While Cheney blurts verbal diarrhea, internal Army report documents the depth of his incompetence
Juan
Micromanaging Moron Rumsfeld in charge at DOD. And they FAILED at
doing even the most basic things needed to so much as TRY to win the
war against Al Qaeda.
Army History Finds Early Missteps in Afghanistan
NY Times
In the fall of 2003, the new commander of American forces in
Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, decided on a new strategy. Known
as counterinsurgency, the approach required coalition forces to work
closely with Afghan leaders to stabilize entire regions, rather than
simply attacking insurgent cells.
But there was a major drawback, a new unpublished Army history of the
war concludes. Because the Pentagon insisted on maintaining a “small
footprint” in Afghanistan and because Iraq was drawing away resources,
General Barno commanded fewer than 20,000 troops.
As a result, battalions with 800 soldiers were trying to secure
provinces the size of Vermont. “Coalition forces remained thinly
spread across Afghanistan,” the historians write. “Much of the country
remained vulnerable to enemy forces increasingly willing to reassert
their power.”
That early and undermanned effort to use counterinsurgency is one of
several examples of how American forces, hamstrung by inadequate
resources, missed opportunities to stabilize Afghanistan during the
early years of the war, according to the history, “A Different Kind of
War.”
This year, a resurgent Taliban prompted the current American
commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, to warn that the war would be
lost without an infusion of additional troops and a more aggressive
approach to counterinsurgency. President Obama agreed, ordering the
deployment of 30,000 more troops, which will bring the total American
force to 100,000.
But as early as late 2003, the Army historians assert, “it should have
become increasingly clear to officials at Centcom and D.O.D. that the
coalition presence in Afghanistan did not provide enough resources”
for proper counterinsurgency, the historians write, referring to the
United States Central Command and the Department of Defense.
“A Different Kind of War,” which covers the period from October 2001
until September 2005, represents the first installment of the Army’s
official history of the conflict. Written by a team of seven
historians at the Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth,
Kan., and based on open source material, it is scheduled to be
published by spring.
The New York Times obtained a copy of the manuscript, which is still
under review by current and former military officials.
Though other histories, including “In the Graveyard of Empires” by
Seth G. Jones and “Descent Into Chaos” by Ahmed Rashid, cover similar
territory, the manuscript of “A Different Kind of War” offers new
details and is notable for carrying the imprimatur of the Army itself,
which will use the history to train a new generation of officers.
The history, which has more than 400 pages, praises several
innovations by the Pentagon, particularly the pairing of small Special
Operations Forces teams with Afghan militias, which, backed by laser-
guided weapons, drove the Taliban from power.
But, once the Taliban fell, the Pentagon often seemed ill-prepared and
slow-footed in shifting from a purely military mission to a largely
peacekeeping and nation-building one, fresh details in the history
indicate.
“Even after the capture of Kabul and Kandahar,” the historians write,
“there was no major planning initiated to create long-term political,
social and economic stability in Afghanistan. In fact, the message
from senior D.O.D officials in Washington was for the U.S. military to
avoid such efforts.”
In one telling anecdote from 2004, the history describes how soldiers
under General Barno had so little experience in counterinsurgency that
one lieutenant colonel bought books about the strategy over the
Internet and distributed them to his company commanders and platoon
leaders.
In another case, a civil affairs commander in charge of small-scale
reconstruction projects told the historians that he had been given $1
million in cash to house and equip his soldiers but that bureaucratic
obstacles prevented him from spending a penny on projects. It took
months to reduce the red tape, the historians say.
The historians also say that such anecdotes underscore the
resourcefulness of commanders faced with unclear guidance and
inadequate resources. But limited manpower still had an impact on
operations, the history indicates.
When the Taliban was on the run in the spring of 2002, Lt. Gen. Dan K.
McNeill, the incoming commander of American forces, traveled to
Washington seeking guidance. The message conveyed by the Army’s vice
chief of staff, Gen. Jack Keane, was, “Don’t you do anything that
looks like permanence,” General McNeill recalled. “We are in and out
of there in a hurry.”
Largely as a result of that mandate, General McNeill took only half of
his headquarters command from the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg,
N.C. But as the conflict became more complicated, requiring diplomatic
and political operations as well as military ones, General McNeill
lacked enough planning personnel, the history suggests. He was
replaced in 2003 by an even smaller headquarters unit, the history
says.
The lack of resources was also apparent in the training of Afghan
security forces, the history shows.
Early in the war, the training program was hampered by poor equipment,
low pay, high attrition and not enough trainers. Living conditions for
the Afghan army were so poor that Maj. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry likened
them to Valley Forge when he took command of the training operation in
October 2002.
“The mandate was clear and it was a central task, but it is also fair
to say that up until that time there had been few resources
committed,” Mr. Eikenberry, now the ambassador to Afghanistan, told
the historians, referring to the army training program.
The historians say resistance to providing more robust resources to
Afghanistan had three sources in the White House and the Pentagon.
First, President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld had criticized using the military for peacekeeping and
reconstruction in the Balkans during the 1990s. As a result, “nation
building” carried a derogatory connotation for many senior military
officials, even though American forces were being asked to fill gaping
voids in the Afghan government after the Taliban’s fall.
Second, military planners were concerned about Afghanistan’s long
history of resisting foreign invaders and wanted to avoid the
appearance of being occupiers. But the historians argue that this
concern was based partly on an “incomplete” understanding of the
Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
Third, the invasion of Iraq was siphoning away resources. After the
invasion started in March 2003, the history says, the United States
clearly “had a very limited ability to increase its forces” in
Afghanistan.
The history provides a detailed retelling of the battle of Tora Bora,
the cave-riddled insurgent redoubt on the Pakistan border where
American forces thought they had trapped Osama bin Laden in December
2001. But Mr. bin Laden apparently escaped into Pakistan along with
hundreds of Qaeda fighters.
The historians call Tora Bora “a lost opportunity” to capture or kill
Mr. bin Laden. But they concluded that even with more troops, the
American and Afghan forces probably could not have sealed the rugged
border. And they deemed the battle a partial success because it “dealt
a severe blow to those Taliban and Al Qaeda elements that remained
active in Afghanistan.”
The history also recounts well-known battles like Operation Anaconda,
in eastern Afghanistan in spring 2002. The history ends in the fall of
2005, when many American officials still felt optimistic about
Afghanistan’s future. Postponed parliamentary elections were held that
fall, but Taliban attacks were also on the rise.
“It was clear that the struggle to secure a stable and prosperous
future for Afghanistan was not yet won,” the history concludes.
news.eternal-september.org
"Juan" <fly...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:a32601d2-993e-49a4...@u7g2000yqm.googlegroups.com...
>>
( BS from the Fat Boi Snipped)
Juan
wrote:
> "Juan" <fly...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
> news:a32601d2-993e-49a4...@u7g2000yqm.googlegroups.com...
>
> ( BS from the Fat Boi Snipped)
And of course, lardassloving Casto has nothing intelligent to say, as
usual. Par for the course for a lardass-temperature IQ. :)
Channel Cast
> On Jan 1, 1:20 am, "news.eternal-september.org" <hrree...@swbell.net>
> wrote:
>> "Juan" <fly...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:a32601d2-993e-49a4...@u7g2000yqm.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> ( BS from the Fat Boi Snipped)
>
> And of course,
How's the divorce coming , fatboi?
http://www.itpreport.com/upload/Juan_Jimenez_200x150.jpg
Sheesh, even a Polack dumped your lard ass...
Channel Cast
> Remember,