Using non-GPL libraries in a GPL program
Juha Nieminen
the official FAQ.
Suppose that I use, for example, an MIT-licensed library in a GPL
program (which I then distribute).
1) I assume this is ok. Is this correct?
2) What happens to the license of that library? Does it retain its own
MIT license, or does it get GPL'd?
Gordon Burditt
>the official FAQ.
>
> Suppose that I use, for example, an MIT-licensed library in a GPL
>program (which I then distribute).
>
> 1) I assume this is ok. Is this correct?
I think this is considerably less than obvious. Another interesting
question is whether a GPLv2 library can be distributed as part of a
GPLv3 program or vice versa.
> 2) What happens to the license of that library? Does it retain its own
>MIT license, or does it get GPL'd?
If you do not own the library in question, you cannot change its
license. Things only "get GPL'd" when the owner of the copyright
distributes it with that license.
Juha Nieminen
> If you do not own the library in question, you cannot change its
> license. Things only "get GPL'd" when the owner of the copyright
> distributes it with that license.
Does this mean that I cannot use an MIT-licensed library in a GPL
program (even though I can use it in basically everything else)?
John Hasler
> Does this mean that I cannot use an MIT-licensed library in a GPL program
> (even though I can use it in basically everything else)?
Of course you can. You distribute the resulting combined work under the
GPL, thereby complying with both the terms of the GPL and the MIT license.
Any recipient of a copy of said combined work can pluck out the library and
distribute it under the MIT license.
--
John Hasler
jo...@dhh.gt.org
Dancing Horse Hill
Elmwood, WI USA
Alexander Terekhov
John Hasler wrote:
>
> Juha Nieminen writes:
> > Does this mean that I cannot use an MIT-licensed library in a GPL program
> > (even though I can use it in basically everything else)?
Welcome to the GNU Republic. The most funny thing is that under GNUtian
viral theory of "work based on" and "relicensing" concept, the GPL is
actually incompatible with public domain because unprotected material
can't be copyright licensed at all.
http://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html
"The idea is that there are some other Free Software licences which
are compatible with the GPL meaning that if a program is released
under one of those licences, that licence gives, effectively,
permission to relicence under the GPL. There are two ways that can
happen. Some licences explicitly say "you can also use this program
under the GNU GPL". In other cases, it's because the licence is so
permissive that to relicence it under the GNU GPL is permitted."
>
> Of course you can. You distribute the resulting combined work under the
> GPL, thereby complying with both the terms of the GPL and the MIT license.
Uncle Hasler, uncle Hasler. The distribution right is about copies
(material objects -- see 17 USC 101 and 106), not about licensing of
copyrighted work. The GPL insists on COPYRIGHT LICENSING "the entire
work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into possession
of a copy."
Only copyright owners and authorized sublisenors can copyright
(sub)license protected material. And while the MIT license does allow
sublicensing ("Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any
person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction,
including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge,
publish, distribute, SUBLICENSE...", the GPL shoots itself in the foot
proclaiming that "Sublicensing is not allowed ... the recipient
automatically receives a license from the original licensors" (that is
original MIT license in the case of "MIT-licensed library in a GPL
program").
regards,
alexander.
--
http://gng.z505.com/index.htm
(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Juha Nieminen
> Only copyright owners and authorized sublisenors can copyright
> (sub)license protected material. And while the MIT license does allow
> sublicensing ("Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any
> person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
> files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction,
> including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge,
> publish, distribute, SUBLICENSE...", the GPL shoots itself in the foot
> proclaiming that "Sublicensing is not allowed ... the recipient
> automatically receives a license from the original licensors" (that is
> original MIT license in the case of "MIT-licensed library in a GPL
> program").
I didn't quite understand if this is a "yes" or "no" answer to my
question, ie. what happens if you use MIT-licensed code in a GPL
program. Does the code become GPL? If the answer is yes, can this cause
problems with respect to the original MIT-licensed code: Now it has two
licenses, MIT and GPL, and the latter one does not allow for the code to
be used with the former?
Alexander Terekhov
Juha Nieminen wrote:
>
> Alexander Terekhov wrote:
> > Only copyright owners and authorized sublisenors can copyright
> > (sub)license protected material. And while the MIT license does allow
> > sublicensing ("Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any
> > person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
> > files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction,
> > including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge,
> > publish, distribute, SUBLICENSE...", the GPL shoots itself in the foot
> > proclaiming that "Sublicensing is not allowed ... the recipient
> > automatically receives a license from the original licensors" (that is
> > original MIT license in the case of "MIT-licensed library in a GPL
> > program").
>
> I didn't quite understand if this is a "yes" or "no" answer to my
> question, ie. what happens if you use MIT-licensed code in a GPL
> program.
In the GNU Republic, it magically becomes GPL'd by virtue of
"relicensing" ("The idea is that there are some other Free Software
licences which are compatible with the GPL meaning that if a program is
released under one of those licences, that licence gives, effectively,
permission to relicence under the GPL."
http://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html)
and in spite of the GPL itself proclaiming that "Sublicensing is not
allowed ... the recipient automatically receives a license from the
original licensors"). The GNU Republic is the land of contradictory
absurdity.
> Does the code become GPL? If the answer is yes, can this cause
> problems with respect to the original MIT-licensed code: Now it has two
> licenses, MIT and GPL, and the latter one does not allow for the code to
> be used with the former?
To begin with, see
http://www.usfca.edu/law/determann/softwarecombinations060403.pdf
Hth.
John Hasler
> I didn't quite understand if this is a "yes" or "no" answer to my
It's neither. It is intended to confuse you. Just ignore Terekhov. He is
a well-known troll.
> I didn't quite understand if this is a "yes" or "no" answer to my
> question, ie. what happens if you use MIT-licensed code in a GPL program.
You distribute the combined work under the terms of the GPL. Since the MIT
license permits you to do the things that the GPL requires you to do there
is no problem.
> Does the code become GPL?
You cannot change the terms of distribution of someone else's code, nor is
there any need to do so. The terms of the MIT license are a subset of the
terms of the GPL so by complying with the latter you are complying with the
former.
> If the answer is yes...
It is no. Someone who receives the source for the above-mentioned combined
work from you can pluck the MIT-licensed library out and distribute it
under the terms of the MIT license.
Alexander Terekhov
John Hasler wrote:
[...]
> The terms of the MIT license are a subset of the
> terms of the GPL so by complying with the latter you are complying with the
> former.
Okay, once again for mentally challenged: Complying with the latter
under GNUtian viral "work based on" theory requires "relicensing" (see
http://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html) of
MIT-licensed material such that "Each time you convey a covered work,
the recipient automatically receives a license from the original
licensors" and that "You must license the entire work, as a whole, under
this License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy." That's only
possible if MIT-licensed material is actually dual licensed BY ORIGINAL
MIT LICENSORS under MIT and GPL. (Note that such compliance is
absolutely impossible in the case of public domain material because
public domain material can not be copyright licensed by definition. Ha
ha.)
rjack
> It's neither. It is intended to confuse you. Just ignore Terekhov. He is
> a well-known troll.
Hey Turdblossom !
Doesn't it take "a well-known troll" to know "a well known troll" ?
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
--- "The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn't
Falling", Sunday, December 14 2003 @ 09:06 PM EST --- PJ@Groklaw
Dave Crossland
> John Hasler wrote:
> > Juha Nieminen writes:
> > > Does this mean that I cannot use an MIT-licensed library in a GPL program
> > > (even though I can use it in basically everything else)?
>
> Welcome to the GNU Republic. The most funny thing is that under GNUtian
> viral theory of "work based on" and "relicensing" concept, the GPL is
> actually incompatible with public domain because unprotected material
> can't be copyright licensed at all.
IANAL, but this makes no sense: Public Domain works can be included in
a copyrighted work, and if modified, the modifications are subject to
copyright. The problem with PD is that in many jurisdictions outside
the USA, its not possible to dedicate something to the Public Domain,
works can only becomes PD by their copyright term expiring.
> http://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html
>
> "The idea is that there are some other Free Software licences which
> are compatible with the GPL meaning that if a program is released
> under one of those licences, that licence gives, effectively,
> permission to relicence under the GPL. There are two ways that can
> happen. Some licences explicitly say "you can also use this program
> under the GNU GPL". In other cases, it's because the licence is so
> permissive that to relicence it under the GNU GPL is permitted."
"That licence gives, EFFECTIVELY, permission to relicence"
Since Stallman said "effectively," that means that you cannot take him
literally.
And he is not a lawyer either, so you can ignore the whole quote
anyway.
> Only copyright owners and authorized sublisenors can copyright
> (sub)license protected material. And while the MIT license does allow
> sublicensing ..., the GPL shoots itself in the foot
> proclaiming that "Sublicensing is not allowed ... the recipient
> automatically receives a license from the original licensors"
You have totally misunderstood what "sublicensing" is: It is a legal
term that means "pass on copies of the work to 3rd parties with this
license" and does NOT mean "pass on copies with another license of
your choice"
Juha, I strongly recommend reading http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2008/foss-primer.html
:-)
Dave Crossland
> John Hasler wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > The terms of the MIT license are a subset of the
> > terms of the GPL so by complying with the latter you are complying with the
> > former.
>
> Okay, once again for mentally challenged: Complying with the latter
> under GNUtian viral "work based on" theory requires "relicensing"
> (seehttp://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html)
Forget what Stallman might _say_ - he is no a lawyer.
Try reading the MIT and GPL licenses and thinking it through for
yourself.
Cheers,
Dave
Alexander Terekhov
Dave Crossland wrote:
>
> On May 26, 2:47 pm, Alexander Terekhov <terek...@web.de> wrote:
> > John Hasler wrote:
> > > Juha Nieminen writes:
> > > > Does this mean that I cannot use an MIT-licensed library in a GPL program
> > > > (even though I can use it in basically everything else)?
> >
> > Welcome to the GNU Republic. The most funny thing is that under GNUtian
> > viral theory of "work based on" and "relicensing" concept, the GPL is
> > actually incompatible with public domain because unprotected material
> > can't be copyright licensed at all.
>
> IANAL, but this makes no sense: Public Domain works can be included in
> a copyrighted work, and if modified, the modifications are subject to
> copyright.
The copyright in a derivative work doesn't cover elements taken from
preexisting work and employed in a derivative work. (It "extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work" 17
USC 103). Hence it is absolutely impossible to have a derivative work
based on preexisting public domain material copyright licensed "as a
whole" under GNUtian viral theory of "work based on". Got it now?
[...]
> You have totally misunderstood what "sublicensing" is: It is a legal
The act of sublicensing is what happens when a licensee becomes a
licensor to some other party by granting some or all of the exclusive
rights that they received as a licensee.
The thing is that nonexclusive copyright licenses are generally
indivisible as a matter of law (this is referred to as "settled law" in
every source you can find) unless the licensing contract states
otherwise. This means that a nonexclusive license does not carry an
implicit sublicense agreement. With the exception of the MIT License
(which contains a sublicense clause), permissive licenses generally do
not include a sublicense right and instead offer a direct grant of
rights from the original licensor to any recipient of source code
released by him or her under that license.
Actually, according to the 9th Circuit, exclusive licensees are not
transferable or sublicenseable either unless the licensing contract
states otherwise. See Gardner v. Nike, a case which appears to have
surprised a lot of lawyers at the time:
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/annrev/exmplrs/csum/gardnervcsum.pdf
Hth.
Alexander Terekhov
Dave Crossland wrote:
>
> On May 26, 7:40 pm, Alexander Terekhov <terek...@web.de> wrote:
> > John Hasler wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > The terms of the MIT license are a subset of the
> > > terms of the GPL so by complying with the latter you are complying with the
> > > former.
> >
> > Okay, once again for mentally challenged: Complying with the latter
> > under GNUtian viral "work based on" theory requires "relicensing"
> > (seehttp://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html)
>
> Forget what Stallman might _say_ - he is no a lawyer.
Please visit
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/openbsd/2008-01/0300.html
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/openbsd/2008-01/0861.html
Stallman replied to the latter message of mine (he cc'd it to
openbsd-misc but it arrived there after they've banned him and so it
didn't show up in archives):
------
from Richard Stallman <r...@gnu.org>
reply-to r...@gnu.org
to Alexander Terekhov <alexander...@gmail.com>
cc rnich...@yahoo.com, es...@nerim.net, mi...@openbsd.org
date Tue, Jan 8, 2008 at 9:07 PM
subject Re: Real men don't attack straw men
mailed-by gnu.org
This may be *your* "usual interpretation of the revised BSD license"
Eben Moglen says that it is nearly universal among lawyers.
As this is a legal issue, I have confidence in him.
------
My reply to his message about having confidence in Eben Moglen:
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/openbsd/2008-01/1040.html
Hth.
Alexander Terekhov
Dave Crossland wrote:
[...]
> Juha, I strongly recommend reading http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2008/foss-primer.html
> :-)
Yeah, yeah. Funny reading indead!!!
"You do not need to register to enforce your copyright. "
From the United states Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
where SFLC resides and likes to file their harrasing suits (just to
dismiss voluntary and even with prejudice against own clients shortly
after filing initial complaint):
"It provides that "no action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until pre-registration
or registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title." 17 U.S.C. sec. 411(a); see also 17
U.S.C. sec. 501.1 Whether this requirement is jurisdictional is
not up for debate in this Circuit. On two recent occasions, we
have squarely held that it is."; In re Literary Works in
Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation; Nos. 05-5943-cv(L),
06-0223-cv(CON)(2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2007).
No jurisdiction -- automatic dismissal.
More:
http://infotechlawpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/01/second-circuit-vacates-settlement-of.html
Juha, SFLC isn't a "law center". For the most part it's a center of
pseudo-legal nonsense aimed to foster GNUtian agenda.
rjack
> You have totally misunderstood what "sublicensing" is: It is a legal
> term that means "pass on copies of the work to 3rd parties with this
> license" and does NOT mean "pass on copies with another license of
> your choice"
There is exactly 1 (one) valid, legally enforceable meaning to the term
"sublicense" that applies to a NONEXCLUSIVE copyright license under U.S.
copyright law:
With the permission of a copyright OWNER, a nonexclusive licensee may
TRANSFER his CONTRACUAL INTEREST in a nonexclusive copyright license to
a third party. In the act of transferring his CONTRACTUAL INTEREST, the
original nonexclusive licensee RELINQUISHES his contractual rights in
that nonexclusive license.
Any other theory of "downstream" sublicensing with respect to a
nonexclusive copyright license is a fantasy of Richard Stallman's design.
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
“The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn't
Falling”, Sunday, December 14 2003 @ 09:06 PM EST PJ@Groklaw
Alfred M. Szmidt
> > subset of the terms of the GPL so by complying with the latter
> > you are complying with the former.
>
> Okay, once again for mentally challenged: Complying with the
> latter under GNUtian viral "work based on" theory requires
> "relicensing"
> (seehttp://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html)
Forget what Stallman might _say_ - he is no a lawyer.
He does get his info directly from lawyers; and this cannot be said
for Terekhov. So it is foolish to forget what RMS says just because he
doesn't have a degree in law.
Dave Crossland
> Dave Crossland wrote:
> > Public Domain works can be included in
> > a copyrighted work, and if modified, the modifications are subject to
> > copyright.
>
> The copyright in a derivative work doesn't cover elements taken from
> preexisting work and employed in a derivative work. (It "extends only
> to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
> distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work" 17
> USC 103).
Thanks for the reference to what I said :-)
> Hence it is absolutely impossible to have a derivative work
> based on preexisting public domain material copyright licensed "as a
> whole" under GNUtian viral theory of "work based on". Got it now?
I got it - have you? :-)
The works that are subject to copyright must be licensed "as a whole"
under the GPL. The works that are public domain are not subject to
copyright. Hence it is absolutely trivial to have a derivative work
based on preexisting public domain material copyright licensed under
the GPL.
Are you a lawyer, btw?
> > You have totally misunderstood what "sublicensing" is: It is a legal
>
> The act of sublicensing is what happens when a licensee becomes a
> licensor to some other party by granting some or all of the exclusive
> rights that they received as a licensee.
AIUI, it is "all," not "some or all."
> The thing is that nonexclusive copyright licenses are generally
> indivisible as a matter of law (this is referred to as "settled law" in
> every source you can find) unless the licensing contract states
> otherwise. This means that a nonexclusive license does not carry an
> implicit sublicense agreement. With the exception of the MIT License
> (which contains a sublicense clause), permissive licenses generally do
> not include a sublicense right and instead offer a direct grant of
> rights from the original licensor to any recipient of source code
> released by him or her under that license.
>
> Actually, according to the 9th Circuit, exclusive licensees are not
> transferable or sublicenseable either unless the licensing contract
> states otherwise. See Gardner v. Nike, a case which appears to have
> surprised a lot of lawyers at the time:
>
> http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/annrev/exmplrs/csum/...
>
> Hth.
I fail to see how this realtes to programs made up of MIT X11 + GPL
code.
Alexander Terekhov
Dave Crossland wrote:
[...]
> The works that are subject to copyright must be licensed "as a whole"
> under the GPL. The works that are public domain are not subject to
> copyright. Hence it is absolutely trivial to have a derivative work
> based on preexisting public domain material copyright licensed under
> the GPL.
Given: D is a derivative work "as a whole" employing public domain
expression P.
The copyright on D (i.e. stuff that you can copyright license) covers
only D - P = C expression. "As a whole" expression is C + P = D. To
repeat: stuff that can be copyright licensed is only C and not P. Hence
(now try concentrate your brain power)
C < D
which means that D can not be licensed "as a whole" under the GPL.
That's impossible because C < D.
Grok it now?
rjack
Terekhov accurately cites to appropriate Federal statutory and case law
as interpreted by federal judges who have the final word on what the law
means and how it is applied.
Here's RMS's lawyer (Eben Moglen):
"Licenses are not contracts: the work's user is obliged to remain within
the bounds of the license not because she voluntarily promised, but
because she doesn't have any right to act at all except as the license
permits." Eben Moglen founder of the SFLC
Here's Terekhov's lawyers (three Federal Appellate Court judges):
"Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. งง 101- 1332,
grants exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the federal
courts, those courts construe copyrights as contracts and turn to the
relevant state law to interpret them."; Automation by Design, Inc. v.
Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d 749, (United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit 2006)
Now, who's your daddy?
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
--- "Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition
on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights,..."; ALLEN v.
WRIGHT 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ---
Dave Crossland
> > > The terms of the MIT license are a
> > > subset of the terms of the GPL so by complying with the latter
> > > you are complying with the former.
> >
> > Okay, once again for mentally challenged: Complying with the
> > latter under GNUtian viral "work based on" theory requires
> > "relicensing"
> > (seehttp://fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/barcelona-rms-transcript.en.html)
>
> Forget what Stallman might _say_ - he is no a lawyer.
>
> for Terekhov. So it is foolish to forget what RMS says just because he
> doesn't have a degree in law.
This is true of Stallman's written works, but I would be very wary of
putting any trust in something from a transcription of an audio
recording of a spoken comment made in a Q&A session after a speech.
--
Regards,
Dave
I support www.gnuherds.org -
democratic free software jobs
Miles Bader
>> He does get his info directly from lawyers; and this cannot be said
>> for Terekhov. So it is foolish to forget what RMS says just because he
>> doesn't have a degree in law.
>
> This is true of Stallman's written works, but I would be very wary of
> putting any trust in something from a transcription of an audio
> recording of a spoken comment made in a Q&A session after a speech.
He's had enough real interaction with lawyers on these issues that
surely he's formed reasonable instincts regarding them.
Terekhov, on the other hand, is simply a blithering idiot.
You can make your own choice I suppose.
-Miles
--
Guilt, n. The condition of one who is known to have committed an indiscretion,
as distinguished from the state of him who has covered his tracks.
David Kastrup
> "Dave Crossland" <da...@lab6.com> writes:
>>> He does get his info directly from lawyers; and this cannot be said
>>> for Terekhov. So it is foolish to forget what RMS says just because he
>>> doesn't have a degree in law.
>>
>> This is true of Stallman's written works, but I would be very wary of
>> putting any trust in something from a transcription of an audio
>> recording of a spoken comment made in a Q&A session after a speech.
>
> He's had enough real interaction with lawyers on these issues that
> surely he's formed reasonable instincts regarding them.
>
> Terekhov, on the other hand, is simply a blithering idiot.
>
> You can make your own choice I suppose.
It helps to take a look at the track record of both person's
predictions.
--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
Tim Smith
>
> He does get his info directly from lawyers; and this cannot be said
> for Terekhov. So it is foolish to forget what RMS says just because he
> doesn't have a degree in law.
Well, then, I'd hate to play "telephone" with RMS, as he doesn't always
do a good job of relaying what the lawyers say!
--
--Tim Smith
Tim Smith
wrote:
> > This is true of Stallman's written works, but I would be very wary of
> > putting any trust in something from a transcription of an audio
> > recording of a spoken comment made in a Q&A session after a speech.
>
> He's had enough real interaction with lawyers on these issues that
> surely he's formed reasonable instincts regarding them.
>
> Terekhov, on the other hand, is simply a blithering idiot.
So how come Federal courts seem to mostly agree with Tereknov's
positions?
How come when RMS decides to wax forth legalistically, there never seem
to be either cases or statutes that back his position?
--
--Tim Smith
David Kastrup
> In article <87iqwxj...@catnip.gol.com>, Miles Bader <mi...@gnu.org>
> wrote:
>> > This is true of Stallman's written works, but I would be very wary of
>> > putting any trust in something from a transcription of an audio
>> > recording of a spoken comment made in a Q&A session after a speech.
>>
>> He's had enough real interaction with lawyers on these issues that
>> surely he's formed reasonable instincts regarding them.
>>
>> Terekhov, on the other hand, is simply a blithering idiot.
>
> So how come Federal courts seem to mostly agree with Tereknov's
> positions?
Huh? Terekhov has a rather bad track record of predicting verdicts. He
explains this by calling judges drunk or idiots or so and blusters even
more when the appellate court is of the same opinion.
Now Terekhov is fabulous at quoting a lot of stuff and interpreting it
in his own twisted manner and parading in the sure knowledge it supports
his points. That may look convincing at times. But it does not help
his predictions when actual cases are handled.
> How come when RMS decides to wax forth legalistically, there never
> seem to be either cases or statutes that back his position?
Because the FSF is not a litigation company and so the GPL has been
written not as a contract, but a license. As a consequence, it does not
make sense for anybody to sue about the GPL: either it is valid, and
people have to abide the terms of the license, or it isn't, and people
are not in the situation where they can make use of the software in
question.
So GPL violators settle because they have no leg to stand on. And that
means that there are few enough court cases with a definite verdict
because the GPL violators lose _regardless_ of the verdict. Once the
violators see that, they have nothing to gain from staying in court and
settle.
Tim Smith
wrote:
> > How come when RMS decides to wax forth legalistically, there never
> > seem to be either cases or statutes that back his position?
>
> Because the FSF is not a litigation company and so the GPL has been
> written not as a contract, but a license. As a consequence, it does not
See, that's a perfect example. A license is a kind of contract. It's
handled in court under contract law. But in FSF-land, license has some
kind of different meaning that doesn't correspond to the one used by
lawyers and the courts.
Same with the concept of "distribution". Whatever it is the FSF talks
about when it talks about software distribution seems to have little
connection to what the copyright law means when it uses that term.
Remember when the FSF was claiming that giving someone code that can be
linked with GPLed software is an implicit distribution of the GPLed
software, even though it is up to the recipient to decide if they want
to get and link with the GPLed software, or get and link with other,
non-GPLed software? But only if the GPLed and non-GPLed software have
different interfaces? If they have the same interface, then it is no
longer an implicit distribution.
I invite you to find any statutory or case law support for that
interesting theory. You'll have a long search, 'cause there is none.
With Terekhov's claims, I can go read the cases and statues he cites,
because he actually makes *legal* arguments. The FSF and RMS make a lot
of legal-sounding arguments that appear to actually be them stating what
they wish the law to be, using terms somewhat similar to, not not always
the same as, real legal terms.
--
--Tim Smith
Alexander Terekhov
David Kastrup wrote:
[...]
> Huh? Terekhov has a rather bad track record of predicting verdicts. He
> explains this by calling judges drunk or idiots or so and blusters even
> more when the appellate court is of the same opinion.
You've got really bad memory, GNUtian dak. In each case that I called
judges drunk or idiots I've explaned why. Here's an example:
http://groups.google.com/group/gnu.misc.discuss/msg/f70d5687745a8712
-----
Alexander Terekhov wrote:
> David Kastrup wrote:
> [...]
> > > That's all bullshit. The FSF simply managed to fool Judge Tinder
> > > that Wallace lacks standing. Tinder recorgnized that "Plaintiff’s
> > > Third Amended Complaint States a Claim Upon Which Relief can be
> > > Granted" and that "Plaintiff’s Allegations Sufficiently Set Forth a
> > > Violation of the Rule of Reason", but he was fooled by FSF's "even
> > > if it were possible for Plaintiff to allege some harm to competition
> > > in the abstract, Plaintiff has not alleged antitrust injury to
> > > himself, and thus lacks standing."
> > You have an interesting notion of "fooled".
> -----
> Accompanying Injury
> Supreme Court case law holds that predatory pricing may inflict
> antitrust injury on competitors (“Predatory pricing . . . is a
> practice that harms both competitors and competition.”) (Cargill, Inc.
> v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986)); (“[i]n the
> context of pricing practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite
> anticompetitive effect”) (Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
> 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990)).
> The district court ruled, “Antitrust laws are for ‘the protection of
> competition, not competitors.’ Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat,
> Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)” (ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
> DISMISS at 3) but the Supreme Court clarified the Brunswick language
> in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 353
> (1990):
> The "antitrust laws were enacted for `the protection of competition,
> not competitors.'" Ante, at 338 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United
> States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). This proposition - which is often
> used as a test of whether a violation of law occurred - cannot be
> read to deny all remedial actions by competitors. When competitors
> are injured by illicit agreements among their rivals rather than by
> the free play of market forces, the antitrust laws protect
> competitors precisely for the purpose of protecting competition.
> The Ninth Circuit addressed competitor status in American Ad
> Management, Inc. v. General Telephone Co. of California, 190 F.3d
> 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.1999):
> Further, it is not the status as a consumer or competitor that
> confers antitrust standing, but the relationship between the
> defendant's alleged unlawful conduct and the resulting harm to the
> plaintiff. See Amaral, 102 F.3d at 1508 ("Losses a competitor
> suffers as a result of predatory pricing is a form of antitrust
> injury because `predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive
> effect' against competitors.") (quoting ARCO, 495 U.S. at 339)).
> The leading Supreme Court case on predatory pricing under §1 of
> the Sherman Act is Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio,
> 475 US 574 (1986). (“This is a Sherman Act 1 case . . .”) (fn 8).
> Predatory pricing was defined in Matsushita. (“[(i)] pricing below
> the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below
> some appropriate measure of cost.”) (fn 9).
> Judge Richard Posner has acknowledged the heavy fixed costs involved
> with the production of intellectual property:
> Intellectual property is characterized by heavy fixed costs relative
> to marginal costs. It is often very expensive to create, but once it
> is created the cost of making additional copies is low, dramatically
> so in the case of software, where it is only a slight overstatement
> to speak of marginal cost as zero. Antitrust in the New Economy,
> (Nov. 2000) U. Chicago Law & Economics, 1, 3,
> The Seventh Circuit examined a host of cost measures and found
> pricing below long run incremental cost (LRIC) as one appropriate
> indicator of predatory pricing. MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d
> 1081, fn 59 (7th Cir. 1983).
> Regardless of whether the measure of cost is LRIC or some other
> appropriate formula, a final price of “no charge” leads to the
> absurd conclusion that the “heavy fixed costs” for developing
> intellectual property in computer programs are non-existent.
> The Supreme Court held that it might be that only “direct evidence”
> (Matsushita at fn 9) is sufficient to demonstrate below-cost
> pricing. A contract term fixing licensing fees at no charge is
> certainly “direct evidence” of pricing below long run incremental
> cost.
> Wallace in his Second Amended Complaint alleged:
> The Defendants' pooling and cross licensing of intellectual property
> with the described predatory price fixing scheme is foreclosing
> competition in the market for computer operating systems. Said
> predatory price-fixing scheme prevents Plaintiff Daniel Wallace from
> marketing his own computer operating system as a competitor.
> Wallace has certainly alleged an injury “of the type the antitrust
> laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes
> defendants’ acts unlawful.”
> -----
And here's fooled (drunk in a sense) Judge Tinder:
"The allegation in the Fourth Amended Complaint that the GPL is
foreclosing Mr.Wallace from entering into the market for operating
systems also is not a cognizable antitrust injury. The court
understands Mr. Wallace’s argument that the GPL may be preventing
him from marketing his own operating system, and, for the purposes
of the instant motion, accepts that allegation as true. However,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
[However, he simply ignores Wallace's allegation of predatory
pricing which is essential element to establish antitrust injury.
He should have accepted that allegation as true for the purposes
of the instant motion as a matter of law.]
while this may be significant enough from Mr. Wallace’s perspective,
a plaintiff must prove not only an injury to him or herself, but
to the market as well, Martin v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 697 F.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
[Predatory pricing . . . is a practice that harms both competitors
and competition. (Cargill)]
Supp. 997, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1988), which Mr. Wallace has failed to
do. As the court stated in its November 28, 2005 Entry, reduced
opportunity as a competitor does not necessarily equate to an
antitrust injury as recognized by the courts. Brunswick, 429 U.S.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
[Losses a competitor suffers as a result of predatory pricing is a
form of antitrust injury because `predatory pricing has the
requisite anticompetitive effect' against competitors. (Amaral)]
at 488. Indeed, injury in fact is “a different beast” than antitrust
injury."
So he admits that there's injury and just fails to recognize that
it flows from the alleged predatory pricing (the allegation which
he simply ignores in his analysis).
Predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive effect (ARCO).
-----
David Kastrup
> In article <8563ssp...@lola.goethe.zz>, David Kastrup <d...@gnu.org>
> wrote:
>> > How come when RMS decides to wax forth legalistically, there never
>> > seem to be either cases or statutes that back his position?
>>
>> Because the FSF is not a litigation company and so the GPL has been
>> written not as a contract, but a license. As a consequence, it does not
>
> See, that's a perfect example. A license is a kind of contract.
Uh no, it isn't. What the software companies purport to call a license
is a kind of contract.
> It's handled in court under contract law. But in FSF-land, license
> has some kind of different meaning that doesn't correspond to the one
> used by lawyers and the courts.
Uh no. It corresponds perfectly with what the lawyers and the courts
call a license. It does not correspond with what typical software
companies call a license.
From Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Revised 6th Ed (1856) [bouvier]:
LICENSE, contracts. A right given by some competent authority to do an act,
which without such authority would be illegal. The instrument or writing
which secures this right, is also called a license. Vide Ayl. Parerg, 353;
15 Vin. Ab. 92; Ang. Wat. Co. 61, 85.
2. A license is express or implied. An express license is one which in
direct terms authorizes the performance of a certain act; as a license to
keep a tavern given by public authority.
3. An implied license is one which though not expressly given, may be
presumed from the acts of the party having a right to give it. The following
are examples of such licenses: 1. When a man knocks at another's door, and
it is opened, the act of opening the door licenses the former to enter the
house for any lawful purpose. See Hob. 62. A servant is, in consequence of
his employment, licensed to admit to the house, those who come on his
master's business, but only such persons. Selw. N. P. 999; Cro. Eliz. 246.
It may, however, be inferred from circumstances that the servant has
authority to invite whom he pleases to the house, for lawful purposes. See 2
Greenl. Ev. Sec. 427; Entry.
4. A license is either a bare authority, without interest, or it is
coupled with an interest. 1. A bare license must be executed by the party to
whom it is given in person, and cannot be made over or assigned by him to
another; and, being without consideration, may be revoked at pleasure, as
long as it remains executory; 39 Hen. VI. M. 12, page 7; but when carried
into effect, either partially or altogether, it can only be rescinded, if in
its nature it will admit of revocation, by placing the other side in the
same situation in which he stood before he entered on its execution. 8 East,
R. 308; Palm. 71; S. C. Poph. 151; S. C. 2 Roll. Rep. 143, 152.
5.-2. When the license is coupled with an interest the authority
conferred is not properly a mere permission, but amounts to a grant, which
cannot be revoked, and it may then be assigned to a third person. 5 Hen. V.,
M. 1, page 1; 2 Mod. 317; 7 Bing. 693; 8 East, 309; 5 B. & C. 221; 7 D. & R.
783; Crabb on R. P. Sec. 521 to 525; 14 S. & R 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq.
Cas. Ab. 522. When the license is coupled with an interest, the formalities
essential to confer such interest should be observed. Say. R. 3; 6 East, R.
602; 8 East, R. 310, note. See 14 S. & R. 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab.
522; 11 Ad. & El. 34, 39; S. C. 39 Eng, C. L. R. 19.
Note that the "license" from software companies in essence says "Ok, you
are entitled to certain uses according to copyright by buying this
medium. However, you agree to not make use of those rights. If you
refuse to relinquish your rights, we refuse to let you do some other
things."
That's a contract because the _interest_ of the software company is
monetary. What is stipulated as license conditions is not interest per
se.
> Same with the concept of "distribution". Whatever it is the FSF talks
> about when it talks about software distribution seems to have little
> connection to what the copyright law means when it uses that term.
> Remember when the FSF was claiming that giving someone code that can
> be linked with GPLed software is an implicit distribution of the GPLed
> software, even though it is up to the recipient to decide if they want
> to get and link with the GPLed software, or get and link with other,
> non-GPLed software?
It never claimed anything like that. You are confusing this with
contributory infringement: doing software distribution in a manner that
_requires_ the recipient to perform steps _on behalf_ of the distributor
without which he would not get what he paid for.
> But only if the GPLed and non-GPLed software have different
> interfaces? If they have the same interface, then it is no longer an
> implicit distribution.
You are making terms up as you go. When they have the same interface,
linking the GPLed library in stops being a necessary step for the
recipient for getting working software.
Also when it can be convincingly argued that the offering was _not_ for
functional software but, say, for educational purposes (programming
books containing skeleton code or scraps that don't run on their own),
no infringement by the distributor will be actionable.
> I invite you to find any statutory or case law support for that
> interesting theory. You'll have a long search, 'cause there is none.
Sure. Because in the stated form, you made this theory up by yourself.
Not the FSF's problem.
> With Terekhov's claims, I can go read the cases and statues he cites,
Yes.
> because he actually makes *legal* arguments.
Actually, he is quite willing to quote stuff which strictly contradicts
his own statements. While he feels free to make legal arguments, more
often than not they are pretty absurd and don't hold up to what the
courts read into the cases he cites.
> The FSF and RMS make a lot of legal-sounding arguments that appear to
> actually be them stating what they wish the law to be, using terms
> somewhat similar to, not not always the same as, real legal terms.
Their track record in court is quite better than Terekhov's predictions.
Moglen is paid by Columbia University to teach law. Nobody gives a dime
for Terekhov's legal advice.
There are reasons for that.
Tim Smith
wrote:
> > Same with the concept of "distribution". Whatever it is the FSF talks
> > about when it talks about software distribution seems to have little
> > connection to what the copyright law means when it uses that term.
> > Remember when the FSF was claiming that giving someone code that can
> > be linked with GPLed software is an implicit distribution of the GPLed
> > software, even though it is up to the recipient to decide if they want
> > to get and link with the GPLed software, or get and link with other,
> > non-GPLed software?
>
> It never claimed anything like that. You are confusing this with
> contributory infringement: doing software distribution in a manner that
> _requires_ the recipient to perform steps _on behalf_ of the distributor
> without which he would not get what he paid for.
Incorrect. Given two libraries that both contain a function to do a
given task, the FSF claimed that distributing this source code:
#ifdef USE_LIBRARY_A
function_from_library_A( ...arguments... );
#else
function_from_library_B( ...different_argument... );
#endif
so that the recipient can decide which library they prefer to use,
required that this source be GPLed if library B is a GPL'ed library.
The program was fully functional if the user compiled it to use library
A.
The author of the code finally made a new library, that had the same
interface as library B, but that was public domain (I believe it was
just a wrapper for library A). The FSF then shut up, because now there
was a non-GPL library that had the same interface as the GPL library, so
there was no longer an "implicit distribution".
As far as contributory infringement goes, there cannot be contributory
infringement without direct infringement. If there is no one who is a
direct infringer, there is no infringement for one to be a contributory
infringer to. GPL allows me, the end user, to link GPL code with
anything I want to, as long as I'm not going to distribute that. You
can do anything you want that helps me do that, in it is *IMPOSSIBLE*
for your actions to be a contributory infringement.
>
> > But only if the GPLed and non-GPLed software have different
> > interfaces? If they have the same interface, then it is no longer an
> > implicit distribution.
>
> You are making terms up as you go. When they have the same interface,
> linking the GPLed library in stops being a necessary step for the
> recipient for getting working software.
It was never a necessary step. The software was fully functional
without using any GPLed libraries.
--
--Tim Smith
Alexander Terekhov
David Kastrup wrote:
[...]
> Moglen is paid by Columbia University to teach law.
http://dartreview.com/archives/2005/04/08/intellectual_property_is_so_last_year.php
-----
Intellectual Property Is So Last Year
By James D. Judah | Friday, April 8, 2005
Left-wing bias in higher education is pervasive; by the time one reaches
sophomore year, it usually just fades to the background. But every once
in a while a class manages to shock us back into the recognition that a
vast majority of our professors are liberal, that it often seeps into
the classroom, and that it occasionally reaches the level of outrage. I
am currently in such a class at Columbia Law School.
The class is "Perspectives in Modern Legal Thought," and the Professor
is one Eben Moglen.
A few words about the course. The official name of the class is
misleading for two reasons. One, as nearly everyone I knew pointed out
within the first week, there is only one "perspective" offered in the
class—Moglen's. Two, most of our readings are socialist monographs that
precede the fall of Communism, and are therefore neither especially
"modern" nor "legal." And a few introductory words about the Professor.
Think Dartmouth education Professor Andrew Garrod meets Mussolini. An
acid-tongued student in the class once described Moglen as equal parts
The Fountainhead's Ellsworth Toohey, Invitation to a Beheading's
Monsieur Pierre, and The Office's David Brent. He is the type of
professor who plays music to begin and end each class. Selections so far
have included the Beatles' "Revolution" and a rendition of the
"Internationale" by Ani DiFranco. He is a celebrity of sorts in
something called the "Free Software Movement" and the author of
something called "The Dot-Communist Manifesto."
And now on to the class. Besides playing the Beatles to establish his
revolutionary bona fides, Moglen wasted no time in diving into the heart
of the course. We were, on that first fateful day, informed that Rudy
Guliani is a fascist, reminded of Justice Scalia's duck hunt with Vice
President Cheney, instructed on the immorality of the second Iraq war,
and somberly updated that "the United States is now a torturing
society...and when was the vote on that?" Skeptics might wonder whether
these incendiary points were absolutely essential, or even relevant, to
an investigation of Oliver Wendell Holmes' "The Path of the Law,"
published in 1897, which was our assigned reading for the week.
But the sort of person who would wonder something like that "doesn't
understand what Eben is trying to do," according to another student in
the class who was frustrated that an alarming number of us didn't seem
to be "digging the vibe." The vibe was laid down very early: I think
there was technically a vote, but the first order of business was the
imperative that we were to call Eben by his first name, not "Professor"
or "Professor Moglen." The second important thing we were to keep in
mind was that class was not going to be a bunch of lectures, but an
ongoing "conversation." This "conversation" would continue outside of
the classroom when students could e-mail their opinions to the rest of
the class. These comments vary in quality, but I have the suspicion that
I'm one of the only people who actually reads them. One student,
apparently frustrated at accidentally opening e-mails from the mailing
list, actually sent out a suggestion that future posts include a
"uniform heading on the title/subject of the e-mail" to make "the
sorting of the e-mail a heck of a lot easier." Eben did not find that
that particular proposal advanced the conversation, and vetoed the idea.
One early submission to the mailing list, on the topic of anarchy,
caught my attention:
There is a rich philosophical and political anarchist movement
(historical and contemporary) both in the United States and abroad.
Anarchists lead [sic] the Spanish Civil War against fascism, the U.S.
labor movement at the turn of the last century, and now the contemporary
anti-corporate globalization movement. In New York City, they can be
found building libraries and community centers, saving community
gardens, and advocating peaceful discussion. There are christian [sic]
anarchists, queer anarchists, anarchists of color, anarchafeminists,
anarcho-hedonists, anarchoprimitivists, and anarcho-syndicalists, to
name a few.
The writer obviously leaves out such types as the
anarcho-Haymarket-Riot-bomber and anarcho-Presidential assassin. Sadly,
the e-mail is not un-representative of a large portion of the mailing
list.
But let me start at the beginning. I had heard the Moglen legends—that
he had, for example, "murdered" his father (he didn't, per se, he
assisted the suicide) or that he dated students, supposedly being
engaged to a woman in the current graduating class (this one may have
actually been true). I was, you can imagine, wary of entering the class.
I had spoken to a few Moglen veterans—some who loved him, some who hated
him, and believe it or not a few in between—and their advice was
unequivocal: if you intend to survive the course, don't open your mouth.
Ever. I was too stunned by what I saw the first day to deviate from
their counsel, but after witnessing a foolhardy conservative literally
be shouted down by Eben in class, I vowed to enter the fray. The topic
was whether a society could survive without a legal system. In the
spirit of Hobbes, a student pointed out that chaos and violence would
succeed an absence of legal authority, which led Eben to shout him down,
pronouncing, "that is a lie!" Another brave student asked Eben to
produce a single successful society that didn't have a legal system.
Eben paused, and then matter-of-factly offered his slam-dunk
counter-example: the Arctic. Yes, you read that correctly. In the
ensuing silence, Eben added that pre-Columbian Native American tribes
were another example. (We later learned, through repetition of citation,
that the Iroquois are a particular favorite of his.)
At this point, I saw my opening and raised my hand. I conceded that
those societies in fact didn't have a legal system (which may or may not
be true), but suggested that their pre-industrial status might be an
unfortunate but unavoidable limitation of such a plan. For modern
civilizations, with things we value like skyscrapers, law schools, and
dentists, we need a legal system. I knew I had him here—Eben was a
world-class orator, but such a silly position left him little room to
maneuver.
Eben let me finish my point, glared at me, and then off-handedly
remarked to the other side of the room, "I didn't realize dentists were
such an integral part of modern civilization." The Myrmidons in the
front laughed, and Eben went on with the conversation. I later tried to
argue another point, which ended with our both yelling at each other and
Eben's refusing to let me make any further points until I looked up the
statistics he was citing on drug-related incarcerations. I might add
that my participation was by no means the day's most colorful.
It should also be mentioned that "Perspectives in Modern Legal Thought"
is required for all first-year law students. Transferring sections is
difficult and usually involves swapping one's entire schedule.
Fortunately, there is a law school rule that all exams and papers be
graded blindly. Regrettably, Eben despises this policy, and therefore
insists that he be allowed to know the identity of the author for the
first two papers (there are three in total). Now, so as not to
discourage prospective Columbia Law students, I will add that this
course will no longer be required after this year. But this is obviously
a bitter consolation for those of us stuck in the class now. Morale is
low. To paraphrase a famous dissident: how do you ask a 1L to be the
last man to die for a mistake?
But back to the aftermath of that first week. In case the point hadn't
sunk in, Eben sent a mailing to the class over the weekend, admonishing
some of us for what he styled "jousting." He reminded us that unlike our
classes from the previous term ("Torts," "Contracts," and "Civil
Procedure"), "now we are trying to think about law not as it is seen by
gladiators, whose product is success in combat, but as it is seen by
those whose product is ideas." He ended with this observation: "jousting
is just as stupid as exams are. The goal is to ask better questions, not
to impose a narrowing of answers."
Fearful of committing the grave sin of jousting and aware that
challenging Eben's opinions might be construed as an attempt to "impose
a narrowing of answers," I decided to follow the earlier advice and
never open my mouth. Most of the dissenters in the class quickly
followed suit, with one exception being a well-liked Orthodox Jew on the
Student Senate, who posted to the mailing list and argued with Eben in
class frequently. However, one day the student broke down and a uniquely
uncomfortable confrontation ended with Eben's kicking him out of the
classroom and later, according to the student, threatening to ruin his
career and flunk him. This incident finally convinced a dean that the
student should be allowed the transfer he had repeatedly requested.
The few conservatives who were still voicing their opinions basically
stopped participating after that, only a few weeks into the semester.
Since then, Eben's ire has mostly been directed at those students in the
class who say they are committed to social justice but whom he suspects
will end up working for big law firms. In a memorable moment from a
recent class, Eben finished a long screed against the law school's
admissions department and its over-reliance on the LSAT at the expense
of other factors, such as commitment to social justice, by leaning
forward and lamenting, with a voice of infinite bitterness and
disappointment: "I wanted a class that was committed to changing the
world ... and instead ... I got you!"
I think, at this point, the reader has a pretty good idea of the bias of
the class, but the full effects of this belligerent myopia on any
"conversation" are best illustrated with a final example involving Bill
Gates. Eben harbors an eerily personal animus towards Mr. Gates, related
to the damage he thinks Microsoft has done to software development. In
the midst of a fairly technical screed that I wasn't computer-savvy
enough to really follow, Eben spiced things up by declaring that Bill
Gates was a "mutant human being that we would be repulsed by" and then
matter-of-factly informed the class that Microsoft's dehumanizing
software stemmed from the fact "Mr. Bill" was autistic. In case anyone
missed that part, or wasn't sure he heard correctly, Eben repeated the
diagnosis a few more times in the conversation. Like most people, I had
never heard that Bill Gates suffered from autism before, and no one I
spoke to about it afterwards had either. This might be considered odd as
Bill Gates is one of the most famous people in the world and autism is
both debilitating and difficult to conceal. Nevertheless, in a class of
127 Columbia law students, not a single one dared inquire as to the
foundation or source of the autism charge, let alone try to dispute it.
When a non-political statement of fact, unsupported by even an iota of
evidence and in conflict with common knowledge, cannot be challenged in
the classroom due to the intimidation and denigration of all dissenting
views, the hopes for free inquiry on complex normative topics—for
example, modern legal thought—can be all too readily inferred. Res ipsa
loquitur.
-----
David Kastrup
> David Kastrup wrote:
> [...]
>> Moglen is paid by Columbia University to teach law.
>
> [Lots of slander]
And your point being? He is paid by Columbia University to teach law
and has all the required qualifications.
You are not and have not. Simple as that.
Dave Crossland
> Dave Crossland wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > The works that are subject to copyright must be licensed "as a whole"
> > under the GPL. The works that are public domain are not subject to
> > copyright. Hence it is absolutely trivial to have a derivative work
> > based on preexisting public domain material copyright licensed under
> > the GPL.
>
> Given: D is a derivative work "as a whole" employing public domain
> expression P.
>
> The copyright on D (i.e. stuff that you can copyright license) covers
> only D - P = C expression. "As a whole" expression is C + P = D. To
> repeat: stuff that can be copyright licensed is only C and not P. Hence
> (now try concentrate your brain power)
>
> C < D
>
> which means that D can not be licensed "as a whole" under the GPL.
>
> That's impossible because C < D.
The copyright on D covers only D - P = C expression, so D can be
licensed "as a whole" under the GPL but the the GPL only applies to C,
you can re-distribute P under any terms.
Supposing your are right, and GPL can't include PD works: What free
software programs in use today are GPL and include public domain works?
rjack
> Their track record in court is quite better than Terekhov's predictions.
> Moglen is paid by Columbia University to teach law. Nobody gives a dime
> for Terekhov's legal advice.
Their track record in court, as plaintiffs, is absolutely impressive:
1. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
2. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
3. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
4. Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice.
Anyone out there understand the legal ramifications of a plaintiff's
"Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice"?
1. ROFL
2. ROFL ROFL
3. ROFL ROFL ROFL
4. ROFL ROFL ROFL ROFL
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
--- "A voluntary dismissal with prejudice operates as a final
adjudication on the merits and has a res judicata effect. Harrison v.
Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice 'is a complete
adjudication on the merits of the dismissed claim.')"; The Travelers
Insurance Company v. AlliedSignal TBS Holdings, 2001 FED App. 0357P (6th
Cir.) ---
--- "Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that
were or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral
estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to
its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a
suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first
case."; San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), fn. 16 ---
Alfred M. Szmidt
software programs in use today are GPL and include public domain
works?
More fun yet, what _non-free_ software program in use today can
include public domain works?
David Kastrup
> David Kastrup wrote:
>
>> Their track record in court is quite better than Terekhov's predictions.
>> Moglen is paid by Columbia University to teach law. Nobody gives a dime
>> for Terekhov's legal advice.
>
> Their track record in court, as plaintiffs, is absolutely impressive:
>
> 1. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
> 2. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
> 3. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
> 4. Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice.
You are forgetting that the defendant decided to come into compliance.
And they are not in it for damages (hard to press for something which is
usually given away at cost). So what would be the point to continue?
> Anyone out there understand the legal ramifications of a plaintiff's
> "Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice"?
That they can't bring the identical case a second time. Why would they,
when they got an agreement to compliance?
Richard Tobin
rjack <rob...@ixweb.com> wrote:
>Their track record in court, as plaintiffs, is absolutely impressive:
>
>1. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
>2. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
>3. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
>4. Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice.
Yes. In each case, the defendant gave in and did what was required
by the GPL.
-- Richard
--
In the selection of the two characters immediately succeeding the numeral 9,
consideration shall be given to their replacement by the graphics 10 and 11 to
facilitate the adoption of the code in the sterling monetary area. (X3.4-1963)
rjack
>> 1. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice. 2. Voluntary Dismissal
>> Without Prejudice. 3. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice. 4.
>> Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice.
> Yes. In each case, the defendant gave in and did what was required
> by the GPL.
In each case, the plaintiffs dismissed before the Court could even read
the text of the GPL... it was that or pay the defendants' attorney fees
and court costs.
In the Verizon case, Verizon kicked their butt out of court and forced
them to give up the right to file their silly GPL claims against Verizon
ever again.
David Kastrup
> Richard Tobin wrote:
>
>>> 1. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice. 2. Voluntary Dismissal
>>> Without Prejudice. 3. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice. 4.
>>> Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice.
>
>> Yes. In each case, the defendant gave in and did what was required
>> by the GPL.
>
> In each case, the plaintiffs dismissed before the Court could even
> read the text of the GPL... it was that or pay the defendants'
> attorney fees and court costs.
>
> In the Verizon case, Verizon kicked their butt out of court and forced
> them to give up the right to file their silly GPL claims against
> Verizon ever again.
Uh what?
<URL:http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/linux/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904096>
"As part of the settlement announced Monday, Verizon (NYSE: VZ)
subcontractor Actiontec Electronics must pay an undisclosed sum to
developers Erick Andersen and Rob Landley. It must also appoint an
internal officer to ensure that it's in compliance with licenses
governing the open source software it uses. "
As long as Verizon stays in compliance with the settlement terms, yes,
the court will not hear the case again.
So what?
Richard Tobin
rjack <rob...@insightbb.com> wrote:
>> Yes. In each case, the defendant gave in and did what was required
>> by the GPL.
>In each case, the plaintiffs dismissed before the Court could even read
>the text of the GPL.
Because the defendants gave in.
In your world, if someone pleads guilty to murder they've won because
they get out of court even before the evidence is presented.
Let me know when a court rules that it's ok to violate the GPL.
Alexander Terekhov
David Kastrup wrote:
[...]
> > In the Verizon case, Verizon kicked their butt out of court and forced
> > them to give up the right to file their silly GPL claims against
> > Verizon ever again.
>
> Uh what?
> <URL:http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/linux/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904096>
>
> "As part of the settlement announced Monday, Verizon (NYSE: VZ)
> subcontractor Actiontec Electronics must pay an undisclosed sum to
> developers Erick Andersen and Rob Landley. It must also appoint an
> internal officer to ensure that it's in compliance with licenses
> governing the open source software it uses. "
Verizon isn't a party to that "settlement"[1] to begin with and the suit
was against Verizon (that's not Actiontec), moron. As for Actiontec,
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/12/07/1953217
^^^^^^^^
------
Looking on Actiontec's "Support: Open Source" website
(http://opensource.actiontec.com/index.html [actiontec.com]), I see the
following:
GPL Code Download is available for the following Actiontec products:
Wireless Broadband Router Model MI424WR
The following is the portion of the Actiontec source code for the
MI424WR Products.
List of modules:
busybox-0.50
Release Date Filename
11/27/2007 actiontec_opensrc_mi424wr.tar.gz
Hmmm... looks like Actiontec is at least attempting to honor the
license. I haven't researched what's in the tarball, but at least it's
there.
So, again, why is SFLC suing Verizon?
------
Actiontec has made available the source code long before the lawsuit
against Verizon.
More to the point:
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/news/2007/dec/07/busybox/verizon.pdf
(SFLC's complaint)
"The License permits a licensee to distribute BusyBox, or works based
on BusyBox, in object code or executable form, on the condition that
the licensee gives recipients access to the source code corresponding
to what they distribute.
[...]
Upon information and belief, Verizon distributes to its customers the
Actiontec MI424WR wireless router (“Infringing Product”), which
contains embedded executable software (“Firmware”). Defendant also
provides the Firmware corresponding to the Infringing Product for
download via its website, at
http://www2.verizon.net/micro/actiontec/actiontec.asp.
[...]
Defendant has not responded to Plaintiffs’ notice and continues to
distribute the Infringing Products and Firmware in violation of
Plaintiffs' exclusive rights under the Copyright Act."
Now let's visit that link once again:
http://www2.verizon.net/micro/actiontec/actiontec.asp
and witness that there's still no word about the GPL and/or source code
on that web page of Verizon.
Care to explain that, GNUtian dak?
>
> As long as Verizon stays in compliance with the settlement terms, yes,
> the court will not hear the case again.
>
> So what?
SFLC self nuked ("with prejudice") and Verizon "continues to
distribute the Infringing Products and Firmware in violation of
Plaintiffs' exclusive rights under the Copyright Act" in the same
manner as Verizon did it at the time and before SFLC filing their
idiotic complaint, stupid. You must have real fun playing an utter
idiot, GNUtian dak.
[1] a) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Settlement_(law)>
"Generally, when a settlement is reached in the U.S., it will be
submitted to the court to be "rolled into a court order". This is done
so that the court which was initially assigned the case may retain
jurisdiction over it. The court is then free to modify its order as
necessary to achieve justice in the case, and a party that breaches the
settlement may be held in contempt of court, rather than facing only a
civil claim for the breach. In cases where confidentiality is required
by the parties, the court order may refer to another document which is
not disclosed, but which may be revealed to prove a breach of the
settlement."
And what the court "rolled into a court order" in Verizon case is this:
http://www.terekhov.de/GPLvVerizon/VOLUNTARY_DISMISSAL.pdf
("WITH PREJUDICE")
not a settlement.
b) From the United states Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
where SFLC resides and likes to file their idiotic complaints (just
to dismiss voluntary and even with prejudice against own clients
shortly after filing initial complaint):
"It provides that "no action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until pre-registration
or registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title." 17 U.S.C. sec. 411(a); see also 17
U.S.C. sec. 501.1 Whether this requirement is jurisdictional is
not up for debate in this Circuit. On two recent occasions, we
have squarely held that it is."; In re Literary Works in
Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation; Nos. 05-5943-cv(L),
06-0223-cv(CON)(2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2007).
http://infotechlawpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/01/second-circuit-vacates-settlement-of.html
(Second Circuit Vacates Settlement...)
b) From SFLC's "lawyers":
"You do not need to register to enforce your copyright. "
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2008/foss-primer.html
LOL
Alexander Terekhov
Richard Tobin wrote:
>
> In article <np-dnXnJEd_YddjV...@giganews.com>,
> rjack <rob...@insightbb.com> wrote:
>
> >> Yes. In each case, the defendant gave in and did what was required
> >> by the GPL.
>
> >In each case, the plaintiffs dismissed before the Court could even read
> >the text of the GPL.
>
> Because the defendants gave in.
Stop halucinating, GNUtian Tobin.
http://www2.verizon.net/micro/actiontec/actiontec.asp
Alexander Terekhov
"Alfred M. Szmidt" wrote:
>
> Supposing your are right, and GPL can't include PD works: What free
> software programs in use today are GPL and include public domain
> works?
It's really close to impossible to write a computer program that
wouldn't include material unprotectable under copyright (public domain)
and hence not licensable under copyright "as a whole".
See
http://digital-law-online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise24.html
"- The element’s expression was dictated by reasons of efficiency, such
as when it is the best way of performing a particular function.
- The element’s expression was dictated by external factors, such as
using an existing file format or interoperating with another program.
- The element’s expression is a conventional way of writing something in
the particular programming language or machine running the program.
- The element, at the particular level of abstraction, is an
unprotectable process and not protectable expression.
- The element is taken from the public domain or is an unprotectable
fact.
Any protection for elements dictated by efficiency or external factors
or processes must come from patents or trade secrets, if at all, and not
from copyright."
>
> More fun yet, what _non-free_ software program in use today can
> include public domain works?
In contrast to Stallmanist software, "_non-free_" software doesn't
pretend to *copyright* (copyright license) included public domain
material, moron. Any *copyright* license in "_non-free_" software (if
any... typically "_non-free_" software don't convey any *copyright*
license at all) covers only copyrighted material and not "work as a
whole".
rjack
> That they can't bring the identical case a second time. Why would they,
> when they got an agreement to compliance?
Uhhhhhhhhh.
Question: For what use is an unenforceable agreement?
Answer: The same use as an unenforceable GPL license. Toilet paper.
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
--- "Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. งง 101- 1332,
grants exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the federal
courts, those courts construe copyrights as contracts and turn to the
relevant state law to interpret them."; Automation by Design, Inc. v.
Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d 749, (United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit 2006) ---
David Kastrup
> David Kastrup wrote:
>> rjack <rob...@ixweb.com> writes:
>>
>>> David Kastrup wrote:
>>> .........
>
>
>> That they can't bring the identical case a second time. Why would they,
>> when they got an agreement to compliance?
>
> Uhhhhhhhhh.
>
> Question: For what use is an unenforceable agreement?
Why would it be unenforceable?
If a case is dismissed when the defendant agrees to, say, work 20 hours
in some social institution, is this agreement unenforceable because the
case is dismissed?
> Answer: The same use as an unenforceable GPL license. Toilet paper.
Invalid question, invalid answer. Garbage in, garbage out.
rjack
> rjack <rob...@ixweb.com> writes:
>
>> David Kastrup wrote:
>>> rjack <rob...@ixweb.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> David Kastrup wrote:
>>>> .........
>>
>>> That they can't bring the identical case a second time. Why would they,
>>> when they got an agreement to compliance?
>> Uhhhhhhhhh.
>>
>> Question: For what use is an unenforceable agreement?
>
> Why would it be unenforceable?
>
> If a case is dismissed when the defendant agrees to, say, work 20 hours
> in some social institution, is this agreement unenforceable because the
> case is dismissed?
>
The only verifiable source of information on the legal status of the
SFLC's "BusyBox" cases with their subsequent dismissals is the official
Federal Court records:
1. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
2. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
3. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice.
4. Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice.
Has anyone ever seen a written copy of an "agreement" between any of the
parties?
What we see is unverifiable claims of mysterious "agreements" between
the parties churned out by the SFLC.
1). Are they oral agreements?
2). Are they written agreements?
3). Are they imaginary claims of victory by the SFLC posted on a blog?
Where's the evidence? The SFLC's leadership has made utterly frivolous
legal claims refuted by every United States Federal Court from the
Supreme Court on down. The most famous claim:
Here's the SFLC's Eben Moglen (10 September 2001):
"Licenses are not contracts: the work's user is obliged to remain within
the bounds of the license not because she voluntarily promised, but
because she doesn't have any right to act at all except as the license
permits." Eben Moglen founder of the SFLC
Here's the United States Federal Courts:
"Although the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. งง 101- 1332,
grants exclusive jurisdiction for infringement claims to the federal
courts, those courts construe copyrights as contracts and turn to the
relevant state law to interpret them."; Automation by Design, Inc. v.
Raybestos Products Co., 463 F.3d 749, (United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit 2006)
When you chant an obviously false legal mantra for seven years, never
offering to correct the record, you end up with zero credibility
concerning your specious legal claims.
Why in heaven's name would anyone actually believe the SFLC's self-
serving, unverifiable claims about favorable BusyBox "agreements?
Even the extremely gullible eventually ask to see some proof.
So... WHERE'S THE EVIDENCE?
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
--- "The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn't
Falling", Sunday, December 14 2003 @ 09:06 PM EST --- PJ@Groklaw
Miles Bader
-Miles
--
Barometer, n. An ingenious instrument which indicates what kind of weather we
are having.
rjack
> Heh, you've really got the trolls riled up today!
>
> -Miles
>
Hey. . . trolls need love too!
Have *you* hugged *your* troll today?
Sincerely
Rjack :)
Have a nice day!
_ _
|_| |_|
| | /^^^\ | |
_| |_ (| "o" |) _| |_
_| | | | _ (_---_) _ | | | |_
| | | | |' | _| |_ | `| | | | |
| | / \ | |
\ / / /(. .)\ \ \ /
\ / / / | . | \ \ \ /
\ \/ / ||Y|| \ \/ /
\__/ || || \__/
() ()
|| ||
ooO Ooo
Alfred M. Szmidt
Answer: The same use as an unenforceable GPL license. Toilet paper.
A unenforceable license is very useful, without a license, you cannot
do anything.
rjack
Thank You!
Everything is now crystal clear. It all makes perfect sense.
Sincerely
Rjack :)
--- "[I]f an extra element is required instead of or in addition
to the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display
in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, there is
no preemption, provided that the extra element changes the nature
of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim." Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283
(United States Court Of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 2004) ---
David Kastrup
> Alfred M. Szmidt wrote:
>> Question: For what use is an unenforceable agreement?
>>
>> Answer: The same use as an unenforceable GPL license. Toilet paper.
>>
>
>
>> A unenforceable license is very useful, without a license, you cannot
>> do anything.
>>
>>
>
> Thank You!
>
> Everything is now crystal clear. It all makes perfect sense.
Well, here is a quote for you from the GPL:
9. Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.
You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or
run a copy of the Program. Ancillary propagation of a covered work
occurring solely as a consequence of using peer-to-peer transmission
to receive a copy likewise does not require acceptance. However,
nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or
modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do
not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a
covered work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so.
A license you need not accept is not enforceable, obviously. It is the
choice of the recipient whether or not he wants to use the license. If
he does, he has to heed its terms. If he doesn't, he is restricted to
what copyright law allows him.
You won't find "You are not required to accept this License in order to
receive or run a copy of the Program" in a license from Microsoft.
That's why _those_ licenses are actually contracts.
rjack
> A license you need not accept is not enforceable, obviously. It is the
> choice of the recipient whether or not he wants to use the license. If
> he does, he has to heed its terms. If he doesn't, he is restricted to
> what copyright law allows him.
If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it, does it make a sound?
Sincerely,
Rjack :)
-- "Whether express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed by
ordinary principles of state contract law.'"; McCoy v. Mitsuboshi
Cutlery, Inc., 67. F.3d 917, (United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit 1995) --
John Hasler
> You won't find "You are not required to accept this License in order to
> receive or run a copy of the Program" in a license from Microsoft
However, in the US that statement is true anyway. It is only when dealing
with Microsoft and its agents that agreeing to the contract is a condition
of sale of a copy.
--
John Hasler
jo...@dhh.gt.org
Dancing Horse Hill
Elmwood, WI USA
David Kastrup
> David Kastrup writes:
>> You won't find "You are not required to accept this License in order to
>> receive or run a copy of the Program" in a license from Microsoft
>
> However, in the US that statement is true anyway. It is only when
> dealing with Microsoft and its agents that agreeing to the contract is
> a condition of sale of a copy.
Oh, you can sell legally acquired copies all you want (Autocad just got
reminded in court about that, hard). As long as you have not
contractually agreed not to do so by an explicit act of agreement or by
doing something for which you need implied permission.
Put informally: a shrink-wrap license is nothing you need to bother
about as long as the shrink-wrap is still on.
John Hasler
> Put informally: a shrink-wrap license is nothing you need to bother about
> as long as the shrink-wrap is still on.
Or even if it is off as long as you are not the initial purchaser.
rjack
> rjack <rob...@insightbb.com> writes:
>>> A unenforceable license is very useful, without a license, you cannot
>>> do anything.
>
> Well, here is a quote for you from the GPL:
>
> 9. Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.
>
> You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or
> run a copy of the Program. Ancillary propagation of a covered work
> occurring solely as a consequence of using peer-to-peer transmission
> to receive a copy likewise does not require acceptance. However,
> nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or
> modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do
> not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a
> covered work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so.
>
> A license you need not accept is not enforceable, obviously. It is the
> choice of the recipient whether or not he wants to use the license. If
> he does, he has to heed its terms. If he doesn't, he is restricted to
> what copyright law allows him.
Sigh... The semantic maneuvering some individuals employ to deny that a
license is a contract is simply amazing. Perhaps it would be helpful to
observe the underlying legal and ontological foundations of "license".
Well, here is a quote for you from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit:
"Whether express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed by
ordinary principles of state contract law.'"; McCoy v. Mitsuboshi
Cutlery, Inc., 67. F.3d 917, (United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit 1995)
If you examine the ruling above you see "a license is a contract".
Notice the existential "is"? [N.1] No amount of tortured verbiage will
alter this fact -- that a LICENSE "is" a CONTRACT.
Now, all this smarmy word salad ("Ancillary propagation", "peer-to-peer
transmission", "propogation") concerning contingent existence in
paragraph 9 of the GPL is Moglen-Stallman blather.
Look to contract law. A necessary and sufficient condition that a
license exist is that an enforceable I.P. contract exist.
It is really easy to repeat several times, "a license is a contract"...
"a license is a contract"..."a license is a contract". The word
c-o-n-t-r-a-c-t will soon flow smoothly from your lips. A short time
thereafter, you will be admired by your peers as a consummate professional!
[N.1] If you're William Jefferson Clinton this could depend on
what the meaning of "is" is.
Sincerely
David Kastrup
It becomes a contract once both parties sign their acceptance. Previous
to that it is a one-sided warranty for one party, a piece of paper for
the other. It still differs from a contract in several ways. For
example, a contract is invalid if signed under force or duress, and it
remains valid even if one of the undersigners changes his mind. The
license terms, however, are not coupled to an act of undersigning, nor
can there be any contract penalties. If a person breaks the license
terms, you can sue for damages and for compliance. But you can't set
any penalties into a license apart from withdrawal of the license
itself.
> If you examine the ruling above you see "a license is a
> contract". Notice the existential "is"? [N.1] No amount of tortured
> verbiage will alter this fact -- that a LICENSE "is" a CONTRACT.
So why can't it specify contract penalties?
> Now, all this smarmy word salad ("Ancillary propagation",
>"peer-to-peer transmission", "propogation") concerning contingent
>existence in paragraph 9 of the GPL is Moglen-Stallman blather.
I'll take the blather of a law professor over that of a Usenet troll any
time.
> It is really easy to repeat several times, "a license is a
> contract"... "a license is a contract"..."a license is a
> contract". The word c-o-n-t-r-a-c-t will soon flow smoothly from your
> lips. A short time thereafter, you will be admired by your peers as a
> consummate professional!
But who wants to be a consummate professional Usenet troll?
rjack
> I'll take the blather of a law professor over that of a Usenet troll any
> time.
> But who wants to be a consummate professional Usenet troll?
Oh cruel rejection! Just remember though, Usenet trolls need love too!