[analytic-borders] RE: LW ain't a Platonist
bruce denner
"There is one correct way to read a directional sign."
and so would have LW had Platonist leanings, a
yearning for absolute turths expressed in enduring
forms. But he ain't. So he writes...
"Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and
sometimes not. "
"And now this is no longer a philosophical
proposition, but an empirical one."
...because, as a philosopher, he isn't interested in
the empirical questions "What do people say and do all
day", but rather the philosophical insistance of both
the Rationalists and Empiricists that e are compelled
to doubt.
His pragmatism tells him...just as he doesn't have to
hold to any absolute doubt, he does have to entertain
absolute truths,
bruce
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Martin N Brampton
interested in anyone's comments on it.
We tend to suppose that we know what we are talking about
when we say that something is real. Philosophically, realism is
generally contrasted with idealism. Realism takes some entity
or other to be mind independent.
Now suppose we consider Kant's transcendental idealism, which
I have suggested may be more or less equivalent to structuralism
(and opposed to nomenclaturism). Kant's scheme indicates that
when we think about the character of human knowledge, we are
forced to the conclusion that what we ordinarily call objects fail
to qualify as mind independent, taking a broad view of what is
meant by mind. For Kant, things in themselves (or the
transcendental object) are mind independent.
Perhaps this is a consequence of our conception of mind as
basically a receptive faculty that is not able to impose itself on
the world in a direct way. Things in themselves is another name
for whatever there is "behind" experience. Supposing that there
is something "behind" experience is a way of expressing our
feeling that the world is by no means arbitrary - it won't simply do
as we wish and often goes against us. But for good philosophical
reasons, Kant is not willing to accept the reality of any particular
object, only the reality of things in general, about which we can
say nothing particular. We cannot conceptualize things in
themselves.
This seems consistent with structuralism, if it is opposed to
nomenclaturism. It denies that there is some particular set of
objects in advance of language. We bring the set of objects
into existence through the development of a particular
language. Saussurean structuralism is itself neutral on the
question of what it might be that we divide up using the
distinctions of language, but we could plausibly suppose that
it is something akin to Kant's things in themselves.
The ideas of structuralism maybe make it rather clearer than
Kant's formulations that we should also view the distinction
of real versus ideal as something that derives from our choice
of language, and does not correspond to sets of objects that
exist prior to us coming along and naming them.
But this seems to lead us into problems. To talk about mind
independence we have to make a distinction between mind
and something else (matter?). The distinction is our choice,
from a structuralist perspective. Likewise, the distinction we
make that involves us describing some things and not others
as real is in a sense our choice, not something forced upon
us (collectively). Indeed it seems clear that theories of all kinds
are necessarily language relative. More specifically, though, it
is hard to see what distinction we are making when we talk of
something being real unless we can also be clear about the
distinction we are making when we call something mind. The
answer to that does not seem at all obvious.
Perhaps we can retreat from our theorising in Wittgensteinian
fashion and simply assert that we know how to use "real" in
contexts such as a real Van Gogh painting as opposed to a
fake. In one way at least, Kant is not at all unhappy with this
step, because it is exactly in this kind of context that he readily
concedes that everyday objects are empirically real.
He does also think that we can't stop there. If we simply regard
all the everyday objects (and perhaps also the arcane objects
posited by physicists and others) as really real, Kant thinks that
we lead ourselves into contradictions (notably the Antinomy of
Pure Reason). He therefore (quite reasonably?) insists that we
distinguish the different contexts in which we use "real".
In fact, we can read Kant as taking the original definition of the
real as the mind independent as fundamentally ambiguous. So
ordinary objects are mind independent in the sense that there
are some fundamental principles that a finite being must apply
to experience in order to derive knowledge, and our objects
are shaped in this way. In one sense that makes them
independent of mind, because mind is not free to operate just
any old way, but is constrained by the requirement to derive a
structured experience. In another sense, the objects are by
no means mind independent because the active deployment of
judgement is an essential part of the construction of objects out
of intuitions.
And so on ...
Best regards, Martin
Manuel Delaflor
> when we say that something is real. Philosophically, realism is
> generally contrasted with idealism. Realism takes some entity
> or other to be mind independent.
I would say that we suppose we know because language is "designed" in a way
that, by definition, "creates" a difference between the observer and the
observed. I think that, right from the beginning, the use of a language
draws a "frontier" between what is "I" and what is "the world". Can we
"reduce" the problem to non existence just by making this idea clear? I
don't know, but Im working on a proposal about it.
> Kant's scheme indicates that
> when we think about the character of human knowledge, we are
> forced to the conclusion that what we ordinarily call objects fail
> to qualify as mind independent, taking a broad view of what is
> meant by mind. For Kant, things in themselves (or the
> transcendental object) are mind independent.
Perception independent would make more sense for me. I would say that our
perceptual systems are designed also in a way that allows language to make a
dualist distinction.
> Perhaps this is a consequence of our conception of mind as
> basically a receptive faculty that is not able to impose itself on
> the world in a direct way. Things in themselves is another name
> for whatever there is "behind" experience. Supposing that there
> is something "behind" experience is a way of expressing our
> feeling that the world is by no means arbitrary - it won't simply do
> as we wish and often goes against us. But for good philosophical
> reasons, Kant is not willing to accept the reality of any particular
> object, only the reality of things in general, about which we can
> say nothing particular. We cannot conceptualize things in
> themselves.
Because concepts are maps. I would go as far as to postulate that every
perception is a map in itself, built to construct a world of objects instead
of a world of constantly changing phenomena. For example, a table and its
shape remain constant for us as an object of thinking and perception,
regardless of the fact (theoretically at least) that it is always different,
depending on our point of view, the senses we use to feel it, the worlds we
use to describe it, etc.
> This seems consistent with structuralism, if it is opposed to
> nomenclaturism. It denies that there is some particular set of
> objects in advance of language. We bring the set of objects
> into existence through the development of a particular
> language.
Of course, following what I said, I agree with this posture. We can't talk
about what is "there" before language. But we can invent different language
or different approaches to what we sense and reach different conclusions
(the works of philosophy) regarding the ultimate state of what is the case.
> But this seems to lead us into problems. To talk about mind
> independence we have to make a distinction between mind
> and something else (matter?).
Excellent point. Where do we draw the line?
>Indeed it seems clear that theories of all kinds
> are necessarily language relative. More specifically, though, it
> is hard to see what distinction we are making when we talk of
> something being real unless we can also be clear about the
> distinction we are making when we call something mind. The
> answer to that does not seem at all obvious.
I think that something that might help here is that our "state of
consciousness" (whatever that is) seems to dictate our perspective and thus
the point at which the frontier will be drawn. Altered states of
consciousness can pull us in to "places" in which we no longer feel, so
clearly, where the line was drawn in a normal state.
I don't know if Im headed, at all, in the direction you wanted, but you
welcomed any comment, so here is mine. ;-)
Life is Life.
It is just Beautiful if you make it Beautiful.
______________
Manuel Delaflor
Martin N Brampton
On Mon, 1 Jul 2002 16:08:20 -0500, Manuel Delaflor wrote:
>> We tend to suppose that we know what we are talking about
>> when we say that something is real. Philosophically, realism is
>> generally contrasted with idealism. Realism takes some entity
>> or other to be mind independent.
>
>I would say that we suppose we know because language is "designed" in a way
>that, by definition, "creates" a difference between the observer and the
>observed. I think that, right from the beginning, the use of a language
>draws a "frontier" between what is "I" and what is "the world". Can we
>"reduce" the problem to non existence just by making this idea clear? I
>don't know, but Im working on a proposal about it.
OK. Does language draw a frontier between things that were there
before language, or does language institute the distinction? That is,
is the separation between "I" and "world" a product of language or
is it merely reflected by language?
My putative definition of realism seems to depend on us knowing what
mind is. Kant has reservations about this. Descartes moved quickly to
the conclusion that he not only existed but that he was a thinking
being. (Is that the same thing as a mind?). Kant opposes this move as
unwarranted, and merely relies on the "I" as the unifying factor for
intuitions. If there are intuitions (plural) then we seem to need something
to bring them together, and for that purpose only Kant introduces the
"I" and the synthesis of apperception.
Heidegger goes further and challenges the whole notion of subjectivity.
Is that related to your project?
>> Kant's scheme indicates that
>> when we think about the character of human knowledge, we are
>> forced to the conclusion that what we ordinarily call objects fail
>> to qualify as mind independent, taking a broad view of what is
>> meant by mind. For Kant, things in themselves (or the
>> transcendental object) are mind independent.
>
>Perception independent would make more sense for me. I would say that our
>perceptual systems are designed also in a way that allows language to make a
>dualist distinction.
Is that a scientific or a philosophical claim? Also, could you expand
on your reason for preferring "perception independent"? I think that
Kant would regard perceptions as part of the populace of the mind,
and so the two would be linked.
Kant's successors criticised him for dualism. I'm not sure how far that
is warranted. Is Kant dualist with respect to what is transcendentally
real (things in themselves)? I'd have thought perhaps not. His dualism
seems to arise in connection with what is transcendentally ideal.
Is that somehow equivalent to a linguistic issue (especially if we take
a broadly structuralist view) that we can only have language by making
distinctions? Is language therefore inherently dualist?
Asking a more general question, is it that we instigate thought, or is it
that thought instigates us? The latter might become something like
absolute idealism. Or is it merely an observation about language?
>> Perhaps this is a consequence of our conception of mind as
>> basically a receptive faculty ...
>
>Because concepts are maps. I would go as far as to postulate that every
>perception is a map in itself, built to construct a world of objects instead
>of a world of constantly changing phenomena. For example, a table and its
>shape remain constant for us as an object of thinking and perception,
>regardless of the fact (theoretically at least) that it is always different,
>depending on our point of view, the senses we use to feel it, the worlds we
>use to describe it, etc.
Yes, a concept is not for use on just one occasion! But are perceptions
at the conceptual level, or are they the constituents of the changing
phenomena?
>> This seems consistent with structuralism, if it is opposed to
>> nomenclaturism. ...
>
>Of course, following what I said, I agree with this posture. We can't talk
>about what is "there" before language. But we can invent different language
>or different approaches to what we sense and reach different conclusions
>(the works of philosophy) regarding the ultimate state of what is the case.
Yes, plain sailing so far!
>> But this seems to lead us into problems. To talk about mind
>> independence we have to make a distinction between mind
>> and something else (matter?).
>
>Excellent point. Where do we draw the line?
Not sure - at this point the idea of mind independence seems to
be unravelling, leaving our notion of philosophical realism adrift.
>>Indeed it seems clear that theories of all kinds
>> are necessarily language relative. More specifically, though, it
>> is hard to see what distinction we are making when we talk of
>> something being real unless we can also be clear about the
>> distinction we are making when we call something mind. The
>> answer to that does not seem at all obvious.
>
>I think that something that might help here is that our "state of
>consciousness" (whatever that is) seems to dictate our perspective and thus
>the point at which the frontier will be drawn. Altered states of
>consciousness can pull us in to "places" in which we no longer feel, so
>clearly, where the line was drawn in a normal state.
Do we want to introduce a "state of consciousness" as some kind
of fundamental entity, or is this a derivative notion? Could it be
something that is a consequence of language and sociality rather
than a precursor? How does it fit in?
>I don't know if Im headed, at all, in the direction you wanted, but you
>welcomed any comment, so here is mine. ;-)
I'm very glad of the opportunity to discuss these questions - thanks.
Best regards, Martin
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bruce denner
(and I'm pleased to hear new voices here)
>I think that, right from the beginning,
> the use of a language
> draws a "frontier" between what is "I" and what is
> "the world".
If we can recognize this "frontier drawing", then, in
a sense, we can dispense with it and imagine a
condition in this distinction dissolves. And yet you
write..
>We can't talk
> about what is "there" before language.
So we can't talk about that "frontierless" state. And
yet you write...
>But we can
> invent different language
> or different approaches to what we sense and reach
> different conclusions
> (the works of philosophy) regarding the ultimate
> state of what is the case.
It almost sounds as if you were reaching for a
condition before language (without frontier) but hen
again the philosophy is in language. Does that mean we
must stay with the this distinction between word and
world? You suggest not...
> Altered states of
> consciousness can pull us in to "places" in which we
> no longer feel, so
> clearly, where the line was drawn in a normal state.
Yes, there is an enormous literature on altered states
induced by drugs, dance, and trance. But are these
empirical findings relevant to the philosophical
debate between the metaphysical realists (there is a
world of objects outside our words, close to Gary's
position i believe) and Martin's Structuralism that
suggests that all boundaries are drawn with a
linguistic distinctions?
bruce
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Manuel Delaflor
way
> >that, by definition, "creates" a difference between the observer and the
> >observed. I think that, right from the beginning, the use of a language
> >draws a "frontier" between what is "I" and what is "the world". Can we
> >"reduce" the problem to non existence just by making this idea clear? I
> >don't know, but Im working on a proposal about it.
>
> OK. Does language draw a frontier between things that were there
> before language, or does language institute the distinction? That is,
> is the separation between "I" and "world" a product of language or
> is it merely reflected by language?
Good question. Before answering it, I think we need to know for sure how
language is first developed (in a particular culture). My guess is that it
is the language what does the distinction (it is not inherent to the
configuration of "the universe in itself"). Our particular language is based
on the culture in which was developed, a culture which have learned to
clearly separate the observer and the observed, but this "clear" distinction
has developed through time. I also think that an isolated culture can
develop forms of language which doesn't need to postulate that distinction.
> My putative definition of realism seems to depend on us knowing what
> mind is.
Exactly! and to me it is a non answered question. Nobody has ever being able
to define a "mind". For me is precisely a concept arised to determine where
do we need to draw the line that separate "us" from the "universe".
> Heidegger goes further and challenges the whole notion of subjectivity.
> Is that related to your project?
Yes, I'm attempting to work in a way to anihilate the need for the
subjective-objective distinctions. I want to stress attempting, it is a
formidable task, and it will take me many years to finally make something
more or less plausible ;-)
> >Perception independent would make more sense for me. I would say that our
> >perceptual systems are designed also in a way that allows language to
make a
> >dualist distinction.
>
> Is that a scientific or a philosophical claim? Also, could you expand
> on your reason for preferring "perception independent"? I think that
> Kant would regard perceptions as part of the populace of the mind,
> and so the two would be linked.
Philosophical, I think. And of course a claim to be proven by scientifical
facts. In saying that perceptions belong to the mind, Kant already draw the
line. I did the same when I choose to put perceptions before. It seems
logical to think that our language has developed from the way our senses
work, and that only after we have developed some sort of language "a mind"
arises.
Now, I would say that the way our perception works allow us to develop a
language in which a dualist distinction is implicit, but I also need to
postulate that it is not always the case. Sorry, one thing that stops me
from explaining this further is my English level. I hope to end a little
writing about all this matters and post it on Analytic Borders before the
year end.
> Kant's successors criticised him for dualism. I'm not sure how far that
> is warranted. Is Kant dualist with respect to what is transcendentally
> real (things in themselves)? I'd have thought perhaps not. His dualism
> seems to arise in connection with what is transcendentally ideal.
I'm lost here, I have not read Kant in a long time. Which would be the
difference between this "transcendentally ideal" and "things in themselves"?
> Is that somehow equivalent to a linguistic issue (especially if we take
> a broadly structuralist view) that we can only have language by making
> distinctions? Is language therefore inherently dualist?
I would say that it is, but also that it doesn't need to be this way. Our
particular language appears to have developed a form of dualism throughout
time, but as we go further and further in the past, reading some
philosophical accounts, we note that our dualism is somewhat different from
their dualism, furthermore, than some of them didn't required a dualism at
all to explain the universe (being the Advaita Vedanta the most excel
demonstration of it). But perhaps we should not use a generalized word like
"language" because some of our thinking is based more on our conceptual
schemes than in language itself. I mean, those a language have some sort of
philosphical account in an implicit way? What is a language anyway? I
suddenly feel I no longer know what I'm talking about! ;-)
> Asking a more general question, is it that we instigate thought, or is it
> that thought instigates us? The latter might become something like
> absolute idealism. Or is it merely an observation about language?
I thought I understand that at sight, but the more I read, the more confused
I feel! ;-)
> >Because concepts are maps. I would go as far as to postulate that every
> >perception is a map in itself, built to construct a world of objects
instead
> >of a world of constantly changing phenomena. For example, a table and its
> >shape remain constant for us as an object of thinking and perception,
> >regardless of the fact (theoretically at least) that it is always
different,
> >depending on our point of view, the senses we use to feel it, the worlds
we
> >use to describe it, etc.
>
> Yes, a concept is not for use on just one occasion! But are perceptions
> at the conceptual level, or are they the constituents of the changing
> phenomena?
Good question! We need to define "perception" in order to advance. I would
say that there are different levels in a perception, some of them occurs
before "the language filter" some others after the language filter. What we
see (more exactly, what we THINK we see) is the resultant product of all the
different levels.
> >Of course, following what I said, I agree with this posture. We can't
talk
> >about what is "there" before language. But we can invent different
language
> >or different approaches to what we sense and reach different conclusions
> >(the works of philosophy) regarding the ultimate state of what is the
case.
>
> Yes, plain sailing so far!
;-)
Another way to put it is to say that every language is (necessarily) a map
and that all that we can do is to make different kind of maps, without a
single possibility of reaching which is "outside" our maps without using
another maps. Is this meaningful at all? Would something like this can lead
us to an end of a dualist approach without becoming some sort of idealism?
> >I think that something that might help here is that our "state of
> >consciousness" (whatever that is) seems to dictate our perspective and
thus
> >the point at which the frontier will be drawn. Altered states of
> >consciousness can pull us in to "places" in which we no longer feel, so
> >clearly, where the line was drawn in a normal state.
>
> Do we want to introduce a "state of consciousness" as some kind
> of fundamental entity, or is this a derivative notion? Could it be
> something that is a consequence of language and sociality rather
> than a precursor? How does it fit in?
Good questions, I'm not sure how to deal with them. We need a working
definition of those "state of consciousness" before attempting good
answers. Still, that the use of a language modify the "state of
consciousness" to a point in which the world is looked through a language
structure. So, in a way, I need to say that the notion of "states of
consciousness" it is a fundamental variable, but surely one that it is still
not developed at all in Western cultures, some old East cultures have a lot
to say about those states, but I'm far from saying that I know enought about
them to attempt to expain anything.
I also understand perfectly that sadly, so far, is an evanecent concept, and
there are no ways I can think to make a working definition.
> >I don't know if Im headed, at all, in the direction you wanted, but you
> >welcomed any comment, so here is mine. ;-)
>
> I'm very glad of the opportunity to discuss these questions - thanks.
Thanks to you. I always follow the discussions between you, Bruce, Gary and
the rest of the community, and I love to take part on the discussions from
time to time.
Life is Life.
It is Beautiful if you make it Beautiful.
_______________
Manuel Delaflor
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Manuel Delaflor
> > the use of a language
> > draws a "frontier" between what is "I" and what is
> > "the world".
>
> If we can recognize this "frontier drawing", then, in
> a sense, we can dispense with it and imagine a
> condition in this distinction dissolves. And yet you
> write..
>
> >We can't talk
> > about what is "there" before language.
>
> So we can't talk about that "frontierless" state. And
> yet you write...
I think these are two different things. One is to talk about "what's left
without language" and another very different is to talk about if what we
call the universe does not have any "subject-object" division in itself,
that this "division" is somewhat only a byproduct of our use of language.
> Yes, there is an enormous literature on altered states
> induced by drugs, dance, and trance. But are these
> empirical findings relevant to the philosophical
> debate between the metaphysical realists (there is a
> world of objects outside our words, close to Gary's
> position i believe) and Martin's Structuralism that
> suggests that all boundaries are drawn with a
> linguistic distinctions?
Yes Bruce, I think it is. Current philosphy asumes that we see the world
from the only point of view that have "epistemological rights". In other
words, it doesn't account that there are different possible "points of view"
in which the findings of another point of view will no longer be relevant. I
will go as far as to say that there are ways to permanently alter our state
of consciousness "to a place" in which the OBVIOUS distinction between the
subjective and the objective, and all the castles builded upon them
(structuralism, idealism, realism, etc) just dissapear.
Life is Life.
It is Beautiful if you make it Beautiful.
_______________
Manuel Delaflor
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bruce denner
>Our particular language is based
> on ... a culture
> ....learned to clearly separate the observer and
>the observed,
And yet this division is indeterminate. That's the
opening philosophical point.
> Nobody has ever being able
> to define a "mind". For me is precisely a concept
> arised to determine where
> do we need to draw the line that separate "us" >from
> the "universe".
You seem to favor teleological accounts. Anyway, are
we separate from the universe?
> Yes, I'm attempting to work in a way to annihilate
> the need for the
> subjective-objective distinctions.
And why does this distinction concern you?
>I would say that our perceptual systems are
>>designed also in a way that allows language to
>>make a
> >dualist distinction.
> > Is that a scientific or a philosophical claim?
> Philosophical, I think. And of course a claim to be
> proven by scientific
> facts.
First, from my viewpoint, a philosophical claim is not
a tentative scientific claim waiting for verification.
Nor do I think that the claim "that a psychological
system was designed" is a scientific one. It's
teleological, not naturalistic.
>as we go further and further in the past,
> reading some
> philosophical accounts, we note that our dualism >is
> somewhat different from
> their dualism,
Yes, that's the way it goes with philosophy.
I think , to make a decision, dualism or no dualism,
in ones account, one must first be clear about the
question at hand. What is your question?
>I would
> say that there are different levels in a perception,
> some of them occurs
> before "the language filter" some others after the
> language filter.
Indeed that is the case. But what is the philo
significance?
From a related Post:
> I think these are two different things. One is to
> talk about "what's left
> without language" and another very different is to
> talk about if what we
> call the universe does not have any "subject-object"
> division in itself,
Both "the universe" and the "subject-object division"
are our concepts. We can ask whether they go together
for us. But I don't see how we can ask "what the
universe is like" outside our concepts. In what
language would the answer be in?
>I will go as far as to say that there are ways to
> permanently alter our state
> of consciousness "to a place" in which the >OBVIOUS
> distinction between the
> subjective and the objective, and all the castles
> builded upon them
> (structuralism, idealism, realism, etc) just
> dissapear.
Yes, of course. An infant, nor a brain damaged adult,
can grasp any of these "isms". But the truth of these
"isms" doesn't lie in the mind of the thinker.
>another very different is to
> talk about if what we
> call the universe does not have any "subject-object"
> division in itself,
Both "the universe" and the "subject-object division"
are our concepts. We can ask whether they go together
for us. But I don't see how we can ask "what the
universe is like" outside our concepts. In what
language would the answer be us?
>I will go as far as to say that there are ways to
> permanently alter our state
> of consciousness "to a place" in which the >OBVIOUS
> distinction between the
> subjective and the objective, and all the castles
> builded upon them
> (structuralism, idealism, realism, etc) just
> dissapear.
Yes, of course. An infant, nor a brain damaged adult,
can grasp any of these "isms". But the truth of these
"isms" doesn't lie in the mind of the thinker.
I recognize that you are put off by the subject-object
split. Could you say what damage it does?
bruce
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Martin N Brampton
>> OK. Does language draw a frontier between things that were there
>> before language, or does language institute the distinction? That is,
>> is the separation between "I" and "world" a product of language or
>> is it merely reflected by language?
>
>Good question. Before answering it, I think we need to know for sure how
>language is first developed (in a particular culture). My guess is that it
>is the language what does the distinction (it is not inherent to the
>configuration of "the universe in itself"). Our particular language is based
>on the culture in which was developed, a culture which have learned to
>clearly separate the observer and the observed, but this "clear" distinction
>has developed through time. I also think that an isolated culture can
>develop forms of language which doesn't need to postulate that distinction.
We are getting ourselves into an interesting hole here. The distinction
between mind and matter (or whatever we call what is not mind) is now
looking to be rooted in language. But what is language? When we talk
of language we are certainly not talking of the material objects (marks on
paper, vibrations in the air) that are used as signs. So we must conclude
that language only comes alive, signs only function as signs, when there
is a mental component to what is happening. Unfortunately, if our notion
of what is mental is instituted by language itself, then this explanation
collapses.
>> My putative definition of realism seems to depend on us knowing what
>> mind is.
>
>Exactly! and to me it is a non answered question. Nobody has ever being able
>to define a "mind". For me is precisely a concept arised to determine where
>do we need to draw the line that separate "us" from the "universe".
The danger with that formulation is being drawn into a theocentric view
of knowledge, a view that supposes that we can stand outside the
universe in a Godly way. Kant (and I think Wittgenstein agrees with this)
emphasizes that we are finite beings, incorporated in the universe.
Anyway, it seems that accepting the popular definition of realism as a
view of what is mind independent is getting us nowhere. In order to
explain what we mean by real, we are required to understand what we
understand by mind, and that is at least as difficult as the original question
about what we understand by real.
Kant thinks that we can qualify the real, we can have different kinds of
reality, or use the term "real" in different ways. Perhaps that will help us.
When Kant talks of what is empirically real, he talks of appearances, but
not in a superficial way. He is definitely not talking about the kind of
appearances that suggest that a stick partly submerged in water is bent.
For Kant, the empirically real situation is that the stick is straight, and that
we can provide an empirical explanation of why it seems bent. So a
starting point for Kant's notion of empirically real would be the best
description we can develop. Kant believes that reason involves a
normative recommendation to express our beliefs in ways that can be
understood and criticized by others. As a result, the crooked stick is
not empirically real, nor is any other illusory appearance. But a great
many quite abstract things can be empirically real as Kant's understanding
of an object is very wide, including anything that we can synthesize out
of our intutions.
This understanding of what is empirically real is plainly anthropocentric.
Now Kant is willing to make the contrast with a theocentric view, or a
view of how things are that is not rooted in our best endeavours.
It is difficult to avoid thinking that we have an adequate intuitive grasp
of what it is to be real, and from that, to understand that however good
our theories may be, there is something else that is how things really are.
That is Kant's transcendental reality.
He tries to get at it by talking of how things are in themselves, or of the
transcendental object. The latter is only helpful if we think we already
know what "transcendental" means for Kant; it is no use for explaining
transcendental.
The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus seems to have a rather similar
scheme. The world can be broken down into logically atomic elements,
although we never observe such elements. They might as well be
called things in themselves, and they are the constituents of what we
talk about as objects. Our objects are strongly linked with language,
which has to be analysed to find the connection between true claims
and the world. There does seem to be a significant difference, in that
Wittgenstein supposes that our talk can be analysed into the logical
elements of the real world, while Kant does not suggest that there could
be an analysable relationship between empirical objects and things in
themselves.
The later Wittgenstein seems to lay all the stress on what is, in Kant's
terms, empirically real. Maybe he is doubtful about our ability to talk
about anything else?
>> Heidegger goes further and challenges the whole notion of subjectivity.
>> Is that related to your project?
>
>Yes, I'm attempting to work in a way to anihilate the need for the
>subjective-objective distinctions. I want to stress attempting, it is a
>formidable task, and it will take me many years to finally make something
>more or less plausible ;-)
Good luck!
>Philosophical, I think. And of course a claim to be proven by scientifical
>facts. In saying that perceptions belong to the mind, Kant already draw the
>line. I did the same when I choose to put perceptions before. It seems
>logical to think that our language has developed from the way our senses
>work, and that only after we have developed some sort of language "a mind"
>arises.
That is a challenging thought. If mind is language dependent, and language
is in many respects ideal, it seems as if we are heading towards mind being
ideal, that is to say in some sense dependent on mind. This looks dangerously
like a vicious circle. Or is it just a thoroughgoing idealism?
>Now, I would say that the way our perception works allow us to develop a
>language in which a dualist distinction is implicit, but I also need to
>postulate that it is not always the case. Sorry, one thing that stops me
>from explaining this further is my English level. I hope to end a little
>writing about all this matters and post it on Analytic Borders before the
>year end.
I look forward to that.
> ... But perhaps we should not use a generalized word like
>"language" because some of our thinking is based more on our conceptual
>schemes than in language itself. I mean, those a language have some sort of
>philosphical account in an implicit way? What is a language anyway? I
>suddenly feel I no longer know what I'm talking about! ;-)
Is a conceptual scheme something different from a language? I'm
inclined to doubt it.
>> Asking a more general question, is it that we instigate thought, or is it
>> that thought instigates us? The latter might become something like
>> absolute idealism. Or is it merely an observation about language?
>
>I thought I understand that at sight, but the more I read, the more confused
>I feel! ;-)
Is there a subject prior to thought? Prior to language? Is there thought
prior to language?
>Good question! We need to define "perception" in order to advance. I would
>say that there are different levels in a perception, some of them occurs
>before "the language filter" some others after the language filter. What we
>see (more exactly, what we THINK we see) is the resultant product of all the
>different levels.
The trouble with all this - and perhaps this is where the later Wittgenstein is
taking a stand - is that we can't talk about what is pre-linguistic (by definition)
as you said earlier.
>Another way to put it is to say that every language is (necessarily) a map
>and that all that we can do is to make different kind of maps, without a
>single possibility of reaching which is "outside" our maps without using
>another maps. Is this meaningful at all? Would something like this can lead
>us to an end of a dualist approach without becoming some sort of idealism?
The difficulty is explaining what it is a map of. That is Kant's concern about
appearances - how can something be an appearance, unless it is an
appearance of something?
>Thanks to you. I always follow the discussions between you, Bruce, Gary and
>the rest of the community, and I love to take part on the discussions from
>time to time.
Glad to talk with you.
Best regards, Martin
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Manuel Delaflor
> >Our particular language is based
> > on ... a culture
> > ....learned to clearly separate the observer and
> >the observed,
>
> And yet this division is indeterminate. That's the
> opening philosophical point.
Definitely. I will like to discuss this further, to learn about what Im
trying to talk about.
> > Nobody has ever being able
> > to define a "mind". For me is precisely a concept
> > arised to determine where
> > do we need to draw the line that separate "us" >from
> > the "universe".
>
> You seem to favor teleological accounts. Anyway, are
> we separate from the universe?
I fail to see why Im implying a teleological point of view. Perhaps this is
a dumb question, but can you elaborate a bit? And answering your question,
no, I presuppose that we are not separate from what we call the universe at
all. The separation is an illusion that comes after the subjective-objective
division.
> > Yes, I'm attempting to work in a way to annihilate
> > the need for the
> > subjective-objective distinctions.
>
> And why does this distinction concern you?
Huh, this question was a pleasant suprise for me, I have thinked about it
since yesterday... I thought I had an inmediate answer, but not Im not sure
at all. At some point I was trying to explain the world to myself, and found
some mystical accounts on Zen and Advaita Vedanta traditions. Those accounts
opened my intellect to forms of perception that, apparently, allow human
consciousness to see a world in which the normal divisions between the self
and the universe are gone. Everything becomes a continuum. Back in the
Western philosophical views, I found that all they seems to imply (back to
Socrates and all the way to Descartes) that the self is there just
"experimenting the world" but somehow is not the world. I believe this
implicit dualism is a source of problems. Some people tried to get rid of
dualism proposing the materialism, proposing that the mind is only "an
artefact" or an epiphenomenum. Then modern cognitive accounts are trying to
say that "the mind", whatever it is, is as real as the material reality, but
nobody seems to be able to draw a conclusive theory or account of it.
I believe those "problems" are related to our arbitrary separation between a
"self" and a "material world".
On the other hand, Im just an amateur (with little time to study this
subjects), so if any of what I said is without fundament or illogical I will
appreciate clarifications.
> >I would say that our perceptual systems are
> >>designed also in a way that allows language to
> >>make a
> > >dualist distinction.
>
> > > Is that a scientific or a philosophical claim?
>
> > Philosophical, I think. And of course a claim to be
> > proven by scientific
> > facts.
>
> First, from my viewpoint, a philosophical claim is not
> a tentative scientific claim waiting for verification.
> Nor do I think that the claim "that a psychological
> system was designed" is a scientific one. It's
> teleological, not naturalistic.
I understand now better about my teleological "position", perhaps I should
say also that this "design" is strictly evolutive, in the same sense that an
eye is "designed" to perceive changes in photon density. So Im not implying
a designer of some sort. Did I get you right?
> >as we go further and further in the past,
> > reading some
> > philosophical accounts, we note that our dualism >is
> > somewhat different from
> > their dualism,
>
> Yes, that's the way it goes with philosophy.
>
> I think , to make a decision, dualism or no dualism,
> in ones account, one must first be clear about the
> question at hand. What is your question?
My question is; why does a division line exists at all?
And; what would happen, how our "view of the world" will change if this
division is transcended?
> >I would
> > say that there are different levels in a perception,
> > some of them occurs
> > before "the language filter" some others after the
> > language filter.
>
> Indeed that is the case. But what is the philo
> significance?
Hmm, Im lost here, what are you saying? I tried to make a little sense of
all this lines behind, would that counts as significance?
> > From a related Post:
>
> > I think these are two different things. One is to
> > talk about "what's left
> > without language" and another very different is to
> > talk about if what we
> > call the universe does not have any "subject-object"
> > division in itself,
>
> Both "the universe" and the "subject-object division"
> are our concepts. We can ask whether they go together
> for us. But I don't see how we can ask "what the
> universe is like" outside our concepts. In what
> language would the answer be in?
Agreed and I said precisely that in another part. Perhaps I didn't explain
well myself. I was trying to say that we can talk about if the distinction
is valid or useful at all from a philosophical point of view without the
need to talk about "the universe in itself".
> >I will go as far as to say that there are ways to
> > permanently alter our state
> > of consciousness "to a place" in which the >OBVIOUS
> > distinction between the
> > subjective and the objective, and all the castles
> > builded upon them
> > (structuralism, idealism, realism, etc) just
> > dissapear.
>
> Yes, of course. An infant, nor a brain damaged adult,
> can grasp any of these "isms". But the truth of these
> "isms" doesn't lie in the mind of the thinker.
The truth lie's only in the mind of the thinker. Are there truth's outside?
Life is Life.
It is Beautiful if you make it Beautiful.
_______________
Manuel Delaflor
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Manuel Delaflor
> between mind and matter (or whatever we call what is not mind) is now
> looking to be rooted in language. But what is language? When we talk
> of language we are certainly not talking of the material objects (marks on
> paper, vibrations in the air) that are used as signs. So we must conclude
> that language only comes alive, signs only function as signs, when there
> is a mental component to what is happening. Unfortunately, if our notion
> of what is mental is instituted by language itself, then this explanation
> collapses.
Yep, is a deep hole. Just by intuition I would say that what we call "mind"
(human mind to be more specific) is basically a byproduct of our use of
language. Every animal has some sort of "mind", they feel, they think, have
emotions, etc. But only few animals have some sort of intentional language.
I think Vervet monkeys, for example, have some rudimentary form of
communication. They have, at least, two words (from what I recall at this
moment) and they learn to use them while infants. Those words are "eagle" or
"flying thing" or "danger from upside" and "snake" or "ground danger" or
"danger movements at sight". Some other primates can recognize themselfs in
a mirror (a common "test" designed to see if they are "aware of themselfs as
individuals". Which processes are needed to recognize themselfs or speak
meaningful words is still a mystery, but I think those two things are
necessary to develope a sense of "I AM".
Of course, developing a functional definition of "mind" is needed in order
to advance in this subjects.
> >> My putative definition of realism seems to depend on us knowing what
> >> mind is.
> >
> >Exactly! and to me it is a non answered question. Nobody has ever being
able
> >to define a "mind". For me is precisely a concept arised to determine
where
> >do we need to draw the line that separate "us" from the "universe".
>
> The danger with that formulation is being drawn into a theocentric view
> of knowledge, a view that supposes that we can stand outside the
> universe in a Godly way. Kant (and I think Wittgenstein agrees with this)
> emphasizes that we are finite beings, incorporated in the universe.
Im not sure why a theocentric view is implicit. Does this is because the
privilegiated point of view needed to define what is mind from "outside" the
universe and the mind? What if this point of view is the real "universe in
itself"? Im trying to say that, perhaps, the human mind and the universe are
two poles of a continnum which is not the mind nor the physical reality.
> Anyway, it seems that accepting the popular definition of realism as a
> view of what is mind independent is getting us nowhere. In order to
> explain what we mean by real, we are required to understand what we
> understand by mind, and that is at least as difficult as the original
question
> about what we understand by real.
Agreed. Still, I think that perhaps we can avoid a definition by just
stating that what is "before" "a mind" and "the world" is what is the case.
No, Im not saying that some form of idealism is needed, at least in the
sense of an conscious intelligence, because I will not attribute thinking to
what is "before". I would say that both mind and world are just two
different aspects of what it is, that both arise at the very same time.
Does this make ANY sense?
> This understanding of what is empirically real is plainly anthropocentric.
> Now Kant is willing to make the contrast with a theocentric view, or a
> view of how things are that is not rooted in our best endeavours.
> It is difficult to avoid thinking that we have an adequate intuitive grasp
> of what it is to be real, and from that, to understand that however good
> our theories may be, there is something else that is how things really
are.
> He tries to get at it by talking of how things are in themselves, or of
the
> transcendental object. The latter is only helpful if we think we already
> know what "transcendental" means for Kant; it is no use for explaining
> transcendental.
Unless we consider that, somehow, we can "enter in a trascendental state"
in which we transform ourselfs (or become aware) into what is real before
the subject-object division. It would be not anthropocentric, I think,
because there is nothing "human" in that state. Granted, highly speculative,
but those are the apparent findings of ancient cultures, like the ones that
created Zen or the Advaita Vedanta. My intuition (rather vague at the moment
as you can see), is that this can lead us to solve some of the problems that
belong to the "normal" points of view.
> There does seem to be a significant difference, in that
> Wittgenstein supposes that our talk can be analysed into the logical
> elements of the real world, while Kant does not suggest that there could
> be an analysable relationship between empirical objects and things in
> themselves.
This is an interesting point. Does Kant take those empirical objects as mind
dependent? It is still not clear at all how he can separate those objects
and "things in themselves". I need to read Kant!
> >Philosophical, I think. And of course a claim to be proven by
scientifical
> >facts. In saying that perceptions belong to the mind, Kant already draw
the
> >line. I did the same when I choose to put perceptions before. It seems
> >logical to think that our language has developed from the way our senses
> >work, and that only after we have developed some sort of language "a
mind"
> >arises.
>
> That is a challenging thought. If mind is language dependent, and
language
> is in many respects ideal, it seems as if we are heading towards mind
being
> ideal, that is to say in some sense dependent on mind. This looks
dangerously
> like a vicious circle. Or is it just a thoroughgoing idealism?
I don't know, Im very confused as you might note. Perhaps what I said before
in this post can help. If we take the realism point of view of thinking that
a mind is, somehow, a product of relations between physical entities then we
encounter the problem you mention, on the other hand, if we take a monistic
point of view in which both the physical and the mind are aspects of the
same "reality" then all we need is to explain their relations (as if they
were that easy!). I don't know, perhaps Im talking nonsense here.
> > ... But perhaps we should not use a generalized word like
> >"language" because some of our thinking is based more on our conceptual
> >schemes than in language itself. I mean, those a language have some sort
of
> >philosphical account in an implicit way? What is a language anyway? I
> >suddenly feel I no longer know what I'm talking about! ;-)
>
> Is a conceptual scheme something different from a language? I'm
> inclined to doubt it.
What I tried to say is that we all use the same language, yet, we can
conclude amazingly different things about "the same world". This is because
our concepts are based on a language, but are not necesarily delimited by
it.
> Is there a subject prior to thought? Prior to language? Is there thought
> prior to language?
Difficult questions! I believe the answer to them lies more in science than
philosophy.
> >Another way to put it is to say that every language is (necessarily) a
map
> >and that all that we can do is to make different kind of maps, without a
> >single possibility of reaching which is "outside" our maps without using
> >another maps. Is this meaningful at all? Would something like this can
lead
> >us to an end of a dualist approach without becoming some sort of
idealism?
>
> The difficulty is explaining what it is a map of. That is Kant's concern
about
> appearances - how can something be an appearance, unless it is an
> appearance of something?
Yes, that is a big problem. How can we make maps if we don't have an
original? Still, we do not need to ascribe a particular ontological state to
"the original", we can limit ourselfs to talk and discuss about our maps and
how they deal with some aspects of "the original" without the need to say
that our particular map is "more accurated". Or in other words, we can do
philosphy from this side of the fence without the need to go "there".
Going "there" is something which, in my view, has to be done, not
conjectured.
Life is Life.
It is Beautiful if you make it Beautiful.
_______________
Manuel Delaflor
bruce denner
>Nobody has ever being able to define a "mind".
What's wrong with the dictionary definitions?
Anyway, my take on "What is Reality?"
1. Not a physics question, nor psychological, i.e.,
how does mind work, but a..
2. Philosophic one which asks "What is Reality for
Us?" and is answered by...
3. A prescribed line of thinking, a discourse that
makes our reality more intelligible. More
intelligible?
4. Well yes, if one can first get clear about what is
not intelligible. That's the first step. Answers
without questions are all correct!
> I understand now better about my teleological
> "position", perhaps I should
> say also that this "design" is strictly evolutive,
> in the same sense that an
> eye is "designed" to perceive changes in photon
> density. So Im not implying
> a designer of some sort. Did I get you right?
Not entirely. Darwinian evolution (biology and
psychology) is strictly non-teleological. Certain eyes
survive through natural selection, by chance, not
because of any design. Science questions are answered
with "how."
In contrast, we can ask, philosophically, why we want
to continue with the object-subject distinction
bruce
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Manuel Delaflor
>
> What's wrong with the dictionary definitions?
What is good about dictionary definitions? What is the weight of a
definition?
> 4. Well yes, if one can first get clear about what is
> not intelligible. That's the first step. Answers
> without questions are all correct!
How do you define intelligible?
> Not entirely. Darwinian evolution (biology and
> psychology) is strictly non-teleological. Certain eyes
> survive through natural selection, by chance, not
> because of any design.
Understood. I have to work on the "design" arguments.
> In contrast, we can ask, philosophically, why we want
> to continue with the object-subject distinction
I don't understand where are you headed with this question. Do you imply
that there is nothing inherently wrong with that approach? that does not
lead to contradictions? I don't want to go with that disctinction because
some of the resulting problems appear to be insolvable. Wheter this
"insolvability" is due to the use of wrong arguments or because the very
nature of the world is something we most yet find out.
Life is Life.
It is Beautiful if you make it Beautiful.
_______________
Manuel Delaflor
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bruce denner
> >
definitions? and Manuel responded
>
> What is good about dictionary definitions? What >is
the weight of a definition?
With regard to the subject-object distinction, Manuel
commented..
>Do you imply that there is nothing inherently >wrong
with that approach? that does not
> lead to contradictions?
If I get you right, Manuel, you view a philosophical
task as asking "What is X" were X is a critical noun
(Reality, Mind) or problematic distinction.
I look forward to your answers.
bruce
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