2C?
Tom Adams
boldface about having a 2C target:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2069395,00.html
The article incorrectly states that the CO2 level is 459ppm, but
perhaps he meant the current lowest realistic maximum.
Anyway, the politics of giving up on the 2C target are interesting.
I wonder if anyone has come up with a timeline for giving up on 3C,
4C, etc. as we continue without a serious treaty to set a cap.
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
target:
Energy Policy
Volume 35, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 424-432
Europe's long-term climate target: A critical evaluation
Abstract
The European Commission as a whole and a number of its Member States
individually have adopted a stringent long-term target for climate
policy, namely that the global mean temperature should not rise more
than 2 °C above pre-industrial times. This target is supported by
rather thin arguments, based on inadequate methods, sloppy reasoning,
and selective citation from a very narrow set of studies. In the
scientific literature on "dangerous interference with the climate
system", most studies discuss either methodological issues, or
carefully lay out the arguments for or against a particular target.
These studies do not make specific recommendations, with the exception
of cost-benefit analyses, which unanimously argue for less stringent
policy targets. However, there are also a few "scientific" studies
that recommend a target without supporting argumentation. Overall, the
2 °C target of the EU seems unfounded.
Michael Tobis
greater than 0.1 C .
How should we narrow it down in the absence of perfect information?
I would say a 10% chance of severe disruptions is about as risky as we
should get. Nobody would construct a bridge with a 10% chance of
severe injury to anyone crossing it. Yet here we are at least flirting
with that sort of thing for the entire planet.
I think at 2 C we are well above 10% chance of severe consequences,
but the definition of "severity" is also, admittedly, unclear.
Still, some serious target must be chosen and stuck to, and that many
serious people think 2 C is already a very big deal.
Leaving aside all the other concerns, if we ever do control climate
our first objective would surely be to have a stable sea level, and 2
C is a long way from sea level stability.
mt
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
> perhaps he meant the current lowest realistic maximum.
Actually, he says the CO2 equivalent GHG levels are 459 ppm.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/6620909.stm
As happens, I wrote an email to Richard Black, advising him of his
"minor error" and that CO2 concentrations weren't above 400 ppm, and
got a one liner reply that it was for carbon dioxide equivalent ...
Strangely though, Moniot's number differs from Richard Black's number,
and a bit of googling and looking around the IPCC website led me
nowhere.
James Annan
>> Overall, the
>> 2 °C target of the EU seems unfounded.
Sounds about right to me.
Michael Tobis wrote:
> Let us begin by agreeing that the target must be less than 85 C and
> greater than 0.1 C .
No, let us begin by asking what is the purpose of a "target" (or even
"limit")?
> I would say a 10% chance of severe disruptions is about as risky as we
> should get. Nobody would construct a bridge with a 10% chance of
> severe injury to anyone crossing it. Yet here we are at least flirting
> with that sort of thing for the entire planet.
Um, people drive cars, and the lifetime probability of a crash is surely
above the 10% mark. Traffic crashes are the largest cause of death among
young adult males in the UK for certain, and probably much of the rest
of the world. Of course, it is disproportionately the poor who suffer.
The problem is especially grave in less developed countries.
Just a bit of context...
James
Michael Tobis
a change larger than 85 C in the global mean if it should seem
inclined to head that way?
I would have thought "we'd better keep the ocean from boiling" would
be something reasonable people could agree upon.
mt
James Annan
> Are you suggesting that the economy should not be constrained to avoid
> a change larger than 85 C in the global mean if it should seem
> inclined to head that way?
Since it's not going to happen, I think it is reasonable to ask what is
the purpose of such a "target" (or even "limit")? Is it just a
rhetorical device to steer the debate in a particular direction? Would
you support Govt action to set this "limit"?
Having just read Stoat's new post, I should also raise again the
question of whether any serious attempt to restrict carbon emissions
could potentially result in "dangerous interference" with the global
economy.
Returning to the "bridge" analogy, if there was a trivial way of
building a better bridge at negligible cost, then of course it would be
sensible to do it. But in the real world, where resources are limited,
people _do_ build dodgy bridges in poor countries. Even in Japan, let
along Turkey, people fake earthquake resistance certification for their
buildings.
James
Michael Tobis
system, an artifact, every bit as bizarre as the idea that it is *not*
dangerous to interfere with the biosphere, at the very least an
astonishing and rare accident of nature.
I am, for now, rendered speechless by the conjunction of both ideas. I
will have to scratch my head a bit.
While I gather my wits I refer you to the Easter Islanders who appear
to have made a similar error. See the relevant chapters in Jared
Diamond's _Collapse_.
mt
On 5/15/07, James Annan <james...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
James Annan
> I find the idea that it is dangerous to interfere with the economic
> system, an artifact, every bit as bizarre as the idea that it is *not*
> dangerous to interfere with the biosphere, at the very least an
> astonishing and rare accident of nature.
The issue is not whether it IS dangerous to interfere with something
that is itself a human construct - such a suggestion would probably be
silly, since its mere existence is the result of much continuing
"interference" (OTOH, any particular course of action will benefit some
at the expense of others, so perhaps even this is dangerous interference
to some, but that makes the term rather vacuous). The issue is whether
it may be dangerous to interfere *in a particular manner*.
I hope that the fact that economic factors may severely ("dangerously")
impact on peoples' lives is not a matter for disagreement. Try going to
central Africa and tell the people there that the difference between
your life and theirs is just an artefact!
James
Michael Tobis
at least we are agreed so far. I agree that there are some economic
policies which are dangerous.
I am unconvinced that economic analysis as typically performed is
especially useful in the matter of sustainability. I think
sustainability is a goal, and that economics is a potentially useful
tool.
Regarding the 2 C, my intuition says it is very risky from sea level
rise alone. (Ocean acidification, hydrology, food security issues also
matter.)
Other people's intuitions disagree. While I am not sure what to do
about it, I would like you to acknowledge that there is some number
not two orders bigger than 2 C that would be a billion year disaster,
ask you how you would estimate it, and given such a number what you
would do about it.
I don't buy Stern's reasoning, and I think the WG II process produced
a useless mess. Nevertheless we need a target.
I really wish more engineers would think about economics from a
control systems point of view. To me, the contemporary economic system
obviously has the character of a defective control system, but I don't
seem able to convey this analogy very well. There are missing
feedbacks. In order to stabilize the system, the desired state must be
part of the optimization algorithm.
We desperately need constraints, and 2 C is the most stringent one we
have a good shot at. I think that is the necessary and sufficient
reason for 2 C.
mt
On 5/15/07, James Annan <james...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
Tom Adams
> Michael Tobis wrote:
> > Are you suggesting that the economy should not be constrained to avoid
> > a change larger than 85 C in the global mean if it should seem
> > inclined to head that way?
>
> Since it's not going to happen, I think it is reasonable to ask what is
> the purpose of such a "target" (or even "limit")? Is it just a
> rhetorical device to steer the debate in a particular direction? Would
> you support Govt action to set this "limit"?
No, because action at the mere govt level is futile. It will take a
treaty with the US, China, and India on board.
If China drafted a treaty, it would call for per capita limits and the
financial responsibilities would be allocated based on every molecule
of GHG pumped into the atmosphere since the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution.
>
> Having just read Stoat's new post, I should also raise again the
> question of whether any serious attempt to restrict carbon emissions
> could potentially result in "dangerous interference" with the global
> economy.
>
> Returning to the "bridge" analogy, if there was a trivial way of
> building a better bridge at negligible cost, then of course it would be
> sensible to do it. But in the real world, where resources are limited,
> people _do_ build dodgy bridges in poor countries. Even in Japan, let
> along Turkey, people fake earthquake resistance certification for their
> buildings.
>
> James
We don't seem to be able to justify much based on risk-benefit. So
what is driving the push for limits? Actually, all we really have
now is an attempt to appear to be doing something about global
warming, on the part of public officials and and some corporate
officials. The ROI is measured in PR, not safety. Comes down to
public horror I think, but I don't know if that will be enough to
sustain follow through.
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
Surely the amount of cost/inconvenience/lifestyle change etc..
involved has some bearing on whether we consider 0.1C the right target
or 6C. If all that was required was for the one big evil oil company
to get a patent on GHG free oil, and then that was the end of the
story and people could get on with their lives, I'd guess 0.1C and a
near immediate and complete ban on GHG's would have been agreed on 20
years ago without Hansen having to even bother showing up at that
congressional hearing in 1988.
Michael Tobis
I believe that the climate risks are already large enough that we
should choose the lowest target which makes the economic risk of
disaster small. I think this should be roughly expressed in terms of
peak CO2 concentration in practice, and that would appear to be in the
neighborhood of 500 ppmv, assuming the carbion cycle feedbacks don't
decide to bite with a vengeance.
I don't put much stock in the 2 C number except to say it is the best
estimate of the outcome of the lowest peak we can achieve, barring
some unforeseeable technological fix.
mt
Fergus
On 16 May, 20:29, "Michael Tobis" <mto...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Sure. I agree with that summary but don't see how to turn it into a number.
>
> I believe that the climate risks are already large enough that we
> should choose the lowest target which makes the economic risk of
> disaster small. I think this should be roughly expressed in terms of
> peak CO2 concentration in practice, and that would appear to be in the
> neighborhood of 500 ppmv, assuming the carbion cycle feedbacks don't
> decide to bite with a vengeance.
>
> I don't put much stock in the 2 C number except to say it is the best
> estimate of the outcome of the lowest peak we can achieve, barring
> some unforeseeable technological fix.
>
> mt
>
> On 5/16/07, gerha...@aston.ac.uk <gerha...@aston.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > How should we narrow it down in the absence of perfect information?
>
> > Surely the amount of cost/inconvenience/lifestyle change etc..
> > involved has some bearing on whether we consider 0.1C the right target
> > or 6C. If all that was required was for the one big evil oil company
> > to get a patent on GHG free oil, and then that was the end of the
> > story and people could get on with their lives, I'd guess 0.1C and a
> > near immediate and complete ban on GHG's would have been agreed on 20
> > years ago without Hansen having to even bother showing up at that
> > congressional hearing in 1988.
What you are effectively saying, then , Michael, is that, as we almost
certainly can't do any better than keeping GW down to 2C (from pre-
ind?), we may as well take this as a baseline target. Like wise the
the concentration, though between 450-500 ppm is probably achievable,
given the will. Sadly, the current fashion is for 550 ppm; 2x CO2, o
it looks like we are, via our representatives, currently aiming for a
3C rise.
Michael Tobis
Yep.
</laconic>
mt
James Annan
>
> What you are effectively saying, then , Michael, is that, as we almost
> certainly can't do any better than keeping GW down to 2C (from pre-
> ind?), we may as well take this as a baseline target. Like wise the
> the concentration, though between 450-500 ppm is probably achievable,
> given the will. Sadly, the current fashion is for 550 ppm; 2x CO2, o
> it looks like we are, via our representatives, currently aiming for a
> 3C rise.
We don't seem to be aiming for any stabilisation as far as I can see.
2C seems like motherhood and apple pie-in-the-sky, frankly - especially
if it really means 2C above pre-industrial rather than 2C above 1990 or
the present. It fulfils the attractive function of enabling usually
understated climate scientists to use words like "dangerous" in their
oh-so-dry scientific papers, but that's about it. IMO it functions more
as a thought-stopping rhetorical device than an aid to scientific
understanding.
James
James Annan
> Sure. I agree with that summary but don't see how to turn it into a number.
>
> I believe that the climate risks are already large enough that we
> should choose the lowest target which makes the economic risk of
> disaster small.
Are you referring to the "disaster" of AGW or the "disaster" of cutting
emissions?
> I think this should be roughly expressed in terms of
> peak CO2 concentration in practice, and that would appear to be in the
> neighborhood of 500 ppmv, assuming the carbion cycle feedbacks don't
> decide to bite with a vengeance.
>
> I don't put much stock in the 2 C number except to say it is the best
> estimate of the outcome of the lowest peak we can achieve, barring
> some unforeseeable technological fix.
I think the problem is best considered as one of (continuous and
adaptive) optimisation, rather than "minimise emissions at all costs".
Furthermore, although it is sensible to bear in mind the long-term
outcome, I'm not convinced that the best approach is to build a strategy
around a "target" CO2 level in 2100-2150.
James
Michael Tobis
> Michael Tobis wrote:
> > Sure. I agree with that summary but don't see how to turn it into a number.
>
> > I believe that the climate risks are already large enough that we
> > should choose the lowest target which makes the economic risk of
> > disaster small.
>
> Are you referring to the "disaster" of AGW or the "disaster" of cutting
> emissions?
Sorry, I could have been clearer by swapping two words: We should
choose the lowest CO2 target which makes the risk of economic disaster
small.
Admittedly this is a crude constraint, probably insufficient to drive
a formal optimization.
That said, I think the name of the game is disaster avoidance, not
cost avoidance. We are going to incur some costs. Our objective should
be stated in terms of sustainability; we want to avoid the largest and/
or most abrupt declines in well-being.
> > I think this should be roughly expressed in terms of
> > peak CO2 concentration in practice, and that would appear to be in the
> > neighborhood of 500 ppmv, assuming the carbion cycle feedbacks don't
> > decide to bite with a vengeance.
>
> > I don't put much stock in the 2 C number except to say it is the best
> > estimate of the outcome of the lowest peak we can achieve, barring
> > some unforeseeable technological fix.
>
> I think the problem is best considered as one of (continuous and
> adaptive) optimisation, rather than "minimise emissions at all costs".
I agree in principle. A couple of points are relevant, which makes
your statement nearly equivalent to mine, in my view.
> Furthermore, although it is sensible to bear in mind the long-term
> outcome, I'm not convinced that the best approach is to build a strategy
> around a "target" CO2 level in 2100-2150.
The general principle is sound, but I think there is good reason in
the case of carbon accumulation to implement a long-range policy on
current evidence.
First of all, policy is a very blunt instrument, not an ensemble
Kalman filter. (Most readers will not even know what I am talking
about...) The point is that the optimization has to be performed in an
environment where the grasp of statistical methods is very weak. I
think the public understands probability better than they are given
credit for. Most people can play poker passably well. However,
adaptive optimization doesn't really map onto games of chance very
well, and it's a tall order to implement such a thing using the
mechanisms we have. As a consequence, the optimization will have to be
performed offline and passed as a recommendation to the policy sector.
This can be done adaptively, but the adaptation will not be
instantaneous. In fact, policy will necessarily match the best advice
of a few years previous.
The effect of irresponsible denialists and irresponsible alarmists
alike is to inject noise into the observation system, which means the
response of the controller will continue to be especially sluggish. In
a sense, the more public attention there is to the subject, the less
effective the communication of genuine expertise will be, and the less
responsive the policy sector, viewed as a control system, will be to
new input.
We aren't running entirely open loop, but for present purposes we
might as well be. This is why setting an explicit set of constraints
on CO emissions (very much in the spirit of engineering tolerances:
not to exceed a certain rate, or a certain maximum, to asymptote to
within a certain range of a certain final value...) is sensible.
Secondly, the idea that no constraints whatsoever, surely the easiest
outcome for the policy sector to achieve, constitutes "conservatism"
has been successfully promulgated by the more successful branch of
noisemakers. Consequently, the policy is currently very far from the
optimum that a sensible control system for a sensibly controlled plant
would achieve. If our behavior were middling-muddling, we could talk
about the sort of fine-tuning you imply.
At the moment, though, after twenty years of ignoring advice, we have
moved from a relatively manageable problem to a rather serious one,
and show every sign of moving to a range where the risk of cataclysmic
catastrophe is not negligible. We need to overcome a systematic bias
that has been built into policy. The possibility of historically
unprecedented abrupt global decline is what needs to drive the
discussion, and the failure to account for it means that vigorous
action is required.
It is, of course, no good avoiding a CO2-driven catastrophe by
creating an economics-driven catastrophe. There are other horsemen of
the apocalypse waiting in the wings as well. The problem is that there
is a new horseman on the scene, and it is past time to start giving
him his due. The longer we delay, the narrower the chance of keeping
the one at bay without leaving openings for the others.
mt
Eric Swanson
Michael Tobis wrote:
I wish things were actually as rational as you suggest. Al Gore
(whether you like his movie or not) has a new commentary on the
"control" side of things. Here's a link to an excerpt:
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1622015,00.html
Gore may be faulted for portions of his presentation of the science
behind the global problem of climate change. In the political arena,
he is most certainly an expert. Thus, I think he must be taken
seriously when he comments about the political world with which we in
the U.S. are "controlled".
ES
--
Michael Tobis
I was suggesting that politics is **not ** very competent, so that
adaptive goal-setting is very difficult, the more so the more
prominent the issue. This fits in with the Benedick quote I offered in
the ozone thread. James is arguing for a more subtle approach, one
which might work in a competently run company but which would be very
difficult to achieve in a modern democracy.
I recall wondering on sci.env in the mid-90s when the last time one
member of any legislature ever changed the opinion of another during
the formal "debates". I'm sure President Gore knows more about the US
senate than I do, but the fact that nobody attends these speeches
doesn't surprise me a bit.
mt
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
> response of the controller will continue to be especially sluggish.
I am not sure why a temperature or concentration target would all by
itself change that dynamic, it might even be argued that because
governments like say Canada's are perfectly happy to have a lofty
target without having a policy to achieve it, the targets might
actually make the response more sluggish.
> It is, of course, no good avoiding a CO2-driven catastrophe by
> creating an economics-driven catastrophe. There are other horsemen of
> the apocalypse waiting in the wings as well.
Some people argue that there can't be an economics driven catastrophe,
because renewables and efficiency are cheap enough already that a
switch over a few decades would only mean slower growth.
That's fine, except in so far as it's not just eco-systems that are
complex and hard to predict, human society is also. I have to think of
the fuel protests in Britain a few years ago, which surprised me at
the time.
If the burdens are felt to be distributed unfairly, there may be a
violent backlash, and a fair distribution of the burden isn't
something easily negotiated.
Michael Tobis
>
> the
> > response of the controller will continue to be especially sluggish.
>
> I am not sure why a temperature or concentration target would all by
> itself change that dynamic, it might even be argued that because
> governments like say Canada's are perfectly happy to have a lofty
> target without having a policy to achieve it, the targets might
> actually make the response more sluggish.
Good point, but only reinforcing my argument to James that we must
accept a solution that is far from optimal.
> > It is, of course, no good avoiding a CO2-driven catastrophe by
> > creating an economics-driven catastrophe. There are other horsemen of
> > the apocalypse waiting in the wings as well.
>
> Some people argue that there can't be an economics driven catastrophe,
> because renewables and efficiency are cheap enough already that a
> switch over a few decades would only mean slower growth.
I don't think many people argue that.
Many people believe that there is no necessity of an economics driven
catastrophe, which is different.
I don't think it's possible to argue that there is no possibility of
an economic catastrophe for a sufficiently incompetent economic
policy. The issue is how difficult it is to arrive at a policy that
threads the needle. In my estimate, the needle gets narrower every
year, so it gets harder the longer we delay.
The alternative point of view is that our increasing skills and wealth
suggest delaying until some later date. The problem with this argument
as usually presented is that no way of detecting the last possible
minute to take action so as to probably avoid all catastrophes is
proposed.
There is no informed view of the situation wherein policy inaction
does not with very high likelihood reach a moment where it is too late
to avoid catastrophe. I would call the likelihood well over 90% but
even if it is over 10% it calls for mitigation.
I am of the intuitive opinion that we probably have not passed that
moment but that its arrival is quite soon given the lags in political
and industrial systems as well as in the climate response.
Logically rather than intuitively, I would say that the intuition
expressed above, in agreement with no less than Jim Hanson, is
difficult to prove but more importantly it is difficult to exclude.
Because estimating that moment is difficult and because optimizing
policy is also difficult, vigorous action now is required to avoid
significant probability of a catastrophe later.
mt
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
> (whether you like his movie or not) has a new commentary on the
> "control" side of things. Here's a link to an excerpt:
>
> http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1622015,00.html
Maybe Al Gore is romanticising the past a bit too much. The whole
point of representative democracy was that direct democracy was not
only technically impossible, but people weren't sufficiently informed
to make decisions for themselves. Not unreasonable, particularly at
the time with 90% of Americans subsistence farmers and analphabets.
That's why their democratic input was and still is in fact reduced to
selecting representatives rather than voting in frequent referenda on
major issues.
And I don't buy the idea that television is responsible for a recent
reduction in the public's grasp of reality and reason. The evidence
that there has been any such decline is awfully anecdotal and does not
square with a number of trends, eg:
http://politicalarithmetik.blogspot.com/2007/02/would-you-vote-for-fill-in-blank-for.html
In 1960, only 40% of the public were willing to vote for a black
President. There's been a pretty steady rise, and now it's over 95%.
Was that percentage in 1960 due to the public being so open to reason
and so well informed by the independent print media?
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
What do you make of John Quiggin's comment over on Stoat:
--------------
http://scienceblogs.com/stoat/2007/05/help_me_here_defining_dangerou.php#c438132
"Could we rule out the risk of economic collapse if we restricted out
CO2 emissions (this is, I think, from JA)."
Absolutely. ...
--------------
Don Libby
From: "Michael Tobis" <mto...@gmail.com>
Newsgroups: gmane.science.general.global-change
To: <global...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 10:04 AM
Subject: [Global Change: 1590] Re: 2C?
>
> On 5/20/07, gerh...@aston.ac.uk <gerh...@aston.ac.uk> wrote:
>> governments like say Canada's are perfectly happy to have a lofty
>> target without having a policy to achieve it, the targets might
>> actually make the response more sluggish.
>
> Good point, but only reinforcing my argument to James that we must
> accept a solution that is far from optimal.
> Because estimating that moment is difficult and because optimizing
> policy is also difficult, vigorous action now is required to avoid
> significant probability of a catastrophe later.
>
> mt
>
While we might agree that vigorous action is required sooner rather than
later, I would suggest that rather than picking a target & time-table, the
probability of successfully achieving stabilization may be increased by
choosing a path of least resistance. To paraphrase Gerhaus, put an
achievement policy in place rather than set a lofty goal.
A simple analogy may help: suppose we are rolling down the road to
catastrophe. To change direction, we may set a goal aloft, on top of a
peak, and then apply whatever force is required to roll our globe uphill to
reach the peak. An alternative achievement policy would be to lower the
terrain in the direction of the goal and allow the globe to roll
effortlessly in the direction of the goal.
By changing the political conditions under which economic decisions are
made, the economic engine can be steered toward the goal. In the energy
production sector this might play out by lowering the cost of non-fossil
alternatives relative to fossil fuels, by imposing a carbon tax, for
example. Decision-makers would then tilt power-production infrastructure
development in the direction of low GHG-emitting alternatives and get us
rolling in the direction of stabilization, without the need to set explicit
allowable emission limits.
Picking a goal of 2C or, a particular GHG concentration like 2x, while
necessary in a general sense to indicate change is desired, is not necessary
for policy formation or action. If it were, then potential delays would
arise from arguing over where to draw the line and how precisely it is to be
measured and what penalties are to be imposed for non-compliance, and what
global law enforcement agency will regulate emissions, punish wrongdoers,
etc. etc. This kind of argument occupied (some might say "wasted") much of
the Kyoto negotiators' time.
I think that to get policy tilting in the right direction, for now it is
sufficient to gesture vaguely in the direction of "stabilization" without
being too particular about what level of stabilization must be achieved, or
when.
-dl
Michael Tobis
major pitfalls.
I am reminded of the early happy reports from post-Katrina New Orleans
that gleefully announced "the levee is only broken in a couple of
spots". Excellent.
We don't get half marks for avoiding a climate crisis at the cost of
an economic crisis, or vice versa.
On 5/20/07, gerh...@aston.ac.uk <gerh...@aston.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > I don't think many people argue that.
>
> What do you make of John Quiggin's comment over on Stoat:
>> "Could we rule out the risk of economic collapse if we restricted out
>> CO2 emissions (this is, I think, from JA)."
>
> Absolutely. ...
As a response to ""Could we rule out the risk of economic collapse if
we restricted out CO2 emissions" an affirmative response is not as
strong a claim as "there is no possibility of an economics driven
catastrophe". It can be read as a claim that a reasonable policy
exists, not that no unreasonable policy exists.
That said and even so, I acknowledge that Quiggin seems to be making a
bizarrely overconfident claim.
As you know, I fail to see the applicability of that way of thinking,
but even within those terms it seems incoherent at first blush. I
would call it a muddle of a muddle.
I don't have any prior idea who John Quiggin is, and I suggest and
hope he does not represent "many people". I see there is a John
Quiggin who represents himself as the Krugman of the antipodes, but I
have not seen Krugman represent himself as the Quiggin of the eastern
seaboard.
It is certainly possible to make great misery by bad economic policy,
whether energy-related or not. It's pretty disconcerting to see
someone who is apparently an economist claiming otherwise.
This only increases my concern that we don't have much of an economic
theory to base our actions on, and that we have to rethink what we
know about how economics works.
mt
William M Connolley
>> Some people argue that there can't be an economics driven catastrophe,
>> because renewables and efficiency are cheap enough already that a
>> switch over a few decades would only mean slower growth.
>
> I don't think many people argue that.
John Quiggin does:
http://scienceblogs.com/stoat/2007/05/help_me_here_defining_dangerou.php#comment-438132
----
"Could we rule out the risk of economic collapse if we restricted out CO2
emissions (this is, I think, from JA)."
Absolutely. Here's an easy way of getting an upper bound on the costs. Suppose
we made a collective decision to replace all fossil fuels with solar (the most
expensive of the renewables, but essentially unlimited in supply) by 2050, and
had no technological progress, improvements in energy efficiency etc. Allowing
for costs of storage and so on, solar might cost four times as much as the
fossil fuel alternative. Since energy is about 5 per cent of output value, this
would reduce income by 20 per cent.
If the average growth rate to 2050 under BAU, this would reduce it to 1 per
cent; a substantial slowdown, but still growth rather than decline, let alone
collapse.
Of course, this upper bound is way in excess of a realistic estimate. With a
quadrupling of price, demand would certainly decline by at least 50 per cent,
bringing the cost down to 10 per cent of income. Then there would be induced
innovation and so on.
And that's for complete elimination of fossil fuel consumption, which no-one is
proposing. A cut by 50 per cent relative to BAU would be less than half as
expensive by the low-hanging fruit principle. So, even with highly pessimistic
assumptions, it's almost impossible to get a cost estimate higher than 5 per
cent of income.
----
-W.
William M Connolley | w...@bas.ac.uk | http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/met/wmc/
Climate Modeller, British Antarctic Survey | 07985 935400
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James Annan
> On Sun, 20 May 2007, Michael Tobis wrote:
>>> Some people argue that there can't be an economics driven catastrophe,
>>> because renewables and efficiency are cheap enough already that a
>>> switch over a few decades would only mean slower growth.
>> I don't think many people argue that.
>
> John Quiggin does:
>
> http://scienceblogs.com/stoat/2007/05/help_me_here_defining_dangerou.php#comment-438132
>
> ----
> "Could we rule out the risk of economic collapse if we restricted out CO2
> emissions (this is, I think, from JA)."
>
> Absolutely. Here's an easy way of getting an upper bound on the costs.
First, although I can't find the original, I'm pretty sure that when I
originally posed that question I quite deliberately used exactly the
same language as had been used to talk about the risk of harm due to
climate change. Eg, when people talk about how we cannot "rule out" a
particular level of (economic) damage from AGW, I was asking if we could
"rule out" a similar level of economic harm from mitigation required to
avoid the AGW damage.
William's use of "economic collapse" perhaps a little out of context
gave JQ the opportunity to address a straw man, rather than the real
question. His "upper bound" is right at (I think most would say beyond)
the very top end of plausible estimates of the cost of AGW.
Secondly, his answer seems rather simplistic to me, with its explicit
assumption that no (economic) action could possibly have consequences
greater than the immediate direct financial cost.
Don't forget, I'm not talking about the expected cost, or likely cost,
but the _possibility_ of a high cost.
There are those who would argue that we shouldn't be talking purely
about cost. There is undoubtedly some validity to that point, but it's
not directly relevant to the one I was trying to make.
James
Michael Tobis
I'm certainly not going to defend him, anyway.
mt
Michael Tobis
an interesting exchange in the Q & A at the last of Jeffrey Sachs's
Reith lectures:
==>
PROF. SIR BERNARD CRICK: It seems to me that this is sort of H.G.
Wells re-born - that scientific wisdom can replace politics. These are
surely political problems, and you seem to have you know skipped
entirely from the logic of politics into, if you don't mind my saying,
standing with both feet firmly planted at mid-air of the wisdom of
scientists.
JEFFREY SACHS: I think when you review the words carefully, I
certainly did not say that scientific wisdom could or should replace
politics. What I said is that science should inform politics. We do
need science. The idea that we can somehow intuitively find our way
through these challenges I find to be completely off the mark. With
six and a half billion people in the world, with the ecological
pressures that we face, with the challenges of extreme poverty, we'd
better invoke expertise, because I see what happens when only hunch is
used, and the results are miserable. We need to get science
systematically into policy thinking and policy knowledge, and that's
why I'm trying to think of processes and institutions that can help
the public to understand. After all we did not say that the IPCC, this
inter-governmental panel on climate change, should decide our climate
policy. Indeed they're not even allowed to make policy
recommendations. They are to inform the public. So I'm looking for
science that informs politics, not science that replaces politics.
<==
(The entire lecture series is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2007/lecture4.shtml
and is well worth reading.)
I think James' advocacy of adaptive rather than prescriptive goals
needs to be considered in this context.
If we had no politics and no economics, if we all thought as one mind,
we could resolve most of our global problems quickly and
effortlessly.
We all have our own interests, and little tendency to put others'
ahead of our own. So carving out a policy that is sufficiently
acceptable to everyone that it actually gets put into place turns out
to be much harder than the technical constraints would indicate.
There are many comments on internet discussions of these topics saying
"all we need is the political will", which is surely true and sadly
useless. The idea that we can set goals adaptively seems to me very
much of the same stripe. It might be better technically to have goals
expressed in terms that most people cannot understand, but I suspect
it is politically infeasible.
James, (or anyone) could you state an adaptive policy in a form that
you might expect the general public to understand and support? I have
technocratic inclinations myself, but I just don't see how we can put
this into place globally under foreseeable conditions.
mt
Tom Adams
On May 21, 10:20 pm, James Annan <james.an...@gmail.com> wrote:
> William M Connolley wrote:
> > On Sun, 20 May 2007, Michael Tobis wrote:
> >>> Some people argue that there can't be an economics driven catastrophe,
> >>> because renewables and efficiency are cheap enough already that a
> >>> switch over a few decades would only mean slower growth.
> >> I don't think many people argue that.
>
> > John Quiggin does:
>
> >http://scienceblogs.com/stoat/2007/05/help_me_here_defining_dangerou....
>
> > ----
> > "Could we rule out the risk of economic collapse if we restricted out CO2
> > emissions (this is, I think, from JA)."
>
> > Absolutely. Here's an easy way of getting an upper bound on the costs.
>
> First, although I can't find the original, I'm pretty sure that when I
> originally posed that question I quite deliberately used exactly the
> same language as had been used to talk about the risk of harm due to
> climate change. Eg, when people talk about how we cannot "rule out" a
> particular level of (economic) damage from AGW, I was asking if we could
> "rule out" a similar level of economic harm from mitigation required to
> avoid the AGW damage.
>
> William's use of "economic collapse" perhaps a little out of context
> gave JQ the opportunity to address a straw man, rather than the real
> question. His "upper bound" is right at (I think most would say beyond)
> the very top end of plausible estimates of the cost of AGW.
>
> Secondly, his answer seems rather simplistic to me, with its explicit
> assumption that no (economic) action could possibly have consequences
> greater than the immediate direct financial cost.
>
> Don't forget, I'm not talking about the expected cost, or likely cost,
> but the _possibility_ of a high cost.
>
> There are those who would argue that we shouldn't be talking purely
> about cost. There is undoubtedly some validity to that point, but it's
> not directly relevant to the one I was trying to make.
>
> James- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Suppose we had a world legal system that determined the cost and
responsibility for each molecule of GHG emitted. That is, you are
responsible in perpetuity for the cost of your own net GHG emmissions.
You'd have to put in a deposit in escrow to cover estimated cost of
your past and (at least) your current emmissions. And you would share
some responsibility for past emissions that cannot be assigned to a
currently living person.
The problem with talk about generic cost and benefits is that it
ignores the justice issue. My costs are often your benefits.
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
> ignores the justice issue. My costs are often your benefits.
Some people think there is a lot of justice in imposing costs on
others. My pet example is oil. Reducing oil demand is going to hurt a
lot of oil exporting developing countries. However, it's argued that's
great, because the money is just used to finance terrorism.
What's just is very much in the eye of the beholder, some Americans
seem to argue that it's fine to suffer a bit, as long as Arabs are
made to suffer more.
Following that logic a bit further, and noting that a large number of
undesirable oil exporters are located in rather hot and/or dry bits of
the world, maybe the fact that these countries will suffer is really
something rather desirable?
Tom Adams
On May 23, 1:44 pm, "gerha...@aston.ac.uk" <gerha...@aston.ac.uk>
wrote:
> > The problem with talk about generic cost and benefits is that it
> > ignores the justice issue. My costs are often your benefits.
>
> Some people think there is a lot of justice in imposing costs on
> others. My pet example is oil. Reducing oil demand is going to hurt a
> lot of oil exporting developing countries.
It's not unjust to refuse to buy a produce.
I know people confuse justice with benevolence and charity, but I am
just talking about taking financial responsibility for the damage you
force on others.
> However, it's argued that's
> great, because the money is just used to finance terrorism.
Again, a separate issue. A person might earn money justly and then do
something unjust with the money.
>
> What's just is very much in the eye of the beholder, some Americans
> seem to argue that it's fine to suffer a bit, as long as Arabs are
> made to suffer more.
>
> Following that logic a bit further, and noting that a large number of
> undesirable oil exporters are located in rather hot and/or dry bits of
> the world, maybe the fact that these countries will suffer is really
> something rather desirable?
I am really just thinking of a world where we all feel sure that we
are eventually going to pay the price for our GHG pollution whatever
that price may be, that we are liable for our actions. Most of us act
as if others will bear the cost, and that does seem to be a good
prediction at this point. What if we each had to insure the
estimated cost now? Just that might cause appropriate adaptation.
Tom Adams
On May 23, 1:44 pm, "gerha...@aston.ac.uk" <gerha...@aston.ac.uk>
wrote:
> > The problem with talk about generic cost and benefits is that it
> > ignores the justice issue. My costs are often your benefits.
>
> Some people think there is a lot of justice in imposing costs on
> others. My pet example is oil. Reducing oil demand is going to hurt a
> lot of oil exporting developing countries.
It's not unjust to refuse to buy a produce.
I know people confuse justice with benevolence and charity, but I am
just talking about taking financial responsibility for the damage you
force on others.
> However, it's argued that's
> great, because the money is just used to finance terrorism.
Again, a separate issue. A person might earn money justly and then do
something unjust with the money.
>
> What's just is very much in the eye of the beholder, some Americans
> seem to argue that it's fine to suffer a bit, as long as Arabs are
> made to suffer more.
>
> Following that logic a bit further, and noting that a large number of
> undesirable oil exporters are located in rather hot and/or dry bits of
> the world, maybe the fact that these countries will suffer is really
> something rather desirable?
Well, the fees that I am talking about would be passed on to consumers
even if they were initially collected from producers.
Raymond Arritt
> I am really just thinking of a world where we all feel sure that we
> are eventually going to pay the price for our GHG pollution whatever
> that price may be, that we are liable for our actions. Most of us act
> as if others will bear the cost, and that does seem to be a good
> prediction at this point. What if we each had to insure the
> estimated cost now? Just that might cause appropriate adaptation.
In economics those are called "external costs." Evaluating external
costs is notoriously difficult, and often turns into a game where the
best liar wins.
Hank Roberts
Tom Adams wrote:
...
> If China drafted a treaty, it would call for per capita limits and the
> financial responsibilities would be allocated based on every molecule
> of GHG pumped into the atmosphere since the beginning of the
> Industrial Revolution.
...
Why not draft it for them here? You all are experts enough to do the
numbers for that extreme political case, I think.
It might actually reveal some non-perverse incentives.
For example at present, China continues to emit arge volumes of ozone-
depleting refrigerants and collect phaseout payments while building
new factories to emit more HCFCs, while still allowed, gaming the
system (and the USA and all the others are trying to speed up the
Montreal Protocol timetable).
So if China's treaty draft basis is "every molecule of GHG" then
there's an immediate argument for them to _now_ agree to cut off
production of ozone-depleting chemistry. Suddenly, it's in their own
interest as the basis for a climate treaty to do that.
James Annan
> James, (or anyone) could you state an adaptive policy in a form that
> you might expect the general public to understand and support?
Apologies for the delay, an intrusion of Real Life :-)
The underlying presumption of the rational, economically optimal
approach seems to be that "we" should choose the "best" temperature
change in say 2150 (actually a discounted change over all time, but
still...), and then use climate model to work out what CO2 level this
amounts to, and use a carbon cycle model to work out what CO2 emissions
will produce this result, and then set economic policies to generate
the emissions. And we have to take account of all the uncertainties at
all stages (and for anyone who thinks the climate science aspects are
uncertain, 150 years of economics and technology is at least a binary
order of magnitude worse). What hubris!
("Best" is not really set a priori, but is itself dependent on the
economic policies necessary to achieve the result, but that's a bit of a
detail.)
"Adaptive" means that we try to point in roughly the right direction,
with the understanding that our policies will change according to all
future innovation and knowledge gains, but without any precise outcome
in mind. Of course we need to think a bit about what "roughly the right
direction" means, in order that we don't set off in the wrong direction
entirely. But we don't need to know what our great-grandchildren will be
doing in 2100, let alone telling them what they ought to be doing.
In theory there may not be a whole lot of difference between the policy
choices on the ground, but I am confident that the latter approach would
make such choices easier to justify. It's really a matter of mind-set
- rather than worrying about the uncertainties, we should just embrace
them, pick low-hanging fruit in the meantime and put downward pressure
on emissions. There is no real need to talk and plan endlessly about it
- we can already "Work as if you lived in the early days of a better
nation." Even though I personally suspect that the climate and
environment systems are a bit more robust than most people seem to say,
I would fully support efforts to reduce our impact on them. Even those
who are officially "sceptics" are often more reasonably sympathetic to
renewable energy and efficiency gains, so long as they are packaged
appropriately.
I suppose this is also quite closely related to my "Is climate science
dead" blog post which I haven't written yet...maybe I should do that
some day.
James
Tom Adams
Tom Adams
This seems to be the point were you diverge 2C limit advocates.
Their main goal seem to be to avoid a tipping point. You get much
bigger economic impact after a tipping point.
But the attempt to avoid a tipping point may need to be adaptive
anyway since the research is ongoing to determine if there is a one
and where it is.
> Even those
> who are officially "sceptics" are often more reasonably sympathetic to
> renewable energy and efficiency gains, so long as they are packaged
> appropriately.
>
> I suppose this is also quite closely related to my "Is climate science
> dead" blog post which I haven't written yet...maybe I should do that
> some day.
Be sure to explain how climate science could be dead while this
tipping point question is hanging in the air. I'd think that would
make it even livelier. Hanson seems to be calling for detailed
simulation of Greenland in a world with no Artic ice, for instance.
Could be we have passed the tipping point. Lovelock thinks so. Some
seem to think the Artic melt is the last straw.
Hanson et al, thinks the tipping point may be 1C.
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/acp-7-2287-2007.pdf
(50 authors, is that passed the tipping point?)
>
> James
gerh...@aston.ac.uk
Note that this is above present, rather than above pre-industrial,
it's essentially the same number as the EU goal of 2C.