The Brain Minds Whether We Believe in Free Will or Not

[Craig Weinberg]

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract

Abstract

The feeling of being in control of one’s own actions is a
strong subjective experience. However, discoveries in psychology and
neuroscience challenge the validity of this experience and suggest
that free will is just an illusion. This raises a question: What would
happen if people started to disbelieve in free will? Previous research
has shown that low control beliefs affect performance and motivation.
Recently, it has been shown that undermining free-will beliefs
influences social behavior. In the study reported here, we
investigated whether undermining beliefs in free will affects brain
correlates of voluntary motor preparation. Our results showed that the
readiness potential was reduced in individuals induced to disbelieve
in free will. This effect was evident more than 1 s before
participants consciously decided to move, a finding that suggests that
the manipulation influenced intentional actions at preconscious
stages. Our findings indicate that abstract belief systems might have
a much more fundamental effect than previously thought.


Has anyone posted this yet? Hard to explain what brain correlates are
doing responding to an illusion...

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2012 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract

Abstract

        The feeling of being in control of one�s own actions is a
strong subjective experience. However, discoveries in psychology and
neuroscience challenge the validity of this experience and suggest
that free will is just an illusion. This raises a question: What would
happen if people started to disbelieve in free will? Previous research
has shown that low control beliefs affect performance and motivation.
Recently, it has been shown that undermining free-will beliefs
influences social behavior. In the study reported here, we
investigated whether undermining beliefs in free will affects brain
correlates of voluntary motor preparation. Our results showed that the
readiness potential was reduced in individuals induced to disbelieve
in free will. This effect was evident more than 1 s before
participants consciously decided to move, a finding that suggests that
the manipulation influenced intentional actions at preconscious
stages. Our findings indicate that abstract belief systems might have
a much more fundamental effect than previously thought.


Has anyone posted this yet? Hard to explain what brain correlates are
doing responding to an illusion...

�
I think they just rediscovered hypnotism.

Brent
"Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."
�� --- Schopenhauer

[Craig Weinberg]

> I think they just rediscovered hypnotism.
>
> Brent
> "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."

>     --- Schopenhauer

If someone is hypnotized to think that they are eating an apple when
they are really eating a raw onion, they have to be able to imagine
what it is like to eat an apple.

If someone is hypnotized to think that they have no free will, but
free will doesn't exist to begin with, why would there be any
difference to the brain?

Craig

[Stathis Papaioannou]

You might be able to show that people who believe in an afterlife are
more relaxed when faced with death. There are recognised neurological
correlates of relaxation. Would it thereby follow that there is in
fact an afterlife?

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract

Abstract

       > The feeling of being in control of one’s own actions is a strong subjective experience.

And the reason we feel that way is because we can't predict what the external environment will throw at us, and even if we could we still wouldn't always know what we would do next until we actually did it, and the same is true of Turing Machines. When we eventually see what we did we say we "decided" to do it, it's what the word means.
 

> However, discoveries in psychology and neuroscience challenge the validity of this experience and suggest that free will is just an illusion.

The "free will" noise is not a illusion, the vibration of the air molecules caused by that sound can be measured in the lab.
 

> This raises a question: What would happen if people started to disbelieve in free will?

About the same thing would happen if people started to disbelieve in what burps had to say.

  John K Clark

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 14, 10:44 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

The concept of an afterlife is a perfectly reasonable thing to be able
to imagine, since we are born and have a life, it is not a problem to
imagine that we could continue to have a life even after this one
ends. This is not the case with free will. Hypnotizing a computer to
think it has 'free will' will not result in any changes in its
processing, since for a computer there is no possible difference
between voluntary action and automatic action. For us there is a
tremendously significant and obvious difference.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 14, 11:31 am, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract
>
> > Abstract
>
> >        > The feeling of being in control of one’s own actions is a strong
> > subjective experience.
>
> And the reason we feel that way is because we can't predict what the
> external environment will throw at us,

Why does that cause some kind of subjective experience? A rock doesn't
know what the environment will throw at it either. Why would our
feeling of being in control be any different from a rock's?

> and even if we could we still
> wouldn't always know what we would do next until we actually did it, and
> the same is true of Turing Machines.

Do you think that Windows or a smart phone has a feeling of being in
control of its actions?

> When we eventually see what we did we
> say we "decided" to do it, it's what the word means.

If that were the case, then deciding to breathe deeply would be no
different from seeing that we have been breathing deeply after
exercising. It's not at all though. It's completely different. We are
not just spectators in our own bodies, we are participants. There is a
difference.

>
> > > However, discoveries in psychology and neuroscience challenge the
> > validity of this experience and suggest that free will is just an illusion.
>
> The "free will" noise is not a illusion, the vibration of the air molecules
> caused by that sound can be measured in the lab.

I can see characters here on the screen so I know that your opinion is
not an illusion, it is just meaningless noise that happens to have
electronic consequences.

>
> > > This raises a question: What would happen if people started to
> > disbelieve in free will?
>
> About the same thing would happen if people started to disbelieve in what
> burps had to say.

Are you contradicting this study for a reason, or just making
unfounded claims against it?

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 3/14/2012 7:21 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Mar 13, 11:15 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> On 3/13/2012 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract
>>> Abstract

>>> The feeling of being in control of one�s own actions is a

I someone says to you, "You are paralyzed. You can't lift your arm." and you hear these
words and interpret them how would that happen without any changes in your brain?

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

Voluntary movement has to first exist in order for a suggestion of
paralysis to be meaningful. If all movement was involuntary in the
first place then there would be no significant difference between
passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
move, so the suggestion of paralysis would not change the brain more
than any other non-sequitur suggestion.

If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex. We
might be able to fool ourselves, but if our brain cares what we
believe in then our ability to execute our will can hardly be said to
be deterministic. Hypnosis is further evidence that physiological
process of the brain can be directly influenced semantically, and by
extension belief, or self-hypnosis is evidence of the same.

Craig

[meekerdb]

Compare: "If you had no immortal soul that would be judged after your death your belief
about it should have no effect on your religious behavior." Beliefs can have effects
whether they have real referents or not.

> We
> might be able to fool ourselves, but if our brain cares what we
> believe in then our ability to execute our will can hardly be said to
> be deterministic.

A double non-sequitur.

> Hypnosis is further evidence that physiological
> process of the brain can be directly influenced semantically, and by
> extension belief, or self-hypnosis is evidence of the same.

Wow! We've discovered that if we shout, "LOOK OUT!" people will duck. I'll be sure to
publish this evidence of direct semantic influence.

Brent

[John Mikes]

Craig and Brent:

"Free Will" is not a matter of faith. One does not "believe "IN" it, or not".

(Of course this is a position in my (agnostic) worldview - my 'belief' ha ha).

We are part of an infinite complexity with limited capabilities to accept influence from the infinite factors (if those ARE factors indeed, not just 'relations') 

Our mental activity (assigned in our limited conventional sciences to the brain) is pondering consciously and unconsciously, including arguments we know of and arguments (not yet?) known. The result may not be deterministic because we are not a simpleton machine (sorry Bruno, emphasis here is on simpleton) 

so we may have 'options' - choices, but not 'freely at all. We have the power to choose disadvantegously, even knowingly so. 

 

We know only a portion of the factors (aspects, I almost wrote: components)  in the infinite complexity (call it God, or nature, totality, wholeness, or even everything)  and surely misunderstand even those. We "humanize" knowledge into terms and qualia we can understand and use. Such is our 'model' of the world. Our mental work is influenced by the 'model-content' AND also by facts (?) beyond our knowable circle. Decisionmaking is a complex procedure using the known and unknown influences into a result within the givens.

 

I repeat my original position: "FREE WILL" is the reins to keep human slaves in line by fear of violating the 'rules of power' (religious, or political/economic) WILLFULLY and undergoing to a punishment later on. The concept of SIN.

 

JM

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[Craig Weinberg]

False equivalence. Belief itself is inseparable from free will. An
immortal soul doesn't supervene on being able to believe in something.
To have a valid comparison you would have to say something like 'If
you had no car then you couldn't drive your own car" - which would be
true.

>
> > We
> > might be able to fool ourselves, but if our brain cares what we
> > believe in then our ability to execute our will can hardly be said to
> > be deterministic.
>
> A double non-sequitur.

Makes sense to me.

We might be able to fool ourselves...

but

if our brain cares what we believe (as is proved by this study)

then

our ability to execute our will can hardly be said to be

deterministic.

because our beliefs influence our ability to execute our will and
they are not deterministic if they can be intentionally manipulated by
suggestion...
whatever deterministic cascade of consequence supposedly controls our
every thought and action is superseded by someone's deliberate
intention to change it. If I can change someone else's belief then I
am determining their behavior, not their biology.

>
> > Hypnosis is further evidence that physiological
> > process of the brain can be directly influenced semantically, and by
> > extension belief, or self-hypnosis is evidence of the same.
>
> Wow! We've discovered that if we shout, "LOOK OUT!" people will duck.  I'll be sure to
> publish this evidence of direct semantic influence.

It doesn't need to be published. Evidence of semantic influence is not
generally denied outside of the Everything List.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 14, 4:34 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Craig and Brent:
> "Free Will" is not a matter of faith. One does not "believe "IN" it, or
> not".
> (Of course this is a position in my (agnostic) worldview - my 'belief' ha
> ha).
> We are part of an infinite complexity with limited capabilities to accept
> influence from the infinite factors (if those ARE factors indeed, not just
> 'relations')
> Our mental activity (assigned in our limited conventional sciences to the
> brain) is pondering consciously and unconsciously, including arguments we
> know of and arguments (not yet?) known. The result may not be deterministic
> because we are not a simpleton machine (sorry Bruno, emphasis here is on
> simpleton)
> so we may have 'options' - choices, but not 'freely at all. We have the
> power to choose disadvantegously, even knowingly so.

I agree. I never imply that free will must be absolutely free, rather
I say that there are many shades of liberty that we experience, from
the nearly involuntary physiological systems which yogic discipline
can achieve some degree of control over, to the nearly complete
freedom of our imagination. The key is that 'we have the power to
choose'. That is not explainable under determinism, which then is
forced to cast doubt on the existence of 'we' to cover for it's lack
of understanding of what it means to 'choose'.

>
> We know only a portion of the factors (aspects, I almost wrote: components)
>  in the infinite complexity (call it God, or nature, totality, wholeness,
> or even everything)  and surely misunderstand even those. We "humanize"
> knowledge into terms and qualia we can understand and use. Such is our
> 'model' of the world. Our mental work is influenced by the 'model-content'
> AND also by facts (?) beyond our knowable circle. Decisionmaking is a
> complex procedure using the known and unknown influences into a result
> within the givens.

It's not just decision making though. Free will is creativity,
expression, and preference. Like Bob Ross, I can choose to put a happy
little tree in my world on canvas, without any meaningful consequence
to evolutionary biology or religious righteousness. I can change my
mind and paint over the tree too. There is very little room for
determinism in this context.

>
> I repeat my original position: "FREE WILL" is the reins to keep human
> slaves in line by fear of violating the 'rules of power' (religious, or
> political/economic) WILLFULLY and undergoing to a punishment later on. The
> concept of SIN.
>
> JM
>

I can partially agree with that (although doing so doesn't seem to be
out of any fear of violating any rules of power') but those reigns are
still completely different from how machines are controlled.
Programming does not hem in the willful nature of a computer, it does
just the opposite, it accumulates rules through which we command
computers to impersonate our purposefulness. They have no option but
to follow their programming as they have no power to violate any rules
that they contain. They are made of rules, and so need no fear to keep
them in line. Humans have many rules, but we are not made of them, we
are made of that which makes and breaks rules.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:34, John Mikes wrote:

Craig and Brent:

"Free Will" is not a matter of faith. One does not "believe "IN" it, or not".

(Of course this is a position in my (agnostic) worldview - my 'belief' ha ha).

In "pure ideal science" there is no act of faith, except in the rationality of the opponents.

In applied science there is always some act of faith, in the very sense of the subject matter.

So I think I agree with you. Unlike consciousness, which we all know very well, despite we cannot define it, free-will is more problematic because many people propose different and often incompatible definitions.

Many definitions of it are contradictory.

We are part of an infinite complexity with limited capabilities to accept influence from the infinite factors (if those ARE factors indeed, not just 'relations') 

I am not sure what you mean by "to accept". What you say make sense with "perceive" or "realize" *all* infinite influences, but some can be, at least if by "we" you mean us the Löbian entities (machines or non-machine).

Our mental activity (assigned in our limited conventional sciences to the brain)

I would say, assigned by theory or hypothesis. The idea that the mental activity results from the brain activity is an hypothesis or a theory, not a convention. If it was a convention, I would go to the dentist for my headache, and perhaps to the neuropsychiatrist or psychologist for my teeth holes.

is pondering consciously and unconsciously, including arguments we know of and arguments (not yet?) known. The result may not be deterministic because we are not a simpleton machine (sorry Bruno, emphasis here is on simpleton) 

We are not simpleton is a big generalization, and humans have often been known to be gullible and foolish (as I see "simpleton" means in the dictionary).

so we may have 'options' - choices, but not 'freely at all. We have the power to choose disadvantegously, even knowingly so. 

OK.

 

We know only a portion of the factors (aspects, I almost wrote: components)  in the infinite complexity (call it God, or nature, totality, wholeness, or even everything)  and surely misunderstand even those. We "humanize" knowledge into terms and qualia we can understand and use. Such is our 'model' of the world. Our mental work is influenced by the 'model-content' AND also by facts (?) beyond our knowable circle.

OK. Thats the motor of science. Theories just put light, and shadows on what we explore.

Decisionmaking is a complex procedure using the known and unknown influences into a result within the givens.

OK.

 

I repeat my original position: "FREE WILL" is the reins to keep human slaves in line by fear of violating the 'rules of power' (religious, or political/economic) WILLFULLY and undergoing to a punishment later on. The concept of SIN.

Interesting suggestion, it might be related. The concept seems to me to be a generalization of responsibility, which might be useful to decide if someone need some medical treatment, or need to be just isolated (for the protection of the neighborhood), or need some punishment (?). The frontier is fuzzy, but there are clear in and out case, a bit like the mandelbrot set). 

Eventually it relies on the difference between the error and the lie. The first should be encouraged, because it needs to be done to progress, the second should be discouraged in most situations, I think.

We have partial control.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Mikes]

On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:03 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:34, John Mikes wrote:

>>Craig and Brent:

"Free Will" is not a matter of faith. One does not "believe "IN" it, or not".

(Of course this is a position in my (agnostic) worldview - my 'belief' ha ha).<<

>So I think I agree with you.<

 

Thank you.

 

> Unlike consciousness, which we all know very well, despite we cannot define it, (free wil: Many definitions of it are contradictory.)<

 

As far as I follow the hubbub on consciousness in the various sciences-related inernational discussions, every author applies a desciption that fits his theoretical position. We "know very well" a functional outcome on human thinking, which is not too impressive. I generalized the process (sic!) and ended up (so far) with response to relations, very close to what I find for "life". Of course those 'relations' are humanly (and today) identified.

 

>>We are part of an infinite complexity with limited capabilities to accept influence from the infinite factors (if those ARE factors indeed, not just 'relations') <<

>I am not sure what you mean by "to accept". What you say make sense with "perceive" or "realize" *all* infinite influences, but some can be, at least if by "we" you mean us the Löbian entities (machines or non-machine).<

 

I meant a more 'pyhysical' acceptance: when the arriving influence exercises a responding activity (activates a response?) IOW we (already) developed a capability to be affected by some of the infinite influences.

And I do not restrict ourselves (we, us) to Loebian definitions: there may be more and wider domains than those we may think about now.

 

    >>Our mental activity (assigned in our limited conventional sciences to the brain) ...<<

 

> I would say, assigned by theory or hypothesis. The idea that the mental activity results from the brain activity is an hypothesis or a theory, not a convention. If it was a convention, I would go to the dentist for my headache, and perhaps to the neuropsychiatrist or psychologist for my teeth holes.<

 

Convention(al) refers ONLY to the sciences we (officially) have nowadays.

I agree - even state that mental phenpomena are more (complex) than tissue-work ever could produce, even when billions cooperate into it.

>>...is pondering consciously and unconsciously, including arguments we know of and arguments (not yet?) known. The result may not be deterministic because we are not a simpleton machine (sorry Bruno, emphasis here is on simpleton) ...<<

>We are not simpleton is a big generalization, and humans have often been known to be gullible and foolish (as I see "simpleton" means in the dictionary).<

 

My definition of 'simple' is like: the (reduced?) part of the totality (complexity) we include into our pondering. Not the "contrary" rather "part of" complexity.

>>...so we may have 'options' - choices, but not 'freely at all. We have the power to choose disadvantegously, even knowingly so. <<

>OK.<

 

>>We know only a portion of the factors (aspects, I almost wrote: components)  in the infinite complexity (call it God, or nature, totality, wholeness, or even everything)  and surely misunderstand even those. We "humanize" knowledge into terms and qualia we can understand and use. Such is our 'model' of the world. Our mental work is influenced by the 'model-content' AND also by facts (?) beyond our knowable circle.<<

>OK. Thats the motor of science. Theories just put light, and shadows on what we explore.<

>>Decisionmaking is a complex procedure using the known and unknown influences into a result within the givens. <<

>OK.<

 

I repeat my original position: "FREE WILL" is the reins to keep human slaves in line by fear of violating the 'rules of power' (religious, or political/economic) WILLFULLY and undergoing to a punishment later on. The concept of SIN.

>Interesting suggestion, it might be related. The concept seems to me to be a generalization of responsibility, which might be useful to decide if someone need some medical treatment, or need to be just isolated (for the protection of the neighborhood), or need some punishment (?). The frontier is fuzzy, but there are clear in and out case, a bit like the mandelbrot set). 

Eventually it relies on the difference between the error and the lie. The first should be encouraged, because it needs to be done to progress, the second should be discouraged in most situations, I think.

We have partial control.<

OK and thanks - JohnM

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 14, 2:52 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

Remind me again what is the argument for why anyone would mind having
their liberty taken away?

Craig

[1Z]

On Mar 14, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mar 14, 2:52 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> > Compare: "If you had no immortal soul that would be judged after your death your belief
> > about it should have no effect on your religious behavior."  Beliefs can have effects
> > whether they have real referents  or not.
>
> False equivalence. Belief itself is inseparable from free will.

So you say.

> because our beliefs influence our ability to execute our will and
> they are not deterministic if they can be intentionally manipulated by
> suggestion...

That's still a non sequitur

[1Z]

"Voluntary" might mean "controlled deterministically by higher brain
centres".

>If all movement was involuntary in the
> first place then there would be no significant difference between
> passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> move

>

> If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.

Non sequitur.

[1Z]

Programmign a computer to believe in FW is a change in its programming

> since for a computer there is no possible difference
> between voluntary action and automatic action.

"voluntary" could mean "controlled determinsitcally by higher brain
centres".

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 9:49 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Mar 14, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Mar 14, 2:52 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > Compare: "If you had no immortal soul that would be judged after your death your belief
> > > about it should have no effect on your religious behavior."  Beliefs can have effects
> > > whether they have real referents  or not.
>
> > False equivalence. Belief itself is inseparable from free will.
>
> So you say.

How do you suggest that it could be otherwise?

>
> > because our beliefs influence our ability to execute our will and
> > they are not deterministic if they can be intentionally manipulated by
> > suggestion...
>
> That's still a non sequitur

What part of it doesn't make sense to you?

[Craig Weinberg]

The higher brain centers might mean 'us'. We control our own voluntary
movements. To control is to determine. We determine our movements
because we are the phenomenological end of the process to which our
brain is the conjugate. What we want to do is reflected in the
processes of our brain, but the brain has no opinion at all about our
voluntary movements. It is our subjective experience and physiological
process both contribute to who we are and what we do. Neither aspect
makes sense without the other.

>
> >If all movement was involuntary in the
> > first place then there would be no significant difference between
> > passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> > move
>
> > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
>
> Non sequitur.

Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
improve its performance in any way?

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 9:54 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

>
> > since for a computer there is no possible difference
> > between voluntary action and automatic action.
>
> "voluntary" could mean "controlled determinsitcally by higher brain
> centres".

If that were the case, why should we identify with that control
personally? What would be accomplished for the higher brain centers by
generating that 'illusion' and how could such a thing exist
mechanically?

Craig

[Jason Resch]

Craig,

What is the definition of free will you are applying here?  Please be as specific as possible.

Thanks,

Jason

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If all movement was involuntary in the
> > first place then there would be no significant difference between
> > passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> > move

>

> > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.

>
> Non sequitur.

Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
improve its performance in any way?

If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the world, then it will try to form a model of itself.  But it would be difficult and extremely wasteful, from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary to model its own physical internal decision processes.  Failing to have this introspection it may come to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 10:38 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Craig,
>
> What is the definition of free will you are applying here?  Please be as
> specific as possible.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jason

Since free will is primitive, it is not possible to define it in terms
other than its own. That is the problem. It is the epistemological
bedrock upon which all meaningful definitions rely. Meaning itself is
a word which reiterates this by equating intention with sense. 'What
do you mean?' = 'What do you intend for me to understand?'. Intention
is part of understanding (which is why a machine can't have either
one).

The good news is that there is no need to define it because it is
inescapably obvious. We use it to participate in any way with our own
experience. We use it to control and define how we move our body and
appendages. We use it to determine what it is we pay attention to,
what we accept or emulate vs what we reject.

Craig

[1Z]

On Apr 2, 3:03 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 9:49 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On Mar 14, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Mar 14, 2:52 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > > Compare: "If you had no immortal soul that would be judged after your death your belief
> > > > about it should have no effect on your religious behavior."  Beliefs can have effects
> > > > whether they have real referents  or not.
>
> > > False equivalence. Belief itself is inseparable from free will.
>
> > So you say.
>
> How do you suggest that it could be otherwise?

We could believe things as a result of deterministc processes. Where
is the
contradiction in that?

>
> > > because our beliefs influence our ability to execute our will and
> > > they are not deterministic if they can be intentionally manipulated by
> > > suggestion...
>
> > That's still a non sequitur
>
> What part of it doesn't make sense to you?

The bit where "can be manipulated" somehow means "not deterministic".

One deterministic process can manipulate another.

[1Z]

None of that makes sense to me.

>
> > >If all movement was involuntary in the
> > > first place then there would be no significant difference between
> > > passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> > > move
>
> > > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> > > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
>
> > Non sequitur.
>
> Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> would such a belief have any effect on its behavior?

It woudl say thins like "yes i do have FW". It might make
different deductions about its status as a moral agent. It might
say things like "how dare you keep me locked up in this lab, i am a
free agent!"

> How could it
> improve its performance in any way?

Dunno. The original claim was "effect", not "Improve". Don't shift the
ground.

[1Z]

On Apr 2, 5:28 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 10:38 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Craig,
>
> > What is the definition of free will you are applying here?  Please be as
> > specific as possible.
>
> > Thanks,
>
> > Jason
>
> Since free will is primitive, it is not possible to define it in terms
> other than its own. That is the problem. It is the epistemological
> bedrock upon which all meaningful definitions rely. Meaning itself is
> a word which reiterates this by equating intention with sense. 'What
> do you mean?' = 'What do you intend for me to understand?'.

Where's the "free" in that?

> Intention
> is part of understanding (which is why a machine can't have either
> one).
>
> The good news is that there is no need to define it because it is
> inescapably obvious.

So what's wrong with determinists?

[Craig Weinberg]

Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
processes and how would that experience not be free will?

If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
readiness?

Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
(belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
contributing to making choices using free will) causing measurable
changes in the supposedly deterministic functions of the brain.

Craig

[1Z]

On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> > >>> >  >  first place then there would be no significant difference between
> > >>> >  >  passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> > >>> >  >  move
>
> > >>> >  >  If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> > >>> >  >  the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
>
> > >> >  Non sequitur.
> > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > > improve its performance in any way?
>
> > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the world, then it
> > will try to form a model of itself.  But it would be difficult and extremely wasteful,
> > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary to model its
> > own physical internal decision processes.  Failing to have this introspection it may come
> > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
>
> Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> processes and how would that experience not be free will?

It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling,
and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually
have. Feelings can be wrong.

> If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> readiness?

huh? readiness?

>
> Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it


> (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> contributing to making choices using free will)

So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions. You might
want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.

[meekerdb]

On 4/2/2012 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>>> If all movement was involuntary in the
>>>>>> > first place then there would be no significant difference between
>>>>>> > passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
>>>>>> > move
>>>>>> > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
>>>>>> > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
>>>>> Non sequitur.
>>> Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
>>> would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
>>> improve its performance in any way?
>> If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the world, then it
>> will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and extremely wasteful,
>> from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary to model its
>> own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this introspection it may come
>> to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
>>
> Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> processes and how would that experience not be free will?

Most decisions do not have an experience associated with them, we make them
'subconsciously' (e.g. the movement of my fingers in typing this). So the experience of
free will is just the failure to be able to trace all the causes of a conscious decision.
Why are some decisions conscious, while most aren't...I'm not sure. I think it has to do
with decisions for which we employee language/logic to predict consequences.

>
> If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> readiness?
>
> Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> contributing to making choices using free will) causing measurable
> changes in the supposedly deterministic functions of the brain.

Why not? If the brain is deterministic then beliefs are deterministic and changing them
by external inputs can change performance.

Brent

>
> Craig
>

[1Z]

On Apr 2, 6:33 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Most decisions do not have an experience associated with them, we make them
> 'subconsciously' (e.g. the movement of my fingers in typing this).  So the experience of
> free will is just the failure to be able to trace all the causes of a conscious decision.

Non sequitur.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> > > >>> >  >  first place then there would be no significant difference between
> > > >>> >  >  passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> > > >>> >  >  move
>
> > > >>> >  >  If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> > > >>> >  >  the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
>
> > > >> >  Non sequitur.
> > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > > > improve its performance in any way?
>
> > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the world, then it
> > > will try to form a model of itself.  But it would be difficult and extremely wasteful,
> > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary to model its
> > > own physical internal decision processes.  Failing to have this introspection it may come
> > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
>
> > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> > processes and how would that experience not be free will?
>
> It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling,
> and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually
> have. Feelings can be wrong.

We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but
the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument
has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must
reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the
feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to
falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic. There is no
mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.

>
> > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > readiness?
>
> huh? readiness?

Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readiness_potential

The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
influenced by exposure to anti-free will ideas.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLPPkUA/s1600/eeg%2Bfree%2Bwill.JPG

>
>
>
> > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.

It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
that they could influence anything. Belief could only be an
epiphenomenon.

> You might
> want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.

Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
freely what to deny and what to accept.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

The belief is about the power to self determine though. The
performance change is evidence that some change is possible. There can
be more or less free will. That is not possible under determinism.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 1:33 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Most decisions do not have an experience associated with them,

That's an assumption. All decisions could have an experience
associated with them without their being part of *our* experience.

> we make them
> 'subconsciously' (e.g. the movement of my fingers in typing this).

That doesn't mean that nothing is conscious of them being made. It is
possible to change our attention to include these subconscious
movements, or to possibly recover them under hypnosis, etc. Our
uppermost consicous layer is just the tip of the iceberg - not an
iceberg just of public mechanisms but a whole universe of private
experiences on different levels.

> So the experience of
> free will is just the failure to be able to trace all the causes of a conscious decision.

You are assuming that the causes of conscious decisions aren't
conscious themselves. I don't assume that. You are assuming that
intention and decision are deployed in a discrete serial system,
whereas I think they are just the opposite. I think that because we
are a single cell divided, every part of us is actually 'us' in the
same way that every piece of a hologram reflects the whole image from
a more fixed perspective. The decisions I make are the decisions my
brain makes. Sometimes I push my brain to move my body, sometimes my
brain pushes me to wake up. There is no reason to make the dynamic
have to be more one than the other.

> Why are some decisions conscious, while most aren't...I'm not sure.  I think it has to do
> with decisions for which we employee language/logic to predict consequences.

No, we use language and logic all of the time without being conscious
of it. If anything our executive level awareness has to do with
dealing with novelty. It's interesting to think aboout how a sudden
event can both wake you up to the fact of the event, even as it puts
you into a mode where you act out of pure reflex or instinct. You
become more conscious and unconscious at the same time. This would
support my view that different regions of our brain are conscious (in
perhaps exotically different ways) rather than the mind being a motor
with a single gear shift.

Craig

[meekerdb]

But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will. It didn't even show
there was any free will. It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
performance. It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
performance. Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.

Brent

>
> Craig
>

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 5:05 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:


>
> But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will.  It didn't even show
> there was any free will.  It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
> performance.

Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.

>It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
> performance.

No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
being considered.

> Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.

No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
others and by ourselves. If I can suggest beliefs to myself that
causally affect the performance of anything at all, then I am using
free will to determine their function rather than only being
determined by them. The whole idea of convincing yourself of something
or building confidence doesn't make sense if we were only passive
spectators in our own minds.

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 4/2/2012 7:12 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Apr 2, 5:05 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>> But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will. It didn't even show
>> there was any free will. It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
>> performance.
> Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.
>
>> It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
>> performance.
> No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
> that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
> suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
> our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
> being considered.
>
>> Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.
> No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
> of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
> it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
> others and by ourselves.

There is nothing in determinism that prevents a change in response to suggestions.

> If I can suggest beliefs to myself that
> causally affect the performance of anything at all, then I am using
> free will to determine their function rather than only being
> determined by them.

That's just assuming what you want to prove. I'd say you were determined to suggest that
belief to yourself. All kinds of systems have feedback loops and they are still
deterministic.

Brent

[1Z]

The correct logic would be that it falsifies any worldview,
deterministic or not, that is not able to account for
feelings.

>There is no
> mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.

It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
things that aren't possible. But you are shifting around between
determinism,
feelings/qualia and concepts here.

>
> > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > readiness?
>
> > huh? readiness?
>
> Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
>

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...

>
> The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> influenced by exposure to anti-free will ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
>

> http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...

>
>
>
> > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
>
> It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> that they could influence anything.

It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
can determine another...but not freely determine another.

> Belief could only be an
> epiphenomenon.

So?

> > You might
> > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
>
> Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> freely what to deny and what to accept.

i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.

[1Z]

Change is possible under determinism. In a sense.
> Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

Why is it necessarily foolish? It might be foolish if the person defend an inaccurate conception of free will, and it might be sane if he defends a reasonable notion of free will.

We cannot predict ourselves, but we do have a notion of partial responsibility. It would make no sense for a lawyer to claim that his client , after committing some murder, was just obeying to the physical laws. For in that case the member of the jury can judge him guilty and responsible, and when ask why, just answer that they too are just obeying the physical laws.

In fact the physical laws, or the low level computations are just not relevant, and free will is the ability to make a choice with respect to ignorance on a spectrum of possible actions. It is just a more general notion of partial responsibility, so that we can decide if someone deserve a medical treatment or to go to jail (to protect society). Of course I am in favor of the compatibilist account of free will, and I follow you on your reply to Craig. You can call it simply "will", if you prefer. I think all animals have some amount of will.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[1Z]

On Apr 3, 3:12 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 5:05 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> > But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will.  It didn't even show
> > there was any free will.  It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
> > performance.
>
> Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.

Nothing in the experiment indicates the will was free in a
philosophical
sense, just the usual scientific sense of volition, ie conscious
control
or control by higher brain centres.

> >It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
> > performance.
>
> No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
> that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
> suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
> our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
> being considered.
>
> > Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.
>
> No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
> of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
> it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
> others and by ourselves.

One deterministic process can affect another. Think of dropping a
clock
of a tall building.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 2, 11:22 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> On 4/2/2012 7:12 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 2, 5:05 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
>
> >> But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will.  It didn't even show
> >> there was any free will.  It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
> >> performance.
> > Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.
>
> >> It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
> >> performance.
> > No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
> > that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
> > suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
> > our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
> > being considered.
>
> >>   Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.
> > No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
> > of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
> > it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
> > others and by ourselves.
>
> There is nothing in determinism that prevents a change in response to suggestions.

Is there anything in determinism that prevents making suggestions?

What is free will other than using your own intention/suggestion to
change the behavior of your body and mind?

Should we try to pretend that the experiments are running themselves?
Making their own suggestions?

>
> > If I can suggest beliefs to myself that
> > causally affect the performance of anything at all, then I am using
> > free will to determine their function rather than only being
> > determined by them.
>
> That's just assuming what you want to prove.  I'd say you were determined to suggest that
> belief to yourself.

What would be the role of such a 'belief'? If I am determined to
believe that I am suggesting beliefs to myself, why not cut out that
whole useless process and just have the determination directly execute
its function, like breathing or digesting food? It's like saying that
a computer could maybe benefit by telling itself to 'try harder' to
execute a line of code. If a program is equipped for resource
optimization, it will prioritize computations in the processor queue
but there is no plausible experience of 'effort' or belief which could
impact performance in doing that. Why would there be? The only reason
is because we are reverse engineering our own experience and
universalizing it.

> All kinds of systems have feedback loops and they are still
> deterministic.

Effort is not a feedback loop. A computer can compute more often, or
for longer, or devote more resources to a task, but any kind of
additional abstraction layer which represents those strategies as
participatory experiences would be a redundant waste of resources.

Besides, such a disembodied, unexplained experience has no means of
grounding to physical reality. Every feedback loop would require
another feedback loop to interpret the model presented by the parent
interpretation process. If we need to see a representation of an
orange tree rather than just unconsciously react to the conditions
presented by an orange tree, then why wouldn't a single neuron also
need such a representation for its detections?

Why wouldn't the organelles of the neuron that interpret that feedback
loop with a perceptual illusion also require their own perceptual
illusion, and so on. Its a Cartesian-homunculus-regressing notion. I
see no reason that such a theatrical production as human experience
would materialize ex nihilo when every system, organ, cell, and
molecule in the universe is assumed to function without any illusions
of participation. What makes these monkeys on Earth so special?

If we have internally perceived worlds for any reason at all, then
everything should have an equivalent phenomenology for the same
reason. If that is the case, and I think that it is, then there is no
reason to assume that those phenomenological experiences can be
understood or anticipated through the mechanisms they are associated
with. We can't feel our own neurological structures, and neurological
imaging can't reproduce our feelings, so we should not expect that
either presentation can be reduced to the other. Determinism is what
you get when you choose to look outside of yourself. Within the
psyche, it is you who is doing most of the determination while your
neurology carries out your will.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
account for in a purely deterministic universe. "I feel like I am
choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
can be drawn.

>
> >There is no
> > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
>
> It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> things that aren't possible.

We can't conceive of a square circle. We can't conceive of the
opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
our knowledge not physically possible, but we cannot conceive of
anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
a deterministic universe. That is what awareness would be to a
mechanistic universe.

> But you are shifting around between
> determinism,
> feelings/qualia and concepts here.

How so?

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > > readiness?
>
> > > huh? readiness?
>
> > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
>
> > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > influenced by exposure to anti-free will ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
>
> >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
>
> > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
>
> > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > that they could influence anything.
>
> It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> can determine another...but not freely determine another.

But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
determining another, and how could such a belief measurably improve
its performance in actually determining another? You are focusing on
the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point. It's the 'will'
part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.
Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
approximating 'truly free' will.

>
> > Belief could only be an
> > epiphenomenon.
>
> So?

So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
Tasks?

>
> > > You might
> > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
>
> > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > freely what to deny and what to accept.
>
> i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.

Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
about something that would be inconceivable?

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 3, 5:07 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > Why not?  If the brain is deterministic then beliefs are deterministic and changing them
> > > by external inputs can change performance.
>
> > The belief is about the power to self determine though. The
> > performance change is evidence that some change is possible.
>
> Change is possible under determinism. In a sense.

Is it though? It would require some pretty tortured reasoning I
think.

If I can suggest something that always makes a placebo work better
(against other suggestions which do not), then the placebo +
suggestion becomes medicine.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 3, 5:27 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

>
> > > But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will. It didn't even show
> > > there was any free will. It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
> > > performance.
>
> > Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.
>
> Nothing in the experiment indicates the will was free in a
> philosophical
> sense, just the usual scientific sense of volition, ie conscious
> control
> or control by higher brain centres.

Right. I don't even look at the philosophy of how free is free - any
experience of will is unexplainable in a deterministic universe.

>
> > >It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
> > > performance.
>
> > No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
> > that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
> > suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
> > our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
> > being considered.
>
> > > Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.
>
> > No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
> > of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
> > it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
> > others and by ourselves.
>
> One deterministic process can affect another. Think of dropping a
> clock
> of a tall building.

That's a straw man of the findings. What the experiment shows would be
like dropping a clock off of a tall building and seeing that it falls
faster than 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it that it's doomed to fall,
slower than 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it that it can control the speed
of its fall, and exactly 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it unrelated things.

Craig

[1Z]

No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings,
you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW.

>"I feel like I am
> choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> can be drawn.
>
>
>
> > >There is no
> > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
>
> > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> > things that aren't possible.
>
> We can't conceive of a square circle.

Which is a logical impossibiility. But
we can conceive of natural impossibilities,
like perpetual motion machines.

> We can't conceive of the
> opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
> our knowledge not physically possible,

So returning to:

"The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it."

what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable.
However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase
"possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws
of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural
impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine.

> but we cannot conceive of
> anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
> a deterministic universe.

No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe
is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible.
THat has nothing to do with conceivability.

>That is what awareness would be to a
> mechanistic universe.
>
> > But you are shifting around between
> > determinism,
> > feelings/qualia and concepts here.
>
> How so?

Re-read what you wrote.

>
> > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > > > readiness?
>
> > > > huh? readiness?
>
> > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
>
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
>
> > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
>
> > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
>
> > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
>
> > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > > that they could influence anything.
>
> > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> > can determine another...but not freely determine another.
>
> But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
> determining another,

It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically
believe what it was determined to believe.

> and how could such a belief measurably improve
> its performance in actually determining another?

One mechanism can do someting to another
that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser
could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork.

>You are focusing on
> the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point.

Clearly not, or there would be no problem with
determinism.

> It's the 'will'
> part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
> qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
> the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.

So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic
freedom.

> Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
> potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
> approximating 'truly free' will.

????

> > > Belief could only be an
> > > epiphenomenon.
>
> > So?
>
> So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
> Tasks?

Their realisers could.

> > > > You might
> > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
>
> > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > > freely what to deny and what to accept.
>
> > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
>
> Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
> about something that would be inconceivable?

It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible.

[1Z]

On Apr 3, 4:58 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 5:07 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > Why not?  If the brain is deterministic then beliefs are deterministic and changing them
> > > > by external inputs can change performance.
>
> > > The belief is about the power to self determine though. The
> > > performance change is evidence that some change is possible.
>
> > Change is possible under determinism. In a sense.
>
> Is it though? It would require some pretty tortured reasoning I
> think.

Determinism doens't require every process to continue uninterrupted.
The interruptions
are changes.

> If I can suggest something that always makes a placebo work better
> (against other suggestions which do not), then the placebo +
> suggestion becomes medicine.

????

[1Z]

On Apr 3, 5:20 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 5:27 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will.  It didn't even show
> > > > there was any free will.  It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
> > > > performance.
>
> > > Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.
>
> > Nothing in the experiment indicates the will was free in a
> > philosophical
> > sense, just the usual scientific sense of volition, ie conscious
> > control
> > or control by higher brain centres.
>
> Right. I don't even look at the philosophy of how free is free - any
> experience of will is unexplainable in a deterministic universe.

So you keep saying, but "deterministic" doens't mean "qualia-less".

>
>
>
>
>
> > > >It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
> > > > performance.
>
> > > No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
> > > that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
> > > suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
> > > our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
> > > being considered.
>
> > > > Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.
>
> > > No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
> > > of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
> > > it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
> > > others and by ourselves.
>
> > One deterministic process can affect another. Think of dropping a
> > clock
> > of a tall building.
>
> That's a straw man of the findings. What the experiment shows would be
> like dropping a clock off of a tall building and seeing that it falls
> faster than 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it that it's doomed to fall,
> slower than 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it that it can control the speed
> of its fall, and exactly 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it unrelated things.

I wasn;t talking about the psychology experiment at all. I meant
that the falling and the ticking are both deterministic processes,
and the one is bound to impact the other: "One deterministic process
can affect another."

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 4, 6:09 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> > account for in a purely deterministic universe.
>
> No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings,
> you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW.

What makes you think that you can have any feeling? How can a
deterministic universe account for feelings at all?

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >"I feel like I am
> > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> > can be drawn.
>
> > > >There is no
> > > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
>
> > > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> > > things that aren't possible.
>
> > We can't conceive of a square circle.
>
> Which is a logical impossibiility. But
> we can conceive of natural impossibilities,
> like perpetual motion machines.

That's my point, in a deterministic universe, free will is a logical
impossibility; even more inconceivable than a square circle since with
free will not existing at all, there could be no alternative to the
square at all.

>
> > We can't conceive of the
> > opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
> > our knowledge not physically possible,
>
> So returning to:
> "The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it."
> what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable.
> However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase
> "possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws
> of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural
> impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine.

Right. But the fact that it is a logical possibility would make no
sense in a deterministic universe.

>
> > but we cannot conceive of
> > anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
> > a deterministic universe.
>
> No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe
> is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible.
> THat has nothing to do with conceivability.

Why not?

>
> >That is what awareness would be to a
> > mechanistic universe.
>
> > > But you are shifting around between
> > > determinism,
> > > feelings/qualia and concepts here.
>
> > How so?
>
> Re-read what you wrote.

I don't need to. I know that I'm not shifting anything around. If you
can't defend your accusation then I'm not interested in it.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > > > > readiness?
>
> > > > > huh? readiness?
>
> > > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
>
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
>
> > > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
>
> > > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
>
> > > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> > > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
>
> > > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > > > that they could influence anything.
>
> > > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> > > can determine another...but not freely determine another.
>
> > But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
> > determining another,
>
> It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically
> believe what it was determined to believe.

Why would it believe anything?

> > and how could such a belief measurably improve
> > its performance in actually determining another?
>
> One mechanism can do someting to another
> that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser
> could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork.

But the beliefs or an oil dispenser cannot influence its performance.

>
> >You are focusing on
> > the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point.
>
> Clearly not, or there would be no problem with
> determinism.

Not sure what you mean.

>
> > It's the 'will'
> > part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
> > qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
> > the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.
>
> So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic
> freedom.

I agree, but I don't think that.

>
> > Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
> > potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
> > approximating 'truly free' will.
>
> ????

Machines improve, so we improve ourselves by using them. What is the
point ultimately of any machine other than to free our will to pursue
more voluntary pursuits?

>
> > > > Belief could only be an
> > > > epiphenomenon.
>
> > > So?
>
> > So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
> > Tasks?
>
> Their realisers could.

Not sure what you mean. Either a person's beliefs can change their
behavior or not. Since we know that they can, that means that the
semantic content of a person's mind is causally efficacious, and not
just a spectatorship that seems like it is participatory (for some
unexplainable reason).

>
> > > > > You might
> > > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
>
> > > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > > > freely what to deny and what to accept.
>
> > > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
>
> > Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
> > about something that would be inconceivable?
>
> It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible.

Someone on Quora put it nicely:
"Acceptance requires free will. Non acceptance requires free will. Any
argument for determinism is a performative contradiction since
argumentation presupposes a preference for truth over falsehood and is
aimed at the acceptance of truth."

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 4, 6:16 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 5:20 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 3, 5:27 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will.  It didn't even show
> > > > > there was any free will.  It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed
> > > > > performance.
>
> > > > Performance in what though? Readiness to execute personal will.
>
> > > Nothing in the experiment indicates the will was free in a
> > > philosophical
> > > sense, just the usual scientific sense of volition, ie conscious
> > > control
> > > or control by higher brain centres.
>
> > Right. I don't even look at the philosophy of how free is free - any
> > experience of will is unexplainable in a deterministic universe.
>
> So you keep saying, but "deterministic" doens't mean "qualia-less".

Qualia doesn't really make sense in a deterministic universe, but
that's not what I'm saying. I am saying that in a deterministic
universe, the idea of will is a non-sequitur. If you can imagine a
deterministic universe where the idea of will is possible, then you
aren't really considering the ramifications of universal determinism.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > >It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed
> > > > > performance.
>
> > > > No, they did controls to eliminate that. There may be other beliefs
> > > > that change people's ability to take action as well, but this study
> > > > suggests that this specific idea that we should doubt the existence of
> > > > our own free will has a negative impact on the very thing that is
> > > > being considered.
>
> > > > > Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.
>
> > > > No, determinism would not allow a mention of a deterministic function
> > > > of the brain to affect the performance of that function, because then
> > > > it wouldn't be deterministic - it would be open to suggestion by
> > > > others and by ourselves.
>
> > > One deterministic process can affect another. Think of dropping a
> > > clock
> > > of a tall building.
>
> > That's a straw man of the findings. What the experiment shows would be
> > like dropping a clock off of a tall building and seeing that it falls
> > faster than 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it that it's doomed to fall,
> > slower than 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it that it can control the speed
> > of its fall, and exactly 32ft/sec/sec if you tell it unrelated things.
>
> I wasn;t talking about the psychology experiment at all. I meant
> that the falling and the ticking are both deterministic processes,
> and the one is bound to impact the other: "One deterministic process
> can affect another."

But I am talking about the psychology experiment. I am relating it to
you in your own terms so you can see the logic of why the fact that
accepting a belief about free will has measurable consequences related
to free will cannot be explained deterministically.

Craig

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 1:54 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> account for in a purely deterministic universe. "I feel like I am
> choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> can be drawn.

Your claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic universe
is unjustified. It's simply an idea you have taken a fancy to.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 4, 8:43 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 1:54 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> > account for in a purely deterministic universe. "I feel like I am
> > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> > can be drawn.
>
> Your claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic universe
> is unjustified. It's simply an idea you have taken a fancy to.

I don't claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic
universe, but I suspect that is the case since there is no
deterministic justification for or mechanism of 'feeling' of any kind.
We would have to imagine that there is some mysterious deterministic
purpose for it, otherwise there should be no possibility of feeling,
and a deterministic universe should really be pretty parsimonious when
it comes to allowing for mysterious purposes if it is to be logically
consistent. So there is a completely logical basis for suspecting that
feeling is impossible in a deterministic universe that has nothing to
do with taking a fancy to the idea. I don't care one way or another,
I'm only following the logic where it leads. What would determine that
feeling should exist?

My claim is that the feeling of free will is a special case that goes
beyond this because even the suggestion of free will is inconceivable
in a universe defined a priori as being deterministic. It would be
like saying we could imagine what the 500th dimension or a new primary
color is like.

Craig

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Apr 5, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> Your claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic universe
>> is unjustified. It's simply an idea you have taken a fancy to.
>
> I don't claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic
> universe, but I suspect that is the case since there is no
> deterministic justification for or mechanism of 'feeling' of any kind.
> We would have to imagine that there is some mysterious deterministic
> purpose for it, otherwise there should be no possibility of feeling,
> and a deterministic universe should really be pretty parsimonious when
> it comes to allowing for mysterious purposes if it is to be logically
> consistent. So there is a completely logical basis for suspecting that
> feeling is impossible in a deterministic universe that has nothing to
> do with taking a fancy to the idea. I don't care one way or another,
> I'm only following the logic where it leads. What would determine that
> feeling should exist?
>
> My claim is that the feeling of free will is a special case that goes
> beyond this because even the suggestion of free will is inconceivable
> in a universe defined a priori as being deterministic. It would be
> like saying we could imagine what the 500th dimension or a new primary
> color is like.

Why does feeling have to have "purpose"? The universe as a whole does
not have "purpose" unless you believe in a certain kind of god.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[meekerdb]

On 4/4/2012 7:01 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I don't claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic
universe, but I suspect that is the case since there is no
deterministic justification

Deterministic things are determined.  I can't even conceive of what it would mean for them to be justified.

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

Stathis and Brent,

I'll respond to both at once since they are the same core objection:

"Why does feeling have to have "purpose"? "

"I can't even conceive of what it would mean for them
to be justified. "

They have to be justified and have a purpose because that is what a
deterministic universe would require. Otherwise I can just say that a
deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
goblins, whatever. What business does a feeling have being in a
universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?

Craig

On Apr 4, 10:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 05.04.2012 04:14 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:

Let us imagine that we have a deterministic theory of everything and it
has started at time zero with given initial conditions. Then it is
possible to state that the purpose of that initial conditions was to
reach the state that we have now. Otherwise, why exactly these initial
conditions have been employed? One could definitely imagine that the
theory of everything starts with some other initial conditions (also
with some values of fundamental constants, etc.).

In my view, the same event can have purpose or not depending on how you
describe it. Say a mechanical system develops itself according some
Lagrangian. There is no purpose. Yet, if you remember about the
variational principle, then the trajectory minimizes some functional and
this could be considered as the purpose of the trajectory. Well, this is
a word game but then you have also to make your definitions to justify
your statement.

Evgenii

[meekerdb]

On 4/5/2012 5:37 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Stathis and Brent,
>
> I'll respond to both at once since they are the same core objection:
>
> "Why does feeling have to have "purpose"?"
>
> "I can't even conceive of what it would mean for them
> to be justified. "
>
> They have to be justified and have a purpose because that is what a
> deterministic universe would require.

You apparently think you can just make words mean whatever you want. A deterministic
universe requires that that things be DETERMINED. It does require purpose or justification.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:28 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:

>> Why does feeling have to have "purpose"? The universe as a whole does
>> not have "purpose" unless you believe in a certain kind of god.
>>
>
> Let us imagine that we have a deterministic theory of everything and it has
> started at time zero with given initial conditions. Then it is possible to
> state that the purpose of that initial conditions was to reach the state
> that we have now. Otherwise, why exactly these initial conditions have been
> employed? One could definitely imagine that the theory of everything starts
> with some other initial conditions (also with some values of fundamental
> constants, etc.).
>
> In my view, the same event can have purpose or not depending on how you
> describe it. Say a mechanical system develops itself according some
> Lagrangian. There is no purpose. Yet, if you remember about the variational
> principle, then the trajectory minimizes some functional and this could be
> considered as the purpose of the trajectory. Well, this is a word game but
> then you have also to make your definitions to justify your statement.

It's possible to define "purpose" to mean "whatever happens" but I
don't think that's what Craig meant.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[1Z]

On Apr 5, 1:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Stathis and Brent,
>
> I'll respond to both at once since they are the same core objection:
>
> "Why does feeling have to have "purpose"? "
>
> "I can't even conceive of what it would mean for them
> to be justified. "
>
> They have to be justified and have a purpose because that is what a
> deterministic universe would require.

Nope. Determinism requires efficient causes,,
not final causes or purposes.

> Otherwise I can just say that a
> deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
> goblins, whatever.

Libertarian free will contradicts the requirment
for sufficent causes. The others don;t contradict determinism.

> What business does a feeling have being in a
> universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?

Something happened that would cause a feeling.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 7, 3:43 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 5, 1:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Stathis and Brent,
>
> > I'll respond to both at once since they are the same core objection:
>
> > "Why does feeling have to have "purpose"? "
>
> > "I can't even conceive of what it would mean for them
> > to be justified. "
>
> > They have to be justified and have a purpose because that is what a
> > deterministic universe would require.
>
> Nope. Determinism requires efficient causes,,
> not final causes or purposes.

What do you say the efficient cause of feeling is?

>
> > Otherwise I can just say that a
> > deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
> > goblins, whatever.
>
> Libertarian free will contradicts the requirment
> for sufficent causes.

No more than feeling.

>The others don;t contradict determinism.

Why not?

>
> > What business does a feeling have being in a
> > universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?
>
> Something happened that would cause a feeling.

Are you being serious?

Craig

[1Z]

On Apr 17, 6:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 7, 3:43 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 5, 1:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Stathis and Brent,
>
> > > I'll respond to both at once since they are the same core objection:
>
> > > "Why does feeling have to have "purpose"? "
>
> > > "I can't even conceive of what it would mean for them
> > > to be justified. "
>
> > > They have to be justified and have a purpose because that is what a
> > > deterministic universe would require.
>
> > Nope. Determinism requires efficient causes,,
> > not final causes or purposes.
>
> What do you say the efficient cause of feeling is?

Some priori brain state.

> > > Otherwise I can just say that a
> > > deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
> > > goblins, whatever.
>
> > Libertarian free will contradicts the requirment
> > for sufficent causes.
>
> No more than feeling.

No, Feeling isn't defined in terms of the presence or absence
of any kind of determinism or causality.

> >The others don;t contradict determinism.
>
> Why not?

They are not defined in terms of it or its absence.

> > > What business does a feeling have being in a
> > > universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?
>
> > Something happened that would cause a feeling.
>
> Are you being serious?

Yes. Why shouldn't you have laws of the form
"If <<see kitten>> then <<feel warm and gooey>>" ?

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 20, 8:36 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

>
> > > On Apr 5, 1:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > What do you say the efficient cause of feeling is?
>
> Some priori brain state.

What could make a brain state cause a feeling?

>
> > > > Otherwise I can just say that a
> > > > deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
> > > > goblins, whatever.
>
> > > Libertarian free will contradicts the requirment
> > > for sufficent causes.
>
> > No more than feeling.
>
> No, Feeling isn't defined in terms of the presence or absence
> of any kind of determinism or causality.

Causality is a condition within feeling, as is free will. Feeling
gives rise to free will directly. Whoever is doing the feeling is
ultimately determining the expression of their own free will.

>
> > >The others don;t contradict determinism.
>
> > Why not?
>
> They are not defined in terms of it or its absence.

You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of
causality. I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling and free
will.

>
> > > > What business does a feeling have being in a
> > > > universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?
>
> > > Something happened that would cause a feeling.
>
> > Are you being serious?
>
> Yes. Why shouldn't you have laws of the form
> "If <<see kitten>> then <<feel warm and gooey>>" ?

Because there is no logic to it. If you are positing a universe ruled
by laws of mechanistic logic, then you are required to demonstrate
that logic somehow applies to feeling, which it doesn't. If you have
mechanism, you don't need feeling. You can have data compression and
caching without inventing poetry.

Craig

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Apr 22, 2012 at 5:37 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of
> causality. I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling and free
> will.

It isn't the absence of causality, it isn't the presence of causality.
What does that leave?

>> Yes. Why shouldn't you have laws of the form
>> "If <<see kitten>> then <<feel warm and gooey>>" ?
>
> Because there is no logic to it. If you are positing a universe ruled
> by laws of mechanistic logic, then you are required to demonstrate
> that logic somehow applies to feeling, which it doesn't. If you have
> mechanism, you don't need feeling. You can have data compression and
> caching without inventing poetry.

By this reasoning nothing can ever have an adequate explanation, since
if the explanation offered for A is B, you can always ask, "But why
should B apply to A?"; and if the answer is given, "Because empirical
observation shows that it is so" you can dismiss it as unsatisfactory.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 22, 10:22 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 22, 2012 at 5:37 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of
> > causality. I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling and free
> > will.
>
> It isn't the absence of causality, it isn't the presence of causality.
> What does that leave?

The creation of causality.

>
> >> Yes. Why shouldn't you have laws of the form
> >> "If <<see kitten>> then <<feel warm and gooey>>" ?
>
> > Because there is no logic to it. If you are positing a universe ruled
> > by laws of mechanistic logic, then you are required to demonstrate
> > that logic somehow applies to feeling, which it doesn't. If you have
> > mechanism, you don't need feeling. You can have data compression and
> > caching without inventing poetry.
>
> By this reasoning nothing can ever have an adequate explanation, since
> if the explanation offered for A is B, you can always ask, "But why
> should B apply to A?"; and if the answer is given, "Because empirical
> observation shows that it is so" you can dismiss it as unsatisfactory.

It depends what A and B are. If A is a cloud and B is rain, then you
can see that there could be a connection. If A is a neural fiber and B
is an experience of blue, then there is a gigantic gap separating the
two which can't be bridged just because we are used to looking at
physical objects relating to other physical objects and think it would
be convenient if subjects behaved that way as well.

Craig

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, Apr 23, 2012 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> It isn't the absence of causality, it isn't the presence of causality.
>> What does that leave?
>
> The creation of causality.

But are decisions that a person makes freely caused or uncaused?

>> By this reasoning nothing can ever have an adequate explanation, since
>> if the explanation offered for A is B, you can always ask, "But why
>> should B apply to A?"; and if the answer is given, "Because empirical
>> observation shows that it is so" you can dismiss it as unsatisfactory.
>
> It depends what A and B are. If A is a cloud and B is rain, then you
> can see that there could be a connection. If A is a neural fiber and B
> is an experience of blue, then there is a gigantic gap separating the
> two which can't be bridged just because we are used to looking at
> physical objects relating to other physical objects and think it would
> be convenient if subjects behaved that way as well.

If you're bloody-minded enough you can claim here isn't really an
obvious connection between clouds and rain either.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[John Mikes]

Silly "Subject":  so far nobody could tell  H O W   a brain (tissue-comp?) could MIND anything? (react, maybe. )

 

I still wait for a refusal to my statement that there "may" not be any FREE will in a partially known environment with unknown factors yet influencing (all?) the occurrences? In the future course of the so far ever increasing knowledge-base there is always a chance for an initiation of a factor we don't know today and instigates what we THINK is free will based.

 

What I read about 'feeling' fits perfectly my agnosticism. Thank you.

 

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[meekerdb]

I guess Criag hasn't read Lewis Carroll:

http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 22, 10:57 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 23, 2012 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> It isn't the absence of causality, it isn't the presence of causality.
> >> What does that leave?
>
> > The creation of causality.
>
> But are decisions that a person makes freely caused or uncaused?

Both and neither. Just as a yellow traffic signal is neither red nor
green but represents possibilities of both stop and go. We are the
cause. We are influenced by causes but to varying degrees. We
influence our body and by extension the world with varying degrees of
freedom.

>
> >> By this reasoning nothing can ever have an adequate explanation, since
> >> if the explanation offered for A is B, you can always ask, "But why
> >> should B apply to A?"; and if the answer is given, "Because empirical
> >> observation shows that it is so" you can dismiss it as unsatisfactory.
>
> > It depends what A and B are. If A is a cloud and B is rain, then you
> > can see that there could be a connection. If A is a neural fiber and B
> > is an experience of blue, then there is a gigantic gap separating the
> > two which can't be bridged just because we are used to looking at
> > physical objects relating to other physical objects and think it would
> > be convenient if subjects behaved that way as well.
>
> If you're bloody-minded enough you can claim here isn't really an
> obvious connection between clouds and rain either.

Sure, it's a matter of degree. If I squeeze an orange, it follows very
logically that what comes out of it is orange juice. If I poke a
microorganism like a neuron with an electrode, it does not follow very
logically at all that comedy, symphonies or the smell of pineapple
should ensue. At some point you have to decide whether sanity is real
or reality is insane. I choose the former.

Craig

[1Z]

On Apr 21, 8:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 20, 8:36 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > On Apr 5, 1:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > What do you say the efficient cause of feeling is?
>
> > Some priori brain state.
>
> What could make a brain state cause a feeling?

A psychophsical law or identity.

> > > > > Otherwise I can just say that a
> > > > > deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
> > > > > goblins, whatever.
>
> > > > Libertarian free will contradicts the requirment
> > > > for sufficent causes.
>
> > > No more than feeling.
>
> > No, Feeling isn't defined in terms of the presence or absence
> > of any kind of determinism or causality.
>
> Causality is a condition within feeling,

says who?

> as is free will. Feeling
> gives rise to free will directly.

Says who?

> Whoever is doing the feeling is
> ultimately determining the expression of their own free will.

Says who?

> > > >The others don;t contradict determinism.
>
> > > Why not?
>
> > They are not defined in terms of it or its absence.
>
> You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of
> causality. I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling and free
> will.

Maybe you could make that clear to the rest of us.

> > > > > What business does a feeling have being in a
> > > > > universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?
>
> > > > Something happened that would cause a feeling.
>
> > > Are you being serious?
>
> > Yes. Why shouldn't you have laws of the form
> > "If <<see kitten>> then <<feel warm and gooey>>" ?
>
> Because there is no logic to it.

Statements of scientific law tend not to be analytical in any case.

>If you are positing a universe ruled
> by laws of mechanistic logic, then you are required to demonstrate
> that logic somehow applies to feeling, which it doesn't. If you have
> mechanism, you don't need feeling.

I dare say vast tracts of the universe are unnecessary.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Apr 24, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> But are decisions that a person makes freely caused or uncaused?
>
> Both and neither. Just as a yellow traffic signal is neither red nor
> green but represents possibilities of both stop and go. We are the
> cause. We are influenced by causes but to varying degrees. We
> influence our body and by extension the world with varying degrees of
> freedom.

EITHER something is determined/caused OR it's random/uncaused. This is
standard use of language. You can define your own terms but then at
least you should explain them in relation to the standard language:
"what everyone else calls green, I call red, and what everyone else
calls a dog, I call a cat".

>> >> By this reasoning nothing can ever have an adequate explanation, since
>> >> if the explanation offered for A is B, you can always ask, "But why
>> >> should B apply to A?"; and if the answer is given, "Because empirical
>> >> observation shows that it is so" you can dismiss it as unsatisfactory.
>>
>> > It depends what A and B are. If A is a cloud and B is rain, then you
>> > can see that there could be a connection. If A is a neural fiber and B
>> > is an experience of blue, then there is a gigantic gap separating the
>> > two which can't be bridged just because we are used to looking at
>> > physical objects relating to other physical objects and think it would
>> > be convenient if subjects behaved that way as well.
>>
>> If you're bloody-minded enough you can claim here isn't really an
>> obvious connection between clouds and rain either.
>
> Sure, it's a matter of degree. If I squeeze an orange, it follows very
> logically that what comes out of it is orange juice. If I poke a
> microorganism like a neuron with an electrode, it does not follow very
> logically at all that comedy, symphonies or the smell of pineapple
> should ensue. At some point you have to decide whether sanity is real
> or reality is insane. I choose the former.

But it's an empirical observation that if certain biochemical
reactions occur (the ones involved in processing information) ,
consciousness results. That you find it mysterious is your problem,
not nature's.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 8:59 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 24, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> But are decisions that a person makes freely caused or uncaused?
>
> > Both and neither. Just as a yellow traffic signal is neither red nor
> > green but represents possibilities of both stop and go. We are the
> > cause. We are influenced by causes but to varying degrees. We
> > influence our body and by extension the world with varying degrees of
> > freedom.
>
> EITHER something is determined/caused OR it's random/uncaused. This is
> standard use of language. You can define your own terms but then at
> least you should explain them in relation to the standard language:
> "what everyone else calls green, I call red, and what everyone else
> calls a dog, I call a cat".

It is a standard use of language to say that people are responsible in
varying degrees for their actions. I don't understand why you claim
that your binary determinism is 'standard language' in some way. When
we talk about someone being guilty of a crime, that quality of guilt
makes no sense in terms of being passively caused or randomly
uncaused. It is you who should explain your ideas in relation to the
standard language: "what everyone else calls intention, I call
irrelevant."

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> >> By this reasoning nothing can ever have an adequate explanation, since
> >> >> if the explanation offered for A is B, you can always ask, "But why
> >> >> should B apply to A?"; and if the answer is given, "Because empirical
> >> >> observation shows that it is so" you can dismiss it as unsatisfactory.
>
> >> > It depends what A and B are. If A is a cloud and B is rain, then you
> >> > can see that there could be a connection. If A is a neural fiber and B
> >> > is an experience of blue, then there is a gigantic gap separating the
> >> > two which can't be bridged just because we are used to looking at
> >> > physical objects relating to other physical objects and think it would
> >> > be convenient if subjects behaved that way as well.
>
> >> If you're bloody-minded enough you can claim here isn't really an
> >> obvious connection between clouds and rain either.
>
> > Sure, it's a matter of degree. If I squeeze an orange, it follows very
> > logically that what comes out of it is orange juice. If I poke a
> > microorganism like a neuron with an electrode, it does not follow very
> > logically at all that comedy, symphonies or the smell of pineapple
> > should ensue. At some point you have to decide whether sanity is real
> > or reality is insane. I choose the former.
>
> But it's an empirical observation that if certain biochemical
> reactions occur (the ones involved in processing information) ,
> consciousness results. That you find it mysterious is your problem,
> not nature's.

If I turn on a TV set, TV programs occur. That doesn't mean that TV
programs are generated by electronics. Fortunately I just spent a week
at the consciousness conference in AZ so I now know how deeply in the
minority views such as yours are. The vast majority of doctors and
professors researching in this field agree that the Explanatory Gap
cannot simply be wished away in the manner you suggest. I don't find
it mysterious at all that consciousness could come from configurations
of objects, I find it impossible, as do most people.

Craig

[Richard Ruquist]

Craig, Can you give us a synopsis of the consciousness conference?

Is there any convergence of their thinking or is it still rather scattered?

Richard

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 1:33 pm, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Craig, Can you give us a synopsis of the consciousness conference?
> Is there any convergence of their thinking or is it still rather scattered?
> Richard

The conference had a good mix of well known names, professors and grad
students doing presentations. For others like me they had a gallery of
billboards/posters where we had a designated time to stand around and
answer questions or chat with people.

It has been going on for several years now, so I don't know if there
has been any real progress as far as coming to a consensus, but in the
lectures I attended and the people I talked to, I was surprised to
find that there was a lot of overlap. Really Susan Blackmore was the
only speaker that I saw who advocated a purely materialist view and
she was practically booed when she put up a slide that said
"Consciousness is an Illusion".

Microtubules were well represented, as were fractals and Higher Order
Theories, but nowhere was the kind of knee-jerk instrumentalism that I
encounter so often online. It seemed to me that variations on
panpsychism were more popular. There is a link to abstract book here:
http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu/ if you want to read about all of
the presentations.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 4:21 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 21, 8:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Apr 20, 8:36 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Apr 5, 1:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > What do you say the efficient cause of feeling is?
>
> > > Some priori brain state.
>
> > What could make a brain state cause a feeling?
>
> A psychophsical law or identity.

An omnipotence law could cause omnipotence too.

>
> > > > > > Otherwise I can just say that a
> > > > > > deterministic universe includes libertarian free will, ghosts &
> > > > > > goblins, whatever.
>
> > > > > Libertarian free will contradicts the requirment
> > > > > for sufficent causes.
>
> > > > No more than feeling.
>
> > > No, Feeling isn't defined in terms of the presence or absence
> > > of any kind of determinism or causality.
>
> > Causality is a condition within feeling,
>
> says who?

The notion of a cause is an idea - a feeling about order and sequence.
To have cause you have to have memory and narrative pattern
recognition. Without that, there really is no difference between a
cause and a non-cause. Only disconnected fragments.

>
> > as is free will. Feeling
> > gives rise to free will directly.
>
> Says who?

Says most people who have ever lived. If I feel like doing something,
that feeling allows me to possibly try to do it. It's very
straightforward.

>
> > Whoever is doing the feeling is
> > ultimately determining the expression of their own free will.
>
> Says who?

According to you nobody can say anything except what they are
determined to say, so what possible difference could it make who
happens to say it?

>
> > > > >The others don;t contradict determinism.
>
> > > > Why not?
>
> > > They are not defined in terms of it or its absence.
>
> > You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of
> > causality. I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling and free
> > will.
>
> Maybe you could make that clear to the rest of us.

By writing this sentence I am causing changes in a computer network,
your screen, your eyes, and your mind. Do you doubt that I am choosing
to do this? What physical law do you claim has an interest in what I
write here?

>
> > > > > > What business does a feeling have being in a
> > > > > > universe that is essentially a very sophisticated clock?
>
> > > > > Something happened that would cause a feeling.
>
> > > > Are you being serious?
>
> > > Yes. Why shouldn't you have laws of the form
> > > "If <<see kitten>> then <<feel warm and gooey>>" ?
>
> > Because there is no logic to it.
>
> Statements of scientific law tend not to be analytical in any case.

But there is nothing to it whatsoever. You are saying that it should
help solve a math problem if the computer can smell spaghetti just
because we seem math on one side and spaghetti on the other.

>
> >If you are positing a universe ruled
> > by laws of mechanistic logic, then you are required to demonstrate
> > that logic somehow applies to feeling, which it doesn't. If you have
> > mechanism, you don't need feeling.
>
> I dare say vast tracts of the universe are unnecessary.

Then your insistence upon mechanism is devoid of anything except
arbitrary sentiment. Why not have a classical pantheon of gods? We
could say they improve computation too.

Craig

[David Nyman]

On 24 April 2012 19:37, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Really Susan Blackmore was the
> only speaker that I saw who advocated a purely materialist view and
> she was practically booed when she put up a slide that said
> "Consciousness is an Illusion".

Susan Blackmore, New Scientist, 22 June 2002, p 26-29:

"First we must be clear what is meant by the term "illusion". To say
that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn't exist,
but that it is not what it seems to be--more like a mirage or a visual
illusion.........Admitting that it's all an illusion does not solve
the problem of consciousness but changes it completely. Instead of
asking how neural impulses turn into conscious experiences, we must
ask how the grand illusion gets constructed. This will prove no easy
task, but unlike solving the Hard Problem it may at least be
possible."

The article in the NS, taken as a whole, suggests that her position is
more nuanced than the slogan you quoted might suggest.

David

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 2:57 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

>
> The article in the NS, taken as a whole, suggests that her position is
> more nuanced than the slogan you quoted might suggest.

The context was a "War of the Worldviews" presentation, where she was
sort of head-to-head with Deepak Chopra, so yes, it was probably not
the most well rounded look at either of their worldviews (or the
others on the panel). She likes to be provocative anyhow. I still
don't see how calling it a mirage or illusion gets around the hard
problem at all. A mirage to whom? Why or how is it there at all? For
me the issue was never the veracity of the content of consciousness
compared to external measurements, it is that there can be any content
in the first place.

Craig

[David Nyman]

On 24 April 2012 20:07, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I still don't see how calling it a mirage or illusion gets around the hard
> problem at all. A mirage to whom? Why or how is it there at all? For
> me the issue was never the veracity of the content of consciousness
> compared to external measurements, it is that there can be any content
> in the first place.

Yes, but her position is that empirical science has no purchase on the
latter question (that's why it's Hard), but may be able to make
progress on correlating brain activity with conscious states, and in
the process perhaps re-describe either or both sides of the coin in
helpful ways. I recently read an interesting interview with Patricia
Churchland - pretty much universally regarded as the High Priestess of
Denialism with respect to consciousness - and she vigorously rejected
the idea that she had ever sought to do any such thing. In fact, she
and Paul now regret ever adopting the sobriquet "eliminative
materialism", which she attributes to Richard Rorty (a bloody
philosopher!). Again, the Churchlands' project, like Blakemore's, is
correlation and categorisation, not metaphysics. Trouble is, as you
say, if you've got Deepak Chopra in the other chair, the conversation
is apt to get somewhat polarised. But, political posturing aside,
away from the public gaze there is often lot more doubt than the
slogans would suggest.

David

[meekerdb]

On 4/24/2012 1:03 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> On 24 April 2012 20:07, Craig Weinberg<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I still don't see how calling it a mirage or illusion gets around the hard
>> problem at all. A mirage to whom? Why or how is it there at all? For
>> me the issue was never the veracity of the content of consciousness
>> compared to external measurements, it is that there can be any content
>> in the first place.
> Yes, but her position is that empirical science has no purchase on the
> latter question (that's why it's Hard), but may be able to make
> progress on correlating brain activity with conscious states, and in
> the process perhaps re-describe either or both sides of the coin in
> helpful ways. I recently read an interesting interview with Patricia
> Churchland - pretty much universally regarded as the High Priestess of
> Denialism with respect to consciousness - and she vigorously rejected
> the idea that she had ever sought to do any such thing. In fact, she
> and Paul now regret ever adopting the sobriquet "eliminative
> materialism", which she attributes to Richard Rorty (a bloody
> philosopher!). Again, the Churchlands' project, like Blakemore's, is
> correlation and categorisation, not metaphysics. Trouble is, as you
> say, if you've got Deepak Chopra in the other chair, the conversation
> is apt to get somewhat polarised. But, political posturing aside,
> away from the public gaze there is often lot more doubt than the
> slogans would suggest.
>
> David

As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what it's thinking and
we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want, in other words when we can do
consciousness engineering, the "hard problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical
non-question, like "Where did the elan vital go?"

Brent

[David Nyman]

On 24 April 2012 21:22, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what it's
> thinking and we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want, in other
> words when we can do consciousness engineering, the "hard problem" will be
> bypassed as a metaphysical non-question, like "Where did the elan vital go?"

You may well be right, for all practical purposes. But yet the
parallel with elan vital is inexact, as Chalmers - I think defensibly
- points out. In the latter case, as he puts it, it isn't
controversial (at least, not these days) that all that ever required
explanation was structure and function; what was surprising was that
"gross matter" could in fact evince just such fine-grained structure
and function. Hence, a full elucidation in those terms need omit
nothing relevant to the explanation that was originally demanded.

But that doesn't necessarily apply in the case of consciousness, since
it seems as if one can still ask for more explanation even after a
"perfected" correlation of structure and function with conscious
states. It's a bit like "A Universe from Nothing". Krauss is
(extremely) exasperated with "moronic philosophers" who pester him
with demands for an even more vacuous "nothing" than the quantum
vacuum, and future brain researchers may be similarly frustrated by
those who won't accept that systematic correlation of one domain with
another has exhausted what can possibly be meant by "explanation". In
the end, it probably comes down to personal temperament and taste.

David

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 4:03 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

> Yes, but her position is that empirical science has no purchase on the
> latter question (that's why it's Hard), but may be able to make
> progress on correlating brain activity with conscious states, and in
> the process perhaps re-describe either or both sides of the coin in
> helpful ways.

Yes, in a sense I agree that the Easy Problem of Consciousness has
more to offer in terms of scientific promise, but I see a real danger
in allowing that to define the culture of consciousness research. As
it filters down to the public at large also, I think what you get is a
lot of teachers and students who are quite satisfied with the idea
that everything that they experience is an illusion and that reality
lies permanently elsewhere in microcosmic obscurity. As recent
experiments have shown the negative impact of disbelief in free will,
I think there are many other social consequences which follow from a
worldview in which the world is ultimately unviewed and the viewer is
ultimately unworlded. It's especially important for me because I can
see clearly that the principle of sense cuts through this mistake and
allows us to be present in a world that is real in many overlapping
and underlapping private and public ways.

>I recently read an interesting interview with Patricia
> Churchland - pretty much universally regarded as the High Priestess of
> Denialism with respect to consciousness - and she vigorously rejected
> the idea that she had ever sought to do any such thing.  In fact, she
> and Paul now regret ever adopting the sobriquet "eliminative
> materialism", which she attributes to Richard Rorty (a bloody
> philosopher!).  Again, the Churchlands' project, like Blakemore's, is
> correlation and categorisation, not metaphysics.  Trouble is, as you
> say, if you've got Deepak Chopra in the other chair, the conversation
> is apt to get somewhat polarised.  But, political posturing aside,
> away from the public gaze there is often lot more doubt than the
> slogans would suggest.

You are probably right, probably a lot of political pundits are
likewise not so opinionated in private. There is always a need for
people who will represent politically incorrect opinions in public.


Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 4:22 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what it's thinking and
> we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want,

If w can build a brain that behaves as we want rather than how it
wants, then it isn't a brain.

> in other words when we can do
> consciousness engineering, the "hard problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical
> non-question, like "Where did the elan vital go?"

The hard problem cannot be bypassed because there is no functional
reason for consciousness to exist. It doesn't matter that every time I
push this button I know that the March Hare materializes in mid-air,
it still doesn't make any sense that he could or would appear.

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 4/24/2012 6:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Apr 24, 4:22 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what it's thinking and
>> we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want,
> If w can build a brain that behaves as we want rather than how it
> wants, then it isn't a brain.

So because my children behave as I want they don't have brains!?

Brent

>
>> in other words when we can do
>> consciousness engineering, the "hard problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical
>> non-question, like "Where did the elan vital go?"
> The hard problem cannot be bypassed because there is no functional
> reason for consciousness to exist.

That should make it easy to bypass. We'll make intelligent, compassionate robots and
people like you will want to ban them from lunch counters and make them live in ghettos.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

UDA shows you right in the comp frame. But eventually it is the notion
of (primitive material) object which become impossible with comp.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2012, at 20:57, David Nyman wrote:

> On 24 April 2012 19:37, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Really Susan Blackmore was the
>> only speaker that I saw who advocated a purely materialist view and
>> she was practically booed when she put up a slide that said
>> "Consciousness is an Illusion".
>
> Susan Blackmore, New Scientist, 22 June 2002, p 26-29:
>
> "First we must be clear what is meant by the term "illusion". To say
> that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn't exist,
> but that it is not what it seems to be--more like a mirage or a visual
> illusion.........Admitting that it's all an illusion does not solve
> the problem of consciousness but changes it completely. Instead of
> asking how neural impulses turn into conscious experiences, we must
> ask how the grand illusion gets constructed. This will prove no easy
> task, but unlike solving the Hard Problem it may at least be
> possible."
>
> The article in the NS, taken as a whole, suggests that her position is
> more nuanced than the slogan you quoted might suggest.

I really loved her book "The search of the light", which was a rare
serious and rigorous text in parapsychology. She debunked the field,
and remains completely valid in her conclusion. But when praised by
materialists for her debunking of those results in parapsychology, she
became a super-materialist priest, and lost her initial scientific
attitude to some extent.
To say that consciousness is an illusion does not make any sense.
Everything else can be an illusion, but not consciousness. I think we
agree on that.

Bruno

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 3:19 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> EITHER something is determined/caused OR it's random/uncaused. This is
>> standard use of language. You can define your own terms but then at
>> least you should explain them in relation to the standard language:
>> "what everyone else calls green, I call red, and what everyone else
>> calls a dog, I call a cat".
>
> It is a standard use of language to say that people are responsible in
> varying degrees for their actions. I don't understand why you claim
> that your binary determinism is 'standard language' in some way. When
> we talk about someone being guilty of a crime, that quality of guilt
> makes no sense in terms of being passively caused or randomly
> uncaused. It is you who should explain your ideas in relation to the
> standard language: "what everyone else calls intention, I call
> irrelevant."

It's standard use of language that if something is not determined it
is random. Determined means it's not random and random means it's not
determined. When someone is found guilty of a crime that has nothing
to do with whether their behaviour is determined or random. The
consideration the legal system uses is, essentially, whether punishing
the crime would make a difference. It will deter a criminal if he
knows he will be punished since the fear of punishment will enter the
deterministic or probabilistic equation, swaying the decision in
favour of not offending. On the other hand, it is pointless to punish
a sleepwalker: sleepwalkers do make decisions, but they are probably
not the kinds of decisions that are influenced by fear of
consequences.

>> But it's an empirical observation that if certain biochemical
>> reactions occur (the ones involved in processing information) ,
>> consciousness results. That you find it mysterious is your problem,
>> not nature's.
>
> If I turn on a TV set, TV programs occur. That doesn't mean that TV
> programs are generated by electronics. Fortunately I just spent a week
> at the consciousness conference in AZ so I now know how deeply in the
> minority views such as yours are. The vast majority of doctors and
> professors researching in this field agree that the Explanatory Gap
> cannot simply be wished away in the manner you suggest. I don't find
> it mysterious at all that consciousness could come from configurations
> of objects, I find it impossible, as do most people.

I'm not saying that consciousness is not mysterious and certainly not
non-existent (I think people who say that do it just do it to be
provocative). But it is a problem when a mysterious thing is explained
in terms of another mysterious thing; for how do we explain the second
thing, or the connection between them?

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Stephen P. King]

Given that all appearances and phenomena are the content of said
illusion....

--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 24, 10:45 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 4/24/2012 6:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 24, 4:22 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
>
> >> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what it's thinking and
> >> we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want,
> > If w can build a brain that behaves as we want rather than how it
> > wants, then it isn't a brain.
>
> So because my children behave as I want they don't have brains!?

If that was all that they did, then yes, they would be robots. If you
train your children that behave as you want, does that solve the Hard
Problem?

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 25, 2:23 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> UDA shows you right in the comp frame. But eventually it is the notion
> of (primitive material) object which become impossible with comp.

I wouldn't say that material objects are primitive, but I think that
objectification is a primitive symmetry of subjectivity. Arithmetic I
consider to be flattened qualia, making them maximally public and
interchangeable. As a lens with a tight aperture has a greater depth
of field but loses light sensitivity, quantification strips out the
depth of qualia, the proprietary intimacy, privacy, etc. It is to
account for experience rather than to have experience. In order to
isolate the most universal truths, what is sacrificed is meaning.

Craig

[David Nyman]

On 25 April 2012 08:24, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> To say that consciousness is an illusion does not make any sense. Everything
> else can be an illusion, but not consciousness. I think we agree on that.

We do indeed agree on this. The word illusion has become so imprecise
in this context that it would be better to avoid it. However, to be
fair, in this particular case Susan Blackmore seemed not to intend it
in any clearly eliminative way, but rather in the sense of a mirage -
i.e. a real something, but a something about whose precise nature and
cause we may be misled. Of course, she assumes materialism, and this
makes it difficult to tie up a number of metaphysical and logical
loose ends (i.e. the "hard" ones). But Brent is probably right that
most people will in the end be more impressed by technical wizardry
than ultimate philosophical illumination.

David

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>
>
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[Craig Weinberg]

On Apr 25, 5:21 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 3:19 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> EITHER something is determined/caused OR it's random/uncaused. This is
> >> standard use of language. You can define your own terms but then at
> >> least you should explain them in relation to the standard language:
> >> "what everyone else calls green, I call red, and what everyone else
> >> calls a dog, I call a cat".
>
> > It is a standard use of language to say that people are responsible in
> > varying degrees for their actions. I don't understand why you claim
> > that your binary determinism is 'standard language' in some way. When
> > we talk about someone being guilty of a crime, that quality of guilt
> > makes no sense in terms of being passively caused or randomly
> > uncaused. It is you who should explain your ideas in relation to the
> > standard language: "what everyone else calls intention, I call
> > irrelevant."
>
> It's standard use of language that if something is not determined it
> is random.

I have never heard of that in my life. Did you say that because you
had no choice or was it random?

> Determined means it's not random and random means it's not
> determined.

Why? Random is determined randomly. Free will is determined
intentionally. So what? Word games.

> When someone is found guilty of a crime that has nothing
> to do with whether their behaviour is determined or random.

That would be news to attorneys and judges who spend their lives
splitting hairs over liability.

>The
> consideration the legal system uses is, essentially, whether punishing
> the crime would make a difference.

What are you talking about? Designations such as Murder, manslaughter,
criminal negligence, etc have nothing whatsoever to do with the
effects intended by punishment and everything to do with ascertaining
liability. The criminal justice system is designed to do one thing
only: assess guilt, ie degree of intentionality in a criminal act, and
punish accordingly.

> It will deter a criminal if he
> knows he will be punished since the fear of punishment will enter the
> deterministic or probabilistic equation, swaying the decision in
> favour of not offending.

You are mistaking your philosophy for the criminal justice system. Can
you find any example in any legal code which implies these kinds of
considerations?

On the other hand, it is pointless to punish
> a sleepwalker: sleepwalkers do make decisions, but they are probably
> not the kinds of decisions that are influenced by fear of
> consequences.

Without free will, we are all sleepwalkers. Consequences can only
impact our behavior if we are able to choose what our behavior will
be.

>
> >> But it's an empirical observation that if certain biochemical
> >> reactions occur (the ones involved in processing information) ,
> >> consciousness results. That you find it mysterious is your problem,
> >> not nature's.
>
> > If I turn on a TV set, TV programs occur. That doesn't mean that TV
> > programs are generated by electronics. Fortunately I just spent a week
> > at the consciousness conference in AZ so I now know how deeply in the
> > minority views such as yours are. The vast majority of doctors and
> > professors researching in this field agree that the Explanatory Gap
> > cannot simply be wished away in the manner you suggest. I don't find
> > it mysterious at all that consciousness could come from configurations
> > of objects, I find it impossible, as do most people.
>
> I'm not saying that consciousness is not mysterious and certainly not
> non-existent (I think people who say that do it just do it to be
> provocative). But it is a problem when a mysterious thing is explained
> in terms of another mysterious thing; for how do we explain the second
> thing, or the connection between them?

It's only mysterious if you try to define it in terms which
consciousness itself uses to define all-that-is-outside-of-itself.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

This means only that you have a reductionist conception of machine.

Bruno

>
> Craig
>
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[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2012, at 16:36, David Nyman wrote:

> On 25 April 2012 08:24, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> To say that consciousness is an illusion does not make any sense.
>> Everything
>> else can be an illusion, but not consciousness. I think we agree on
>> that.
>
> We do indeed agree on this. The word illusion has become so imprecise
> in this context that it would be better to avoid it. However, to be
> fair, in this particular case Susan Blackmore seemed not to intend it
> in any clearly eliminative way, but rather in the sense of a mirage -
> i.e. a real something, but a something about whose precise nature and
> cause we may be misled.

It is hard to say. I guess she want just to dismiss consciousness, as
opposed to matter.

> Of course, she assumes materialism, and this
> makes it difficult to tie up a number of metaphysical and logical
> loose ends (i.e. the "hard" ones).

Yes. Coherent materialists have to be eliminativist. It is a chance
that few materialists are coherent!

> But Brent is probably right that
> most people will in the end be more impressed by technical wizardry
> than ultimate philosophical illumination.

I would not separate them. The question consists in finding the less
false conception/theory of reality.
Applications always follow. For the best and the worst.

Bruno

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>>
>>
>>
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[John Clark]

On Sat, Apr 21, 2012 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling

That's a rather odd way of looking at it, but if so then you can clearly see that when billiard ball X hits ball Y ball X has a sudden change in feeling and decides to stop while ball Y feels like moving and does so; what arises from all this we call "causality". I would use different words but if that helps you to see clearly so be it.

> and free will.

Yes, noise can cause things to happen and deterministic events can cause all sorts of noises, including the "free will" noise.

>What could make a brain state cause a feeling?

Brains are in the state they are in because of causality, if you can "see clearly that causality arises out of feeling" then I don't see your problem. If billiard balls can have feelings why not brain states?

> You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of causality.

There are after all only 2 alternatives, the absence of causality or its presents, you can be a Cuckoo Clock or a Roulette Wheel, take your pick.  

 

> you are required to demonstrate that logic somehow applies to feeling, which it doesn't.

It most certainly does! I use logic to deduce that if I throw a baseball at your head your feelings will change, if we actually perform this experiment I would bet money my deduction will prove to be correct.

 >You can have data compression and caching without inventing poetry.

But poetry can be cached, and it can be compressed too just like any other form of information, except white noise. 

> It is a standard use of language to say that people are responsible in
varying degrees for their actions.

People are always responsible for their actions.

> When we talk about someone being guilty of a crime, that quality of guilt makes no sense in terms of being passively caused or randomly uncaused.

It makes all the sense in the world provided you stop and ask yourself, what is the purpose for punishing anybody for anything? The answer is to stop them from doing similar things in the future and as a deterrent to stop others from committing crimes of that sort.

> I don't find it mysterious at all that consciousness could come from configurations
of objects, I find it impossible,

Impossible or not the rock solid FACT remains that changes in the configurations of objects (like atoms or molecules or cells or baseballs or brains) changes consciousness and changes in consciousness can change objects (such as what happens to billiard balls in every game ever played). So apparently the Universe does not care if Craig Weinberg believes something is possible or impossible.

> as do most people.

And it is well known that the naive philosophical beliefs of most people are always correct. 

  John K Clark

[meekerdb]

I don't think there is a solution to the 'hard problem', I think it's ill posed. The fact
that my children behave well, exhibit intelligence and kindness, doesn't solve even the
engineering problem of consciousness because I don't know how their brains are constructed
- I couldn't make one from scratch.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 4/25/2012 7:36 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 April 2012 08:24, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> To say that consciousness is an illusion does not make any sense. Everything
> else can be an illusion, but not consciousness. I think we agree on that.

We do indeed agree on this. The word illusion has become so imprecise
in this context that it would be better to avoid it.  However, to be
fair, in this particular case Susan Blackmore seemed not to intend it
in any clearly eliminative way, but rather in the sense of a mirage -
i.e. a real something, but a something about whose precise nature and
cause we may be misled.  Of course, she assumes materialism, and this
makes it difficult to tie up a number of metaphysical and logical
loose ends (i.e. the "hard" ones).  But Brent is probably right that
most people will in the end be more impressed by technical wizardry
than ultimate philosophical illumination.

The technical wizardy, if we can achieve it, will have philosophical implications - unless like Craig you believe in philosophical zombies.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 4/25/2012 9:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I would not separate them. The question consists in finding the less false conception/theory of reality.
Applications always follow. For the best and the worst.

Bruno

Applications often lead.

Brent

[David Nyman]

On 25 April 2012 18:59, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

> The technical wizardy, if we can achieve it, will have philosophical
> implications - unless like Craig you believe in philosophical zombies.

I agree completely. I didn't mean to imply that one ruled out the
other, only that in general people tend (understandably) to be rather
more interested in practical deliverables than in the philosophical
subtleties they might imply. And no, I don't believe in zombies.

David

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

A link from the Consciousness group on Facebook

We're closing in on consciousness in the brain
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428605.900-were-closing-in-on-consciousness-in-the-brain.html

"Brain "observatories" may solve the puzzle of how material brains
create an intangible world of love, colour, taste and fantasy, says
Christof Koch"

So, the people who correlate are already going to close the problem.

This is the original Facebook link

http://www.facebook.com/groups/rks.consciousness/10150829992540115/

Evgenii



On 24.04.2012 22:03 David Nyman said the following:

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 24.04.2012 22:22 meekerdb said the following:

...

> As I've posted before, when we know how look at a brain and infer what
> it's thinking and we know how to build a brain that behaves as we want,
> in other words when we can do consciousness engineering, the "hard
> problem" will be bypassed as a metaphysical non-question, like "Where
> did the elan vital go?"
>
> Brent
>

This is a position expressed by Jeffrey Gray as follows (he does not
share it):

�What looks like a Hard Problem will cease to be one when we have
understood the errors in our ways of speaking about the issues involved.
If the route were successful, we would rejoin the normal stance: once
our head have been straightened out, science could again just get on
with the job of filling in the details of empirical knowledge.�

Evgenii

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/jeffrey-a-gray