radical relativity, and realism vs. idealism vs. skepticism
Bruce Denner
Rather than continuing with point/counterpoint, I thought it might prove
helpful to stake out my position and, in doing so, hopefully, finding our
points of agreement and disagreemnet.
Definition of Realism: While I'm not certain, I'll suggest we both find
Realism to be that point of view which takes (at least some things of our
world) as "other" than us. That while we hold these things in our hands,
and cognize them in our minds, our hands and our minds are tools for
knowing, knowing something other than ourselves. This way of putting it
recognizes that we come to learn about the world, about ourself,
and,obviously, we can learn to distinguish between these learnings.
I believe you suggested that various folks have held various thigns as
Real. For some, it is beauty and truth. For others it is God. But this
sense of Reality is different from the sense implied that sticks and stones
are real. Those are real in the sense of existing in space-time.
Now a Kantian would point out that space-time are our invention. So, here,
the reality of things is dependent up our minds. But you find this sort of
argument a red-herring. I suppose, because if we consider the mind a "tool"
we can still claim that with this tool we discover something other than
ourselves. Still, the tool is us and not external to what we are. Be that
as it may, I trust you agree, that if our minds were different, so our
objects would be, at least in part. But this doesn't make any of them,
yours, mine, less real, less "other." And, indeed, there are numerous
instances where our "different" objects converge. Peirce called this the
*dynamic object.*
Hopefully we are in substantial agreement up to this point, since here is
where we
diverge, I think.
>From my viewpoint, the real objects, the ones that existence in space time,
the ones that are self-identical, e.g., water everywhere has the same
molecular structure, are the objects of natural science and *not* are
everyday ones. The latter are not self-identical. The tree outside my
window is never quite the same. This is the truth of the Whorfian
Hypothesis. Note it is an hypothesis, namely, that there may be
intra-individual and interpersonal differences among folks in there
everyday perceptions/conceptions. Research is needed to demonstrate the
extent and variety of differences. And, of course, these differences are
conceptualized in a context of a shared world.
And this is the most difficult part. What is shared, for me, are not the
scientific objects, for the most part we can't see them with our naked eye.
Some are frankly not observable, eg., quarks, the unconscious. What *is*
shared is the experience of being in the world. What we can learn to share
is (what Cora Diamond calls) the "Realistic Spirit", namely, the
inclination to look at the world straight on for what it and is not; most
importantly, to resist the temptation to demand that the world be this or
that way, because *that* serves our immediate purpose or quiets our nagging
fears.
Be well,
bruce
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Jan Dejnozka
Definition of Realism: While I'm not certain, I'll suggest we both
find Realism to be that point of view which takes (at least some
things of our world) as "other" than us. That while we hold these
things in our hands, and cognize them in our minds, our hands and our
minds are tools for knowing, knowing something other than
ourselves. This way of putting it recognizes that we come to learn
about the world, about ourself, and,obviously, we can learn to
distinguish between these learnings.
***** Not for me! I provided Butchvarov working definition of
"realism." I explained that on that definition, I could consistently
be both a realist and an idealist who holds that only mental
substances (and their properties) exist. I explained that Berkeley is
both an idealist and a realist in the substance tradition. I explained
that realism is not to be confused with materialism. I believe I also
explained at one point that even a solipsist who holds that only s/he
exists can consistently be a realist, namely by holding that s/he is
the only real substance, a mental substance. I listed the seven themes
defining what a substance is in the Aristotelian tradition. Being
"other" than us was not one of the seven themes. To sum up, I've
stated and explained a very different definition of realism from
yours.
I believe you suggested that various folks have held various thigns as
Real. For some, it is beauty and truth. For others it is God. But this
sense of Reality is different from the sense implied that sticks and
stones are real. Those are real in the sense of existing in
space-time.
***** I said that different people have held very different things to
be real-- in one and the same sense of the word "real," namely the one
defined by Butchvarov. I also said that different people have held
very different things to be (real) substances in the broad
Aristotelian substance tradition-- in one and the same highly generic
sense of the expression "(real) substance" defined by seven themes
found in Aristotle. There are, of course, many other senses of the
word "real" in the philosophical literature, but I have not been
discussing or using or even mentioning them to make my points. And
there was only one other, very restrictive, sense of "substance" which
I have mentioned, namely underlying substratum, which Hume argues is
unintelligible. I observed that Hume's rejection of substance as
underlying substratum is consistent with finding that Hume's
impressions satisfy all or nearly all of Aristotle's seven themes of
substance, since being an imperceptible underlying substratum in
Hume's sense is not one of the seven themes. To sum up, I agree with
your first two sentences, but my discussion is not at all reflected in
your last two sentences-- quite the opposite.
Now a Kantian would point out that space-time are our invention. So,
here, the reality of things is dependent up our minds. But you find
this sort of argument a red-herring. I suppose, because if we consider
the mind a "tool" we can still claim that with this tool we discover
something other than ourselves. Still, the tool is us and not external
to what we are. Be that as it may, I trust you agree, that if our
minds were different, so our objects would be, at least in part. But
this doesn't make any of them, yours, mine, less real, less "other."
And, indeed, there are numerous instances where our "different"
objects converge. Peirce called this the *dynamic object.* Hopefully
we are in substantial agreement up to this point, since here is where
we diverge, I think.
***** I'm sorry, but I can't recognize my discussion of Kant at all
from your description. There was nothing whatsoever in my
interpretation of Kant about the mind being a tool, which suggests
some sort of utility or instrumentalism or pragmatism recalling
Peirce. Nor do I agree at all that if our minds are different, their
objects must be different at least in part. The whole point of realism
for me is that two minds can think of exactly the same
mind-independent object, though perhaps from different perspectives or
under different modes of cognition. If you see the Morning Star and I
see the Evening Star, we are seeing one and exactly the same
physically real object, Venus, on my understanding of realism.
>From my viewpoint, the real objects, the ones that existence in space
time, the ones that are self-identical, e.g., water everywhere has the
same molecular structure, are the objects of natural science and *not*
are everyday ones. The latter are not self-identical. The tree outside
my window is never quite the same. This is the truth of the Whorfian
Hypothesis. Note it is an hypothesis, namely, that there may be
intra-individual and interpersonal differences among folks in there
everyday perceptions/conceptions. Research is needed to demonstrate
the extent and variety of differences. And, of course, these
differences are conceptualized in a context of a shared world.
***** Here I can easily recognize your view as realist in my sense. It
looks like a form of modified realism, since you admit both real
objects in space-time which are self-identical, and everyday objects
which are not self-identical and which are not among what you call
"the real objects."
And this is the most difficult part. What is shared, for me, are not
the scientific objects, for the most part we can't see them with our
naked eye. Some are frankly not observable, eg., quarks, the
unconscious. What *is* shared is the experience of being in the
world. What we can learn to share is (what Cora Diamond calls) the
"Realistic Spirit", namely, the inclination to look at the world
straight on for what it and is not; most importantly, to resist the
temptation to demand that the world be this or that way, because
*that* serves our immediate purpose or quiets our nagging fears.
***** It's not at all difficult for me to accept this, insofar as our
best pre-philosophical understanding is that perspectives and ways of
looking at things are themselves an objective fact, and are often
shared and communicated and passed down for generations (making them
part of culture, where culture is what we pass down for generations),
and all the best evidence we have indicates that some of these
perspectives are far more revealing of the world as it is than others
are, for example scientific perspectives as opposed to
mythological-magical ones. So we seem to wind up agreeing in the end!
My compliments on the very nice way you presented your final
paragraph. I would only add that I would not be merely a scientific
realist. Realism does not live by science alone. The mansion of
realism has many rooms, and not all are described by natural
sciences. Or at least, it can have many rooms, and not all need be
described by a natural science.
Best wishes,
Jan
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Bruce Denner
You wrote (on 1/19)...
>The whole point of realism for me is that two minds can think of exactly
>the same mind-independent object
Of course, minds don't think, people do. And I don't imagine you are
claiming that the two folks have the exactly same images going through
their mind. You appear to be saying that if we are partners in a quiz
program, consult, and determine the answer is "The Eiffel Tower", we
are both making reference to the original in Paris, France and not a
replica in Paris, Texas. We both have *that* in mind, so to speak.
And if it turns out are correct. Win the prize. Then the moderator
also had that in mind. So "independence of mind" means that each of
us, on our own, can think about and make reference to *that* tower.
Help me with this Jan. How would an anti-realist take issue with the
above account? What are you fending off?
Thanks,
bruce