CONF: What (Good) Is Historical Epistemology?
Clark, Stephen
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From: A Forum for Discussion of the History of the Philosophy of Science on behalf of Uljana Feest uljana...@tu-berlin.de
Sent: Thu 24/04/2008 08:10
To: HOP...@LISTSERV.VT.EDU
Subject: International Conference: What (Good) Is Historical Epistemology?
WHAT (GOOD) IS HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY?
International Conference, Max Planck Institute for the History of
Science, Berlin
July 24-26, 2008
Organizers: Thomas Sturm (Max Planck Institute for the History of
Science)
Uljana Feest (Technische Universität, Berlin)
Epistemology traditionally seeks to identify principles for the
evaluation of knowledge claims, while the history of science aims to
elucidate specific contexts of knowledge production. A recent
alternative beyond this divide, appealed to mostly by historians of
science, has been named "historical epistemology". This raises two
basic questions: What kind of historical enterprise is historical
epistemology? Conversely, in what sense is it a form of epistemology?
These questions will be addressed at the conference, which is
structured around issues of (1) epistemic concepts and practices, (2)
epistemic objects, and (3) the dynamics of scientific research.
For a more extensive description, see below.
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Participation is free, but space is limited. To register, please
contact Thomas Sturm: tst...@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de
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Program
July 24
10.00-12.00 a.m.
(I) Epistemic Concepts and Practices
Jutta Schickore (Bloomington): "Experimental Practice in Historical
Perspective"
Thomas Sturm (Berlin): "Perception and Judgment - Historical
Epistemology or History of Epistemology?"
Commentator: Lorraine Daston (Berlin)
1.30-3.30 p.m.
M. Norton Wise (Los Angeles): "On the Historicity of Scientific
Explanation"
Michael Heidelberger (Tübingen): "Plurality and/or Historicity of
Causes"
Commentator: Sandra Mitchell (Pittsburgh)
4.30-6.30 p.m.
(II) Epistemic Objects
Theodore Arabatzis (Athens): "The Historicity of Scientific
Objects: From Cathode Rays to Electrons"
Hasok Chang (London): "The Evolution of Epistemic Objects"
Commentator: Hans-Joerg Rheinberger (Berlin)
July 25
10.00-12.00 a.m.
(II) Epistemic Objects (cont'd)
Margaret Schabas (Vancouver): "The Economy as an Epistemic Object"
Uljana Feest (Berlin): "Remembering Memory: The Death of an Epistemic
Object?"
Commentator: Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (Witten)
1.30-3.30 p.m.
(III) The Dynamics of Scientific Research
Michael Friedman (Stanford): "Extending the Dynamics of Reason:
Generalizing a Post-Kuhnian approach to the History and Philosophy of
Science"
Peter Barker (Oklahama): "The Cognitive Structure of Scientific
Revolutions"
Commentator: Jürgen Renn (Berlin)
6.00-8.00 p.m.
Keynote Address: Philip Kitcher (New York): "Epistemology without
History is Blind"
July 26
9.30-12.30 a.m.
(IV) Reflections: Historiographical and Epistemological
Mary Tiles (Manoa): "Is Historical Epistemology Part of the
'Modernist Settlement'?"
Martin Kusch (Cambridge, UK): "Historical Epistemology and Styles of
Reasoning: A Critique"
Barry Stroud (Berkeley): "The Value of a Historically Oriented
Epistemology"
Commentator: Catherine Wilson (New York)
2.00-3.30 p.m.
*Panel: What Have We Learned? Anything Historical? Anything
Epistemological?*
Chairs: Uljana Feest & Thomas Sturm
Wolfgang Carl (Göttingen), Jean-Francois Braunstein (Paris), Daniel
Garber (Princeton), Robert J. Richards (Chicago)
General description
The central purpose of epistemology, as traditionally understood, is
to identify and justify the epistemic basis of knowledge, including
scientific knowledge. While epistemology in this sense is one of the
strongest branches of contemporary philosophy, its universalizing
approach has been criticized in various ways. In particular, it has
been suggested that knowledge is always situated in a context
(biological, social, historical, material) and that epistemology
cannot afford to ignore the features of this context. In this vein,
recent decades have seen the emergence of naturalized, social, or
feminist epistemologies.
One particular kind of challenge to traditional epistemology has been
named "historical epistemology". Contrary to the other "alternative"
epistemologies just mentioned, it is not widely known or discussed by
contemporary Anglo-American philosophers, but has in recent years
been appealed to mostly by historians of science. Proponents of such
an approach have proceeded by looking at (a) the histories of
epistemic concepts (e.g., observation, rationality, probability), (b)
the histories of the objects of scientific inquiry (e.g., heredity,
life, temperature) or (c) the dynamics of scientific developments, as
they can be extracted from an analysis of scientific texts or practices.
However, historical epistemology may also be pursued as a
philosophical project, namely one that thoroughly historicizes
epistemology. It starts from the assumption that the standards and
forms of what can count as knowledge have histories, which interact
with various kinds of knowledge, most especially scientific
knowledge. Such a project may then take at least two different
directions: (1) One might claim that current epistemological
questions and the standard philosophical methods of answering them
are only historically relative, and no more valid than those of other
times and places. (2) Or one might reject the assumption that to
historicize is to relativize, and instead unsettle current
epistemological questions and methods by exploring, in a serious
historical vein, earlier alternatives in their own philosophical and
scientific frameworks.
All of these construals of historical epistemology are faced with
challenges. For example, even if its aim is "merely" historical, the
choices of concepts, objects, and dynamics under study give rise to
historiographical puzzles not only about the status and identity
conditions of objects and concepts over time, but also regarding the
methods by which historical developments are best to be studied.
What, then, is the relationship (if any) between historical
epistemology and the methodological turns towards the practices and
material cultures of science? Furthermore, from the perspective of
the history and philosophy of science, it may be asked what
contributions historical epistemology has to make towards a genuinely
philosophically informed history of science and/or to a genuinely
historically informed philosophy of science. Historians of
philosophy, again, have already for a while accepted the historicity
of epistemological questions and their dependence upon past science.
They also often acknowledge the possibility of replacing or reforming
currently dominant questions in epistemology by looking at their
history. Does historical epistemology offer any insights in addition
to these developments within the history of epistemology? Last but
not least, philosophical epistemologists might object that the goal
of identifying and justifying the epistemic basis of knowledge most
likely cannot be achieved by asking historical questions about past
science. Can a case be made that historical epistemology is a
philosophically sophisticated project?
In these and other ways, the notion of historical epistemology brings
to the fore a variety of debates that are located at the interface
between philosophy and the history of science. The basic goal of the
conference is to improve these debates by making more precise, and
put to the test, different versions of historical epistemology.
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