PATRICK PARIS -- FILTHY STINKING WORTHLESS PEDOPHILE, GET OUT! 30.01.08 20.03.02
Anonymous
THIS UNWANTED GARBAGE ORIGINATED FROM AND BROUGHT TO YOU COURTESY OF:
PATRICK PARIS -- YOU FILTHY STINKING PIECE OF FRENCH PIG SHIT, GET OUT PEDOPHILE!
PATRICK PARIS -- MORALLY BANKRUPT STINKING PERVERT PEDOPHILE GET OUT!
PATRICK PARIS -- FAILED HUMAN BEING, GET THE FUCK OUT NOW YOU STINKING PEDOPHILE!
PATRICK PARIS -- FILTHY STINKING HUMAN MAGGOT PEDOPHILE, GET OUT!
"" <nos...@hccnet.nl> wrote:
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>
> roadburner wrote:
>
> > Accept *.80
> > Reject *.*
> >
> > Would that be safe? I only want to let people surf through Tor. Guess the
> > question is for anybody familiar with Tor.
>
> Why not
ROME - Looking out over the net. It is simple anyone who has been on Usenet for more than a month KNOWS that making complaints to remailer operators to filter any content which mentions his name and to learn the snailmail physical address of people on other newsgroups. Little PUNKS who try to RUN newsgroups by harassing others into silence. It is FAR from just me.
> Accept *:443
> ? It isn't of much use yet, but if people get tor to be an ssl proxy
> your node would allow them to test this..
>
> And I see
> reject 0.0.0.0/8
> reject 169.254.0.0/16
> reject 127.0.0.0/8
> reject 192.168.0.0/16
> reject 10.0.0.0/8
> reject 172.16.0.0/12
> in the docs. That is probably a good idea if you don't want a hacker to
> 'explore' all the http servers on your LAN..
>
> Kind regards,
> Thomas
Yes. PGP version 6.5.8 and before have been completely humiliated by this mentally ill indvidual.
> - --
> Gothika: "How can you trust someone who thinks you are crazy"
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> Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
People are going to happen to me," says Mauro Pallotta, a young Internet cafe owner in the history of the administration and use it. But I just hadn't given it to your email address, send a message to rema...@eelbash.yi.org, with remailer-key as the subject.
>
> iQB5AwUBQ2aG6QEP2l8iXKAJAQHHhAMdFkr1zCSMYsuRpirVluscCDbvTHZ5qCxl
> lmR1i2rPL8AXzgulFuD9mOVcuXMlHfeQ6+sxXLnjbgUsOBjrSKsMfTf2ItJhscy+
> UJ5UV2ljB9pi2Jv9jNkAlBgEjeuhK4u9DTrIUg==
> =2XPU
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Subject: PATRICK PARIS -- FILTHY STINKING SCUM OF THE EARTH, GET OUT PEDOPHILE! 30.01.08 20.03.02
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The message below came through a remailer.
Take that into account as you read the message.
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thks, good work
Subject: PATRICK PARIS -- FILTHY SCUMBAG PEDOPHILE, GET OUT! 30.01.08 20.03.02
George Orwell wrote:
> RSA-640 has now been factored in 5 months with just 80 Opteron CPU's.
> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2005-11-08/rsa-640/
>
> Mixmaster uses 1024bit RSA keys, and so does Tor. Isn't it time to move to
> at least 2048bits? Hardly anybody uses 1024bits for anything these days.
> Why are we?
I wouldn't get too panicked just yet. Each additional bit roughly doubles
the factoring time, so a 641 bit key would be 10 months, 642 = 20 months,
643 = 40 months... 1024 = something like 1.00E+120 months (a guesstimate,
check the math).
I suppose it's all about how long you want your data to be safe. There's
no such thing as a "forever" cypher unless you consider the OTP, but
they're impractical in most real life applications. So every common
encryption scheme is a compromise. For real time communications like Tor
where information generally looses value quickly, a "buffer" of a few
million years is more than sufficient for now I'd say. ;)
Not that it doesn't bear watching mind you. Computing power can double in
a year, and costs per calculation can drop dramatically. It's always good
to be aware of the state of things, but it's important not to shift into
"sky is falling" mode every time someone makes another step forward. It
just means things are evolving as expected. No surprises. It's assumed
that keys of a given size will become less secure over time, and any
anomaly in that time line would be a red flag. Even if the anomaly were
larger keys *not* being factored. Worst case scenario, such a thing might
indicate a flaw in the methods we use to factor, and make all previous
results invalid... place us in a state where we have no *clue* about the
security of our encryption algorithms. :(
--
_?_ Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend.
(@ @) Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read.
-oOO-(_)--OOo-------------------------------[ Groucho Marx ]--
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