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Neurophilosophy ForumNeuroscience.gsu.edu
This is an interdisciplinary group of faculty and students who meet for discussion and debate on issues at the intersection of philosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. Join us! Unless otherwise specified, all talks will take place in the Philosophy Department at Georgia State University, 34 Peachtree St., 11th floor (directions). Feel free to bring your lunch and spread the word. You may also want to check out other events at the Neuroscience Institute (http://groups.google.com/group/gsu-neuroscience-institute) and events at the Emory Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture.
Spring 2010 Friday, Jan 15th, 12:30-2:00pm Fred Adams (University of Delaware): "EMBODIED COGNITION"
Abstract: Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. Embodied cognition includes (but is not limited to) the claim that cognition is not sandwiched between the perceptual system and the motor system but takes place throughout and across the sensori-motor system. If true, this is exciting and different from the classical cognitivist picture. I'll be considering some recent empirical research by Art Glenberg, Zwaan and several colleagues that is given as evidence that the embodied view is true. I'll also be looking at whether this data supports some very strong conclusions being drawn. Recommended paper: Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2009), "Why the Mind is Still in the Head" For further information about Professor Adams, visit his website: http://udel.edu/~fa/ Friday, Feb 19, 12:30-2pm Carl Craver (Washington University in Saint Louis): "MEMORY, SELF AND AGENCY: A CASE STUDY IN CLINICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY"
Abstract: Oliver Sacks (1970) introduced us all to Jimmie G., “the lost mariner,” a man in his sixties who, in his forties, lost the ability to remember new facts and experiences. Sacks uses J.G. as a scientific window on the nature of the self and personhood. What sort of human life, he asks, is available to a person robbed of his ability to remember the events of his life? Sacks and I share a question and methodology but we draw different conclusions. In this talk, I will discuss a person, K.C., with a profound form of episodic amnesia. I use K.C. as a window on philosophical questions about the requirements of human agency and personhood. I will discuss new empirical results from my experiments with K.C. in the context of philosophical theories about what makes human agency and human responsibility distinctive.
Friday, April 9, 12:30-2pm Gwen Frishkoff (Georgia State University): "NEURAL ELECTROMAGNETIC ONTOLOGIES (NEMO): METHODS FOR A ROBUST SCIENCE OF MIND AND BRAIN"
Abstract: This talk will present an overview of neuro-ontologies and discuss how ontology-based methods can facilitate representation and integration of event-related brain potentials (ERP) data. ERPs are measures of brain electrophysiological activity (“brainwaves”). Spatiotemporal patterns or "components" of the ERP can serve as important markers of specific sensory, motor, cognitive, and emotional processes. Unfortunately, there have been longstanding debates about classification of many ERP patterns, which has made it difficult to achieve high-level synthesis of ERP results across different studies and research labs. To address this issue, we have assembled an international team of ERP researchers, ontology engineers, and computer scientists to found the Neural Elecromagnetic Ontologies (NEMO) consortium. The major goal of NEMO is to address basic scientific questions in ERP research using ontology-based classification and labeling of data, particularly in the area of neurolinguistic processing. In this talk, I will give an overview of the NEMO project and describe how it builds on and extends other efforts in neuro-ontology development. Recommended paper: Frishkoff et al. (2009), "Development of Neural Electromagnetic Ontologies (NEMO): Representation and integration of event-related brain potentials" Tuesday, April 20, 12:30-2pm NEW VENUE: Room 2131, History Department at Georgia State University, 34 Peachtree St., 21st floor Francesco Guala (Department of Economics, University of Milan) and Tim Hodgson (School of Psychology, University of Exeter): "SCANNING THE HUMEAN BRAIN: THE NEURAL BASIS OF SOCIAL CONVENTIONS AND NORMS" Abstract: Hume famously described social institutions as conventional equilibria in repeated coordination games. He pointed out that conventions are threatened by occasional changes in incentives that induce players to deviate from the established path. According to Hume’s followers these temptations are partly offset by expectations of conformity that turn conventions into social norms. In this paper we present neuroscientific evidence that largely confirms this Humean insight. Breaches of convention trigger reactions similar to violations of social norms. Moreover, conformity to conventions is sustained by a natural human tendency to follow past regularities and to avoid uncertain prospects. Key brain areas involved in these processes include the corpus striatum, the insular cortex, the amygdala, and the orbitofrontal cortex.
For further information about Professors Guala and Hodgson, visit their websites: http://users.unimi.it/guala/index.htm and http://psychology.exeter.ac.uk/profiles/profile.php?id=tim_hodgson
PAST MEETINGS Fall 2009 Friday, September 11th, 12.30-2:00pm Nancy Nersessian (Georgia Institute of Technology): "ENGINEERING MODELS: MODEL BASED SIMULATION IN BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING" Abstract:
Engineering and experimenting with in vitro model-systems is a
signature investigative practice of much research in biomedical
engineering. In a six-year ethnographic study of two university
research laboratories, one in tissue engineering and one in neural
engineering, we have observed that the central components of the
model-systems are physical “devices” – custom technology designed and
constructed within the laboratories. Devices are not stable
technologies, but are designed, constructed, and re-designed in the
course of research with respect to problems encountered and changes in
understanding. The devices provide sites of simulation where in vitro
models are used to screen and control selected aspects of in vivo
phenomena that the researchers want to understand, and in the neural
engineering lab in silico models are added to the mix. The devices also
provide sites where cognitive, social, and cultural dimensions of
practice interlock. Recommended papers: Nersessian, N.J. & Patton, C. (2009). "Model-based reasoning in interdisciplinary engineering" and Nersessian, N. J. (2005). "Interpreting scientific and engineering practices: Integrating the cognitive, social, and cultural dimensions". For further information about Professor Nersessian, visit her website: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~nersessian Friday, October 2nd, 12.30-2:00pm Laura Namy (Emory University): "THE ROLE OF COMPARISON IN CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT" Abstract: Young children often make the mistake of categorizing objects based on their perceptual appearance, classifying a ball and a moon, for example, into the same object category. Perhaps surprisingly, comparison across perceptually similar instances from the same object category (e.g., an apple and an orange from the fruit category) appears to facilitate children's ability to focus on functional and relational properties as a basis for categorizing. In this talk, I will review my work investigating the mechanism by which comparison facilitates taxonomic categorization in young children. Recommended paper: Laura L. Namy and Lauren Clepper, "The Differing Roles of Comparison and Contrast in Children’s Categorization" For further information about Professor Namy, visit her lab website: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~lnamy/lab/ Friday, November 6th, , 12.30-2:00pm Michael Owren (Georgia State University): "FUMBLING FOR MEANING IN ANIMAL COMMUNICATION: MECHANISM, FUNCTION, AND THE INFORMATION CONSTRUCT" Abstract: Animal signaling is often understood from the perspective of human language, yet routinely lacks defining features of language communication. One consequence has been that researchers interesting in animal communication have fallen back on a strategy of analogy and metaphor, drawing attention away from the psychological, neural, and evolutionary mechanisms processes involved. A further difficulty is that the concepts of information and information encoding are considered central in defining animal communication, yet are themselves left undefined. These problems are examined in the context of the origins and evolution of animal signals, arguing that central constructs such as information must be either better defined or summarily discarded. Recommended paper: Drew Rendall, Michael J. Owren and Michael J. Ryan (2009), "What Do Animal Signals Mean?". Click here for a response to the paper by Andrea Scarantino (Georgia State University). For further information about Professor Owren, visit his website: http://michaeljowren.googlepages.com/Spring 2009
Friday, January 23,
1.15-2:45pm G. Lynn Stephens (UAB): “Addiction and Compulsion”
Abstract: Is a drug addict compelled to take a drug like cocaine, heroin, and amphetamine? Does compulsion distinguish addictive from non-addictive drug use and consumption? Does addiction qualify as a mental disorder or pathology because it is compulsive? The talk will explore these questions in the light of Kent Berridge’s and Terry Robinson’s recent work on the neuropsychology of drug addiction. Berridge and Robinson have written that one of “the defining features of addiction [is] its compulsive nature?” Again: “The development of addiction involves a transition from casual to compulsive patterns of drug use”. Are they right?
Recommended paper: Lynn Stephens and George Graham, (ms), An Addictive Lesson: a Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. For further information about Professor G. Lynn Stephens consult his website www.uab.edu/philosophy/faculty/stephens
Friday, February 20, 1.15-2:45pm Robert N. McCauley (Emory University): “Accommodating Diachronic Theories in Philosophical Models of Cross-Scientific Relations”
Abstract: Unified accounts of intertheoretic relations in science (what is commonly termed ‘reduction’), whether those of logical empiricists or those of the New Wave reductionists, have dominated both philosophers’ views of cross-scientific relations as well as the views of the broader scholarly community. The cost of the unity which those accounts achieve, however, is that they fail to make at least two important distinctions among types of intertheoretic relations. The first concerns the distinction between successor and cross-scientific contexts. The other concerns the distinction, especially as it pertains to cross-scientific contexts, between structural as opposed to diachronic theories. Unified accounts of intertheoretic relations have proven blind, in particular, to the productive influences in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive neuroscience, of theorizing about long-term processes in large-scale systems.
Recommended paper: McCauley, R. N. (2007). "Enriching Philosophical Models of Cross-Scientific Relations: Incorporating Diachronic Theories," The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. M. Schouten and H. Looren de Jong (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 199-223. For further information about Professor Robert N. McCauley consult his website http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~philrnm
Friday, April 24, 1:15-2:45 pm Terence Horgan (University of Arizona): “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program”
Abstract: Since the late 1970’s, the main research program for understanding Intentionality or the aboutness of the mental has been the attempt to ‘naturalize’ Intentionality by identifying a natural relation that holds between internal states of the brain and external states of the world when and only when the former represent the latter. But some philosophers are skeptical of the entire approach and have argued that reference to phenomenal consciousness has an essential role to play in the theory of Intentionality. Skeptics about a theory of Intentionality that divorces the aboutness of the mental from consciousness appear to be developing an emerging research program – what may be called the ‘Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program’ (PIRP). What is at the heart of this nascent research program? What arguments support PIRP’s key theses as genuine alternatives to the externalist naturalization program? Where might PIRP theorists disagree among themselves? What future work needs to be done to advance the program? The goal of the talk is to outline answers to each of those four questions. Recommended paper: Terence Horgan and Uriah Kriegel (ms), Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.
For further information about Professor Terence Horgan consult his website http://www.u.arizona.edu/~thorgan/index.html
Fall 2008 Friday, September 19, 12:45-2:30 pm Lawrence W. Barsalou (Department of Psychology, Emory University) Grounding Knowledge in the Brain’s Modal Systems
Abstract: The human conceptual system contains categorical knowledge that supports online processing (perception, categorization, inference, action) and offline processing (memory, language, thought). Semantic memory, the dominant theory, typically portrays the conceptual system as modular and amodal. According to this view, amodal symbols represent category knowledge in a modular system, separate from the brain’s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection (e.g., affect, mental states). Alternatively, the conceptual system can be viewed as non-modular and modal, sharing representational mechanisms with the brain’s modal systems. On a given occasion, multimodal information about a category's members is reenacted (simulated) across relevant modalities to represent it conceptually. Behavioral and neural evidence is presented showing that modal simulations contribute to the representation of object categories, abstract categories, and to the symbolic operations of predication and conceptual combination. Although simulation plays important roles in the conceptual system, linguistic processes are important as well. Additional behavioral and neural evidence is presented showing that simulation and language contribute to conceptual processing simultaneously. Furthermore, either system can dominate under different task conditions, such that different profiles of conceptual processing emerge.
Recommended paper: L. Barsalou (2008), Grounded Cognition, Annual Review of Psychology, 59:617–45. Other relevant papers can be found here
Friday, October 31, 12:00-1:30 pm Lindley Darden (Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park) Reasoning in Scientific Discovery: Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms
Abstract: Biologists often work to discover mechanisms. A new analysis of what mechanisms are aids in finding reasoning strategies for their discovery. Abstract schemas for mechanisms often play the roles of theories in biology--providing explanations, predictions, and guiding experimentation. Reasoning in discovery is analyzed via reasoning strategies for constructing, evaluating, and revising mechanism schemas. These strategies are based on work in history and philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science.
Recommended paper: Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden, and Carl Carver (2000), Thinking About Mechanisms, Philosophy of Science 67: 1-25. Other relevant papers here
Friday, November 21, 12:00-1:30 pm Liane Young (Department of Brain & Cognitive
Sciences, MIT) How the brain makes up the moral mind: The neuroscience of mental state reasoning in moral judgment
Abstract: What can neuroscience tell us about morality? While neuroscience can't determine whether our moral judgments are right or wrong, neuroscience can show us the processes that support moral judgments - and in so doing reveal whether we are right or wrong when we introspect on how we make those judgments. In this talk, we'll look at (1) patterns of brain activation in healthy adults making moral judgments, (2) moral judgments of healthy adults with "virtual lesions" to specific brain regions due to transcranial magnetic stimulation, and (3) moral judgments of patient populations with specific cognitive deficits. We'll focus on the challenge of forgiveness, and discuss implications for moral philosophy.
Recommended paper: Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser, and Antonio Damasio (2007), Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements, Nature, April 19, 446(7138): 908-911 Other relevant papers here
Spring 2008 Thursday, January 10, 12:15-2pm, conference room of the Philosophy Department (34 Peachtree, 11th floor) George
Graham (Wake Forest University,
Philosophy) "I Can't Get No Satisfaction: Addiction as a Case Study in Neurophilosophy." George Graham (Wake Forest University, Philosophy) will discuss addiction, and argue that addictive behavior is compulsive yet not irresistible. The neuroscience of addiction teaches us that addicts behave in ways they want but dislike, which suggests that the neural substrates of wanting and liking dissociate in addiction.
Monday, February 25, noon-2pm, conference room of Philosophy Department (34 Peachtree, 11th floor) Ronald Arkin (Georgia Institute of Technology, Mobile Robot Laboratory) “Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in an Autonomous Robot Architecture” Ronald Arkin (Georgia Institute of Technology, Mobile Robot Laboratory) will provide a basis, motivation, theory, and design recommendations for the implementation of an ethical control and reasoning system potentially suitable for constraining lethal actions in an autonomous robotic system so that they fall within the bounds prescribed by the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement. Eddy Nahmias (GSU, Philosophy) will comment.
Thursday, March 27, 12:15-2pm, conference room of the Philosophy Department (34 Peachtree, 11th floor) Michael
Beran (GSU, Language
Research Center) "How Do Chimpanzees and Monkeys Respond To Their Own Fallibility and Impulsivity?" Michael Beran (GSU, Language Research Center) will provide evidence to the effect that monkeys can monitor their own knowledge states in ways that allow them to deal with fallibility. Such uncertainty monitoring is dissociable from purely associative mechanisms. Chimpanzees also can delay gratification in the face of increasing temptation, suggesting the possibility of anticipation of the future in these animals. Both skills offer insights into the nature of animal minds.
2006-2007 Date: Thursday,
October 25 Date:
Thursday, November 29
Date:
Tuesday, April 17
2005-2006 Date: Friday, Oct 28, 2005 Date: Monday,
November 7 Date: Thursday, December 8 Note: the opinions expressed on this page are not the opinions of Georgia State University.
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