[analytic-borders] metaphysical art
wittgensteinian_debianista
(Actually, I'm posting this to Wittgenstein-Dialognet as well, but my
posts seem to take quite awhile to show up.)
Here's another shot at new topics for discussion. I welcome any
comments. I am interested in the following remark from Wittgenstein
both in terms of the language of discussing art and in what insight it
might offer in understanding his use of "metaphysical".
"It is queer that Busch's drawings can often be called 'metaphysical'.
Is there such a thing as a metaphysical style of drawing then? --
'Seen against the background of the eternal', you might say. However
these strokes have such meaning only within a whole language. And it
is a language without grammar; you couldn't say what its rules are."
(CV 75e)
I note that this does not seem in the least pejorative, contrary to
the mistaken but widespread assumption that "metaphysics" must be a
dirty word to Wittgenstein.
For those unfamiliar with Busch: http://rivertext.com/busch.shtml
http://www.lambiek.net/artists/b/busch.htm
There is the "scuola metafisica" art movement, founded by Girogio di
Chrico, whose paintings, peculiar as it may sound, fascinated me as a
small child. Here, isolated silhouetted figures or their shadows,
porticos drawn from multiple perspectives, jaundiced palettes,
mannequins, gloves that are filled with nothing, and other
juxtapositions suggest to me now a sense that could be compared to
foreboding, disorientation, nausea, which could be compared to the
feeling of metaphysical confusion - or bad sausages. But this is
nothing like how one would describe the work of Wilhelm Busch. Busch
is light and lively, energetic, whimsical.
There is something in Busch that can be compared to ink drawings by
great Zen masters. Here the marks are taken to convey a sense of
clarity, complete focus on the moment without hesitation. There is an
assertiveness and spontaneity to many of Busch's marks that suggest a
similar clarity.
Whether or not Wittgenstein had studied Zen art, he certainly would
have had some sympathy with the idea.
"If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but
timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the
present." (TLP 6.4311)
Perhaps this is what he means by "Seen against the background of the
eternal."
This seems not quite right though, as he says, "these strokes have
such meaning only within a whole language." The strokes could signify
such a state of mind even apart from what they are used to represent,
but they cannot represent apart from their relationship to other marks.
I am thinking about individual marks as fertile with endless
possibilities of representation, and as in that sense suggesting the
eternal, the timelessness of logical possibility.
"A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it
represents." (TLP 2.201)
"The possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of
expression, is contained in the logic of depiction." (TLP 4.015)
In a sense, the single line can convey the "logic of depiction", the
possibility of all sorts of imagery, the possibility of all manner of
situations.
But, "you couldn't say what its rules are." This is particularly true
of Busch's energetic, spontaneous, and often whimsical style, though
it is also true of drawing generally. Consider however an example of a
style that could be said to have a grammar. I am thinking of the
"academe", a highly disciplined style of figure drawing in which
students were trained first in making line for line copies of
Renaissance engravings and etchings and the making drawings in black
chalk from plaster casts of classical sculpture, all the while being
taught precise rules for what sort of line was appropriate for a
particular purpose. This style is best known today through the
drawings of Pierre-Paul Prud'hon
http://www.clevelandart.org/explore/artistwork.asp?searchText=Prud&tab=1&recNo=0&woRecNo=0
It is a testament to Prud'hon's genius that he produced quite
compelling and distinctive work within such a restrictive style. There
are countless examples of inferior work by lesser artists that equally
conform to the standard. In fact, Prud'hon broke with some of the
standards
http://www.art.net/~rebecca/OnPrudon1a.html
But it is an indication of the rigidity of the style that Prud'hon's
variations are considered noteworthy.
Compared to the academe, Busch's drawing is chaos through and through.
One gets the sense of complete improvisation, not only from the
obvious speed with which many of the lines are drawn (though some
lines are slow and suggest "taking a line for a walk," as Klee
suggested) but from the variety of uses to which different sorts of
line are put. And this calls to mind the vast possibilities of line.
Of course, the academe is exceptional in its rigidity and many great
artists were quite spontaneous. Rembrandt, for example, draws in a way
that often defines formulization (and the works of his lesser
students, which show the flourish without the substance, illustrate
this). In Rembrandt, a single line is at one point a contour, at
another, the shadow attached to a form, and at yet another point
describes volume as a cross-contour, like a topographical map.
One way that Rembrandt differs is this: rather like Jastrow's
duck-rabbit or the Maltese cross, one finds two choices. One can
attend to the character of the lines or one can attend to the subject
matter depicted. With Busch we find both always present.
Contrast again with Klee (a painter who is quite readily considered
"metaphysical"). With Klee, there is no question of attending to the
form or to the content. This circle does not describe the Sun; it is
the Sun. In Klee's world. This line doesn't describe a leg or
represent a leg. It is a leg. One often feels not the slightest
inclination to imagine the how Klee's subjects "really" looked, as if
the painting were pointing to something else. The worlds of Klee are
self-contained.
But Busch's subjects are often very much things in this world. The
means of representing them assert themselves side by side with what
they represent. the two mingle freely as if in a dance.
"The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction
between factual and conceptual investigations." (Z 458)
"Philosophers often behave like little children, who some marks on a
piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up "What's that?" --
It happens like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child
several times and said: "this is a man", "this is a house", etc. And
then the child makes some marks too and asks: what's _this_ then?" (CV
17e)
Is the "metaphysical" character that Wittgenstein saw in Busch's
drawings that, in the assertiveness and inventiveness of his marks, we
may be reminded of just this sort of thing?
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Get to your groups with one click. Know instantly when new email arrives
http://us.click.yahoo.com/.7bhrC/MGxNAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~->
---
http://analytic.ontologically.com/
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic-borders/
Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic-borders/
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
analytic-borde...@yahoogroups.com
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
bruce denner
--- wittgensteinian_debianista
<wittgensteini...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Here's another shot at new topics for discussion. I
> welcome any
> comments. I am interested in the following remark
> from Wittgenstein
> both in terms of the language of discussing art and
> in what insight it
> might offer in understanding his use of
> "metaphysical".
The is one of the most interesting posts I've read in
the longest time. Give me some time. It needs study.
bruce
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Great things are happening at Yahoo! Groups. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/TISQkA/hOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
> The is one of the most interesting posts I've read in
> the longest time.
Thank you. I'd hoped a change of subject might enrich the list. I'm
pleased it hasn't simply been ignored.
Give me some time.
Certainly. I shall look forward to your comments, when and if.
It needs study.
Thank you. I'll be intrigued to know what you come up with.
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Yahoo! Groups gets a make over. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/XISQkA/lOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 6/5/2006 11:03:03 PM Pacific Standard Time,
wittgensteini...@yahoo.com writes:
"It is queer that Busch's drawings can often be called 'metaphysical'"
Is there such a thing as a metaphysical style of drawing then? --
'Seen against the background of the eternal', you might say. However
these strokes have such meaning only within a whole language. And it
is a language without grammar; you couldn't say what its rules are."
(CV 75e)
As Bruce says, this is interesting stuff. Like many others, I suppose, I
have attempted to find the grammar of art.
I might take Wittgenstein's remarks to mean that art as a whole is a
language without a grammar (at least in the sense that German has a grammar). The
remark he makes is too cryptic to bear much weight of interpretation, of
course. But consider the range of what constitutes art: from rather fixed formula
art to plop art (tubular sculptures that can be plopped down in any park,
providing empty art for park users), and then to performance art like the artist
who once went up on a hill over Los Angeles and fired a .22 rifle at an
airliner. As Clem Snide sings in "Something Beautiful," "I want to change all the
rules so no one else else can play." That sounds anti-grammatical. And yet
there is an attempt to communicate something (what gets communicated by art
isn't clear).
We can describe a particular act of art. We can talk about the grammar of
the Mona Lisa, maybe. But perhaps we are limited in what can we say about the
"whole language"?
When we extend the concept of "language" to include art, something happens.
Those are my deep thoughts, as Jack Handy used to claim.
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Check out the new improvements in Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/6pRQfA/fOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
I'm pleased you could chime in. I still hope that others will also.
> "It is queer that Busch's drawings can often be called 'metaphysical'"
> Is there such a thing as a metaphysical style of drawing then? --
> 'Seen against the background of the eternal', you might say. However
> these strokes have such meaning only within a whole language. And it
> is a language without grammar; you couldn't say what its rules are."
> (CV 75e)
>
>
> As Bruce says, this is interesting stuff.
Thank you. I'd hoped it would be, though I had my suspicions that this
might be of interest to no one but me.
Like many others, I suppose, I
> have attempted to find the grammar of art.
Ah, yes. Personally, I find this temptation to be to the semiotician
what the craving for generality is to the philosopher. Generally, my
tendency is to emphasize the differences between music or drawing and
spoken or written languages. However, when naive resemblance theory
rears its head, it is worthwhile to emphasize the similarity between
pictorial arts and languages - the extent to which conventions play a
role in representation rather than any natural resemblance between a
drawing and what it depicts.
>
> I might take Wittgenstein's remarks to mean that art as a whole is a
> language without a grammar (at least in the sense that German has a
grammar).
If that were his claim, I would certainly concur.
But at what point do you see a transition from discussing Busch to
discussing art as a whole, even graphic, pictorial art?
I don't read it that way at all, but looking again, I can see how one
might.
I should make clear my own bias. To the extent that I'd speak of
pictorial art on the model of language, it would be as styles and
periods reflecting distinct languages with distinct means of
representation and concomitant aesthetic standards. Following
Wolfflin, I take artists of the High Renaissance and the Neo-Classical
to be speaking a language (or two related languages) quite different
from that of the Baroque and the Romantic periods.
And even a single work, particularly a modern work, may be a
self-contained language. The "whole language" to which Wittgenstein
refers here is something I take to be a work taken as a whole with the
standards that it sets up internally, the individual strokes having
meaning only in that language.
Certainly, I would resist the supposition that the marks only had
meaning alongside the entire history of art.
The
> remark he makes is too cryptic to bear much weight of interpretation,
I agree. Although I do think I've offerred a somewaht substantive and
plausible reading, I certainly don't think that the remark provides
enough to exclude quite a few alternatives.
One thing that might have been helpful, had he intended the remark for
public consumption, would have been to identify particular works of
Busch's that stood out to him as "metaphysical."
As it stands and for my own part, I've chosen to look at formal
characteristics (the emphasis on "strokes" and the comparison with
language don't suggest to me a comment about subject matter) that set
apart those works of Busch's that seem distinctly his (as opposed to
those drawings whose draughtsmanly means might as easily have been
found in Daumier. Hogarth, or another early cartoonist).
of
> course. But consider the range of what constitutes art: from rather
fixed formula
> art to plop art (tubular sculptures that can be plopped down in any
park,
> providing empty art for park users), and then to performance art
like the artist
> who once went up on a hill over Los Angeles and fired a .22 rifle
at an
> airliner. As Clem Snide sings in "Something Beautiful," "I want to
change all the
> rules so no one else else can play." That sounds anti-grammatical.
And yet
> there is an attempt to communicate something (what gets
communicated by art
> isn't clear).
I won't go into my own views on such things except to say that I've
gotten the sense that Wittgenstein was even more the cultural
conservative (neither of us in the Religious Right sense, mind you)
than I am. But I'm sure he'd have accepted that the use of "art" has
expanded in a variety of directions, for good or ill.
>
> We can describe a particular act of art. We can talk about the
grammar of
> the Mona Lisa, maybe.
Or even of an entire epoch, though I'd note that Mona Lisa helped to
shape its epoch, with its many technical and representational innovations.
But perhaps we are limited in what can we say about the
> "whole language"?
Unquestionably, we are severely limited if we take "whole language" as
you do.
>
> When we extend the concept of "language" to include art, something
happens.
Yes, new comparisons, new analogies, and with them new confusions arise.
>
> Those are my deep thoughts, as Jack Handy used to claim.
Thank you.
My favorite Jack Handy:
"We tend to scoff at the beliefs of the ancients. But we can't scoff
at them personally, to their faces, and this is what annoys me."
(Not that I agree with it)
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Great things are happening at Yahoo! Groups. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/TISQkA/hOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
bruce denner
myself on this List, I feel that I'm playing hooky
turning to art -- well, a sense that I speculate.
Recently, under the influence of a musical scholar
friend I've been listening to Schonberg's 1912
_Pierrot Lunaire_, Not for the faint of heart, I'll
tell you. A vocal/ensemble piece written, as I
understand, almost formulaic, but with the fascinating
instruction to the vocalist "not to sing nor speak"
and yet voice.
As if he, forgive for putting it this way, creates a
grammar only to deconstruct it. From the liner notes.
Schonberg set himself in opposition to one of the
fundamental tendencies of our century, that of
transferring speech into a medium for the precise
communication of knowledge on the one hand and into a
reservoir of nonbinding private metaphors on the
other.
bruce
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Yahoo! Groups gets a make over. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/XISQkA/lOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
> Given all the unread Posts and the hole I've dug for
> myself on this List, I feel that I'm playing hooky
> turning to art -- well, a sense that I speculate.
Interestingly, while I am having some difficulty connecting this
directly with my previous post about Wittgenstein's thoughts on Busch,
I do see connections with the rule-following discussion. We shall see.
>
> Recently, under the influence of a musical scholar
> friend I've been listening to Schonberg's 1912
> _Pierrot Lunaire_, Not for the faint of heart, I'll
> tell you. A vocal/ensemble piece written, as I
> understand, almost formulaic,
You may wish to check with the person who'd imparted this
understanding. This is a tricky point, but there is a difference
between "formulaic" and "composed according to strict rules".
"Formulaic" as applied to the arts invariably has a negative
connotation. (Actually, "invariably" may be too strong: some
Post-Modernism celebrates the formulaic through pastiche, but that's a
noteworthy exception.) It is used as a rough synonym with "hackneyed",
"imitative". and "cliched".
A few points:
First, one seldom sees a work by the 20th century Viennese School
(Schoenberg, Berg, Webern) that is purely composed according to the
rules of dodecaphony. Those rules are broken freely for aesthetic effect.
Second, even where there is strict conformity to the rules of
Twelve-Tone composition, one must remember that Schoenberg defined
those rules. It would be rather queer to call "imitative" conformity
to a set of rules one had set for oneself.
(Still, I can't help but recall this gem from Picasso: "To copy others
is necessary, but to copy oneself is pathetic.")
Third, and this is the key point, it is entirely possible that a very
strict set of rules should permit great room for creativity and
innovation. For example, Bach's fugues (I choose the example in part
because the rules of Twelve-Tone music are similar to the rules of the
Baroque fugue in many respects.), particularly his later fugues, which
are actually more strict, are noted for their originality of
expression in contrast with anything that had gone before.
It is easy to compose a fugue. It is far more difficult to compose one
that stands out as art rather than being a tiresome exercise.
but with the fascinating
> instruction to the vocalist "not to sing nor speak"
> and yet voice.
Interesting, I've been told that it is often easier for an
inexperienced singer to get the right effect than for a classical
trained vocalist. Popular vocalists like Sinatra, Johnny Cash, and Lou
Reed produced good approximations of Sprechstimme, though I doubt any
of them had heard the phrase.
>
> As if he, forgive for putting it this way, creates a
> grammar only to deconstruct it.
I'm not certain what you mean by this. But it should be noted that his
instructions of Sprechstimme aren't at all paradoxical if you read his
full explication:
The melody given in the Sprechstimme by means for notes is not
intended for singing (except for specially marked isolated
exceptions). The task of the performer is to transform it into a
speech-melody, taking into acount the given pitch. this is achieved by:
I. Maintaining the rhythm as accurately as if one were singing, i.e.
with no more freedom than would be allowed with singing melody;
II. Becoming acutely aware of the difference between singing tone and
speaking tone: singing tone unalterably stays on the pitch, whereas
speaking tone gives the pitch but immediately leaves it again by
falling or rising. However, the performer must be very careful not to
adopt a singsong speech pattern. That is not intended at all. Nor
should one strive for realistic, natural speech. On the contrary, the
difference between ordinary speaking and speaking that contributes to
a musical form should become quite obvious. but it must never be
reminiscent of singing.
Moreover, I stress the following concerning performances:
It is never the task of performers to recreate the mood and character
of the individual pieces on the basis of the meaning of the words, but
rather solely on the basis of the music. the extent to which the
tone-painting-like rendering of the events and emotions of the text
was important to the author is already found in the music. where the
performer finds it lacking, he should abstain from presenting
something that was not intended by the author. He would not be adding,
but rather detracting.
From the liner notes.
>
> Schonberg set himself in opposition to one of the
> fundamental tendencies of our century, that of
> transferring speech into a medium for the precise
> communication of knowledge on the one hand and into a
> reservoir of nonbinding private metaphors on the
> other.
I wish you'd provide more context for this remark, because as it
stands, it's not at all clear what is being said.
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Check out the new improvements in Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/6pRQfA/fOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 6/17/2006 11:32:27 PM Pacific Standard Time,
gnobian...@gmail.com writes:
Gary wrote:
>Like many others, I suppose, I
> have attempted to find the grammar of art.
Ah, yes. Personally, I find this temptation to be to the semiotician
what the craving for generality is to the philosopher. Generally, my
tendency is to emphasize the differences between music or drawing and
spoken or written languages. However, when naive resemblance theory
rears its head, it is worthwhile to emphasize the similarity between
pictorial arts and languages - the extent to which conventions play a
role in representation rather than any natural resemblance between a
drawing and what it depicts.
That looks useful to me. Thanks for the cogent reply.
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Great things are happening at Yahoo! Groups. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/TISQkA/hOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
> >Like many others, I suppose, I
> > have attempted to find the grammar of art.
>
> Ah, yes. Personally, I find this temptation to be to the semiotician
> what the craving for generality is to the philosopher. Generally, my
> tendency is to emphasize the differences between music or drawing and
> spoken or written languages. However, when naive resemblance theory
> rears its head, it is worthwhile to emphasize the similarity between
> pictorial arts and languages - the extent to which conventions play a
> role in representation rather than any natural resemblance between a
> drawing and what it depicts.
>
>
> That looks useful to me. Thanks for the cogent reply.
>
Thank you. I have a few more thoughts on that. When Wittgenstein
speaks in terms of similes of art and language, I have far less
objection than when, e.g. Goodman does. And this isn't merely the bias
of a Wittgensteinian. Wittgenstein already uses "language" and
"grammar" to include a a variety of practices, like pointing,
counting, measuring, comparing swatches, using diagrams and signs, et
al, that many semioticians do not include under discussions of
"language", per se, i.e. a formal system of sounds and marks that can
be analyzed and classified in various ways. Where the semiotician goes
wrong is in attempting to fit this very specific system of analysis
onto something for which it was not designed, so we are left with
things like Goodman's expressions "syntactic density" and "semantic
density", which implicitly acknowledge the differences while
pretending that it notions of syntax and semantics apply at all.
In Wittgenstein's broad use, it is not at all confused to call art and
language. And it then makes sense to say of a particular language
(Busch's art) that it lacks a grammar. Pictorial art with a definite
grammar, clear rules for how the elements are used, might be the cut
out silhouette. Here, the relationship between the black paper and the
background and what it represents, what each edge of the paper is
supposed to represent (the edge of a cross-section of the visual field
that encloses the subject) is clear.
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Check out the new improvements in Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/6pRQfA/fOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
Pictorial art with a definite
> grammar, clear rules for how the elements are used, might be the cut
> out silhouette. Here, the relationship between the black paper and the
> background and what it represents, what each edge of the paper is
> supposed to represent (the edge of a cross-section of the visual field
> that encloses the subject) is clear.
PS I've always liked the story of the Corinthian maid, recounted in
Pliny's Natural History, who invented drawing by tracing the shadow
cast on the wall by her soon to be separated beloved. And not because
it is a likely inspiration for the Myth of the Cave. (Art then is
tracing the shadow cast by another shadow, an imitation of an
imitation.) While of course, it is completely speculative, it presents
such a neat and tidy view of the development of pictorial form that
one cannot help being tempted by it. Drawing has its roots in a
primitive sort of photography! I am sure this has even more appeal to
a modern man than even to the ancients. Of course, archaeology does
not support outlines predating stick figures and the earliest
pictorial representations of which we're aware cannot have been done
in close proximity to their subjects, but still, isn't it a lovely story?
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Great things are happening at Yahoo! Groups. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/TISQkA/hOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
bruce denner
--- gnobianken00bie <gnobian...@gmail.com> wrote:
> In Wittgenstein's broad use, it is not at all
confused to call art >and language.
what? Something is missing or I'm missing it.
>And it then makes sense to say of a particular
language
> (Busch's art) that it lacks a grammar.
Gary asks somewhere whether this is an instance of a
private language. I'm also uncertain what it means to
say a language (a particular art expression, form,
style) lacks a grammar.
Should I take it to mean that there are certain
criteria for grammar to be in place and in their
absence, there is no grammar?
Or is grammar a concept applied, like morality lets
say? You may, but I may not, see any purpose, sense,
in applying "morality" to in a particular case.
bruce
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
See what's inside the new Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/2pRQfA/bOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
> > In Wittgenstein's broad use, it is not at all
> confused to call art >and language.
>
> what? Something is missing or I'm missing it.
"And" should be "a".
>
> >And it then makes sense to say of a particular
> language
> > (Busch's art) that it lacks a grammar.
>
> Gary asks somewhere whether this is an instance of a
> private language. I'm also uncertain what it means to
> say a language (a particular art expression, form,
> style) lacks a grammar.
>
> Should I take it to mean that there are certain
> criteria for grammar to be in place and in their
> absence, there is no grammar?
>
> Or is grammar a concept applied, like morality lets
> say? You may, but I may not, see any purpose, sense,
> in applying "morality" to in a particular case.
>
We're extending a metaphor and the sense of the metaphor has been
developed in discussing Prud'hon and silhouettes.
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Check out the new improvements in Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/6pRQfA/fOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
PS You'll also see that I addressed the issue yesterday and the
criterion Wittgenstein seems to apply and point out that elsewhere he
later seems to reject such a criterion.
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, "gnobianken00bie"
<gnobianken00bie@...> wrote:
>
> Bruce,
>
> > > In Wittgenstein's broad use, it is not at all
> > confused to call art >and language.
> >
> > what? Something is missing or I'm missing it.
>
> "And" should be "a".
>
> >
> > >And it then makes sense to say of a particular
> > language
> > > (Busch's art) that it lacks a grammar.
> >
> > Gary asks somewhere whether this is an instance of a
> > private language. I'm also uncertain what it means to
> > say a language (a particular art expression, form,
> > style) lacks a grammar.
> >
> > Should I take it to mean that there are certain
> > criteria for grammar to be in place and in their
> > absence, there is no grammar?
> >
> > Or is grammar a concept applied, like morality lets
> > say? You may, but I may not, see any purpose, sense,
> > in applying "morality" to in a particular case.
> >
>
> We're extending a metaphor and the sense of the metaphor has been
> developed in discussing Prud'hon and silhouettes.
>
> Take care,
>
> John
>
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Yahoo! Groups gets a make over. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/XISQkA/lOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
bruce denner
--- gnobianken00bie <gnobian...@gmail.com> wrote:
> PS You'll also see that I addressed the issue
> yesterday and the criterion Wittgenstein seems to
apply and point out
> that elsewhere he later seems to reject such a
criterion.
If you gave me a reference in the __PI__, I'd be even
more indebted to you.
That is, the criteria for having or not having a
grammar.
bruce
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Something is new at Yahoo! Groups. Check out the enhanced email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/SISQkA/gOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
> > PS You'll also see that I addressed the issue
> > yesterday and the criterion Wittgenstein seems to
> apply and point out
> > that elsewhere he later seems to reject such a
> criterion.
>
> If you gave me a reference in the __PI__, I'd be even
> more indebted to you.
> That is, the criteria for having or not having a
> grammar.
You won't find such a thing in the Philosophical Investigations for
this simple reason: The PI is concerned primarily with spoken and
written languages which obviously do have a grammar, and only
concerned with pictures and the like as the function as adjuncts to
language games that are primarily spoken or written. So the issue of
whether pictures, per se, have a grammar does not arise.
However, in the remark on Busch's art from CV, he seems to be saying
that because we cannot say what the rules are, the language (of
Busch's drawing) has no grammar. This seems to be suggesting that our
ability to say what the rules are is a criterion for the presence of a
grammar. But this is at variance with discussions of rule-following in
the PI, specifically PI 83, as I noted yesterday in this post:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic-borders/message/4155?l=1
In any case, we are talking about a metaphorical use of the word
"grammar" when we apply it to art. I've suggested examples, based on
my own extension of the metaphor, such as Prud'hon and the academe and
silhouettes, that we might say exhibit more of what we might call a
"grammar" and contrasted these with Busch's approach, in which the
relationships between various design elements and what is represented
is much less clear, in hopes of bringing out the point of the remark.
But I would also say that, if we are to use such a metaphor, we are
speaking of degrees, not of straightforward presence or absence of
grammar: the grammar metaphor fits well here, much less well there.
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
See what's inside the new Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/2pRQfA/bOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
bruce denner
--- gnobianken00bie <gnobian...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You won't find such a thing in the Philosophical
> Investigations for this simple reason: The PI is
concerned >primarily with spoken and written languages
which obviously do >have a grammar,
OK- reasonable.
> However, in the remark on Busch's art from CV, he
> seems to be saying that because we cannot say what
the rules >are, the language (of Busch's drawing) has
no grammar. This >seems to be suggesting that our
ability to say what the rules are >is a criterion for
the presence of a grammar.
I was wondering, if I figured out the rules for
Busch's composition, what sort of rules, or what
complexity would satisfy the criterion for presence of
grammar? Would Busch need to know them?
> In any case, we are talking about a metaphorical use
of the >word "grammar" when we apply it to art
And LW's use? "Essence is expressed by grammar",
"Grammar tell us what kind of object anything is.
Theology as grammar."
If I think of grammar as what I learned in the primary
grades, then the above use sounds metaphorical to me.
bruce
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Check out the new improvements in Yahoo! Groups email.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/6pRQfA/fOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
> I was wondering, if I figured out the rules for
> Busch's composition, what sort of rules, or what
> complexity would satisfy the criterion for presence of
> grammar?
That's an interesting question, but rather misplaced in my estimation.
We are dealing with a metaphor and we can at most say that the
metaphor is fitting. By presenting reasons for saying the opposite,
that the art does have a grammar, you would be showing the respects in
which a contrasting metaphor fits. Equally? Moreso? We don't have
rules for measuring such things, though we could say that the extent
to which you'd found regularity in his practice, to that extent, the
metaphor, "Busch's art is a language with a grammar," would be a
fitting one. But to the extent that another might point out other
examples, e.g. the academe, the silhouette, that exhibit greater
regularity, we could say that these fit better and that Busch's art
does not have a grammar in the sense that these do.
Metaphors can be discussed, even debated, and they are answerable to
reasons, but they are not the sort of thing assertion that can be
straightforwardly justified or refuted.
Would Busch need to know them?
If we are following the use of "grammar" in its most familiar context,
then the answer is no, not necessarily. Many people speak
grammatically, following what could be described as rather complex
rules, even rules that no grammarian may have ever taught, without
being able to articulate those rules.
But then we are back to an answer I gave elsewhere, that it depends on
how we are using "know". And in the case of grammar (as it is most
familiarly used), we can see why we might be tempted to say that a
person who speaks immaculate English does after all know the rules of
grammar, calling this tacit knowledge, even if that person cannot
articulate those rules. But we can also see why we might be tempted to
say that he does not.
For what it's worth, putting myself in Busch's shoes, using my own
experience as an artist (without supposing that my meagre talents and
dilletante efforts are in any fashion comparable), I can imagine he'd
answer such an exposition of the rules he was using with a mixture of
delight and disappointment.
"I had tried, had hoped, to do something novel at each turn, to never
be complacent, but challenge myself to always respond in new ways to
my subject. How remarkable that, for all my efforts, a formula for all
that I've done could be expressed!"
>
> > In any case, we are talking about a metaphorical use
> of the >word "grammar" when we apply it to art
>
> And LW's use? "Essence is expressed by grammar",
> "Grammar tell us what kind of object anything is.
> Theology as grammar."
>
> If I think of grammar as what I learned in the primary
> grades, then the above use sounds metaphorical to me.
We can say that. The boundary between extending the use of a word and
applying it metaphorically are not always clear.
http://www.answers.com/grammar&r=67
I suspect that you are comparing Wittgenstein's usage with something
like this:
"The system of inflections, syntax, and word formation of a language."
But if we accept this:
"The rules for standard use of words. A grammar is also a system for
classifying and analyzing the elements of language."
or this
"A system of rules for speaking and writing a particular language."
then Wittgenstein's usage doesn't seem nearly so metaphorical.
That said, Wittgenstein certainly does use both "logic" and "grammar"
in ways that extend their more familiar uses. But there is also a
family resemblance between his use and those.
Note that this definition,
"The basic principles of an area of knowledge: the grammar of music."
would make even the use of "grammar" with regard to art, a
non-metaphorical use - or at least a metaphor so familiar that its
being such is easily overlooked.
Speaking of forgotten metaphors, do you know that "glamour" and
"grammar" have the same root? What could be more glamorous than a
grammar school teacher? The relationship is tied to the magical powers
ascibed to the use of language.
Take care,
John
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Great things are happening at Yahoo! Groups. See the new email design.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/TISQkA/hOaOAA/yQLSAA/9rHolB/TM
gnobianken00bie
Getting to the point, as you may have felt my previous remarks somehow
evasive...
Assuming that Wittgenstein's use of "grammar" is metaphorical, and in
all consistency with my previous remarks, assessing "this is a
grammatical remark" is a matter of judging the fit of the metaphor and
such a claim can't be straightforwardly justified or refuted. But
nothing really hangs on this. If we want to use "grammar" and "logic"
more narrowly than Wittgenstein does, we can say "conceptual" or
"semiotic", so long as we understand the distinction being made in a
particular context, e.g. that a remark about a proposition's being
certain is not a psychological remark about the confidence that people
will express in the proposition, but rather a remark about the role
that the proposition plays in our deliberations.