Call for papers

Tax competition: how to meet the normative and political challenge

Workshop at the Université de Montréal

August 28-29, 2008

Deadline for abstracts: 31st March 2008

Abstract length: 750 words

On the back of technological change and the end of exchange controls,
capital mobility has over the last 30 or so years led to increasing tax
competition. By lowering tax rates on individual savings as well as on
corporate income, governments hope to attract portfolio investment and
productive capital to their constituencies. Empirical research has shown
that individual countries do not always benefit from tax competition, but
might gain from cooperation. In determining what form this cooperation
should take, two questions are of central importance:
1)    What are the normative principles that should underlie such
international cooperation on fiscal policy? Simultaneously, what other,
conflicting normative principles does such international cooperation have to
respect?
2)    Which policies stand the best chance of implementing the selected
normative principles in practice?

The aim of the workshop is to critically assess existing answers to these
questions and potentially to come up with new solutions. In bringing
together researchers from economics, law, and philosophy, the workshop hopes
to build on synergies between the different perspectives of these
disciplines that have not been previously seized upon.

Confirmed keynote speakers:
Reuven Avi-Yonah (Law School, University of Michigan): ³The OECD harmful tax
competition report: a 10th anniversary retrospective²
Philipp Genschel (Political Science, Universität Bremen): ³Tax competition
and democracy in the EU²
Richard Murphy (Tax Justice Network, UK): ³Tax competition: the view from
the Crown Dependencies²
Michael Webb (Political Science, University of Victoria): ³Understanding and
overcoming the neglect of distributional questions in the OECD¹s response to
international tax competition²

Tax competition: the themes of the debate
1)    Tax competition significantly affects the distribution of income both
within and between countries. Cosmopolitan theories of justice propose to
evaluate the resulting inequalities without attributing any normative
significance to national boundaries. On the other hand, should sovereign
states not be able, with certain limits, to set fiscal policy according to
their citizens¹ preferences about the size of government? How do we
reconcile these two perspectives?
2)    Does tax competition promote efficiency? If so, which kind of
efficiency? For example, does competitive pressure on governments make them
less wasteful? Alternatively, does tax competition promote the maximisation
of social welfare? What is the normative status of these objectives?
3)    Where to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate tax
policies? For instance, are non-differentiation rules that exclude
ring-fencing and other forms of targeted tax holidays sufficient? What are
the prospects of, say, the European Union (EU) or the Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) implementing a satisfactory
answer to this type of question?
4)    Addressing the negative aspects of tax competition is likely to
require different measures in the contexts of taxing individuals as opposed
to companies. Residence-based taxation of the former may be combined with
some form of source-based taxation of the latter. What can we learn from the
important questions of feasibility that act as side-constraints on these
policy choices?
5)    A related and complementary phenomenon to the competition on tax rates
is the competition on banking regulations. For instance, tax havens are
known for their bank secrecy laws. On the one hand, these laws are defended
in the name of liberty. Yet, on the other hand, they facilitate tax evasion.
To what extent does fiscal cooperation have to include cooperation on
regulatory frameworks to be effective?
6)    Arguably, co-operation on tax competition would be in many countries¹
best interest, except for those tax havens that actually benefit from the
status quo. At what cost should the international community attempt to
persuade the countries in question to join a multilateral agreement? Is
there a point at which positive incentives should give way to sanctions?
7)    Calls for a World Tax Authority might be justified, but always have a
utopian flavour to them. What are the prospects of meeting the normative and
political challenge of tax competition based on multilateral, but not
universal, co-operation on fiscal policy?

Organisation of the workshop
Since the principal aim of the workshop is to have a sustained discussion on
some of the above issues, the number of participants will be limited.
Presentations will be grouped together according to topic, allowing
sufficient time for an in-depth discussion of each paper. The presence of
paper givers throughout the workshop will be essential.

Please send a detailed abstract of about 750 words and a short CV to:

Peter.diet...@umontreal.ca

by March 31st 2008.

Sincerely,
Peter Dietsch

--
Peter Dietsch, PhD
Professeur Adjoint, Assistant Professor
Département de Philosophie de l'Université de Montréal
C.P.6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montréal, Québec
Canada H3C 3J7
tél.    +1 514 343 6482
téléc.  +1 514 343 7899
peter.diet...@umontreal.ca
http://www.philo.umontreal.ca
http://www.creum.umontreal.ca

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