Future of agriculture
James Annan
comment here which was originally posted on my blog
<http://julesandjames.blogspot.com/2007/01/baer-on-stern.html#1382981649143204616>.
I'll probably write a reply of my own shortly...
James
---------
Kooiti MASUDA said...
I agree that slow a climate change is not a catastrophe and we can and
should adapt to it. but, ...
> Crop yields will decline, particularly in Africa
I think that THIS is likely -- a very unfortunate thing.
There are two very distinct issues are there.
One is my outlook of climate change. It is difficult to predict future
distribution of aridity. But it is almost certain that local, short-term
precipitation can increase in proportional to saturation specific
humidity that is exponential in temperature, and that global mean
precipitation does not increase so much because it must almost match
global mean evaporation which is limited by energy balance at the
surface where the input will increase more or less like log(CO2 conc.).
Thus it is almost sure that precipitation tend to concentrate spatially
and temporally. In some places there will be excess of precipitation
which may lead to floods. Elsewhere precipitation does not increase to
match evaporation locally and the land would be more arid.
The other thing is the capacity of agriculture. The increase of crop
yield in the 20th century owe much to fossil fuel: chemical fertilizers,
pesticides, machines (e.g. tractors), large-scale irrigation, etc. They
do not logically depend on fossil fuel -- just on low-entropy energy
resources. But practically we cannot immediately substitute them with
renewable resources only (or even with nuclear power, for that matter).
We cannot assume either that the future generations will magically find
some novel low-entropy resources that we cannot access now.
After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
or more adaptable. The world will be outside the realm of experience of
the age of fossil fuel. (I think this discussion should move to
"globalchange" forum.)
William M Connolley
On Mon, 15 Jan 2007, James Annan wrote:
> After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
And yet this *is* the assumption that all the economic modelling makes. And it
is supported by historical trends. Barring catastrophe, is there a plausible
reason for it to be wrong (presumably in cash-type terms, interpreting "richer"
literally)?
The Stern report ends up deciding that a potential loss of 20% of future
consumption would be very bad, which is a loss on top of considerable gains. If
you can plausibly assert that we wouldn't be richer at all, then in Stern terms
this is a complete disaster, with or without climate change.
-W.
William M Connolley | w...@bas.ac.uk | http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/met/wmc/
Climate Modeller, British Antarctic Survey | (01223) 221479
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Eric Swanson
> On Mon, 15 Jan 2007, James Annan wrote:
> > After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
>
> And yet this *is* the assumption that all the economic modelling makes. And it
> is supported by historical trends. Barring catastrophe, is there a plausible
> reason for it to be wrong (presumably in cash-type terms, interpreting "richer"
> literally)?
Yes, recent economic history in the U.S. suggests a real ongoing
decline in the real wealth of the average person.
> The Stern report ends up deciding that a potential loss of 20% of future
> consumption would be very bad, which is a loss on top of considerable gains. If
> you can plausibly assert that we wouldn't be richer at all, then in Stern terms
> this is a complete disaster, with or without climate change.
>
> -W.
The big problem is that our use of fossil fuels has ment that out
energy sources are easier to use and more concentrated than was the
situation in previous times. As these energy sources become harder to
acquire, we in the U.S. are seeing a trend toward less equitable
distribution of wealth (as in, money), such that the average person is
less well off. A very large fraction of the population is just getting
by, spending all of their pay check each month with little savings.
That our recent economic history appears to show a continual gain in
"wealth" is something of an illusion, as it is based on the one time
consumption of stored energy "capital" in fossil fuels.
When world oil production peaks and the cost of energy begins to rise
relative to everything else, I would expect to see a replay of the
economic distress of the late 1970's and early 1980's. However, next
time we get in this situation, there won't be any easily available
cheap alternative energy source except coal. The last time around, the
Saudi's had excess oil production capacity, which allowed them to flood
the world market and thus force prices down. I think the economists
assume that science will save us as has happened in the past, with a
somewhat magical appearance of a technical solution which will "keep
the economy moving" -- literally.
I see at least two problems with this notion. The first is that there
are no such easy solutions to be found in today's science, to my
knowledge. The second is the amount of time required for market
penetration of any new energy source and the large shift in wealth
required to implement this new, untested energy supply. Our use of the
energy in fossil fuels has dictated the mix of devices which have been
built to use that energy. A major shift in energy supply is also
likely to result in major changes in the devices which use energy,
which could include junking large portions of what we take as part of
our normal life styles in the U.S. and other "developed" nations. The
first response is to try and build energy systems which would allow all
the things we now have to continue to be used, such as houses and
automobiles and the patterns of development connected to the two which
we have come to accept as normal. But, should it turn out that the
new magical energy source can't be fitted into the present modes of
life, then what? We won't know an answer to that until AFTER the new
magical energy source is found, if one IS found.
Michael Tobis
On Mon, 15 Jan 2007, James Annan wrote:
> After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
And yet this *is* the assumption that all the economic modelling makes.
On what basis is it made?
And it
is supported by historical trends.
Is it supported by anything else?
If that is its only basis, it is a pretty shabbly basis for a transition from an underpopulated and underdeveloped planet to a populated and developed one. There is a phase transition happening, and simple extrapolation is an awfully shabby way to plan for it.
Barring catastrophe, is there a plausible
reason for it to be wrong (presumably in cash-type terms, interpreting "richer"
literally)?
First of all, I'm not even convinced that on the long term it is even meaningful. Recall that wealth is defined in terms of constant dollars, and constant dollars are redefined in terms of a "basket of goods" that represents typical purchasing patterns. I don't know how often the basket is redefined, but it is surely more frequent than a century. It seems to me that one could end up with identical purchasing power with several distinct path dependent estimates of intervening growth.
That's related to the larger more commonly made criticism, which is the argument that money is a poor proxy for well-being anyway. Both issues assert that economics simply asks the worng question altogether.
Ignoring all of those concerns, consider the question. In any physical system, if one observed a finite positive growth rate, one would never ask "is there any reason for this to go away"? One would ask instead "what sets this rate?" and "what process will eventually limit it?"
Someone else on this list suggested that a quantity that could grow indefinitely it is meaningless. I won't go quite that far, but I certainly have some suspicions in that direction. I say it boils down to
1) the quantity cannot possibly grow forever (at least as measured as an extensive property of a finite planet)
2) the quantity measures nothing meaningful
or
3) the quantity is dramatically different from typical meaningful quantities in nature
It seems to me that all this talk about economics implicitly claims the third point, but it is quite an extraordinary position and seems to me to require some defending. This blithe assertion that 2% growth is a "law" of some sort strikes me as ludicrous.
The Stern report ends up deciding that a potential loss of 20% of future
consumption would be very bad, which is a loss on top of considerable gains. If
you can plausibly assert that we wouldn't be richer at all, then in Stern terms
this is a complete disaster, with or without climate change.
I really don't know what any of that means. We will have more iPods and less horses than our grandparents. Are we richer or poorer?
If we need concrete bunkers to protect us from daily tornados, (I am not suggesting that this is literally going to happen) that will stimulate a lot of economic activity. Does that mean tornados make us rich?
I am not being deliberately obtuse. This whole way of thinking seems totally broken to me as applied to long time scales. I believe we do, urgently, need to have a way to think quantitatively about long term policy, but I am entirely unconvinced that the approach that is commonly promoted by economists means anything at all.
I also think that the conventional approach, specifically applying short term thinking to long time scales, fails in a number of ways that will eventually be as obvious as the failures of the Easter Islanders are to us now.
In short, if there is an optimum level of economic activity for human happiness, a strategy for maximizing economic activity will make things better for a while, and then it will make things worse.
mt
James Annan
Kooiti MASUDA said...
>
> > Crop yields will decline, particularly in Africa
I'll start off by pointing out that this comment of the BBC was directly
linked to the environmental impact of climate change (via Stern),
therefore speculation about peak oil and the sustainability of farming
practices is rather tangential to the point they were making.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6098362.stm
But anyway...
> I think that THIS is likely -- a very unfortunate thing.
>
> There are two very distinct issues are there.
>
> One is my outlook of climate change. It is difficult to predict future
> distribution of aridity. But it is almost certain that local, short-term
> precipitation can increase in proportional to saturation specific
> humidity that is exponential in temperature, and that global mean
> precipitation does not increase so much because it must almost match
> global mean evaporation which is limited by energy balance at the
> surface where the input will increase more or less like log(CO2 conc.).
> Thus it is almost sure that precipitation tend to concentrate spatially
> and temporally. In some places there will be excess of precipitation
> which may lead to floods. Elsewhere precipitation does not increase to
> match evaporation locally and the land would be more arid.
Well, as already discussed, the model projections give a worst-case of
~25% reduction in potential yield over significant areas in Africa, with
roughly equivalent increases in other regions:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/sci/tech/6126242.stm
Even with extremely high emissions growth, this change takes about 80
years, so a 0.5% reduction per year seems like a safe upper estimate for
the rate of potential yield loss due to climate change.
Google suggests that the rate of observed yield increase due to
technological and economic factors is much larger than that, at least
over the last 40 years (I could be really heretical and suggest that the
recent warming might have also contributed to the yield growth, but I'd
probably get lynched):
http://historylink101.com/lessons/farm-city/yeild.htm
and there is still a vast gap between the actual yield in poor regions
and the "potential yield" which was the subject of the model
projections, so it's not as if the yields are pushing up against some
hard climate-dominated ceiling.
> The other thing is the capacity of agriculture. The increase of crop
> yield in the 20th century owe much to fossil fuel: chemical fertilizers,
> pesticides, machines (e.g. tractors), large-scale irrigation, etc. They
> do not logically depend on fossil fuel -- just on low-entropy energy
> resources. But practically we cannot immediately substitute them with
> renewable resources only (or even with nuclear power, for that matter).
> We cannot assume either that the future generations will magically find
> some novel low-entropy resources that we cannot access now.
Energy use is a rather different matter, and I agree that much modern
agriculture is essentially the conversion of oil into food calories.
However, it is a little soon to say that fossil fuels are actually
running out - especially when you consider coal and oil shales etc. I
don't want to appear to wave too many magic wands but there are plenty
of opportunities for efficiency gains here - eg low-tillage methods are
increasingly popular, which saves on a lot of energy. As far as I can
see, the recent tripling of the cost of oil has had negligible impact on
food prices.
Here is some info on energy use in USA agriculture, including a
substantial increase in efficiency over the past 50 years:
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/April06/Features/Energy.htm
> After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
> or more adaptable.
Well if we do not get richer rapidly and keep on increasing GHG
emissions then the rate of climate change will tail off substantially in
any case... (and certainly will not accelerate, which is the assumption
underlying Stern).
I conclude that neither climate change nor energy costs are going to
prevent crop yields increasing for the foreseeable future over any
reasonably broad scales and would happily bet on that proposition. Any
takers?
James
James Annan
>
>
> On Mon, 15 Jan 2007, James Annan wrote:
(actually, that was me quoting Kooiti Masuda, but never mind)
>> After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
>
> And yet this *is* the assumption that all the economic modelling makes.
> And it
> is supported by historical trends. Barring catastrophe, is there a
> plausible
> reason for it to be wrong (presumably in cash-type terms, interpreting
> "richer"
> literally)?
>
> The Stern report ends up deciding that a potential loss of 20% of future
> consumption would be very bad, which is a loss on top of considerable
> gains. If
> you can plausibly assert that we wouldn't be richer at all, then in
> Stern terms
> this is a complete disaster, with or without climate change.
I suspect that a large part of the general population is substantially
confused on this point, and I have to wonder if some of it is
deliberate. The presentation of much of this impacts stuff (especially,
but not solely, Stern) is in terms of "losses". I've even seen the term
"recession" widely used:
<http://www.google.co.jp/search?q=recession+stern+climate>
"catastrophic global recession", even - and explicit links to the Wall
Street Crash and Great Depression.
However, in none of the projections and estimates is there actually any
situation in which the global economy shrinks, or comes close to it. His
standard estimate of a 5% cost of climate change actually means a growth
rate of 2.25% pa rather than 2.3% over the next 100 years. Sure, that
compounds to a 5% gap - people being only 9.5 times as rich rather than
10 times.
But tell me, seriously, even if it is true, am I supposed to care about
that?
Have all the environmental activists who seized upon Stern with such
glee really now decided that our lives should be devoted to maximising
economic growth after all? Somehow, I doubt it. Strange bedfellows indeed...
James
Michael Tobis
If that is its only basis, it is a pretty shabbly basis for a transition from an underpopulated and underdeveloped planet to a populated and developed one. There is a phase transition happening, and simple extrapolation is an awfully shabby way to plan for it.
Oh foo, I said that twice. I said that twice!
Maybe I've been spending too much time in the Southern states, where people say everything twice. For emphasis, people in the South say everything twice!
if there is an optimum level of economic activity for human happiness, a strategy for maximizing economic activity will make things better for a while, and then it will make things worse.
I can say THAT again. Maybe I should, Maybe I just should.
mt
Eric Swanson
>
> > After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
> > or more adaptable.
>
> Well if we do not get richer rapidly and keep on increasing GHG
> emissions then the rate of climate change will tail off substantially in
> any case... (and certainly will not accelerate, which is the assumption
> underlying Stern).
>
> I conclude that neither climate change nor energy costs are going to
> prevent crop yields increasing for the foreseeable future over any
> reasonably broad scales and would happily bet on that proposition. Any
> takers?
Is your bet to be based on crop yields or total crop production? If
it's the latter, then there may be some unforseen bumps in the road.
Just today, for example, there's a major cold outbreak over the Western
U.S. and the news tells us that:
"In California, three nights of freezing temperatures have destroyed up
to three-quarters of California's $1 billion citrus crop, according to
an estimate issued Monday. Other crops, including avocados and
strawberries, also suffered damage."
So much for the fresh produce from the Central Valley until the next
crop comes in. the freeze also hit Arizona as well, which is another
area of citrus production. This reminds me of the freezes in the early
1980's, which destroyed much of Florida's citrus crop, killing the
trees as well. Similar impacts were felt in Texas. We've had late
freezes in my area over the past few years as well. A couple of years
ago, the trees were fully leafed and a hard freeze killed almost all
the foliage. It looked like the Fall colors had returned, only it was
May. Also, some models have suggested that the American Great Plains
will experience more frequent drought, which will cut into the
production of corn and wheat.
U.S. corn production is an example of optimization intended to maximize
yield. Other regions may not be so hospitable for corn production and
thus may not substitute for any loss in U.S. production. Consider this
example of requirements for corn production:
http://www.ces.purdue.edu/extmedia/NCH/NCH-40.html
Notice that there is a sharp dividing line in precipitation roughly
along the 100 degree meridian in Figure 4. Roughly speaking, to the
east, corn is grown, to the west, it is not. If warming shifts that
dividing line toward the east, the acreage available for corn
production would shrink. Or, if variability increases and the average
growing season is reduced, then production would also suffer.
I might take your bet, except that your "foreseeable future" is likely
to be longer than mine.
James Annan
>
> James Annan wrote:
>>
>> > After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
>> > or more adaptable.
>>
>> Well if we do not get richer rapidly and keep on increasing GHG
>> emissions then the rate of climate change will tail off substantially in
>> any case... (and certainly will not accelerate, which is the assumption
>> underlying Stern).
>>
>> I conclude that neither climate change nor energy costs are going to
>> prevent crop yields increasing for the foreseeable future over any
>> reasonably broad scales and would happily bet on that proposition. Any
>> takers?
>
> Is your bet to be based on crop yields or total crop production? If
> it's the latter, then there may be some unforseen bumps in the road.
I don't think it makes much odds, but yield seems most logical.
> So much for the fresh produce from the Central Valley until the next
> crop comes in. the freeze also hit Arizona as well, which is another
> area of citrus production. This reminds me of the freezes in the early
> 1980's, which destroyed much of Florida's citrus crop, killing the
> trees as well. Similar impacts were felt in Texas. We've had late
> freezes in my area over the past few years as well. A couple of years
> ago, the trees were fully leafed and a hard freeze killed almost all
> the foliage. It looked like the Fall colors had returned, only it was
> May.
If you are relying on extreme cold to keep yields down then ISTM you are
clutching at straws, since the future reduction in cold extremes over
most of the globe is just about as robust as the increase in hot ones
(although this attracts a lot less attention).
> Also, some models have suggested that the American Great Plains
> will experience more frequent drought, which will cut into the
> production of corn and wheat.
I've already noted here that the US National Assessment of the Potential
Consequences of Climate Variability and Change explicitly predicts
increased yields to a degree that will be harmful to farmers through
depressing prices!
> I might take your bet, except that your "foreseeable future" is likely
> to be longer than mine.
Of course there will be local and short-term bumps in the road, but I'm
thinking about the (inter)national scale over 30 years, like for global
warming itself. It's got to be a long enough time scale to actually see
the predicted effects over natural variability.
James
Eric Swanson
> Eric Swanson wrote:
> >
> > James Annan wrote:
> >>
> >> > After all, we cannot simply assume that future generations are richer,
> >> > or more adaptable.
> >>
> >> Well if we do not get richer rapidly and keep on increasing GHG
> >> emissions then the rate of climate change will tail off substantially in
> >> any case... (and certainly will not accelerate, which is the assumption
> >> underlying Stern).
> >>
> >> I conclude that neither climate change nor energy costs are going to
> >> prevent crop yields increasing for the foreseeable future over any
> >> reasonably broad scales and would happily bet on that proposition. Any
> >> takers?
> >
> > Is your bet to be based on crop yields or total crop production? If
> > it's the latter, then there may be some unforseen bumps in the road.
>
> I don't think it makes much odds, but yield seems most logical.
Yeild is a particularly difficult variable to assess, given that we
know how to increase yields for many crops thru the use of various
energy intensive techniques. Those techniques have been widely adopted
for some crops in a few countries, but there are many other areas where
the yield increasing technologies still have not taken hold. Given
that there is may still be a large gain in global average yield yet to
be realized, betting that climate change might reduce this metric would
most likely be a losing proposition. From an economic and social point
of view, a more appropriate metric might be production per capita, as
it is to be hoped that food production will increase along with
increasing population.
> > So much for the fresh produce from the Central Valley until the next
> > crop comes in. the freeze also hit Arizona as well, which is another
> > area of citrus production. This reminds me of the freezes in the early
> > 1980's, which destroyed much of Florida's citrus crop, killing the
> > trees as well. Similar impacts were felt in Texas. We've had late
> > freezes in my area over the past few years as well. A couple of years
> > ago, the trees were fully leafed and a hard freeze killed almost all
> > the foliage. It looked like the Fall colors had returned, only it was
> > May.
>
> If you are relying on extreme cold to keep yields down then ISTM you are
> clutching at straws, since the future reduction in cold extremes over
> most of the globe is just about as robust as the increase in hot ones
> (although this attracts a lot less attention).
As I've pointed to previously, I think the cold conditions of the late
1970's and early 1980's may have been related to the Great Salinity
Anomaly. If there is a weakening or, worse, a shutdown of the THC, I
would expect to see more frequent transients in the form of cold and
warm extremes. That's because I think that a shutdown of the THC would
result in a corresponding increase in thermal energy carried by the
atmosphere between the tropics and the North Pole.
> > Also, some models have suggested that the American Great Plains
> > will experience more frequent drought, which will cut into the
> > production of corn and wheat.
>
> I've already noted here that the US National Assessment of the Potential
> Consequences of Climate Variability and Change explicitly predicts
> increased yields to a degree that will be harmful to farmers through
> depressing prices!
I haven't looked at that one.
http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/default.htm
"The National Assessment was forwarded to the President and Congress in
November 2000 for their consideration."
Do you think Gee Dubyah looked at it?
See above comment regarding the THC.
> > I might take your bet, except that your "foreseeable future" is likely
> > to be longer than mine.
>
> Of course there will be local and short-term bumps in the road, but I'm
> thinking about the (inter)national scale over 30 years, like for global
> warming itself. It's got to be a long enough time scale to actually see
> the predicted effects over natural variability.
Yes, on that scale, I probably won't be able to witness the end of the
bet!
Tom Adams
Figure 8, you mean?
I does Canada (off the map) figure in to this?
---
Away, away, away down South...
Eric Swanson
Tom Adams wrote:
> Eric Swanson wrote:
> > U.S. corn production is an example of optimization intended to maximize
> > yield. Other regions may not be so hospitable for corn production and
> > thus may not substitute for any loss in U.S. production. Consider this
> > example of requirements for corn production:
> >
> > http://www.ces.purdue.edu/extmedia/NCH/NCH-40.html
> >
> > Notice that there is a sharp dividing line in precipitation roughly
> > along the 100 degree meridian in Figure 4.
>
> Figure 8, you mean?
Woops, should have said Figure 6 (it's on top of Table 4)
> I does Canada (off the map) figure in to this?
You might take a look at the National Assessment document mentioned
above.
I'm still reading it...
James Annan
> I don't think it makes much odds, but yield seems most logical.
>
> Yeild is a particularly difficult variable to assess, given that we
> know how to increase yields for many crops thru the use of various
> energy intensive techniques.
You will of course have noted in the link I provided how the energy
efficiency of US agriculture has increased markedly in recent decades.
In the presence of increasing fuel prices, you can be sure it will
continue to improve.
Nevertheless, the predictions of doom and gloom are predicated not only
on an inability to increase yields through technological and economic
progress (even the transfer of existing technology, let alone new
developments), but even an inability to mitigate the supposed "losses"
due to climate changes. Eg see Rachel Warren's report on impacts for Stern.
However, the figures for the increased "population at risk" depends on a
fast-growing population, with rapid economic growth to drive the rise in
emissions. Do I need to explicitly point out the logical disconnect here?
> From an economic and social point
> of view, a more appropriate metric might be production per capita, as
> it is to be hoped that food production will increase along with
> increasing population.
Well, that is surely a stiffer hurdle, but I do agree it would seem more
relevant to human welfare. History suggests that it is likely to be a
pretty safe bet, but OTOH there are some areas which are pretty much
maxed out in terms of caloric intake and here a reduction in food
production (at least, consumption) would be a benefit rather than a
loss. Anyway, my complaint is primarily with those who have clearly
asserted that yields are going to go down due to climate change.
James
CobblyWorlds
Hello Kooiti Masuda...
"We cannot assume either that the future generations will magically
find
some novel low-entropy resources that we cannot access now."
You remind me of a book I had when I was 16. It enthused about
torroidal magnetic field containment based fusion generation. This,
aparently, was going to provide ample cheap energy by the 1990s. They
didn't quite go as far as to suggest "electricity too cheap to meter".
So far neither have happened, but IMHO fusion remains for me our best
hope to sidestep this mess.
Hello James Annan...
I agree with a lot of what you say, and frankly that worries me. ;)
What I mean is that, given the conflicts, market woes and catastrophe's
of the last 100 years, our pattern has still been onwards and upwards.
I too find Stern unconvincing because where challenges arise the market
will adapt along the way, even leaving aside incidental changes that
remove elements of current economic activity (like the ice making). The
Market is quick to change it's focus, and as past crashes have shown it
is able to reorganise and move on.
Furthermore for all of the talk of Peak Oil, we have stupendous
reserves of coal to fill the gap. We may well be at Hubbert's Peak for
Oil, but demand seems to be very price elastic, here in the UK we pay
way more than the States, yet don't seem to suffer greatly for that.
So based on my understanding the consequences of AGW in the
'foreseeable future' are not likely to severely limit economic growth
or even restrict population growth.
Now I'm not worried about agreeing with you in principal or anything
;). What seems to relax you makes me glad I'm nearly 40 and have no
kids.
What bothers me is that I think our very adaptability and technological
power will enable us to continue emitting CO2 until levels are so high
that even a climate sensitivity of 3degC would be of no comfort. The
reasons you find to be somewhat more relaxed about AGW than others are
the very reason we can keep "stretching" this particular "elastic
band". And the further and faster we proceed with the AGW experiment
the more risk we run of potential disaster. I am doubtful of serious
moves away from fossil fuels or to reduce CO2 because unlike CFCs our
entire civilisation is underpinned by fossil energy. Human ingenuity,
adaptability and intelligence are the means by which we will avoid the
ongoing climate change impeding us.
Imagine it. 2050: almost 10 billion people, of whom a far greater
percentage than now are living carbon intensive lifestyles(I still have
faith that globalisation will make people wealthier.). And at that time
we're moving back to coal which produces more CO2 per joule than oil or
gas. Either we'll run out of fossil fuels, find an alternative, or some
'negative feedback' will act upon us.
But it'll have to be a monster to stop a species like ours.
Don Libby
From: "Eric Swanson" <e_sw...@skybest.com>
Newsgroups: gmane.science.general.global-change
Sent: Monday, January 15, 2007 11:00 AM
Subject: [Global Change: 1150] Re: Future of agriculture
> When world oil production peaks and the cost of energy begins to rise
> relative to everything else, I would expect to see a replay of the
> economic distress of the late 1970's and early 1980's. However, next
> time we get in this situation, there won't be any easily available
> cheap alternative energy source except coal. <...> But, should it turn
> out that the
> new magical energy source can't be fitted into the present modes of
> life, then what? We won't know an answer to that until AFTER the new
> magical energy source is found, if one IS found.
>
>
Nuclear, wind, conservation/efficiency, biomass - these have all been on the
rise in conjunction with the recent oil price rise. You are too
pessimistic. There may not be ONE magical alternative, but one is not
necessary when there are many practical alternatives.
-dl
Don Libby
From: "CobblyWorlds" <Cobbly...@btinternet.com>
Newsgroups: gmane.science.general.global-change
Sent: Friday, January 19, 2007 2:53 PM
Subject: [Global Change: 1166] Re: Future of agriculture
>
<...> Imagine it. 2050: almost 10 billion people, of whom a far greater
> percentage than now are living carbon intensive lifestyles(I still have
> faith that globalisation will make people wealthier.). And at that time
> we're moving back to coal which produces more CO2 per joule than oil or
> gas. Either we'll run out of fossil fuels, find an alternative, or some
> 'negative feedback' will act upon us.
>
> But it'll have to be a monster to stop a species like ours.
>
>
Atomic monster. The authors of emissions scenarios featured in the IPCC
third assessment report imagined a world of 2100 where atmospheric CO2 is
stabilized near twice pre-industrial levels, but not without at least six
times more fission power plants than presently exist world-wide.
-dl
John McCormick
I agree with your assessment that peak oil spell trouble for the global
atmosphere. US military and coal-States governors are teaming up with
speculators to provide future oil supply with coal liquids. Even
Senator (now Presidential hopeful) Barack Obama is encouraging federal
support for coal to liquids.
Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer boasts the following:
With a demonstrated reserve base of 120 billion tons, Montana's coal
is, in liquid terms, over one quarter the size of the entire Middle
East oil reserve--enough fuel to power every American car for decades.
see the following link for his depressing projection of the
contribution Montana will make to the well-being of our children:
http://governor.mt.gov/hottopics/faqsynthetic.asp
Ignore his rhetorical nonsense about carbon sequestration and storage
(I realize
CCS is the mantra for those promoting clean coal but words will not
make that a reality...the (can do) way of marching forward without the
corporate (will do) or the geologic formation (cannot do).
The Governor has a selling job to do and he makes a presentation that
would make a good demo for AMWAY sales agents.
And, I too sense trouble ahead in the stated views of James Annan when
he says:
[Anyway, my complaint is primarily with those who have clearly asserted
that yields are going to go down due to climate change.]
He might not be ready to saddle the South Australian drought to climate
change, just yet. Though, there is observation of a shift in the
subtropical jet stream being drawn closer to the Antarctic pole by the
tightening of the Antarctic Polar Vortex. It seems to be pulling the
Ssouth Australian coast precip patterns with it. Australia wheat crop
is down by 60 percent this year and China is feeling the hurt of lower
yields, expanding desertification and drought. Throw in the melting
Himalayan glaciers that are headwaters for five major rivers in South
Asia, home to nearly 600 million people reliant upon those rivers for
irrigation. Should I also mention the Ogallala Aquifer and the Rocky
Mountain snow pack diminishing water availability in the Western North
American grain basket. It takes more than miracle seeds to grow the
crop.
Am I getting too gloom and doom). There is hope and there is reality?
We need both but economies and civilizations plan best from the
standpoint of the latter.
Sure, Wall Street is on a rocket ride but that does not mean all is
well with the American economy. Petrodollars, CEO mega bonuses and
real estate investment pull back means more investments into the only
game in town. But, our children will have to tax themselves into
pauperism to cover the $40 trillion-plus unfounded mandates and federal
debt hanging over their heads. These pieces do fit into the AGW
picture and are related to the US fix. And, that fiscal straightjacket
will work against much of what Americans will have to do to adapt to
and mitigate the AGW crisis.
When the engine room is taking on water, one solution might be to flip
the boat over. To me, that sounds a lot like Governor Schweitzer up
there on the bridge shouting in the captains’ ear.
John McCormick
John McCormick
lots of interpretations.
http://governor.mt.gov/hottopics/faqsynthetic.asp
South Australian coast precip patterns with it. Australia wheat crop
hank roberts
I think we should closely reread all the globalization laws, to see if
our economy can legally end up owned by some 'monsters' that make a
living by tipping climates, clandestinely taking steps so they end up
owning the resulting warmer, higher-CO2 planets covered with meat
products, and liquidating them for a quick profit.
In other words, I suspect we're already pwned in the galactic economy.
That's more likely that than we're as stupid as we appear to be acting
on our own.
Isn't it?
Kooiti MASUDA
which was kindly communicated by James Annan:
On Mon, 15 Jan 2007 23:04:46 +0900, James Annan wrote:
>> Kooiti MASUDA said...
>> I agree that slow a climate change is not a catastrophe and we can and
>> should adapt to it.
I made a typo error here. Sorry. I meant "... a slow climate change
...".
>> > Crop yields will decline, particularly in Africa
>> I think that THIS is likely -- a very unfortunate thing.
The phrase "particularly in Africa" is not what I would say myself,
though I think that it is not far off the point.
A quantitative outlook of river runoff from currently available climate
projections is shown in the following scientific paper:
Nohara D., Kitoh A., Hosaka M. and Oki T., (2007):
Impact of climate change on river runoff using multi-model ensembles.
(Acceped for publication in Journal of Hydrometeorology.
Its preprint is available from the page of the research project at
http://kyousei.aesto.or.jp/~k041open/ipcc_ar4/ .)
The model-to-model variability of the projection is large,
and we do not know how reliable the multi-model composite is.
But I think that it can be used to know where to watch.
It seems that there are as much land where water availability increases
as where it decreases. But it seems to me that the distribution of
increases and decreases is something unhelpful for agricultural
productivity.
According to the composite map, runoff decreases in the following
areas:
Europe and Central Asia to the south of 50 deg. N;
Mexico, Central America and U.S. West; Argentina; Southern Africa.
Also, West Africa and the southern half of Australia have negative
sign.
Thus, the major zones of production of wheat and corn (maize) of the
world
are covered, where their productivity is generally water-limited.
On the other hand, the composite suggest that runoff will increase
in higher latitudes (to the north of 55 deg. N and around the southern
tip
of South America), and in the greater Southeast Asia including
southern China and eastern India.
In these regions, agriculture is generally not water-limited,
and the risk of flood seems to be more important than that of drought.
*****
Now I comment on the outlook of John McCormick.
On Sat, 20 Jan 2007 12:12:40 -0800, John McCormick wrote;
> He might not be ready to saddle the South Australian drought to climate
> change, just yet. Though, there is observation of a shift in the
> subtropical jet stream being drawn closer to the Antarctic pole by the
> tightening of the Antarctic Polar Vortex. It seems to be pulling the
> Ssouth Australian coast precip patterns with it. Australia wheat crop
> is down by 60 percent this year
According to composites of currently available projections, the change
of
average precipitation in Australia in the 21st century is not so great.
The analysis of the following paper shows that while strengthened
subsidence in the subtropical zone acts to decrease precipitation,
increased amount of moisture compensates it.
Emori S. and Brown S.J., 2005:
Dynamic and thermodynamic changes in mean and extreme precipitation
under changed climate.
Geophysical Research Letters, 32, L17706, doi:10.1029/2005GL023272.
(Abstract is at
http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2005/2005GL023272.shtml .
Some figures are reproduced in the Japanese press release at
http://www.jamstec.go.jp/jamstec-j/PR/0508/0829/index.html ).
On the other hand, evaporation will increase in warmer climate.
Thus the amount of available water will decrease somewhat.
> and China is feeling the hurt of lower
> yields, expanding desertification and drought.
First, please recognize that China has vast heterogeneity of climate.
The northern and western parts are arid, while the southern part is
humid.
It is true that many parts of the arid region of northern China
experience desertification.
But, I guess that the problem is more of conservation of soil and water
rather than of climate change.
(I do not mean that climate does not change there, but it is not
so systematically related to greenhouse effect.)
Maybe situation in Australia is similar.
> Throw in the melting
> Himalayan glaciers that are headwaters for five major rivers in South
> Asia, home to nearly 600 million people reliant upon those rivers for
> irrigation.
It is true that people in many small regions around the central Asian
highlands rely on glacier meltwater, and their agriculture will not be
sustainable when the glaciers disappear.
But, for the most part of major South Asian river basins,
glacier meltwater comprises only a tiny part of water flow in the
rivers.
(Those rivers have more sources besides the headwaters at high
locations.)
Also precipitation is not expected to decrease there,
though its variability is likely to increase.
Seasonal snowcover is expected to decrease, so that the seasonal march
of
river discharge will change (more discharge in winter and less in
spring).
Thus there is a problem about water resources there, but it is more of
its distribution rather than of the average amount.
> Should I also mention the Ogallala Aquifer and the Rocky
> Mountain snow pack diminishing water availability in the Western North
> American grain basket.
I guess that agriculture in the U.S. West is not sustainable at the
current level and that the main reason is its dependence on fossil
water.
It needs to be restructured within the margin of natural replenishment.
Climate change is something which will make this requirement tighter --
Probably evaporation will increase there but precipitation will not.
Whether the precipitation come as snow or rain does not affect average
water
availability downstream so much, though it does affect its seasonality.
Ko-1 M. (Kooiti Masuda)
James Annan
> It seems that there are as much land where water availability increases
> as where it decreases. But it seems to me that the distribution of
> increases and decreases is something unhelpful for agricultural
> productivity.
This I do not doubt (well, all model projections are somewhat doubtful
and the worst scenarios are probably somewhat exaggerated, but for the
sake of argument I accept it here).
However, it also seems clear that there are much more pressing and
urgent problems in many areas. Groundwater use is completely
unsustainable in many areas:
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6321
(it is Fred Pearce, so read with a bucket of salt)
There was more in the news recently about how rivers were basically used
up over much of the world, which I've lost the reference to. It'll be in
the news again in a few weeks or months, no doubt.
Yet global population is increasing. I realise that the lack of water
may somewhat challenge my previous assertion that productivity will
continue to rise, but I'm trying to make a more fundamental point here.
Even if one frames the research in order to present anthropogenic
climate changes over the net century as the last straw to break the
camel's back, it is still probably not meaningful to focus on this straw
to the exclusion of the rest of the bale. For example, simple recharge
ponds could both help to deal with extreme rainfall and also give it
time to soak in to replenish ground water. It is also well known that
management of vegetation cover can have substantial effects. I'm very
suspicious of anyone who presents a "ceteris paribus" sensitivity
experiment as if it is an actual prediction, since it is obvious that
ceteris are not going to be at all paribus a couple of decades or more
into the future.
The crop yield predictions even pretend that there will be no new
varieties developed in the coming years, even as our genetic engineering
technology is taking off. WTF?
James
CobblyWorlds
Sorry to be late getting back, I've been having a rest from this hole
AGW issue prior to the release of AR4 Scientific Basis. Whether or not
I decide to read it (as I did AR3 Sci Basis) will probably determine
whether I carry on learning in this field.
I don't think that short term problems like recessions or depressions
will change what I am saying. Take the world since the 1930s
depression or WWII. Being British I reflect on the UK since the 1970s
- back in the 70s many seemed to see the UK as down and almost out.
We're quite able to pick ourselves up from such events.
With regards crop yields, I really think that's too much of a
resultant effect from the process we can have certainty in. We KNOW
that as we continue to emit CO2 we'll warm the planet. We have very
good reason to think that we will continue to emit at an increasing
rate for some decades at least. But the more one extrapolates from
such processes into other processes like agriculture, the less
interested I am. Sorry but I think the issues around crop yields, as
with the effects on people, are too complex for us to be sure. I'm
prepared to tentatively accept many things as being processes that may
continue and worsen - the Australian drought is but one. On the "Day
After Tomorrow" DVD there's a documentary in which the former head of
the WHOI talked worryingly about drought in continental interiors
progressing. When I first saw it I was a sceptic and dismissed it, now
I just don't know. I'm afraid that my answer to most of these
questions is 'ask me in a decade'.
However as Kooti Masuda indirectly points out re China, climate change
is not the only factor. Didn't ploughing up and down slopes instead of
with the contour contribute to the US' 'dustbowl' in the 1930s?
There's a risk people concentrate of AGW and neglect issues like
deforestation and land use changes (I've recently been reading about
the Aral Sea http://enrin.grida.no/aral/aralsea/english/arsea/
arsea.htm )
Basically I look back at the challenges and technological changes of
the last 100 years and don't think that a climate sensitivity of 3degC
is likely to produce a response that will act as a negative feedback
on our activities (unlike say a 10degC sensitivity). But throughout
the technological changes 1) our numbers have increased as we have
removed constraints (health-care etc), 2) fossil fuels have remained
our best option for energy in terms of 'energy recovered for energy
invested, 3) a greater absolute number of people have experienced an
increasing standard of living (given China and India as examples it's
reasonable to see this as leading to an proportionate increase).
PS CobblyWorlds - the alternate dimensions discovered by the Dogs in
Clifford Simak's "City" - a modernist fantasy that opens with the
death of Cities due to nuclear power providing energy too cheap to
meter. It seemed apt.
Hank,
>That's more likely that than we're as stupid as we appear to be acting
>on our own.
Surely we're acting like any animal does when you remove the
constraints on it's population.
Perhaps we're Cane Toads, not boiling frogs. ;)