"Developed with funding from the Linux Foundation and the NLnet
Foundation, the binary analysis tool is distributed under the permissive
Apache license. "
LOL.
regards,
alexander.
P.S. "Every computer program in the world, BusyBox included, exceeds the
originality standards required by copyright law."
Hyman Rosen <hyr...@mail.com> The Silliest GPL 'Advocate'
P.P.S. "Of course correlation implies causation! Without this
fundamental principle, no science would ever make any progress."
Hyman Rosen <hyr...@mail.com> The Silliest GPL 'Advocate'
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Virtually all open source licenses are unenforceable due to lack of
Article III standing. Open source licenses in general are only
useful for defenses against copyright infringement suits.
Sincerely,
RJack :)
That's false, as we can see from this court decision:
<http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1001.pdf>
Having determined that the terms of the Artistic License
are enforceable copyright conditions, we remand to enable
the District Court to determine whether Jacobsen has
demonstrated (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and
either a presumption of irreparable harm or a demonstration
of irreparable harm; or (2) a fair chance of success on the
merits and a clear disparity in the relative hardships and
tipping in his favor.
The erroneous non-precedental Jacobsen decision is strictly limited
to the one past defendant in a nation of 310 million people. So...
what's your point? That legal errors propagate like rabbits?
"In Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, at 909
(Fed.Cir.1984), this court said:
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate here to decide non-patent matters in
the light of the problems faced by the district court from which each
count originated, including the law there applicable. In this manner, we
desire to avoid exacerbating the problem of intercircuit conflicts in
non-patent areas. A district court judge should not be expected to look
over his shoulder to the law in this circuit, save as to those claims
over which our subject matter jurisdiction is exclusive.
The freedom of the district courts to follow the guidance of their
particular circuits in all but the substantive law fields assigned
exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing opinions and in
this case."; ATARI, INC., v. JS & A GROUP, INC., 747 F.2d 1422, 223 USPQ
1074 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial
system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower
federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts
may think it to be."; HUTTO v. DAVIS, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
Sincerely,
RJack :)
It will be "erroneous" when another court says it is.
Right now, it's a valid decision of a court.
> strictly limited to the one past defendant in a nation
> of 310 million people
And how many decided cases are there that reflect your
erroneous view of open licenses?
The Supreme Court has already said it's erroneous.
"In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992), we
held that, to satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff
must show (1) it has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system,
a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts
no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.";
HUTTO v. DAVIS, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
>
>> strictly limited to the one past defendant in a nation of 310
>> million people
>
> And how many decided cases are there that reflect your erroneous view
> of open licenses?
My views are always correct and error free, therefore a case
reflecting my "erroneous view" is a logical impossibility.
Unfortunately for you, a Supreme Court decision of 1992
does not overrule a US Court of Appeals decision of 2008.
Not until a higher court than the US Court of Appeals
says so. Be sure to get back to me when that happens.
The US Court of Appeals, the US Court of Appeals... c'mon Hyman, face
the truth: the silly opinion that you so much love is a product of a
district court level judge from New Jersey who managed to deliberately
misread and misapply California contract law (Diepenbrock v. Luiz, 159
Cal. 716 (1911). BTW, she is a well known unreasonable bitch:
http://www.therobingroom.com/Judge.aspx?ID=661
"Worst judge I have yet encountered. Decides the case beforehand and her
opinions are excerpts from her predetermined winner's briefs. Ignores
the facts and pleadings. When you lose, you want to at least feel the
judge listened and considered what you had to say -- not so with this
judge. She blows you off and makes it clear she's blowing you off."
New Jersey district judge HOCHBERG shall be impeached for producing
nonsense such as "Thus, ..." below.
"The heart of the argument on appeal concerns whether the terms of the
Artistic License are conditions of, or merely covenants to, the
copyright license. Generally, a "copyright owner who grants a
nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his right to
sue the licensee for copyright infringement and can sue only for breach
of contract. Sun Microsystems, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115,
1121 (9th Cir. 1999); Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998).
If, however, a license is limited in scope and the licensee acts outside
the scope, the licensor can bring an action for copyright infringement.
See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.1989);
Nimmer on Copyright, ' 1015[A] (1999).
Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License allegedly violated are both
covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the
license and are governed by copyright law."
She is deliberately mixing three different contract law concepts of
conditions, covenants, and scope limitations which have nothing to do
with being governed by copyright law. (She probably copy & pasted it
from moronic Jacobsen's brief).
"If you have the facts on your side, pound the facts.
If you have the law on your side, pound the law.
If you have neither on your side, pound the table."
How sad for you, when bitter and hateful name-calling
is all you have left.
Be sure to get back to me when that happens.
Meanwhile, it's instructive to see you spewing your
hateful bile.
The erroneous non-precedential Jacobsen decision is strictly limited
to the one past defendant in a nation of 310 million people. So...
what's your point? That legal errors propagate like rabbits?
"In Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, at 909
(Fed.Cir.1984), this court said:
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate here to decide non-patent matters in
the light of the problems faced by the district court from which each
count originated, including the law there applicable. In this manner, we
desire to avoid exacerbating the problem of intercircuit conflicts in
non-patent areas. A district court judge should not be expected to look
over his shoulder to the law in this circuit, save as to those claims
over which our subject matter jurisdiction is exclusive.
The freedom of the district courts to follow the guidance of their
particular circuits in all but the substantive law fields assigned
exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing opinions and in
this case."; ATARI, INC., v. JS & A GROUP, INC., 747 F.2d 1422, 223 USPQ
1074 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
As the Supreme Court reiterated:
It is instructive to see you failing to grasp that
"Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License allegedly violated are both
covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the
license and are governed by copyright law."
is utter nonsense.
Or does the GNUtian version of copyright law has a section or two
governing scope limitations which are both covenants and conditions in a
copyright license under California contract law, LOL?
That since the CAFC JMRI decision is correct and correctly
reasoned, other courts in like circumstances will adopt the
same reasoning and reach the same conclusions.
In the battle of crank vs. court, court wins.
While it is not a binding precedent it is still a precedent which can
and will be cited. Non-binding precedents are routinely cited in US
courts. It is not "erroneous" unless a higher court says so.
--
John Hasler
jha...@newsguy.com
Dancing Horse Hill
Elmwood, WI USA
Just curious, in what sense is it "instructive"?
--
Keith Thompson (The_Other_Keith) ks...@mib.org <http://www.ghoti.net/~kst>
Nokia
"We must do something. This is something. Therefore, we must do this."
-- Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, "Yes Minister"
One might otherwise believe that the anti-GPL crank position
is simply a different interpretation of law and circumstance
in an "agree to disagree" sort of way.
Only silly freetards would tolerate utter nonsense such as
"Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License allegedly violated are both
covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the
license and are governed by copyright law."
regards,
> Hyman Rosen wrote:
>>
>> On 4/19/2010 5:08 PM, Keith Thompson wrote:
>> > Just curious, in what sense is it "instructive"?
>>
>> One might otherwise believe that the anti-GPL crank position
>> is simply a different interpretation of law and circumstance
>> in an "agree to disagree" sort of way.
>
> Only silly freetards would tolerate utter nonsense such as
>
> "Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License allegedly violated are both
> covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the
> license and are governed by copyright law."
That would make the defendants of this case silly freetards since they
heeded the verdict.
--
David Kastrup
The district court was mandated to treat the contract breach as
copyright infringement. Even so the district court refused to grant the
injunction and Plaintiffs appealed the second time you idiot. The second
appeal was dropped due to *settlement* which included *contractually*
stipulated injunction ... "expressly forbidding Katzer from further
misuse of the software that JMRI has created, and forbidding him to
register any domain names that should rightly belong to us. "
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/Recent.shtml#2010-02-17
The actual text of *contractually* stipulated injunction is here:
http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/403.pdf
And it says nothing about copyright law, silly dak.
And courts. Don't forget courts.
When it's court vs. crank, court wins.
With one court being in a freetard blackout and spouting
"Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License allegedly violated are both
covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the
license and are governed by copyright law."
nonsense doesn't make it "courts" silly Hyman.
And how many court decisions have supported the crank
point of view while addressing open licenses?
The district court in that same case you retard and MySQL court in
http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/saris/pdf/progress%20software.pdf
(alleged breach of the GPL is just a contract breach/not copyright
infringement).
In Wallace v. FSF the court also established that "open licenses" such
as the GPL are contracts.
Is that enough "courts" for you silly Hyman?
Which was overruled.
> and MySQL court in
> http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/saris/pdf/progress%20software.pdf
> (alleged breach of the GPL is just a contract breach/not copyright
> infringement).
<http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/saris/pdf/progress%20software.pdf>
Affidavits submitted by the parties’ experts raise a
factual dispute concerning whether the Gemini program
is a derivative or an independent and separate work
under GPL ¶ 2. After hearing, MySQL seems to have the
better argument here, but the matter is one of fair
dispute. Moreover, I am not persuaded based on this
record that the release of the Gemini source code in
July 2001 didn’t cure the breach.
As usual, your references undermine your case. This order
shows that the judge understands the GPL and believes that
it is a valid copyright license which operates as it says
it does. Notice the reference to release of source code
curing the breach.
> In Wallace v. FSF the court also established that "open
> licenses" such as the GPL are contracts.
But has any court found that open licenses, contract or no,
do not function as their authors intended? CAFC thinks that
they do, and so does the MA District Court.
> On 4/20/2010 10:09 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote:
>> Hyman Rosen wrote:
>>> And how many court decisions have supported the crank
>>> point of view while addressing open licenses?
>>
>> The district court in that same case
>
> Which was overruled.
Let's be fair. An overruled court decision (even if it does not change
the consequences, namely the necessity to comply) is better than
nothing. The usual crank theories here are so wacky that no court would
dare sanctify them even once in an angle irrelevant to the outcome of
the case.
--
David Kastrup
[... progress%20software.pdf ...]
> As usual, your references undermine your case. This order
You're simply too stupid to grasp the fact that the judge in MySQL case
is applying the contract breach standard of review against which she
evaluates the GPL claim, NOT copyright infringement, you retard.
You should simply stop being utter morons.
> David Kastrup wrote:
>>
>> Hyman Rosen <hyr...@mail.com> writes:
>>
>> > On 4/20/2010 10:09 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote:
>> >> Hyman Rosen wrote:
>> >>> And how many court decisions have supported the crank
>> >>> point of view while addressing open licenses?
>> >>
>> >> The district court in that same case
>> >
>> > Which was overruled.
>>
>> Let's be fair.
>
> You should simply stop being utter morons.
Rest assured that nobody is taking your place here.
--
David Kastrup
No, it's worse than nothing. With nothing you are only arguing against
your opponent. With a overruled decision you are arguing against an
appellate court. The latter is far more authoritative even if the
precedent is not binding.
I think that you would find that most lawyers would never cite an
overruled decision.
Except in the case of the appellate court being the CAFC and the subject
matter being NOT patents and NOT something claimed against the United
States government you retard... especially regarding utterly silly
opinion produced by a District Court Judge sitting by designation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Federal_Circuit
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Claims
See also:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html
"The Federal Circuit is unique among the thirteen Circuit Courts of
Appeals. It has nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of subject areas,
including international trade, government contracts, patents,
trademarks, certain money claims against the United States government,
federal personnel, veterans' benefits, and public safety officers'
benefits claims."
See also:
"Rader: Yes. The job of an appellate Judge is to review a record for
reversible error; to correct errors. In order to correct errors based on
a record you need to understand the challenges of making a record, you
need to understand the challenges of administering a trial and narrowing
issues. As an example, I see very often in appellate practice where the
losing case will seize on some minor issue and try and elevate that to
an issue of great importance before the Court of Appeals when in fact
all of the parties had dismissed it as of marginal significance when
before the trial court. So the Appellate Court ends up considering and
making decisions on something which was only marginally considered by
the court below.
It strikes me that we ought to be reviewing the decisions that were made
below. We should not allow parties to present to us as if they were
major decisions, things that were part of the narrowing exercise, which
a trial court must necessarily do.
The value of sitting as a trial judge is you can recognize this. When
you have done it yourself you know what a challenge it is to narrow
issues and have developed a record that reflects your accurate
decisions.
Quinn: I know in the CAFC and I think in other courts as well it also
works in reverse, where some District Court Judges sit by designation.
Has that been beneficial to you and for the Court as a whole?
Rader: I think there have been two benefits to that. I think the
District Judges themselves have seen the Federal Circuit in action and
have become more acquainted with us and have gained more confidence in
the work we do. I think it has worked in reverse as well. The Federal
Circuit Judges have seen the District Judges and their marvelous
preparation to work with us and have gained more confidence in them and
their work. So it has been a wonderful institution strengthening
exercise for both the District Courts and the Federal Circuit."
LOL!
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1001.pdf
"The Honorable Faith S. Hochberg, District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
[...]
Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License allegedly violated are both
covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the
license and are governed by copyright law.
[...]
Under California contract law, "provided that" typically denotes a
condition."
LOL!
In 1984 the Supreme Court held:
"An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it
conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the
copyright statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at
154-155."; SONY CORP. OF AMER. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., 464 U.S.
417 (1984).
The Federal Circuit found:
"It is outside the scope of the Artistic License to modify and
distribute the copyrighted materials without copyright notices and a
tracking of modifications from the original computer files."
This finding directly contradicts the Supreme Court's ruling that to
infringe, an action must violate one of the "specific exclusive rights
conferred by the copyright statute".
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system,
a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts
no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.";
HUTTO v. DAVIS, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
Which court's ruling do you think is binding precedent?
"ARTICLE 224
Condition Defined:
A condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur,
unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under
a contract becomes due."; Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
http://openjurist.org/661/f2d/479/fantastic-fakes-inc-v-pickwick-international-inc
precendent -- adj. (pr-sdnt, prs-dnt)
Preceding.
[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin praecdns, praecdent-,
present participle of praecdere, to go before; see precede.]
"As a general rule, it must clearly appear from the agreement itself
that the parties intended a provision to operate as a condition
precedent (see, 22 N.Y. Jur 2d, Contracts 234; Lui v Park Ridge at
Terryville Assn., 196 A.D.2d 579, 601 N.Y.S.2d 496). If the language is
in any way ambiguous, the law does not favor a construction which
creates a condition precedent (see, Lui v Park Ridge at Terryville
Assn., supra, at 582; Manning v Michaels
9 A.D.2d 897, 540 N.Y.S.2d 583)."; KASS V KASS, SUPREME COURT OF NEW
YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT Cause No. 19970908_0054.NY
"Plaintiffs bring claims for "Contract Failure of Condition" against
each defendent. The Court is not familiar with this term. I assume
"Contract Failure of Condition" is a claim for breach of a condition
precedent." Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, et al. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
et al., 1:2008cv07508, SDNY, (2008). Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, Diasrict
Court judge presiding over Best Buy et. al.
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/AbuDhabi.pd
Sincerely,
RJack :)
No, it's consistent with it - the violation was of
the exclusive right to copy and distribute a work.
And you sidestep the actual question, which was about
how many court decisions have supported the crank point
of view while addressing open licenses. The answer seems
to be none, since the only decisions you quote are old
ones that are not specifically addressing open licenses.
Absolutely none. Nada. Zip. Nicht.
There is *no* legal definition of what an "open" license is, other than
the legal certainty that *all* copyright licenses are contracts to be
interpreted under the state law of contracts.
There is absolutely no legal difference between "open" and "proprietary"
copyright licenses. The same rules of contract construction apply
uniformly to both.
Sincerely,
RJack :)
Publishing "copyright notices" and "tracking of modifications"
do not require use of the rights in 17 USC sec. 106 and therefore no
sec. 106 rights are violated by not doing so.
>
> And you sidestep the actual question, which was about how many court
> decisions have supported the crank point of view while addressing
> open licenses.
How many times must I explain to you that there are no legal
distinctions concerning so called "open" licenses.
> The answer seems to be none, since the only decisions you quote are
> old ones that are not specifically addressing open licenses.
A CAFC decision will NEVER overrule a Supreme Court decision, no
matter how old the Supreme Court decision is, no matter how many times
you falsely claim the CAFC is empowered to do so.
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system,
a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts
no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.";
HUTTO v. DAVIS, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
Sincerely,
RJack :)
The licenses are open in the
sense that they are generally offered to anyone who has a copy of
the covered work, they require no communication from the person
using the authorization to the rights holder, and they allow for
further recipients to avail themselves of the same permissions.
They differ in obvious ways from normal copyright licenses which
are two-party agreements where the rights holder authorizes copying
and distribution in exchange for some consideration and both parties
sign off on the deal.
At least that's your crackpot, make believe theory. You obviously
are too ignorant of common contract law to recognize a bilateral.
third party beneficiary contract when you see one. Keep makin' it
up as you go Hyman.
Sincerely,
RJack :)
[... open ...]
> sense that they are generally offered to anyone who has a copy of
> the covered work, . . .
Given that many proprietary licenses are offered to anyone with or
without a copy of the covered work, the proprietary licenses are
actually more open, right you idiot?
What was your next assertion, you retard?
When a court tells me so, then I'll worry.
When a crank does, not so much.
So far, courts seem to like open licenses just fine.
What is a proprietary license?
Think of not free, you retard.
As in beer, or as in speech? If the former, there must
be communication between the licensee and licensor, in
order for money to be paid. Open licenses do not require
contact.
At least that's your imagined theory.
> The licenses are open in the sense that they are generally offered to
> anyone who has a copy of the covered work, they require no
> communication from the person using the authorization to the rights
> holder, and they allow for further recipients to avail themselves of
> the same permissions.
>
> They differ in obvious ways from normal copyright licenses which are
> two-party agreements where the rights holder authorizes copying and
> distribution in exchange for some consideration and both parties
> sign off on the deal.
I have witnessed children in kindergarten make up stories more
believable than your fantasies. Open your eyes. Your dream is over.
>
> What you fail to realize, in your hatred of the principles for which
> the GPL stands, is that courts will find, and have found, that open
> licenses make sense, and are a legitimate expression of the exclusive
> rights granted by copyright law. You can bring out your law
> dictionary definitions all you like, but when something makes
> powerful sense, it will be accepted. It's not unlike the Supreme
> Court allowing recording of broadcast television for time-shifting.
> It appeared to many to be a slam-dunk case of infringement, and
> indeed, four of the justices thought so, and yet it was declared
> legal.
>
> The CAFC decision points the way.
Let me know when the GPL becomes "legislative expression". ROFL. Until
that occurs, current Supreme Court rulings are still the precedential
law. Your Marxist dreams of the courts upending Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution and the will of Congress is
wishful socialist musing. Sometimes reality bites, but then you're just
going to have to adjust to it.
Sincerely,
RJack :)
As in third-party beneficiary contract, you retard.
Copying and distributing a work without adhering to the
requirements in the grant of permission is infringement.
> A CAFC decision will NEVER overrule a Supreme Court decision
You will first have to wait for the CAFC decision to be
actually overruled, not just blather on about your crank
theories that the CAFC decision contradicts a Supreme
Court ruling, which it does not.
Do you really think that proprietary licenses authorize actions
prohibited by copyright law provided that persons using this
authorization NOT comply with provisions specified by the license, you
idiot Hyman?
What was your next assertion, you retard?
regards,
Open licenses authorize actions otherwise prohibited by copyright
law provided that persons using this authorization comply with
provisions specified by the license. The licenses are open in the
sense that they are generally offered to anyone who has a copy of
the covered work, they require no communication from the person
using the authorization to the rights holder, and they allow for
further recipients to avail themselves of the same permissions.
They differ in obvious ways from normal copyright licenses which
are two-party agreements where the rights holder authorizes copying
and distribution in exchange for some consideration and both parties
sign off on the deal.
What you fail to realize, in your hatred of the principles for which
It is not a matter of liking them or not liking them. They deal with
them, generally in the manner that the creator of the license would have
thought. At least for licenses with significant adoption rates. There
may be a lot of one-shot open licenses by individuals where the legal
consequences are not quite as the creator would have wished. Probably
fewer than proprietary licenses of that kind, though.
--
David Kastrup