[analytic] x as a transcendental object
sbkidde46
The Thing as a Transcendental Object - `x'
When a thing that is being examined is defined in the form of a
variable, it increases the capacity to evaluate the thing
quantitatively. If the value of quantification is considered an
improvement upon a qualitative description without quantification, then
the improvement can be called a transcendence of the non-quantitative
description. Thus, philosophy with mathematics is better than philosophy
without it.
Qualitative description provides a sense of importance particularly in
regards to direct perception, but the inclusion of quantitative
delineation helps to answer the question, "How important is it in
societal affairs?"
Kant wrote about the "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding II" in the "_Critique of Pure Reason_
[A102-106]":
After the sections entitled
1. Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition
2. Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination
Was the section called
3. Of the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts
…It is clear also that, as we can only deal with the manifold in our
representations and as the `x' corresponding to them (the
object), since it is to be something different from all our
representations is really nothing to us, it is clear to say that the
unity necessitated by the object cannot be anything but the formal unity
of our consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in our
representations.
Then and then only do we say that we know an object, if we have produced
synthetical unity in the manifold of intuition. Such unity is
impossible, if the intuition could not be produced according to a rule
by such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the
manifold a priori necessary and a concept in which that manifold is
united possible.
Thus, we conceive a triangle as an object if we are conscious of the
combination of three straight lines according to a rule which renders
such an intuition possible at all times. This unity of rule determines
the manifold and limits it to conditions that render the unity of
apperception possible and the concept of that unity is really the
representation of the object = x, which I think by means of the
predicates of a triangle.
No knowledge is possible without a concept, however obscure or imperfect
it may be and a concept is always with regard to its form something
general; something that can serve as a rule. Thus the concept of body
serves as a rule to our knowledge of external phenomena according to the
unity of the manifold which is thought by it…
…The consciousness of oneself, according to the determinations of
our state is with all our internal perception only empirical and always
transient. There can be no fixed or permanent self in that stream of
internal phenomena. It is generally called the internal sense or
empirical apperception…
No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity of one kind
of knowledge with another without that unity of consciousness that
precedes data of intuition and without reference to which no
representation of objects is possible. This pure, original and
unchangeable consciousness I will call transcendental apperception…
…The only objects that can be given to us immediately are phenomena
and whatever in them refers immediately to the object is called
intuition. These phenomena, however, are not things in themselves, but
representations only that have conceptual objectivity even when the
objects can no longer be seen by us and may therefore be called not
empirical, that is the transcendental object, = x.
["_The Essential Kant_", "Critique of Pure Reason",
translated by F. Max Muller, New American Library, 1970, p.135ff.]
In summary, Kant proposed the transcendental object is an abstraction
that forms a connection with transcendental apperception, a pure and
original state of consciousness.
Kant discouraged the belief that the examination of things gives direct
access to the "mind of God" in this way. The best objective for
which we might aim in philosophical or scientific inquiry is
transcendental apperception as a kind of consciousness that is
indicative of the original exploratory and non-violent nature of human
being.
Steve K
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jrstern
>
> In summary, Kant proposed the transcendental object is an
> abstraction that forms a connection with transcendental
> apperception, a pure and original state of consciousness.
I do not see that he says the apperception *is* the object,
nor that the object in itself is an abstraction.
He says that what we can know, and what we do know, are limited by our
capacity for knowing. Kant posits various ways in which we can know.
Really, I think that a lot of what I wish to restate as agential and
computational nominalism, is already in Kant. Would that we could
bring back the old boy, give him a computer, and ask for his opinions.
Josh