On 4/6/2013 10:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Fingelkurts, A., Fingelkurts, A., and Neves, C. (2010). �Natural World Physical, Brain
> Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time�. *Physics of Life Reviews* 7(2): 195-249.
>
> http://scireprints.lu.lv/141/1/Fingelkurts_Space-time_in_Physics_brain_and_mind.pdf
>
> �We would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational
> space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise distant physical
> space-time reality.�
Which just says that you can think about things that are far way.
>
> See Fig 11 where the phenomenal world is in the brain.
I don't see anything in this paper to support Craig's "top down" magic.
On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:
> Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11
>
> http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg
>
I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors
literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically speaking
in the brain.
See for example
Section 3. Space and time in mind, 3.1. Phenomenal space
�As it was pointed Smythies [333] this phenomenal space may be identical
with some aspect of brain space but not with any aspect of external
physical space. The same idea was explicitly formulated by Searle [334]:
�The brain creates a body image, and pains, like all bodily sensations,
are parts of the body image. The pain-in-the-foot is literally in the
physical space of the brain.��
This immediately leads to Max Velmans paradox {"The real skull (as
opposed to the phenomenal skull) is beyond the perceived horizon and
dome of the sky."}, see
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html
and to some further possible speculations like
'Another researcher, Kuhlenbeck [335] made an even stronger claim,
suggesting that "... physical events and mental events occur in
different space-time systems which have no dimensions in common."
On 07 Apr 2013, at 19:20, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>> On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:
>>>> Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11
>>>>
>>>> http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors
>>> literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically
>>> speaking in the brain.
>>
>> Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains). It's
>> not "there" geometrically speaking. Geometry and "there" are part of
>> the model. Dog bites man.
>
> Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it
> literally as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to
> philosophy.
But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink.
Neurophilophers are usually computationalist and weakly materialist,
and so are basically inconsistent.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.
but would output behaviors consistent with our expectations for those experiences.
Craig
Bruno
>
> Evgenii
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> or put phenomenological consciousness into the brain.
I don't know what this means. That phenomenological consciousness depends on the brain is
empirically well established.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.Two apples is not the number two.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
On 10.04.2013 07:16 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/9/2013 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is
Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made
my comments
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html
Still tilting at that windmill?
"A) From thermodynamic tables, the mole entropy of silver at standard
conditions S(Ag, cr) = 42.55 J K-1 mol-1 is bigger than that of
aluminum S(Al, cr) = 28.30 J K-1 mol-1. Does it mean that there is
more disorder in silver as in aluminium?"
Yes, there is more disorder in the sense that raising the temperature
of a mole of Ag 1deg increases the number of accessible conduction
electron states available more than does raising the temperature of a
mole of Al does.
I agree that disorder is not necessarily a good metaphor for entropy.
But dispersal of energy isn't always intuitively equal to entropy
either. Consider dissolving ammonium nitrate in water. The process is
endothermic, so the temperature drops and energy is absorbed, but
the process goes spontaneously because the entropy increases; the are
a lot more microstates accessible in the solution even at the lower
temperature.
You'd better look at what biologist say. For example:
http://www.icr.org/article/270/
“and that the idea of their improving rather than harming organisms is contrary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which tells us that matter and energy naturally tend toward greater randomness rather than greater order and complexity.”
Do you like it?
Evgenii
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This is close to an idea I have been mulling over for some time... that the source of the phenomenological feeling of pleasure is in some way identified with decreases in entropy, and pain is in some way identified with increases in entropy. It is a way to map the subjective experience of pain and pleasure to a 3p description of, say, a nervous system. Damage to the body (associated with pain) can usually (always?) be characterized in terms of a sudden increase in entropy of the body. Perhaps this is also true in the mental domain, so that emotional loss (or e.g. embarrassment) can also be characterized as an increase in entropy of one's mental models, but this is pure speculation. The case is even harder to make with pleasure. It would be weird if it were true, but so far it is the only way I know of to map pleasure and pain onto anything objective at all.
Terren
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Hi Telmo,Yes, those are good counter examples.
But I think to say "pain and pleasure are fine-tuned by evolution..." is a sleight of hand. Pain and pleasure are phenomenological primitives. If evolution created those primitives, how did it do that? By what mechanism? �
Another way to think of this is to acknowledge that pain signals are mediated by special nerves in the nervous system. But what makes those nerves any different from a nerve that carries information about gentle pressure? �You may be able to point to different neuroreceptors used, but then that shifts the question to why different neuroreceptors should result in different characters of experience.
But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink.
Neurophilophers are usually computationalist and weakly materialist,
and so are basically inconsistent.
“Thus, changes in entropy provide an important window into self-organization: a sudden increase of entropy just before the emergence of a new structure, followed by brief period of negative entropy (or negentropy).”
I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made my comments
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html
Evgenii
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Brent
On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 6:08:31 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 4/10/2013 2:08 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Telmo,Yes, those are good counter examples.
But I think to say "pain and pleasure are fine-tuned by evolution..." is a sleight of hand. Pain and pleasure are phenomenological primitives. If evolution created those primitives, how did it do that? By what mechanism? �
Another way to think of this is to acknowledge that pain signals are mediated by special nerves in the nervous system. But what makes those nerves any different from a nerve that carries information about gentle pressure? �You may be able to point to different neuroreceptors used, but then that shifts the question to why different neuroreceptors should result in different characters of experience.
You have to ground the interpretation in behavior and its relation to evolutionary advantage. People who put their hand in the fire withdraw it quickly and exclaim to warn others.� People that don't suffer reproductive disadvantage.
That's begging the question. People would withdraw their hand with the exact same rapidity regardless of the aesthetic quality of the signal.
Terren and I understand this, and we understand that your view does not understand this.
In a deterministic universe, there is no need to motivate stones to roll down hill. You can't remove all causal efficacy from will on one hand and then rely on it to justify aesthetics on the other.
It doesn't work, and even if it did, it doesn't answer Terren's question: "how did it do that? By what mechanism?". Does evolution simply conjure "pain" from a magical box of infinite experiences, or are there some rules in place as to their nature?
Craig
Brent
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On 4/10/2013 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 6:08:31 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 4/10/2013 2:08 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Telmo,Yes, those are good counter examples.
But I think to say "pain and pleasure are fine-tuned by evolution..." is a sleight of hand. Pain and pleasure are phenomenological primitives. If evolution created those primitives, how did it do that? By what mechanism? �
Another way to think of this is to acknowledge that pain signals are mediated by special nerves in the nervous system. But what makes those nerves any different from a nerve that carries information about gentle pressure? �You may be able to point to different neuroreceptors used, but then that shifts the question to why different neuroreceptors should result in different characters of experience.
You have to ground the interpretation in behavior and its relation to evolutionary advantage. People who put their hand in the fire withdraw it quickly and exclaim to warn others.� People that don't suffer reproductive disadvantage.
That's begging the question. People would withdraw their hand with the exact same rapidity regardless of the aesthetic quality of the signal.
No, that's answering the question. Whatever aesthetic quality causes one to quickly withdraw and warn other is the answer to "What aesthetic quality is pain?"
Terren and I understand this, and we understand that your view does not understand this.
You use "understand" as a synonym for "assert". Your "understanding" has no predictive power and is not consilient with other science.
In a deterministic universe, there is no need to motivate stones to roll down hill. You can't remove all causal efficacy from will on one hand and then rely on it to justify aesthetics on the other.
I'm not the one relying on will - you are.
It doesn't work, and even if it did, it doesn't answer Terren's question: "how did it do that? By what mechanism?". Does evolution simply conjure "pain" from a magical box of infinite experiences, or are there some rules in place as to their nature?
I gave the rules - that's why it's an answer.
On 4/10/2013 2:08 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Telmo,Yes, those are good counter examples.
But I think to say "pain and pleasure are fine-tuned by evolution..." is a sleight of hand. Pain and pleasure are phenomenological primitives. If evolution created those primitives, how did it do that? By what mechanism?
You have to ground the interpretation in behavior and its relation to evolutionary advantage. People who put their hand in the fire withdraw it quickly and exclaim to warn others. People that don't suffer reproductive disadvantage.Another way to think of this is to acknowledge that pain signals are mediated by special nerves in the nervous system. But what makes those nerves any different from a nerve that carries information about gentle pressure? You may be able to point to different neuroreceptors used, but then that shifts the question to why different neuroreceptors should result in different characters of experience.
Brent
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.Two apples is not the number two.
With logic automata, the number two would not be necessary....matter would embody its own programs.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A program is a functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes is defined entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible emergence of any kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would assume are associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling.
Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a functionalist universe.
On 4/10/2013 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:You will just further muddle the meaning of entropy.
This is close to an idea I have been mulling over for some time... that the source of the phenomenological feeling of pleasure is in some way identified with decreases in entropy, and pain is in some way identified with increases in entropy. It is a way to map the subjective experience of pain and pleasure to a 3p description of, say, a nervous system.
Consider dribbling some liquid nitrogen on your skin. Hurts doesn't it. But the entropy of your body is (locally) reduced. The pain comes from neurons sending signals to your brain. They use a tiny amount of free energy to do this which increases the entropy of your body also. Your brain receives a few bits of information about the pain which represent an infinitesimal decrease in entropy if your brain was in a state uncertainty about whether your body hurt.
Damage to the body (associated with pain) can usually (always?) be characterized in terms of a sudden increase in entropy of the body.
It hardly even rises to speculation unless you have some idea of how to quantify and test it.
Perhaps this is also true in the mental domain, so that emotional loss (or e.g. embarrassment) can also be characterized as an increase in entropy of one's mental models, but this is pure speculation.
Damasio proposes that pleasure and pain map into levels of various hormones as well as neural activity.
The case is even harder to make with pleasure. It would be weird if it were true, but so far it is the only way I know of to map pleasure and pain onto anything objective at all.
Brent
On Wed, Apr 10, 2013 at 11:08 PM, Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:Completely agree. I mean pain and pleasure as things that you can
> Hi Telmo,
>
> Yes, those are good counter examples.
>
> But I think to say "pain and pleasure are fine-tuned by evolution..." is a
> sleight of hand. Pain and pleasure are phenomenological primitives. If
> evolution created those primitives, how did it do that? By what mechanism?
observe with an fMRI machine. As for the 1p experience of pain and
pleasure... wish I knew. I don't think evolution created these
primitives in this latter sense.
Yes, I've always been puzzled by that.
> Another way to think of this is to acknowledge that pain signals are
> mediated by special nerves in the nervous system. But what makes those
> nerves any different from a nerve that carries information about gentle
> pressure? You may be able to point to different neuroreceptors used, but
> then that shifts the question to why different neuroreceptors should result
> in different characters of experience.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.Two apples is not the number two.
With logic automata, the number two would not be necessary....matter would embody its own programs.With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A program is a functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes is defined entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible emergence of any kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would assume are associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling.Why?
Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a functionalist universe.?
On 10 Apr 2013, at 22:55, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following:
>
> ...
>
>> I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say that
>> pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to maximise the
>> survivability of species in an environment that is largely also
>> generated by evolution. It's a strange loop.
>>
>
> What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your
> sentence by god?
The difference is that evolution assumes some mechanism.
With comp you can define pain by the qualia associated to anything
contradicting some universal goal.
The most typical universal goal is "protect yourself".
I imagine we send robots on a far planet where there are some acid
rains which might demolish their circuits. We will provide mechanism
so that when such rain occurs the robots find quickly some shelter. No
need of pain at this stage, but if the machine is Löbian, she will be
able to rationalize her behavior, so that when we ask her why she
protect herself, she will will talk about her non communicable qualia
she got when the rain is coming, and she might well call it pain.
Such a theory predicted that if someone burn alive through suicide,
that person would not necessarily feel pain. As sad as it is, this has
been confirmed by some testimony of people doing just that. They
describe being burn even as pleasurable, until they are brought to
some hospital and then the pain becomes quite acute. (Hmm... I don't
find the interview of women who burns themselves in Afghanistan when
their husband cheat them, I will search when I have more times).
This can also be related with some ZEN technic to diminish pain by
"accepting it", and used in Japan to survive Chinese interrogations).
Pain can be the qualia brought by a frustration in a situation
contradicting instinctive universal goals.
The qualia itself can be explained by the combination self-reference +
truth, that is the relatively correct self-reference, which lead the
machine to acknowledge non justifiable truth. The negative aspect of
the affect is brought by the contradiction with respect to universal
goal, and is usually more intense when the goal is instinctive or
hidden.
Note that this needs a notion of truth, so the Platonist God is not
far away, making your point, after all.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.Two apples is not the number two.
With logic automata, the number two would not be necessary....matter would embody its own programs.With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A program is a functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes is defined entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible emergence of any kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would assume are associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling.Why?
Because the function is accomplished with or without any sensory presentation beyond positions of bits.
With comp you already assume the immaterial so its easier to conflate that intangible principle with sensory participation,
since sense can also be thought of as immaterial also.
With logical automata we can see clearly that the functions of computation need not be immaterial at all, and can be presented directly through 4-D material geometry.
In doing this, we expose the difference between computation, which is an anesthetic automatism and consciousness which is an aesthetic direct participation.
Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a functionalist universe.?
That any function performed by a logical automata would be the same configuration of bricks whether we ultimately read the output as a visual experience or an auditory experience.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.Two apples is not the number two.
With logic automata, the number two would not be necessary....matter would embody its own programs.With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.?
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A program is a functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes is defined entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible emergence of any kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would assume are associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling.Why?
Because the function is accomplished with or without any sensory presentation beyond positions of bits.So there is some sensory presentation.
With comp you already assume the immaterial so its easier to conflate that intangible principle with sensory participation,Which conflation? On the contrary, once a machine self-refers, many usually conflated views get unconflated.
since sense can also be thought of as immaterial also.Which ease, but does not solve the things, you need a self between.
With logical automata we can see clearly that the functions of computation need not be immaterial at all, and can be presented directly through 4-D material geometry.Either it violates Church thesis, and then it is very interesting, or not, and then it is a red herring for the mind-body peoblem, even if quite interesting in practical applications.
In doing this, we expose the difference between computation, which is an anesthetic automatism and consciousness which is an aesthetic direct participation.In doing this, all what I see is that you eliminate the person who got a brain prosthesis.Saying that God made the human following his own image also expose a difference, but not in a quite convincing way.
Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a functionalist universe.?
That any function performed by a logical automata would be the same configuration of bricks whether we ultimately read the output as a visual experience or an auditory experience.There is a big difference between computationalism and functionalism. Comp says that functionalism is correct, at some unknown level, and in fine, this plays some role, as we cannot know which machine we are. We are only free to bet on some level, in case we need some new body, or after death.if functionalism was correct, you can replace the entire universe by the program "do nothing", as it will do the same thing as the entire universe.A machine is *much* more than a function. In the math, we distinguish intensional and extensional, to talk about that difference. Modal logic aboard the intensional aspects, already existing in the extensional math, when looked from some (internal or not) point of view.I think you conflate extension and intension (note the "s").
Brent
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:54:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Apr 2013, at 22:55, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following:
>
> ...
>
>> I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say that
>> pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to maximise the
>> survivability of species in an environment that is largely also
>> generated by evolution. It's a strange loop.
>>
>
> What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your
> sentence by god?
The difference is that evolution assumes some mechanism.
With comp you can define pain by the qualia associated to anything
contradicting some universal goal.
The most typical universal goal is "protect yourself".
Why isn't the condition of "satisfying universal goal = false" sufficient?
I imagine we send robots on a far planet where there are some acid
rains which might demolish their circuits. We will provide mechanism
so that when such rain occurs the robots find quickly some shelter. No
need of pain at this stage, but if the machine is Löbian, she will be
able to rationalize her behavior, so that when we ask her why she
protect herself, she will will talk about her non communicable qualia
she got when the rain is coming, and she might well call it pain.
What does it mean to "talk about" that which is non-communicable? What she calls it is irrelevant, but do her reports describe the qualia as "sharp" or "dull"? Excruciating or irritating? Does it make her want to rip her eyes out of her skull
or simply believe that it is time to escalate the priority of a search for protection? Is there any indication at all that a Löbian machine experiences any specific aesthetic qualities at all, or do you assume that every time we ask a machine a question and it fails to communicate an answer that it means that they must have a human-like conscious experience which they cannot express?
Such a theory predicted that if someone burn alive through suicide,
that person would not necessarily feel pain. As sad as it is, this has
been confirmed by some testimony of people doing just that. They
describe being burn even as pleasurable, until they are brought to
some hospital and then the pain becomes quite acute. (Hmm... I don't
find the interview of women who burns themselves in Afghanistan when
their husband cheat them, I will search when I have more times).
This can also be related with some ZEN technic to diminish pain by
"accepting it", and used in Japan to survive Chinese interrogations).
Sure, pain is relative.
Like all sense, it is defined by contrast, previous experience, and expectation.
Pain can be the qualia brought by a frustration in a situation
contradicting instinctive universal goals.
The qualia itself can be explained by the combination self-reference +
truth, that is the relatively correct self-reference, which lead the
machine to acknowledge non justifiable truth. The negative aspect of
the affect is brought by the contradiction with respect to universal
goal, and is usually more intense when the goal is instinctive or
hidden.
Note that this needs a notion of truth, so the Platonist God is not
far away, making your point, after all.
Self-reference + truth is no substitute for aesthetic presence.
The notion of self-reference you are using is a superficial one rooted in symbol manipulation rather than proprietary influence.
Selfness defined this way is a silhouette with no content.
In reality, authentic selfhood arises from aesthetic qualities experienced,
not from logical conditions or non-communicable residues of arithmetic.
Craig
Bruno
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On 11 Apr 2013, at 18:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:54:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Apr 2013, at 22:55, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following:
>
> ...
>
>> I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say that
>> pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to maximise the
>> survivability of species in an environment that is largely also
>> generated by evolution. It's a strange loop.
>>
>
> What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your
> sentence by god?
The difference is that evolution assumes some mechanism.
With comp you can define pain by the qualia associated to anything
contradicting some universal goal.
The most typical universal goal is "protect yourself".
Why isn't the condition of "satisfying universal goal = false" sufficient?In which logic?It is the sufficient, but it must be written in the logic corresponding to the relevant hypostasis (arithmetical point-of-view), and three of them have qualia related to it.
I imagine we send robots on a far planet where there are some acid
rains which might demolish their circuits. We will provide mechanism
so that when such rain occurs the robots find quickly some shelter. No
need of pain at this stage, but if the machine is Löbian, she will be
able to rationalize her behavior, so that when we ask her why she
protect herself, she will will talk about her non communicable qualia
she got when the rain is coming, and she might well call it pain.
What does it mean to "talk about" that which is non-communicable? What she calls it is irrelevant, but do her reports describe the qualia as "sharp" or "dull"? Excruciating or irritating? Does it make her want to rip her eyes out of her skullIt depends on the machine, the situation, the degree of the subgoal s compared to the instinctive universal gial, etc. but roughloy speaking: yes. That's the idea.
or simply believe that it is time to escalate the priority of a search for protection? Is there any indication at all that a Löbian machine experiences any specific aesthetic qualities at all, or do you assume that every time we ask a machine a question and it fails to communicate an answer that it means that they must have a human-like conscious experience which they cannot express?Not all the time, nor with every machine. Only when it comes from the relevant self-reference.
Such a theory predicted that if someone burn alive through suicide,
that person would not necessarily feel pain. As sad as it is, this has
been confirmed by some testimony of people doing just that. They
describe being burn even as pleasurable, until they are brought to
some hospital and then the pain becomes quite acute. (Hmm... I don't
find the interview of women who burns themselves in Afghanistan when
their husband cheat them, I will search when I have more times).
This can also be related with some ZEN technic to diminish pain by
"accepting it", and used in Japan to survive Chinese interrogations).
Sure, pain is relative.I am not sure about this. I'm afraid pain is absolute, like consciousness.But pain can disappear when the soul disconnected from the universal goal, or when the soul find a non terrestrial way to satisfy it, if that exist, as it seems in the "theology of numbers".
Like all sense, it is defined by contrast, previous experience, and expectation.Some qualia related to pain might have some relative aspect, but I think quite plausible that pain is absolute.If you escape a pain, you just escape it, you don't look at it in a new perspective, but you change altogether of the perspective.
Pain can be the qualia brought by a frustration in a situation
contradicting instinctive universal goals.
The qualia itself can be explained by the combination self-reference +
truth, that is the relatively correct self-reference, which lead the
machine to acknowledge non justifiable truth. The negative aspect of
the affect is brought by the contradiction with respect to universal
goal, and is usually more intense when the goal is instinctive or
hidden.
Note that this needs a notion of truth, so the Platonist God is not
far away, making your point, after all.
Self-reference + truth is no substitute for aesthetic presence.I would need some precise definition of aesthetic presence to be sure of that.
The notion of self-reference you are using is a superficial one rooted in symbol manipulation rather than proprietary influence.Number self-reference give 8 hypostases. Three of them are not related to only symbol manipulation, but through the truth of some proposition relating a possibility of 'proprietary influence".
Selfness defined this way is a silhouette with no content.You say so, but don't give argument.
In reality, authentic selfhood arises from aesthetic qualities experienced,I agree with this (being large in the interpretation of the vocabulary).The machines agree too. I already told you this.
not from logical conditions or non-communicable residues of arithmetic.Why? (To make comp false as you wish, I think).
With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.?
Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter doesn't relay on geometry?
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A program is a functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes is defined entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible emergence of any kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would assume are associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling.Why?
Because the function is accomplished with or without any sensory presentation beyond positions of bits.So there is some sensory presentation.
In reality there would be low level sensory presentation, but without a theory of physics or computation which supports that, we should not allow it to be smuggled in.
With comp you already assume the immaterial so its easier to conflate that intangible principle with sensory participation,Which conflation? On the contrary, once a machine self-refers, many usually conflated views get unconflated.
The conflation is between computation and sensation. A machine has no sensation,
but the parts of a machine ultimately are associated with low level sensations at the material level.
It is on those low level sensory-motor interactions which high level logics can be executed, instrumentally, with no escalation of awareness.
since sense can also be thought of as immaterial also.Which ease, but does not solve the things, you need a self between.
Not sure how that relates, but how do you know that a self is needed?
With logical automata we can see clearly that the functions of computation need not be immaterial at all, and can be presented directly through 4-D material geometry.Either it violates Church thesis, and then it is very interesting, or not, and then it is a red herring for the mind-body peoblem, even if quite interesting in practical applications.
My point is that computation need not have a mind -
it can be executed using bodies alone, and logic automata demonstrates that is true.
In doing this, we expose the difference between computation, which is an anesthetic automatism and consciousness which is an aesthetic direct participation.In doing this, all what I see is that you eliminate the person who got a brain prosthesis.Saying that God made the human following his own image also expose a difference, but not in a quite convincing way.
Why isn't the logic automata example convincing? Are you saying that there still must be some mind there even though all functions are executed by bodies? What is your objection?
Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a functionalist universe.?
That any function performed by a logical automata would be the same configuration of bricks whether we ultimately read the output as a visual experience or an auditory experience.There is a big difference between computationalism and functionalism. Comp says that functionalism is correct, at some unknown level, and in fine, this plays some role, as we cannot know which machine we are. We are only free to bet on some level, in case we need some new body, or after death.if functionalism was correct, you can replace the entire universe by the program "do nothing", as it will do the same thing as the entire universe.A machine is *much* more than a function. In the math, we distinguish intensional and extensional, to talk about that difference. Modal logic aboard the intensional aspects, already existing in the extensional math, when looked from some (internal or not) point of view.I think you conflate extension and intension (note the "s").
I would say that a machine is a collection of logical functions which produce another collection of logical functions. What more is there to it, or more to the point, what more is there which could generate any aesthetic experience?
On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.?
Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter doesn't relay on geometry?"comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear.
But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of view, geometry, analysis, and physics.
Then we can compare physics with the empirical data and confirm of refute comp (but not proving comp).Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is a whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp.
On Saturday, April 13, 2013 6:47:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.?
Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter doesn't relay on geometry?"comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear.
I think its pretty clear. Without a printer or video screen, my computer cannot generate geometry.
It doesn't matter how much CPU power or memory I have, the functions will come no closer to taking on a coherent geometric form somewhere. I can make endless computations about circles and pi, but there is never any need for any literal presentation of a circle in the universe. No actual circle is present.
But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of view, geometry, analysis, and physics.
That's only because you have given + and * the benefit of the dream to begin with.
Comp is tautology.
Then we can compare physics with the empirical data and confirm of refute comp (but not proving comp).Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is a whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp.
What is the relation between comp and geometry?
On 14 Apr 2013, at 00:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, April 13, 2013 6:47:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.?
Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter doesn't relay on geometry?"comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear.
I think its pretty clear. Without a printer or video screen, my computer cannot generate geometry.Why?(printer and video screen are not geometry).
There are program able to solve geometrical puzzle by rotating "mentally" (in their RAM, without using screen, nor printer) complex geometrical figure, ...
It doesn't matter how much CPU power or memory I have, the functions will come no closer to taking on a coherent geometric form somewhere. I can make endless computations about circles and pi, but there is never any need for any literal presentation of a circle in the universe. No actual circle is present.Not sure I have ever see an actual circle anywhere, nor do I think that seeing proves existence ...
But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of view, geometry, analysis, and physics.
That's only because you have given + and * the benefit of the dream to begin with.No. I begin with assuming that the brain is Turing emulable. It is not that obvious to get everything (brain and consciousness) from + and *.
Comp is tautology.If comp was tautology, I would like you to attribute to my sun in law, the one with the digital brain, a little more tautological consideration. You should accept that he has consciousness then.
But of course that is not the case, as comp might be false, logically. Indeed, it can be shown refutable, and if the evidences were that physics is Newtonian, I would say that comp would be quite doubtful.Then we can compare physics with the empirical data and confirm of refute comp (but not proving comp).Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is a whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp.
What is the relation between comp and geometry?It extends already the very many relation between number and geometry discovered by Descartes.Most elementary geometries on the reals are decidable, and so are common toys in the machine's dreams, then it is like an old couple, the relations are for the best and the worth. For example the fact that the following diophantine equation has no non trivial solution---- x^2 = 2*y^2---is equivalent with the fact that the diagonal of a square, in the euclidienne plane, is incommensurable with the side of the square. They have no common unities.You can sum up 90% of math by the study of the relation between the numbers and the geometries.
On Sunday, April 14, 2013 1:27:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 14 Apr 2013, at 00:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, April 13, 2013 6:47:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.?
Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter doesn't relay on geometry?"comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear.
I think its pretty clear. Without a printer or video screen, my computer cannot generate geometry.Why?(printer and video screen are not geometry).
Printers and video screen have no other purpose other than to manifest geometric forms in public.
There are program able to solve geometrical puzzle by rotating "mentally" (in their RAM, without using screen, nor printer) complex geometrical figure, ...
That's what I'm saying. All geometric function can be emulated computationally with no literal geometry. The puzzle shapes aren't literally "in" the RAM. There is no presentation of shape in that universe, and the addition of shape (from screens or printers) would add nothing to that computation.
It doesn't matter how much CPU power or memory I have, the functions will come no closer to taking on a coherent geometric form somewhere. I can make endless computations about circles and pi, but there is never any need for any literal presentation of a circle in the universe. No actual circle is present.Not sure I have ever see an actual circle anywhere, nor do I think that seeing proves existence ...
I don't think that there is 'existence'. There is seeing, feeling, touching, etc.
I don't understand what you mean by not being sure if you have seen an actual circle anywhere. OOOOOOOO see?
Those are actual circles that you see on your screen.
The computer doesn't see those though. It doesn't see the similarity between o,O,0,O,o, etc.
To the computer there are different quantities associated with the ASCII characters, different codes for font rendering as screen pixels or printer instructions, etc, but unless you are running an OCR program, the computer by default has no notion of visual circularity associated with OOOOOOOO.
But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of view, geometry, analysis, and physics.
That's only because you have given + and * the benefit of the dream to begin with.No. I begin with assuming that the brain is Turing emulable. It is not that obvious to get everything (brain and consciousness) from + and *.
It's one thing to assume that the brain is Turing emulable, but another to assume that interior experience is isomorphic to brain activity.
My view is that it is not.
To the contrary, exteriority is the anesthetic, orthomodular reflection of interiority. This orthomodularity is total, so that it circumscribes both arithmetic truth and ontological realism entirely.
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/04/14/1060/Comp is tautology.If comp was tautology, I would like you to attribute to my sun in law, the one with the digital brain, a little more tautological consideration. You should accept that he has consciousness then.
He doesn't have consciousness, but he has the capacity to broadly and deeply enrich our consciousness. I give him the appropriate consideration, he gets a nice juicy retro-memory implant of a generic steak eating experience - free of charge!
But of course that is not the case, as comp might be false, logically. Indeed, it can be shown refutable, and if the evidences were that physics is Newtonian, I would say that comp would be quite doubtful.Then we can compare physics with the empirical data and confirm of refute comp (but not proving comp).Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is a whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp.
What is the relation between comp and geometry?It extends already the very many relation between number and geometry discovered by Descartes.Most elementary geometries on the reals are decidable, and so are common toys in the machine's dreams, then it is like an old couple, the relations are for the best and the worth. For example the fact that the following diophantine equation has no non trivial solution---- x^2 = 2*y^2---is equivalent with the fact that the diagonal of a square, in the euclidienne plane, is incommensurable with the side of the square. They have no common unities.You can sum up 90% of math by the study of the relation between the numbers and the geometries.
It seems that there are implicit equivalences but only after the fact of geometry. Geometry itself is a separate aesthetic dimension which does not follow explicitly from comp.
See if you like my idea for a Sci-Fi story about artificial qualia/hyper-quanta: http://s33light.org/post/47951545367
I think that while we disagree on whether machines experience qualia themselves, I think we can both agree on the idea that machine discovered quanta can be translated into our experience as significantly novel qualitative content, if not new sensory modalities (by perceptual cheating or neural mod).
Craig
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There are other reason as well. A Newtonian physics uses action at a distance, arguably a non comp phenomenon.
Brent
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On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 01:41:07PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Apr 2013, at 04:14, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 02:41:19PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>You cannot be more right on this. It has been part of my job to show
> >>that if the brain is Turing emulable, then the interior experience
> >>is not at all isomorphic to brain activity. It is already done
> >>explicitely in step seven (you don't need the more subtle step 8).
> >>
> >
> >If you have shown this, then empirically, COMP is falsified.
>
> Why?
> Only if you still believe in primitive material brain. But the point
> is that does not exist primitively.
>
This has nothing to do with "primitiveness". Stick an fMRI scanner on
your brain, and think some thoughts. You will find you cannot have a
different thought without different brain activity. Moreover, there
appears to be a quite close correspondence, viz experiments where
computers are taught to read someone's mind. The experiments are
getting better over time - I would say its pretty overwhelming
evidence that mind supervenes on (phenomenal) physical matter
(particularly the brain).
Furthermore, the anthropic principle is completely unexplainable with
some sort of "phenomenal" physical supervenience.
Primarily where you assert that conscious states supervening on
recordings are an absurdity. There are some other places where
intuition has cropped up, but that seems to be the main one.
On 4/17/2013 8:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Apr 2013, at 08:41, Russell Standish wrote:
Primarily where you assert that conscious states supervening on
recordings are an absurdity. There are some other places where
intuition has cropped up, but that seems to be the main one.
In the comp frame. It is absurd because there is no computation done by a recording.See my preceding posts, you have confused association and supervenience.
But a recording refers to a computation at a different time.
Is a computation, as done by a Turing machine, localized in time?
Brent
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