[analytic-borders] "Philosophy in the Flesh"
nikolas
>
>> I would say our criteria come from people
>> delineating differences that interest them...I, of
>>course, mean this mythologically (merely
>>to differentiate these criteria as subject to our
>>judgments and interests) and not empirically or
>>historically.
Mr. Denner: (9-21-3)
>Mythological vs. empirical. Just a fiction not a fact
>that can be established? Where are going with this?
Philosopher's made up stories---like people in caves, chains,
fly-bottles... It was a story I was using to differentiate one
concept of 'criteria' from another. It is the difference that was
meant to be grasped, and I didn't want anyone fixating on the story
(say, comparing it to medical or anthropological (empirical, right?)
stories).
---not that I mean to assume that this is where Mr. Denner was going
with this (I'm not quite sure really). It did make me think about
when I once got into it with George Lakoff who co-wrote 'Philosophy
in the Flesh'. I reprint below the initial review (re-edited a
little).
From Conception to Morality (8-6-99):
In the Theatetus (penguin), Plato follows a discussion of what
makes perception certain into debating what makes belief true (pg 90-1), by
assuming something. In Philosophy in the Flesh I take Lakoff and Johnson's
argument to be in the same ballpark (but not topically)--thus we get
sentences like, "To act morally, for instance, we must, at the very least,
understand our unconscious moral systems and how they function. pg 343
Phil. in the Flesh", which sounds similar to, "So anyone who doesn't know
what 'knowledge' is cannot understand cobberly or any other craft.
(Theatetus pg 22)".
I don't take, say, conceptualization (or the book in general) as
inapplicable or irrelevant to morals. Compare an example Wittgenstein
brings up "'For a second I felt violent pain.'--Why does it sound queer to
say: 'For a second I felt deep grief'? pg 174 PI" We do use pain to talk
about grief, but in this case we want something from one because of our
understanding of the other. "The question ['But don't you feel grief NOW?']
was really, of course, a temporal and personal one, not the logical
question which we wanted to raise. ibid"
I take L&J's requirements for 'embodiment' to determine their
picture of 'morality'. For example: It requires 'acting morally' to be
encapsulated by a theory. Also, 'philosophy' is pictured as a set of theories
(pg 337) and as a set of questions (in the intro).
Not that I'm arguing with the pictures (they aren't, wrong). I take
problem in the Witt quote not to be focused on the fact that it was a
LOGICAL question (or that it is just about this topic) but that 'we
wanted to raise it'--and maybe also, raise it here (out of,
place?)--elsewhere (#107) he gives reasons or implications, why and
what that does. In L&J's case, it is the effort to dictate the
implications of their findings that sets the idea of 'morality', the
meaningfulness of which then has to be explained (pg 326&342 Flesh),
as it assumes what our interest in the subject is.
Plato, at the end of the Theatetus, says we may have learned to be
more responsible, even after he scraped all his theories of knowledge.
Philosophy in the Flesh would have us, learn "empirical responsibility pg
551-2", but the desire to ensure it fixates the idea of 'the
philosophical'--And I would say, although relativism has been motivation
for debate, what 'philosophy' is itself has become an issue of contention.
In L&J's book the question lies unaddressed explicitly, but, because the
answer is fixed, reduces it to simply a battle to usurp control, as when
Plato banished poetry to try to make philosophy the ruler of our moral
realm (Republic, starting pg 245; Grube); it simply isn't the "dialogue"
(552, Flesh) we are supposed to be having.
tony nickles
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nikolas
"Philosophy in the Felsh" currently. I reprint Mr. Lakoff's response
to my review in that it may be of some interest:
(8-12-99)
Hi,
The major rewrite of the new book is over and school here starts next week.
So I can peek now and then at this discussion.
It's very interesting eavesdropping on
a discussion of something we've written to see how it's interpreted. I, of
course, feel very self-conscious writing to those of you discussing the
book. The scene that comes to mind is one in Annie Hall, where a guy in a
movie line is trying to impress a girl with his knowledge of Marshall
McLuhan, when McLuhan walks up and says."You've got it all wrong." This is
NOT what I'm trying to do here, but rather to clarify a bit.
Tony writes:
> In the Theatetus (penguin), Plato follows a discussion of what
>makes perception real into debating what makes belief true (pg 90-1), by
>assuming something. In Philosophy in the Flesh I take Lakoff and Johnson's
>argument to be in the same ballpark (but not topically)--thus we get
>sentences like, "To act morally, for instance, we must, at the very least,
>understand our unconscious moral systems and how they function. pg 343
>Phil. in the Flesh", which sounds similar to, "So anyone who doesn't know
>what 'knowledge' is cannot understand cobberly or any other craft.
>Theatetus pg 22").
The quote is taken out of context. The context is a discussion of what
guidance
for action can come from an empirically-based cognitive analysis - that is,
from understanding one's own and others' conceptual systems and from an
understanding of how this changes philosophy in a constructive manner. In
context, the expression "To act morally" is to be read as "To make an
informed, responsible, conscious decision about what constitutes moral
action in a situation on the basis of a philosophy informed by the best
empirical understanding of mind that we have,... "
The full statement would then be: "To make an informed,
responsible, conscious decision about what constitutes moral action in a
situation on the basis of a philosophy informed by the best empirical
understanding of mind that we have, we must, at the very least, understand
our unconscious moral systems and how they function." This is what is meant
in context, and I stand by it.
In context,so far as I can see, Plato's quote and Tony's criticism do not
appear to apply.
Of course, given a particular understanding of what constitutes
morality (from a particular metaphorical perspective), someone can happen
to act "morally" according that perspective without knowing anything about
cognitive science or philosophy.
Am I missing something? Or does that make sense to everyone?
>
> Plato, at the end of the Theatetus, says we may have learned to be
>more responsible, even after he scraped all his theories for knowledge.
>Philosophy in the Flesh would have us, learn "empirical responsibility pg
>551-2",
Right - in the spirit of Socrates' "Know Thyself." A philosophy that
ignores new knowledge in favor of apriori speculation is not really a
"philosophy" in the sense that there is no love of knowledge there.I plead
guilty to accepting Socrates' invocation.
but the desire to ensure it fixates the idea of 'the
>philosophical'
In the same way that Socrates "fixates the idea 'the philosophical.'".
"Know Thyself" says that knowledge matters.
If there is new knowledge about the mind and about how one understands
philosophy itself, it matters as much as anything.
--And I would say, although relativism has been motivation
>for debate, what 'philosophy' is itself has become an issue of contention.
Absolutely right. That's why we wrote the book.
>In L&J's book the question lies unaddressed explicitly, but, because the
>answer is fixed, reduces it to simply a battle to usurp control,
Again it is in the "Know Thyself" spirit. Socrates wanted to "usurp
control" too. He wanted knowledge to count.
as when
>Plato banished poetry to try to make philosophy the ruler of our moral
>realm (Republic, starting pg 245; Grube);
Unfair! I cry "foul" here!
Mark Turner and I have written a book about poetry --
"More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor." The point there
is that, on empirical grounds, it turns out that poetry is fundmental to
human thought, that it uses the same basic mechanisms as what is called
"reason", and that any adequate cognitive sceince (and philosophy) has to
take poetic thought seriously.
it simply isn't the "dialogue"
>(552, Flesh) we are supposed to be having.
I wasn't present when you defined the dialogue, but it seems like a
dialogue worth having. It is certainly the dialogue Johnson and I hoped
would happen when people read our book.
Tony goes on later:
I don't even DISAGREE with breadth (wanting to apply their
methodology to different subjects). I merely show the fact that generally
applying their findings makes the subjects (my examples--philosophy and
morality), determined.
So does applying the findings of physics. We don't live in a geocentric
universe. That "limits" what speculations one can make.Generally applying
findings bout the mind similarly limits what claims philosophies can make.
It
does not fully "determine" them -- just places empirical limits on them.
Tony continues:
Your statement about 'non-confrontational' would make their claims
seem harmless--but their desire avoids the need for consensus; it already
sets out the terms in which we would 'talk things out'.
My response:
We set out the commitments we assume for doing adequate scientific research
on the mind. (page 79 -81). We show that these commitments do not determine
the results. They only guarantee that the scientific inquiry not be
artificially constrained by apriori philosophical assumptions about what
the results should be.
Those are the only "terms" we "set out." The rest constiutes the results
and the sources of evidence are set out on pages 81 - 87, and the studies
are listed in the references.
If you, as a philosopher, feel constrained by the "terms" we "set out", you
should. We are suggesting that you SHOULD be constrained to making
empirically realistic claims about the mind and language.This does not go
beyond the limits of the inquiry. It is what the inquiry is about.
You are right that it is not "harmless" - in the sense of being "ineffectual."
We think it has a major effect.You SHOULD be concerned.
Tony speaks of "the need for consensus." Consensus by who about what? We
think there should be a consensus about the initial commitments of the
scientific enterprise (pages 79-81) in order to protect it from apriori
assumptions about what the results should be. If that consensus is made,
the rest is empirical research.
>There is nothing wrong with the methodology unless it goes beyond its limits
>and becomes just another metaphysic or ideology in a swarm of competing
>claims.
The "limits" are about how the mind works. The issue is convergent evidence,
which is why we made such a big deal about it.
The results are not "just another metaphysic or ideology in a swarm of
competing
claims." They are the results of a scientific inquiry made under the
commitments on pages 79 - 81 with sources of evidence given on pp. 81-87.
You may not accept those commitments, you may criticize the adequacy of the
science, and so on.
The issue is whether you care about knowing yourself. Those commitments are
commitments to such knowledge. Those sources of evidence, which are
required to converge and do, constrain what an empirically adequate
philosophy can assume.
Those commitments and those sources of evidence themselves do not determine
any results until the research is carried out. Now that it has been, we can
see that the results indeed are not "harmless," that is, they are not
ineffectual.
Tony continues:
Well, the problem I see is that what they want from the methodology goes
beyond it's limits, and so we are simply left with a truncated subject.
(L&J would have us think, what makes philosophy understandable to us, is
what makes it meaningfull to us; or that what makes it meaningfull to us,
is our understanding of it--but this is beside the point.)
What understanding and meaning are is not beside the point if knowing
yourself is the issue.
Tony has a right to be upset. We ARE trying to change philosophy as an
apriori mode of inquiry. We ARE trying to change the rules of the game.
What we are doing is NOT uncontroversial.We ARE trying to do something
different from what Wittgenstein did. But it is not what Tony took us to be
doing.
Hope this helps.
Thanks for letting me peek in.
Best wishes to all,
George
nikolas
(8-13-99)
First, I take a lot of Lakoff's response to be based on taking me to be
against stuff I'm not. I did try to say I agree with their findings and
realize that they are both relevant and applicable--I'm really trying to
point out something I see as just at the edges of the book. Yet:
>We are suggesting that you SHOULD be constrained to making
>empirically realistic claims about the mind and language.
If they just wanted to say that philosophy shouldn't use incorrect notions
of what has been empirically proven, fine. Who would want to?
> A philosophy that
>ignores new knowledge in favor of apriori speculation is not really a
>"philosophy" in the sense that there is no love of knowledge there.
But that seems given; I'm not trying to do that. Sure, most people and a
lot of philosophers still have those ideas, and they should be corrected,
but I take the book to go beyond those implications.
Some of the response was due to a confusion created by my post.
>Tony writes:
>
>> In the Theatetus (penguin), Plato follows a discussion of what
>>makes perception real into debating what makes belief true (pg 90-1), by
>>assuming something. In Philosophy in the Flesh I take Lakoff and Johnson's
>>argument to be in the same ballpark (but not topically)--thus we get
>>sentences like, "To act morally, for instance, we must, at the very least,
>>understand our unconscious moral systems and how they function. pg 343
>>Phil. in the Flesh", which sounds similar to, "So anyone who doesn't know
>>what 'knowledge' is cannot understand cobberly or any other craft.
>>Theatetus pg 22").
>
>The quote is taken out of context...
>In context,so far as I can see, Plato's quote and Tony's criticism do not
>appear to apply.
I apologize for the confusion; I only threw the quotes in as intro to show
the flavor of what I was talking about--unexamined terms.
The content of the quotes is not really that important. I see that
it is easy to read the focus as you did ("someone can happen to act
"morally"... without knowing anything about cognitive science or
philosophy", sure) and I shouldn't have been so sloppy. I was actually
merely grazing over the similarity that both contain assumptions. Plato's
is about knowledge, L&J's lies in 'moral system'.
I'm talking about what, on page 312, is not done when they, "turn
from this relatively well-established claim [moral concepts are
metaphorical] to one that is far less obvious and more highly speculative
[what binds these several metaphors together into a coherent moral view]."
What a 'moral view' even is, is either assumed, or determined.
(This speculation, based on 'what came before'--a priori--contains
assumptions; a determined structure.)
> The full statement would then be: "To make an informed,
>responsible, conscious decision about what constitutes moral action in a
>situation on the basis of a philosophy informed by the best empirical
>understanding of mind that we have, we must, at the very least, understand
>our unconscious moral systems and how they function." This is what is meant
>in context, and I stand by it.
The assumption would then be that we decide what constitutes moral action
on the basis of a 'philosophy'. (I think the assumptions about philosophy
are easier to see; that philosophy is theoretical, someone's 'philosophy'.
That philosophy concerns a set of given problems.)
>--And I would say, although relativism has been motivation
>>for debate, what 'philosophy' is itself has become an issue of contention.
>
>Absolutely right. That's why we wrote the book.
But, what philosophy is, isn't the topic of investigation in the book.
tony nickles
the rest is more general confusion:
>>In L&J's book the question lies unaddressed explicitly, but, because the
>>answer is fixed, reduces it to simply a battle to usurp control,
>
>Again it is in the "Know Thyself" spirit.
How does the spirit in which you intend the book really matter to what I'm
saying?
>Socrates wanted to "usurp control" too.
What is this trying to tell me? Do you take it that because Socrates did
it, this makes it somehow necessary, or justified?
> as when
>>Plato banished poetry to try to make philosophy the ruler of our moral
>>realm (Re
>"More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor." The point there
>is that, on empirical grounds, it turns out that poetry is fundmental to
>human thought, that it uses the same basic mechanisms as what is called
>"reason", and that any adequate cognitive sceince (and philosophy) has to
>take poetic thought seriously.
My point is the structure of the book reduces the argument about
what philosophy is, to a battle for authority. It has nothing to do with
poetry.
>Tony continues:
>
>Your statement about 'non-confrontational' would make their claims
>seem harmless--but their desire avoids the need for consensus; it already
>sets out the terms in which we would 'talk things out'.
>
>My response:
>
>We set out the commitments we assume for doing adequate scientific research
>on the mind...
And I'm not saying those are wrong or that it marred the findings, or makes
them ineffective. I am concerned with implications I see as assumed--only
thus, 'dangerous'.
>Those are the only "terms" we "set out."
I am referring to the terms 'philosophy' and 'morality' and that their
structure is either assumed, or determined by, as I take it, the structure
of the requirements of embodied realism and generalizibility.
John
for sharing with us this interesting exchange with Lakoff.
I'd like to comment on a few points that stood out for me.
> Philosophy in the Flesh would have us, learn "empirical
responsibility pg
> 551-2", but the desire to ensure it fixates the idea of 'the
> philosophical'--And I would say, although relativism has been
motivation
> for debate, what 'philosophy' is itself has become an issue of
contention.
> In L&J's book the question lies unaddressed explicitly, but,
because the
> answer is fixed,
Yes, I absolutely agree. The idea that how the problems and terms are
defined can be simply taken for granted in too much "naturalized"
philosophy. I have defended naturalistic approaches, but this is
partly on the grounds that I see much of the conceptual work as
continuous with the empirical. There are genuine conceptual problems
that naturalistic approaches to philosophy may sometimes too quickly
cast aside. That's part of why the philosophy of science is important.
> reduces it to simply a battle to usurp control, as when
> Plato banished poetry to try to make philosophy the ruler of our
moral
> realm (Republic, starting pg 245; Grube); it simply isn't
the "dialogue"
> (552, Flesh) we are supposed to be having.
>
Exactly! An "empirically responsible philosophy" should not be
scientistic and assume that every discourse must be understood on its
terms.
You shared Lakoff's response to your review and I here excerpt some
portions:
> It's very interesting eavesdropping on
> a discussion of something we've written to see how it's
interpreted. I, of
> course, feel very self-conscious writing to those of you discussing
the
> book. The scene that comes to mind is one in Annie Hall, where a
guy in a
> movie line is trying to impress a girl with his knowledge of
Marshall
> McLuhan, when McLuhan walks up and says."You've got it all wrong."
This is
> NOT what I'm trying to do here, but rather to clarify a bit.
>
I imagine there are some who would have told McLuhan that his own
interpretation of his work is merely one of many.
He quotes you:
>
> > In the Theatetus (penguin), Plato follows a discussion
of what
> >makes perception real into debating what makes belief true (pg 90-
1), by
> >assuming something. In Philosophy in the Flesh I take Lakoff and
Johnson's
> >argument to be in the same ballpark (but not topically)--thus we
get
> >sentences like, "To act morally, for instance, we must, at the
very least,
> >understand our unconscious moral systems and how they function. pg
343
> >Phil. in the Flesh", which sounds similar to, "So anyone who
doesn't know
> >what 'knowledge' is cannot understand cobberly or any other craft.
> >Theatetus pg 22").
>
He offers a revision of what he believes captures the context of his
previously quoted remark:
> The full statement would then be: "To make an informed,
> responsible, conscious decision about what constitutes moral action
in a
> situation on the basis of a philosophy informed by the best
empirical
> understanding of mind that we have, we must, at the very least,
understand
> our unconscious moral systems and how they function." This is what
is meant
> in context, and I stand by it.
> In context,so far as I can see, Plato's quote and Tony's criticism
do not
> appear to apply.
I agree that the criticisms do not apply to the revised statement, if
he gets leverage from the words "responsible" and "conscious".
However, while I don't have the text handy at present, I don't know
of any context that makes "To act morally…" into "To make an
informed, responsible, conscious decision…" without presupposing the
very Platonic attitude from which he wants to distance himself,
especially if he wants to get the aforementioned leverage he needs
for the second version to escape the charge.
Perhaps he was overly enthused, sloppily overstating his point in the
original version. Appealing to context doesn't seem to solve that,
but it's an understandable maneuver for him to make.
> Of course, given a particular understanding of what
constitutes
> morality (from a particular metaphorical perspective), someone can
happen
> to act "morally" according that perspective without knowing
anything about
> cognitive science or philosophy.
The scare quotes around "morally" in this concession further
reinforce the impression of sharing Plato's bias. Are they not really
acting morally? Has no one acted morally without studying philosophy
and cognitive science?
He quotes you:
> > Plato, at the end of the Theatetus, says we may have
learned to be
> >more responsible, even after he scraped all his theories for
knowledge.
> >Philosophy in the Flesh would have us, learn "empirical
responsibility pg
> >551-2",
>
and agrees:
> Right - in the spirit of Socrates' "Know Thyself." A philosophy that
> ignores new knowledge in favor of apriori speculation is not really
a
> "philosophy" in the sense that there is no love of knowledge there.
That would be suspect if the putative knowledge were relevant. In
some cases, perhaps it isn't.
> but the desire to ensure it fixates the idea of 'the
> >philosophical'
>
> In the same way that Socrates "fixates the idea 'the
philosophical.'".
> "Know Thyself" says that knowledge matters.
> If there is new knowledge about the mind and about how one
understands
> philosophy itself, it matters as much as anything.
>
It matters in some contexts a great deal. In others perhaps it
matters not at all. I have previously noticed that Lakoff and Johnson
both seem at times to view their work as a panacea. This seems quite
naïve to me and more propaganda than science, which is not to say
that a scientist cannot engage in both. Scientism is a danger however
even if their scientism would not be nearly so destructive as
previous versions.
He goes on to address some other points tied to this, but I'll
comment on them in commenting on your reply.
He does make what seems a fair point in response to your remark about
banning the poets:
> Unfair! I cry "foul" here!
> Mark Turner and I have written a book about poetry --
> "More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor." The
point there
> is that, on empirical grounds, it turns out that poetry is
fundmental to
> human thought, that it uses the same basic mechanisms as what is
called
> "reason", and that any adequate cognitive sceince (and philosophy)
has to
> take poetic thought seriously.
>
I think he's right on there, but it doesn't refute your analogy; it
only shows its limitations. This is why I would call their position a
less destructive scientism, but perhaps a scientism nonetheless.
Quoting you again (on a point related to my observation about
their "panacea" view of their work):
>
> I don't even DISAGREE with breadth (wanting to apply their
> methodology to different subjects). I merely show the fact that
generally
> applying their findings makes the subjects (my examples--philosophy
and
> morality), determined.
>
He replied:
> So does applying the findings of physics. We don't live in a
geocentric
> universe. That "limits" what speculations one can make.Generally
applying
> findings bout the mind similarly limits what claims philosophies
can make.
> It
> does not fully "determine" them -- just places empirical limits on
them.
That's a subtle but important distinction and I agree with it. I just
think that the limits are very much open to debate.
> Tony speaks of "the need for consensus." Consensus by who about
what? We
> think there should be a consensus about the initial commitments of
the
> scientific enterprise (pages 79-81) in order to protect it from
apriori
> assumptions about what the results should be. If that consensus is
made,
> the rest is empirical research.
>
I agree with him on this point. It is the further application of the
findings that I am dubious about.
You made a similar point:
>
> Well, the problem I see is that what they want from the methodology
goes
> beyond it's limits, and so we are simply left with a truncated
subject.
and I agree, but I am less certain about:
> (L&J would have us think, what makes philosophy understandable to
us, is
> what makes it meaningfull to us; or that what makes it meaningfull
to us,
> is our understanding of it--but this is beside the point.)
>
To which he replied:
> What understanding and meaning are is not beside the point if
knowing
> yourself is the issue.
>
It is certainly one issue and an important one.
In your response to Lakoff you wrote:
> If they just wanted to say that philosophy shouldn't use incorrect
notions
> of what has been empirically proven, fine. Who would want to?
>
Exactly! I didn't read you as advocating that.
> But that seems given; I'm not trying to do that. Sure, most people
and a
> lot of philosophers still have those ideas, and they should be
corrected,
> but I take the book to go beyond those implications.
>
>
I too sensed, not so much assertions as an attitude and the attitude
seemed clearer if anything in his response.
> I'm talking about what, on page 312, is not done when
they, "turn
> from this relatively well-established claim [moral concepts are
> metaphorical] to one that is far less obvious and more highly
speculative
> [what binds these several metaphors together into a coherent moral
view]."
> What a 'moral view' even is, is either assumed, or determined.
> (This speculation, based on 'what came before'--a priori--contains
> assumptions; a determined structure.)
>
Yes, it's tricky to sort this out and it requires careful conceptual
analysis.
Again quoting his revision for "context":
> > The full statement would then be: "To make an informed,
> >responsible, conscious decision about what constitutes moral
action in a
> >situation on the basis of a philosophy informed by the best
empirical
> >understanding of mind that we have, we must, at the very least,
understand
> >our unconscious moral systems and how they function." This is what
is meant
> >in context, and I stand by it.
>
> The assumption would then be that we decide what constitutes moral
action
> on the basis of a 'philosophy'. (I think the assumptions about
philosophy
> are easier to see; that philosophy is theoretical,
someone's 'philosophy'.
> That philosophy concerns a set of given problems.)
>
That's an important point.
>
> >--And I would say, although relativism has been motivation
> >>for debate, what 'philosophy' is itself has become an issue of
contention.
> >
> >Absolutely right. That's why we wrote the book.
>
> But, what philosophy is, isn't the topic of investigation in the
book.
>
Exactly!
> >Again it is in the "Know Thyself" spirit.
>
> How does the spirit in which you intend the book really matter to
what I'm
> saying?
>
> >Socrates wanted to "usurp control" too.
>
> What is this trying to tell me? Do you take it that because
Socrates did
> it, this makes it somehow necessary, or justified?
>
A fair question!
As I see it, there is a tendency (further reinforced by the scare
quotes around "morally" earlier) to conflate ethical and meta-ethical
questions and one particular set of meta-ethical questions
especially: How do we understand the meaning of ethical language?
This may yield important and valuable insights into how ethical
debate is carried out; even suggest more fruitful ways of engaging in
ethical discussion. I don't at all see how any empirical discipline
could settle ethical questions themselves however.
The suggestion that one must be "conscious" of and "responsible" to
these discoveries in order to act morally seems extremely
disingenuous, if not megalomaniacal.
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bruce denner
To catch up I'm prepared to set aside lots of stuff I
might take issue, including your tone, at times
insulting (paraphrase "if you write that about him
this way then obviously you've read him" rather than
an alterantive reading,) in order to focus on the
issue that concerns me here,on this List, not in the
discipline in general, and this critical because, for
example, my point was never philo is all metaphor
and...but rather in certain Posts tropes were passed
off as empirical findings.
And you've granted me that, viz., language-games (as
the concept appears in the_PI_ is still yet
metaphor...waiting for the empirical turn that I grant
one could take.
You wrote...
"Some philosophical positions can be empirically
tested. Many cannot."
The latter are conceptual, I presume, and leave for
your Post on Certainty. Again, I'm curious to know
what questions *you* identify as empirically testable.
Here I'm not asking for instances in which folks
identified as philosophers speculated about the brain.
Let's talk here and now, if we may. Let's go beyond
"taking science seriously" or paraphrasing LW,
"consistent with the general facts."
I'll be straight up with my concern: On this List,
"How the mind works" gets answered with what I called
pop-psychology in which the authro comes to some
conclusion based on "experience". This move is
identified as empirical, when frequently is a pale
imitation of the same and then is propped up by a
background deep metaphor (philo Empiricism) which to
me is legitimate (discussable) as an alternative,
following Pepper. But there is a muddle here.
An example is Gary's claim that objects exist because
he gets the salt when he asks at a dinner party or
that for centuries folks have played with rocks. But
let's not discuss him.
Again, I'm not saying that's a accurate description of
your Posts.
So, again, it would help me of you give an example.
You wrote...
"Who said Wittgenstein was offering a scientific
account of language?
Who said I interpreted him as doing so?"
I'd be interested in your sense of his account.
On this List I've read that LW was on his way to a
scientific account in the sense that it would be an
empirically valed explanation (read description) of
how language works. The contrast is metaphysics, never
quite characterized. And, I buy the contrast, for at
least here I can argue the metaphysical alternative.
Not at all sure about you. In writing about Lakoff and
Johnson you mentioned their defense of a certain kind
of metaphysics. Is that what you have in mind? I would
like to learn more.
Again, it would seem to work best if you could state a
philo problem that wasn't entirely conceptual, suggest
what empirical steps one might take (a thought
experiment is fine) and how the various results would
speak to this philo question.
bruce
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bruce denner
Wow, what's the chance of randomly choosing a book
while killing time only to find a reviewer? And I've
looked over your Posts, but must say I can't get a fix
on your viewpoint.
Are you sanguine about a meeting the of the
philosophical and cognitive psych minds? And if so,
what philo questions might that team address?
More about embeddedness...
>The meaning doesn't come from within the sentence,
>and it doesn't come without a context, whether
>presumed or elaborated.
In the above sentence yous seem to want to say where
meaning comes from. I wodner if that's a good idea. It
suggests a time before meaning and a moment of
arrival.
Also, you seem to suggest that the meaning doesn't
come from the words (within the sentence?) but never
quite say where it does come from. One thing you do
say is that it doesn't arrive if no context is
present. But what's a world without a context?
bruce
bruce
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John
> and...
Granting, as you have, that you've painted with a "broad brush" to
make a point and that you haven't ever agreed to what sense
of "metaphor" you intended, you'll understand if you were read this
way.
"Philosophers exploit the figurative possibilities of language to
tell a story that brings order, peace of mind..." (08/10)
"...the difference between psychology and philosophy and the latter's
figurative essence." (09/06)
"...the language of philo is essentially metaphoric. Pressing on to
the literal is of no service." (09/06)
"In philosophy, the critical terms are used figuratively." (09/07)
"The philosopher doesn't win you over with logic. He grabs you by
lapels of your mind and says `talk this way, you'll learn to like
it.'" (09/07)
>but rather in certain Posts tropes were passed
> off as empirical findings.
>
> And you've granted me that, viz., language-games (as
> the concept appears in the_PI_ is still yet
> metaphor
I said that the expression had its origin in a simile.
First, I have been remiss in failing to specify different senses
of "language game".
"Language game" is introduced in aphorism 7. It refers to games that
children play in learning their native language. Do you deny that
games are played with children in teaching them words, at home and at
school? There is nothing metaphorical at all about that usage.
Now, he mentions this in comparison (a simile) to the hypothetical
activities described in aphorism 2. Now here, he speaks of imagining.
He likewise speaks of imagining in aphorism 6, suggesting this is the
whole of a tribe's language. This is the "fictional natural history"
aspect of language games.
He also uses "language game" in aphorism 7 to refer to the whole of a
language and the activities of which it is a part. This is a
metaphor, suggesting we look at the similarities between playing a
game and using one's language in performing various activities.
Now, in aphorism 23, he is using "language game" in another related
sense: particular activities in which language is used within a
language and he wants us to see the similarities between
these "countless" activities and the earlier examples of children's
games and imaginary activities of primitive workers. "Here the
term 'language game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
the 'speaking' of language is part of an activity, or form of life."
Do you deny that people do tell jokes, pose riddles, ask for
information, apologize, recite poems, issue commands, tell stories,
report events, etc.? Is this a fiction? Do you deny that it can be
important to recognize which activity is being engaged in if we are
to understand? If I'm playing the "dozens" with a friend from
the `hood, you might think we were soon to come to blows if you
didn't realize it was part of a game. (I think Wittgenstein would
have been intrigued by this language game.)
>…waiting for the empirical turn that I grant
> one could take.
>
You apparently remain captive to the notion that a metaphor is to be
contrasted with an "empirical turn": "still yet" metaphor
but "waiting" for someone to operationalize it or use it in an
experiment, as if that would make it cease to be metaphor. You
continue to muddle etymological, literary, and methodological
questions and I see no point in continuing this discussion without
some clarification of this. I'm done on this topic.
> You wrote...
>
> "Some philosophical positions can be empirically
> tested. Many cannot."
>
> The latter are conceptual, I presume, and leave for
> your Post on Certainty. Again, I'm curious to know
> what questions *you* identify as empirically testable.
First, note the sentence following what you quoted:
"To the extent that empirical considerations are relevant, it is the
overall coherence of our concepts, which may only touch observation
at the periphery, that philosophy will be concerned with."
In other words, the role that a particular philosophical position
plays in our knowledge is typically not one that can be directly
tested. In science, our theories meet the test of observation as a
group, and philosophical theories are even more difficult. I probably
shouldn't even have used the word "tested", only "criticized on
empirical grounds", but I was following your phrasing. I meant the
next sentence to make the distinction.
> Here I'm not asking for instances in which folks
> identified as philosophers speculated about the brain.
Is Descartes now someone only "identified" as a philosopher?
> Let's talk here and now, if we may.
Typically, a contemporary philosopher would hesitate to deal with
questions that were obviously subject to empirical testing, which is
not to assume that at some future date, some questions won't become
so amenable. The original context was you discussing Lakoff's
suggestion that we put past philosophers to the test, so sticking to
the "here and now" is changing the subject.
If this change of subject to contemporary philosophy is an indication
that you are letting go of this idea that we must be misreading past
philosophers when we interpret them "naturalistically", I see that as
a positive development.
> Let's go beyond
> "taking science seriously" or paraphrasing LW,
> "consistent with the general facts."
An example I could offer would be consistent with my clarification
of "criticizable on empirical grounds" rather than "testable", and I
think the theories of Lakoff, Johnson, et al, regarding the role of
metaphor and cognition are as good an example as any. Maybe they only
count as "folks identified as philosophers".
How about Eleanor Rosch's work on "prototype theory", which is
supports the anti-essentialist "family resemblance" discussion in
Wittgenstein? She's definitely a psychologist, not a "pop
psychologist" or a philosopher dabbling in cognitive science; and I
assume Wittgenstein's a philosopher, and essentialism is a major
issue in philosophy going back to Socrates dialogues. Her work is at
least within my lifetime, so I guess that's "here and now" enough.
>
> I'll be straight up with my concern: On this List,
> "How the mind works" gets answered with what I called
> pop-psychology in which the authro comes to some
> conclusion based on "experience". This move is
> identified as empirical, when frequently is a pale
> imitation of the same and then is propped up by a
> background deep metaphor (philo Empiricism) which to
> me is legitimate (discussable) as an alternative,
> following Pepper. But there is a muddle here.
>
The only muddle I've been able to identify here is in that paragraph.
I have no idea what you're talking about. Could you please rephrase?
> An example is Gary's claim that objects exist because
> he gets the salt when he asks at a dinner party or
> that for centuries folks have played with rocks. But
> let's not discuss him.
>
That's an example of what you were talking about in the last
paragraph?
I'm not certain how this related to "How the mind works" or should be
called "pop psychology". Of what sense of "empirical" is this a "pale
imitation"? How does this example presuppose
philosophical "Empiricism"? In what sense are you using that? With
what are you contrasting it?
Pointing to the uses to which language is successfully put in
everyday life and similar truisms is only irrelevant once you clarify
the sense of "physical objects exist" you wish to question and show
that these points aren't dealing with the "physical objects" or the
kind of "existence" you have in mind.
I had asked:
>
> "Who said Wittgenstein was offering a scientific
> account of language?
> Who said I interpreted him as doing so?"
>
> I'd be interested in your sense of his account.
>
I won't presume to summarize any such thing in the space of a single
post, but I will say that a major concern is to dispel us of
confusions engendered by philosophical biases and to disabuse us of
assumptions. There is description involved and familiar facts, but it
is neither a cultural anthropologist's or evolutionary biologist's
account of the evolution of language nor a developmental
psychologist's model of language acquisition. He is not discovering
new facts but laying out familiar ones in a manner that is hopefully
perspicuous and suggestive, reminding us of things that philosophical
prejudice may have obscured.
> On this List I've read that LW was on his way to a
> scientific account in the sense that it would be an
> empirically valed explanation (read description) of
> how language works.
I do think there could be some truth to that. As the Rosch example
illustrates, some of his ideas may turn out to suggest empirically
testable hypotheses. I don't however assume that that was his aim or
that this applies to the whole of his work.
> The contrast is metaphysics, never
> quite characterized. And, I buy the contrast, for at
> least here I can argue the metaphysical alternative.
>
> Not at all sure about you. In writing about Lakoff and
> Johnson you mentioned their defense of a certain kind
> of metaphysics.
I don't recall them explicitly defending a particular kind of
metaphysics nor do I recall saying so. Are you referring to this?
"Do they deny that theirs too is a metaphysic? Lakoff and Johnson
criticize 'a priori metaphysics', 'objectivist metaphysics',
and 'disembodied metaphysics', but not metaphysics per se, so far as
I recall."
That was a question.
I don't have that book handy, but reviewing an earlier text by
Johnson (and I don't recall a change of heart in the other), he
compares his own metaphysics to that of Putman, calling it "internal
realism" and seems to subscribe also to non-reductive physicalism
(although I am guessing on that point). He also alludes to and
connects his work with the phenomenological tradition.
> Is that what you have in mind? I would
> like to learn more.
>
While I do not embrace all of their work and am not at all as
enthused about some of their propaganda, my views are somewhat
similar. I tend to waver between a very moderate version of technical
realism and some form of internal realism as well and am sympathetic
with non-reductive physicalism, although I see the position as
potentially quite unstable and in need of further clarification. I am
also very sympathetic with phenomenology and the defense of pre-
scientific modes of understanding the world as worth preserving and
ultimately grounding the possibility of science. Best summary:
pluralist, non-reductive physicalist, internal realist.
> Again, it would seem to work best if you could state a
> philo problem that wasn't entirely conceptual, suggest
> what empirical steps one might take (a thought
> experiment is fine) and how the various results would
> speak to this philo question.
>
>
Again, I overstated the point with the phrase "empirically tested"
(though I made my point more clear in what followed) and I think that
for the most part, contemporary Anglo-American philosophers (outside
of cognitive science) are very conscientious about sticking to
conceptual questions, although they also want them to be consistent
with scientific theories, so for recent philosophy that's hard to
come by. I don't rule out that at some point science may discover
things that seem wholly conceptual now (recall that for
millennia, "atoms" were discussed by philosophers in terms of
conceptual questions about divisibility and continua), but if a
problem were obviously amenable to empirical examination it would
typically not be treated as philosophy in contemporary practice,
although drawing one's attention to observable everyday facts is
certainly appropriate in some discussions.
I'm not really qualified to comment on Continental philosophy, but I
do know that historians have many problems with Foucault's
methodology and conclusions and he does seem to try to draw
philosophical conclusions from historical studies. The latter is also
true of some in the philosophy of science, although their history
seems to be held in higher esteem and their conclusions are usually
debated on conceptual grounds rather than their presentation of
facts. Perhaps this sort of philosophical work can also be challenged
on empirical grounds, but I am not an historian either, so I'd only
be speculating.
nikolas
>The suggestion that one must be "conscious" of and "responsible" to
>these discoveries in order to act morally seems extremely
>disingenuous, if not megalomaniacal.
To clarify for them, I think they were saying that philosophers and
philosophy are the ones that should be empirically conscious and
responsible in doing any philosophy (which is fine). But my point
was that their further (self-aggrandizing at least) ambition for
their findings (wanting them to be more than just simply facts)
caused concepts like moral reasoning to be predefined.
tony nickles
p.s. I no longer have the book.
nikolas
>philosophical and cognitive psych minds?
I found any meeting point limited with L&J---that they appear to talk
past one another (maybe different interests). I think cog. sci. can
be appreciated for what it is on its own---I think Moyal-Sharrock's
descriptions (especially in her online article--see my 9-6 post) fall
in this category in a way.
>And if so, what philo questions might that team address?
I don't really think about questions as being necessarily philosophical.
> >The meaning doesn't come from within the sentence,
>>and it doesn't come without a context, whether
>>presumed or elaborated.
>
>In the above sentence you seem to want to say where
>meaning comes from.
Actually, that choice of words was arbitrary and sloppy---the point
was not, how; but, under what circumstances. I was making a specific
negative differentiation and not a general positive statement.
>seem to suggest that the meaning doesn't
>come from the words (within the sentence?)
Yes. Let's just 'look at the words' in: "I have a boat" To say the
meaning is that 'I own a boat', is just to explain what 'having' is.
The words are understandable. As I had said earlier, we also
understand it in language as a familiar form: "I have a cat". This
is "meaning"? (the sentence, alone, isn't "meaningless"). Maybe
there is something more you could point out.
>but never quite say where it does come from.
I guess that depends on what we are talking about, under what
circumstances, with whom----the situation and who cares about it,
etc. etc. I believe we could say the meaning comes from the context,
though "The" meaning seems to make it something that exists always,
and 'comes' 'from' feeds into that. My point was showing how
recognizing that things are placed or found in a time and situation
gets us out of generalizing too much (or explaining generally).
>what's a world without a context?
I imagine it is a situation in which we can't find our feet. Where
we have nothing to push off from or differentiate between. Or maybe
some place where we have no interests or lack judgment. We sometimes
say we have no context in which to make a decision---say, a foreign
situation. We might say context always exists because we are always
in a place and time, but we make believe in contexts and without
context (and these are still 'worlds').
tony nickles
bruce denner
work on!
--- John <sceptic...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>you haven't ever agreed to what sense of "metaphor"
>you intended,
True, and yet the text you quote, and are so kind to
collect, seem to orient, point in a direction...
I'll not reprint them here. I'll just keep it in mind.
As you go to work on my notion of metaphor by looking
at LW's LG.
>"Language game" is introduced in aphorism 7. It
>refers to games that children play in learning their
>native language.
Yes, literally it refers to games children play in the
course of learning a language. My grandson does just
that, at pre-school. He is not 3 and he uses the word
"bitch." I asked him where he heard it and he said:
"In my ear." Obviously a philosopher in the making.
If I now say, "G has learned a new language game,
meaning the use of "bitch", I'm using LG
metaphorically. I've read on and you seem to agree.
> "Here the term 'language game' is meant to bring
>into prominence the fact that the 'speaking' of
>language is part of an activity,
> or form of life."
A notational device is used to bring out a point. Yes,
the point is literally a fact. But where is LW going
with this?
>Do you deny that it can be important to recognize
>which activity is being engaged in if we are
>to understand?
The question is too vague. Understand what? I'll say
the same thing here I recently wrote to Tony:
"That's a language game", is an answer. But to what
question? What is it we don't understand that will
become easier to grasp if we adopt that notation?
Later on you suggest a bias not to see "language in
the stream of life." But is this a bias or a strategy
to effectively reach a different goal that LW may have
in mind?
Put differently, who disagrees. ST A told us that he
learned the language in the course of interaction with
his parents. The stream of life. Plato is a study of
dialogues...and so on.
> You apparently remain captive to the notion that a
> metaphor is to be contrasted with an "empirical
>turn"
It's not "metaphor" but the use it is put to. The
Skinnerian says we are a black box and to understand
learning all we need to know are functional relations
between stimulus input and behavioral output. That's a
metaphor. As such it is very reductive.
But it is a powerful model for learning in a wide
variety of contexts. It proves its worth in prediction
and control. That's the empirical turn.
Is the use of the LG in the _PI_ in any way comparable
to Skinner? Do you read him as proposing a theory of
language learning?
LW writes that a philo question is like losing our
way. What does that mean to you? In what sense are
lost and in what manner can we be found?
You appear to take this on here...
>...the role that a particular philosophical position
> plays in our knowledge is typically not one that can
> be directly tested
> shouldn't even have used the word "tested", only
> "criticized on empirical grounds"
I recognize I'm cutting here and violating your prose.
But I get the impression that you hold to the notion
of a philosophical theory that gives us knowledge.
That it must be consistent with what we know
empirically.
I agree. But what are these philo theories about?
>I think the theories of Lakoff, Johnson, et al,
> regarding the role of metaphor and cognition are as
good an example as any.
Examples of philo theories? If so. how do they differ
from psychology and anthropology that must stand to
the empirical test?
"How about Eleanor Rosch's work on "prototype theory",
which is supports the anti-essentialist "family
resemblance" discussion in Wittgenstein?"
I confess ignorance of this work.
Here you sketch out LW's contribution
"..but I will say that a major concern is to dispel us
of confusions engendered by philosophical biases..."
Psychologists talk about 'philosophical bias' and mean
unexamined, untested or untestable assumptions. But
can a philosopher? Isn't a philo bias just another
philo point of view? What are the biases in Plato,
Descartes, Kant...
"There is description involved and familiar facts, but
it is neither a cultural anthropologist's or
evolutionary biologist's account of the evolution of
language nor a developmental psychologist's model of
language acquisition."
Just a *neutral* description from no point of view?
Yes it can sound like that. I can't disagree that
there are claims that are rock certain or that words
have meaning in the stream of life. But what philo
questions can be settled by such generalities?
then again, you suggest that LW has a negative
project. Just sweeping away the prejudices. Now what?
>I tend to waver between a very moderate version of
>technical realism and some form of internal realism..
You waver. Why? Are there any facts that go against
your sense of Realism? Could you imagine a study that
would shore up your conviction? I couldn't.
Clearly, this is a conceptual problem in which we seek
to find the words that coherently express our sense of
Realism. You know what I'm going to say now...yes we
need a compelling metaphor.
Years ago, on this List, a Realist was in combat with
a anti-Realist. It was a duel of words.
By the way, Gary, if I have him right, finds that LW
transcends the Realism debate. Do you agree?
bruce
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John
I am glad if my posts have stimulated thought and discussion. Thank
you.
With that in mind, I want to get some points out of the way with as
little testiness on my part as possible to focus on what may be more
productive.
First, you've presented more remarks on "metaphor". If your intent is
to use "metaphor" in such a way as to mean that Skinner's "black box"
ceased to be a metaphor when it was incorporated into a scientific
theory, then you're welcome to. I certainly won't follow you in that
usage however. I don't know if that's what you're saying and I don't
particularly care. You seem now to be saying something slightly
different from this although the post before referred to expressions
being "still yet metaphor", so I'm unclear if you've changed your
mind. I am done with this topic.
Second, I have explicitly (and repeatedly) said that Wittgenstein was
not proposing a scientific theory of language acquisition, so the
question is either rhetorical or demonstrates you haven't read very
closely. Since you later quote the very same remark, I can only
assume the former. In that case, I don't see the point.
Third, regarding "language-game": you obviously make use of the
distinction yourself even if you don't favor that particular
circumlocution. You maintain that philosophy and science are two
distinct language-games and that one is confused when one assesses
the former by the standards of the latter. I suggest that in some
cases, particularly historically, there is significant overlap and
provide textual references in support of that claim, but I do support
the idea that it is important to assess a text in terms of the sort
of text it is and clearly so do you. That's (one) of the point(s)
of "language-games". In any case, I'm done with this topic too.
Now, you wrote:
> you suggest a bias not to see "language in
> the stream of life."
First, I don't even use that expression, so I am not certain what you
were referring to.
Second, I wouldn't characterize philosophical biases so broadly.
>But is this a bias or a strategy
> to effectively reach a different goal that LW may have
> in mind?
>
> Put differently, who disagrees?
I don't see this as one questions put differently, but two distinct
questions. "Who disagrees that language must be understood in
the `stream of life'?" (Again this is not a phrase I favor at all) is
a separate question from "Do people separate language from
the `stream of life' out of bias or as part of a strategy aiming at
different goals?"
As to the first question, I would say that no one does, at least in
practice. Whether sometimes in theory they neglect this is another
question, but I find the question too broad, as I said.
As to the second, there are goals and strategies for which some kinds
of separation are perfectly reasonable and legitimate, for example
structural linguistics. If this methodology engenders a more
widespread bias that leads one to neglect other aspects of language
when they may be important, then that is another matter.
> ST A told us that he
> learned the language in the course of interaction with
> his parents. The stream of life.
Actually, that's a good point and I think that viewing Augustine
through the lens of Wittgenstein may lead one to neglect the
affinities.
However, as Wittgenstein himself acknowledges (foreshadowing the
discussion of language-games) early in the Investigations:
3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication;
only not everything that we call language is this system. And one
has to say this in many cases where the question arises 'Is this an
appropriate description or not?' The answer is: 'Yes, it is
appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for
the whole of what you were claiming to describe."
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules..." --and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.
Such a crude description of philosophical biases as being merely "not
to see language in the `stream of life'," would fail to do justice to
this passage. Of course, I never said any such thing, but if I had it
would have been very sloppy thinking.
> Plato is a study of
> dialogues...
Plato's philosophy survives in dialogue form (although these were
popularizations and the texts used by fellow Academicians are no
longer with us), but I don't see how these are a "study of
dialogues", per se.
and so on.
>
You've made some valid points here, but since I never made so broad a
claim as you suggest, you've argued with a straw-man.
(In what follows, I am taking your points out of order, but I believe
connecting them topic-wise.)
You quote me:
> "..but I will say that a major concern is to dispel us
> of confusions engendered by philosophical biases..."
>
and you ask:
> Psychologists talk about 'philosophical bias' and mean
> unexamined, untested or untestable assumptions. But
> can a philosopher? Isn't a philo bias just another
> philo point of view? What are the biases in Plato,
> Descartes, Kant...
The way that you framed your question actually provides a clue to
your answer.
Calling untestable assumptions "philosophical" certainly seems
fitting, which is not to say that scientific theories do not also
contain assumptions that are not directly testable.
Calling untested assumptions "philosophical" is consistent with my
own view of the historical continuity between philosophy and science,
although I'm not certain it's consistent with your view.
Calling unexamined assumptions "philosophical" seems almost
oxymoronic. Examining assumptions is a central part of the
philosophical endeavor. Surely we can agree that part of a
philosopher's task is to examine, expose, and question assumptions?
In referring to "philosophical bias" I am not necessarily referring
to the assumptions of any one particular philosopher, but rather to
widespread assumptions to which philosophers seem particularly
predisposed, biases engendered by the character of the philosophical
enterprise.
One example, engendered by the philosophical emphasis on a priori
reasoning, would be the assumption that when we use words we must
somehow, if we are using them correctly, be applying and
understanding them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
One of the tasks of philosophy becomes determining what those
necessary and sufficient conditions are. Perhaps they are difficult
to ascertain, but they must be there, otherwise we would be
irrational and words wouldn't permit communication. This assumption
is present as far back as Socrates and also characteristic of much
Analytic philosophy in Wittgenstein's time.
Part of the discussion of "family resemblance" and "rule-following"
is to bring these assumptions to light and make us question them.
Now, as I've said (but you seem to keep feeling the need to point
this out), Wittgenstein didn't wasn't engaged in a scientific
description of language. He brings together familiar facts and asks
us to consider them together, e.g. to look at the many uses to which
words are put and ask ourselves whether there is any set of necessary
and sufficient conditions applicable to them all, to consider how we
might "shore up" our usage, to ask whether there might still be more
room for variation even then, and then to look at the extent to which
we seem quite able to communicate often enough in spite of this.
Sometimes the juxtaposition of truisms can lead to insight.
>
> LW writes that a philo question is like losing our
> way. What does that mean to you?
That's not an expression I much favor. Like the "therapeutic"
language, I find it may promote a tendency more toward condescension
than edification (at least among those who parrot
Wittgensteinianisms), so I may not be the person to ask.
>In what sense are
> lost and in what manner can we be found?
I find that question so broad as to be useless. I'm interested in
particular confusions and biases, not some broad notion that we've
lost our way.
>
> You appear to take this on here...
>
I'm not seeing the connection, but okay. You go on to quote me:
> >...the role that a particular philosophical position
> > plays in our knowledge is typically not one that can
> > be directly tested
> > shouldn't even have used the word "tested", only
> > "criticized on empirical grounds"
>
> I recognize I'm cutting here and violating your prose.
> But I get the impression that you hold to the notion
> of a philosophical theory that gives us knowledge.
> That it must be consistent with what we know
> empirically.
>
> I agree. But what are these philo theories about?
>
Philosophy provides knowledge about the relationships between our
concepts, but often the empirical is (or at least seems to be)
neither here nor there. Sometimes it is relevant, but then typically
the connection is very remote. Sometimes part of the philosophical
problem is identifying the connection, if any.
> >I think the theories of Lakoff, Johnson, et al,
> > regarding the role of metaphor and cognition are as
> good an example as any.
>
> Examples of philo theories? If so. how do they differ
> from psychology and anthropology that must stand to
> the empirical test?
>
Aspects of their work are amenable to empirical testing while others
are defended by appeals to converging evidence. I withhold judgment
on their scientific legitimacy.
Other aspects (and I believe that their enthusiasm leads them to
sometimes gloss over this) are very much conceptual questions for
which the empirical work may be suggestive, but almost certainly not
conclusive and perhaps not even relevant. Here we see my two points
about connections being remote and about identifying the connections.
The other point, that the empirical may be irrelevant, is also
important to remember, although this needs to be explicitly argued,
not legislated by appeals to arbitrary disciplinary boundaries.
Rather than discuss the work of Lakoff and Johnson, with its vast and
in some cases perhaps dubious ambitions, I will focus on the the work
of Rosch, to which I referred in my previous post. It is specific and
it ties into the previous topic of philosophical biases by pointing
out a specific bias that Wittgenstein has identified and challenged.
Before I get to Rosch, by way of preparation, let me address this.
You quote me:
>
> "There is description involved and familiar facts, but
> it is neither a cultural anthropologist's or
> evolutionary biologist's account of the evolution of
> language nor a developmental psychologist's model of
> language acquisition."
>
> Just a *neutral* description from no point of view?
I don't consider any description to be from "no point of view". What
I wrote about "laying out familiar ones (facts) in a manner that is
hopefully perspicuous and suggestive, reminding us of things that
philosophical prejudice may have obscured" makes clear that there is
a purpose and therefore a point of view.
> Yes it can sound like that. I can't disagree that
> there are claims that are rock certain or that words
> have meaning in the stream of life. But what philo
> questions can be settled by such generalities?
>
Some philosophical questions may be perhaps not so much answered as
shown to be misguided, even senseless. Obviously, we've debated the
legitimacy of this so for now, I'll move on.
> then again, you suggest that LW has a negative
> project. Just sweeping away the prejudices. Now what?
>
The question of whether Wittgenstein sought to bring philosophical
discourse has been discussed elsewhere. I can only say that it's not
an ambition I hold. I do however believe that there is nothing
trifling about leading us to question prejudices. That itself is an
intellectual service and an important part of the philosophical
endeavor.
Now, I move onto the work of Dr. Eleanor Rosch. The following is
excerpted from a page on her work at the website of the University of
Pittsburg's School of Information Sciences, included in
the "Information Science Hall of Fame."
(It can be found at
http://www.sis.pitt.edu/~mbsclass/hall_of_fame/rosch.htm#TABLE%20OF%
20CONTENTS )
Professor Rosch saw categorization itself as one of the most
important issues in cognitive science. Professor Rosch established
research paradigms in cognitive psychology for demonstrating
centrality, family resemblance, basic-level categorization, basic-
level primacy, and reference-point reasoning, as well as certain
kinds of embodiment. Professor Rosch is perhaps best known for
developing experimental paradigms for determining subjects' ratings
of how good an example of a category a member is judged to be.
Professor Rosch ultimately realized that these ratings do not in
themselves constitute models for representing category structure;
they are rather effects that are inconsistent with the classical
theory and that place significant constraints on what an adequate
account of categorization must be.
Professor Rosch noted that children learned classes first in terms of
concrete cases rather than defining features and she ran many tests
which showed robins were much better "prototypes" of the class bird
than were chickens or ostriches. And carrots were a better example of
vegetable than were pickles. Professor Rosch defined a hierarchy of
categories: superordinate, basic and subordinate:
· A basic category is the largest class of which we can form a
fairly concrete image, like chair or ball. These are the first
classifications that children make.
· Superordinate categories are collections of basic
categories: furniture includes chairs, lamps, desks, beds, etc. Toys
include balls, dolls, furry animals and blocks. No one object clearly
represents them.
· Subordinate categories represent divisions of basic classes:
such as deck chairs, bar stools, teddy bears or school desks.
Professor Rosch stated that the functional purpose of classes was "to
provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort."
Although all classes are fuzzy in nature, members of a language group
maintain communication by rounding them off to their core, to their
most common prototypes. These common prototypes have many features in
common, although other members of the same class might share only a
few of those features. For example, define a chair. And then think of
whether or not a beanbag chair would fit in your definition? And what
about a swing? Or a saddle? Or a throne?
…
Professor Eleanor Rosch received her Ph.D. from Harvard University.
She is currently a professor in the Psychology Department of The
University of California, Berkeley. Her research interests include
cognition, concepts, causality, thinking, memory, cross-cultural,
Eastern psychology, and psychology of religion. Professor Rosch
established a great reputation with her pioneering work on
categorization. Traditional theories argue that people categorize
using the common the features of the members. Professor Rosch
overcame the constraints of these theories, and showed that:
(1) When people categorize, they cannot tell you what features
they are using;
(2) When people categorize, they usually find some members of
categories more "typical" or "better" than others (e.g., a robin is a
better
member of the category "bird" than an ostrich).
(3) When people categorize, they categorize more typical members
more quickly than less typical ones.
Professor Rosch concluded that features are not the basis on which
people categorize. Rather, they categorize on the basis of how close
something is to the "prototype" or ideal member of a category. For
example, a robin is closer to the bird prototype than an ostrich is,
but they are both closer to it than they are to the prototype of a
fish, so we call them both birds, only it takes longer to say an
ostrich is a bird than it take to say a robin is a bird, because the
ostrich is further from the prototype.
…
Professor Rosch has also studied linguistics. Her 'basic-level'
concepts and radial category structures have been applied to
prepositions in English, Spanish, French, and German languages. There
appear to be central, basic meanings of prepositions that often match
up across languages. For example, the same 'best example'
situation, "on the table", shows up for on (English), sur (French),
sobre (Spanish) and auf (German). In contrast, less central meanings
(such as the relation of passengers to buses) may vary more from
language to language.
among her publications (listed to make the Wittgenstein connection
explicit if you missed it) are:
· Wittgenstein and Categorization Research in Cognitive
Psychology. In Meaning and the Growth of Understanding:
Wittgenstein's Significance for Developmental Psychology, Ed. M.
Chapman and R. Dixon. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
· Family Resemblance: Studies in the Internal Structure of
Categories, Cognitive Psychology 7 (1975):573-605.
I'll take up realism in my next post.
sceptical_whimsey
apparently thought that hacking and deactivating my account would
somehow compensate for the fact that their mother always viewed them
with disappointment.
(Incidentally, that's what "pop psychology" is to me.)
You asked some questions about my comments regarding Realism. Before
proceeding, let me say that this is not a subject to which I have
given much attention of late, so my remarks will be brief and
certainly incomplete.
I said:
> >I tend to waver between a very moderate version of
> >technical realism and some form of internal realism..
>
You asked:
> You waver. Why?
There are several reasons for my indecision between these two labels,
one of which is that I am not at all clear that it is a distinction
without a difference.
Metaphysical realism is typically criticized in its extreme forms and
it's unclear which criticisms of it apply equally to more modest
forms of external realism. What do I mean by modest? At least one of
two distinctions would reflect something of what I have in mind.
Metaphysical realism emphasizes the independence of the world from
our ways of conceptualizing it. A more modest form would draw out a
distinction between being causally independent (our concepts do not
cause the world to exist) and being ontologically independent (our
concepts do not determine the structure of the world). A more modest
realism might be committed to the former without embracing the
latter. Some ways of characterizing "internal realism" also seem to
allow for the former (and if they do not, then I would say that
calling them actually species of anti-realism is legitimate) but
internal realists view causation as in part imposed on the world by
our conceptual schemes. The distinction needs further refinement and
elaboration in any case.
The second distinction, which I believe might set internal realism
apart from the more modest external realism I have in mind, concerns
an ambiguity in ontological independence: when we say "the structure
of the world", do we mean to say that the world exhibits only one
true structure, one system of parts, wholes, and relations, or do we
allow that the world's structure is such as to admit a variety of
valid conceptualizations? In the former case, we have a metaphysical
realism that would seem to require a "God's eye view" to make sense
of any claim that our concepts fit reality and would seem to require
a miracle for our concepts to just happen to fit. In the latter case,
no miracle seems to required: our concepts facilitate our coping in
the world and so must in some ways fit with aspects of the world's
structure. We could speak of different conceptual schemes being more
or less adequate to different purposes and make sense of the idea
that science gradually comes to more and more adequate (for its
purposes) descriptions of the world, without assuming that it has
found or is moving toward the One True Description or that there even
is such a thing.
Now, while modest forms of external realism are not often
discussed, "internal realism" has been more discussed, but it has
been characterized in different ways by its originator, Putnam.
Different ways of characterizing the position have been favored by
different philosophers who express sympathy with the view(s), but it
is not at all clear to me that each characterization entails the
others nor even that all of the characterizations are consistent. It
is also unclear whether on some characterizations it is
distinguishable from the modest external realism I have referred to.
Other questions also concern me. For example, Davidson has cast doubt
on the whole scheme-content distinction and internal realism seems to
require such a distinction, but some internal realists have proposed
ways of characterizing the distinction that are not susceptible to
Davidson's criticisms.
(Davidson's views on these matters were unclear. He was critical of
both realism and anti-realism, but his attacks on the former were
primarily directed against more extreme varieties. Perhaps he
subscribed to the causal but not the ontological independence of the
world or perhaps his view could be called an internal realism without
a scheme-content distinction.)
Is Putnam's model-theoretic argument valid and if so what does it
prove and under what assumptions? What about the need for endless
hierarchy of meta-languages? These are all important questions
requiring close conceptual examination and debate.
As I said, I have not been much focused on these issues of later. My
presentation of them is likely flawed in many respects, but since I
did mention them regarding your question about metaphysics, I wanted
to provide some idea of how I view the problem.
> Are there any facts that go against
> your sense of Realism?
First, note that I waver between two forms of realism, albeit
moderate ones.
Second, while I do not believe that any empirical facts could refute
realism generally, I do believe that the history of science
undermines many arguments in support of more extreme forms of
realism. I also believe that quantum mechanics may undermine some
versions of realism.
> Could you imagine a study that
> would shore up your conviction? I couldn't.
>
An empirical study? Perhaps not.
> Clearly, this is a conceptual problem in which we seek
> to find the words that coherently express our sense of
> Realism. You know what I'm going to say now...yes we
> need a compelling metaphor.
>
Yes, this is your idée fixée. I am well aware.
If "Realism" cannot be coherently expressed, then arguments for or
against it are idle. I don't dismiss that possibility.
A "compelling metaphor" is just more words, so I don't see how that
would have any relevance to the debate about how or whether words
connect with reality. Without more specification, your remark is
nothing more than reciting a mantra.
> Years ago, on this List, a Realist was in combat with
> a anti-Realist. It was a duel of words.
>
Are not all debates in this forum a "duel of words"?
> By the way, Gary, if I have him right, finds that LW
> transcends the Realism debate. Do you agree?
>
First, one must recall that Wittgenstein was writing during a period
between the resurgences of the Realism debate at the beginning and
end of the last century, so while he discusses Moore's arguments on
this, it is not his primary focus.
Second, it's not clear to me whether we should say that he
transcended the debate or simply considered it confused and
misguided, sidestepping it. If that amounts to the same thing, so be
it.
Third, I tend to read Wittgenstein as anticipating something like
internal realism. Putnam does seem to read him this way, but
then "internal realism" may need further elaboration and
clarification.
bruce denner
time being, they have a way of returning. So, I'll
briefly comment...and wait for the return in other
contexts.
--- John <sceptic...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> First, you've presented more remarks on "metaphor".
> If your intent is to use "metaphor" in such a way as
> to mean that Skinner's "black box"
> ceased to be a metaphor...
You have a uneasiness with transitional cases.
> Second, I have explicitly (and repeatedly) said that
> Wittgenstein was not proposing a scientific theory
I'm well aware. But I've yet to learn what sort of
theory...and I'm comfortable with uncertainty here
> you maintain that philosophy and science are two
> distinct language-games..
If I wrote that, please forgive me. I agree with Rob
that philosophy isn't a language-game.
>Calling untested assumptions "philosophical" is
>consistent with my own view of the historical
>continuity between philosophy and science,
One can always argue for continuity or
discontinuity...my specific argument for discontinuity
is that philo questions are inherently untestable and
the answers are not claims to knowledge. Hence,
Realsim debate is untouched by physics.
>One of the tasks of philosophy becomes determining
>what those necessary and sufficient conditions are.
Science seeks the necessary and sufficient conditions.
How can a discipline that runs no tests determine
conditions at all?
You go on to discuss this...
>LW brings together familiar facts and asks us to
>consider them together...and ask ourselves whether
>there is any set of necessary and sufficient
>conditions applicable to them all...
This is good stuff for me, John. It helps me make a
distinction.
For example: One might ask: "are there necessary and
sufficient conditions for communicating love. Research
is done. Not all the variance is accounted for. But
the conditions are stated.
But if you ask: "Are there necessary and sufficient
conditions for communication to occur?", You're not
asking a testable, empirical question. You may, like
LW, discourage the wish for the necessary and
sufficient or you may not. Either way, your text
invites you think of us as communicators along certain
lines.
The same point again..
>Philosophy provides knowledge about the relationships
>between our concepts, but often the empirical is (or
>at least seems to be) neither here nor there.
Now that's something I'd write. Except by knowledge I
wouldn't mean some fact about how the mind works and
"neither here nor there" sounds liek the transitional
state I find so prevelant in philo. so I take my
earlier remark back.
>Now, I move onto the work of Dr. Eleanor Rosch.
Yes, cognitive psychology can employ terms borrowed
from philosophical texts. But isn't it yet again
another example of looking for causes and conditions
for how mind works when we are trying ask "what sort
of beings are we that we think of ourselves as
servo-mechanisms?
bruce
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bruce denner
wrote: (and I realize you don't necessarily buy any of
it)
> Metaphysical realism emphasizes the independence of
> the world from our ways of conceptualizing it.
Besides saying *that*, what else could the
metaphysician say? What could "world" mean if it were
apart from our concepts?
>A more modest form would draw out a
>distinction between being causally independent (our
>concepts do not cause the world to exist)
Of course, concepts can't cause anything.Right?
>and being ontologically independent (our concepts do
>not determine the structure of the world).
The word "determine" is a trouble maker. The way we
think about the world is the world for us. And yet, we
can find out that we were wrong. But when we do, we
trading one set of concepts for another. Right?
John, I read with interest what follows and want to
set it aside in order to focus on the question "What's
philosophy?"
What could philosophy hope to tells us about all these
Realisms? And when it does, what difference it would
make to whom.
>Second, while I do not believe that any empirical
>facts could refute realism generally, I do believe
>that the history of science undermines many arguments
>in support of more extreme forms of realism.
Here is where we differ! I can't see how any
scientific discover impacts the Realism issue.
>If "Realism" cannot be coherently expressed, then
>arguments for or against it are idle.
But the problem is that *coherence* is in the ear of
the hearer.
>A "compelling metaphor" is just more words...
What else do we have here but words? Deeds?
>..so I don't see how that would have any relevance to
>the debate about how or whether words
>connect with reality. Without more specification,
>your remark is nothing more than reciting a mantra.
Well, there is something to be said about Mantras. But
I'll not say it here. You're right. Specification.
More words.
Actually, what we need is a thesis statement. Just
what is the question one is answering by claiming
internal, external, or any kind of Realism? It's not
uncommon on this List to go on and on with answers
without questions. I'm guilty as the rest.
>Are not all debates in this forum a "duel of words"?
Yes. So let's figure out how to tell the difference
between a Mantra and a specification.
bruce
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sceptical_whimsey
>
> You have a uneasiness with transitional cases.
>
What a condescending and patently false remark! At least you took it
back later. My problem is not with vagueness, but with equivocation,
particularly equivocation in cases where the ambiguity involved is
between a standard usage and a non-standard usage that remains
unspecified. You mix together literary and etymological issues with
(apparently) methodological and ontological ones. You won't specify
what you have in mind in a given context. You're wasting my time.
> Realism debate is untouched by physics.
>
Philosophers of science and philosophically minded physicists dealing
with the interpretation of quantum mechanics disagree, but that's
fine.
> >One of the tasks of philosophy becomes determining
> >what those necessary and sufficient conditions are.
>
Yes, and what you quoted was from a paragraph elucidating what I saw
as one example of philosophical bias. Of course, quoting that out of
context is par for the course for you.
> Science seeks the necessary and sufficient conditions.
> How can a discipline that runs no tests determine
> conditions at all?
>
Considering you've already granted that the process of
operationalization cannot itself be operationalized, but
operationalization involves specifying necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of a construct, your question shows a
retreat from ground we've covered and I refuse to cover it again.
>
> Yes, cognitive psychology can employ terms borrowed
> from philosophical texts. But isn't it yet again
> another example of looking for causes and conditions
> for how mind works when we are trying ask "what sort
> of beings are we that we think of ourselves as
> servo-mechanisms?
>
Servo-mechanisms? Who suggested we think of ourselves as servo-
mechanisms? Not me. Not Wittgenstein. Not Rosch. Who is the "we"
asking? You object to an answer because you have a different question
in mind? Well, I went to great lengths expressing my thoughts on the
relationship between scientism and philosophy, reposted those remarks
at your request. You don't want to reply to THAT, you just want to
throw up the specter of scientism whenever it suits your purposes.
You're wasting my time.
>
> >Second, while I do not believe that any empirical
> >facts could refute realism generally, I do believe
> >that the history of science undermines many arguments
> >in support of more extreme forms of realism.
>
> Here is where we differ! I can't see how any
> scientific discover impacts the Realism issue.
>
The post referred to the history of science, not scientific
discoveries (although discoveries in physics have been part of the
discussion too), but if you part company with Kuhn, Lakatos,
Feyerabend, Putnam, Hanson, Hesse, Bachelard, Canguilhem, et al,
that's fine.
> >If "Realism" cannot be coherently expressed, then
> >arguments for or against it are idle.
>
> But the problem is that *coherence* is in the ear of
> the hearer.
>
I've specified what I mean by coherence, but you can go on your merry
with your relativistic assertions. I'm done!
sceptical_whimsey
is not vagueness, still less the existence of borderline cases to
which I object but rather to equivocation, conflating different
senses of a word when it suits the "argument" (if such it can be
called) and using words in some unspecified but clearly non-standard
sense while conflating this with more familiar senses. We've been
dealing with this since early August, with no clarification from you,
so you may expect that henceforth any claims made using the
word "metaphor" will be simply disregarded.
Second, regarding whether Wittgenstein's philosophy can be said to
constitute a theory and if so in what sense, I went to great lengths
to specify many senses of the word "theory" in a post on August 24th,
whether and to what extent it was appropriate to say ascribe "theory"
to Wittgenstein in different senses. I have also repeatedly said that
he was not proposing a scientific theory. Even if you are confused
about some aspect of this, I fail to see how repeatedly saying that
Wittgenstein was not doing science or asking me if I thought he was
is likely to resolve such confusion. This is another topic I won't be
addressing unless and until something changes in your approach.
Third, regarding whether you consider philosophy a language-game, I
stand corrected. You haven't explicitly said that although it
appeared to me you urged such a distinction. Apparently, I was
mistaken.
Fourth, regarding the putatively "inherent" untestability of
philosophical questions and the suggestion that answers are "not
claims to knowledge", you call this an "argument", but it is merely
an assertion, reiterating that you hold a contrasting position.
That's fine of course. The further use of "hence" in saying that the
realism debate is untouched by physics suggests that this conclusion
is supported by your "argument", but in fact this is circular
reasoning (appealing to a broader claim to refute a narrower one upon
which the broader claim would itself in part depend) if the first
claim is meant as an argument rather than simply an evaluative claim
about what we should count as "philosophical" masquerading as a
description, i.e. a persuasive definition. You can always stick with
this definition, excluding 20th century Analytic philosophers for
their "naturalistic" confusions, excluding ancient and early modern
philosophers for their scientific naiveté, and in the case of Rosch
and Wittgenstein, you can minimize it as merely using terms "borrowed
from philosophical texts" (ignoring the substantive connections) and
then bring up the red herring of thinking of ourselves as "servo-
mechanisms", suggesting that the right questions aren't being asked.
I simply won't waste my time further with this topic. It's a
pointless exercise and I'll henceforth disregard arguments appealing
to such definitions of "philosophy".
Fifth, regarding "servo-mechanisms" and similar remarks insinuating
some scientistic bias, I have explicitly stated how I believe that
particular forms of scientism can and should be challenged and the
problems I see with "challenging" scientism with relativist, anti-
realist, or skeptical arguments. I even posted the latter remarks
twice, but you've ignored them. Henceforth, I shall disregard any
arguments raising the specter of scientism as simply attempts to
muddy the waters.
Sixth, regarding what I said about relationships between concepts, if
I considered this to be primarily "some fact about how the mind
works" as you suggest, then I would not have said, "…often the
empirical is (or at least seems to be) neither here nor there." Of
course, concepts are related to how the mind works, but how the mind
works may have very little bearing on many particular conceptual
questions. That I consider cognitive science possibly relevant in
some cases is not to say that I see it as a panacea. Far from it as I
think I've made abundantly clear.
Now, I proceed to the remainder of your letter, which deals
with "necessary and sufficient conditions", addressing two specific
points.
First, you quoted me saying, "One of the tasks of philosophy becomes
determining what those necessary and sufficient conditions are." I
wish to make very clear that this was taken from a paragraph in which
I was elaborating on what I see as a philosophical bias. I was not
advocating that position.
Second, you said, "Science seeks the necessary and sufficient
conditions," and asked, "How can a discipline that runs no tests
determine conditions at all?" Then you quoted me, really mangling
what I said so as not to make clear that I was talking about uses to
which words are put. Here and in the context of the philosophical
bias I was describing, I made very clear that I was talking about how
we understand and use particular words, not about necessary and
sufficient conditions for communication, per se. Likewise, the
excerpts from information of Rosch's research makes very clear she's
talking about how particular words are used. The same is true of
course of Wittgenstein's discussion of "family resemblance". You then
offer two examples of research into necessary and sufficient
conditions of communication, one you consider testable, the other
not, but this is all quite beside the point, because I wasn't talking
about whether there are necessary and sufficient conditions for
communication to take place, but rather whether in using a particular
word, we must have a definition that ultimately consists of necessary
and sufficient conditions in order to be understood.
Now, assuming that you now understand me, do you see how your
question about a "discipline that runs no tests" is a retreat over
ground we've already covered? Operationalization is a process of
specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a
theoretical term. You have already conceded that when scientists
operationalize a construct, precisify the use of a word, they do not
perform tests that somehow validate the usage. There's no testing an
operationalization in a vacuum; one can only compare one
operationalization with another. Different schools of philosophy,
from Socratic questioning to phenomenology's eidetic reduction to
close attention to ordinary language usage or logical analysis in
different styles of analytic philosophy, have all taken different
approaches to this issue. Wittgenstein's arguments suggest any such
approach may be misguided, pointing out some questionable assumptions
about how we use and understand words. Rosch's research provides
empirical support for some of Wittgenstein's arguments.
In each of these subjects, I am not trying to tell you how to talk.
You may talk however you wish, but I am unwilling to participate in
conversations I've become convinced are pointless. I've tried to be
more civil in addressing these issues, but I do believe they needed
to be addressed. The alternative, simply ignoring your arguments
without explanation seemed to me even ruder that explaining why I
won't continue to discuss certain topics. I wanted to get this out of
the way before we move on to hopefully more fruitful discussion.
sceptical_whimsey
<blroadies@y...> wrote:
> --- sceptical_whimsey <sceptical_whimsey@y...>
> wrote: (and I realize you don't necessarily buy any of
> it)
Good.
>
> > Metaphysical realism emphasizes the independence of
> > the world from our ways of conceptualizing it.
>
> Besides saying *that*, what else could the
> metaphysician say?
I've mentioned the variety of ways of characterizing the positions.
> What could "world" mean if it were
> apart from our concepts?
>
Nothing, but I didn't say that the word "world" had meaning apart
from our concepts only that the world itself exists independently of
them. Here again, you seem to be confusion linguistic truisms with
ontological theses.
> >A more modest form would draw out a
> >distinction between being causally independent (our
> >concepts do not cause the world to exist)
>
> Of course, concepts can't cause anything.Right?
>
That's an interesting question, perhaps tied to the philosophy of
mind and the putative causal role of mental states and prepositional
attitudes. Do political concepts play a causal role in revolutions?
Does the concept of God play a role in human history? Perhaps.
But concepts don't cause the world to exist.
> >and being ontologically independent (our concepts do
> >not determine the structure of the world).
>
> The word "determine" is a trouble maker. The way we
> think about the world is the world for us. And yet, we
> can find out that we were wrong. But when we do, we
> trading one set of concepts for another. Right?
>
We are trading one set of concepts for another, yes, but how are we
to make sense of being able to "find out we were wrong"?
> John, I read with interest what follows and want to
> set it aside in order to focus on the question "What's
> philosophy?"
>
> What could philosophy hope to tells us about all these
> Realisms? And when it does, what difference it would
> make to whom.
>
There are all sorts of questions, tied to the tenability of
skepticism or relativism, the legitimacy of certain kinds of
inference (for example those appealing to the law of the excluded
middle), the interpretation of scientific progress, the putative role
of "natural kinds" in scientific theorizing, and many others.
> >Second, while I do not believe that any empirical
> >facts could refute realism generally, I do believe
> >that the history of science undermines many arguments
> >in support of more extreme forms of realism.
>
> Here is where we differ! I can't see how any
> scientific discover impacts the Realism issue.
>
I'd suggest you study the role developments in optics have played in
arguments against "naīve realism", the role quantum mechanics has
played in discussing the reality of unobserved physical magnitudes,
the issue of causality as a synthetic a priori concept, and
antinomies concerning causation, similarly the role that General
Relativity's use of non-Euclidean geometry has played in discussions
of antinomies concerning space and the status of Euclidean geometry
as synthetic a priori, and (what I was specifically referring to
here) the role that the history of science itself, among other things
the alleged radical discontinuities in the development of scientific
theories, has played in debates about realism.
> >If "Realism" cannot be coherently expressed, then
> >arguments for or against it are idle.
>
> But the problem is that *coherence* is in the ear of
> the hearer.
>
> >A "compelling metaphor" is just more words...
>
> What else do we have here but words? Deeds?
>
Deeds certainly do play a role in demonstrating why certain kinds of
anti-realism are simply nonsensical. However, my point was that
against someone who parades linguistic truisms as arguments that all
we know is language, a metaphor is no better than any other use of
language.
> >..so I don't see how that would have any relevance to
> >the debate about how or whether words
> >connect with reality. Without more specification,
> >your remark is nothing more than reciting a mantra.
>
> Well, there is something to be said about Mantras. But
> I'll not say it here. You're right. Specification.
> More words.
>
Yes, more words. And against someone who feigns ignorance of the
distinction between words and that to which words refer, of course
words will not and cannot make a difference.
What I meant is not to contrast metaphors with specifications, but
rather to contrast merely saying, "we need a compelling metaphor"
with a specification of what sort of metaphor one has in mind and why
a metaphor would be any different from any other use of language. If
it were merely because metaphors are "compelling", I'd only say that
I happen to find dealing with everyday life far more compelling
reason to accept at least a minimal form of realism than any literary
flourish.
> Actually, what we need is a thesis statement. Just
> what is the question one is answering by claiming
> internal, external, or any kind of Realism? It's not
> uncommon on this List to go on and on with answers
> without questions. I'm guilty as the rest.
>
That was a major point of my post, that different ways of
characterizing different forms of realism specified, compared,
different arguments assessed, etc. As I said, this is not a subject
to which I have paid particular attention of late and I am not
disposed to take it up at this time, but you did ask about my self-
described "wavering" and were entitled to some answer.
> >Are not all debates in this forum a "duel of words"?
>
> Yes. So let's figure out how to tell the difference
> between a Mantra and a specification.
>
I don't see how the distinction would render a debate any less
a "duel of words". Marshalling logical arguments and empirical
research in this forum is as much a "duel of words" as merely
restating intransigent positions.
I've elaborated on what I mean by "specification". "Mantra" is used
to describe the repetition of a single word or phrase until semantic
satiation takes place and the meanings, if such there ever were, are
lost.
Of course, "What the Hell are you talking about, Bruce?" can become a
mantra too, hence my reticence about continuing with certain topics.
bruce denner
wrote:
> Nothing, but I didn't say that the word "world" had
> meaning apart from our concepts only that the world
>itself exists independently of them. Here again, you
>seem to be confusion linguistic truisms with
> ontological theses.
>...concepts don't cause the world to exist.
Let's see if I get it. It's an ontological thesis that
the world is exists independent of our concepts. Are
ontological theses conceptual? Is philosophy the
discipline which proposes ontological theses? Can they
be empirically tested?
> I'd suggest you study the role developments in
> optics have played in arguments against "naive
>realism",
I suggest that we find a philosophical defense of
Realism and see whether optics has any relevance.
>However, my point was that against someone who
>parades linguistic truisms as arguments...
> Yes, more words. And against someone who feigns
> ignorance of the distinction between words and that
>to which words refer, of course words will not and
>cannot make a difference.
Who on this List do you have in mind?
> I happen to find dealing with everyday life far more
> compelling reason to accept at least a minimal form
>of realism than any literary flourish.
And this sentence isn't a literary flourish? In what
way is "dealing with everyday life" a philosophical
defense of Realism?
>Of course, "What the Hell are you talking about,
>Bruce?" can become a mantra too, hence my reticence
>about continuing with certain topics.
I take to heart LW's notion that what I understand is
exhausted in what I can explain to another. If I fail
to communicate then possibly I'm confused or muddled.
bruce
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bruce denner
and sees reality
and the things he sees
are bigger than himself
from A CONEY ISLAND OF THE MIND
by Lawrence Ferlinghetti
Cartoon From the New Yorker
A dog staring up into the heavens
Caption: Without making a big deal of it, dogs often
questions the existence of an almighty.
bruce
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bruce denner
and sees reality
and the things he sees
are bigger than himself
from A CONEY ISLAND OF THE MIND
by Lawrence Ferlinghetti
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bruce denner
It is obvious I can't keep up. I'd rather not drop
out. I don't think "Post and Run away" quite fair.so,
I'll try to limited my comments to specific points.
My interest on List is, has always been, to find out
what the Philosophers are up to. I know that I appear
critical but this is my way of coming to understand. I
have no vested interest in what philosophy *is.* I
just want to get what folks on this List think it
might be.
I'm tempted to lay out the alternatives, but I'll
resist because I don't want to get into a hassle of
whether I'm accurately reflecting other's texts.
Instead, I will read the Posts with my basic interest
in mind and comment when appropriate.
I recognize that this ignores lots of interesting
material and does an injustice to the careful work of
others. I apologize. I accept corrections and advice.
But I'm choosing this as an alterantive to silence.
sceptical_whimsey
As you know I've felt rather poorly of later, but even at my best I
can be rather abrasive. I do try to add touches of humor to my posts
(though I suspect the most amusing part are quite inadvertent), but I
take philosophy seriously and tend to adopt a somewhat adversarial
stance. Because of this and while I have tried to be charitable to
your arguments, I have not been particularly charitable toward you.
As a relative newcomer to a group in which you have been a regular
participant for years, I really have no business expecting discussing
to proceed along the lines and in the manner that I might prefer.
This is a discussion board, not a peer reviewed journal or a formal
debate, and so whatever my druthers may be have no more weight than
yours or anyone else's. Please don't let any preferences I may
express be taken on as obligations.
Your presence on this board would be seriously missed. Do what you're
comfortable with, accept or reject any suggestions I may have to
offer about where debate might proceed, but don't let this group
become a chore.
Your most recent posts have prompted some responses on my part,
responses that I shall be sharing soon. Some of your questions have
seemed more pertinent, whether or not my haranguing has played a
role. I'll be getting to them this week.
Take care.
John
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sceptical_whimsey
Bruce, you posed some questions about ontology and realism:
"Let's see if I get it. It's an ontological thesis that the world is
exists independent of our concepts. Are ontological theses
conceptual? Is philosophy the discipline which proposes ontological
theses? Can they
be empirically tested?"
Taking the second question first, I don't see it as the business of
philosophy, at least in the modern setting, to propose theses
concerning what exists. Rather, it is the task of philosophy to
examine what constitutes an ontological commitment, what criteria are
to be applied, what are the commitments of a given discourse, what
sorts of analyses can reduce one ontology to a more basic one, what
makes an ontology "more basic", etc. These are largely conceptual
problems.
Your third question, whether an ontological commitment can be
empirically tested is itself a philosophical problem as well. My
suspicion is on the side of Quine (at least when it comes to
scientific methodology) who argues, "statements about the external
world face the tribunal of experience not individually but only as a
corporate body."
As for the first question, the status of different ontological theses
as conceptual or factual is also a philosophical question and one
might adopt different stances, e.g. in the ontology of mathematics or
the ontology of physics. One may also question the applicability of
the factual/conceptual distinction.
I wrote, "...(A)gainst someone who feigns ignorance of the
distinction between words and that to which words refer, of course
words will not and cannot make a difference," prompting you to
ask, "Who on this List do you have in mind?"
I do not necessarily speak of anyone on this list. It does however
seem to be the sort of thing some of Derrida's more enthusiastic,
less cautious followers seem to do.
I have suspected you of doing this, but you maintain that you are
not. However, in one remark, you quote me saying, "I happen to find
dealing with everyday life far more compelling reason to accept at
least a minimal form of realism than any literary flourish." And you
then ask, "And this sentence isn't a literary flourish?"
If it is a flourish, it isn't much of one. But I won't debate the
point, lest it degenerate into more fruitless debate about the
figurativeness of language. Certainly, the sentence is in language
and as I said, words will not and cannot make a difference debating
someone who focuses on the words and ignores that to which the words
refer..
I point out your question however, because it seems to illustrate
what I was talking about. It is not talking about everyday coping or
the expression "dealing with everyday life" that I find compelling,
but rather the coping itself. Do you not see the difference?
You went on to ask, "In what way is 'dealing with everyday life' a
philosophical defense of Realism?"
By itself, perhaps neither the expression nor the activities to which
it refers constitute a defense. However, in conjunction with the
pragmatist's point that, to be genuine, doubt must make some
difference in our activities and experiences or the Wittgensteinian
view that language is only meaningful against a background of
behavior, a defense begins to form.
Note that I said a "minimal form of realism". Kant's "transcendental
idealism", which is after all also an "empirical realism", does
qualify on this score, whatever other faults it may have, while more
outlandish forms of "linguistic idealism" do not.
However, it may well be that all debates between transcendental
idealism and more robust forms of realism are idle on pragmatic and
Wittgensteinian grounds.
I'll take up the history of optics in debates about realism soon.
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bruce denner
wrote:
> Taking the second question first, I don't see it as
> the business of
> philosophy, at least in the modern setting, to
> propose theses
> concerning what exists. Rather, it is the task of
> philosophy to
> examine what constitutes an ontological commitment,
> what criteria are
> to be applied, what are the commitments of a given
> discourse, what
> sorts of analyses can reduce one ontology to a more
> basic one, what
> makes an ontology "more basic", etc. These are
> largely conceptual
> problems.
Can we work with a specific ontological commitment so
I can learn how it works?
>Certainly, the sentence is in language
> and as I said, words will not and cannot make a
> difference debating someone who focuses on the words
>and ignores that to which the words refer..
I'd be interested in examining an example of this.
> I point out your question however, because it seems
> to illustrate
> what I was talking about. It is not talking about
> everyday coping or
> the expression "dealing with everyday life" that I
> find compelling,
> but rather the coping itself. Do you not see the
> difference?
Sorry John I don't...is this an example of the above?
bruce
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