[analytic-borders] Some Info. on Wittgenstein for Kelvin
swmaerske
encyclopedic entry by Duncan Richter, a well known Wittgenstein
scholar. I was especially interested in it since Duncan appeared to
be touching on many of the issues Kelvin has raised here in the
course of his critique of Wittgenstein's thinking.
The link to the full article is provided as well.
SWM
http://www.iep.utm.edu/w/wittgens.htm
5. Meaning
Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says
that: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we
employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language."
It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is not offering the general
theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted as
doing. The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that
the meaning of a word is some object that it names--in which case the
meaning of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is
nonsense--and that the meaning of a word is some psychological
feeling--in which case each user of a word could mean something
different by it, having a different feeling, and communication would
be difficult if not impossible.
Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many things: to
what objects the word refers (if any), whether it is slang or not,
what part of speech it is, whether it carries overtones, and if so
what kind they are, and so on. To know all this, or to know enough to
get by, is to know the use. And generally knowing the use means
knowing the meaning. Philosophical questions about consciousness, for
example, then, should be responded to by looking at the various uses
we make of the word "consciousness." Scientific investigations into
the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although they
might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led us to
change our use of such words). The meaning of any word is a matter of
what we do with our language, not something hidden inside anyone's
mind or brain. This is not an attack on neuroscience. It is merely
distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with
linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned
with discovering facts).
One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in
Philosophical Investigations Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says
that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as the
copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is not its
use. That is to say, "is" has not one complex use (including
both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one complex
meaning, but two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an accident
that the same word has these two uses. It is not an accident that we
use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is
accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us, on how
we use it. . . .
9. Continuity
Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking
considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated
in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory of
language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there came a
transitional middle period when he first returned to philosophical
work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems of
philosophy. This period led to his mature, later period which gave us
the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work, but the
differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two
central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the Tractatus
is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the general
nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work Wittgenstein is
very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the Tractatus
Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas
the later work treats no problems as central. Another obvious
difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a carefully
constructed set of short propositions. The Investigations, though
also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly
organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This reflects
Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few
central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying
attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.
On the other hand, the Tractatus itself says that its propositions
are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to understand), rejects
itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the Tractatus is
not, therefore, proof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The
main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are
investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a
full-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy.
Otherwise, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack
much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.
6. Rules and Private Language
. . The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole
topic is Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
Kripke is struck by the idea that anything might count as continuing
a series or following a rule in the same way. It all depends on how
the rule or series is interpreted. . . .
Kripke's theory is clear and ingenious, and owes a lot to
Wittgenstein, but is doubtful as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.
Kripke himself presents the argument not as Wittgenstein's, nor as
his own, but as "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke
p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein's is suggested by the
fact that it is a theory, and Wittgenstein rejected philosophical
theories, and by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the
first sentence of Philosophical Investigations Sect. 201: "This was
our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
rule." For Kripke's theory as a reading of Wittgenstein, it is not
good that the very next paragraph begins, "It can be seen that there
is a misunderstanding here..." Still, it is no easy matter to see
just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person often
referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The key perhaps lies later in the same
paragraph, where Wittgenstein writes that "there is a way of grasping
a rule which is not an interpretation". Many scholars, notably Baker
and Hacker, have gone to great lengths to explain why Kripke is
mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understand, one of the
best ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to study Kripke and his
Wittgensteinian critics. At the very least, Kripke introduces his
readers well to issues that were of great concern to Wittgenstein and
shows their importance. . . .
7. Realism and Anti-Realism
Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and
Anti-Realism is an interesting one. His emphasis on language and
human behavior, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-
Realism in many people's eyes. He has even been accused of linguistic
idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of
physics, say, would by this theory just be laws of language, the
rules of the language game of physics. Anti-Realist scepticism of
this kind has proved quite popular in the philosophy of science and
in theology, as well as more generally in metaphysics and ethics.
On the other hand, there is a school of Wittgensteinian Realism,
which is less well known. Wittgenstein's views on religion, for
instance, are often compared with those of Simone Weil, who was a
Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of
Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her Realism and Imagination in
Ethics and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's
Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. However, one should not go too
far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. Lovibond, for instance,
equates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement), so
her Realism is of a controversial kind.
Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of
theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of
theories in philosophy. This does not prove that he practiced what he
preached, but it should give us pause. It is also worth noting that
supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist
nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics. There is
something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's
belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found
to 'agree' with it. The Anti-Realist says that we could not get
outside our thought or language (or form of life or language games)
to compare the two. But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we
can or cannot do, but with what makes sense. If metaphysical Realism
is incoherent then so is its opposite. The nonsensical
utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by saying, "No, it
is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical
impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, as Wittgenstein would
say, then so is Anti-Realism.
10. Wittgenstein in History
. . In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy
enormously. The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly
impressed by what they found in the Tractatus, especially the idea
that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability principle
and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at clarification,
not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that it was
what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.
The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to
Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought.
These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later work and
its attention to grammar.
Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and
history of analytic philosophy, but he has become rather
unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti- scientism
stance, because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also
because he has been little understood. Similarities between
Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating interest
among continental philosophers, and Wittgenstein may yet prove to be
a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of
philosophy.
Kelvin Mcqueen
As everyone here knows, when you criticise someone in philosophy, you
present your opponents argument and then you rebut it. However, whenever I
try and do that with Wittgenstein, I always get the same old response:
"That is what YOU think wittgenstein was saying but that is not what he
was ACTUALLY saying, your argument is thus nothing more than a strawman".
Unfortunatly we never get to find out what Wittgenstein was ACTUALLY
saying.
This is what gives guys like Duncan Richter a role in society.
Given that it is againt the philosphical law to criticise Wittgenstein,
given that it is against the philosophcal law to present strawmans and
that you cannot criticise Witt without being accused of producing
strawmans, we can instead criticise WittgensteinIANS, to at least show
that the general methodology is confused.
Quoting swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com>:
> I happened on this today while surfing the Net. It's material from an
> encyclopedic entry by Duncan Richter, a well known Wittgenstein
> scholar. I was especially interested in it since Duncan appeared to
> be touching on many of the issues Kelvin has raised here in the
> course of his critique of Wittgenstein's thinking.
>
> The link to the full article is provided as well.
>
> SWM
>
>
>
> http://www.iep.utm.edu/w/wittgens.htm
>
>
>
Thanks :)
>
> 5. Meaning
>
> Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says
> that: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we
> employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
> word is its use in the language."
>
> It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is not offering the general
> theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted as
> doing.
O.k., so is it clear then that he is offering a theory for a large number
of cases?
> The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that
> the meaning of a word is some object that it names--in which case the
> meaning of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is
> nonsense-
Is that meant to be an argument?
Thanks (Dr. Richter) for reminding me that it sounds funny to say such
things about meanings, but that form of argument is deeply unconvincing.
Certainly the sentence "Socrates is dead" continues to be meaningful even
though the man socrates no longer exists, and the name "socrates" does not
refer to any existing thing. However, is it so clear that "Socrates" fails
to refer to anything at all? If it did fail to refer, then it would be
hard to see how the sentence "Socrates is dead" could be true - since the
subject expression wouldn't refer to anything that had the property
expressed by the predicate. So perhaps names can continue to refer to
things that once existed but no longer do. If the things they refer to are
their meanings, then names may remain meaningful, even when the things
that are their meanings cease to exist. If for some reason, that *sounds*
funny, then that shows nothing more than the fact that we are not
ordinarily accustomed to thinking in these terms. And anyway, what's the
alternative? The meaning of a name can't be associated descriptions, as
Kripke has shown us. So it seems pretty clear to me that there is nothing
wrong with the meaning of a word (e.g. a proper name) having as its
meaning its referent. At least Wittgenstein nor Richter has given us any
argument to think otherwise.
> -and that the meaning of a word is some psychological
> feeling--in which case each user of a word could mean something
> different by it, having a different feeling, and communication would
> be difficult if not impossible.
Communication would be difficult if not impossible? The meaning of
"throbbing pain" is the feeling which the phrase designates. How then can
I talk to you about throbbing pains? Perhaps because we are both human
beings, i.e. extremely similar biological organisms? By "red" I mean the
colour red, and I would be surprised if your red differs in colour from
mine, given that our brains are so biologically similar. Similarily, I
would be surprised if your throbbing pains differed substantially from
mine, why would they? From an evolutionary biological standpoint, it would
be utterly counterintitive to think that they differed so dramatically so
that we couldn't even talk about such phenomena!
So again, there is no argument here.
>
> Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many things: to
> what objects the word refers (if any), whether it is slang or not,
> what part of speech it is, whether it carries overtones, and if so
> what kind they are, and so on. To know all this, or to know enough to
> get by, is to know the use. And generally knowing the use means
> knowing the meaning.
These are statements not arguments. And given that a 'use-theoretic'
approach is being advocated, the statements are utterly question-begging.
> Philosophical questions about consciousness, for
> example, then, should be responded to by looking at the various uses
> we make of the word "consciousness."
That is not going to get us anywhere at all whatsoever. This is analogous
to someone in the 15th century saying: "philosophical questions about
gravity should be responded to by looking at the various uses WE make of
the word "gravity"" - (questions like "what is gravity", "what is
consciousness"). Can you not see that this methodology is utterly utterly
hopeless?
> Scientific investigations into
> the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although they
> might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led us to
> change our use of such words).
Perhaps the scientists don't have the conceptual framework that will allow
them to understand their phenomena under a new logic, a new system of
representation, such that this system will allow them to think thoughts
which will advance their empirical research? Like when Hume butchered
Newtons system of representation, Kant replied to Hume with a new one, and
then Einstein said that he could not have come up with his relativity
theory without these philosophers?
When interpreting Wittgesntein it is utterly important to keep in mind
that he was completely ignorant of the history of philosophy. Richter is
obviously ignorant of this fact, and of history.
> The meaning of any word is a matter of
> what we do with our language,
Rubbish, the meaning of the word "whale" has never been "a kind of fish"
even though we once used it so.
Of course, we may interpret this remark in another way. What we do with
"whale" is refer to whales. And so the meaning of the word is its
reference.
> not something hidden inside anyone's
> mind or brain.
The meaning of "chair" is the associated description "something you sit
on" and that associated description is represented IN MY MIND/BRAIN. So
once again, we have a claim without an argument - the typical
Wittgensteinian style.
> This is not an attack on neuroscience.
If we take it to its full implications, it is actually a criticism of all
science and all knowledge, given what philosophy has done for science in
the past, as mentioned above. So it does really come to an attack on
neuroscience whether Richter likes it or not.
> It is merely
> distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with
> linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned
> with discovering facts).
>
Why would we want to make such a distinction? Well, the early Witt, with
the positivists and everyone else around at the time, thought philosphical
theses to be non-empirical, and therefore apriori. They then idfentified
the apriori with the necessary, which were then identified with the
analytic. So philosophy deals with the analytic - what's true in virtue of
meaning. The later Witt still held this view, but thought analytic truths
to just be rules for the use of terms. Add his confused 'theory' of
meaning, and then you have an identification of philosophy with an
activity which reminds us of rules for the use of terms. But as we now
know, thanks to Kripke, those concepts are not coextensive, and that,
given what I have said above, the conception of meaning is hopelessly
confused.
> One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in
> Philosophical Investigations Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says
> that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as the
> copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is not its
> use. That is to say, "is" has not one complex use (including
> both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one complex
> meaning, but two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an accident
> that the same word has these two uses.
There is a reasonably clear confusion between words (the combination of a
physical vehicle and its meaning) and the physical vehicle (e.g. ink
marks). I'll let you figure it out.
> It is not an accident that we
> use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is
> accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us, on how
> we use it. . . .
>
So it is essential to "whale" that we use it to refer to things which we
also refer to as "fish"? O.k.
>
>
> 9. Continuity
>
>
> Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking
> considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated
> in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory of
> language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there came a
> transitional middle period when he first returned to philosophical
> work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems of
> philosophy. This period led to his mature, later period which gave us
> the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
>
The middle position is where he advocated verificationism.
> There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work, but the
> differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two
> central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the Tractatus
> is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the general
> nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work Wittgenstein is
> very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the Tractatus
> Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas
> the later work treats no problems as central.
That can't be right, in both he concluded with generalisations about all
of philosphy. In both he thought all philosophical problems were
linguistic in nature, in the early he thought they could all be dissolved
by translation into the correct canonical logical notation, in the later
they could all be dissolved with reminders of the rules of our language
games.
> Another obvious
> difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a carefully
> constructed set of short propositions. The Investigations, though
> also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly
> organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This reflects
> Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few
> central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying
> attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.
>
Actually, it reflects what I just mentioned, in the early he shows us the
nature of representation so that we know how to dissolve philosophical
problems, in the later, he shows how problems can be resolved by reminders
with many examples.
> On the other hand, the Tractatus itself says that its propositions
> are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to understand), rejects
> itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the Tractatus is
> not, therefore, proof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The
> main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are
> investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a
> full-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy.
> Otherwise, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack
> much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.
>
Thats one thing I agree with.
>
>
>
> 6. Rules and Private Language
>
> . . . The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole
> topic is Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
> Kripke is struck by the idea that anything might count as continuing
> a series or following a rule in the same way. It all depends on how
> the rule or series is interpreted. . . .
>
> Kripke's theory is clear and ingenious, and owes a lot to
> Wittgenstein, but is doubtful as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.
> Kripke himself presents the argument not as Wittgenstein's, nor as
> his own, but as "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke
> p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein's is suggested by the
> fact that it is a theory, and Wittgenstein rejected philosophical
> theories,
Unbelievable. Why should one have the right to be a theory and not the
other? Who cares what witt says he is doing, he is not humpty dumpty and
so if he is giving a theory then he is giving a theory full stop, no
matter he thinks he is doing. I can play rugby while saying that I am
actually playing soccor, it does not follow from that that I am playing
soccor.
> and by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the
> first sentence of Philosophical Investigations Sect. 201: "This was
> our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
> because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
> rule." For Kripke's theory as a reading of Wittgenstein, it is not
> good that the very next paragraph begins, "It can be seen that there
> is a misunderstanding here..." Still, it is no easy matter to see
> just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person often
> referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The key perhaps lies later in the same
> paragraph, where Wittgenstein writes that "there is a way of grasping
> a rule which is not an interpretation". Many scholars, notably Baker
> and Hacker, have gone to great lengths to explain why Kripke is
> mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understand, one of the
> best ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to study Kripke and his
> Wittgensteinian critics. At the very least, Kripke introduces his
> readers well to issues that were of great concern to Wittgenstein and
> shows their importance. . . .
Concerning our older discussions of Kripke's interpretations of Witt, it
is important to note that the book mentioned here is quite different from
naming and necessity, which is what I ahve been advocating.
>
>
>
> 7. Realism and Anti-Realism
>
>
> Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and
> Anti-Realism is an interesting one.
I disagree :-)
> His emphasis on language and
> human behavior, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-
> Realism in many people's eyes.
Really? I guess so, given the "whale" and "gravity"/"consciousness"
examples above.
> He has even been accused of linguistic
> idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of
> physics, say, would by this theory just be laws of language, the
> rules of the language game of physics.
O.k., I can kind of see this, if problems, that cannot yet be solved by
empirical study, given that we do not yet have the conceptual tools, can
be dealt with in no other way but repeating what we already know, then
yes, this is a kind of anti-realism.
> Anti-Realist scepticism of
> this kind has proved quite popular in the philosophy of science and
> in theology, as well as more generally in metaphysics and ethics.
>
O the damage that Witt has done.
> On the other hand, there is a school of Wittgensteinian Realism,
> which is less well known.
Perhaps they need to just drop the "Wittgensteinian".
> Wittgenstein's views on religion, for
> instance, are often compared with those of Simone Weil, who was a
> Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of
> Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her Realism and Imagination in
> Ethics and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's
> Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. However, one should not go too
> far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. Lovibond, for instance,
> equates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement), so
> her Realism is of a controversial kind.
>
ho hum.
> Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of
> theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of
> theories in philosophy.
O god. This is just a broken record. More importantly it establishes
ABSOLUTLY NOTHING. Wittgenstein may say that he is not doing theory, but
that does not mean that there is no anitrealist claims in his work.
> This does not prove that he practiced what he
> preached,
Yes, thankyou. Ritcher does have *some* sense.
> but it should give us pause.
I don't mind giving a pause...
> It is also worth noting that
> supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist
> nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics.
And what on earth does that amount to?
> There is
> something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's
> belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found
> to 'agree' with it.
Someone says or thinks that the cat is on the mat, and so I take that
proposition, and compare it with reality, that is, I go and see if the cat
really is on the mat.
If this is unWittgenstienian then Witt was pretty clearly an anti-realist.
> The Anti-Realist says that we could not get
> outside our thought or language (or form of life or language games)
> to compare the two.
We cannot think about some thing, without thinking about it (in our
language game; or whatever jargon you want to use).
This is a tautology, therefore no non-tautologous, anti-realist conclusion
can validly be drawn from it.
Wittgesntein was also a logicician (of sorts) and so surely he could see
that.
> But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we
> can or cannot do, but with what makes sense.
I thought he was concerned with our use of terms. Isn't using language
something that we can do?
> If metaphysical Realism
> is incoherent
Which it isn't.
> then so is its opposite. The nonsensical
> utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by saying, "No, it
> is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical
> impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, as Wittgenstein would
> say, then so is Anti-Realism.
>
So wittgenstein (for no apparent reason) would say that realism was
incoherent, but he never actually did?
I think what this shows is that Wittgenstein scholorship can play other
roles, for it can also be the butt of a joke!
>
>
>
>
> 10. Wittgenstein in History
>
> . . . In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy
> enormously.
And linguistics, he pointed towards the theoretical signicance of language
use, the flexibility of language (e.g. family resemblance), and the
significance of vagueness. Too bad he didn't confine himself to these
topics.
> The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly
> impressed by what they found in the Tractatus, especially the idea
> that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability principle
> and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at clarification,
> not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that it was
> what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.
yeap... unfortunatly the postivists didn't give us a great deal.
>
> The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to
> Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought.
> These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later work and
> its attention to grammar.
Yeap, they have done wonders for modern linguistics.
>
> Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and
> history of analytic philosophy,
Well that has certainly not been established!
> but he has become rather
> unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti- scientism
> stance,
Which is fair enough...
> because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also
> because he has been little understood.
Well we have been trying to understand him for fifty years, how long does
it take?
> Similarities between
> Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating interest
> among continental philosophers,
ahhhh so that is whats keeping continental philosphy alive. Now I see the
light.
> and Wittgenstein may yet prove to be
> a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of
> philosophy.
>
As a student, training to become a professor of the emerging post-analytic
school, I can tell you with reasonable certainty, that Wittgenstein will
not be any kind of driving force. In fact it is the neo-krikean, Scott
Soames, that is currently the force behind the drive.
Thanks for this Stu, I think this guy (Ritcher) is a typical Wittgesntein
scholor, and that what he has shown, is really nothing other then the
imminent demise of Wittgensteins way of thinking.
Cheers,
Kelvin.
Eray Ozkural
> Cheers for this Stu,
> As everyone here knows, when you criticise someone in philosophy, you
> present your opponents argument and then you rebut it. However, whenever I
> try and do that with Wittgenstein, I always get the same old response:
> "That is what YOU think wittgenstein was saying but that is not what he
> was ACTUALLY saying, your argument is thus nothing more than a strawman".
> Unfortunatly we never get to find out what Wittgenstein was ACTUALLY
> saying.
> This is what gives guys like Duncan Richter a role in society.
> Given that it is againt the philosphical law to criticise Wittgenstein,
> given that it is against the philosophcal law to present strawmans and
> that you cannot criticise Witt without being accused of producing
> strawmans, we can instead criticise WittgensteinIANS, to at least show
> that the general methodology is confused.
W.IANS must be ashamed of such acts. Whenever somebody summarizes
a "position" of W. a WIAN comes up and claims that it is not what W. said.
And it is never revealed what he has said.
As a consequence, none of his "arguments" can ever be discussed.
No mistake can ever be found.
It is a fail-proof philosophy. It hangs itself from the sky with big
large skyhooks.
Their rhetoric is obviously drawn from medieval theology.
It is as if "If you question God, you have allied with Satan, and you cannot
go to heaven"
Or better "If you question his integrity, then you have not understood him"??
It is odd.
I mean, odd as Wittgenstein living in a hut.
Why does no other philosopher try to control others by asserting
what philosophy is, what its preferred method is, and so forth???
It simply doesn't make any sense to me.
--
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~erayo Malfunct: http://myspace.com/malfunct
ai-philosophy: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
swmaerske
Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and round
the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at the
moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Kelvin Mcqueen
Peter D Jones
> W.IANS must be ashamed of such acts. Whenever somebody summarizes
> a "position" of W. a WIAN comes up and claims that it is not what W.
said.
Obscurity=immortality. W will be discussed even after Kant is forgotten.
Eray Ozkural
Good point. So perhaps we should get together and produce
some crypto-philosophy that will take forever to distill :) It's not
half as difficult as it seems.
Best,
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 1/20/2007 5:58:03 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
mcqk...@student.otago.ac.nz writes:
When interpreting Wittgenstein it is utterly important to keep in mind
that he was completely ignorant of the history of philosophy.
You might try comparing and contrasting Wittgenstein with Aristotle and Kant
to see where he fits in -- and more immediately, you might compare him to
Frege. Then decide if he is ignorant of the history of philosophy.
GGOSS
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
swmaerske
>
>
> In a message dated 1/20/2007 5:58:03 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
>
> When interpreting Wittgenstein it is utterly important to keep in
mind
> that he was completely ignorant of the history of philosophy.
>
>
I think that's a bit of an overstatement. He certainly was not
steeped in the history of philosophy as someone who had "come up" the
usual way would be. But he had his philosphical schooling under some
of the best of his era, even if he commenced it at a higher level,
and he was widely if somewhat eclectically read. Perhaps that is what
gave him the ability to see things in a fresh way and to finally toss
out so much of the old way of doing business.
> You might try comparing and contrasting Wittgenstein with
Aristotle and Kant
> to see where he fits in -- and more immediately, you might compare
him to
> Frege. Then decide if he is ignorant of the history of philosophy.
>
> GGOSS
>
I'm not sure of the point you're making. Can you clarify?
SWM
bruce denner
--- ggos...@aol.com wrote:
> You might try comparing and contrasting Wittgenstein
> with Aristotle and Kant
> to see where he fits in -- and more immediately, you
> might compare him to
> Frege. Then decide if he is ignorant of the history
> of philosophy.
Good to hear from you again. It's been a while. Should
trade stories about G-chidren.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
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Kelvin Mcqueen
> It's clear from what you've written below that you still don't "get"
> Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and round
> the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at the
> moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
>
Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
Also, my spam catcher has picked up messages from some new person who has
replied to me, unfortunatly I wasn't able to view the messages. If someone
was asking me questions, I would like to respond, perhaps if someone could
reask them if thats cool, otherwise no worries.
Cheers,
Kelvin.
ggos...@aol.com
In a message dated 1/23/2007 6:21:02 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
swma...@yahoo.com writes:
--- In _analytic-borders@analytic-borana_
(mailto:analytic...@yahoogroups.com) , ggoss123@... wrote:
>
>
"You might try comparing and contrasting Wittgenstein with
Aristotle and Kant
to see where he fits in -- and more immediately, you might compare
him to
Frege. Then decide if he is ignorant of the history of philosophy."
I'm not sure of the point you're making. Can you clarify?
SWM
I'll pass on the Aristotle comparison and hope someone better versed will
respond. Kant and Wittgenstein (briefly) tackled some of the same problems,
for instance, the sense that radical skepticism and empiricism, Idealism and
Realism, don't work as fundamental positioning. What might work? What is given
and what is learned? What is given for Kant differs from what is given for
Wittgenstein, and the difference is major, but in a very broad way there is a
resemblance in their presentations. From what I've read in secondary sources,
Wittgenstein read Kant.
Best,
Gary
Rob de Villiers
Concerning:
> > It's clear from what you've written below that you still don't "get"
> > Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and round
> > the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> > lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> > Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at the
> > moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> > philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
I have every sympathy, SWM.
I am doing an even lengthier response to Kelvin. But it will be a while
yet. My wife is objecting to the amount of time I am spending on the
PC!
> Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
No. That does not follow from what SWM said.
swmaerske
least in their interests and projects, between Kant and
Wittgenstein.
On another note, I have posted two messages to this list since last
week but for some reason they have not shown up. One was long and one
was rather brief, so I don't think the length can be the issue. I
post fairly regularly on at least one other yahoo list and am not
encountering trouble there. Is anyone else running into this peculiar
problem here (i.e., some messages showing up and some not)?
SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, ggoss123@... wrote:
>
>
> In a message dated 1/23/2007 6:21:02 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
> swmaerske@... writes:
>
>
>
>
> --- In _analytic-borders@analytic-borana_
bruce denner
--- swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On another note, I have posted two messages to this
> list since last
> week but for some reason they have not shown up. One
> was long and one
> was rather brief, so I don't think the length can be
> the issue. I
> post fairly regularly on at least one other yahoo
> list and am not
> encountering trouble there. Is anyone else running
> into this peculiar
> problem here (i.e., some messages showing up and
> some not)?
Hasn't been my experience. Can't say if it has ever
happened. Though, must say, I wished, afterwords, that
some guardian would have intervened.
bruce
____________________________________________________________________________________
Be a PS3 game guru.
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Rob de Villiers
Concerning:
> > It's clear from what you've written below that you still don't "get"
> > Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and round
> > the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> > lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> > Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at the
> > moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> > philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
I have every sympathy, SWM.
I am doing an even lengthier response to Kelvin. But it will be a while
yet. My wife is objecting to the amount of time I am spending on the
PC!
> Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
No. That does not follow from what SWM said.
swmaerske
>
> > It's clear from what you've written below that you still
don't "get"
> > Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and
round
> > the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> > lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> > Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at
the
> > moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> > philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
> >
>
> Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
>
I'm not sure why my response to you on this one didn't come through
on this list, Kelvin, but am rather frustrated about it since I wrote
a rather lengthy piece, one that I am not likely to be able to wholly
duplicate, nor do I feel inclined to do so at this juncture. Still, I
think you are owed some sort of response:
Suggesting that you don't understand Wittgenstein in your critique of
him, or that you are stubbornly refusing to 'hear' the criticisms
offered against your position (I'm not sure which is the case here),
is not to say that Wittgenstein is beyond criticism. Indeed, if you
are reading my postings elsewhere on this list you will see that I
have criticized Wittgenstein myself. You want to say that my
suggestion that it is pointless to go round and round in circles with
you over this is tantamount to my saying "If x is a criticism of Witt
then x is necessarily a misinterpretation". But that is not only
wrong, it is simplistic. It is certainly not what I have said. I have
said, in fact, that your particular criticisms of Wittgenstein are
mistaken and given my reasons for saying so. You are converting it
into some sort of universal claim, not I.
Do you think it is not possible that you have misunderstood
Wittgenstein or that you are missing the point of those comments
offered here by me and some others with regard to your criticisms of
Wittgenstein?
Isn't it the case that a debate is always resolved only insofar as
one side sees the point? But what if neither side ever comes round?
Does it mean both are right, neither are wrong?
How shall we resolve this? Take a vote? Do you think that would be a
satisfactory way of ending this? (I doubt you would say so and if you
did I would argue that you are wrong because majority rule doesn't
determine what is the case and what isn't.)
At least when we are arguing empirical claims we can test our
arguments in the world. We can submit our competing claims to tests
that we can all, in principle, observe. Not so with this sort of
debate we are currently engaged in.
Even a purely logical argument, even a syllogism, must be
comprehended to be judged right or wrong, no? My little six year old
grandson would not grasp a relatively simple syllogism would he? (Or,
if he should surprise me, then my four year old grandson would not,
or my three year old granddaughter . . . well you get the picture.)
In the end, these sorts of arguments are as much about what we "get"
as what is shown to be true.
You go on and on about what Wittgenstein claimed but you impute
things to him that are contrary to what he is on record as claiming
and then want to insist that your imputation carries more weight than
what he actually said. When I and others show that you have got
things wrong, you simply disregard what we say and go on as though no
one corrected you. After awhile it really doesn't pay to waste a lot
of energy on such discussions. (I've already wasted more time than I
intended by re-typing here another version of two prior posts I
placed on this list last week in response to your comments above.)
If you could bring yourself to acknowledge some of what I and others
are calling to your attention and adjust your comments to address
that, then there might be a reason to continue. But if it's all to be
philosophical tail chasing, if we just have to go over the same
ground with you again and again and again, without any gain in
understanding or any movement in the discussion, then why bother?
Now I'm sure you will not acknowledge any of this. You think you have
got Wittgenstein nailed and won't accept that perhaps you
misunderstand his work (which is why you think you have him). I don't
know how to make clear to you that you are in error any more than I
know how to teach my six year old grandson to understand a logical
syllogism. In the end it's about "getting it". And on my view you
haven't.
But you are free to imagine that this statement of mine, that there
is no value in continuing to discuss your Wittgenstein
critique "proves" your point that I and others are bewitched by
Wittgenstein and cannot accept the trenchant criticism you have
offered. I suppose you will feel that way no matter what. (I do wish
those other posts had come through since I think I made my point on
this matter much more sharply than I have now done, but never mind,
if they're lost, they're lost.)
By the way, you never responded to me on my last comments re: Kripke.
As it happens, I think Kripke is interesting though I think he has
this whole notion of essences as being metaphysically real totally
wrong. I would be glad to correspond further on that and, if we then
touched on Wittgenstein, I'd be glad to address that as well. What I
am tired of doing is going over your critique of Wittgenstein which
so utterly fails to address the real Wittgenstein at all.
SWM
Alex. Arthur
Why not focus on positions and arguments?
Alex.
_____
From: analytic...@yahoogroups.com
[mailto:analytic...@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Kelvin Mcqueen
Sent: 21 January 2007 01:53
To: analytic...@yahoogroups.com
Cc: anal...@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [analytic-borders] Wittgenstein (SWM)
Cheers for this Stu,
As everyone here knows, when you criticise someone in philosophy, you
present your opponents argument and then you rebut it. However, whenever I
try and do that with Wittgenstein, I always get the same old response:
"That is what YOU think wittgenstein was saying but that is not what he
was ACTUALLY saying, your argument is thus nothing more than a strawman".
Unfortunatly we never get to find out what Wittgenstein was ACTUALLY
saying.
This is what gives guys like Duncan Richter a role in society.
Given that it is againt the philosphical law to criticise Wittgenstein,
given that it is against the philosophcal law to present strawmans and
that you cannot criticise Witt without being accused of producing
strawmans, we can instead criticise WittgensteinIANS, to at least show
that the general methodology is confused.
Quoting swmaerske <swmaerske@yahoo. <mailto:swmaerske%40yahoo.com> com>:
> I happened on this today while surfing the Net. It's material from an
> encyclopedic entry by Duncan Richter, a well known Wittgenstein
> scholar. I was especially interested in it since Duncan appeared to
> be touching on many of the issues Kelvin has raised here in the
> course of his critique of Wittgenstein's thinking.
>
> The link to the full article is provided as well.
>
> SWM
>
>
>
> http://www.iep. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/w/wittgens.htm>
utm.edu/w/wittgens.htm
>
>
>
Thanks :)
I disagree :-)
ho hum.
Which it isn't.
Which is fair enough...
Cheers,
Kelvin.
Kelvin Mcqueen
Quoting swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com>:
> >
> > Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> > immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> > criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
> >
>
>
> I'm not sure why my response to you on this one didn't come through
> on this list, Kelvin, but am rather frustrated about it since I wrote
> a rather lengthy piece, one that I am not likely to be able to wholly
> duplicate, nor do I feel inclined to do so at this juncture.
That sucks, do you not have an outbox folder which stores your sent
messages? If so, just copy and paste, as I would be quite interested in
reading it.
> Still, I
> think you are owed some sort of response:
>
Cheers.
> Suggesting that you don't understand Wittgenstein in your critique of
> him, or that you are stubbornly refusing to 'hear' the criticisms
> offered against your position (I'm not sure which is the case here),
> is not to say that Wittgenstein is beyond criticism.
Of course not, but the problem is that when you tell me that I have
misunderstood or misrepresented him, you do not tell me what his *actual*
position is. I just want to know what Witt really said so that I can
understand it and critically analysis it, and I have been waiting to do
this on this list and on analytic for a long time now. I'm tired of talk
of exegesis and just want to get down to doing philosophy.
> Indeed, if you
> are reading my postings elsewhere on this list you will see that I
> have criticized Wittgenstein myself.
I'm afraid I havn't been able to keep up with your morality discussion,
but that is good to hear.
> You want to say that my
> suggestion that it is pointless to go round and round in circles with
> you over this is tantamount to my saying "If x is a criticism of Witt
> then x is necessarily a misinterpretation". But that is not only
> wrong, it is simplistic. It is certainly not what I have said.
Well i'm not so sure, we would break out of the circle if you just
confirmed what Witt's actual position is.
> I have
> said, in fact, that your particular criticisms of Wittgenstein are
> mistaken and given my reasons for saying so. You are converting it
> into some sort of universal claim, not I.
>
I'm not so sure that you have. For example, when I say that Witt
identified the apriori with the necessary and the analytic, you just tell
me that he jettisoned such terms. But that is no help, either he thought
such concepts were senseless, for which we need some kind of argument, or
that if he did employ the concepts he would have explained how they are
not coextensive, again, we would need an explanation for why they are not.
You also often say, in a very mysterious manner, that Wittgenstein was not
interested in theory of ARGUMENT, the former is true, the latter not.
There is no reason why an argument between two people can't take the form
of linguistic reminders. When a Wittgensteinian attacks a metaphysician
with her linguistic intuiutions, she is entering into an argument.
> Do you think it is not possible that you have misunderstood
> Wittgenstein or that you are missing the point of those comments
> offered here by me and some others with regard to your criticisms of
> Wittgenstein?
>
Of course, but I could just say the same thing right back to you.
Moreover, I was an obsessed Wittgensteinan for a long time, and practised
his philosophy, my dept., which is perhaps the most anti-Wittgensteinian
phil dept. in the world, couldn't stand me, I took all the metaphysics
papers, and attempted to dissolve all the issues in my essays by showing
them to be linguistic confusions. So I have lived it, and that is what
gives me confidence that I understand Wittgenstein. Moreover, my claims
which you label as misinterpretations, are not considered
misinterpretations by my Wittgenstein teachers.
All I did was criticise what Ritcher said, how could I misrepresent him
when I did not summarize his position at all, but rather copied and pasted
his own words, and criticised those words!
> Isn't it the case that a debate is always resolved only insofar as
> one side sees the point? But what if neither side ever comes round?
> Does it mean both are right, neither are wrong?
>
If neither side ever comes around, it is typically because they are both
assuming something as obvious, which is false, but is fueling their
debate.
> How shall we resolve this? Take a vote? Do you think that would be a
> satisfactory way of ending this? (I doubt you would say so and if you
> did I would argue that you are wrong because majority rule doesn't
> determine what is the case and what isn't.)
>
The debate will end when you make up your mind as to which is the correct
way to interpret Witt. For once we have agreed on the correct
interpretation, I will show you why the arguments are flawed.
> At least when we are arguing empirical claims we can test our
> arguments in the world. We can submit our competing claims to tests
> that we can all, in principle, observe. Not so with this sort of
> debate we are currently engaged in.
>
You have just identified our debate (philosophy) with the apriori. If you
agree with Witt then, you will identify philosophy with rules for the use
of our terms (what *I* call analytic truths). In PI 372, Witt clearly
identifies such rules with the necessary. Therefore Witt holds the
coextensiveness thesis. The coextensiveness thesis is wrong. Therefore
Wittgenstein is wrong. I also reject the identification of philosphy with
the apriori, it is refuted by history.
> Even a purely logical argument, even a syllogism, must be
> comprehended to be judged right or wrong, no? My little six year old
> grandson would not grasp a relatively simple syllogism would he? (Or,
> if he should surprise me, then my four year old grandson would not,
> or my three year old granddaughter . . . well you get the picture.)
> In the end, these sorts of arguments are as much about what we "get"
> as what is shown to be true.
>
> You go on and on about what Wittgenstein claimed but you impute
> things to him that are contrary to what he is on record as claiming
> and then want to insist that your imputation carries more weight than
> what he actually said.
I thought the point of the Richter post was to get pass the exegesis, why
can't we agree on his interpretation, so that we can get down to the
critical analysis?
> When I and others show that you have got
> things wrong, you simply disregard what we say and go on as though no
> one corrected you.
I cannot disregard something that does not exist. When you tell me that I
am wrong, you do not tell me why, you do not give me the correct
interpretation, and so I have nothing to disregard.
> After awhile it really doesn't pay to waste a lot
> of energy on such discussions. (I've already wasted more time than I
> intended by re-typing here another version of two prior posts I
> placed on this list last week in response to your comments above.)
>
I hope there is some philosophy in there. Let's agree that accusations and
exegesis are getting old.
> If you could bring yourself to acknowledge some of what I and others
> are calling to your attention and adjust your comments to address
> that, then there might be a reason to continue.
Well that is what I tried to do with the Richer post.
> But if it's all to be
> philosophical tail chasing, if we just have to go over the same
> ground with you again and again and again, without any gain in
> understanding or any movement in the discussion, then why bother?
>
The onus is on you to break us out of the circle, with a foundation of
arguments that we can both analyse. I really don't mind how you interpret
Witt, for I think the whole program is bankrupt, so just provide an
interpretation, and we can work with that. If you cannot decide on what
the correct interpretation of Witt is, then we should never mention his
name again.
> Now I'm sure you will not acknowledge any of this. You think you have
> got Wittgenstein nailed and won't accept that perhaps you
> misunderstand his work (which is why you think you have him). I don't
> know how to make clear to you that you are in error any more than I
> know how to teach my six year old grandson to understand a logical
> syllogism. In the end it's about "getting it". And on my view you
> haven't.
>
WHAT haven't I got? Surely when you influence your grandson to 'get'
something, you give him something to get. What exactly do you want me to
get? I thought it was Richers comments?
Look, don't take this the wrong way, I'm here to make friends, but don't
you think its possible that you are implicitly refusing to give up
something that you have believed in just because you have believed it for
a long amount of time?
> But you are free to imagine that this statement of mine, that there
> is no value in continuing to discuss your Wittgenstein
> critique "proves" your point that I and others are bewitched by
> Wittgenstein and cannot accept the trenchant criticism you have
> offered. I suppose you will feel that way no matter what. (I do wish
> those other posts had come through since I think I made my point on
> this matter much more sharply than I have now done, but never mind,
> if they're lost, they're lost.)
>
> By the way, you never responded to me on my last comments re: Kripke.
I'm sorry about that, but I felt that those discussions were too much
concerned with exegesis, and what words like "theory" means. If there is
any loose ends though, or if you have any questions concerning Kripke or
our older debate, please ask.
> As it happens, I think Kripke is interesting though I think he has
> this whole notion of essences as being metaphysically real totally
> wrong.
So does my teacher, he thinks that any form of essentialism can only arise
from one of two sources, what he calls "misconditionalisation" a notion he
has received from his friend David Stove, and from what he calls "the
unholy alliance with definition". If he is right then Kripke's philosophy
collapses, but more importantly for me, all of Scott Soames contemporary
research, including his conception of the history of 20th century
philosophy collapses. I don't agree with my teacher (yet, at least), and
he admits that his views are radical, nonetheless, its very interesting
and that is what i'm up to at the moment. You can learn alot about Kripke
(and Soames) from me, as I am sure that I can learn alot about
Wittgenstein from you, but I just don't want to debate exegesis. I discuss
this stuff alot on the analytic group, you really should come join.
Also, it is misleading to speak of essences as 'metaphysically real', I
think it would be more correct to call them 'logically real', but that is
for another post.
mjmurphy
Kelvin wrote:
You have just identified our debate (philosophy) with the apriori. If you
agree with Witt then, you will identify philosophy with rules for the use
of our terms (what *I* call analytic truths). In PI 372, Witt clearly
identifies such rules with the necessary. Therefore Witt holds the
coextensiveness thesis. The coextensiveness thesis is wrong. Therefore
Wittgenstein is wrong. I also reject the identification of philosphy with
the apriori, it is refuted by history.
Well,
You are quite wrong about PI 372, for one thing, since LW prefaces the remark with the word "Consider". He is asking you to entertain the notion that "intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule", not accept it. So here you've pretty clearly misinterpreted his intent. The fact that the remark itself appears in quotes ought to have clued you in.
Cheers,
\M.J.Murphy
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swmaerske
>
> > It's clear from what you've written below that you still
don't "get"
> > Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and
round
> > the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> > lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> > Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at
the
> > moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> > philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
> >
>
> Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
Well if a grade schooler criticizes an upper classman there are at
least two possibilities: either the the grade schooler is remarkably
precocious or the upper classman is a dolt relative to the grade
schooler on the one hand, or the grade schooler is in over his head
but cannot see it. This is not to say anything about you or me or
anyone else in these discussions but it is to note that it is at
least as likely that you simply don't grasp what you are talking
about as that you do.
It is just not the case that all criticisms and all critics are
equal. If someone gets something wrong and persistently does so, then
after a while what is the point of carrying on the discussion?
Now in the case of argument, particularly of the philosophical
variety, what is our measure? Unlike scientific and related types of
questions, where we may submit our claims to empirical testing and
judge the results together with other observers, what is available to
us in cases like the present one? We may have resort to authority but
then we may differ on the different authorities' relative merit. Or
we may have resort to plain old argument, relying on our reason and
common sense. But then that will be driven by what each of
us "grasps" in the process.
You and I, arguing, go over the same ground and come to different
conclusions. It is possible that one of us is right or that neither
of us is. If we are saying contradictory things, however, it is
certainly not likely (though possible still under some scenarios)
that both of us are (though I think this would be a special case).
How are we to figure out which situation obtains?
In philosophical argument the debate generally goes on and on until
it doesn't. It ends when one or both sides become tired. THAT may
occur either because we have talked ourselves out or lost interest or
because one or both concludes the other side is hopeless.
I have spent countless hours arguing Wittgenstein with Popperians and
have come to conclude that 1) we were speaking different languages
(understanding the same words differently) and 2) that there was an
inherent bias in one or both sides which sometimes reflected an
emotional commitment to one side or the other and sometimes reflected
a tendency on the part of the interlocutors on either sides to see
issues differently. For instance, I found that the Popperians saw
everything in the light of what I would call an empiricist (sometimes
a scientific) paradigm. This tended to push everything through a
certain conceptual mold, prompting the Popperians to claims like this
one: 'there is no such thing as knowledge only guesswork
(conjecture).'
While not wishing to deny this claim when applied to an empirical
model, I tried to explain to them that that was NOT how we used the
word "knowledge" and that obviously there were uses which did not fit
that empirical paradigm nor should they be expected to. This prompted
them to accuse me of playing with words.
In the end I concluded that we were saying the same thing but in
different words and that they were simply dismissing my concerns as
being "verbal" whereas I was dismissing their claims about how we use
knowledge in a scientific sense as being rather obvious and really
unimportant, i.e., just a lot of hyperventilating theorizing that was
not really necessary to our knowledge claims and which really didn't
add much to what scientists did. Needless to say, the Popperans never
saw my point though they did often accuse me of not really
understanding Popper!
I had similar arguments about the Wittgensteinian approach to
philosophy with some DRTsts though there, when I challenged their
Kripkean claims, they simply cut me off, banning me from their list.
Of course, I am always willing to discuss these issues but in that
case those who opposed the Wittgensteinian viewpoint weren't willing
to. In the end, they said I didn't understand Kripke!
When dealing with the Popperians (who called themselves CRsts) they
also came close to shutting me out of their list on many occasions
but invariably drew back because of Popper's dictum about always
being open to criticism. Though they wanted to toss me, they could
not do so and still be consistent with their own doctrine. It
sometimes proved an awful bind for them.
Now you post your criticisms of Wittgenstein here and I and others
have responded. We make our cases and you make yours. How to
adjudicate? Well we could take a vote but somehow I think that would
not be unsatisfying. Don't you agree? So if you don't see our point
and we don't see yours what are we to do? You can say we don't get it
as much as we (or I) can say you don't. It is certainly likely that
at least one of us doesn't. Who?
In the end don't we come back to "seeing it"? When someone makes a
complex and abstruse logical argument (or even a simple syllogism
perhaps), it is not a foregone conclusion that everyone exposed to it
will get it. My little six year old grandson, who is bright for his
age, will simply become glassy eyed if I try to explain a simple
syllogism to him. He will not see the point (though I can teach him
to mouth the correct words I suppose and create the illusion,
thereby, that he understands the point).
Now here we have an argument over things like what did Wittgenstein
mean when he said X? Or what should we take his statement X to mean?
You want to impute things to Wittgenstein that he denied and we deny
of him. You want to interpret him in a way that utterly misses the
point (on the view of at least some of us here) of what he was
saying. You want to take him on and will not acknowledge when some of
us, who may have a greater exposure to, or understanding of,
Wittgenstein, tell you that you've got things wrong.
So we go round in circles.
Let's suppose you are right though you just cannot convince us. Then
you are the "teacher" or "upper classman" and we are the "grade
schoolers." And so, by implication, is Wittgenstein. But what is the
likelihood of that? What is the likelihood that Wittgenstein, who
made a huge dent in the philosophical world is really so utterly
wrong on all he had to say as you suppose? What is the likelihood he
made such simplistic mistakes as you accuse him of? What is the
likelihood that you are the one who has seen through a philosopher of
such note and recognized ability?
Of course it is possible. Even Wittgenstein saw himself as correcting
those who had gone before so why shouldn't you be in that relation to
Wittgenstein? I would suggest that, on reflection, you will see that
the likelihood is very low that you are to Wittgenstein as he was to
Russell, Frege, Descartes, etc. Perhaps you are. But if so, wouldn't
it make sense to suppose that you would already be setting the
philosophical world on its ears (as Wittgenstein did in his earliest
day in the "business" and as Russell did when he first began writing
and, indeed, as Kripke did while still a young philosopher himself)?
Now I am not suggesting that all great philosophical contributions
must come from the young or that THAT is the measure of philosophical
accomplishment. But you are arguing here that you have Wittgenstein
right in spite of our denials which denials are largely consistent
with a whole philosophic tradition in modern Anlo-American
philosophy. So I am suggesting that, if nothing else, you compare
the probability that you have shattered the Wittgensteinian edifice
with the probability that you are really just missing something and
so not quite grasping the points he made and which you are now
wrestling with.
SWM
>
>
> Also, my spam catcher has picked up messages from some new person
who has
> replied to me, unfortunatly I wasn't able to view the messages. If
someone
> was asking me questions, I would like to respond, perhaps if
someone could
> reask them if thats cool, otherwise no worries.
>
> Cheers,
> Kelvin.
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> > --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Kelvin Mcqueen
swmaerske
that one of my posts finally did come through. Very strange to have
been delayed so. I don't know if it's a function of human
intervention or something systemic. Meanwhile, I haven't much time to
post a lot here but I want to respond to some degree.
Below you suggest that I (and others) have not been arguing substance
with you. That is a strange view since we have talked about things
that Kripke said in relation to what Wittgenstein said extensively.
Rather than range over the universe of Wittgenstein's comments (or
Kripke's) it pays in something like this to stay focused and that's
what I have generally tried to do. My citing Duncan Richter's
commentary was selective, i.e., I directed my selections to the
issues you raised and, of course, to the nexus between Wittgenstein
and Kripke since so much of your criticism of Wittgenstein seems to
have its origins in Kripke.
Now you say you responded to the Richter material though, in fact,
most of your responses had to do with suggesting that Richter was
some sort of philosophical parasite, making a living off
Wittgensteinian legerdemain. Better to have dealt with the substance
of Richter's commentary on Wittgenstein. Indeed, it was those
Wittgensteinian issues that were important. Richter's comments were
merely provided here to give you another perspective on the issues
you had raised. One of the issues had to do with whether Wittgenstein
was engaged in theorizing. Richter of course noted that just because
he said he wasn't doesn't mean we must take him at his word. But as
Richter noted, it should at least give us pause when imputing
theories to him.
Now part of what we were (or at least I was) arguing with you about
had to do with whether it paid to interpret Wittgenstein as thinking
philosophy was a matter of the analytic and/or the a priori. Of
course these are established terms in the lexicon of modern
philosophy but I noted that they were not terms Wittgenstein made a
lot of use of and, indeed, they were terms he seemed to have little
interest in. In his effort to show that philosophy was mainly about
the language in which we spoke and thought rather than about the
things we spoke and thought about (however rarified we might imagine
such things to be) he was advocating a very different approach to
philosophy. In essence, he was jettisoning the old way of speaking
about philosophical matters for a newer way, a way that drew us back
to our ordinary language. He took this position because the old way
was, on his view, misleading. It created confusions for us, implied a
realm of objects for study that weren't, in fact, there. His new way
said look, you can tak about this kind of stuff better if you simply
recognize that your words are doing different things in different
situations. You have to take your words on their own terms. Thus, he
was basically telling us to pay closer attention to the language in
which we philosophized (or did anything else for that matter).
Now I have no illusions that you will agree to this brief exegesis.
You are still, on my view, enamoured of the language of philosophy as
we have it from centuries of philosophers. That is fine. I rather
like such verbiage myself. Where we differ is that I have concluded
that Wittgenstein's insight gives us a knife to cut through the fog
of such language. Of course the things philosophy concerns itself
with continue to interest me. But I have found, in general, that the
best solution to the problems of philosophy, most of the time anyway,
is to firmly grasp the Wittgensteinian knife and slice away.
Sometimes though, as with the moral issues I am engaged in talking
about elsewhere, I find some bone left, after all the fat and gristle
of classical philosophy has been carved off.
SWM
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Kelvin Mcqueen
<mcqke464@...> wrote:
>
> Hi Stu,
Kelvin Mcqueen
> since LW prefaces the remark with the word "Consider". He is asking >
you to entertain the notion that "intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary >
rule", not accept it.
Goes no where in justifying your bold claim that:
> You are quite wrong about PI 372
Firstly, Wittgenstein clearly advocated the co-extensiveness thesis in the
Tractatus (4.46, 4.463, 4.466, 5.634). More importantly, this was a
significant aspect of the Tractatus that the later Wittgesntein DID NOT
REPUDIATE. Now, given that the later Witt was so keen to repudiate key
aspects of the Tractatus, the fact that he did not attempt to show the
faults in the co-extensiveness thesis should clue you into the fact that
he never ceased to maintain it.
ON TOP OF THIS, we have a remark, (PI 372) in which he appears to be
openly advocating a significant aspect of the co-extensiveness thesis
(that all necessity is verbal necessity).
Then you come along and say "oh no, he doesn't want us to 'accept it' he
just wants us to 'entertain it'. Come on M.J., doesn't that sound just a
little bit ad hoc? And what is the difference anyway? Why would he WANT us
to entertain it? Perhaps so that we can CONSIDER it so that we are able to
come to accept it?
Kelvin.
swmaerske
concerns, Kelvin, one more time by exploring some of what you say re:
Duncan Richter's comments below. But I shall try to do this
selectively.
--- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Kelvin Mcqueen
<mcqke464@...> wrote:
>
> Quoting swmaerske <swmaerske@...>:
>
> > It's clear from what you've written below that you still
don't "get"
> > Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and
round
> > the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> > lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> > Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at
the
> > moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> > philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
> >
>
> Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
>
<snip>>
> > > > 5. Meaning
> > > >
> > > > Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says
> > > > that: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in
which we
> > > > employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning
of a
> > > > word is its use in the language."
> > > >
> > > > It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is not offering the
> > general
> > > > theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted
as
> > > > doing.
> > >
> > > O.k., so is it clear then that he is offering a theory for a
large
> > number
> > > of cases?
> > >
Where is that implied by Richter's comments? Or in Wittgenstein's?
Aren't you just continuing to do what I have pointed out before,
i.e., confuse at least two notions of "theory"? There is theorizing
as in formulating theories about things and testing them, and there
is having an idea or picture of something in mind which sometimes, in
ordinary language, we might be moved to describe as "a theory" (as in
Sam's statement that it is raining outside shows us that Sam holds
some idea about the world that makes it possible for there to be
rain, i.e., Sam has a kind of implicit theory of rain and the world).
Theorizing in the sense scientists do it involves formulating a
system of statements which may lead to certain testable claims. Such
a system must be both logically coherent and, if it is to be taken to
be true, confirmable by passing observational tests (even if, in
Popperian terms, we think of the tests as efforts at falsification
rather than verification).
In THAT sense Wittgenstein was proposing no theories. The evidence
for this is that he not only said he wasn't, he actually offers no
carefully constructed formulations for testing (either through
observation or logical analysis).
But in the sense in which we all have pictures in our heads or
embedded in our language about how things are, he certainly had
theories. But the two notions of "theory" are quite distinct, that
is, they mean very different things.
Now it is for you to show that Wittgenstein's remarks constituted an
example of the kind of theorizing that scientists and certain
philosophers have indulged in despite his saying they did not. But
you can't just say it. You must show us that Wittgenstein
specifically proposed a theoretical description of something or other
in the course of his philosophizing which is constructed in the
careful and logical way theories are and which was offered as a way
of explaining the way something in the world is.
Actually Kripke explicitly acknowledges in Naming and Necessity that
in some cases a set of descriptions does the job, e.g., in reference
to the question "who is Jack the Ripper?" So you can't claim they
never do the job, on Kripke's arguments anyway.
Note that the Wittgensteinian point is to show that the idea that a
meaning is some kind of separate animal from the word it is presumed
to attach to is merely to fall into the confusion that language
sometimes makes for us. Language, as a public phenomenon, is
constucted around observable aspects of the world. And so we have
words that function like that, such as "meaning" which seems to name
a something and thus prompts us to assume there is such a something
to be found if only we, as philosophers, look harder. Wittgenstein
was pointing out that while our language often leads us to think of
the referents of words like "meaning" as being analogous to words
like "soup" in fact there is no reason to expect them to be or to
believe that there must be, somewhere (in some special realm?), a
thing or entity that corresponds to what "meaning" names.
The reason we start to think things "sound funny" is because
sometimes we notice the unusual role our words play and note the
discontinuities in their uses.
> So it seems pretty clear to me that there is
> > nothing
> > > wrong with the meaning of a word (e.g. a proper name) having as
its
> > > meaning its referent. At least Wittgenstein nor Richter has
given
> > us any
> > > argument to think otherwise.
> > >
That is because this is not a matter of argument, it's a matter of
insight, of seeing that what we first took to be one thing doesn't
work like we thought it did at all. The point of Wittgenstein's
remarks here was to bring us to see this, to stop looking for that
elusive referent of "meaning". Look, he was saying, for the use and
there you will find all you need in terms of a word's meaning. There
is no entity that corresponds to "meaning". Now none of this is to
say anything about the particular referents of a word that names
except to note that it is equally odd to think that a word's meaning
is just what it designates as to think that there are strange, non-
observable entities residing somewhere in a special realm.
Wittgenstein's suggestion is to stop looking for meanings except,
perhaps, dictionaries (which document usages).
But there is no theory here, only an observation which has the effect
of redirecting our thinking down a different pathway. But to take
that path, you have to get his point. You have to see what he means
when he says words work like tools, doing different things,
especially in different applications.
Richter's point was to note that if the meanings of our words were
only the images we had in our heads, then it would be hard to really
understand one another because we can't see into one another's heads
and, more, we may each have different images. But, of course, if
meanings are the uses we put words to, then we can understand one
another by interacting based on the shared behavior we have via the
rules of word usage that constitute our language. Thus language is,
at bottom, behavioral. This, too, is an insight, not a theory about
what makes languages tick though, certainly one interested in
studying language might be moved to formulate theories from such
insight.
Again, though, Wittgenstein was interested in insights, in getting
it, not in developing and arguing for theories about how things
work.
> > > >
> > > > Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many
things: to
> > > > what objects the word refers (if any), whether it is slang or
not,
> > > > what part of speech it is, whether it carries overtones, and
if so
> > > > what kind they are, and so on. To know all this, or to know
> > enough to
> > > > get by, is to know the use. And generally knowing the use
means
> > > > knowing the meaning.
> > >
> > > These are statements not arguments.
Right. So? Richter is explaining Wittgenstein's point here, not
debating it.
> And given that a 'use-theoretic'
> > > approach is being advocated, the statements are utterly
question-
> > begging.
> > >
Where is a "use-theoretic" approach being advocated? That appear to
be in your mind. But I don't see Richter doing it. Or Wittgenstein,
despite your claims to the contrary.
> > > > Philosophical questions about consciousness, for
> > > > example, then, should be responded to by looking at the
various
> > uses
> > > > we make of the word "consciousness."
> > >
> > > That is not going to get us anywhere at all whatsoever. This is
> > analogous
> > > to someone in the 15th century saying: "philosophical questions
> > about
> > > gravity should be responded to by looking at the various uses WE
> > make of
> > > the word "gravity"" - (questions like "what is gravity", "what
is
> > > consciousness").
You are here confusing scientific with philosophical inquiry. The
scientist is interested in explaining and predicting phenomena in the
world. The scientist, to this end, wants to collect new knowledge
about what makes things happen in the world. The philosopher,
especially on the Wittgensteinian view, is interested in getting
clear on things, understanding things aright. He wants to better
grasp the knowledge we already have.
You seem to continuously slip and slide between the two types of
inquiry. Maybe that is your whole problem?
> Can you not see that this methodology is utterly
> > utterly
> > > hopeless?
> > >
Well it won't do for scientific inquiry but it works wonderfully well
for philosophical concerns.
> > > > Scientific investigations into
> > > > the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although
they
> > > > might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led us
to
> > > > change our use of such words).
> > >
> > > Perhaps the scientists don't have the conceptual framework that
> > will allow
> > > them to understand their phenomena under a new logic, a new
system
> > of
> > > representation, such that this system will allow them to think
> > thoughts
> > > which will advance their empirical research? Like when Hume
> > butchered
> > > Newtons system of representation, Kant replied to Hume with a
new
> > one, and
> > > then Einstein said that he could not have come up with his
> > relativity
> > > theory without these philosophers?
> > >
All knowledge inquiries are interrelated. It is as important to see
things aright for a scientist as it is for a philosopher. Look,
earlier on here I noted that Wittgenstein's insights into language
might form a useful underpinning for a linguistic scientist
interested in developing a comprehensive theory of languages which
could then be used to, perhaps, develop artificial languages more
suitable for artificially intelligent machines. Or perhaps such a
theory would better aid us in teaching languages to others. Or in
learning how the human brain works. Philosophical inquiries are not
walled off from this sort of thing. Clearer and more precise thinking
about things scientists care about can lead to improvements in the
work of science. But none of this either demonstrates that
Wittgenstein was formulating theories as you claim or that his notion
of meaning as use was mistaken.
> > > When interpreting Wittgesntein it is utterly important to keep
in
> > mind
> > > that he was completely ignorant of the history of philosophy.
> > Richter is
> > > obviously ignorant of this fact, and of history.
> > >
Yours is an overstatement here. Wittgenstein's background in
philosophy was not the classical one but he was taught by some of the
best and he was quite well read if selectively so. I can also assure
you that Richter is not "ignorant" of things concerning Wittgenstein,
let alone the false fact you assert.
> > > > The meaning of any word is a matter of
> > > > what we do with our language,
> > >
> > > Rubbish, the meaning of the word "whale" has never been "a kind
of
> > fish"
> > > even though we once used it so.
Here you continue to demonstrate your lack of grasp of this. The
meaning of "whale" was used to refer to a certain kind of sea creaure
which was once taken to be a big fish and is now understood to be
something quite different from a fish. Word usages also change over
time. They are a function of what we do with them.
> > > Of course, we may interpret this remark in another way. What we
do
> > with
> > > "whale" is refer to whales. And so the meaning of the word is
its
> > > reference.
> > >
The question then is what is "reference"? No one will deny that some
words refer. For people like me, referring is simply tagging, one of
the many things we do with words. There is nothing mysterious or
amazing about this. Referring does not suggest to me that there must
always be an entity-like referrent at the other end of the referring
relation. For Kripke it seems to me that it does, and so, I think, it
does for you. The Wittgensteinian view recognizes that not every
referring word has an isolatable referent. Sometimes the referent is
no more than an abstraction, a presumed something for which, as
Gertrude Stein said of Oakland, "there is no there there."
> > > > not something hidden inside anyone's
> > > > mind or brain.
> > >
> > > The meaning of "chair" is the associated description "something
you
> > sit
> > > on" and that associated description is represented IN MY
> > MIND/BRAIN.
And some may see a three legged stool and others may see a huge flat
rock. Are they both "chairs"? Are either? Is a stool a chair or
something else you sit on when there are no chairs available? How
about a table? Isn't that something we may sit on, too?
What is a man, a featherless biped?
> So
> > > once again, we have a claim without an argument - the typical
> > > Wittgensteinian style.
> > >
You look for arguments when you should be seeking insight. As long as
you are enmeshed in this notion that philosophy is about competing
theories, you are likely to be unable to benefit from the insights
Wittgenstein had to offer.
> > > > This is not an attack on neuroscience.
> > >
> > > If we take it to its full implications, it is actually a
criticism
> > of all
> > > science and all knowledge, given what philosophy has done for
> > science in
> > > the past, as mentioned above. So it does really come to an
attack on
> > > neuroscience whether Richter likes it or not.
> > >
I think this is your problem, not Richter's.
> > > > It is merely
> > > > distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with
> > > > linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is
> > concerned
> > > > with discovering facts).
> > > >
> > >
> > > Why would we want to make such a distinction?
To be better able to do each.
> Well, the early Witt,
> > with
> > > the positivists and everyone else around at the time, thought
> > philosphical
> > > theses to be non-empirical, and therefore apriori. They then
> > idfentified
> > > the apriori with the necessary, which were then identified with
the
> > > analytic. So philosophy deals with the analytic - what's true in
> > virtue of
> > > meaning. The later Witt still held this view, but thought
analytic
> > truths
> > > to just be rules for the use of terms. Add his
confused 'theory' of
> > > meaning,
Not a "theory" and never demonstrated by you to be one.
> and then you have an identification of philosophy with an
> > > activity which reminds us of rules for the use of terms. But as
we
> > now
> > > know, thanks to Kripke, those concepts are not coextensive, and
> > that,
> > > given what I have said above, the conception of meaning is
> > hopelessly
> > > confused.
No, but your grasp of Wittgenstein is. I am not sure yet about
Kripke's contribution vis a vis analyticity and related claims, but
as I have said before, Wittgenstein, especially in his later work saw
very little value added in trying to reduce our discussions to
questions of analytical and a priori truths. Indeed, he thought the
terminology less than edifying and so abandoned it. I don't see a
strong reason to take it up again except insofar as one wishes to
study the history of philosophy.
> > >
> > > > One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in
> > > > Philosophical Investigations Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says
> > > > that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as
the
> > > > copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is
not
> > its
> > > > use. That is to say, "is" has not one complex use (including
> > > > both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one
> > complex
> > > > meaning, but two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an
> > accident
> > > > that the same word has these two uses.
> > >
> > > There is a reasonably clear confusion between words (the
> > combination of a
> > > physical vehicle and its meaning) and the physical vehicle
(e.g. ink
> > > marks). I'll let you figure it out.
> > >
Actually I think this example given by Richter in explicating
Wittgenstein's notion that meaning is use in most cases, is somewhat
weak. It does not, to my mind, offer an exampl where meaning is not
use but, rather, an example where one word has at least two distinct
and relatively unrelated uses, i.e., in designating a characteristic
of water and in designating identity between two terms.
> > > > It is not an accident that we
> > > > use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But
what is
> > > > accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us,
on
> > how
> > > > we use it. . . .
> > > >
> > >
> > > So it is essential to "whale" that we use it to refer to things
> > which we
> > > also refer to as "fish"? O.k.
> > >
Where do you get that?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > 9. Continuity
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his
thinking
> > > > considerably over his philosophical career. His early work
> > culminated
> > > > in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory
of
> > > > language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there
came a
> > > > transitional middle period when he first returned to
philosophical
> > > > work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems
of
> > > > philosophy. This period led to his mature, later period which
> > gave us
> > > > the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
> > > >
> > >
> > > The middle position is where he advocated verificationism.
> > >
From his earliest days with the Vienna Circle he said they had
misundertood him. Indeed, the Tractatus ends with the claim that all
the foregoing is nonsense and to properly understand it one must toss
it all away. The logical positivists, in deifying his point about
verification, did not toss it away. Thus they were in violation, as
it were, of his own claims from the first. Still, it took him a long
time to formulate a better way of what he had been trying to get at
in the Tracatus.
> > > > There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work,
but the
> > > > differences between his early and late work can be
exaggerated.
> > Two
> > > > central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the
> > Tractatus
> > > > is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the
general
> > > > nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work
Wittgenstein
> > is
> > > > very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the
> > Tractatus
> > > > Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy,
whereas
> > > > the later work treats no problems as central.
> > >
> > > That can't be right, in both he concluded with generalisations
> > about all
> > > of philosphy.
Where do you see such generalizations in the Investigations?
> In both he thought all philosophical problems were
> > > linguistic in nature, in the early he thought they could all be
> > dissolved
> > > by translation into the correct canonical logical notation,
Yes, he was interested in formulating an ideal language, as Russell
was.
> in the
> > later
> > > they could all be dissolved with reminders of the rules of our
> > language
> > > games.
> > >
He stopped trying to make grand systematic (or, as you might
say, "theoretical,") pronouncementsand turned, instead, to the
examination of cases from many different directions, examinations
intended to develop better (clearer) pictures about things we
thought. (This is not to be confused with his earlier picture theory
of language in which he asserted that language mirrored the world.)
> > > > Another obvious
> > > > difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a
> > carefully
> > > > constructed set of short propositions. The Investigations,
though
> > > > also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly
> > > > organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This
reflects
> > > > Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few
> > > > central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying
> > > > attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Actually, it reflects what I just mentioned, in the early he
shows
> > us the
> > > nature of representation so that we know how to dissolve
> > philosophical
> > > problems, in the later, he shows how problems can be resolved by
> > reminders
> > > with many examples.
> > >
You miss the point repeatedly. In the early work he thought a
definitive description of how things were could be constructed such
that going through the process of doing this would lead to an abrupt
crystallization characterized by seeing the world aright. It was this
vision that was ultimately important to him, not the individual
claims which, in context, were only of value in that they helped
build the necessary metaphysical framework.
In the later work he tossed all that out and decided that seeing the
world aright was an ongoing process which could only be done
piecemeal rather than as part of a systematic metaphyiscal project.
And so he turned to the accumulation of insights instead of the
building of one big insight with a system.
This is not about "rights" Kelvin. A theory is a systematic claim
built to support certain conclusions. Wittgenstein in his later work
is nowhere that I am aware of engaged in doing that. Even Kripke
seems unsure at times that he is offering a theory in Naming and
Necessity. But we can take him at his word since, at the end, he
seems to equate his proposals with a theory (though they may not
actually be in the systematic, predictive sense scientists formulate
theories). So why not also take Wittgenstein at his word?
>Who cares what witt says he is doing, he is not humpty
> > dumpty and
> > > so if he is giving a theory then he is giving a theory full
stop,
Prove it is a theory. First define your terms (tell us what you mean
by theory) and then, if we can agree that that is a "theory" show us
how Wittgenstein's work fits that characterization.
> no
> > > matter he thinks he is doing. I can play rugby while saying
that I
> > am
> > > actually playing soccor, it does not follow from that that I am
> > playing
> > > soccor.
> > >
You can also say you are philosophizing though you may not be.
Noted.
<snip> > >
> > > > It is also worth noting that
> > > > supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a
> > Realist
> > > > nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics.
> > >
> > > And what on earth does that amount to?
> > >
It means they are dismissing the distinction as pointless and,
perhaps, ultimately meaningless.
> > > > There is
> > > > something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the
Realist's
> > > > belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and
> > found
> > > > to 'agree' with it.
> > >
> > > Someone says or thinks that the cat is on the mat, and so I take
> > that
> > > proposition, and compare it with reality, that is, I go and see
if
> > the cat
> > > really is on the mat.
> > >
> > > If this is unWittgenstienian then Witt was pretty clearly an
anti-
> > realist.
Who says it is unWittgensteinian? What is unWittgensteinian is
thinking this is an important question.
> > >
> > > > The Anti-Realist says that we could not get
> > > > outside our thought or language (or form of life or language
> > games)
> > > > to compare the two.
> > >
> > > We cannot think about some thing, without thinking about it (in
our
> > > language game; or whatever jargon you want to use).
> > >
> > > This is a tautology, therefore no non-tautologous, anti-realist
> > conclusion
> > > can validly be drawn from it.
> > >
It's a question of insight: is it important and meaningful to worry
about whether the world is in our minds or our minds are in the
world? Isn't the answer, in some really important sense, both . . .
and neither? Can we speak coherently about this then?
> > > Wittgesntein was also a logicician (of sorts) and so surely he
> > could see
> > > that.
> > >
> > > > But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we
> > > > can or cannot do, but with what makes sense.
> > >
> > > I thought he was concerned with our use of terms. Isn't using
> > language
> > > something that we can do?
> > >
That was one of his most important insights, that language is
behavioral in its nature.
> > > > If metaphysical Realism
> > > > is incoherent
> > >
> > > Which it isn't.
> > >
I'm not surprised you would miss this one.
> > > > then so is its opposite. The nonsensical
> > > > utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by
saying, "No,
> > it
> > > > is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a
logical
> > > > impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, as
Wittgenstein
> > would
> > > > say, then so is Anti-Realism.
> > > >
> > >
> > > So wittgenstein (for no apparent reason) would say that realism
was
> > > incoherent, but he never actually did?
> > >
The question is what follows from Wittgenstein's insights isn't it?
> > > I think what this shows is that Wittgenstein scholorship can
play
> > other
> > > roles, for it can also be the butt of a joke!
> > >
> > > >
Only to those who don't get it.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > 10. Wittgenstein in History
> > > >
> > > > . . . In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century
philosophy
> > > > enormously.
> > >
> > > And linguistics, he pointed towards the theoretical signicance
of
> > language
> > > use, the flexibility of language (e.g. family resemblance), and
the
> > > significance of vagueness. Too bad he didn't confine himself to
> > these
> > > topics.
> > >
> > > > The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly
> > > > impressed by what they found in the Tractatus, especially the
idea
> > > > that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability
> > principle
> > > > and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at
> > clarification,
> > > > not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that
it was
> > > > what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.
> > >
> > > yeap... unfortunatly the postivists didn't give us a great deal.
> > >
Since Wittgenstein wasn't a positivist (though he influenced them in
his early days) criticizing them here is beside the point. Actually,
though, I think they did give us quite a bt, even if their approach
ultimately collapsed on itself. Had they better grasped the Tracatus,
as Wittgenstein seemed to think, perhaps they would not have hung on
for so long to the verification principle.
> > > >
> > > > The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to
> > > > Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of
thought.
> > > > These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later
work
> > and
> > > > its attention to grammar.
> > >
> > > Yeap, they have done wonders for modern linguistics.
> > >
They are not linguists nor linguistic researchers. They are
philosophers. Of course, though Wittgestein influenced them, he was
never an ordinary language philosopher either. He did much more than
simply trouble over the nuances of words.
> > > >
> > > > Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development
and
> > > > history of analytic philosophy,
> > >
> > > Well that has certainly not been established!
> > >
> > > > but he has become rather
> > > > unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti- scientism
> > > > stance,
> > >
> > > Which is fair enough...
> > >
This woud be stronger from you if you actually got Wittgenstein right
in your criticisms.
> > > > because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also
> > > > because he has been little understood.
> > >
> > > Well we have been trying to understand him for fifty years, how
> > long does
> > > it take?
> > >
For some, perhaps, very long indeed.
> > > > Similarities between
> > > > Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating
> > interest
> > > > among continental philosophers,
> > >
> > > ahhhh so that is whats keeping continental philosphy alive. Now
I
> > see the
> > > light.
> > >
> > > > and Wittgenstein may yet prove to be
> > > > a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of
> > > > philosophy.
> > > >
> > >
> > > As a student, training to become a professor of the emerging
post-
> > analytic
> > > school, I can tell you with reasonable certainty, that
Wittgenstein
> > will
> > > not be any kind of driving force. In fact it is the neo-krikean,
> > Scott
> > > Soames, that is currently the force behind the drive.
> > >
So expound is views here then. Hope you do a better job of it than
you have so far managed with your nemesis, Wittgenstein.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks for this Stu, I think this guy (Ritcher) is a typical
> > Wittgesntein
> > > scholor, and that what he has shown, is really nothing other
then
> > the
> > > imminent demise of Wittgensteins way of thinking.
> > >
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Kelvin.
I think you are incredibly closed minded in your thinking and, of
course, mistaken in your notions about Wittgenstein. Richter actually
gives a pretty fair rendition of Wittgenstein's thinking on these
topics though you seem to have missed so much of it.
I wonder if it was really worth it going through this so closely?
SWM
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>
Rob de Villiers
SWM has made a stout effort to respond to you on Richter on LW.
But there are issues that SWM does not altogether cover so
I had better chuck in my hasty contribution as well, though it is
necessarily not nearly as complete and edited as I had wanted
it to be.
Here we go again....
> As everyone here knows, when you criticise someone in philosophy, you
> present your opponents argument and then you rebut it.
Is this is what they teach you in the sophomore foundation courses?
I would not even teach this "methodology" to a school child. Or I would
only teach it to the stupidest pupils in the hopes that it might give them
some chance of faking it.
You do not present his argument. The author has already done that. You
FIRST _demonstrate_ that you understand it in any way you like, if
there is anything intelligible to understand, that is. And in either case
you then address what he actually said. And try to rebut that or show
that it is nonsense. OK. If you are criticising a poem or Shakespeare
play you don't write a précis of it and then rebut your bloody précis.
> However, whenever I
> try and do that with Wittgenstein, I always get the same old response:
> "That is what YOU think wittgenstein was saying but that is not what he
> was ACTUALLY saying, your argument is thus nothing more than a strawman".
Quite so. Because it is nothing more than that. Your _presentation_ of LW's
argument, that is.
> Unfortunatly we never get to find out what Wittgenstein was ACTUALLY
> saying.
Of course not. Because we never bother to read, analyse and understand what
he actually _wrote_ and respond to that. We prefer someone else's (or our own)
potted versions at all times. What he actually said is copiously published. All you
seem to be aware of is a few slogans that you happen to remember. What he was
actually saying is in black and white, just as what Shakespeare was actually saying
is in black and white. If what they published was not what they were _actually_
saying and had to say then neither of them would have published it in the first
place. It is _that_ that you have to demonstrate that you have read, considered,
understood, tried to interrelate all the parts and aspects of, before presenting
your version of it. If Wittgenstein had believed that what he actually wanted
and had to say could be said in the 5-line potted version you have given
then he would have thus expressed it himself, just as he tried to compact
everything in the Tractatus.
Your criticisms of Wittgenstein are the philosophical equivalent of
dismissing the whole of Beethoven because the simple four-note
"da-da-da-Dum" theme of the 1st movement of the 5th and a bit of
the tune of "fur Elise" (which is about all we can remember of
Beethoven) sound rather trite when _you_ try to whistle them!
> This is what gives guys like Duncan Richter a role in society.
> Given that it is againt the philosphical law to criticise Wittgenstein,
Puff, puff, puff.
> given that it is against the philosophcal law to present strawmans and
> that you cannot criticise Witt without being accused of producing
> strawmans, we can instead criticise WittgensteinIANS,
A bit of a pointless exercise, unless you pick some of moderate
substance in their own right.
Would you not just like to discuss Wittgenstein? Well if you
don't want to discuss him we can discuss anything that you
like. But please don't make us first swear not to say anything
of a remotely Wittgensteinian flavour or perhaps bring him into
the consideration.
> to at least show
> that the general methodology is confused.
You can criticise _people_, especially WittgensteinIANS, as much as
you like and no doubt will be able to come up with no end or "moral"
accusations to spray about the place. And you can criticise what you
might think is their "methodology" as much as you like too. But in the
end of the day, the bottom line, Kelvin, is: can you deal with and rebut
_what your interlocutor says_.
Ok, by all means, explain to me what my alleged "general methodology"
is and _demonstrate_ that, whatever that is, it is confused. Or that anything
I have _said_ is. I will quite happily admit it if you show that anything I say
is confused, nonsense or wrong. I make quite a few mistakes along the line
but the problem is that you read so hastily that you tend to miss them.
You have tried and failed countless times before. You are welcome to try
again. And when you do it deal with what we _actually_ say, the _text_, line
by line, word by word, not what you think we are saying or think we are saying
because you think LW says it and therefore we must be saying it.
> Quoting swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com <mailto:swmaerske%40yahoo.com> >:
>
> > I happened on this today while surfing the Net. It's material from an
> > encyclopedic entry by Duncan Richter, a well known Wittgenstein
> > scholar. I was especially interested in it since Duncan appeared to
> > be touching on many of the issues Kelvin has raised here in the
> > course of his critique of Wittgenstein's thinking.
> >
> Thanks :)
Thanks SWM, from me also ... :-)
It is another not too bad potted version of LW - _as far as it goes_.
Pretty inoffensive and balanced. Not much harm done unless some
fool tries to take it further than it goes and presume that it has captured
everything that might need to be said about the issues! I do believe
you are just trying to be helpful, SWM, and would not be claiming that
a few pages from Richter could possibly be anything more than the
roughest of guides for tyros. If Kelvin wants to get really heavily into
the ultimate rights and wrongs of LW in both the deepest and broadest
senses then we have little alternative but back to the source text itself.
When we first encountered Plato or Shakespeare or Doestoevsky did
we first read the potted Plato's and plot summaries available on any crib-
sheet and a few literary critics and only later get round to read
(smidgens of) the originals, through the eyes of the latter? If so we
were very badly educated. (But I am given to understand that a
lot of people get through exams that way that these days.)
> > 5. Meaning
> >
> > Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says
> > that: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we
> > employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
> > word is its use in the language."
> >
> > It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is not offering the general
> > theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted as
> > doing.
Quite so, SWM, or whoever wrote this.
> O.k., so is it clear then that he is offering a theory for a large number
> of cases?
No, not at all. He is _describing_ a large number of cases.
To say that in
> > The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that
> > the meaning of a word is some object that it names--in which case the
> > meaning of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is
> > nonsense-
>
> Is that meant to be an argument?
> Thanks (Dr. Richter) for reminding me that it sounds funny to say such
> things about meanings, but that form of argument is deeply unconvincing.
> Certainly the sentence "Socrates is dead" continues to be meaningful even
> though the man socrates no longer exists, and the name "socrates" does not
> refer to any existing thing. However, is it so clear that "Socrates" fails
> to refer to anything at all?
This absolutely appalling crap argument once again!!!!! NO ONE SAID
that "Socrates" fails to _refer_ because Socrates is dead! Your argument
is completely circular. The issue, which is the point that you simply do not
grasp is: why _must_ its meaning be some _thing_? Whether referred to
or not! "Socrates" is generally used to refer to the ancient Greek philosopher
rather than the Brazilian (or whatever) footballer! On these pages at any rate.
> If it did fail to refer,
NO ONE SAID IT DID!
> then it would be
> hard to see how the sentence "Socrates is dead" could be true - since the
> subject expression wouldn't refer to anything that had the property
> expressed by the predicate.
Call that an argument?!!!! That still does not entail that the _meaning_
of a proper name or referring expression is the object referred to.
>So perhaps names can continue to refer to things that once existed
> but no longer do.
Of course they can! That is what they sometimes do - or rather that
what we use them to do on some particular occasion!
> If the things they refer to are
> their meanings,
There is no "if" about it. They are not. What utter twaddle to say that
a word refers to its meaning. What on earth is that supposed to mean.
How on earth does it do it? What does it even mean to say that a _word_
refers! We _use_ words and in doing so we refer to things. We use
the expression "the meaning of "X"" to refer to its meaning but how
the word "X" manages to refer to its own meaning I simply cannot
imagine! - unless you simply beg the question by stipulating that
the meaning of "X" _is_ whatever we are referring to when we
use the word.
> then names may remain meaningful, even when the things
> that are their meanings cease to exist.
Rubbish! The meaning ceases to exist when the object
named ceases to exist - since the object named which ceased
to exist _is_, according to you, _the meaning_! That is all you
can say! And that is nonsense! You just do not get it, do you.
> If for some reason, that *sounds*
> funny, then that shows nothing more than the fact that we are not
> ordinarily accustomed to thinking in these terms.
Quite so. We do not think about it in these terms because these
terms not only "sound funny" they are utter and complete twaddle.
If you want to say that "the things they [proper names] refer to
are their meanings" what _purpose_ does that serve? What is it
_telling_ me? How am I to _use_ your statement. It has no use
other than to befuddle the theorisers mind for the _sake_ of what
he presumes his theorising must do or requires of him. Your pre-
conceived notions of the requirements of your theorising are
_driving_ what you say. And therefore what you say cannot be
saying anything about the world or language it can only at best be
_your_ proposal for a change in the norms of usage for no reason
other than the preconceived notion you have of what your theory is
supposed to do. The data (or what you are beginning to think are
the data) are becoming theory driven rather than the theory data
driven. That just means that you are very likely to wind up in utter
and complete confusion and twaddle. The theory has become
and ideology.
You can say what you like and tell me it "means" something in your
theory. So what? I presume you are _using_ the words "meaning"
and "thing" in the way we all normally do. But in that case you now
also have to say: that the meaning of "Fido" is in the kennel, the
menaing of "Fido" is ill, the meaning of "Fido" has been taken to
the vet, etc. which is just rubbish. We do not use words this way!
Meanings do not get ill and we do not take them to the vet.
And we don't greet them and say good-bye to them. I can walk
through London and I can walk through the streets of London
but I have no clue what it might mean to say, or what purposed is
served in saying that I walk through the meaning of the word
"London".
If you tell me "Peter has leukaemia" it makes sense for me to
ask "What does "leukaemia" _mean_?" And it would make
sense for me to ask "_Who_ is Peter?" But what sense would
it make for me to ask "What does "Peter" mean?"!!!! Well,
the answer to that one might be "Peter" means "rock"! Just
as "Robert" means "Oak"! If John told you "Peter is coming to
the party" and you asked him "What does "Peter" mean?"
I suspect you would just get a blank stare and John might be
justified in concluding that you were mildly deranged. OF
COURSE we _could_ all start talking this way but the
_fact_ is that we _do not_! And that is _significant_. There
are reasons for talking the way we do and that means
there are also reasons for NOT talking the way we DON'T.
And if there were not such reasons language would cease
to exist. But you think you can just say what you damn well
like and leave everyone else to pick up the bloody pieces!
> And anyway, what's the
> alternative? The meaning of a name can't be associated descriptions, as
> Kripke has shown us.
Russell certainly equated them but (later) LW certainly did not.
All we said (or would say) is that how to _use_ a particular name
is sometimes _explained_ by pointing at its bearer or giving a
description... but these activities, of course, as LW points out,
_presuppose_ a whole lot of _stage setting_ not least our already
learnt _practices_ of _using_ proper names! - to e.g. _call_ people,
_greet_ people, to alert or warn people, or tell someone where
one is going. "What's the alternative?" you ask. The alternative is
perfectly obvious and true: the meaning of a proper name is
the way it is used in the language. And that resolves or dissolves
all you problems which are really not problems, just confusions
and bogus pretexts for bogus theorising.
> So it seems pretty clear to me that there is nothing
> wrong with the meaning of a word (e.g. a proper name) having as its
> meaning its referent. At least Wittgenstein nor Richter has given us any
> argument to think otherwise.
A 2 page potted summary cannot possibly include
and repeat all the multitude of arguments contained
in the PI, let alone all the rest of LW's corpus.
The arguments just fly straight over your head.
What I have given you above is just a scratching of
the surface. There is tons more to be said.
Yet again you simply have not read the PI or have
been incapable of doing so because you have been
blinded by the preconceived requirements of you ill-
conceived notions of philosophical theorising.
The meaning of a proper name is its use, _how_ we use it
and explain it. And that can survive even if the object referred
to by the name does not, and our _use_ of the proper name
does not get ill even if the bearer of the name does. And that
is on of the (many) reasons why we say that it is sensible to
describe meaning of words as their _use_ in the language
and not identify meanings (of proper names or any other
words) with some object (of any physical or metaphysical
type) to which they might refer or be otherwise "linked" or
"associated"! Words do not _refer_ to their _meanings_,
they refer to things and events.
You simply think that because one can point to an
object in order the help explain the use of a word
that the object pointed to _must_ be the meaning!
Basically you are just through and through committed
to the "Augustinian" picture of meaning!
How do you even know that some word or expression _is_
a proper name without knowing _how it is used_?
These hasty comments of mine, probably with the the
odd infelicity as well, just scratch the surface of this
twaddle you (and Kripke) are talking about proper
names. There is volumes more that could and may
need to be said. I would gladly send some of it if you
showed that you were in the least interested rather
than simply proselytising the dogmas to which you
are prior committed.
> When interpreting Wittgesntein it is utterly important to keep in mind
> that he was completely ignorant of the history of philosophy. Richter is
> obviously ignorant of this fact, and of history.
Utter and complete rubbish. That LW was ignorant of the history
of philosophy is just an urban myth. But that you are is a patently
clear fact.
Oh, this is all so much bullshit. It is not worth responding to.
> Rubbish, the meaning of the word "whale" has never been "a kind of fish"
> even though we once used it so.
So do we now use it according to its "true" and eternal metaphysical
meaning? What pray is that?
So you presume to tell all humanity throughout history, and even now,
that they do not have a clue about the meaning of what they are talking
about! The question is: do you?! Neither Jonah nor anyone else knew
what he was talking about until Kripke defined the meaning of "great
fish", "whale" etc.,!
Utter, utter presumptuous conceptual totalitarianism. Susan Haack
has a name for it - Preposterism! But even that does not do it justice.
And if and when we did that was what we then _meant_ - our _concept
_fish_ then, included what we now call whales and most of us do not
include under this other concept !
You utterly dishonest creep. You have not even given any answer to my
criticisms of your bullshit about whales and fish on analytic, and there
you go sprouting it all again. You are an utter disgrace.
> Of course, we may interpret this remark in another way. What we do with
> "whale" is refer to whales. And so the meaning of the word is its
> reference.
Oh, how sweet. So Jonah was swallowed by the meaning of a word
and Greenpeace is dedicated to saving the meaning of a word!
> > not something hidden inside anyone's
> > mind or brain.
>
> The meaning of "chair" is the associated description "something you sit
> on" and that associated description is represented IN MY MIND/BRAIN.
Oh really? Really?! what does all this twaddle _amount_ to?!!!!
What does this all _mean_?! And of course it is not even bloody
true - one sits on all sorts of things that are not chairs, the lawn,
the fence, one's haunches, etc... Can you point to this alleged
"mind/brain"? neural? "representation" of "chair=something you
sit on"? Bullshitter! The fact that something of a neurological
character is going on inside my brain does NOT mean that that
_meaning_ of the word "chair" is some "associated" (how?)
description that is "represented" (how? and to whom? or what?)
in my "mind/brain". This is one of the biggest loads of phoney,
pseudo-scientific bullshit theorising I have ever heard. Please try
to refrain from theorising until you are clear about the meaning of
the words and expressions you are using. Otherwise the result will
just be hogwash. You present this statement "The meaning of "chair"
is the associated description "something you sit on" and that
associated description is represented IN MY MIND/BRAIN." (
your emphasis) as if it were a plain _fact_ that everyone can
simply see by opening his eyes! How utterly and completely
dishonest! At best it is hypothesis - but it is not even that
because it is nothing but an utterly meaningless noise!
That is NOT how WE use the word meaning! And if something
in my brain is a "representation" then it must be capable of
_representing_ both correctly and incorrectly. A representation
is only a representation if it is a representation to a cognising
subject of what it represents. And so presupposes what it
represents and does not explain of account for it! You just
do not begin to get it do you?
Let me try to explain more fully.....
What if there was some (of course yet to ve discovered and
verified!) "representation" of the meaning of "table" in the "mind"
or in neuronal grey matter - HOW WOULD THAT HELP? What
exactly would be _explained_ thereby? Whatever this "representation"
thingammy-bob _is_ would it explain (for the first time in human history!)
the (correct?) meaning of the word "chair"! or would it jusy explain
something (what?) about the neurological basis of _my ability to use
the word "chair" correctly_? A slightly different matter I would have
thought - or do you in your utterly confused theorising simply obfuscate
all such distinctions?
And now tell us what is this bloody "mind/brain" thing that you talk
about? Do _you_ equate the two? Is the equation of the mind and
the brain a settled issue in contemporary "scientific" philosophy?
Or is the expression "mind/brain" just fudge and a gerrymander
concept to mask the fact that you are utterly befuddled about what
you yourself mean! Philosophers have been racking our brains
about the fatuous mind-brain identity for ages now - but You just
assume it?
Does that alleged hypothetical neuronal "representation" constitute
the _meaning_ of the word "table" in the English language? When
neuroscience has borne fruit will we consult these representations
of meaning rather than the representations given in dictionaries
and our normal explanations of meaning?
If something is a representation then, I would suggest, that _means_
a number of things. Firstly, it means that the representation must be
capable of being a correct or incorrect representation of what it is a
representation of. I.e. a representation that is not capable of being
correct or incorrect is not a representation, it is just an object or
arrangement of objects with certain properties.
How do you know that this thing in the "mind" or the grey matter is
a correct representation of what it represents without having an
independent means of identifying what it is supposed to represent -
in this case the meaning of "table"? But that means, secondly, that
"representation" is an irreducibly normative (and "intensional"?)
concept. Something is a representation if it is a representation _of_
something _to_ someone, some subject, in accordance with some
_norms_ of representation. (E.g. norms of pictorial representation,
artistic symbolism, architects plans and elevations, traffic signs, norms
of representation of machine parts in geometrical drawings, or
representation of sub-atomic particle interactions in Feynman
diagrams, representation of facts (perhaps... I have doubts about
"representationalism" as a coherent way of thinking about language),
propositional attitudes, etc., in language according to norms of the
language, etc., etc... Otherwise I would suggest you are just inflating
or abusing the concept of "representation". At the very least you owe
us an explanation of what you now mean by "representation" and why
you use that word and not some other. Do you want to _trade_ on its
implicit normativity while at the same time pretending that you are
talking about a non-normative reductive account of meaning and
language, perhaps? (Queue a load of the usual confused "arguments
from analogy" with computers! Beloved of the "cognitive scientists".
Eray, perhaps. More gobbledygook about "neural realisations", "innate-
ness", "languages of thought" on analogy with computer machine code
and such like! I am perfectly aware of all that. It is a complete bore and
load of hogwash.) And thirdly, related to the above, if something is a
"representation" then I would humbly suggest that means it is a
representation of something to someone - i.e. that which does the
RE-presenting must surely itself be _present_, perceivable, available,
accessible, given, in some way, to the subject for whom it serves as a
representation of something else. How do I perceive, access, or what-
ever the "mental" or "neuronal" "representation" _as a representation_?
With my minds eye? Queue all sorts of flavours of homunculi and
heirarchies thereof. More peuedo-scientific mythmaking and
humbug! To shore up what was confused humbug right from the
start. Thus nonsense _breeds_ nonsense. Like rabbits breed
rabbits.
You also clearly have some other problems with what you are
saying. Should Jonah and I have had the same "mental" or
neuronal "representation" of the meaning of "big fish" and
"whale"? Or are the meanings of "natural kind terms"
metaphysically utterly different sorts of things to the
meanings of "table" and such like? If Jonah and my
mental (or whatever) representations of these meanings
were different who was right and why? Until you have
inspected our "neural representations" do neither you nor
anyone else know what either or any of us means by these
words? If on the other hand you or anyone does ever know
this why the need for a "theory" about "neuronal represent-
ations"? What is the _problem_? What is the _question_?
You see, Kelvin, I do not think you have even begun to scratch
the surface of the issues involved in these matters that you so
glibly pontificate about. Certainly your arrogance and dogmat-
ism gives every indication that you have not. And does not
reflect very well on the philosophy department of Otago
University, but maybe they are not to blame.
So
> once again, we have a claim without an argument - the typical
> Wittgensteinian style.
Once again you are too simple minded to get the argument.
> > This is not an attack on neuroscience.
>
> If we take it to its full implications, it is actually a criticism of all
> science and all knowledge, given what philosophy has done for science in
> the past, as mentioned above. So it does really come to an attack on
> neuroscience whether Richter likes it or not.
Bullshit. Once again you have given absolutely no intelligible
answers to my criticisms of your bullshit to this effect on "analytic"
and here you go sprouting it again.
> > It is merely
> > distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with
> > linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned
> > with discovering facts).
> >
>
> Why would we want to make such a distinction?
For all sorts of reasons.
> Well, the early Witt, with
> the positivists and everyone else around at the time, thought philosphical
> theses to be non-empirical, and therefore apriori. They then idfentified
> the apriori with the necessary, which were then identified with the
> analytic. So philosophy deals with the analytic - what's true in virtue of
> meaning. The later Witt still held this view, but thought analytic truths
> to just be rules for the use of terms. Add his confused 'theory' of
> meaning, and then you have an identification of philosophy with an
> activity which reminds us of rules for the use of terms. But as we now
> know, thanks to Kripke, those concepts are not coextensive, and that,
> given what I have said above, the conception of meaning is hopelessly
> confused.
Oh how pathetic. Kripke has proved nothing of the sort.
> > One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in
> > Philosophical Investigations Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says
> > that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as the
> > copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is not its
> > use. That is to say, "is" has not one complex use (including
> > both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one complex
> > meaning, but two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an accident
> > that the same word has these two uses.
>
> There is a reasonably clear confusion between words (the combination of a
> physical vehicle and its meaning) and the physical vehicle (e.g. ink
> marks). I'll let you figure it out.
You obviously have not even the faintest glimmer of the point being
made here. You are a disgrace to you philosophy department. Maybe
they are the disgrace.
> > It is not an accident that we
> > use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is
> > accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us, on how
> > we use it. . . .
> >
>
> So it is essential to "whale" that we use it to refer to things which we
> also refer to as "fish"? O.k.
Yes, if and when that were how we so used it!
"Essence is expressed by grammar."
> > 9. Continuity
> >
> >
> > Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking
> > considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated
> > in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory of
> > language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there came a
> > transitional middle period when he first returned to philosophical
> > work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems of
> > philosophy. This period led to his mature, later period which gave us
> > the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
> >
>
> The middle position is where he advocated verificationism.
At best for a very short time when all his thinking was in continual
and considerable flux.
> > There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work, but the
> > differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two
> > central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the Tractatus
> > is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the general
> > nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work Wittgenstein is
> > very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the Tractatus
> > Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas
> > the later work treats no problems as central.
>
> That can't be right, in both he concluded with generalisations about all
> of philosphy. In both he thought all philosophical problems were
> linguistic in nature, in the early he thought they could all be dissolved
> by translation into the correct canonical logical notation, in the later
> they could all be dissolved with reminders of the rules of our language
> games.
And much else besides... including a complete turnabout through 180
degrees in the way we think!
Certainly he argued that the problems all concerned the bewitchment of
the intellect by means of language - but he pointed out that they also
concerned many, many other things, ranging from subliminal "pictures" to
the jejune imitation of the methods of science... to the _will_ itself, the
will to illusion and self-deception... and much else besides! And
he said things to the effect that _he_ was giving reminders for particular
purposes, though I am not sure that he said that that was _all_ he was
doing, though he might have... and those reminders might not ONLY have
been reminders about rules. And of course whether a reminder resolves
a philosophical problem depends entirely on what the person reminded
does with the reminder. BUT now where exactly in the later philosophy, or
anywhere, does he say that ALL philosophical problems could be dissolved
SIMPLY with reminders about rules? Please tell us where in LW writings
you find this claim. Or did you just dream it, or trump it up in the course of
imposing some potted 5-line interpretation on LW, or pick it up from some
other hack commentator or one of your professors? Where exactly please?
Are you aware that when Wittgenstein was puzzling about what title to give
the PI his friend Drury suggested why not just call it "Philosophy" and
Wittgenstein immediately angrily snapped back: "Don't be such a bloody ass.
How could I possibly call my book that when the word "philosophy" has meant
so much to so may people! What I am doing is only one tiny little corner of
philosophy" (or words to this effect) This little remark might give you pause
to reconsider your fatuous imputation that LW was laying down the law on
what philosophy _must_ consist in.
However finally, to wind up this little stretch, why don't you give us some
examples of philosophical problems that are NOT linguistic or conceptual
in nature. They must be two-a-penny. So lets have them.
> > Another obvious
> > difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a carefully
> > constructed set of short propositions. The Investigations, though
> > also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly
> > organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This reflects
> > Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few
> > central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying
> > attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.
> >
>
> Actually, it reflects what I just mentioned, in the early he shows us the
> nature of representation so that we know how to dissolve philosophical
> problems, in the later, he shows how problems can be resolved by reminders
> with many examples.
He shows us how these can help. The resolving still has to be done
by _you_. If you suffer from such tunnel vision that you can't see the
point of the reminders don't blame the person reminding you.
> > On the other hand, the Tractatus itself says that its propositions
> > are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to understand), rejects
> > itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the Tractatus is
> > not, therefore, proof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The
> > main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are
> > investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a
> > full-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy.
> > Otherwise, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack
> > much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.
> >
>
> Thats one thing I agree with.
Good.
> > 6. Rules and Private Language
> >
> > . . . The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole
> > topic is Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
> > Kripke is struck by the idea that anything might count as continuing
> > a series or following a rule in the same way. It all depends on how
> > the rule or series is interpreted. . . .
> >
> > Kripke's theory is clear and ingenious, and owes a lot to
> > Wittgenstein, but is doubtful as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.
> > Kripke himself presents the argument not as Wittgenstein's, nor as
> > his own, but as "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke
> > p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein's is suggested by the
> > fact that it is a theory, and Wittgenstein rejected philosophical
> > theories,
>
> Unbelievable. Why should one have the right to be a theory and not the
> other?
What an utterly fatuously inappropriate comment! You are just so
blinded by fear and hatred that you cannot even read!
> Who cares what witt says he is doing, he is not humpty dumpty and
> so if he is giving a theory then he is giving a theory full stop, no
> matter he thinks he is doing. I can play rugby while saying that I am
> actually playing soccor, it does not follow from that that I am playing
> soccor.
But if I claim that you are playing soccer then I have to (1) explain what
soccer is and demonstrate that you are either playing it or at least confused
about what you are doing. Likewise if you claim that LW is theory building
then you have to explain what theory building is in a nontrivial & non-question-
begging terms acceptable to all of us and demonstrate that LW is engaged
in it. This you have never done. (Hint: It cannot be demonstrated becasuse
he is not. So don't waste your time trying to demonstrate it again.)
> > and by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the
> > first sentence of Philosophical Investigations Sect. 201: "This was
> > our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
> > because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
> > rule." For Kripke's theory as a reading of Wittgenstein, it is not
> > good that the very next paragraph begins, "It can be seen that there
> > is a misunderstanding here..." Still, it is no easy matter to see
> > just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person often
> > referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The key perhaps lies later in the same
> > paragraph, where Wittgenstein writes that "there is a way of grasping
> > a rule which is not an interpretation". Many scholars, notably Baker
> > and Hacker, have gone to great lengths to explain why Kripke is
> > mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understand, one of the
> > best ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to study Kripke and his
> > Wittgensteinian critics. At the very least, Kripke introduces his
> > readers well to issues that were of great concern to Wittgenstein and
> > shows their importance. . . .
>
> Concerning our older discussions of Kripke's interpretations of Witt, it
> is important to note that the book mentioned here is quite different from
> naming and necessity, which is what I ahve been advocating.
>
> >
> >
> >
> > 7. Realism and Anti-Realism
> >
> >
> > Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and
> > Anti-Realism is an interesting one.
>
> I disagree :-)
You are juts revealing your ignorance!
Well very many others do not. Kripke, Dummet and many others all
interpreted LW as a most important progenitor of anti-realism, especially
as regards his allegedly being a progenitor of a so-called "assertions-conditions"
as opposed to "truth-conditions" theory of meaning! Even Hacker in his early
days subscribed to this one. Soon saw the error of his ways. Whatever the
merits of the fatuous realism/anti-realism debates of the 70's and 80's
the fact of the matter is that if they are interesting at all then LW has an
utterly critical place in them.
> > His emphasis on language and
> > human behavior, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-
> > Realism in many people's eyes.
>
> Really? I guess so, given the "whale" and "gravity"/"consciousness"
> examples above.
>
> > He has even been accused of linguistic
> > idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of
> > physics, say, would by this theory just be laws of language, the
> > rules of the language game of physics.
>
> O.k., I can kind of see this, if problems, that cannot yet be solved by
> empirical study, given that we do not yet have the conceptual tools, can
> be dealt with in no other way but repeating what we already know, then
> yes, this is a kind of anti-realism.
And such twaddle has nothing to do with LW. The issue is whether the
problem is an intelligible problem or a psuedo problem in the first place
and that is not a matter of waiting for some solution from future "empirical
study"
> > Anti-Realist scepticism of
> > this kind has proved quite popular in the philosophy of science and
> > in theology, as well as more generally in metaphysics and ethics.
> >
>
> O the damage that Witt has done.
Oh you silly little child. LW is the only one that gives us the real
wherewithal to deal with this sort of twaddle.
> > On the other hand, there is a school of Wittgensteinian Realism,
> > which is less well known.
>
> Perhaps they need to just drop the "Wittgensteinian".
Why? You arrogant little git. Just because you want to arrogate
all "true" realism to yourself and Kripke?
> > Wittgenstein's views on religion, for
> > instance, are often compared with those of Simone Weil, who was a
> > Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of
> > Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her Realism and Imagination in
> > Ethics and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's
> > Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. However, one should not go too
> > far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. Lovibond, for instance,
> > equates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement), so
> > her Realism is of a controversial kind.
and very un-Wittgensteinian.
> >
>
> ho hum.
You are an expert on all this?
> > Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of
> > theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of
> > theories in philosophy.
>
> O god. This is just a broken record. More importantly it establishes
> ABSOLUTLY NOTHING. Wittgenstein may say that he is not doing theory, but
> that does not mean that there is no anitrealist claims in his work.
You must demonstrate that there are.
But we have a little problem here. E.g. if equating
the meaning of certain words (proper names) with
objects is an aspect of (your? Kripean?) realism
then I guess denying that that makes any sense
must be some flavour or anti-realism, by default!
Oh well, deary me.
> > This does not prove that he practiced what he
> > preached,
>
> Yes, thankyou. Ritcher does have *some* sense.
>
> > but it should give us pause.
>
> I don't mind giving a pause...
You are going to have to take a very long pause
and read the whole of the PI again and think about
it without imposing you fatuous opinionatedness
upon it.
> > It is also worth noting that
> > supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist
> > nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics.
>
> And what on earth does that amount to?
That he had metaphysics sussed. Once again what it amounts to
is the _whole_ of his later philosophy, not some little tuppeny-
ha'penny tautologous one line formula of the sort you think
philosophy should consist. So go read the PI &c. again.
> > There is
> > something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's
> > belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found
> > to 'agree' with it.
> Someone says or thinks that the cat is on the mat, and so I take that
> proposition, and compare it with reality, that is, I go and see if the cat
> really is on the mat.
> If this is unWittgenstienian then Witt was pretty clearly an anti-realist.
Not at all. How do you "compare" the proposition with reality?
> > The Anti-Realist says that we could not get
> > outside our thought or language (or form of life or language games)
> > to compare the two.
> We cannot think about some thing, without thinking about it (in our
> language game; or whatever jargon you want to use).
> This is a tautology, therefore no non-tautologous, anti-realist conclusion
> can validly be drawn from it.
>
> Wittgesntein was also a logicician (of sorts) and so surely he could see
> that.
"Of sorts"! - you arrogant little prat.
A far better one than you. He actually made some
fundamental contributions to formal logic - let alone
philosophical logic generally! If LW could tie Russell
in knots then he know a thing or two. Of sorts!
> > But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we
> > can or cannot do, but with what makes sense.
>
> I thought he was concerned with our use of terms. Isn't using language
> something that we can do?
Oh how brilliant! Wow! Is using language something we can just
do like scratching one s forehead? Using a language is also something
that some people cannot do. Small children and "wolf" children can
use little or no language at all and I would guess that most of us on
this list cannot speak Chinese or Zulu.
> > If metaphysical Realism
> > is incoherent
>
> Which it isn't.
Prove it.
> > then so is its opposite. The nonsensical
> > utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by saying, "No, it
> > is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical
> > impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, as Wittgenstein would
> > say, then so is Anti-Realism.
Quite so.
> So wittgenstein (for no apparent reason) would say that realism was
> incoherent, but he never actually did?
You just have not understood the arguments! Want LW to spoon feed
you like a spoilt brat kindergarten child all the time. Maybe he does
say it. Go read PI $402 again - and _think_ about it! and all that has
gone before and all that comes after! LW is giving the key hints and
pointers all along the trail and in this paragraph too. You go do some
work and do your own thinking about them and work out the explanations
laboriously for yourself - and don't just expect to be spoon-fed all the
time.
> I think what this shows is that Wittgenstein scholorship can play other
> roles, for it can also be the butt of a joke!
We are perfectly well aware of that.
> >
> > 10. Wittgenstein in History
> >
> > . . . In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy
> > enormously.
>
> And linguistics, he pointed towards the theoretical signicance of language
> use, the flexibility of language (e.g. family resemblance), and the
> significance of vagueness. Too bad he didn't confine himself to these
> topics.
Wow. Aren’t we just so magnificent in the breadth, depth and power
of our insights! As regards vagueness he pointed out what a phoney
problem the "philosophical problem" of vagueness was.
> > The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly
> > impressed by what they found in the Tractatus, especially the idea
> > that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability principle
> > and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at clarification,
> > not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that it was
> > what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.
>
> yeap... unfortunatly the postivists didn't give us a great deal.
They gave us much that was far better than what their Popperian
successors gave us.
> > The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to
> > Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought.
> > These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later work and
> > its attention to grammar.
>
> Yeap, they have done wonders for modern linguistics.
Oh so the being and end all of philosophy is to be of
service to industry devoted to the pseudo-science of
theoretical linguistics? You pathetic prat. What service
were Plato and Kant to any branch of science? So they
are crap.
> >
> > Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and
> > history of analytic philosophy,
>
> Well that has certainly not been established!
Oh how sweet. Talk about being ignorant of the history
of philosohy!
> > but he has become rather
> > unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti- scientism
> > stance,
>
> Which is fair enough...
Which is what all you blind hatred of LW is fundamentally about!
All you understand about LW is that virtually everything he wrote
is a fundamentally devastating as regards the dogmatic scientism
and obsession with theory to which you are prior committed and
hence al these harangues you are treating us to. The natural
response of an ideology under threat.
> > because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also
> > because he has been little understood.
>
> Well we have been trying to understand him for fifty years, how long does
> it take?
YOU think you understand him after two semesters? What if it will
take a lifetime to understand him. Understanding LW is something
that _individuals_ have to do. That is what it is like with any great
work. Do we understand Shakespeare and Beethoven? Just like
that? A few years ago we didn't , after 1887 we did? If a book has
anything worth knowing in it then one will find more to understand
in it after umpteen re-readings throughout a lifetime.
> > Similarities between
> > Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating interest
> > among continental philosophers,
>
> ahhhh so that is whats keeping continental philosphy alive. Now I see the
> light.
No, the po-mos, deconstructionist &Co are getting interested in it
because, LIKE YOU, they know that that it is LW that represents the
one single most frightening ogre to disturb their (like YOUR) dogmatic
slumbers - they, like you, therefore are busily engaged in the cottage
industry of Pulling Wittgenstein's Teeth, making him one of them, safe
for po-po-mo or whatever the next fad will be.
> > and Wittgenstein may yet prove to be
> > a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of
> > philosophy.
> >
>
> As a student, training to become a professor of the emerging post-analytic
> school,
Why don't you consider becoming a _philosopher_ first, rather
than a member of a school, a schoolmaster, a high-priest of
a religion that you call a school. For all our puff and bluster
about how modern and advanced we are this is a fundamentally
_scholastic_ age that we are living in - Philosophy now dedicated
to serving some higher master - in your case the school (church) of
scientism you want to become part of! Your desire to serve your
school of scientism is in essence no different to the 13th centaury
Schoolmen's desire to serve the Church of Rome.
I am perfectly well aware that you will reply that I am doing just
the same as regard the school of Wittgensteinianism.
We are sometimes told that a philosopher is someone who
aspires to understanding and wisdom and though I often have
my doubts about it, I would rather think that that a philosopher
aspires to this than to professorships and club membership of
any "school" of anything at all. Well in the first instance anyway.
The notion of a professional philosopher I can give some little
credence to but the notion of a career philosopher I cannot.
The philosopher should come first the profession after, maybe.
"If you know what I mean."
> I can tell you with reasonable certainty, that Wittgenstein will
> not be any kind of driving force.
Excellent! Wittgenstein never wanted to be the founder
or driving force of a _school_!!! Least of all a "professor"
attached to one!!!! A high preist! He would have utterly
abhorred the very idea!
> In fact it is the neo-krikean, Scott
> Soames, that is currently the force behind the drive.
Find yourself first - before you go looking for someone else
to be the driving force behind you.
Kripke and his epigone Soames are a joke. Don Quixote and
Sancho Panza.
> Thanks for this Stu, I think this guy (Ritcher) is a typical Wittgesntein
> scholor, and that what he has shown, is really nothing other then the
> imminent demise of Wittgensteins way of thinking.
What this little exercise of yours shows is that is your way of
thinking that is utterly defunct and a disgrace to academia and
ripe for demise in the waste-bins of philosophical theory
construction.
I have been around, Kelvin. I have your measure. I know the
score. You can go on constructing ever more absurd castles
of cards for me to blow over. I will tire of it eventually. And you
will think that you have then won the day. But you know in your
heart that you have not.
Regards,
Rob.
Rob de Villiers
SWM has made a stout effort to respond to you on Richter on LW.
But there are issues that SWM does not altogether cover so
I had better chuck in my hasty contribution as well, though it is
necessarily not nearly as complete and edited as I had wanted
it to be.
Here we go again....
> As everyone here knows, when you criticise someone in philosophy, you
> present your opponents argument and then you rebut it.
Is this is what they teach you in the sophomore foundation courses?
I would not even teach this "methodology" to a school child. Or I would
only teach it to the stupidest pupils in the hopes that it might give them
some chance of faking it.
You do not present his argument. The author has already done that. You
FIRST _demonstrate_ that you understand it in any way you like, if
there is anything intelligible to understand, that is. And in either case
you then address what he actually said. And try to rebut that or show
that it is nonsense. OK. If you are criticising a poem or Shakespeare
play you don't write a précis of it and then rebut your bloody précis.
> However, whenever I
> try and do that with Wittgenstein, I always get the same old response:
> "That is what YOU think wittgenstein was saying but that is not what he
> was ACTUALLY saying, your argument is thus nothing more than a strawman".
Quite so. Because it is nothing more than that. Your _presentation_ of LW's
argument, that is.
> Unfortunatly we never get to find out what Wittgenstein was ACTUALLY
> saying.
Of course not. Because we never bother to read, analyse and understand what
he actually _wrote_ and respond to that. We prefer someone else's (or our own)
potted versions at all times. What he actually said is copiously published. All you
seem to be aware of is a few slogans that you happen to remember. What he was
actually saying is in black and white, just as what Shakespeare was actually saying
is in black and white. If what they published was not what they were _actually_
saying and had to say then neither of them would have published it in the first
place. It is _that_ that you have to demonstrate that you have read, considered,
understood, tried to interrelate all the parts and aspects of, before presenting
your version of it. If Wittgenstein had believed that what he actually wanted
and had to say could be said in the 5-line potted version you have given
then he would have thus expressed it himself, just as he tried to compact
everything in the Tractatus.
Your criticisms of Wittgenstein are the philosophical equivalent of
dismissing the whole of Beethoven because the simple four-note
"da-da-da-Dum" theme of the 1st movement of the 5th and a bit of
the tune of "fur Elise" (which is about all we can remember of
Beethoven) sound rather trite when _you_ try to whistle them!
> This is what gives guys like Duncan Richter a role in society.
> Given that it is againt the philosphical law to criticise Wittgenstein,
Puff, puff, puff.
> given that it is against the philosophcal law to present strawmans and
> that you cannot criticise Witt without being accused of producing
> strawmans, we can instead criticise WittgensteinIANS,
A bit of a pointless exercise, unless you pick some of moderate
substance in their own right.
Would you not just like to discuss Wittgenstein? Well if you
don't want to discuss him we can discuss anything that you
like. But please don't make us first swear not to say anything
of a remotely Wittgensteinian flavour or perhaps bring him into
the consideration.
> to at least show
> that the general methodology is confused.
You can criticise _people_, especially WittgensteinIANS, as much as
you like and no doubt will be able to come up with no end or "moral"
accusations to spray about the place. And you can criticise what you
might think is their "methodology" as much as you like too. But in the
end of the day, the bottom line, Kelvin, is: can you deal with and rebut
_what your interlocutor says_.
Ok, by all means, explain to me what my alleged "general methodology"
is and _demonstrate_ that, whatever that is, it is confused. Or that anything
I have _said_ is. I will quite happily admit it if you show that anything I say
is confused, nonsense or wrong. I make quite a few mistakes along the line
but the problem is that you read so hastily that you tend to miss them.
You have tried and failed countless times before. You are welcome to try
again. And when you do it deal with what we _actually_ say, the _text_, line
by line, word by word, not what you think we are saying or think we are saying
because you think LW says it and therefore we must be saying it.
> Quoting swmaerske <swma...@yahoo.com <mailto:swmaerske%40yahoo.com> >:
>
> > I happened on this today while surfing the Net. It's material from an
> > encyclopedic entry by Duncan Richter, a well known Wittgenstein
> > scholar. I was especially interested in it since Duncan appeared to
> > be touching on many of the issues Kelvin has raised here in the
> > course of his critique of Wittgenstein's thinking.
> >
> Thanks :)
Thanks SWM, from me also ... :-)
It is another not too bad potted version of LW - _as far as it goes_.
Pretty inoffensive and balanced. Not much harm done unless some
fool tries to take it further than it goes and presume that it has captured
everything that might need to be said about the issues! I do believe
you are just trying to be helpful, SWM, and would not be claiming that
a few pages from Richter could possibly be anything more than the
roughest of guides for tyros. If Kelvin wants to get really heavily into
the ultimate rights and wrongs of LW in both the deepest and broadest
senses then we have little alternative but back to the source text itself.
When we first encountered Plato or Shakespeare or Doestoevsky did
we first read the potted Plato's and plot summaries available on any crib-
sheet and a few literary critics and only later get round to read
(smidgens of) the originals, through the eyes of the latter? If so we
were very badly educated. (But I am given to understand that a
lot of people get through exams that way that these days.)
> > 5. Meaning
> >
> > Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says
> > that: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we
> > employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
> > word is its use in the language."
> >
> > It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is not offering the general
> > theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted as
> > doing.
Quite so, SWM, or whoever wrote this.
> O.k., so is it clear then that he is offering a theory for a large number
> of cases?
No, not at all. He is _describing_ a large number of cases.
To say that in
> > The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that
> > the meaning of a word is some object that it names--in which case the
> > meaning of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is
> > nonsense-
>
> Is that meant to be an argument?
> Thanks (Dr. Richter) for reminding me that it sounds funny to say such
> things about meanings, but that form of argument is deeply unconvincing.
> Certainly the sentence "Socrates is dead" continues to be meaningful even
> though the man socrates no longer exists, and the name "socrates" does not
> refer to any existing thing. However, is it so clear that "Socrates" fails
> to refer to anything at all?
This absolutely appalling crap argument once again!!!!! NO ONE SAID
that "Socrates" fails to _refer_ because Socrates is dead! Your argument
is completely circular. The issue, which is the point that you simply do not
grasp is: why _must_ its meaning be some _thing_? Whether referred to
or not! "Socrates" is generally used to refer to the ancient Greek philosopher
rather than the Brazilian (or whatever) footballer! On these pages at any rate.
> If it did fail to refer,
NO ONE SAID IT DID!
> then it would be
> hard to see how the sentence "Socrates is dead" could be true - since the
> subject expression wouldn't refer to anything that had the property
> expressed by the predicate.
Call that an argument?!!!! That still does not entail that the _meaning_
of a proper name or referring expression is the object referred to.
>So perhaps names can continue to refer to things that once existed
> but no longer do.
Of course they can! That is what they sometimes do - or rather that
what we use them to do on some particular occasion!
> If the things they refer to are
> their meanings,
There is no "if" about it. They are not. What utter twaddle to say that
a word refers to its meaning. What on earth is that supposed to mean.
How on earth does it do it? What does it even mean to say that a _word_
refers! We _use_ words and in doing so we refer to things. We use
the expression "the meaning of "X"" to refer to its meaning but how
the word "X" manages to refer to its own meaning I simply cannot
imagine! - unless you simply beg the question by stipulating that
the meaning of "X" _is_ whatever we are referring to when we
use the word.
> then names may remain meaningful, even when the things
> that are their meanings cease to exist.
Rubbish! The meaning ceases to exist when the object
named ceases to exist - since the object named which ceased
to exist _is_, according to you, _the meaning_! That is all you
can say! And that is nonsense! You just do not get it, do you.
> If for some reason, that *sounds*
> funny, then that shows nothing more than the fact that we are not
> ordinarily accustomed to thinking in these terms.
Quite so. We do not think about it in these terms because these
> And anyway, what's the
> alternative? The meaning of a name can't be associated descriptions, as
> Kripke has shown us.
Russell certainly equated them but (later) LW certainly did not.
All we said (or would say) is that how to _use_ a particular name
is sometimes _explained_ by pointing at its bearer or giving a
description... but these activities, of course, as LW points out,
_presuppose_ a whole lot of _stage setting_ not least our already
learnt _practices_ of _using_ proper names! - to e.g. _call_ people,
_greet_ people, to alert or warn people, or tell someone where
one is going. "What's the alternative?" you ask. The alternative is
perfectly obvious and true: the meaning of a proper name is
the way it is used in the language. And that resolves or dissolves
all you problems which are really not problems, just confusions
and bogus pretexts for bogus theorising.
> So it seems pretty clear to me that there is nothing
> wrong with the meaning of a word (e.g. a proper name) having as its
> meaning its referent. At least Wittgenstein nor Richter has given us any
> argument to think otherwise.
A 2 page potted summary cannot possibly include
> When interpreting Wittgesntein it is utterly important to keep in mind
> that he was completely ignorant of the history of philosophy. Richter is
> obviously ignorant of this fact, and of history.
Utter and complete rubbish. That LW was ignorant of the history
of philosophy is just an urban myth. But that you are is a patently
clear fact.
Oh, this is all so much bullshit. It is not worth responding to.
> Rubbish, the meaning of the word "whale" has never been "a kind of fish"
> even though we once used it so.
So do we now use it according to its "true" and eternal metaphysical
meaning? What pray is that?
So you presume to tell all humanity throughout history, and even now,
that they do not have a clue about the meaning of what they are talking
about! The question is: do you?! Neither Jonah nor anyone else knew
what he was talking about until Kripke defined the meaning of "great
fish", "whale" etc.,!
Utter, utter presumptuous conceptual totalitarianism. Susan Haack
has a name for it - Preposterism! But even that does not do it justice.
And if and when we did that was what we then _meant_ - our _concept
_fish_ then, included what we now call whales and most of us do not
include under this other concept !
You utterly dishonest creep. You have not even given any answer to my
criticisms of your bullshit about whales and fish on analytic, and there
you go sprouting it all again. You are an utter disgrace.
> Of course, we may interpret this remark in another way. What we do with
> "whale" is refer to whales. And so the meaning of the word is its
> reference.
Oh, how sweet. So Jonah was swallowed by the meaning of a word
and Greenpeace is dedicated to saving the meaning of a word!
> > not something hidden inside anyone's
> > mind or brain.
>
> The meaning of "chair" is the associated description "something you sit
> on" and that associated description is represented IN MY MIND/BRAIN.
Oh really? Really?! what does all this twaddle _amount_ to?!!!!
What does this all _mean_?! And of course it is not even bloody
true - one sits on all sorts of things that are not chairs, the lawn,
the fence, one's haunches, etc... Can you point to this alleged
"mind/brain"? neural? "representation" of "chair=something you
sit on"? Bullshitter! The fact that something of a neurological
character is going on inside my brain does NOT mean that that
_meaning_ of the word "chair" is some "associated" (how?)
description that is "represented" (how? and to whom? or what?)
in my "mind/brain". This is one of the biggest loads of phoney,
pseudo-scientific bullshit theorising I have ever heard. Please try
to refrain from theorising until you are clear about the meaning of
the words and expressions you are using. Otherwise the result will
just be hogwash. You present this statement "The meaning of "chair"
is the associated description "something you sit on" and that
So
> once again, we have a claim without an argument - the typical
> Wittgensteinian style.
Once again you are too simple minded to get the argument.
> > This is not an attack on neuroscience.
>
> If we take it to its full implications, it is actually a criticism of all
> science and all knowledge, given what philosophy has done for science in
> the past, as mentioned above. So it does really come to an attack on
> neuroscience whether Richter likes it or not.
Bullshit. Once again you have given absolutely no intelligible
answers to my criticisms of your bullshit to this effect on "analytic"
and here you go sprouting it again.
> > It is merely
> > distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with
> > linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned
> > with discovering facts).
> >
>
> Why would we want to make such a distinction?
For all sorts of reasons.
> Well, the early Witt, with
> the positivists and everyone else around at the time, thought philosphical
> theses to be non-empirical, and therefore apriori. They then idfentified
> the apriori with the necessary, which were then identified with the
> analytic. So philosophy deals with the analytic - what's true in virtue of
> meaning. The later Witt still held this view, but thought analytic truths
> to just be rules for the use of terms. Add his confused 'theory' of
> meaning, and then you have an identification of philosophy with an
> activity which reminds us of rules for the use of terms. But as we now
> know, thanks to Kripke, those concepts are not coextensive, and that,
> given what I have said above, the conception of meaning is hopelessly
> confused.
Oh how pathetic. Kripke has proved nothing of the sort.
> > One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in
> > Philosophical Investigations Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says
> > that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as the
> > copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is not its
> > use. That is to say, "is" has not one complex use (including
> > both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one complex
> > meaning, but two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an accident
> > that the same word has these two uses.
>
> There is a reasonably clear confusion between words (the combination of a
> physical vehicle and its meaning) and the physical vehicle (e.g. ink
> marks). I'll let you figure it out.
You obviously have not even the faintest glimmer of the point being
made here. You are a disgrace to you philosophy department. Maybe
they are the disgrace.
> > It is not an accident that we
> > use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is
> > accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us, on how
> > we use it. . . .
> >
>
> So it is essential to "whale" that we use it to refer to things which we
> also refer to as "fish"? O.k.
Yes, if and when that were how we so used it!
"Essence is expressed by grammar."
> > 9. Continuity
> >
> >
> > Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking
> > considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated
> > in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory of
> > language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there came a
> > transitional middle period when he first returned to philosophical
> > work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems of
> > philosophy. This period led to his mature, later period which gave us
> > the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
> >
>
> The middle position is where he advocated verificationism.
At best for a very short time when all his thinking was in continual
and considerable flux.
> > There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work, but the
> > differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two
> > central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the Tractatus
> > is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the general
> > nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work Wittgenstein is
> > very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the Tractatus
> > Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas
> > the later work treats no problems as central.
>
> That can't be right, in both he concluded with generalisations about all
> of philosphy. In both he thought all philosophical problems were
> linguistic in nature, in the early he thought they could all be dissolved
> by translation into the correct canonical logical notation, in the later
> they could all be dissolved with reminders of the rules of our language
> games.
And much else besides... including a complete turnabout through 180
> > Another obvious
> > difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a carefully
> > constructed set of short propositions. The Investigations, though
> > also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly
> > organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This reflects
> > Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few
> > central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying
> > attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.
> >
>
> Actually, it reflects what I just mentioned, in the early he shows us the
> nature of representation so that we know how to dissolve philosophical
> problems, in the later, he shows how problems can be resolved by reminders
> with many examples.
He shows us how these can help. The resolving still has to be done
by _you_. If you suffer from such tunnel vision that you can't see the
point of the reminders don't blame the person reminding you.
> > On the other hand, the Tractatus itself says that its propositions
> > are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to understand), rejects
> > itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the Tractatus is
> > not, therefore, proof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The
> > main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are
> > investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a
> > full-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy.
> > Otherwise, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack
> > much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.
> >
>
> Thats one thing I agree with.
Good.
> > 6. Rules and Private Language
> >
> > . . . The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole
> > topic is Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
> > Kripke is struck by the idea that anything might count as continuing
> > a series or following a rule in the same way. It all depends on how
> > the rule or series is interpreted. . . .
> >
> > Kripke's theory is clear and ingenious, and owes a lot to
> > Wittgenstein, but is doubtful as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.
> > Kripke himself presents the argument not as Wittgenstein's, nor as
> > his own, but as "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke
> > p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein's is suggested by the
> > fact that it is a theory, and Wittgenstein rejected philosophical
> > theories,
>
> Unbelievable. Why should one have the right to be a theory and not the
> other?
What an utterly fatuously inappropriate comment! You are just so
blinded by fear and hatred that you cannot even read!
> Who cares what witt says he is doing, he is not humpty dumpty and
> so if he is giving a theory then he is giving a theory full stop, no
> matter he thinks he is doing. I can play rugby while saying that I am
> actually playing soccor, it does not follow from that that I am playing
> soccor.
But if I claim that you are playing soccer then I have to (1) explain what
soccer is and demonstrate that you are either playing it or at least confused
about what you are doing. Likewise if you claim that LW is theory building
then you have to explain what theory building is in a nontrivial & non-question-
begging terms acceptable to all of us and demonstrate that LW is engaged
in it. This you have never done. (Hint: It cannot be demonstrated becasuse
he is not. So don't waste your time trying to demonstrate it again.)
> > and by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the
> > first sentence of Philosophical Investigations Sect. 201: "This was
> > our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
> > because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
> > rule." For Kripke's theory as a reading of Wittgenstein, it is not
> > good that the very next paragraph begins, "It can be seen that there
> > is a misunderstanding here..." Still, it is no easy matter to see
> > just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person often
> > referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The key perhaps lies later in the same
> > paragraph, where Wittgenstein writes that "there is a way of grasping
> > a rule which is not an interpretation". Many scholars, notably Baker
> > and Hacker, have gone to great lengths to explain why Kripke is
> > mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understand, one of the
> > best ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to study Kripke and his
> > Wittgensteinian critics. At the very least, Kripke introduces his
> > readers well to issues that were of great concern to Wittgenstein and
> > shows their importance. . . .
>
> Concerning our older discussions of Kripke's interpretations of Witt, it
> is important to note that the book mentioned here is quite different from
> naming and necessity, which is what I ahve been advocating.
>
> >
> >
> >
> > 7. Realism and Anti-Realism
> >
> >
> > Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and
> > Anti-Realism is an interesting one.
>
> I disagree :-)
You are juts revealing your ignorance!
Well very many others do not. Kripke, Dummet and many others all
interpreted LW as a most important progenitor of anti-realism, especially
as regards his allegedly being a progenitor of a so-called "assertions-conditions"
as opposed to "truth-conditions" theory of meaning! Even Hacker in his early
days subscribed to this one. Soon saw the error of his ways. Whatever the
merits of the fatuous realism/anti-realism debates of the 70's and 80's
the fact of the matter is that if they are interesting at all then LW has an
utterly critical place in them.
> > His emphasis on language and
> > human behavior, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-
> > Realism in many people's eyes.
>
> Really? I guess so, given the "whale" and "gravity"/"consciousness"
> examples above.
>
> > He has even been accused of linguistic
> > idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of
> > physics, say, would by this theory just be laws of language, the
> > rules of the language game of physics.
>
> O.k., I can kind of see this, if problems, that cannot yet be solved by
> empirical study, given that we do not yet have the conceptual tools, can
> be dealt with in no other way but repeating what we already know, then
> yes, this is a kind of anti-realism.
And such twaddle has nothing to do with LW. The issue is whether the
problem is an intelligible problem or a psuedo problem in the first place
and that is not a matter of waiting for some solution from future "empirical
study"
> > Anti-Realist scepticism of
> > this kind has proved quite popular in the philosophy of science and
> > in theology, as well as more generally in metaphysics and ethics.
> >
>
> O the damage that Witt has done.
Oh you silly little child. LW is the only one that gives us the real
wherewithal to deal with this sort of twaddle.
> > On the other hand, there is a school of Wittgensteinian Realism,
> > which is less well known.
>
> Perhaps they need to just drop the "Wittgensteinian".
Why? You arrogant little git. Just because you want to arrogate
all "true" realism to yourself and Kripke?
> > Wittgenstein's views on religion, for
> > instance, are often compared with those of Simone Weil, who was a
> > Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of
> > Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her Realism and Imagination in
> > Ethics and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's
> > Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. However, one should not go too
> > far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. Lovibond, for instance,
> > equates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement), so
> > her Realism is of a controversial kind.
and very un-Wittgensteinian.
> >
>
> ho hum.
You are an expert on all this?
> > Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of
> > theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of
> > theories in philosophy.
>
> O god. This is just a broken record. More importantly it establishes
> ABSOLUTLY NOTHING. Wittgenstein may say that he is not doing theory, but
> that does not mean that there is no anitrealist claims in his work.
You must demonstrate that there are.
But we have a little problem here. E.g. if equating
the meaning of certain words (proper names) with
objects is an aspect of (your? Kripean?) realism
then I guess denying that that makes any sense
must be some flavour or anti-realism, by default!
Oh well, deary me.
> > This does not prove that he practiced what he
> > preached,
>
> Yes, thankyou. Ritcher does have *some* sense.
>
> > but it should give us pause.
>
> I don't mind giving a pause...
You are going to have to take a very long pause
and read the whole of the PI again and think about
it without imposing you fatuous opinionatedness
upon it.
> > It is also worth noting that
> > supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist
> > nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics.
>
> And what on earth does that amount to?
That he had metaphysics sussed. Once again what it amounts to
is the _whole_ of his later philosophy, not some little tuppeny-
ha'penny tautologous one line formula of the sort you think
philosophy should consist. So go read the PI &c. again.
> > There is
> > something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's
> > belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found
> > to 'agree' with it.
> Someone says or thinks that the cat is on the mat, and so I take that
> proposition, and compare it with reality, that is, I go and see if the cat
> really is on the mat.
> If this is unWittgenstienian then Witt was pretty clearly an anti-realist.
Not at all. How do you "compare" the proposition with reality?
> > The Anti-Realist says that we could not get
> > outside our thought or language (or form of life or language games)
> > to compare the two.
> We cannot think about some thing, without thinking about it (in our
> language game; or whatever jargon you want to use).
> This is a tautology, therefore no non-tautologous, anti-realist conclusion
> can validly be drawn from it.
>
> Wittgesntein was also a logicician (of sorts) and so surely he could see
> that.
"Of sorts"! - you arrogant little prat.
A far better one than you. He actually made some
fundamental contributions to formal logic - let alone
philosophical logic generally! If LW could tie Russell
in knots then he know a thing or two. Of sorts!
> > But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we
> > can or cannot do, but with what makes sense.
>
> I thought he was concerned with our use of terms. Isn't using language
> something that we can do?
Oh how brilliant! Wow! Is using language something we can just
do like scratching one s forehead? Using a language is also something
that some people cannot do. Small children and "wolf" children can
use little or no language at all and I would guess that most of us on
this list cannot speak Chinese or Zulu.
> > If metaphysical Realism
> > is incoherent
>
> Which it isn't.
Prove it.
> > then so is its opposite. The nonsensical
> > utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by saying, "No, it
> > is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical
> > impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, as Wittgenstein would
> > say, then so is Anti-Realism.
Quite so.
> So wittgenstein (for no apparent reason) would say that realism was
> incoherent, but he never actually did?
You just have not understood the arguments! Want LW to spoon feed
you like a spoilt brat kindergarten child all the time. Maybe he does
say it. Go read PI $402 again - and _think_ about it! and all that has
gone before and all that comes after! LW is giving the key hints and
pointers all along the trail and in this paragraph too. You go do some
work and do your own thinking about them and work out the explanations
laboriously for yourself - and don't just expect to be spoon-fed all the
time.
> I think what this shows is that Wittgenstein scholorship can play other
> roles, for it can also be the butt of a joke!
We are perfectly well aware of that.
> >
> > 10. Wittgenstein in History
> >
> > . . . In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy
> > enormously.
>
> And linguistics, he pointed towards the theoretical signicance of language
> use, the flexibility of language (e.g. family resemblance), and the
> significance of vagueness. Too bad he didn't confine himself to these
> topics.
Wow. Aren’t we just so magnificent in the breadth, depth and power
of our insights! As regards vagueness he pointed out what a phoney
problem the "philosophical problem" of vagueness was.
> > The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly
> > impressed by what they found in the Tractatus, especially the idea
> > that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability principle
> > and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at clarification,
> > not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that it was
> > what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.
>
> yeap... unfortunatly the postivists didn't give us a great deal.
They gave us much that was far better than what their Popperian
successors gave us.
> > The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to
> > Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought.
> > These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later work and
> > its attention to grammar.
>
> Yeap, they have done wonders for modern linguistics.
Oh so the being and end all of philosophy is to be of
service to industry devoted to the pseudo-science of
theoretical linguistics? You pathetic prat. What service
were Plato and Kant to any branch of science? So they
are crap.
> >
> > Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and
> > history of analytic philosophy,
>
> Well that has certainly not been established!
Oh how sweet. Talk about being ignorant of the history
of philosohy!
> > but he has become rather
> > unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti- scientism
> > stance,
>
> Which is fair enough...
Which is what all you blind hatred of LW is fundamentally about!
All you understand about LW is that virtually everything he wrote
is a fundamentally devastating as regards the dogmatic scientism
and obsession with theory to which you are prior committed and
hence al these harangues you are treating us to. The natural
response of an ideology under threat.
> > because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also
> > because he has been little understood.
>
> Well we have been trying to understand him for fifty years, how long does
> it take?
YOU think you understand him after two semesters? What if it will
take a lifetime to understand him. Understanding LW is something
that _individuals_ have to do. That is what it is like with any great
work. Do we understand Shakespeare and Beethoven? Just like
that? A few years ago we didn't , after 1887 we did? If a book has
anything worth knowing in it then one will find more to understand
in it after umpteen re-readings throughout a lifetime.
> > Similarities between
> > Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating interest
> > among continental philosophers,
>
> ahhhh so that is whats keeping continental philosphy alive. Now I see the
> light.
No, the po-mos, deconstructionist &Co are getting interested in it
because, LIKE YOU, they know that that it is LW that represents the
one single most frightening ogre to disturb their (like YOUR) dogmatic
slumbers - they, like you, therefore are busily engaged in the cottage
industry of Pulling Wittgenstein's Teeth, making him one of them, safe
for po-po-mo or whatever the next fad will be.
> > and Wittgenstein may yet prove to be
> > a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of
> > philosophy.
> >
>
> As a student, training to become a professor of the emerging post-analytic
> school,
Why don't you consider becoming a _philosopher_ first, rather
than a member of a school, a schoolmaster, a high-priest of
a religion that you call a school. For all our puff and bluster
about how modern and advanced we are this is a fundamentally
_scholastic_ age that we are living in - Philosophy now dedicated
to serving some higher master - in your case the school (church) of
scientism you want to become part of! Your desire to serve your
school of scientism is in essence no different to the 13th centaury
Schoolmen's desire to serve the Church of Rome.
I am perfectly well aware that you will reply that I am doing just
the same as regard the school of Wittgensteinianism.
We are sometimes told that a philosopher is someone who
aspires to understanding and wisdom and though I often have
my doubts about it, I would rather think that that a philosopher
aspires to this than to professorships and club membership of
any "school" of anything at all. Well in the first instance anyway.
The notion of a professional philosopher I can give some little
credence to but the notion of a career philosopher I cannot.
The philosopher should come first the profession after, maybe.
"If you know what I mean."
> I can tell you with reasonable certainty, that Wittgenstein will
> not be any kind of driving force.
Excellent! Wittgenstein never wanted to be the founder
or driving force of a _school_!!! Least of all a "professor"
attached to one!!!! A high preist! He would have utterly
abhorred the very idea!
> In fact it is the neo-krikean, Scott
> Soames, that is currently the force behind the drive.
Find yourself first - before you go looking for someone else
to be the driving force behind you.
Kripke and his epigone Soames are a joke. Don Quixote and
Sancho Panza.
> Thanks for this Stu, I think this guy (Ritcher) is a typical Wittgesntein
> scholor, and that what he has shown, is really nothing other then the
> imminent demise of Wittgensteins way of thinking.
What this little exercise of yours shows is that is your way of
mjmurphy
Here is the remark:
Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition."
This is no more an assertion of the quoted statement (and its important that he puts it in quotes, cuz this is one of the things you do when you want to make a statement and indicate that you are not committed to the truth of it) than if I said:
Consider: "The moon is made of green cheese."
and then go onto discuss the assertion.
This is not rocket science. You've screwed up here.
And the relationship between the PI and Tractatus is far more complicated than "repudiation". He does not even really repudiate the picture theory of meaning, only show that its application is much narrower than he origonally thought.
swmaerske
>
> > It's clear from what you've written below that you still
don't "get"
> > Wittgenstein. I don't know that much is gained going round and
round
> > the same circles. If I find time I will try to address your rather
> > lengthy response, which so misreads Richter's commentary and
> > Wittgenstein himself. But no promises. I am on to other things at
the
> > moment and there does come a point where argument, even of the
> > philosophical sort, must exhaust itself. -- SWM
> >
>
> Doesn't this just verify what I said about Wittgenstein's artificial
> immortality? It is impossible to criticise Witt because If x is a
> criticism of Witt then x is necessarily a misinterpretation.
>
And I would add one more thing for your consideration: the idea that
you are reducing the statements by some here, including me, that you
have misinterpreted Wittgenstein to "if x is a criticism of
Wittgenstein, then x is necessarily a misinterpretation" is quite
mistaken. No one here has suggested that Wittgenstein cannot be
criticized, i.e., that this false reduction you have made is a true
statement.
If you look at other comments I've posted here you will see that I
myself essay to criticize Wittgenstein in some areas. More, I, at
least, have not suggested that other critics of Wittgenstein, such as
Kripke in his argument for essences via claims of direct reference
(contra Wittgenstein's denial of essences in a metaphysical sense),
simply don't get Wittgenstein. In fact, I am quite happy to admit
that Kripke appears to have a firm grasp on Wittgenstein's ideas. But
I still claim that Kripke's effort to overturn the idea that essence
is illusory at bottom (an idea I take to be Wittgensteinian) is
mistaken. Thus, I grant that Kripke gets Wittgenstein but claim he is
still wrong. On the other hand, I am claiming that you don't get
Wittgenstein in your criticisms so there is nothing to argue about
with you whereas there is good reason to argue with Kripke.
Your attempt to reduce my exclamation of exhaustion with you, vis a
vis a debate in which you and I seem to make no progress because you
simply repeat the same charges without taking account of, or
attending to, the counterclaims offered, is simply in error. And that
error is, itself, further demonstration that you miss the point since
you don't even notice that you are repeating yourself in this
discussion.
It's hard, I know, to recognize our own errors and I have not always
been good at it myself. But it's an important first step to doing
philosophy in a serious way, at least in my opinion.
SWM
>
> Also, my spam catcher has picked up messages from some new person
who has
> replied to me, unfortunatly I wasn't able to view the messages. If
someone
> was asking me questions, I would like to respond, perhaps if
someone could
> reask them if thats cool, otherwise no worries.
>
> Cheers,
> Kelvin.
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> > --- In analytic...@yahoogroups.com, Kelvin Mcqueen
Peter D Jones
<rob.devilliers@...> wrote:
> Of course not. Because we never bother to read, analyse and
understand what
> he actually _wrote_ and respond to that.
We look at it, we find no sense in it, we discard it.
..and then along come the True Believers...
Rob de Villiers
> > Of course not. Because we never bother to read, analyse and
> understand what
> > he actually _wrote_ and respond to that.
>
> We look at it, we find no sense in it, we discard it.
>
> ...and then along come the True Believers...
Sure you take a _look_ at it, as you say.
But are you capable of reading?
"A book is a mirror: if an ass peers into it you can't
expect an apostle to look out" - Lichtenberg
"If a head and a book collide and a hollow sound
is heard, must it always have come from the
book?" - Lichtenberg.
Peter, you are quite welcome to discard and ignore it,
and go your own sweet way. None of us are trying to
force you swallow Wittgenstein. But if we so chose we
may bring Wittgenstein-type or any other type criticisms
to bear on the things you say in expounding your philosophy
on this list, what ever your philosophical views may be. I have
not been too bothered to examine them. But if you choose
to pontificate about and proselytise your discarding of what
LW has to say then you have to do a little more than just
tell us that "we find no sense in it" (who are this lordly "we"?)
- it then behoves you to _demonstrate_ that what you are
discarding _and pontificating about_ indeed is nonsense and
makes no sense (& you are quite welcome to try to do that)
- but please don’t just tell us that _you_ "find no sense in it".
Who, after all are, _you_?!
Our friend Kelvin, on the other hand, does not in the least
just discard and ignore Wittgenstein. He presumes to expound
LW in 5 lines and then dismiss his exposition, presuming that
this fatuous little exercise of his refutes not only everything LW
ever wrote but also establishes that LW is a "failure as a moral
human being"! A somewhat different matter.
Rob.
Eray Ozkural
they seem to assume that the proponent of the argument
has a superior morality. While, on the other hand, it is
arguable how much connection there is between published
works and one's morality. I often see professors with low
morality and lots of legitimate work!
Peter D Jones
>
> > > Of course not. Because we never bother to read, analyse and
> > understand what
> > > he actually _wrote_ and respond to that.
> >
> > We look at it, we find no sense in it, we discard it.
> >
> > ...and then along come the True Believers...
>
> Sure you take a _look_ at it, as you say.
> But are you capable of reading?
> "A book is a mirror: if an ass peers into it you can't
> expect an apostle to look out" - Lichtenberg
> "If a head and a book collide and a hollow sound
> is heard, must it always have come from the
> book?" - Lichtenberg.
Ad hominem. great.
> Peter, you are quite welcome to discard and ignore it,
> and go your own sweet way.
I am asking for the right to point out a naked emperor.
> None of us are trying to
> force you swallow Wittgenstein. But if we so chose we
> may bring Wittgenstein-type or any other type criticisms
> to bear on the things you say in expounding your philosophy
> on this list,
And that's where the fun starts. I ask how the Wittgensteinian
argument works...and I an never told...just assured that there is an
argument which I am unfortunately too stupid to understand.
> what ever your philosophical views may be. I have
> not been too bothered to examine them. But if you choose
> to pontificate about and proselytise your discarding of what
> LW has to say then you have to do a little more than just
> tell us that "we find no sense in it" (who are this lordly "we"?)
The Wittgenskeptics of course. But it's OK for the Wittgenolators to
say they do find sense in it without ever explaining themselves clearly...
> - it then behoves you to _demonstrate_ that what you are
> discarding _and pontificating about_ indeed is nonsense and
> makes no sense
The burden is the other way round. No-one "demonstrates" that
"Jabberwocky" is nonsense.
>(& you are quite welcome to try to do that)
> - but please don't just tell us that _you_ "find no sense in it".
> Who, after all are, _you_?!
>
> Our friend Kelvin, on the other hand, does not in the least
> just discard and ignore Wittgenstein. He presumes to expound
> LW in 5 lines and then dismiss his exposition,
Almost all philosophical debates work like that.
Or at least they start like that. Usually what happens is that the
5-line versions is tossed backwards and forwards, being added to and
qualified all the time.
Kelvin Mcqueen
Concerning Wittgenstein's remark:
>
> Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is
> an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this
> intrinsic necessity into a proposition."
>
MJ wrote:
> This is no more an assertion of the quoted statement (and its important
> that he puts it in quotes, cuz this is one of the things you do when
> you want to make a statement and indicate that you are not committed to
> the truth of it) than if I said:
>
> Consider: "The moon is made of green cheese."
>
> and then go onto discuss the assertion.
>
> This is not rocket science. You've screwed up here.
>
> And the relationship between the PI and Tractatus is far more
> complicated than "repudiation". He does not even really repudiate the
> picture theory of meaning, only show that its application is much
> narrower than he origonally thought.
>
MJ,
All you are doing here is playing with words. There is plenty of evidence,
even independently of this remark, that Wittgenstein accepted the
proposition that he is asking us to consider. I can think of at least
five:
(1) Wittgenstein held the view that the only necessity is verbal necessity
in the Tractatus (4.46, 4.463, 4.466, 5.634). What reason do we have to
think that he gave this view up? None. You don't like how I say that the
later Witt did not "repudiate" this quite explicit aspect of the
Tractatus. Well use any word you like. He didn't alter/improve
on/refute/repudiate (whatever), that aspect of the Tractatus. In fact, the
only explicit place that the later Witt remarks on it is in the quote we
are concerned with. It would be utterly strange if the Later Witt was
asking us to consider his own view with new terminology, without him
wanting us to consider it so that we can come to accept it. If he wanted
us to reject it, or even just doubt/be suspiscious of it, he would have
told us whats wrong with it!!!
(2) So even if this quote was not in the Investigations, it is something
he always believed. On top of this, even without this quote, it is pretty
obvious given his later metaphilosophy that he accepted it! Wittgenstein
held that "our considers could not be empirical" - that is just to say
that our considerations in philosophy are not aposteriori. Which is just
to say that our considerations are apriori. So philosophy deals with the
apriori, science with the aposteriori. Wittgenstein, as we know,
identified philosophy with an activity which collects reminders of how we
use words (what he calls "grammatical propositions" or what I call
"analytic truths"). So obviously, he identifies the apriori with the
analytic, with philosophy. And the aposteriori with the synthetic, with
science. Now, which one deals with the necessary and which the contingent?
Think about it.
(3) The necessary and the apriori only came apart in the 70's, before
then, it was accepted by everyone! Absolutely everyone! The only people
who rejected the co-extensiveness thesis were those who accepted synthetic
apriori (which don't concern the remark we are discussing). So are you are
implying that Wittgenstein rejected a major, significant view, that
absolutely everyone around him held, because why? Because he puts
"consider" in front of his way of explicating it? Come on MJ!
(4) No one agrees with you. When arguing for aposteriori necessities with
our resident Wittgensteinian, Rob, he found this quote, and started using
it against me, he used to say, "go on, find me a correlate in language to
an intrinsic necessity which is not an arbitary rule, you simply cannot!"
- and he said this in defence of Witt. Moreover, a while ago I put a
discussion I had with the well published Wittgenstein scholor, Grant
Gillet, on here. I demonstrated the plausibility of aposteriori
necessities to him, and then showed him this conflicting quote in Witt,
and he tried everything he could to make the quote consistent with them.
And he couldn't do it. The point is, it would have been utterly ridiculous
for him to try and squirm out of it by reinterpreting what Witt might have
meant by "consider" - that's just not even worth defending. This is not a
bandwagon argument, for I am demonstrating that even the linguistic
intuitions of the stauchest wittgensteinians disagree with you.
(5) You are just abusing the word "consider", that is, you are taking it
out of its ordinary use. When I say to someone, "O.K., consider this..."
of course I am advocating what I am asking people to consider. That is how
we ordinarily, conventionally use the word "consider". You are imputing
onto Wittgenstien an unconventional usage - without any evidence for why
he would be using it unconventionally - and of course if he uses the word
"consider", he will then put the rest in quotes. To get someone to
consider something that you don't want them to accept is itself an
unconventional act! So why on earth would Witt do it without warning?? Of
course he wouldn't!
I could probably go on like this MJ, but I have made my point. Your
attempt to save Wittgenstein rests on nothing but a misuse of language,
and you have given no evidence to explain why we should believe that
Wittgenstein was speaking unconventionally. On the other hand, I have
given tonnes of evidence for why we should just accept that Witt was
speaking conventionally, and using the notion of "consider" as we
ordinarily use it. And so I conclude that your attempt to save
Wittegenstein here, is just ad hoc.
Thus, Wittgenstein's philosophy assumes the co-extensiveness thesis, the
co-extensivesness thesis is wrong, therefore Wittgesntein's philosophy is
wrong. It is time to move on from it.
Kelvin.
bruce feinstein
> Your attempt to save Wittgenstein rests on nothing but a misuse of language
Splendid irony!
---------------------------------
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mjmurphy
MJ,
All you are doing here is playing with words. There is plenty of evidence,
even independently of this remark, that Wittgenstein accepted the
proposition that he is asking us to consider. I can think of at least
five:
Me:
Perhaps, but my point was that you had misinterpreted the passage in question. And since you are now moving on to other passages to establish your point. I am assuming you have conceded this. Remember, the question at the time was do a) opponents of Wittgenstein misinterpret him, or b) is this just a knee-jerk defense to criticism.
You responded b) and in doing so offered an obvious misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks.
(1) Wittgenstein held the view that the only necessity is verbal necessity
in the Tractatus (4.46, 4.463, 4.466, 5.634). What reason do we have to
think that he gave this view up? None. You don't like how I say that the
later Witt did not "repudiate" this quite explicit aspect of the
Tractatus. Well use any word you like. He didn't alter/improve
on/refute/repudiate (whatever), that aspect of the Tractatus. In fact, the
only explicit place that the later Witt remarks on it is in the quote we
are concerned with. It would be utterly strange if the Later Witt was
asking us to consider his own view with new terminology, without him
wanting us to consider it so that we can come to accept it. If he wanted
us to reject it, or even just doubt/be suspiscious of it, he would have
told us whats wrong with it!!!
Me:
Well, no, analytic does not mean merely "verbal" in the Tractatus. Analytic statements *show* the logical structure of the world. They are analytic by logical convention, but logical convention is not just verbal convention. It is a reflection of the logical form of the world.
This is a part of Tractarian thought that gets dropped from Carnap and the Logical positivists
(3) The necessary and the apriori only came apart in the 70's, before
then, it was accepted by everyone! Absolutely everyone!
You're history of the analytic/synthetic distinction is incredibly naive. I know of no philosophical distinction that was ever held by "every" philosopher, and I am familiar with philosopher's both post and pre 1970.
(5) You are just abusing the word "consider", that is, you are taking it
out of its ordinary use. When I say to someone, "O.K., consider this..."
of course I am advocating what I am asking people to consider. That is how
we ordinarily, conventionally use the word "consider". You are imputing
onto Wittgenstien an unconventional usage - without any evidence for why
he would be using it unconventionally - and of course if he uses the word
"consider", he will then put the rest in quotes. To get someone to
consider something that you don't want them to accept is itself an
unconventional act! So why on earth would Witt do it without warning?? Of
course he wouldn't!
Me:
Oh, so you're STILL going with your misinterpretation! But the above is rubbish. If I say, consider this line of reasoning, I am asking you to consider, not accept it. Maybe I just want you to work its consequences out to the end without pronouncing on its truth. Maybe I want you to work out its consequences in the belief that you will find that they lead to a contradiction. We do this all the time, and its what I think LW was up to. The PI is a series of dialogues, where LW engages with a series of personas who hold sometimes hold views he is partial to, sometimes hold views he is opposed to. It is sometimes easy to miss this, especially if your hostile to the book in the first place.
Cheers,
M.J.MurphyRecent Activity
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bruce denner
--- Kelvin Mcqueen <mcqk...@student.otago.ac.nz>
wrote:
> Thus, Wittgenstein's philosophy assumes the
> co-extensiveness thesis, the
> co-extensivesness thesis is wrong, therefore
> Wittgesntein's philosophy is
> wrong. It is time to move on from it.
Appreciate any help with the following:
1. What is the co-extensiveness thesis?
2. What does have to do with necessity?
3. On what grounds can it be attributed to LW?
4. What is the evidence that it is wrong?
Thanks,
bruce
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Randall Helzerman
Man, I really shouldn't wade in here, because
my knowledge of W is close to zero, but
this:
> (4) No one agrees with you.
Isn't true. PMS Hacker in his "W's place in 2oth
century philosophy" explicitly states that
W didn't conflate necessity with aprioriy or
analyticity.
Whether W did or didn't, I don't know!!!
-Randy