Is a 2 degree target realistic?
Zeke Hausfather
F&ES. A number of us involved in climate science and economics have
lately been debating what targets are really feasible, and whether
there needs to be a bit of public reassessment that, even if we start
as soon as possible with strong abatement measures, a mean 3 degrees C
increase in global temperature relative to preindustrial temps is the
lowest that may be achievable in practice. I've brought this up in
passing with a number of climate scientists and economists over the
last few months (including Gavin Schmidt last fall), and there seems
to be some degree of agreement that 3 degrees may be the most
realistic outcome of the best foreseeable realistic abatement efforts.
Hansen's alternate emissions scenario is often brought up to defend
the position that stabilization under two degrees C above pre-
industrial average temps (or at one degree over 1990 temps) is
practical. However, looking over the equilibrium climate sensitivity
in the AR4 (see Table 3.9 on the bottom of page 91 of chapter three of
the WGIII report: http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages_media/AR4-chapters.html
), a mean increase of 1 degree C over 1990 levels (1.6 over pre-
industrial) would on average occur at 402 ppm CO2e, with current
atmospheric concentration at ~430 CO2e. At 441 CO2e, a concentration
that is for all intents and purposes inevitable at this point, we have
an expected warming of 2 degrees C relative to preindustrial levels.
Thus it appears that goals of limiting expected warming to a mean of 2
degrees C (such as the European proposal) would require immediately
ceasing all emissions.
If we structure our goal toward avoiding a particular level of
warming, things look even more grim. To avoid more than 3 degrees
warming over pre-industrial levels (e.g. having only a 17% chance of
exceeding 3 degrees), we would also have to essentially cease all
emissions immediately (see the figure reference above).
Given the rapid economic development of China and India, and the
manifest failure of the international community to take action over
the past decade, it seems unlikely that global emissions will peak in
the next ten years, as would be required to realistically limit
warming to 2-2.4 degrees C. From a political economy standpoint, it
would be very difficult to imagine peaking world emissions prior to
2020, which would put us roughly on course for a 550 ppm CO2e
equilibrium concentration (accompanied by a mean expected warming of 3
degrees).
The Stern Review contained a similar analysis, where it calculated the
annual emission reductions associated with different stabilization
scenarios. To meet a 450 ppm CO2e target, global emissions would have
to be capped by 2010 with an annual decrease in emissions of 7% per
year thereafter. To put this figure in perspective, the collapse of
the economy of the former Soviet Union only decreased emissions in
that region by roughly 5% annually. If an utter economic collapse
cannot produce this level of reduction, especially considering the
difficulty of rapidly replacing existing capital stock, and the
rapidly growing Asian economies, it is difficult to see how such a
stabilization level could be achieved. Likewise, a 500 ppm CO2e
stabilization level would require capping emissions around 2020 (or
possibly 2030 in an overshoot scenario), with subsequent reductions of
4-6% per year. Even a 550 ppm CO2e stabilization level will be
difficult to achieve, but seems considerably more realistic to achieve
given the political, economic, and infrastructural constraints that
any climate change policy would face.
Curiously, according to George Monbiot (http://www.monbiot.com/
archives/2007/05/01/1058/#more-1058), the EU target of 2 degrees C
also uses a figure of 550 ppm CO2e (or 550 ppm CO2, in the case of the
UK)! Even if they were (somewhat disingenuously) using a target of 2
degrees C max warming relative to current temperatures, instead of the
more appropriate pre-industrial baseline, 550 ppm CO2e would still
yield a mean warming of 2.4 degrees C according to the IPCC. This
seems an odd disconnect, if Monbiot is correct.
This discussion is not to detract from the urgency of the problem, or
suggest that action can be postponed or that 3 degrees C would be an
acceptable temperature. Much to the contrary, it suggests that we are
in deeper trouble than is commonly perceived, and that immediate
action is all the more necessary. We are already committed to roughly
2 degrees warming at equilibrium relative to pre-industrial levels,
and will probably end up with at least three degrees. No matter what
we do, climate change will have substantial impacts on our planet. If
we start later rather than sooner, these impacts will be exponentially
worse.
-Zeke Hausfather
MEM Candidate, '08
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
http://scienceblogs.com/stoat/2007/05/more_hot_air.php#comments
You may have seen that anyway, as you've commented on his blog
yourself.
I've got several comments:
1. If there was enough urgency, I think a great deal could be done to
cut emissions very rapidly. I've commented on this in the past in the
peak oil context:
http://heikoheiko.blogspot.com/2006/06/my-take-on-peak-oil-doomerism.html
Think of what the US say was willing to do in WWII. With that level of
willingness for sacrifice, emissions could be reduced by 90% plus
virtually overnight. Rather arguably the urgency isn't such, but if it
were, you'd find that outlawing driving and forced reallocation of
existing housing stock could be extremely effective.
2. Carbon dioxide sequestration via mineralisation seems to be
feasible at a cost of $100 per tonne.
http://www.ecn.nl/en/bkm/r-d-programme/environmental-risk-assessment/research-programmes/mineral-co2-sequestration/
I don't see why we couldn't drive emissions well below zero in a few
decades. It's far from a given that we'll still have emissions greater
than zero in 2050, let alone 2100.
3. We are already doing "geo-engineering" with aerosols, it's even
major geo-engineering as the forcing from tropospheric sulfate
aerosols is of a similar (though much more uncertain) magnitude as
CO2. Rather than using stratospheric aerosols to completely off-set
greenhouse gases, why not at least consider using them to (partially)
compensate for declining tropospheric aerosols?
4. I find demands for "action" in the generic somewhat frustrating. We
are "acting" already in many ways (eg the US and Europe have various
efficiency and renewables standards and support nuclear power to
varying degrees).
Because the word "action" doesn't contain any detail involving
anything difficult/unpopular (such as replacing all coal fired
generation with nuclear, or imposing gasoline taxes of $10 per gallon,
or a 400% tax on cars), this generic call sometimes seems like an
avoidance strategy, a cop-out, particularly when it's used by
governments. Eg, when European politicians decide on a 2C target and
say virtually nothing on how they think it'll get achieved ...
William M Connolley
On Sat, 30 Jun 2007, gerh...@aston.ac.uk wrote:
> 2. Carbon dioxide sequestration via mineralisation seems to be
> feasible at a cost of $100 per tonne.
> http://www.ecn.nl/en/bkm/r-d-programme/environmental-risk-assessment/research-programmes/mineral-co2-sequestration/
>
> I don't see why we couldn't drive emissions well below zero in a few
> decades. It's far from a given that we'll still have emissions greater
> than zero in 2050, let alone 2100.
I'm curious about this, because you treat it as just a matter of money. IT also
costs energy. And the version they use uses materials that would not be
available in a quantity to do everyones.
-W.
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Michael Tobis
At this point, the gap between what is necessary and what is possible
appears narrow enough that we should choose the tightest constraint
that might be feasible.
Logically, I think it makes most sense to target cumulative emissions,
rather than concentrations or global mean temperature change, both of
which have some associated uncertainty (though the focus on the latter
these days seems misguided; the carbon cycle uncertainties are a much
bigger deal at this point).
However, that's a hard concept to get across in public discussions. It
brings in all sorts of subtleties that obviously can be used to
confuse the issue and that aren't really well handled in public
discourse. So, it may be better to work backward from the tightest
constraints to what we hope those constraints might achieve; that
might well be a global mean temperature change because it's an easy
concept to understand.
The consequences of any of these constraints taken seriously would be similar.
The point is that the time for chitchat is over, and we need to get to
work. Picking a target that is probably going to be missed (say,
emissions probably leading to 2C) is the only way to motivate
sufficient effort to limit the actual outcome to not much more than
3C, which is already in risky territory.
mt
Zeke Hausfather
possible. Hell, cutting emissions 100 percent instantly is
theoretically possible. What bothers me is the public disconnect
between what the scientific community says is necessary (say, a global
50% emissions reduction relative to 1990 levels by 2050) and what is
politically feasible.
Al Gore puts it concisely when he argues that:
"The outer edge of the politically possible falls short of the inner
edge of the necessary."
Or as Thom Friedman over at the Times says,
"The whole Senate energy effort only reinforced my feelings that we're
in a green bubble - a festival of hot air by the news media, corporate
America and presidential candidates about green this and green that,
but, when it comes to actually doing something hard to bring about a
green revolution at scale - and if you don't have scale on this you
have nothing - we wimp out. Climate change is not a hoax. The hoax is
that we are really doing something about it."
A carbon tax of $100 a ton is not going to happen in the foreseeable
future. The only bill in congress I've seen with an actual carbon
price had an escape valve set at $10 a ton (e.g. was a tradable permit
system that limited potential price increases by allowing unlimited
emissions at $10 a ton when permit prices passed $10 a ton). Here in
India, where I am spending the summer researching climate policy and
CDM markets, no one is even willing to entertain the concept that
India itself might be subject to some sort of restrictions on carbon
emissions in the future; everyone thinks that binding restrictions
will be a province only of rich countries till well after 2012, and
are backing this expectation by real investments in projects to sell
emissions reductions to the EU ETS and U.S. voluntary markets.
Similarly, China has balked at the thought of capping emissions,
arguing that it would interfere with the imperatives of development
and poverty alleviation.
Even if, as many people expect, the U.S. passes a climate bill after
the 2008 presidential elections, it will likely be a simple
stabilization at 2000 levels by 2020 or something similarly weak. As
the AR4 WGIII report clearly shows, to achieve a stabilization target
without imposing unacceptably high costs requires a gradual and
accelerating reduction of emissions (a ramping up of policy) starting
with a cap on global emissions. The longer we delay, the less likely
we will be to achieve these targets.
Also, I doubt the U.S. or any country will ever be willing to put
resources on par with a war mobilization to combat climate change.
There is no Pearl Harbor of climate change, no ozone hole to shock us
into action. By the time gradual impacts accumulate to the point where
policymakers and the public begin to truely grasp the scope of the
problem, it will be to late to avoid many unfortunate effects
(especially given the thermal inertia of the Earth's climate). Even
when the scope of the changes to the global economy necessary to solve
the problem are widely recognized, key nations will have little
incentive to do anything early. The U.S., parts of Europe, Canada,
Japan, and other countries all may benefit with moderate (< 2 degrees
C) warming. Its tough to be optimistic when those most responsible for
the problem are among those least effected by its impacts (in
economics, a classic externality).
Gareth
> Here in
> India, where I am spending the summer researching climate policy and
> CDM markets, no one is even willing to entertain the concept that
> India itself might be subject to some sort of restrictions on carbon
> emissions in the future
India has quite explicitly told the G8 countries that they will only
entertain "cap and converge" solutions, as I noted <a href="http://hot-
topic.co.nz/2007/06/14/india-to-g8-the-partys-over/">here</a> a while
ago. This implies that the US, Europe and the rest of the developed
world will have to make steep cuts sooner, while allowing India and
China "room" to grow. Since cap and converge means agreeing on an
acceptable global level of emissions at some point in the future
(typically 2050), everyone has an incentive to agree to a large cap.
Big slices of a big pie being cheaper and less painful than small
slices of a small pie. The art of the possible trumps good science.
> Also, I doubt the U.S. or any country will ever be willing to put
> resources on par with a war mobilization to combat climate change.
> There is no Pearl Harbor of climate change, no ozone hole to shock us
> into action.
I suspect that a dramatic climate change event* is probably the only
way we'll ever get aggressive action on emissions reductions. The
irony, of course, is that the built-in lag in the system virtually
guarantees that when we get one it'll be too late to avoid much, much
more.
* What could that be? I don't agree with your characterisation of the
US, Europe and Japan as being more likely to benefit with modest
warming. Repeated 2003-style summer heatwaves in Europe, a marked
intensification in rainfall leading to damaging flooding (anywhere),
(even more) rapid reductions in summer sea ice in the Arctic or more
ice-shelf disintegration in the Antarctic, another bad hurricane
season, or a typhoon scoring a direct hit on Shanghai - all of these
things could be enough to stiffen the geopolitical sinews enough to
get serious action. Gradual change might be better for us all in the
short term, but dramatic change might be necessary to get action that
prevents the worst long term impacts. It remains to be seen what that
might mean in human terms.
llewelly
[snip]
> I suspect that a dramatic climate change event* is probably the only
> way we'll ever get aggressive action on emissions reductions. The
> irony, of course, is that the built-in lag in the system virtually
> guarantees that when we get one it'll be too late to avoid much, much
> more.
>
> * What could that be? I don't agree with your characterisation of the
> US, Europe and Japan as being more likely to benefit with modest
> warming. Repeated 2003-style summer heatwaves in Europe, a marked
> intensification in rainfall leading to damaging flooding (anywhere),
> (even more) rapid reductions in summer sea ice in the Arctic or more
> ice-shelf disintegration in the Antarctic, another bad hurricane
> season, or a typhoon scoring a direct hit on Shanghai - all of these
> things could be enough to stiffen the geopolitical sinews enough to
> get serious action. Gradual change might be better for us all in the
> short term, but dramatic change might be necessary to get action that
> prevents the worst long term impacts. It remains to be seen what that
> might mean in human terms.
You describe weather extremes. The ability of science to attribute
weather extremes is quite limited. This is particularly true of
tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes). See for example RC on the
attribution of hurricanes to global warming:
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=181
(If you haven't read it already.)
With each extreme event, the confidence that a higher frequency of
extreme events increases only by a tiny amount. There is no support
for a clear demarcation beyond which global warming is clearly the
cause of a disaster or a group disasters. We're slowly boiling a pot
of water, and waiting for frogs to jump out. In real life (outside of
analogies), frogs do jump out, but they don't have to cope with a 100
year delay between the jump, and actually getting out of the pot.
We're left hoping for a good decision driven by a misunderstanding of
the relationship between climate change and extreme weather.
Gareth
> You describe weather extremes.
Of course. Those are the things that will concentrate the minds of
politicians
It's a bit like erosion on my small farm. Every day, little bits of
land get washed or blown away, but you only really notice when heavy
rain comes along and a few metres of paddock disappear into the river.
When do I plan erosion control? After a flood...
Most aspects of climate change are (if we're lucky) relatively slow
changes in terms of human perceptions (though fast in terms of
biological impact), so it will be the impact of extreme events that
catches the attention.
> We're left hoping for a good decision driven by a misunderstanding of
> the relationship between climate change and extreme weather.
It's only a misunderstanding if the frequency of extreme events
doesn't change by much. With respect to the 2003 European heatwave, it
will be a normal summer in 20-30 years. Not an extreme event...
James Annan
>> We're left hoping for a good decision driven by a misunderstanding of
>> the relationship between climate change and extreme weather.
>
> It's only a misunderstanding if the frequency of extreme events
> doesn't change by much. With respect to the 2003 European heatwave, it
> will be a normal summer in 20-30 years. Not an extreme event...
Indeed, it will be normal because you will be used to it (more or less).
And it will still be nowhere near as hot as a current Tokyo summer,
that's for sure!
The summer death toll from hot extremes in the UK has been falling even
as the temperatures have been rising. (I only focus on the UK by virtue
of having seen figures for it.) That doesn't stop people extrapolating
out to future carnage, even before the projected temperature gets
anywhere close to what is typical in Tokyo.
James
Zeke Hausfather
Gore's depictions of flooding cities in his film, coupled with a
hypothetical description of hundreds of millions of refugees and a
comparison to Katrina. Sure, half of Bangladesh deluged would create
refugees, but it would likely be a slow process of population movement
as the seas rise a few mm per year.
Likewise, we can expect European and other countries to adapt by
purchasing more air conditioning in response to more frequent heat
waves (and thus creating an interesting feedback of higher energy use
and more associated emissions). Its only in the countries that lack
the potential to significantly adapt to the effects of climate change
where the gradual worsening effects will have the greatest toll.
Michael Tobis
expect half the population of Bangladesh to go? The other half of
Bangladesh? Elsewhere?
Thing two: It is true that more success at adaptation reduces the
urgency of mitigation but it in no way removes its necessity. The
atmospheric composition must and will eventually restabilize. Whether
civilization is merely inconvenienced or is decimated or is
obliterated in the process is the moral question. Too much early
weight on adaptation increases the difficulties and risks of later
mitigation.
A friend recently told me, in a discussion of Texas's amazing water
control problems, "a dam is just a flood waiting to happen".
That all said, Zeke, thanks for your participation! I am looking
forward to hearing more of your perspective.
I mention one of your postings on my blog here:
http://initforthegold.blogspot.com/2007/07/environmental-economics-vs-ecological.html
mt
James Annan
> Thing one: your choice of Bangladesh is telling. Where exactly do you
> expect half the population of Bangladesh to go? The other half of
> Bangladesh? Elsewhere?
Where do you imagine half of Bangladesh's population went over the last
30 years, over which time the total population doubled?
> Thing two: It is true that more success at adaptation reduces the
> urgency of mitigation but it in no way removes its necessity. The
> atmospheric composition must and will eventually restabilize.
Actually, it may go up and down substantially. Your point about the
long-run growth rate being zero is true but trite: the long-run growth
rate being zero tells us nothing whatsoever about any century-scale (or
longer) changes, either actual or desirable.
> Whether
> civilization is merely inconvenienced or is decimated or is
> obliterated in the process is the moral question.
I can only repeat the advice I gave to someone last night at a party,
who was wondering how concerned he should be about climate change:
Don't believe everything you read in the Independent. In fact, don't
believe _anything_ there unless it is corroborated elsewhere.
FWIW, the two other climate scientists present concurred.
James
Zeke Hausfather
would be anything but a disaster. Rather, I was just pointing out that
the "refugee crisis" expected from sea level rise will likely be
different from what we commonly perceive as a refugee crisis, barring
Hansen et al.'s more dire projections proving correct (which they may
well, though I'm waiting for more evidence on the subject to take a
personal position). If Bangladesh is flooded over the course of, say,
200-300 years, it may resemble more of a demographic shift, perhaps
resulting in more crowding in other areas of Bangladesh. But there
will not be millions of people who are suddenly homeless.
You are correct in pointing out that adaptation shouldn't distract us
too much from the fundamental need for mitigation, especially as
worsening effects of climate change make adaptation more difficult
over time (e.g. its easier to adapt to a rise from 1 to 2 degrees over
current temperatures than 4 to 5).
Also, thanks for the link.
-Zeke
On Jul 5, 8:23 pm, "Michael Tobis" <mto...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Thing one: your choice of Bangladesh is telling. Where exactly do you
> expect half the population of Bangladesh to go? The other half of
> Bangladesh? Elsewhere?
>
> Thing two: It is true that more success at adaptation reduces the
> urgency of mitigation but it in no way removes its necessity. The
> atmospheric composition must and will eventually restabilize. Whether
> civilization is merely inconvenienced or is decimated or is
> obliterated in the process is the moral question. Too much early
> weight on adaptation increases the difficulties and risks of later
> mitigation.
>
> A friend recently told me, in a discussion of Texas's amazing water
> control problems, "a dam is just a flood waiting to happen".
>
> That all said, Zeke, thanks for your participation! I am looking
> forward to hearing more of your perspective.
>
> I mention one of your postings on my blog here:
>
> http://initforthegold.blogspot.com/2007/07/environmental-economics-vs...
>
> mt
>
Tom Adams
I spent last week vacationing in Florida. I was at a party with a
number of Republicans and the subject of global warming came up. To
my surprise, nobody expressed the typical half-baked denier opinion.
I think times are a changing. Crist, the Republican governor fo
Florida, has blocked one coal-fired plant and he blocked the expansion
of another that the greens were not even lobbying about.
Florida had a damaging hurricane season in 2004, vast insurance
cancellations/hikes, no hurricanes in 2005 leading to a current 12-
inch rainfall deficit. Florida needs lots of milder rainy hurricanes/
storms and milder temps and that is not what Gaia seems to be offering
these days. I think this is causing a sea-change in opinion.
Tom Adams
> We often have a bad habit of ignoring adaptation. Case in point is
> Gore's depictions of flooding cities in his film, coupled with a
> hypothetical description of hundreds of millions of refugees and a
> comparison to Katrina. Sure, half of Bangladesh deluged would create
> refugees, but it would likely be a slow process of population movement
> as the seas rise a few mm per year.
I would question that. I'd think the process would be flood/storm
driven, driven by extreme events. Like New Orleans, Galvaston, etc.
Isn't that the historical norm? And maybe El Nino causes a cycle in
storms and sea level on that coast.
>
> Likewise, we can expect European and other countries to adapt by
> purchasing more air conditioning in response to more frequent heat
> waves (and thus creating an interesting feedback of higher energy use
> and more associated emissions). Its only in the countries that lack
> the potential to significantly adapt to the effects of climate change
> where the gradual worsening effects will have the greatest toll.
>
> On Jul 5, 11:24 am, James Annan <james.an...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Gareth wrote:
> > >> We're left hoping for a good decision driven by a misunderstanding of
> > >> the relationship between climate change and extreme weather.
>
> > > It's only a misunderstanding if the frequency of extreme events
> > > doesn't change by much. With respect to the 2003 European heatwave, it
> > > will be a normal summer in 20-30 years. Not an extreme event...
>
> > Indeed, it will be normal because you will be used to it (more or less).
> > And it will still be nowhere near as hot as a current Tokyo summer,
> > that's for sure!
>
> > The summer death toll from hot extremes in the UK has been falling even
> > as the temperatures have been rising. (I only focus on the UK by virtue
> > of having seen figures for it.) That doesn't stop people extrapolating
> > out to future carnage, even before the projected temperature gets
> > anywhere close to what is typical in Tokyo.
>
> > James- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
> costs energy. And the version they use uses materials that would not be
> available in a quantity to do everyones.
"They" incidentally are my current employer in the Netherlands (ECN,
the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands; and the usual stuff
applies, I am not talking for them, anything I say here is my own
private opinion expressed in my spare time). I've spent a little time
talking to Wolter about his thesis. He doesn't think the energy
penalty of 20-30% is the main problem at the moment. All that means is
that for a coal fired power plant some more coal needs to be dug out
with the attendant externalities of that. What's the big issue at the
moment is indeed the cost. Mineralisation is more expensive than other
options.
Mineralisation is a beautiful concept, because it reflects the way CO2
is being controlled over millions of years by nature. It is
unquestionably safe, and 99.9% or something like that of the world's
CO2 is already locked up in that way. And there is no limit on storage
capacity. There is no question that all of the world's fossil fuels
could be stored in minerals. Steel slag is a bit cheaper to use,
because it's a waste product available at 0 cost, but the 102 Euro
estimate isn't for steel slag, but for natural mineral deposits.
Wolter also mentioned that it has been proposed to grind up mountains
to increase the surface area available for reaction, and to speed up
natural weathering, interesting concept, but he didn't go into any
detail.
You'll know that I've been arguing for a fair while that zero
emissions doesn't have to be the end point. I now think that
mineralisation is another realistic option to make that happen. And
yes, at some stage that might mean having to dedicate some nuclear/
solar power plants purely towards producing power for sequestration.
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
> possible. Hell, cutting emissions 100 percent instantly is
> theoretically possible. What bothers me is the public disconnect
> between what the scientific community says is necessary (say, a global
> 50% emissions reduction relative to 1990 levels by 2050) and what is
> politically feasible.
Economic cost-benefit analyses don't say that 50% is optimal, let
alone "necessary". And what does that word mean anyway? To me it seems
that this comes from scientists who see say species loss or long term
sea level rise as possible problems, then argue from that that some
temperature target should be met, and then work out what emissions
reduction should follow, often it seems to me, on the premise that
fossil fuel emissions should be reduced in any case and that therefore
there is no real cost, or not much of one.
Now, if "necessary" had some real teeth, why shouldn't WWII type
mobilisation be appropriate?
To me it seems that the current response is broadly reasonable, and
that if there is a disconnect, it's between rhetoric about what should
be done, and what people really believe should be done. And the reason
there isn't WWII type mobilisation isn't that climate change is
gradual, or that people can't look ahead properly. I am very dubious
that these explanations make much sense. I think it's rather simple.
People haven't been convinced that the issue is sufficiently serious
to require WWII mobilisation type of attention, or anything coming
vaguely close to it.
CobblyWorlds
I sense a massive disconnect between the reality of most people's
lives and the discussions going on in the media and forums like this.
I'm not a climate scientist. I was a sceptic until several years ago
when I addressed my doubts by studying, I've been reading the science
since. I work in an office in the UK (nothing scientific - just a
callcentre backoffice), and those people I know only know GW as
something that's on TV before they change channel to watch something
more interesting - like Big Brother.
Before we even get to the issue of persuading the Chinese and Indian
populations (together with millions elswhere) that they need to stop
aspiring to the sort of carbon intensive energy wasteful lives we in
the "developed" world currently live. We need to persuade people in
countries like the UK that we need to change the way we live.
Here in the UK from what I see the majority of people want: more
holidays a year in warmer countries, patio heaters, less road traffic
so they can drive more with more ease, greater choice of goods and
produce from around the world, cheaper goods and produce from around
the world.
In short they want what they already have, and more, and they want it
now.
Out of everyone I know, one person has given up driving, started
walking, reduced electricity consumption, etc etc. That one person is
me. Since I ditched my scepticism on GW most people I know now live
further from work, earn more, buy more goods from abroad and indulge
in luxuries like Patio heaters. People think nothing of flying to
European Cities for the weekend - the average seems to be 2 holidays
abroad per year.
If our emissions have stabilised in the UK, as far as I can see it's
mainly because our heavy industry has died and we now import from
other countries, like China.
I have read this thread, but I don't think the idea of even a global
stabilisation of emissions growth rate is a realistically attainable
prospect.
And as we're adaptable enough for the wealthy consumers to side-step
even the worst reasonably forseeable impacts of climate change, short
of cracking fusion, I think we'll stride through 2xCO2 and beyond. The
US may have undergone massive economies during WWII, but Germany also
managed to source up to half of it's oil needs from coal, and there's
more than enough of that to follow BAU emissions throughout this
century. Furthermore in terms of EROEI surely coal is the cheapest bet
for an alternative base energy supply as gas/oil deplete.
As for making people change the way they live, they need to vote for
it first. And as a Lovelock style cataclysm seems highly unlikely, I
don't think they'll be motivated by any of the reasonably expected
consequences of GW.
Don Libby
From: "CobblyWorlds" <Cobbly...@btinternet.com>
Newsgroups: gmane.science.general.global-change
To: "globalchange" <global...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, July 22, 2007 10:53 AM
Subject: [Global Change: 1928] Re: Is a 2 degree target realistic?
>
> Before we even get to the issue of persuading the Chinese and Indian
> populations (together with millions elswhere) that they need to stop
> aspiring to the sort of carbon intensive energy wasteful lives we in
> the "developed" world currently live. We need to persuade people in
> countries like the UK that we need to change the way we live.
Why "change the way we live" rather than "change the amount of coal we
burn"? To start by saying we must do something as difficult or impossible
as "change the way we live" will delay progress even longer, so let's start
by saying we must do something relatively easy: "tax coal".
Do you think it will be easier or faster to persuade people to change the
way they live, or to persuade people to build new nuclear power stations
rather than new coal stations? Similarly, will it be easier or faster to
persuade India or China to build no new power stations than to build new
nuclear stations instead of new coal stations?
>
> century. Furthermore in terms of EROEI surely coal is the cheapest bet
> for an alternative base energy supply as gas/oil deplete.
That is why we must change the price of coal: vote to raise a carbon
emission tax and reinvest revenues in low-emission alternatives or CO2
sequestration facilities.
-dl
CobblyWorlds
> -dl- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
I'm not denying that it's worth making the effort, my reason for
stopping driving and changing the way I live is because it's the right
thing to do. I don't have kids - but I have nephews and I like the
Landscape of the Lake District and the Yorkshire Dales. It's all very
well and good people mumbling "well it's only change" but I like
what's there now - maybe that's what comes of hitting my 40s.
And I'm not denying we might be able to take the edge.
But even with something like taxing coal: We might take the edge off
the rate of emissions growth but will anything short of a change of
direction seriously attack emissions. And what about the shift towards
a global free market - will industry not just move to countries that
do not implement this tax? If we're talking a global tax - will it not
be negotiated down to a token level by virtue of the importance of
coal to India and China's plans for development. If Developing nations
are exempted would there not have to be taxation on imported goods, to
account for emissions exportation to low/no C tax economies?
I just don't think this is realistic, but I must admit to coming from
a free-market small-government political position (well I was before I
changed my mind on climate change - now I just don't know). So I see
you being faced with the sort of forces that bought the British
Chancellor to his knees on Black Wednesday and forced to leave the
Exchange Rate Mechanism. Global Markets are more powerful than then,
and energy is the keystone of our entire civilisation.
Hank Roberts
On Jul 24, 11:58 am, CobblyWorlds <Cobblywor...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>energy is the keystone of our entire civilisation.
Michael Tobis
What does Brin's article have to do with the claim to which you
register disagreement?
confusedly
mt