense.
> > > �The sense is valid.
>
> > "valid" has no fixed meaning
>
> "Has" no fixed meaning. "No" has no fixed meaning. "Fixed" has no
> fixed meaning. "Meaning" has no fixed meaning. Either address your
> argument to what an O'ist may actually posit without trying to define
> away the meaning of words already clearly defined for you, or �go
> away.
"Valid" as used by O-ists does not mean anything sufficently
precise to be of epistemological interest.
> > >�The possibility of a conscious cognitive
> > > error comes later in an apprehension that the stick is bent.
>
> > Whilst I can believe the stick to be un-bent,
> > there is nothing I can do to make the stick seem un-bent, so the
> > error is in fact unconscious and perceptual.
>
> A statement the details of which do in no way support your assertion
> that O'ists believe the senses are inafllible.
It was supposed to refute
your attempt to argue that the possibility of
conscious error somehow entails the ompossibility
of unconscious error.
> > >thus you
> > > are requiring in your error-free sensation
>
> > I am requiring an error-free perception
>
> A requirement that in no way supports your assertion that O'ist
> believe that the senses are infallible.
My point related to your sense/perception distinction.
What is it for if not to point out the infallibility of sense?
> Again, from Rand,
>
> "The valdity of the senses must be taken for granted. [. . . ] The
> knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is
> acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery."
>
> Address your assertions to the above statements, something which
> O'ists *do* say, or go away.
Already have. "Valid" is too vague. However many O-ists,
such as Brose, have taken it to imply infalliblity. Many of
your comments have the same implication. Why insist that sticks
are supposed to look bent if you are not trying to refute an
example of a failed perception? Why do *that* if you are not
trying to build an argument for infallibility?
Jim Klein
> The eye ought not to report on light refraction, it ought
> to report on external objects.
That's fine, which is why over a sufficient period of
time, our eyesight (which includes the brain) might
correct for things like refraction. Naturally there'd
have to be a survival and reproductive benefit, but
if there were, over time it would happen.
> The stick is reported as bent when it
> is straight, hence the report is in error.
It's not "reported" as straight. At the sensual level,
there is only the reception of light waves. We
CONCLUDE (internally) that the stick is straight.
It's even alright to say we SEE it as straight, since
seeing usually includes the whole process. The
problem arises when thousands of years of great
minds switch this meaning of "see" back to the
meaning of "directly sense," and say that therefore
functional humans can directly sense things
in error. Well no, they can't...not even if they try.
jk
Charles Bell
>
> > Irrelevant. The eye is seeing a manifestation of refracted light.
>
> The eye is failing to correctly see an external object
>
The sensation of an object in refracted light is signaled to the
brain. The only failure would be if the sensation of an object in
refracted light is *not* signaled to the brain.
> > You are requiring the eye *not* see the manifestation of refracted
> > light. Why is that?
>
> Because the job of the senses is to inform me about the
> environment, not about the behaviour of light.
>
Ha! Ha! The "job of the senses" . . . You're an idiot. You think
that the senses earn money doing something about the environment.
Boy, are you stupid! Every fudge-factor scientist knows that the
senses have a moral duty to do something about the environment.
> "Valid" as used by O-ists does not mean anything sufficently
> precise to be of epistemological interest.
>
"Valid" means:
well-grounded or justifiable; being at once relevant and
meaningful; implies being supported by objective truth
> > > > The possibility of a conscious cognitive
> > > > error comes later in an apprehension that the stick is bent.
>
> > > Whilst I can believe the stick to be un-bent,
> > > there is nothing I can do to make the stick seem un-bent, so the
> > > error is in fact unconscious and perceptual.
>
The sensation of an object in refracted light is signaled to the
brain. Deal with it.
> > A statement the details of which do in no way support your assertion
> > that O'ists believe the senses are inafllible.
>
> It was supposed to refute
> your attempt to argue that the possibility of
> conscious error somehow entails the ompossibility
> of unconscious error.
>
You made a false statement, still heretofore uncorrected, that O'ist
believe that the senses are infallible.
> > A requirement that in no way supports your assertion that O'ist
> > believe that the senses are infallible.
>
> My point related to your sense/perception distinction.
> What is it for if not to point out the infallibility of sense?
>
You made a false statement, still heretofore uncorrected, that O'ist
believe that the senses are infallible.
> > Again, from Rand,
>
> > "The valdity of the senses must be taken for granted. [. . . ] The
> > knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is
> > acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery."
>
> > Address your assertions to the above statements, something which
> > O'ists *do* say, or go away.
>
> Already have. "Valid" is too vague
valid: well-grounded or justifiable; being at once relevant and
meaningful; implies being supported by objective truth
> However many O-ists,
> such as Brose, have taken it to imply infalliblity.
No, O'ists, such as Broese, have not.
> Many of
> your comments have the same implication. Why insist that sticks
> are supposed to look bent if you are not trying to refute an
> example of a failed perception? Why do *that* if you are not
> trying to build an argument for infallibility?
I have said that the word "infallibly" does not apply to the senses.
Rand never applied the word "infallibility" to senses. O'ists have
not applied the word "infallibility" to the senses. You made a false
statement, still heretofore uncorrected, that O'ist believe that the
senses are infallible. One senses the object in refracted light as one
senses the object in refracted light, and therefore the sense of an
object in refracted light sensed as an object in refracted light is
valid, that is: conforming to the objective reality that an object in
refracted light will be sensed as an object in refracted light, and an
object in refracted light *not* sensed as an object in refracted light
(as you require) is not valid, that is: not conforming to objective
reality that an object in refracted light will be sensed as an object
in refracted light. You require the senses to be invalid.
1Z
> Uh huh. �So what are you saying, that the light
> waves "presented to us" by the bent stick, are
> something other than they appear to be at the
> moment of their "presentation"?
I am saying the stick is other than it appears to
be. I don't care about light. I am not trying to look
at light.
> > Sayign that there is some primitive
> > stage of the process which is infallbile
> > buys you nothing since that stage is inaccessible
> > separately from eveything else.
>
> Take it up with the pragmatists; that doesn't
> interest me.
I don't think it interests anyone else either.
> > It does not,
> > for instance, refute the sceptic.
>
> It establishes that there is a necessarily
> correspondent base at the foundation of
> our conceptual hierarchy, which does a lot
> to defeat run-of-the-mill skepticism.
Nope. You can have correspondence or necessity
but not both. Any causal chain can be interrupted. That
a photon hits the cornea does not guarantee it
will reach the retina. You can only get necessity by
collapsing together cause and effect, so that it is necessarily
the case that if such-and-such a retinal cell registers a photon,
a photon is indeed registered. But then there is no longer
correspondence.
> As far as the skepticism you see around here
> or in academic circles, there's nothing that
> could possibly "defeat" it since it doesn't
> even take "A is A" as necessarily true,
A is A. Looking at a stick is looking
at a stick. Looking at a stick is not looking at light.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
>Scientific induction with statistical limits on certainty due to error
>in observations is well within Objectivism, and, as a matter of fact,
>handled very poorly or not at all by other philosophies.
Objectivism does not handle limitations due to perceptual error well
at all. I suspect you were nervous about writing that, since you have
no basis for comparing it to other philosophies - you have little or
no knowledge of other philosophies or what they have to say on the
subject.
For example
http://www.publicbookshelf.com/public_html/Outline_of_Great_Books_Volume_I/w
hatisin_cbc.html
http://snurl.com/twl2q
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>There is no analytic-synthetic dichotomy.
That's true, because Rand made it up as a piece of fiction, a demon to
send her minion Peikoff to do battle with. Much of Objectivism is
based upon such tilting at windmills.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> Rand herself was able to conclude that Quantum Mechanics was wrong
>
>Rand only concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation was wrong.
Citation?
>Objectivism is actually the only philosophy that can describe how
>Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and Classical Physics can simultaneously
>and not paradigmatically be correct and that the elusive Theory of
>Everything (one might have supposed it to be M-theory) is to be
>expected and *necessarily* include elements of all three.
The rest of that paragraph counts only as a "testimonial," which is a
statement of belief on behalf of a product. Testimonials are commonly
found at websites or tv ads offering fake cures for various ailments.
Rand reduced selling a philosophy down to a business enterprise,
complete with all the trappings of selling a product to the masses.
Charles Bell
> On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 16:25:05 -0800, Charles Bell
>
>
> >Scientific induction with statistical limits on certainty due to error
> >in observations is well within Objectivism, and, as a matter of fact,
> >handled very poorly or not at all by other philosophies.
>
> Objectivism does not handle limitations due to perceptual error well
> at all.
If your understanding of how Objectivism handles "limitations due to
perceptual error" is on par with The Idiot's then you are attacking a
strawman. In any case, scientific induction including statistical
limits on certainty due to error in observation does not include the
concept of "limitations due to perceptual error", at least, as
conveyed by The Idiot. Hint: that there is a calculable probability
that a chemist will be off by a fraction of a drop of a reagent in
measuring his chemicals for an experiment that is to be repeated
several times among several chemists is a fact -- all part of the
reality to be recognized by an Objectivist within the context of
knowledge to be gained from that experiment. The public at large and,
regrettably, many scientists are limited by their non-Objectivist
philosophies that there is operating at all times a single truth (a
metaphysical truth above or outside the context of human
understanding ) that comes into conflict with the several "truths"
that will come from experiments that have different results even
though theory (typically, a rationalist depiction of the contextless
metaphysical truth) demands the results always be exactly the same.
J.S. Mill, in quotation you provided, . . .
<<A compound of the first kind is seen in the chemical products of
chemical substances. Thus hydrogen and oxygen may produce a new
product, a new bundle of effects known as water. How are the causes in
such cases to be unravelled? In most cases such compound effects can
be unravelled by experiment, for such compounds can usually be made to
reproduce their causes. Thus, water under certain circumstances may be
made to reproduce its causes, oxygen and hydrogen. Complex mental
effects, however, do not lend themselves to this simple mode of
analysis, and we can only discover their causes by the slow process of
studying the simple feelings themselves, and ascertaining
synthetically, by an examination of their possible combinations, what
they are capable of eventually producing.>>
. . . is babbling worthless banalities.
1Z
> > The stick is reported as bent when it
> > is straight, hence the report is in error.
>
> It's not "reported" as straight. �
No, it's reported as bent.
>At the sensual level,
> there is only the reception of light waves. �We
> CONCLUDE (internally) that the stick is straight.
So what? The "conclusion" is still involuntary
and still part of the overall perceptual process.
So, to all intents and puposes, we have fallible
perceptions. Insisting that there is some stage
of the perceptual process that is infallible buys you nothing.
> It's even alright to say we SEE it as straight,
It isn't. We don't. It isn't because we don't.
>since
> seeing usually includes the whole process. �The
> problem arises when thousands of years of great
> minds switch this meaning of "see" back to the
> meaning of "directly sense," and say that therefore
> functional humans can directly sense things
> in error. �Well no, they can't...not even if they try.
It is the not-so-great minds of the O-ists who
are switching meanings.
Charles Bell
> It is the not-so-great minds of the O-ists who
> are switching meanings.
No, it's pathetic, dissembling dunces like you who think they can just
substitute the word "sense" for the word for "perceive" or vice-versa
and think no one will notice.
The human eye would be malfunctioning as a human eye if it did *not*
signal to the brain an object in refracted light as an object in
refracted light.
By the way, this little bit below you got from Wikipedia is NOT in the
reference therein cited, the book by Kelley. Kelley never said this
in that book or anywhere else.
"She thought that perception, being physiologically determined, is
incapable of error. So optical illusions, for example, are errors in
the conceptual identification of what is seen, not in the seeing
itself.[22]" [22] "The Evidence of the Senses" by David Kelley.
In this book Kelley wrote that perception is a relational activity
between the object and the senses, and all perceptions of an object
are sensations of an object *through* a form of awareness. "Perception
is direct awareness of discriminated entities by means of patterns of
energy absorption by sense receptors" Kelley refutes the diaphanous
model in which an object perceived is the object in reality: the view
that awareness of objects cannot be mediated by any process whose
nature affects the way the objects appear. He also rejects
representationalism and idealism.
Jim Klein
> >At the sensual level,
> > there is only the reception of light waves. We
> > CONCLUDE (internally) that the stick is straight.
>
> So what? The "conclusion" is still involuntary
> and still part of the overall perceptual process.
> So, to all intents and puposes, we have fallible
> perceptions.
I'm not going to quibble over this. I don't really
object to this usage on its own, and I've already
mentioned that Rand (slightly) erred in thinking
that the lines between sensation, perception and
conceptualization were so blatantly evident.
Still, she defined her terms reasonably well and
what's important is what is concluded from all
this. The fallibility of perception is critical to
those skeptics who then misunderstand the
concept of "possibility" and put the two
together to conclude that it's always possible
that we're not integrating reality.
The fact of the matter is that we ARE integrating
reality and that there IS a correspondence born
of the necessary relationship between how things
are, and how we sense them to be.
> Insisting that there is some stage
> of the perceptual process that is infallible buys you nothing.
It buys me an understanding (admittedly broad and
not in specifics) of what the hell is going on.
Just look at the complexity (and talk about imagination!)
of the philosophies that go so far out of their way to
begin with a founding principle that we /can't/ know
what the hell is going on...about anything, let alone
about something as complex as human thought.
Well sorry, I very strongly disagree with that.
> > It's even alright to say we SEE it as straight,
>
> It isn't. We don't. It isn't because we don't.
Sorry; that's senility again. I meant to say it's even
alright to say we SEE it as bent.
I don't like arguing over word usage, but I'll sure
as hell argue over meaning.
> >since
> > seeing usually includes the whole process. The
> > problem arises when thousands of years of great
> > minds switch this meaning of "see" back to the
> > meaning of "directly sense," and say that therefore
> > functional humans can directly sense things
> > in error. Well no, they can't...not even if they try.
>
> It is the not-so-great minds of the O-ists who
> are switching meanings.
Stop distracting from the point. The point is that
WHATEVER is going on, and however the various
processes are consciously differentiated, the whole
shebang begins with the physical, immutable and
error-free (because it doesn't apply) action of
various attributes of objects being sensed.
Now the other yahoos here want to spend their time
working with the WORD "attribute," so that since we
have a separate word for it, it must be a separate
thing from the object that "has it." But a thing IS
its attributes and characteristics, all of them. That
we only sense some of them, is completely irrelevant
to this.
Philosophers have spent thousands of years chasing
that point, and we are now able to understand just
how wrong it is. So either understand it or don't.
jk
Jim Klein
> > Uh huh. So what are you saying, that the light
> > waves "presented to us" by the bent stick, are
> > something other than they appear to be at the
> > moment of their "presentation"?
>
> I am saying the stick is other than it appears to
> be. I don't care about light. I am not trying to look
> at light.
And I'm not talking about what you're trying to
do, whether consciously or sub-consciously. I'm
talking about what you ARE doing, and you ARE
looking at light.
> > It establishes that there is a necessarily
> > correspondent base at the foundation of
> > our conceptual hierarchy, which does a lot
> > to defeat run-of-the-mill skepticism.
>
> Nope. You can have correspondence or necessity
> but not both.
Bullshit, but that's because you don't understand
"necessity." Everything is technically "necessary,"
even willful actions. But that's a different topic
really, determinism.
Existence exists; c'est tout. What doesn't exist, is
existentially impossible. <possible> is an
epistemological concept, referencing roughly
"is consistent with my knowledge."
> Any causal chain can be interrupted. That
> a photon hits the cornea does not guarantee it
> will reach the retina.
No, but it guarantees that it hit the cornea,
doesn't it? That's quite sufficient because
in normal operations of functional humans,
it does then reach the retina.
> You can only get necessity by
> collapsing together cause and effect, so that it is necessarily
> the case that if such-and-such a retinal cell registers a photon,
> a photon is indeed registered. But then there is no longer
> correspondence.
Not only can we have both, most of the time we
do. That's why cars really go down the road.
> A is A. Looking at a stick is looking
> at a stick. Looking at a stick is not looking at light.
Whatever you say, pal. We can look at x without
looking at light. Got it. "I'm sho' you be right."
jk
1Z
> On Dec 30, 9:26�am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > It is the not-so-great minds of the O-ists who
> > are switching meanings.
>
> No, it's pathetic, dissembling dunces like you who think they can just
> substitute the word "sense" for the word for "perceive" or vice-versa
> and think no one will notice.
>
> The human eye would be malfunctioning as a human eye �if it did *not*
> signal to the brain an object in refracted light as an object in
> refracted light.
if it compensated for the refracted light it would be behaving
*better* than a standard human eye. Calling that "malfunctioning" is
itself dissembling.
> By the way, this little bit below you got from Wikipedia is NOT in the
> reference therein cited, the book by Kelley. �Kelley never said this
> in that book or anywhere else.
Then why don't you change the article? That could be interesting
1Z
> Still, she defined her terms reasonably well and
> what's important is what is concluded from all
> this. �
Which is?
>The fallibility of perception is critical to
> those skeptics who then misunderstand the
> concept of "possibility" and put the two
> together to conclude that it's always possible
> that we're not integrating reality.
Maybe. But that doesn't mean you have to
insist on infallibility to defeat the sceptic.
That would be replacing one absurdity with another.
> The fact of the matter is that we ARE integrating
> reality and that there IS a correspondence born
> of the necessary relationship between how things
> are, and how we sense them to be.
If there is "necessity" in the senses, they are
unique. Every other physical, causal process is subject
to failure, deviation, etc.
> > Insisting that there is some stage
> > of the perceptual process that is infallible buys you nothing.
>
> It buys me an understanding (admittedly broad and
> not in specifics) of what the hell is going on.
That is a very vague statement.
> Just look at the complexity (and talk about imagination!)
> of the philosophies that go so far out of their way to
> begin with a founding principle that we /can't/ know
> what the hell is going on...about anything, let alone
> about something as complex as human thought.
Just look at the philosophies that avoid both absurdities--
100% error rate and 0% error rate.
> Stop distracting from the point. �The point is that
> WHATEVER is going on, and however the various
> processes are consciously differentiated, the whole
> shebang begins with the physical, immutable
if the senses are immutable, they are the only
physical things that are.
>and
> error-free (because it doesn't apply)
then success doesn't either. How does
that defeat the sceptic?
> action of
> various attributes of objects being sensed.
>
> Now the other yahoos here want to spend their time
> working with the WORD "attribute," so that since we
> have a separate word for it, it must be a separate
> thing from the object that "has it."
Do you think that is the argument for
realism about universals? it isn't.
1Z
> And I'm not talking about what you're trying to
> do, whether consciously or sub-consciously. �I'm
> talking about what you ARE doing, and you ARE
> looking at light.
So? You don't get to redefine the standard--what I
ought to be doing.
> Bullshit, but that's because you don't understand
> "necessity."
Don't tell me I don't understand it, explain it.
I seemed to have missed that bit when I was
studying physics.
> Existence exists; c'est tout. �What doesn't exist, is
> existentially impossible. �
That is a bold claim, not an obvious truth.
><possible> is an
> epistemological concept, referencing roughly
> "is consistent with my knowledge."
Says who?
> > Any causal chain can be interrupted. That
> > a photon hits the cornea does not guarantee it
> > will reach the retina.
>
> No, but it guarantees that it hit the cornea,
> doesn't it? �
That's just my point. You can only
attach necessity to tautologies like "if
a photon hits the cornea, it hits the cornea".
But then there is no longer correspondence
between one thing and another. So you can
have correspondence or necessity but not both.
>That's quite sufficient because
> in normal operations of functional humans,
> it does then reach the retina.
Most of the time. But that is pragmatism, not
infalliblism. Sure pragmatism can defeat the sceptic.
But it doesn';t need any pretzel-logic about how
sticks are supposed to look bent. But you are putting
forward the pretzel logic,
so you are not arguing pragmatism.
> > You can only get necessity by
> > collapsing together cause and effect, so that it is necessarily
> > the case that if such-and-such a retinal cell registers a photon,
> > a photon is indeed registered. But then there is no longer
> > correspondence.
>
> Not only can we have both, most of the time we
> do. �That's why cars really go down the road.
Sighh..I have explained *why* we cannot.
Insisting that we somehow can in some unexplained
way is not philosophy or even reason
Malrassic Park
>>The fallibility of perception is critical to
>> those skeptics who then misunderstand the
>> concept of "possibility" and put the two
>> together to conclude that it's always possible
>> that we're not integrating reality.
Which skeptics have said any such thing? Which skeptics even use
Randroid terms such as "integrating reality"?
Malrassic Park
>> Stop distracting from the point. �The point is that
>> WHATEVER is going on, and however the various
>> processes are consciously differentiated, the whole
>> shebang begins with the physical, immutable
..
Tell my poor eyes, that require stronger and stronger reading glass
with each passing year, how immutable they are.
1Z
On 30 Dec 2009, 12:19, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
The public at large and,
> regrettably, many scientists are limited by their non-Objectivist
> philosophies that there is operating at all times a single truth (a
> metaphysical truth above or outside the context of human
> understanding )
Realists only need the world itself as the final arbiter
of truth, not any perjoratively metaphysical capital-t Truth
> that comes into conflict with the several "truths"
> that will come from experiments that have different results even
> though theory (typically, a rationalist depiction of the contextless
> metaphysical truth) demands the results always be exactly the same.
There are not multiple truths, therefore there
are not multiple "truths in context" therefore there
is not "contextual certainty"
1Z
> On Fri, 01 Jan 2010 07:25:39 -0800, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
The quote is Klein's of course
1Z
> On 31 Dec 2009, 01:39, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> > And I'm not talking about what you're trying to
> > do, whether consciously or sub-consciously. �I'm
> > talking about what you ARE doing, and you ARE
> > looking at light.
>
> So? You don't get to redefine the standard--what I
> ought to be doing.
Mrs Objectivist: DId you succeed in putting up the shelves while I was
out , dear?
Mr Objectivist: No, but I did succeed in drinking beer and watching
the game
Mrs Objectivist: That's alright dear, so long as you succeeded at
something.
Jim Klein
> > And I'm not talking about what you're trying to
> > do, whether consciously or sub-consciously. I'm
> > talking about what you ARE doing, and you ARE
> > looking at light.
>
> So? You don't get to redefine the standard--what I
> ought to be doing.
That should be the standard...for you. For me, the
standard is just the same...what I ought to be doing.
In case you haven't figured it out, I'm not here for
that. I figure out what I ought to be doing based on
what the facts are. I'm here to assist myself in
discovering that, albeit on some fairly compicated
facts.
So whatever the hell you're saying here, I don't care.
I'm only interested in what's going on.
> > Bullshit, but that's because you don't understand
> > "necessity."
>
> Don't tell me I don't understand it, explain it.
> I seemed to have missed that bit when I was
> studying physics.
By the time you studied it in physics, for whatever
reason that was, the philosophers had already
made mincemeat of it.
Oh, but I guess that's a Randism too, even though I
for one came to the conclusion long before I knew
who Rand was.
> > Existence exists; c'est tout. What doesn't exist, is
> > existentially impossible.
>
> That is a bold claim, not an obvious truth.
It's nearly tautological, your favorite kind of certain
truth. But then, nearly all truths come out that way
with a sufficient understanding of the referents
underlying the concepts and their associated words.
"What isn't, could've been." Think about it for a minute.
If there is an existential referent to "could've been but isn't,"
then there is an existential referent to something that
doesn't exist. That's a big problem, though no doubt
you believe that the utterance of "inherent randomness"
somehow makes that problem go away.
IMO it actually makes it worse, but I'm not even
slightly interested in discussing that with you.
> ><possible> is an
> > epistemological concept, referencing roughly
> > "is consistent with my knowledge."
>
> Says who?
It's not, "Says who?" It's, "Says what?" And what says
it, is the state of (the nature of) the referents of the
concepts involved.
> > > Any causal chain can be interrupted. That
> > > a photon hits the cornea does not guarantee it
> > > will reach the retina.
>
> > No, but it guarantees that it hit the cornea,
> > doesn't it?
>
> That's just my point. You can only
> attach necessity to tautologies like "if
> a photon hits the cornea, it hits the cornea".
No...YOU can only attach necessity to tautologies.
That's why it keeps getting back to the "Analytic-
Synthetic Dichotomy."
Me, I attach necessity to all that is necessary. I
plead guilty to being a strict determinist (in the
very widest meaning of the term), so the first
thing I attach <necessarily is> to, is that which is.
> But then there is no longer correspondence
> between one thing and another. So you can
> have correspondence or necessity but not both.
I have a hunch you're being Platonic, but I'm not
totally sure. Correspondence isn't yet another
essence of some sort that's either there or not.
It denotes (references) a particular type of
relationship, between /something/ about a
part of reality, and the conscious (or cognitive
or aware) integration of it. If the awareness is
of something that actually is, then we say it's
correspondent. If not, then not.
The word can be used for percepts or senses as
well, though personally I think it's better reserved
for abstractions. The relevant point is that if it's
going to be used for sensory integration, then it's
automatically (like literally) correspondent. To
put it simply, there's nothing to make it not
correspondent, except dysfunction.
> >That's quite sufficient because
> > in normal operations of functional humans,
> > it does then reach the retina.
>
> Most of the time. But that is pragmatism, not
> infalliblism. Sure pragmatism can defeat the sceptic.
> But it doesn';t need any pretzel-logic about how
> sticks are supposed to look bent. But you are putting
> forward the pretzel logic,
> so you are not arguing pragmatism.
I'm not arguing either, really. My point isn't, "See;
we can be infallible." And my point isn't really to
defeat skeptics per se, since there's always, "Maybe
we're brains in a vat," or "Maybe a thing isn't what
it is." I wouldn't say those are undefeatable, but I'm
not about to waste my time trying to defeat them,
at least not with you.
The pretzel-logic is all yours, snuck in with "supposed
to," as if light waves are "supposed to" do anything.
The stick DOES look bent. And it ISN'T bent. What does
this have to do with the "automatic correspondence" of
sensory data?
> > > You can only get necessity by
> > > collapsing together cause and effect, so that it is necessarily
> > > the case that if such-and-such a retinal cell registers a photon,
> > > a photon is indeed registered. But then there is no longer
> > > correspondence.
>
> > Not only can we have both, most of the time we
> > do. That's why cars really go down the road.
>
> Sighh..I have explained *why* we cannot.
That's not explaining. It's regurgitating something
you've bought into...that there's some dichotomy
out there between what is and what had to be.
In the man-made realm--which means in the context of
volitionally guided behavior--it's completely sensible to
say that what is, didn't have to be. But like ALL else,
that's contextual and cannot be accurately extrapolated
into an identification of the nature of the universe.
> Insisting that we somehow can in some unexplained
> way is not philosophy or even reason
It's not "some unexplained way." What is, is, and had to
be. This is basic and fundamental, and no it doesn't
touch anything about free will. You tell me---in what
manner did gravity "not have to be" a force that
manifests on earth as 32'/sec/sec?
What "could it have been" instead? And more
importantly, what existential significance will
you give to your answer such that it would make
any sense at all--be any sort of "philosophy or
even reason" in your words--to attach any
reference to that at all?
I.e., is it necessary that gravity manifests on
earth as 32'/sec/sec when it does? [If it's
some other number, then insert that number.]
So just as soon as you figure that out, and
continue to believe that we've got at least that
much identified...voila, you'll have it--correspondence
and necessity.
Do you think "that much"--at least /some/ context in
which we've /accurately/ conceptualized the fact
of the matter--exists? Or do you think we might be
wrong--again only about that much, the accelaration
of at least certain particular objects in this place and
time--with our identification? Are you like David Friedman
and Gordon Sollars, who will only admit to 99.9999%
liklihood of correspondence, or are you certain of it?
jk
1Z
> On Jan 1, 10:41 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > And I'm not talking about what you're trying to
> > > do, whether consciously or sub-consciously. �I'm
> > > talking about what you ARE doing, and you ARE
> > > looking at light.
>
> > So? You don't get to redefine the standard--what I
> > ought to be doing.
>
> That should be the standard...for you. �For me, the
> standard is just the same...what I ought to be doing.
>
> In case you haven't figured it out, I'm not here for
> that. �I figure out what I ought to be doing based on
> what the facts are. �I'm here to assist myself in
> discovering that, albeit on some fairly compicated
> facts.
>
> So whatever the hell you're saying here, I don't care.
> I'm only interested in what's going on.
Vague. But note that error is error is departure from a standard or
norm.
If you refuse to contemplate any kind of standard or norm apart
from what actually happens, you are going to be in a position
to say nothing about error, and therefore in a position to
say nearly nothing about the great problems of epistemology.
As you apparently don't.
> > > Bullshit, but that's because you don't understand
> > > "necessity."
>
> > Don't tell me I don't understand it, explain it.
> > I seemed to have missed that bit when I was
> > studying physics.
>
> By the time you studied it in physics, for whatever
> reason that was, the philosophers had already
> made mincemeat of it.
>
> Oh, but I guess that's a Randism too, even though I
> for one came to the conclusion long before I knew
> who Rand was.
You still haven't explained.
> > > Existence exists; c'est tout. �What doesn't exist, is
> > > existentially impossible.
>
> > That is a bold claim, not an obvious truth.
>
> It's nearly tautological,
Not even close.
A bald King of France is neither
existent not impossible.
(You can argue that what does not exist is impossible
by *assuming* that everything is strictly necessary. But
that is the claim you were trying to prove.
"what does not exist is impossible"
and "everything is strictly necessary" are corrolaries
of each other, but neither is a tautology).
> your favorite kind of certain
> truth. �But then, nearly all truths come out that way
> with a sufficient understanding of the referents
> underlying the concepts and their associated words.
Uh-huh. So you have a deeper understanding of physical causality
than physicists, is that what you are saying?
> "What isn't, could've been." �Think about it for a minute.
OK. Napoleon could have won Waterloo. OK.
Peikoff thinks it is literally impossible to think about
counterfactuals. Since people write books about alternative
history, he is obviously wrong.
> If there is an existential referent to "could've been but isn't,"
> then there is an existential referent to something that
> doesn't exist.
Oh right. You are now appealing to the reference-only
theory of meaning. well, one man;s modus ponens as another
man's modus tollens. " Napoleon could have won Waterloo"
is meaningful. It has no referent. Therefore meaning is not
just reference. QED
>�That's a big problem, though no doubt
> you believe that the utterance of "inherent randomness"
> somehow makes that problem go away.
As you have outlined the problem, I think that
a Fregean theory of meaning makes it go away.
But inherent randomness is logically possible
without being logically necessary,
so the issue must be settled by science.
> IMO it actually makes it worse, but I'm not even
> slightly interested in discussing that with you.
I'm not interested in poeple who make
claims they don't back up.
> > ><possible> is an
> > > epistemological concept, referencing roughly
> > > "is consistent with my knowledge."
>
> > Says who?
>
> It's not, "Says who?" �It's, "Says what?" �And what says
> it, is the state of (the nature of) the referents of the
> concepts involved.
Pffft. You keep claiming t0o have this awesome knowledge
of the universe,m yet you never shift from your armchair to the
laboratory.
> No...YOU can only attach necessity to tautologies.
> That's why it keeps getting back to the "Analytic-
> Synthetic Dichotomy."
>
> Me, I attach necessity to all that is necessary. �I
> plead guilty to being a strict determinist (in the
> very widest meaning of the term), so the first
> thing I attach <necessarily is> to, is that which is.
Yeah, but that is just an opinion.
You are digging yourself into hole here. In order
to justify the dubious infallibility claim, you need
another dubious claim that everything in necessary, which itself
has to be backed by the dubious reference-only theory of meaning.
> > But then there is no longer correspondence
> > between one thing and another. So you can
> > have correspondence or necessity but not both.
>
> I have a hunch you're being Platonic, but I'm not
> totally sure. �Correspondence isn't yet another
> essence of some sort that's either there or not.
I'm being logical.
> It denotes (references) a particular type of
> relationship, between /something/ about a
> part of reality, and the conscious (or cognitive
> or aware) integration of it. �If the awareness is
> of something that actually is, then we say it's
> correspondent. �If not, then not.
Whatever.
> The word can be used for percepts or senses as
> well, though personally I think it's better reserved
> for abstractions. �The relevant point is that if it's
> going to be used for sensory integration, then it's
> automatically (like literally) correspondent.
What happened to "if not, then not". Automatic
does not mean error theory. You are sneaking in
the idea that it's only automatically correspondent when it works.
>�To
> put it simply, there's nothing to make it not
> correspondent, except dysfunction.
>
> > >That's quite sufficient because
> > > in normal operations of functional humans,
> > > it does then reach the retina.
>
> > Most of the time. But that is pragmatism, not
> > infalliblism. Sure pragmatism can defeat the sceptic.
> > But it doesn';t need any pretzel-logic about how
> > sticks are supposed to look bent. But you are putting
> > forward the pretzel logic,
> > so you are not arguing pragmatism.
>
> I'm not arguing either, really. �My point isn't, "See;
> we can be infallible."
That doesn't make sense. The point of infallibility
is that you *cannot* be anything else.
>�And my point isn't really to
> defeat skeptics per se, since there's always, "Maybe
> we're brains in a vat," or "Maybe a thing isn't what
> it is." �I wouldn't say those are undefeatable, but I'm
> not about to waste my time trying to defeat them,
> at least not with you.
Maybe. The question is whether you are doing anything
epistemological at all.
> The pretzel-logic is all yours, snuck in with "supposed
> to," as if light waves are "supposed to" do anything.
They senses have a function.
> The stick DOES look bent. �And it ISN'T bent. �What does
> this have to do with the "automatic correspondence" of
> sensory data?
I think it is rather obvious that the way it looks does
not correspond to how it is.
> > > Not only can we have both, most of the time we
> > > do. �That's why cars really go down the road.
>
> > Sighh..I have explained *why* we cannot.
>
> That's not explaining. �It's regurgitating something
> you've bought into...that there's some dichotomy
> out there between what is and what had to be.
The only kind of necessity that can be established from
the philosophers armchair. is logical tautology. Anything else
requires extensive investigation of the real world. You
have not doen this, preferring to make armchair claims
about knowing rerfereets.
> In the man-made realm--which means in the context of
> volitionally guided behavior--it's completely sensible to
> say that what is, didn't have to be. �But like ALL else,
> that's contextual and cannot be accurately extrapolated
> into an identification of the nature of the universe.
We don't know apriori whether it applies to the rest
of the universe or not. You are taking "it might not apply"
to mean "it definitely does not apply" which is
a logical fallacy.
Since we don't know apriori, we have to study emprically.
This neither you nor Peikoff have done, sittign as you are in your
armchairs,
to anything like the extent
that physicists haver.
> > Insisting that we somehow can in some unexplained
> > way is not philosophy or even reason
>
> It's not "some unexplained way." �What is, is, and had to
> be. �
Saying it doesn't make it so.
>This is basic and fundamental, and no it doesn't
> touch anything about free will. �You tell me---in what
> manner did gravity "not have to be" a force that
> manifests on earth as 32'/sec/sec?
The mass of the Earth could have been different. Then the local
g would have been different. In fact it caries slightly with latitude
and longitude.
> What "could it have been" instead? �And more
> importantly, what existential significance will
> you give to your answer such that it would make
> any sense at all--be any sort of "philosophy or
> even reason" in your words--to attach any
> reference to that at all?
You are requiring that words must have referents
to be meaningful and I dispute that.
> I.e., is it necessary that gravity manifests on
> earth as 32'/sec/sec when it does? �[If it's
> some other number, then insert that number.]
Whether there is strict physical determinism
cannot be established by a philosophical argument.
> So just as soon as you figure that out, and
> continue to believe that we've got at least that
> much identified...voila, you'll have it--correspondence
> and necessity.
>
> Do you think "that much"--at least /some/ context in
> which we've /accurately/ conceptualized the fact
> of the matter--exists? �Or do you think we might be
> wrong--again only about that much, the accelaration
> of at least certain particular objects in this place and
> time--with our identification? �Are you like David Friedman
> and Gordon Sollars, who will only admit to 99.9999%
> liklihood of correspondence, or are you certain of it?
I don't think there is certainty to be had. I think
physical determinism could be true, but the
evidence for it is not strong in physics, and the
idea of establishing it by armchair argument is laughable.