Primitive Awareness and Symmetry
Craig Weinberg
2. Our awareness may represent realities which are independent from
our own existence.
3. Our awareness may represent ideas and fantasies which have no
existence independent from our experience of it (and whatever
neurological processes are behind it)
4. Representation can only be accomplished through presentation.
5. A word or a picture has to look like something to us in order to
remind of us of something else.
6. Saying that awareness or qualia only represents another process
does not explain why there should be any presentation of that process
in the first place, let alone posit a mechanism by which a physical
process can be represented by something that does not physically
exist.
7. The problem with the mechanistic view is that it relies on the real
existence of awareness and choice to make a case for distrusting
awareness and choice.
A consequence of this logical contradiction is that when we begin from
the assumption of mechanism and work backwards it almost invariably
blinds us to the presentation of the work that we ourselves are doing
in determining this deterministic opinion. We fool ourselves into
thinking that there is no man even behind our own curtain, and mistake
all authentic, concrete presentations for abstract, symbolic
representations. That does not work for awareness because awareness
itself can only be represented to something which is already aware.
Thus the symbol grounding problem arises when we make the mistake of
assuming first that awareness must follow the rules of the world which
is represented within awareness. Since the experience does not show up
on the radar of materialism, we are forced to accept the absurdities
of ungrounded feeling which emerges somehow without mechanism or
explanation from generic physical changes or computations. We have to
conflate symbol and reality - either by making reality not primitively
real (comp) or by making symbols not really real (physics).
To me, the clear solution to this is not to begin from either the
assumption of idealism or materialism but to examine the relationship
between them. Once we notice that there is really nothing about these
two positions which is not symmetrical, we can move on to the next
step of examining symmetry itself. What I find is that symmetry is a
bootstrap metaphor for metaphor.
Symmetry is what makes sense - literally. How it does this is
understandable. It presents and then re-presents itself. It
demonstrates how significance and order can be expressed through
reflection. It is both mathematical and aesthetic but serves no
purpose in either a comp or physical universe. It is so fundamental
that we miss it entirely - which makes sense since we are part of the
universe rather than objective observers of it.
William R. Buckley
Please explain a little further what you mean by *accomplished through presentation* and in
particular, what you mean by presentation.
Your point number 5 fits clearly within the purview of semiotics.
wrb
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Craig Weinberg
On Apr 2, 1:02 pm, "William R. Buckley" <bill.buck...@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
> Please explain a little further what you mean by *accomplished through
> presentation* and in
> particular, what you mean by presentation.
else, it has to appear as something experienced in the first place.
The color blue can't be purely a representation of optical/
neurological patterns without there being a presentation of those
patterns (blue) which is different from that which is represented. If
the patterns were already literally blue, there would be no need to
translate them and we would see blue images in the tissues of the
brain. If blue was nothing but a summary of physical patterns, any
presentation would be redundant and we would use purely abstract,
instinctive (unconscious) models.
From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
represent for us, so it seems impossible to justify qualia on a
functionalist basis. Just as a computer needs no speakers and video
screen inside itself, there is no purpose for such a presentation
layer within our own mechanism. Of course, even if there were a
purpose, there is no hint of such a possibility from mechanism alone.
If there was some reason that a bucket of rocks could benefit by some
kind of collective 'experience' occurring amongst them, that's a
million miles from suspecting that experience could be a conceivable
possibility.
Rather than 'consciousness', human beings would benefit evolutionarily
much more by just being able to do something mechanically conceivable
things like teleport, time travel, or breathe fire. Awareness doesn't
even make sense as a possibility. Were we not experiencing it
ourselves we could never anticipate any such possibility in any
universe.
>
> Your point number 5 fits clearly within the purview of semiotics.
itself arises out of sense-motive experience. It has to start with a
subject who can receive, interpret, and transmit signs. Signs without
a subject can't be signs...can't really be anything.
Craig
>
> wrb
Stathis Papaioannou
> From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
> qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
> represent for us, so it seems impossible to justify qualia on a
> functionalist basis. Just as a computer needs no speakers and video
> screen inside itself, there is no purpose for such a presentation
> layer within our own mechanism. Of course, even if there were a
> purpose, there is no hint of such a possibility from mechanism alone.
> If there was some reason that a bucket of rocks could benefit by some
> kind of collective 'experience' occurring amongst them, that's a
> million miles from suspecting that experience could be a conceivable
> possibility.
>
> Rather than 'consciousness', human beings would benefit evolutionarily
> much more by just being able to do something mechanically conceivable
> things like teleport, time travel, or breathe fire. Awareness doesn't
> even make sense as a possibility. Were we not experiencing it
> ourselves we could never anticipate any such possibility in any
> universe.
Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
meekerdb
I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same parts of the brain
for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of thing that evolution
would do, jury rigged but efficient.
Brent
Craig Weinberg
other way around. Evolution is an epiphenomenon of physics, and
physics is the back end of the Totality. The front end is awareness.
To assume that consciousness must be a side-effect of something else
begs the question of the origin of consciousness and arbitrarily
privileges purposeless mechanism from the start. Once you make that
presumption, it follows logically that consciousness must be an
illusion since it can't be explained. The logic isn't bad, it's just
based on initial assumptions that aren't carefully examined. Awareness
transcends logic.
“I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative
from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything we
talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates
consciousness.” - Max Planck 25 January, 1931”
Craig
Craig Weinberg
> I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same parts of the brain
> for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of thing that evolution
> would do, jury rigged but efficient.
model what I call super-signifying ideas in culture (much better than
H.A.D.D., which I hate for explaining religion but works well for
explaining why we want to believe computers can become conscious). I
don't know of anything he wrote about though that explains why or how
awareness could exist in the first place.
Craig
meekerdb
Why perception exists is pretty obvious in terms of evolutionary advantage. Even bacteria
perceive chemical gradients. Jaynes theory shows why thinking should be like perceiving a
voice in your head.
Brent
>
> Craig
>
1Z
Bruno Marchal
Consciousness comes from the conjunction of an (instinctive,
preprogrammed, or better pre-engrammed) belief in a consistent reality/
god/universe/whatever, and the existence of that reality. The side-
effect comes from the fact that the logic of communicable belief is
different from the logic of the communicable-and-true beliefs.
Evolution, being driven by locally communicable events, cannot give an
advantage to truth, that's true, but without truth, they would be no
communicable events at all. So consciousness has to exist to make
sense of the relative selection, by the universal mind, and the third
person plural type of reality needed for sharable physical realities.
It that sense, consciousness is not really a side effect, but is what
make evolution and physical realities selectable by the "universal
mind". Consciousness looks like a side effect, from inside, only in
the Aristotelian picture. With comp, and its platonist consequences,
we might as well say that matter and evolution is a side effect of
consciousness. Without consciousness the notion of physical reality
would lost his meaning, given that the physical reality can only
result from the shared dreams, lived by the universal mind multiple
instantiations.
And consciousness can be associated with a range of behavior, but is
not equal to any behavior. It is of the type of knowledge, and is a
fixed point on self-doubting (like in Descartes). It is universal and
exists, with comp, right at the "start" of arithmetical truth. It does
not need to be selected, fro it exists at the start, and eventually is
the one responsible for all possible observer selections.
The point here is difficult and subtle, and I am just trying to convey
it. It takes into account the universal mind, as David pointed on
recently, and which I have to endorse through thought experience with
amnesia, (or some report of real experiences with some drugs) and the
complete UDA reversal.
> Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?
OK.
Bruno
Craig Weinberg
> On 4/2/2012 7:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same parts of the brain
> >> for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of thing that evolution
> >> would do, jury rigged but efficient.
> > I like what I've read of Jaynes too. The Bicameral Mind helps begin to
> > model what I call super-signifying ideas in culture (much better than
> > H.A.D.D., which I hate for explaining religion but works well for
> > explaining why we want to believe computers can become conscious). I
> > don't know of anything he wrote about though that explains why or how
> > awareness could exist in the first place.
>
> Why perception exists is pretty obvious in terms of evolutionary advantage.
unconscious computation. Blindsight shows that perceptual function
does not necessarily rely on conscious presentation. If we had no
perception ourselves, we could never guess that such a phenomena could
exist or that it could improve survival in any way, any more than it
would improve a neuron's odds of successfully signalling to another if
it played the theme song from Hawaii Five-0 to itself every time it
depolarized.
> Even bacteria
> perceive chemical gradients. Jaynes theory shows why thinking should be like perceiving a
> voice in your head.
helps them survive. Everything that they do to survive could be
accomplished unconsciously and mechanically. From a functionalist
perspective, perception can only be purely ornamental gravy. In
reality, I think that it's the survival-and-existence part that is the
gravy, perception is the essential meat and potatoes.
Craig
Evgenii Rudnyi
The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray,
is late-error detection.
Evgenii
Evgenii Rudnyi
It depends on how do you define what a perception is. If a perception is
supposed to be conscious experience, then bacteria do not perceive
chemical gradients, but rather sense them. If you however define
perceive and sense as equivalent terms, then even a ballcock perceives a
level of water.
�Bacteria can perceive� is typical for biologists, see my small comment
on this
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/01/perception-feedback-and-qualia.html
Evgenii
Craig Weinberg
detection?
As far as ballcocks and electronic sensors, the difference is that
they don't assemble themselves. We use their native capacities for
purposes that plastic and metal has no way of accessing. The ballcock
is only a thing in our world, it doesn't have any world of its own. I
think that the molecules that make up the materials have their own
world, but it's not likely to be anything like what we could imagine.
Maybe all molecules have a collective experience on that microcosmic
level, where snapshots of momentary awareness corresponding to change
string together centuries of relative inactivity.
It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that is
in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
Craig
Bruno Marchal
I agree. People confuse consciousness-the-qualia, and consciousness-
the-integrating function. Stathis was talking about the qualia.
Evolution can press only on the function, a priori.
>
> As far as ballcocks and electronic sensors, the difference is that
> they don't assemble themselves. We use their native capacities for
> purposes that plastic and metal has no way of accessing. The ballcock
> is only a thing in our world, it doesn't have any world of its own. I
> think that the molecules that make up the materials have their own
> world, but it's not likely to be anything like what we could imagine.
> Maybe all molecules have a collective experience on that microcosmic
> level, where snapshots of momentary awareness corresponding to change
> string together centuries of relative inactivity.
>
> It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that is
> in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
> cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself which can be
explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
"feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks at
first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person view.
If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the meta-
level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
Bruno
Craig Weinberg
> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that is
> > in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
> > cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
>
> This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
> well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself
they are the same thing. Mechanism assumes that because we can't
explain the existence of qualia mechanistically, it must be an
emergent property/illusion of mechanism. If we instead see that
mechanism is a particular kind of lowest common denominator exterior
qualia, then it would be silly to try to explain the parent
phenomenology in terms of the child set of reduced possibilities.
> which can be
> explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
> "feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks at
> first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
> from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person view.
> If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
> As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
> mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the meta-
> level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
> consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
anything, because it has no capacity to describe anything else and it
has not capacity to extend beyond descriptions. Consciousness is a
much larger phenomenon, as it includes all of mechanism as well as
many more flavors of experience. Only through direct experience can we
know that it is possible that there is a difference between
description and reality.
Through the monochrome lens of mechanism, it is easy to prove that
audiences will think they see something other than black and white
pixels because we understand that they are seeing fluid patterns of
changing pixels rather than the pixels themselves, but this doesn't
explain how we see color. The idea that a machine would logically not
think of itself as a machine doesn't explain the existence of what it
feels like to be the opposite of a machine or how it could really feel
like anything.
Craig
Evgenii Rudnyi
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.
Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.
He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework of
the normal science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but then he
shows that conscious experience cannot be explained by the theories
within a normal science (functionalism, neural correlates of
consciousness, etc.).
According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display. It
is necessary yet to find how Nature produces it but at the moment this
is not that important.
He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of
feedback mechanisms (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is
necessary to set a goal and then to have a comparator that compares the
goal with the reality. It might function okay at the unconscious level
but conscious experience binds everything together in its display. This
binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal binding)
but also within a single sense (intramodel binding). For example we
consciously experience a red kite as a whole, although in the brain
lines, colors, surfaces are processed independently. Yet we cannot
consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.
Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare
expectations with reality and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error
detection. That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running
on their own but then conscious experience allows brain to synchronize
everything together. This is a clear advantage from the Evolution viewpoint.
Evgenii
On 04.04.2012 09:31 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>
> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> On Apr 3, 3:56 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
>>> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
...
>>>> Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
>>>> side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
>>>> Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?
>>>
>>> The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray,
>>> is late-error detection.
>>
>> Why would a device need to be conscious in order to have late-error
>> detection?
>
> I agree. People confuse consciousness-the-qualia, and
> consciousness-the-integrating function. Stathis was talking about the
Bruno Marchal
On 04 Apr 2012, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>> It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that
>>> is
>>> in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
>>> cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
>>
>> This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
>> well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself
>
> I don't see that there can be any interior realism without qualia -
> they are the same thing.
I agree with this.
> Mechanism assumes that because we can't
> explain the existence of qualia mechanistically, it must be an
> emergent property/illusion of mechanism.
It explains the existence of qualia, including some possible geometry
of them. It fails to explain only some aspect of qualia, but it meta-
explains why it cannot explain those aspects. The internal realism has
a necessary blind spot somehow.
> If we instead see that
> mechanism is a particular kind of lowest common denominator exterior
> qualia,
> then it would be silly to try to explain the parent
> phenomenology in terms of the child set of reduced possibilities.
?
>
>> which can be
>> explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
>> "feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks
>> at
>> first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
>> from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person
>> view.
>> If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
>> As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
>> mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the
>> meta-
>> level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
>> consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
>
> Mechanism is always going to implicate mechanism as the cause of
> anything, because it has no capacity to describe anything else and it
> has not capacity to extend beyond descriptions.
Yes it has. Once a machine is Löbian it can see its limitations, and
overcome it. This leads to many paths.
> Consciousness is a
> much larger phenomenon, as it includes all of mechanism as well as
> many more flavors of experience.
It is fuzzy. I can agree and disagree depending how you circumscribe
the meaning of the terms you are using.
> Only through direct experience can we
> know that it is possible that there is a difference between
> description and reality.
Yes. But we cannot know reality as such, except for the conscious non
communicable parts. So, when we talk with each other, we can only make
hypothesis and reasoning.
>
> Through the monochrome lens of mechanism, it is easy to prove that
> audiences will think they see something other than black and white
> pixels because we understand that they are seeing fluid patterns of
> changing pixels rather than the pixels themselves, but this doesn't
> explain how we see color. The idea that a machine would logically not
> think of itself as a machine doesn't explain the existence of what it
> feels like to be the opposite of a machine or how it could really feel
> like anything.
But mechanism is not proposed as an explanation. It is more a "law"
that we exploit to clarify the problems. You can see it as a strong
assumption/belief given that it is a belief in possible
reincarnations. Comp is refutable. Non-comp is not refutable.
Bruno
Craig Weinberg
binding of data, why not just synchronize and bind the data
quantitatively? Parallel processing, compression, etc. Where would the
possibility of experienced qualities come in?
Craig
Stathis Papaioannou
> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>> Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
>> side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
>> Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?
>>
>
> The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray, is
> late-error detection.
But the late-error detection processing could be done in the same way
by a philosophical zombie. Since, by definition, a philosophical
zombie's behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a conscious being
there is no way that nature could favour a conscious being over the
equivalent philosophical zombie. You then have two options to explain
why we are not zombies:
(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
(b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
of consciousness.
Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Craig Weinberg
> On 04 Apr 2012, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that
> >>> is
> >>> in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
> >>> cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
>
> >> This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
> >> well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself
>
> > I don't see that there can be any interior realism without qualia -
> > they are the same thing.
>
> I agree with this.
>
> > Mechanism assumes that because we can't
> > explain the existence of qualia mechanistically, it must be an
> > emergent property/illusion of mechanism.
>
> It explains the existence of qualia, including some possible geometry
> of them. It fails to explain only some aspect of qualia, but it meta-
> explains why it cannot explain those aspects. The internal realism has
> a necessary blind spot somehow.
phenomenon from a child perspective.
>
> > If we instead see that
> > mechanism is a particular kind of lowest common denominator exterior
> > qualia,
> > then it would be silly to try to explain the parent
> > phenomenology in terms of the child set of reduced possibilities.
>
> ?
denominator of qualia, just as black and white could be said to be
kinds of color (the most colorless kinds) but colors are not reducible
to black and white.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> which can be
> >> explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
> >> "feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks
> >> at
> >> first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
> >> from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person
> >> view.
> >> If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
> >> As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
> >> mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the
> >> meta-
> >> level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
> >> consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
>
> > Mechanism is always going to implicate mechanism as the cause of
> > anything, because it has no capacity to describe anything else and it
> > has not capacity to extend beyond descriptions.
>
> Yes it has. Once a machine is Löbian it can see its limitations, and
> overcome it. This leads to many paths.
to many paths but they are all descriptions rather than experiences.
At what point can a Löbian machine see that it can't taste or smell?
>
> > Consciousness is a
> > much larger phenomenon, as it includes all of mechanism as well as
> > many more flavors of experience.
>
> It is fuzzy. I can agree and disagree depending how you circumscribe
> the meaning of the terms you are using.
>
> > Only through direct experience can we
> > know that it is possible that there is a difference between
> > description and reality.
>
> Yes. But we cannot know reality as such, except for the conscious non
> communicable parts. So, when we talk with each other, we can only make
> hypothesis and reasoning.
experiencing the non communicable parts ourselves directly.
>
>
>
> > Through the monochrome lens of mechanism, it is easy to prove that
> > audiences will think they see something other than black and white
> > pixels because we understand that they are seeing fluid patterns of
> > changing pixels rather than the pixels themselves, but this doesn't
> > explain how we see color. The idea that a machine would logically not
> > think of itself as a machine doesn't explain the existence of what it
> > feels like to be the opposite of a machine or how it could really feel
> > like anything.
>
> But mechanism is not proposed as an explanation. It is more a "law"
> that we exploit to clarify the problems. You can see it as a strong
> assumption/belief given that it is a belief in possible
> reincarnations. Comp is refutable. Non-comp is not refutable.
being refutable is a computation. Refuting comp through a comp is like
saying that running things over with a steam roller is a test of
whether or not they are flat.
Craig
Evgenii Rudnyi
Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical
studies. Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy
philosophers, so I am not sure if this is relevant.
As I have written, conscious experience offers unique capabilities to
tune all running servomechanisms to the brain that otherwise it has not.
This is what neuroscience says. When neuroscience will find zombies,
then it would be possible to consider this hypothesis as well.
Clearly one can imagine that he/she is not zombie and others are
zombies. But then he/she must convince others that they are zombies.
Evgenii
Evgenii Rudnyi
We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be that
at the level of neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious display
than to employ other means. On the other hand, the robotics has yet to
prove that they can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals.
This has not been done yet. One cannot exclude that the progress here
will be achieved only when people will find a trick how a brain creates
conscious experience.
Evgenii
Evgenii
meekerdb
> The term late error detection as such could be employed without consciousness indeed.
> Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning that I will try briefly describe below.
>
> Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is, exactly about
> qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.
>
> He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework of the normal
> science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but then he shows that conscious
> experience cannot be explained by the theories within a normal science (functionalism,
> neural correlates of consciousness, etc.).
>
> According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display. It is necessary yet
> to find how Nature produces it but at the moment this is not that important.
Display to whom? the homunculus?
>
> He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of feedback mechanisms
> (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is necessary to set a goal and then to have a
> comparator that compares the goal with the reality. It might function okay at the
> unconscious level but conscious experience binds everything together in its display.
But why is the binding together conscious?
> This binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal binding) but also
> within a single sense (intramodel binding). For example we consciously experience a red
> kite as a whole, although in the brain lines, colors, surfaces are processed
> independently. Yet we cannot consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.
Actually I can. It takes some practice, but if, for example, you are a painter you learn
to see things a separate patches of color. As an engineer I can see a kite as structural
and aerodynamic elements.
>
> Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare expectations with reality
> and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error detection.
But none of that explains why it is necessarily conscious. Is he contending that any
comparisons of expectations with reality instantiates consciousness? So if a Mars Rover
uses some predictive program about what's over the hill and then later compares that with
what is over the hill it will be conscious?
> That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running on their own but then
> conscious experience allows brain to synchronize everything together. This is a clear
> advantage from the Evolution viewpoint.
It's easy to say consciousness does this and that and to argue that since these things are
evolutionarily useful that's why consciousness developed. But what is needed is saying
why doing this and that rather than something else instantiates consciousness.
It seems that Gray is following my idea that the question of qualia, Chalmer's 'hard
problem', will simply be bypassed. We will learn how to make robots that act conscious
and we will just say consciousness is just an operational attribute.
Brent
>
> Evgenii
meekerdb
But what constitutes 'a conscious display'. Display implies someone to whom it is displayed.
> than to employ other means. On the other hand, the robotics has yet to prove that they
> can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals. This has not been done yet. One
> cannot exclude that the progress here will be achieved only when people will find a
> trick how a brain creates conscious experience.
I think they will solve the problem of producing intelligent behavior and just assume they
have created conscious experience.
Brent
>
> Evgenii
>
> Evgenii
>
David Nyman
>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
>> of consciousness.
>>
>> Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
>>
>
> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
> so I am not sure if this is relevant.
I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
without reference to any putative conscious states
The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
our theories of how things are. Hence, in the case that either option
a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.
David
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 4/4/2012 11:58 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> The term late error detection as such could be employed without
>> consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
>> that I will try briefly describe below.
>>
>> Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
>> exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.
>>
>> He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework
>> of the normal science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but
>> then he shows that conscious experience cannot be explained by the
>> theories within a normal science (functionalism, neural correlates of
>> consciousness, etc.).
>>
>> According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display.
>> It is necessary yet to find how Nature produces it but at the moment
>> this is not that important.
>
> Display to whom? the homunculus?
No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
p. 110. �(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium,
that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual
medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells;
(2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;
(3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its
usual electrochemical medium.�
Hence the unconscious brain does the job. I should say that this does
not answer my personal inquiry on how I perceive a three dimensional
world, but this is another problem. In his book, Jeffrey Gray offers
quite a plausible scheme.
>>
>> He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of
>> feedback mechanisms (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is
>> necessary to set a goal and then to have a comparator that compares
>> the goal with the reality. It might function okay at the unconscious
>> level but conscious experience binds everything together in its display.
>
> But why is the binding together conscious?
There is no answer to this question yet. This is just his hypothesis
based on experimental research. In a way, this is a description of
experiments. The question why requires a theory, it is not there yet.
>> This binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal
>> binding) but also within a single sense (intramodel binding). For
>> example we consciously experience a red kite as a whole, although in
>> the brain lines, colors, surfaces are processed independently. Yet we
>> cannot consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.
>
> Actually I can. It takes some practice, but if, for example, you are a
> painter you learn to see things a separate patches of color. As an
> engineer I can see a kite as structural and aerodynamic elements.
If you visually experiences this indeed, it might be good to make a MRI
test to see the difference with others. This way you will help to
develop the theory of consciousness.
I understand what you say and I can imagine a kite as a bunch of masses,
springs and dampers but I cannot visually experience this when I observe
the kite. I can visually experience this only when I draw it on a paper.
>>
>> Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare
>> expectations with reality and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error
>> detection.
>
> But none of that explains why it is necessarily conscious. Is he
> contending that any comparisons of expectations with reality
> instantiates consciousness? So if a Mars Rover uses some predictive
> program about what's over the hill and then later compares that with
> what is over the hill it will be conscious?
He just describes experimental results. He has conscious experience, he
has a brain, MRI shows activities in the brain, then another person in
similar circumstances shows a similar activities in the brain and states
that he has conscious experience. Hence it is logical to suppose that
brain produces conscious experience.
There is no discussion in his book whether this is necessarily
conscious. There are no experimental results to discuss that. As for
Mars Rover, in his book there is a statement that ascribing
consciousness to robots is not grounded scientifically. There are no
experimental results in this respect to discuss.
>> That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running on their
>> own but then conscious experience allows brain to synchronize
>> everything together. This is a clear advantage from the Evolution
>> viewpoint.
>
> It's easy to say consciousness does this and that and to argue that
> since these things are evolutionarily useful that's why consciousness
> developed. But what is needed is saying why doing this and that rather
> than something else instantiates consciousness.
This remains as Hard Problem. There is no solution of that in the book.
> It seems that Gray is following my idea that the question of qualia,
> Chalmer's 'hard problem', will simply be bypassed. We will learn how to
> make robots that act conscious and we will just say consciousness is
> just an operational attribute.
No, his statement is that this phenomenon does not fit in the normal
science. He considers current theories of consciousness including
ephiphenomenalism, functionalism, neural correlate of consciousness and
his conclusion is that this theories cannot describe observations, that
is, Hard Problem remains.
Evgenii
> Brent
>
>>
>> Evgenii
>
Evgenii Rudnyi
It is hard to predict what happens. Let us see.
Evgenii
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
>
>>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
>>> of consciousness.
>>>
>>> Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
>>>
>>
>> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
>> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
>> so I am not sure if this is relevant.
>
> I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
> nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
> physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
> pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
> assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
> complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
> without reference to any putative conscious states
>
> The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
> actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
> our theories of how things are. Hence, in the case that either option
> a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
> neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
> the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.
>
> David
In this sense, his conclusion is in agreement with philosophers. In his
book, Jeffery Gray shows that "consciousness display" cannot be
explained by the current science. According to him, a new science is
required.
Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness
display" could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is,
but if is there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in
the body.
Evgenii
meekerdb
But 'conscious display' is just putting another name on what he purports to explain.
Unless Gray can point to specific brain structures and processes and explain why those
structures and processes make consciousness and others don't, he has done nothing to put
new words on "consciousness". Science needs *operational* definitions. Conversely, if he
can specify the structures and processes then we can instantiate those in a robot and see
if the robot acts as if it were conscious. I think that will be the experimental test of
a theory of consciousness. If we can manipulate consciousness by physical/chemical
manipulation of the brain that will be evidence we know what consciousness is. Notice
that in the physical science we don't go around saying, "Yes, I know how gravity works and
I can predict its effects and write equations for it, but what IS it?"
Brent
David Nyman
> Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
> could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
> there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.
Sure, if it is there, it could indeed be advantageous, if not
indispensable. But such notions of course do not avoid the Hard
Problem. Many independent considerations converge to suggest that -
as it bears on macroscopic physical evolution - consciousness in the
Hard sense will always be externally indistinguishable from
sufficiently intelligent behaviour, as Brent argues. The problem with
"display" ideas about consciousness (compare, for example, Johnjoe
McFadden's EM theory) is that they must, in the end, be fully
justified in impersonal terms, and hence once again appeals to the
additional hypothesis of consciousness, at the relevant level of
description, will be redundant.
I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory. On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand. It also
entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives, but at
a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).
David
meekerdb
>>
>> Display to whom? the homunculus?
>
> No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
>
> p. 110. �(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious
> perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of electrochemical activity in
> and between nerve cells;
Is it a physical medium, made of quarks and electrons? Is it an immaterial soul stuff?
Or is it just a placeholder name for a gap in the theory?
>
> (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;
Is the display conscious or the 'it' that's doing the inspection.
>
> (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its usual
> electrochemical medium.�
Sounds like a soul or homunculus to me.
>
> Hence the unconscious brain does the job.
But the display is denoted 'conscious'? Is it not part of the brain?
> I should say that this does not answer my personal inquiry on how I perceive a three
> dimensional world, but this is another problem. In his book, Jeffrey Gray offers quite a
> plausible scheme.
Doesn't sound anymore plausible than a conscious spirit.
Brent
meekerdb
> I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory. On the
> other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
> Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
> implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
> of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
> macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.
I think that's the story even if comp is false.
> It also
> entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
> of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
> features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
Are you contemplating consciousness as a kind of equivalence relation that picks out the
different branches of Everett's MWI, i.e. solves the basis problem of decoherence? That
would seem to make every quasi-classical object conscious.
> But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
> the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives,
To refer to 'subjective' perspectives seems to already assume consciousness.
Brent
Evgenii Rudnyi
Science start with a research on a phenomenon. If to speak about a
theory of consciousness then we are presumably close to the level when
ancient Greeks would try to develop a theory of electricity. Yet, the
phenomenon, for example lighting was already there and it was possible
to describe it even then.
'Conscious display' is a metaphor, if you like then a placeholder. We
cannot explain right now how brain produces consciousness and this is
Gray's point. Yet, this does not mean that the phenomenon is not there.
We just cannot explain it. In this respect, Gray's book is a very good
example of empirical science, the theory of consciousness is however not
there.
Evgenii
Evgenii Rudnyi
Gray's book is not a theory of consciousness, this is rather an
empirical research with an outcome that the modern science cannot
explain observation in that research. Gray also confesses that
�There are no behavioral tests by which we can distinguish whether a
computer, a robot or a Martian possesses qualia.�
At the same time, he shows how to bring consciousness into the lab:
�These experiments demonstrate yet again, by the way, that the �privacy�
of conscious experience offers no barrier to good science. Synaesthetes
claim a form of experience that is, from the point of view of most
people, idiosyncratic in the extreme. Yet it can be successfully brought
into the laboratory.�
Evgenii
David Nyman
>> Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
>> implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
>> of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
>> macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.
>
>
> I think that's the story even if comp is false.
I certainly hope so, if comp is to be consistent with physics.
> Are you contemplating consciousness as a kind of equivalence relation that
> picks out the different branches of Everett's MWI, i.e. solves the basis
> problem of decoherence? That would seem to make every quasi-classical
> object conscious.
Well, one could argue for a subjective perspective centred on every
quasi-classical object capable of instantiating the appropriate
structural relations, both internally and with respect to its
environment (to speak rather loosely). It is instructive in this
regard to consider the effects of changes in brain structure on the
range of possible human conscious states, which are so obviously
dependent on such relations. For example, from the various stages of
sleep, to the extreme impairment of the ability to integrate personal
history characteristic of late-stage dementia (which is close to
unconsciousness, I would speculate), culminating in the total loss of
appropriate function characteristic of brain-death.
>> But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
>> the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives,
>
>
> To refer to 'subjective' perspectives seems to already assume consciousness.
Yes I am indeed assuming it, as indispensable to the account, not in
the sense of a causal role in the "physical" narrative, but rather in
terms of the "universal mind" heuristic. I hope it's apparent that I'm
not peddling some knock-down theory here, but rather proposing a
possibly illuminating way of thinking about the various states of
affairs that seem to require something supplementary to any possible
objective account. It seems to me that there are three features of the
subjective - but NOT the objective - account the presupposition of
which is both indispensable and irreducible:
(a) subjective localisation in terms of one of all possible such
states; but also
(b) the discontinuity and mutual exclusivity of such subjectively
localised states (i.e. what we usually conceive as change of
subjective location in time);
(c) the subjective integration ("emergence") of
epistemologically-composite states.
The heuristic I have described allows one to render a coherent
account, at least in broad outline, of the first two of these
features. The final feature, that of the integration of
epistemological composites, seems to me a particularly strong argument
for the justification of consciousness as a "truth" as opposed to a
mere belief, in that there is simply no need of the hypothesis of
composition in the ontologically-reduced objective account. Be that as
it may, it has proved to be an elusive intuition for many.
David
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>
>>> Display to whom? the homunculus?
>>
>> No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
>>
>> p. 110. �(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium,
>> that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual
>> medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells;
>
> Is it a physical medium, made of quarks and electrons? Is it an
> immaterial soul stuff? Or is it just a placeholder name for a gap in the
> theory?
It is just a placeholder. The modern science cannot explain the nature
of that medium.
>>
>> (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;
>
> Is the display conscious or the 'it' that's doing the inspection.
It is the unconscious brain.
>>
>> (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its
>> usual electrochemical medium.�
>
> Sounds like a soul or homunculus to me.
Here it again the unconscious brain. As I have written, 'consciousness
display' just gives new possibilities to the unconscious brain to rule
over all the servomechanisms.
>>
>> Hence the unconscious brain does the job.
>
> But the display is denoted 'conscious'? Is it not part of the brain?
It is an open question. For example Gray asks
�Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in this
way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists have a
clear answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4, disconnected
from its normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot discharge the
functions associated with the experience of colour. But, if we had a
theory that started, not from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it
would give a different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse,
even one had been proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in
a brain slice!�.
No one knows. This is the state of the art.
>> I should say that this does not answer my personal inquiry on how I
>> perceive a three dimensional world, but this is another problem. In
>> his book, Jeffrey Gray offers quite a plausible scheme.
>
> Doesn't sound anymore plausible than a conscious spirit.
>
> Brent
>
When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and
panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not give
an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of consciousness.
However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it in
the lab.
Evgenii
Bruno Marchal
On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 05.04.2012 21:44 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Display to whom? the homunculus?
>>>
>>> No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
>>>
>>> p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium,
>>> that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual
>>> medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells;
>>
>> Is it a physical medium, made of quarks and electrons? Is it an
>> immaterial soul stuff? Or is it just a placeholder name for a gap
>> in the
>> theory?
>
> It is just a placeholder. The modern science cannot explain the
> nature of that medium.
>
>>>
>>> (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;
>>
>> Is the display conscious or the 'it' that's doing the inspection.
>
> It is the unconscious brain.
>
>>>
>>> (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its
>>> usual electrochemical medium.”
>>
>> Sounds like a soul or homunculus to me.
>
> Here it again the unconscious brain. As I have written,
> 'consciousness display' just gives new possibilities to the
> unconscious brain to rule over all the servomechanisms.
>
>>>
>>> Hence the unconscious brain does the job.
>>
>> But the display is denoted 'conscious'? Is it not part of the brain?
>
> It is an open question. For example Gray asks
>
> “Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in
> this way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists
> have a clear answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4,
> disconnected from its normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot
> discharge the functions associated with the experience of colour.
> But, if we had a theory that started, not from function, but from
> brain tissue, maybe it would give a different answer. Alas, no such
> theory is to hand. Worse, even one had been proposed, there is no
> known way of detecting qualia in a brain slice!”.
>
> No one knows. This is the state of the art.
>
>>> I should say that this does not answer my personal inquiry on how I
>>> perceive a three dimensional world, but this is another problem. In
>>> his book, Jeffrey Gray offers quite a plausible scheme.
>>
>> Doesn't sound anymore plausible than a conscious spirit.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and
> panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not
> give an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of
> consciousness.
>
> However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it
> in the lab.
But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is
doubtful that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only
third person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.
So a theory of consciousness, or *about* consciousness can only be a
theory acknowledging some principle or axioms about the first person
view. This makes sense, if only because such axioms can be found for a
notion deeply related to consciousness, and which is knowledge. Most
research in the cognitive science , sufficiently theoretical, accept
the following axioms for knowledge, with Kp interpreted as "I know p":
Kp -> p
Kp -> KKp
K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)
and with modus ponens and necessitation as inference rule (from p and
(p->q) you can derive q, and from p you can derive Kp).
This is the modal logic S4. Gödel already knew that in any "rich"
theory, provability cannot obey those S4 axioms, and later Kaplan and
Montague have shown that there is just no way we can define such
notion of knowledge, in any third person way, capable of playing that
role, confirming that S4 bears on a pure first person notion.
Yet, as seen by many philsopher (from Theatetus to the old
Wittgenstein), we can "simulate", at the meta-level such a knowledge
by taking any theory of belief, and defining knowledge by a belief
which happens to be true, so that we get the first axiom above. By a
result of Tarski, we know already that truth ---about a theory/
machine---cannot be defined---by the machine or in the theory.
Accepting the knowledge account of consciousness (as the knowldedge of
one truth, may be a tautology or just the constant boolean "t")
explains then completely why consciousness exist (like a true belief),
and why we will never find it in the lab. Now, if the belief notion
can be finitely defined in a third person way, this entails the comp
hypothesis, and this does not solve completely the mind-body problem.
Indeed we might say that such a theory does solve the hard
consciousness problem, but as the UDA shows, it introduces a new
problem: we have to justify the stability of the lab itself from that
theory of consciousness. That is nice because it leads to the first
explanation of why there is a physical universe, and it makes physics
a branch of psychology or theology. Then the constraints of computer
science gives sense to this, because provability obeys to
believability axioms.
Put in another, perhaps provocative way, with comp, consciousness is
not that much difficult, it is a consequence of computer science and
mathematical logic, but we have yet to "find the lab in
consciousness". UDA shows why and how.
Gray is stuck by its aristotelian conception of reality.
Bruno
Craig Weinberg
> We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be that
> at the level of neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious display
> than to employ other means.
It would probably be even simpler to create telepathy or omniscience.
Without any hint of explanation of where the potential for 'display'
could come from, I can't consider it a realistic possibility.
> On the other hand, the robotics has yet to
> prove that they can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals.
> This has not been done yet. One cannot exclude that the progress here
> will be achieved only when people will find a trick how a brain creates
> conscious experience.
experience. A human being is a complex natural whole and it has a
complex experience. A robot is not a natural whole subject, it is an
assembly of parts. To get to natural wholes in a robot you have to get
down to molecules.
Craig
Evgenii Rudnyi
I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned, his
conclusion was that the modern science (here as accepted by a majority
of scientists) cannot explain conscious phenomena. Hence, in a way he
was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific framework.
The difference with your point is that according to him, mind,
knowledge, and self is not related to conscious experience that he has
considered. Well, you go other way around from math, he presumably would
not agree with you. In this respect, you might be right.
Your statement
> But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful
> that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
> person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.
in my view, contradicts to empirical science. I believe that I
understand what you mean, I think I understand your logic. Yet, I am not
sure I understand what a research program on consciousness you offer.
What is the role of experimentalists in your research program?
On a related note. Prof Hoenen in his lectures of on Voraussetzung und
Vorurteil (Prerequisite and Prejudice) talks quite awhile about
Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics. According to Collingwood, your
statements above seems to be an absolute presupposition, that is, a
statement that we can take as it is but we cannot prove if it true or
false.
It is worthy noting that during his historical analysis of absolute
presuppositions, Collingwood came to the conclusion that monotheism was
crucial for the success of the modern science. I have not read his book
by myself, my knowledge is just from lectures, but this is a quote that
I have found in Internet
�The very possibility of applied mathematics is an expression . . . of
the Christian belief that nature is the creation of an omnipotent God.�
Some more what I have found to this end
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/03/collingwood-on-monotheism-and-science.html
The last paper on this page "Matter, Mathematics, and God" shows quite
nicely a peculiar role of mathematics in science. If physicists accept
that Nature obeys to the laws written by mathematical equations, then
actually your position looks quite natural.
Evgenii
On 06.04.2012 10:52 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>
> On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
...
>> When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and
>> panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not give
>> an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of
>> consciousness.
>>
>> However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it
>> in the lab.
>
> But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful
> that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
> person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.
>
> So a theory of consciousness, or *about* consciousness can only be a
> theory acknowledging some principle or axioms about the first person
> view. This makes sense, if only because such axioms can be found for a
> notion deeply related to consciousness, and which is knowledge. Most
> research in the cognitive science , sufficiently theoretical, accept the
> following axioms for knowledge, with Kp interpreted as "I know p":
>
> Kp -> p
> Kp -> KKp
> K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)
>
> and with modus ponens and necessitation as inference rule (from p and
> (p->q) you can derive q, and from p you can derive Kp).
>
> This is the modal logic S4. G�del already knew that in any "rich"
> theory, provability cannot obey those S4 axioms, and later Kaplan and
> Montague have shown that there is just no way we can define such notion
> of knowledge, in any third person way, capable of playing that role,
> confirming that S4 bears on a pure first person notion.
> Yet, as seen by many philsopher (from Theatetus to the old
> Wittgenstein), we can "simulate", at the meta-level such a knowledge by
> taking any theory of belief, and defining knowledge by a belief which
> happens to be true, so that we get the first axiom above. By a result of
> Tarski, we know already that truth ---about a theory/machine---cannot be
meekerdb
Of course the regularity of nature is more consistent with a single god than with many
contending gods, but it is still more consistent with a deist god who creates the world
and then leaves it to itself than a theist god who answers prayers.
Brent
Bruno Marchal
I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned, his conclusion was that the modern science (here as accepted by a majority of scientists) cannot explain conscious phenomena. Hence, in a way he was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific framework.
The difference with your point is that according to him, mind, knowledge, and self is not related to conscious experience that he has considered. Well, you go other way around from math, he presumably would not agree with you. In this respect, you might be right.
Your statement
> But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful
> that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
> person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.
in my view, contradicts to empirical science.
I believe that I understand what you mean, I think I understand your logic. Yet, I am not sure I understand what a research program on consciousness you offer.
What is the role of experimentalists in your research program?
On a related note. Prof Hoenen in his lectures of on Voraussetzung und Vorurteil (Prerequisite and Prejudice) talks quite awhile about Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics. According to Collingwood, your statements above seems to be an absolute presupposition, that is, a statement that we can take as it is but we cannot prove if it true or false.
It is worthy noting that during his historical analysis of absolute presuppositions, Collingwood came to the conclusion that monotheism was crucial for the success of the modern science. I have not read his book by myself, my knowledge is just from lectures, but this is a quote that I have found in Internet
“The very possibility of applied mathematics is an expression . . . of the Christian belief that nature is the creation of an omnipotent God.”
Some more what I have found to this end
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/03/collingwood-on-monotheism-and-science.html
The last paper on this page "Matter, Mathematics, and God" shows quite nicely a peculiar role of mathematics in science. If physicists accept that Nature obeys to the laws written by mathematical equations, then actually your position looks quite natural.
On 06.04.2012 10:52 Bruno Marchal said the following:On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism andpanpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not givean answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory ofconsciousness.However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research itin the lab.But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtfulthat we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only thirdperson (or first person plural) describable phenomena.So a theory of consciousness, or *about* consciousness can only be atheory acknowledging some principle or axioms about the first personview. This makes sense, if only because such axioms can be found for anotion deeply related to consciousness, and which is knowledge. Mostresearch in the cognitive science , sufficiently theoretical, accept thefollowing axioms for knowledge, with Kp interpreted as "I know p":Kp -> pKp -> KKpK(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)and with modus ponens and necessitation as inference rule (from p and(p->q) you can derive q, and from p you can derive Kp).
This is the modal logic S4. Gödel already knew that in any "rich"
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Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 4/6/2012 9:26 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
>> �The very possibility of applied mathematics is an expression . . . of
>> the Christian belief that nature is the creation of an omnipotent God.�
>
> Of course the regularity of nature is more consistent with a single god
> than with many contending gods, but it is still more consistent with a
> deist god who creates the world and then leaves it to itself than a
> theist god who answers prayers.
>
> Brent
I am reading now Feyerabend's The Tyranny of Science. A couple of
related quotes:
�After Newton had found his law of gravitation, he applied it to the
moon and to the planets. It seemed that Jupiter and Saturn, when treated
in this way, slowly moved away from each other � the planetary system
seemed to fall apart.�
�Newton concluded that it was being kept stable by an additional force
and he assumed that God from time to time intervened in the course of
planets. That agreed with his theological views. God, Newton believed,
was not just an abstract principle.�
More to this story
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/04/god-as-a-cosmic-operator.html
where there are results of my search in Google. The story seems to have
a happy end. Yet if Newton were a deist, then we would not have the
Newton laws.
Evgenii
Stathis Papaioannou
I think you've missed the point. It is not necessary that
philosophical zombies exist, it is only necessary that the idea is
coherent. The question then is, Could philosophical zombies exist? If
you say no, then you are saying that consciousness is a necessary
side-effect of the kind of intelligent behaviour that humans display.
Do you believe that that is so, or do you believe that it is possible
for a being to be made that behaves just like a human but lacks
consciousness? You are free to dismiss this question as uninteresting
to you but I think it is still a coherent question.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
meekerdb
What? You think he would have discarded his law of universal gravitation if he had been a
deist? Why wouldn't he have just concluded the solar system was unstable and would
eventually be dispersed?
Brent
>
> Evgenii
>
meekerdb
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors - but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
Brent
Evgenii Rudnyi
"Ancient Babylonian records showed that the planetary system had been
stable for a considerable time."
"At any rate, there was a clash between the facts and Newton's law of
gravitation used without additional assumptions."
You may want to find Leibniz's critics of Newton.
"Leibniz ridiculed Newton's god for being an incompetent universe-maker
and declared that what god does once, he does in a perfect way."
Evgenii
> Brent
>
>>
>> Evgenii
>>
>
meekerdb
Actually not. Newton's gravity would have shown that it would have been sufficiently
stable much longer than Babylonian times - if Newton had been able to solve the multi-body
problem. It is solved numerically now using computers.
Why do you suppose the solar system has been stable enough to be predictable over millions
of years? Do you think general relativity is necessary to explain that?
Brent
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 4/7/2012 10:36 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> On 07.04.2012 22:16 meekerdb said the following:
>>> On 4/7/2012 5:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>> More to this story
>>>>
>>>> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/04/god-as-a-cosmic-operator.html
>>>>
>>>> where there are results of my search in Google. The story seems to
>>>> have a happy end. Yet if Newton were a deist, then we would not have
>>>> the Newton laws.
>>>
>>> What? You think he would have discarded his law of universal gravitation
>>
>>> if he had been a deist? Why wouldn't he have just concluded the solar
>>> system was unstable and would eventually be dispersed?
>>
>> "Ancient Babylonian records showed that the planetary system had been
>> stable for a considerable time."
>>
>> "At any rate, there was a clash between the facts and Newton's law of
>> gravitation used without additional assumptions."
>
> Actually not. Newton's gravity would have shown that it would have been
> sufficiently stable much longer than Babylonian times - if Newton had
> been able to solve the multi-body problem. It is solved numerically now
> using computers.
>
> Why do you suppose the solar system has been stable enough to be
> predictable over millions of years? Do you think general relativity is
> necessary to explain that?
>
> Brent
>
I believe that we should consider Newton in his historical context. As
far as I have understood, because of not quite right empirical values
(masses, etc.) and/or because of low level of mathematics that was
available at his time, his use of his laws did not agree with
observations. Hence his use of God.
This also raises a question about mathematics that bothers me. If we
assume that mathematics (for example Newton's laws written as equations)
is the result of neuron spikes, then to me this whole story seems like a
wonder. For example, try to think about the history of Newton's laws
according to the quote from
http://www.csc.twu.ca/byl/matter_math_god.pdf
(the references are in pdf)
"Materialists believe that mathematical objects exist only materially,
in our brains.[3] Mathematical objects are believed to correspond to
physical states of our brain and, as such, should ultimately be
explicable by neuroscience in terms of biochemical laws. Stanislas
Dehaene suggests that human brains come equipped at birth with an
innate, wired-in ability for mathematics.[4] He postulates that, through
evolution, the smallest integers (1, 2, 3 . . .) became hard-wired into
the human nervous system, along with a crude ability to add and
subtract. A similar position is defended by George Lakoff and Rafael
Nunez, who seek to explain mathematics as a system of metaphors that
ultimately derive from neural processes.[5] Penelope Maddy conjectures
that our nervous system contains higher order assemblies that correspond
to thoughts of particular sets.[6] She posits that our beliefs about
sets and other mathematical entities come, not from Platonic ideal
forms, but, rather, from certain physical events, such as the
development of pathways in neural systems. Such evolutionary
explanations seek to derive all our mathematical thoughts from purely
physical connections between neurons."
Finally a good quote from the same paper
"Bertrand Russell, certainly no friend of theism, concluded from his
study of the history of Greek philosophy that ��Mathematics is . . . the
chief source of the belief in eternal and exact truth, as well as in a
supersensible intelligible world.��".
This shows nicely that the mathematicians have been as a fifth column
all the time.
Evgenii
Stathis Papaioannou
> But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
> find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
> cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
> that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding
> of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
> zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
> probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly
> acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
> was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
> example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
> but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie; for
example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
was blind. If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
zombies. If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental
distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know
if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies
are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence,
either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
meekerdb
Right. There was no "clash between the facts and Newton's law of gravitation used without
additional assumptions." There was a clash between Newton's calculations of the
consequences of his laws and the actual consequences.
> Hence his use of God.
>
> This also raises a question about mathematics that bothers me. If we assume that
> mathematics (for example Newton's laws written as equations) is the result of neuron
> spikes, then to me this whole story seems like a wonder. For example, try to think about
> the history of Newton's laws according to the quote from
>
> http://www.csc.twu.ca/byl/matter_math_god.pdf
>
> (the references are in pdf)
>
> "Materialists believe that mathematical objects exist only materially, in our brains.[3]
> Mathematical objects are believed to correspond to physical states of our brain and, as
> such, should ultimately be explicable by neuroscience in terms of biochemical laws.
> Stanislas Dehaene suggests that human brains come equipped at birth with an innate,
> wired-in ability for mathematics.[4] He postulates that, through evolution, the smallest
> integers (1, 2, 3 . . .) became hard-wired into the human nervous system, along with a
> crude ability to add and subtract. A similar position is defended by George Lakoff and
> Rafael Nunez, who seek to explain mathematics as a system of metaphors that ultimately
> derive from neural processes.[5] Penelope Maddy conjectures that our nervous system
> contains higher order assemblies that correspond to thoughts of particular sets.[6] She
> posits that our beliefs about sets and other mathematical entities come, not from
> Platonic ideal forms, but, rather, from certain physical events, such as the development
> of pathways in neural systems. Such evolutionary explanations seek to derive all our
> mathematical thoughts from purely physical connections between neurons."
The same view expounded by W. S. Cooper's book "The Origin of Reason" which I have
recommended.
Brent
meekerdb
> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb<meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
>> find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
>> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
>> cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
>> that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding
>> of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
>> zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
>> probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly
>> acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
>> was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
>> example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
>> but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
> It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
> isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
> analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
> would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
> would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;
That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than
of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components
(e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings. So the
inference doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie components doesn't imply you
can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.
> for
> example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
> was blind.
There are people like. But they are not partial zombie's. You say "blind but behaved
normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's impossible.
> If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
> zombies.
Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of light? We
don't behave as if we can see it.
Brent
Bruno Marchal
But they confuse human mathematics and the mathematics (like notably
elementary arithmetic) that they use to make sense to notion like
brain, matter, etc.
UDA just refute the conjunction of materialism and mechanism. This
really leads to the elimination of the person (not to confuse with the
elimination of the "little ego" in some mystic tradition)/
This is well illustrated in this (one hour) BBC broadcast, featuring
Marcus de Sautoy (who wrote a nice book on the "music of the primes").
(thanks to the salvianaut linking to this in a salvia forum)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Biv_8xjj8E
Despite being mathematicians, de Sautoy still believes he is flesh and
bones, and that consciousness is neuronal activity. His reasoning are
valid, but uses implicitly both mechanism and the aristotelian
conception of reality. That can't work (cf UDA).
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
>>
>> Finally a good quote from the same paper
>>
>> "Bertrand Russell, certainly no friend of theism, concluded from
>> his study of the history of Greek philosophy that ‘‘Mathematics
>> is . . . the chief source of the belief in eternal and exact truth,
>> as well as in a supersensible intelligible world.’’".
>>
>> This shows nicely that the mathematicians have been as a fifth
>> column all the time.
>>
>> Evgenii
>>
>
Quentin Anciaux
On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings.
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb<meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience toIt's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding
of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly
acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;
I could only say you're right and you're wrong. Consciousness and being is "lived" as a whole. From your own POV, you can't say "zombieness is an attribute of components rather than of their functional organization", because you feel it. Whenever you say such thing, you can't be honest with yourself... that's not an argument. It's just proper English
So the inference doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie components doesn't imply you can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.There are people like. But they are not partial zombie's. You say "blind but behaved normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's impossible.
for
example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
was blind.
Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of light? We don't behave as if we can see it.
If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
zombies.
Brent
If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental
distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know
if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies
are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence,
either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible.
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meekerdb
2012/4/8 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings.
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb<meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience toIt's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding
of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly
acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;
I could only say you're right and you're wrong. Consciousness and being is "lived" as a whole. From your own POV, you can't say "zombieness is an attribute of components rather than of their functional organization", because you feel it.
Whenever you say such thing, you can't be honest with yourself... that's not an argument. It's just proper English
Stathis Papaioannou
A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
visual perception since if we remove it we eliminate vision. A zombie
visual cortex replicates the I/O behaviour at the cut interface of the
removed tissue but does not contribute to consciousness. If whole
zombies are possible then it should be possible to make such a
component. If you say the brain as a whole would have normal
consciousness even though the component didn't you could modify the
thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie, but
adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
are possible.
>> for
>> example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
>> was blind.
>
>
> There are people like. But they are not partial zombie's. You say "blind
> but behaved normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's
> impossible.
I agree it's impossible and that's why I think functionalism is right
and zombies impossible.
>> If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
>> zombies.
>
>
> Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of
> light? We don't behave as if we can see it.
I'm not sure what you mean here. A zombie behaves as if it perceives
everything a conscious being does and nothing a conscious being
doesn't, while not actually having any perceptions at all.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 4/8/2012 5:20 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
>> I believe that we should consider Newton in his historical context. As
>> far as I have understood, because of not quite right empirical values
>> (masses, etc.) and/or because of low level of mathematics that was
>> available at his time, his use of his laws did not agree with
>> observations.
>
> Right. There was no "clash between the facts and Newton's law of
> gravitation used without additional assumptions." There was a clash
> between Newton's calculations of the consequences of his laws and the
> actual consequences.
It depends on how you define fact. Imagine that at Newton's time the
ideal scientific standards would have been accepted. Then his idea and
his paper have been just rejected. "Okay, your idea is nice but you have
to work on it some more to make it scientific." Don't you agree?
This is Feyerabend's point, that the Newton laws have been just ad hoc
hypotheses, nothing more. You cannot say that they come from
observations, as they have contradicted to the observations at that time.
The most interesting that "Who cares?". The Newton laws have been
accepted by the scientific community long time before they have been
brought in agreement with observations.
"But this meant that Newton's theory gave correct results only when used
in an ad hoc way. It did not reveal a feature of universe. Did
scientists give up? No. The theory was plausible, it had astonishing
successes so it retained despite the fact that, taken literally, it led
to absurdities. Besides, many scientists were interested in predictions
only and did not care about a metaphysical notion like 'reality'."
So, to state that a theory is driven by the facts is actually wrong. In
the historical context, the facts are actually driven by a theory.
It happens the same way nowadays. Take for a example the superstring
theory. It is has not been driven by facts in any way. Or this notion
that information is equivalent to the thermodynamic entropy. It has
nothing to do with facts at all.
I see some problems along this way.
Let us consider the story with Newton laws in this context. Laplace was
able to create a new mathematical theory that did not exist at Newton's
time. What does it mean? That there was a gene mutation for time being
between Newton and Laplace? Or that Nature has made natural neural
networks in abundance already at ancient times and Newton just failed to
employ full capabilities of his brain?
Also let us take my experiment with two mathematicians, I have made now
a nice picture to this end, see slide 26
http://embryogenesisexplained.com/files/presentations/Rudnyi2012.pdf
The theory above means that Pi exist only when mathematicians' brains
are running. Yet, it seems that a mathematical theory due to inexorable
laws describes the experiment correctly even at the state when
mathematicians are dead.
Evgenii
Evgenii Rudnyi
>
...
> This is well illustrated in this (one hour) BBC broadcast, featuring
> Marcus de Sautoy (who wrote a nice book on the "music of the primes").
> (thanks to the salvianaut linking to this in a salvia forum)
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Biv_8xjj8E
>
> Despite being mathematicians, de Sautoy still believes he is flesh and
> bones, and that consciousness is neuronal activity. His reasoning are
> valid, but uses implicitly both mechanism and the aristotelian
> conception of reality. That can't work (cf UDA).
Bruno,
I believe that now I understand what physicalism is. What would you
recommend to read about mechanism? Something like this SEP paper about
physicalism
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
As for movie, they mix everything up, for they presume that
consciousness starts at the self level. This is why I like Gray's book
where he distinguish between three different conscious processes.
1) Reconstruction of the external world.
2) Feelings.
3) Cognitive conscious experiences.
The third points adds nothing to the first two, hence he ignores it in
his book.
Evgenii
meekerdb
This is where I find your argument confusing. Consider an atom in the brain. Can you
replace it with a zombie atom? It doesen't matter, so long as it acts like a normal atom
it will contribute to consciousness. The brain as a whole will have normal consciousness
even though the atom doesn't. But the consciousness never depended on the atom *having*
consciousness - only on the atom *contributing* to consciousness (by having the same
functional behavior).
> you could modify the
> thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
> In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie,
No. I can replace all the atoms with zombie atoms and the brain is still a normal
conscious brain.
> but
> adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
> consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
> are possible.
I agree with your conclusion, but your argument seems to imply that since zombies are
impossible, zombie components are impossible and so quarks must have an element of
consciousness. It invites the fallacy of slipping from 'contributes to consciousness' to
'has consciousness'.
Brent
meekerdb
> On 08.04.2012 19:55 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 4/8/2012 5:20 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> ...
>
>>> I believe that we should consider Newton in his historical context. As
>>> far as I have understood, because of not quite right empirical values
>>> (masses, etc.) and/or because of low level of mathematics that was
>>> available at his time, his use of his laws did not agree with
>>> observations.
>>
>> Right. There was no "clash between the facts and Newton's law of
>> gravitation used without additional assumptions." There was a clash
>> between Newton's calculations of the consequences of his laws and the
>> actual consequences.
>
> It depends on how you define fact. Imagine that at Newton's time the ideal scientific
> standards would have been accepted.
I don't know what you mean by 'ideal scientific standards'.
> Then his idea and his paper have been just rejected. "Okay, your idea is nice but you
> have to work on it some more to make it scientific." Don't you agree?
No. The scientists then were not fools. They were well aware that observational data has
errors in it. They could recognize that accounting for the gravitational influence of one
planet on another was mathematically intractable, so even if the theory were exactly right
the approximations necessary to get solutions would not be exact (the same problem with
string theory).
>
> This is Feyerabend's point, that the Newton laws have been just ad hoc hypotheses,
> nothing more.
That's a silly remark. Newton's insight was that things fell down on the surface of the
Earth and if the same for extended out indefinitely it would pull down on the Moon too.
But if the Moon was moving fast enough it wouldn't fall to the Earth it would fall around
the Earth in an orbit.
> You cannot say that they come from observations, as they have contradicted to the
> observations at that time.
Newton was influenced by the observation that orbits were ellipses (approximately) and his
1/r^2 law produced ellipses.
>
> The most interesting that "Who cares?". The Newton laws have been accepted by the
> scientific community long time before they have been brought in agreement with
> observations.
But they were never 'brought into agreement' by your 'ideal' standards. The advance of
the perihelion of Mercury was never explained until Einstein, although people tried
postulating an unobserved planet to account for it.
>
> "But this meant that Newton's theory gave correct results only when used in an ad hoc
> way. It did not reveal a feature of universe. Did scientists give up? No. The theory was
> plausible, it had astonishing successes so it retained despite the fact that, taken
> literally, it led to absurdities. Besides, many scientists were interested in
> predictions only and did not care about a metaphysical notion like 'reality'."
>
> So, to state that a theory is driven by the facts is actually wrong.
No one has stated that. Theory is tested by the facts.
> In the historical context, the facts are actually driven by a theory.
All observations depend on some theory, but not necessarily on the theory being tested.
>
> It happens the same way nowadays. Take for a example the superstring theory. It is has
> not been driven by facts in any way. Or this notion that information is equivalent to
> the thermodynamic entropy. It has nothing to do with facts at all.
Still trying to ride that horse? It's your loss if you can't see the connection.
He stood on the shoulders of Newton.
> That there was a gene mutation for time being between Newton and Laplace? Or that Nature
> has made natural neural networks in abundance already at ancient times and Newton just
> failed to employ full capabilities of his brain?
>
> Also let us take my experiment with two mathematicians, I have made now a nice picture
> to this end, see slide 26
>
> http://embryogenesisexplained.com/files/presentations/Rudnyi2012.pdf
>
> The theory above means that Pi exist only when mathematicians' brains are running. Yet,
> it seems that a mathematical theory due to inexorable laws describes the experiment
> correctly even at the state when mathematicians are dead.
You mean you have a mathematical model which agrees with your observations of an
experiment, even though the guy that thought of the model is now dead. Why is that a
problem. My grandfather was named "Isaac Newton" and that's a true description even
though he's dead.
Brent
Bruno Marchal
On 08.04.2012 21:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:...This is well illustrated in this (one hour) BBC broadcast, featuringMarcus de Sautoy (who wrote a nice book on the "music of the primes").(thanks to the salvianaut linking to this in a salvia forum)http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Biv_8xjj8EDespite being mathematicians, de Sautoy still believes he is flesh andbones, and that consciousness is neuronal activity. His reasoning arevalid, but uses implicitly both mechanism and the aristotelianconception of reality. That can't work (cf UDA).
Bruno,
I believe that now I understand what physicalism is. What would you recommend to read about mechanism? Something like this SEP paper about physicalism
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
As for movie, they mix everything up, for they presume that consciousness starts at the self level.
This is why I like Gray's book where he distinguish between three different conscious processes.
1) Reconstruction of the external world.
2) Feelings.
3) Cognitive conscious experiences.
The third points adds nothing to the first two, hence he ignores it in his book.
Stathis Papaioannou
>> A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
>> of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
>> consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
>> visual perception since if we remove it we eliminate vision. A zombie
>> visual cortex replicates the I/O behaviour at the cut interface of the
>> removed tissue but does not contribute to consciousness. If whole
>> zombies are possible then it should be possible to make such a
>> component. If you say the brain as a whole would have normal
>> consciousness even though the component didn't
>
>
> This is where I find your argument confusing. Consider an atom in the
> brain. Can you replace it with a zombie atom? It doesen't matter, so long
> as it acts like a normal atom it will contribute to consciousness. The
> brain as a whole will have normal consciousness even though the atom
> doesn't. But the consciousness never depended on the atom *having*
> consciousness - only on the atom *contributing* to consciousness (by having
> the same functional behavior).
Yes, I agree with you; I don't believe it is possible to make a
zombie. If it were possible then we would either need components that
lack or don't contribute to intrinsic consciousness (if consciousness
is an intrinsic property of matter or if consciousness is added via an
immaterial soul) or components that lack or don't contribute to the
functional organisation that gives rise to consciousness while
possessing the functional organisation that gives rise to intelligent
behaviour. It's an argument against zombies and against the
substrate-dependence of consciousness.
>> you could modify the
>> thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
>> In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie,
>
>
> No. I can replace all the atoms with zombie atoms and the brain is still a
> normal conscious brain.
>
>
>> but
>> adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
>> consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
>> are possible.
>
>
> I agree with your conclusion, but your argument seems to imply that since
> zombies are impossible, zombie components are impossible and so quarks must
> have an element of consciousness. It invites the fallacy of slipping from
> 'contributes to consciousness' to 'has consciousness'.
No, I don't think quarks are either conscious or zombies. I think
consciousness arises necessarily from intelligent behaviour.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Evgenii Rudnyi
>
> On 09 Apr 2012, at 16:35, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
>> I believe that now I understand what physicalism is. What would you
>> recommend to read about mechanism? Something like this SEP paper about
>> physicalism
>>
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>
> Yes, it is a good description of physicalism. For mechanism such type of
> media are not aware of the UDA argument, so you have to understand it by
> yourself, by reading my papers, or this list. New idea or result take
> time to be accepted, especially when they cross different
> disciplinaries. I can give you many titles of books and papers---or you
> can find them in the references in my thesis, or papers. But mechanism
> is defended mostly by materialist and they use the mechanist assumption
> mainly to burry the mind-body problem. The subject is hot, and
> authoritative-argument are frequent.
>
I understand that but right now I would like to understand what a
mechanism is. Mechanism from a materialist viewpoint would also
interesting. After all, to make a conscious choice it is good to
consider all alternatives. But mostly I am interested to learn what
mechanism is (say theory independent).
Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form, I would
appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not too little, and not
to much.
...
>> This is why I like Gray's book where he distinguish between three
>> different conscious processes.
>>
>> 1) Reconstruction of the external world.
>
> ... that he seems to assume.
>
> From what you said, I think Gray is still physicalist. But as I insist,
> this forces him to postulate some non comp hypothesis, which nobody has
> ever done, except for the theories based explicitly on fairy tales.
> To be fair, some people try to develop a notion of analogical machines,
> but they are all either Turing emulable, or Turing recoverable by using
> the first person indeterminacy.
Gray is definitely physicalist. He recognizes though that consciousness
cannot be explained by physicalism, but the book is written in the
physicalism language. This makes it a nice antiphysicalism weapon: You
like physicalism, please read Gray's book, it is for you. In order to
convince someone you have to speak her language, otherwise it is hard.
As for reconstruction of the external world, in my view this statement
fits well the language of the 1st and 3rd person views. The 1st view is
after all how the 3rd view reality is perceived by the 1st view. In the
Gray's language the brain makes this dirty view and forms for example
conscious visual experience.
Gray says 1) this way "The World is Inside the Head".
p. 1. �For, just like those inner sensations, that world out there is
constructed by our brains and exists within our consciousness. In a very
real sense, the world as we consciously experience it is not out there
at all: it is inside each and every of us.�
Evgenii
Evgenii Rudnyi
By 'ideal scientific standards' I have meant for example this statement
from Wikipedia
'The Oxford English Dictionary says that scientific method is: "a method
or procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th
century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and
experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses."'
Yet, if we consider how science has been done according to historical
facts (not how it could have been done), then there are discrepancies.
After all Newton has called in God who from time to time corrects the
planets to preserve stability of the Solar system. It is written in his
book and this is a historical fact. According to statement above one can
even say that this was a result of systematic observation, measurement
and experiment.
As for entropy and information, I may missed some your arguments. Yet,
in all papers you gave me there was written that the equivalence of the
thermodynamic entropy and information follows from similarity of the two
equations. There were no experiments, observations and measurement to
this end. Even more, people who have made this statement have not
applied it to typical thermodynamics problems and have not shown how
conventional thermodynamic problems (heat engines and computing phase
equilibria) benefit from such a statement. My examples to this end are here
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/02/entropy-and-information.html
Finally, you are right that when living brains still exist, one have
right to say that a mathematical model survives a death of a couple of
mathematicians. The question is how the inexorable laws have functioned
when there were no human beings. How the Universe computed itself when
the mathematics has not been yet developed?
Evgenii
On 09.04.2012 18:21 meekerdb said the following:
Bruno Marchal
Gandy has written good paper on this. The book of Odifreddi on
recursion theory makes a good sum up. The idea of mechanism is mainly
the idea of finiteness and some local causation process, or there
arithmetical counterpart. A good book in computer science can help.
> Mechanism from a materialist viewpoint would also interesting.
That exists because many subset of the physical laws are Turing
universal. So we can implement computation in nature. But the notion
of computation is mathematical, even arithmetical, so the elementary
"causation" can be reframe in term of addition and multiplication.
This is not obvious unless you have read some original paper in the
field, like those in the dover book by Davis (the undecidable).
> After all, to make a conscious choice it is good to consider all
> alternatives. But mostly I am interested to learn what mechanism is
> (say theory independent).
Somehow the best account is the original one made by Turing. You will
find it in the dover Davis book. Probably on the net too.
>
> Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form, I
> would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not too
> little, and not to much.
OK I found the paper by Turing:
http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf
Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in term of
functions instead of real numbers.
You can try to read it. I will search other information, but there are
many, and of different type, and most still blinded by the
aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper which would
satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with Turing's paper I think.
It would be nice you complement it with some good book, like the one
by Nigel Cutland:
Bruno
> p. 1. “For, just like those inner sensations, that world out there
> is constructed by our brains and exists within our consciousness. In
> a very real sense, the world as we consciously experience it is not
> out there at all: it is inside each and every of us.”
Redshirt Bluejacket
recommend a reading of Bernardo Kastrup's essay, The parallels of
Pandeism: http://www.bernardokastrup.com/2010/03/consciousness-and-pandeism.html
-- wherein Kastrup observes "some intriguing parallels between the
debate around the 'hard problem of consciousness' and the philosophy
of Pandeism" which he finds "provides an intriguing, holistic view
encompassing all sides of the debate."
Kastrup defines Pandeism thusly:
"Pandeism is a school of thought that holds that the universe is
identical to God, but also that God was initially an omni-conscious
and omni-sentient force or entity. However, upon creating the
universe, God became unconscious and non-sentient by the very act of
becoming the universe itself."
And so, Pandeism is (naturally) both a kind of Deism and a kind of
Pantheism (and so we get from, Pantheist- Deism to Pan-Deism to
PanDeism to Pandeism).
On Apr 9, 9:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
Craig Weinberg
>
> That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than
> of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components
> (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings.
consciousness themselves since we are made of the same kinds of atoms
as all things are. Assembly only changes the relative presentation of
some group of atoms to another group. It has no power to summon
awareness from the void. To say that unconsciousness is obvious is an
argument from naive realism. We can't see consciousness in a human
body, why should we expect to see it in an atom's body?
Craig
meekerdb
> On Apr 8, 2:10 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than
>> of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components
>> (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings.
> I can just as easily say that all components must have some degree of
> consciousness themselves since we are made of the same kinds of atoms
> as all things are. Assembly only changes the relative presentation of
> some group of atoms to another group.
So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
Brent
Craig Weinberg
> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
>
balls instead of atoms?
What you are not considering is that just because the top level
consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
motive on other levels would not be retained.
LOL
Craig
meekerdb
> On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
>>
> You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
> balls instead of atoms?
That's right - so long as their arrangement produced functional equivalence.
>
> What you are not considering is that just because the top level
> consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
> motive on other levels would not be retained.
Yeah, the sense level of atoms which you know about...how?
Brent
>
> LOL
>
> Craig
>
Craig Weinberg
> On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
>
> > You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
> > balls instead of atoms?
>
> That's right - so long as their arrangement produced functional equivalence.
Function is not dependent only on 'arrangement' but on what is being
arranged.
>
>
>
> > What you are not considering is that just because the top level
> > consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
> > motive on other levels would not be retained.
>
> Yeah, the sense level of atoms which you know about...how?
in the sense of atoms. Either that or it appears as a metaphysical
entity out of nothingness when computational rituals are acted out
invisibly in the silent intangible void.
Given the choice between tracing the origin of awareness to evolving
substance and substantialized evolvingness in a vacuum it seems more
likely that they are both different aspects of the same thing rather
than one being a product of the other. If you could really have
Platonic awareness by itself, what would be the point of having such
relentless physical stability in the universe? If you could have
substance without awareness, why should awareness develop?
Craig
meekerdb
> On Apr 17, 1:49 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>> On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
>>> You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
>>> balls instead of atoms?
>> That's right - so long as their arrangement produced functional equivalence.
> My point is that they could not produce functional equivalence.
> Function is not dependent only on 'arrangement' but on what is being
> arranged.
>
>>
>>
>>> What you are not considering is that just because the top level
>>> consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
>>> motive on other levels would not be retained.
>> Yeah, the sense level of atoms which you know about...how?
> I am made of nothing but atoms, so everything that I know is grounded
> in the sense of atoms.
But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't have any
sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are entirely
different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
Brent
Craig Weinberg
> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't have any
> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are entirely
> different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
>
that consequences of keyboard activity are causing the internet. Atoms
being replaced continuously changes the arrangement continuously as
well. It makes sense to me that patterns are dependent upon pattern
recognition and have no causal efficacy in and of themselves. No byte
has every done anything by itself.
I think it may be the case too that the whole Standard Model rests on
a faulty foundation, so that although our measurements and
observations are assumed to be objective and universal, in fact they
are attributable directly to the common sense of matter which makes up
our instruments, bodies, and brain alike. Our view of the microcosm
assumes significance from the outside in, despite our own experience
of significance arising from the inside out as well. It may be that
there is a sense-making inertia which drives the arrangement of atoms
from the top down and from within. I have not seen this possibility
suggested by anyone else and it seems likely to me that it simply has
not been considered.
Craig
meekerdb
> On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't have any
>> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are entirely
>> different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
>>
> I can turn on the internet by pushing a few buttons. That doesn't mean
> that consequences of keyboard activity are causing the internet.
I can invent irrelevant metaphors, but that doesn't mean I've made an argument.
> Atoms
> being replaced continuously changes the arrangement continuously as
> well.
If the pattern changed your memory and/or function would change - as proven in millions
accidents and brain operations.
> It makes sense to me that patterns are dependent upon pattern
> recognition and have no causal efficacy in and of themselves.
A lot of stuff makes sense to you, because you define 'sense' to mean whatever you need it
to mean.
Brent
Craig Weinberg
> On 4/17/2012 12:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> >> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't have any
> >> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are entirely
> >> different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
>
> > I can turn on the internet by pushing a few buttons. That doesn't mean
> > that consequences of keyboard activity are causing the internet.
>
> I can invent irrelevant metaphors, but that doesn't mean I've made an argument.
comparison, but that doesn't mean you've made a counter argument.
>
> > Atoms
> > being replaced continuously changes the arrangement continuously as
> > well.
>
> If the pattern changed your memory and/or function would change - as proven in millions
> accidents and brain operations.
arrangement. A few molecules of LSD change the psyche. Not much of
anything is rearranged, it is only the substance itself which is
metabolized by the substance of the brain.
>
> > It makes sense to me that patterns are dependent upon pattern
> > recognition and have no causal efficacy in and of themselves.
>
> A lot of stuff makes sense to you, because you define 'sense' to mean whatever you need it
> to mean.
tell me how patterns interact with each other without sense, be my
guest.
Craig
John Mikes
Interesting back-and-forth on conventional ignorance basis.
We (in physics etc.) identified 'atoms' by mostly mathematical
treatment of poorly (if at all) understood phenomenal information (?)
limited to the capability pf the 'then' human mind.
Now 'we' invented zombies, as a mental exercise of a hype not fitting
the image we came up with and argue about some 'consciousness' marvel,
extended into those 'atoms' we invented. Good game.
Brent asked finally an impatient question:
"So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL"
what Craig never formulated in such strictness.
IMO the (hypothetical) physical body AND the so far unknown (both
spiritual(?) and physical(?) - ) mentality - in one complex - provide
the 'function' human we SPEAK about. So far we don't know better.
Change the complexity of them and the functional complex ceased to
exist (like: in death)
JM.
meekerdb
Brent and Craig: Interesting back-and-forth on conventional ignorance basis.
My ignorance isn't a convention - it's the real thing. :-)
Brent
John Mikes
--
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>>
>> Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form, I
>> would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not too
>> little, and not to much.
>
> OK I found the paper by Turing:
> http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf
>
> Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in term
> of functions instead of real numbers.
>
> You can try to read it. I will search other information, but there
> are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by the
> aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper which would
> satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with Turing's paper I
> think.
I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I have
browsed Turing's paper.
Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could be
implemented by some Turing's machine?
Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that
discusses this term philosophically?
Evgenii
Bruno Marchal
Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not
important.
>
> Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that
> discusses this term philosophically?
technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the field is
quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the whole
computability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good
"candid" correspondent. You might try take the wagon.
If not I would suggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book,
or even the first hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular
account on computability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do
serious philosophy, I'm afraid.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Evgenii Rudnyi
> On 29 Jun 2012, at 20:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>> On 11.04.2012 11:11 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>>>
>>> On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>>>>
>>>> Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form,
>>>> I would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not
>>>> too little, and not to much.
>>>
>>> OK I found the paper by Turing:
>>> http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in
>>> term of functions instead of real numbers.
>>>
>>> You can try to read it. I will search other information, but
>>> there are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by
>>> the aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper
>>> which would satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with
>>> Turing's paper I think.
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I
>> have browsed Turing's paper.
>>
>> Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could
>> be implemented by some Turing's machine?
>
> You can say that. But you could take "fortran program" instead of
> Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not
> important.
materialism. How this follows then?
Evgenii
Bruno Marchal
EvgeniiDo you some paper about it that does not have equations but thatdiscusses this term philosophically?Hmm... Not really. The start is simple, but without doing a minimumof technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the fieldis quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the wholecomputability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good"candid" correspondent. You might try take the wagon. If not I wouldsuggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book, or even thefirst hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular account oncomputability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do seriousphilosophy, I'm afraid.Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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meekerdb
>
> On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>>
>> I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How
>> this follows then?
>
> Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are
> equivalent.
>
> Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any
> Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a
> Turing machine.
>
> More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can
> find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means
> that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they
> can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
realization?
Brent
Bruno Marchal
like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic
emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for
more).
There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact that
arithmetic emulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of
"emulate". Step 8 just show that adding a substantial matter cannot
make a difference from the machines' points of view, without adding a
non Turing emulable ability to the mind.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Evgenii Rudnyi
realization. To make my point, let us consider some device that
implements a PID controller, the equation is in Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PID_controller#PID_controller_theory
Now let us start with the M-theory (or any other) and consider the
functioning device in this framework. There is dynamics and evolution of
superstrings, however it is unclear to me what happens with the equation
for the PID controller in this context. Does it mean that the M-theory
computes the equation of the PID controller?
Evgenii
meekerdb
controller and it is running and controlling something, then we have a set of equations
that describes and predicts what will happen, to a good approximation. We might program a
computer to compute what that model predicts.
M-theory is a speculative theory about matter that, if it's correct, would be the basis of
a predictive model of the behavior of the matter making up the device which is a PID
controller at a very low level of detail (e.g. elmentary particles and fields).
meekerdb
>
> On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How
>>>> this follows then?
>>>
>>> Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system
>>> are equivalent.
>>>
>>> Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any
>>> Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a
>>> Turing machine.
>>>
>>> More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you
>>> can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This
>>> means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that
>>> they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
>>
>> But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical
>> realization?
>
> Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can
> emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program
> fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
are abstractions.
>
> There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact that arithmetic
> emulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of "emulate".
and a static, timeless one at that.
Brent
Evgenii Rudnyi
matter that must obey to the M-theory knows about it?
If physicists would say that the M-theory is just a model, then I could
understand. However Hawking in Grand Design says that a physical theory
is more than the model. If I have understood his 'model dependent
realism' correctly, then according to him the M-theory is the reality.
Evgenii
Evgenii
Bruno Marchal
mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same
sense that the number 17 exists.
We can implement them in physical system, but this does not make them
physical.
> They are abstractions.
If you want. This changes nothing.
>
>>
>> There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact
>> that arithmetic emulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of
>> "emulate".
>
> That's a metaphorical sense.
> "Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything,
mathematical notion discovered before the building of physical
computer. Some could even argue that the physical reality can only
approximate them.
And with comp we have to define eventually notion like acting and
performing from the relation between numbers, and this is rather easy
to do. What is difficult is to get the right measure on the
computations, not to define action and performance.
I am explaining what is a computation on the FOAR list, but you can
find it also in any textbook on theoretical computer science. No
notion of physics are involved at all in the definition.
> it's concept and a static, timeless one at that.
case in some physical based theories (for example in all theories
admitting block universe).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
have to know the theory for "obeying" to the theory.
>
> If physicists would say that the M-theory is just a model, then I
> could understand.
There are three things, both for mathematical and physical realities:
The theory
The interpretation of the theory (a model)
Reality (a bet)
Physicists usually confuse either theory and model, or model/
interpretation and reality.
In the case of M-theory, it is even more difficult, because it is
based on QM, and there are no unanimity of what QM means. Then M-
theory itself is particularly hard to interpret, even assuming that QM
is not problematical.
> However Hawking in Grand Design says that a physical theory is more
> than the model. If I have understood his 'model dependent realism'
> correctly, then according to him the M-theory is the reality.
reality. I guess it means that some standard interpretation of M-
Theory fits with some reality that he is speculating about.
If that is true, then, with comp, M-theory would be equivalent with
Robinson arithmetic, which I doubt.
If M-theory is the unique description of reality, and if that cannot
be derived logically from Robinson arithmetic, then either M-theory is
wrong, or computationalism is wrong (we have no relative substitution
level). This follows from UDA.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
meekerdb
description in the newspaper.
>
> If physicists would say that the M-theory is just a model, then I could understand.
> However Hawking in Grand Design says that a physical theory is more than the model. If I
> have understood his 'model dependent realism' correctly, then according to him the
> M-theory is the reality.
'exists' is model dependent.
Brent
meekerdb
Brent
> We can implement them in physical system, but this does not make them physical.
>
>
>
>> They are abstractions.
>
> If you want. This changes nothing.
>
>
>>
>>>
>>> There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact that arithmetic
>>> emulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of "emulate".
>>
>> That's a metaphorical sense.
>
> Not at all.
>
>
>> "Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything,
>
>
> Acting and performing are the metaphor here. Computation is a purely mathematical notion
> discovered before the building of physical computer. Some could even argue that the
> physical reality can only approximate them.
> And with comp we have to define eventually notion like acting and performing from the
> relation between numbers, and this is rather easy to do.
structure for part (or all) of a brain, and so long as the input/output functions were
always the same consciousness would be unchanged. So comp allows that we may still need a
physical realization of the functionality. That this can be described by relations
between numbers does not entail that it is replaceable by the abstraction.
> What is difficult is to get the right measure on the computations, not to define action
> and performance.
> I am explaining what is a computation on the FOAR list, but you can find it also in any
> textbook on theoretical computer science. No notion of physics are involved at all in
> the definition.
realization can be different for (approximately) the same function. It is no different
than abstracting apples and oranges as fruit so that we can add one apple to one orange
and get two fruit. It doesn't make apples and oranges the same thing.
Brent
Jason Resch
On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.
On 01 Jul 2012, at 09:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then?
Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent.
Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine.
More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization?
Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations.
Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the number 17 exists.
Brent,
What is the ontological difference between 17 and the chair you are sitting in? Both admit objective analysis, so how is either any more real than the other?
You might argue 17 is less real because we can't access it with our senses, but neither can we access the insides of stars with our senses. Yet no one disputes the reality of the insides of stars.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
Jason
meekerdb
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:20 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.
On 01 Jul 2012, at 09:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then?
Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent.
Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine.
More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization?
Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations.
Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the number 17 exists.
Brent,
What is the ontological difference between 17 and the chair you are sitting in? Both admit objective analysis, so how is either any more real than the other?
You might argue 17 is less real because we can't access it with our senses, but neither can we access the insides of stars with our senses. Yet no one disputes the reality of the insides of stars.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
Brent
Jason Resch
On 7/1/2012 11:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:20 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.
On 01 Jul 2012, at 09:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then?
Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent.
Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine.
More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization?
Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations.
Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the number 17 exists.
Brent,
What is the ontological difference between 17 and the chair you are sitting in? Both admit objective analysis, so how is either any more real than the other?
You might argue 17 is less real because we can't access it with our senses, but neither can we access the insides of stars with our senses. Yet no one disputes the reality of the insides of stars.
We access them indirectly via instruments and theories of those instruments.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
You can kick it and it kicks back.
Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?
Brent
meekerdb
On 7/1/2012 11:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:20 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.
On 01 Jul 2012, at 09:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then?
Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent.
Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine.
More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization?
Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations.
Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the number 17 exists.
Brent,
What is the ontological difference between 17 and the chair you are sitting in? Both admit objective analysis, so how is either any more real than the other?
You might argue 17 is less real because we can't access it with our senses, but neither can we access the insides of stars with our senses. Yet no one disputes the reality of the insides of stars.
We access them indirectly via instruments and theories of those instruments.
Are numbers not also inferred from theories of our instruments?
For example, computers are instruments that let us observe and study the properties of various Turing machines, which themselves are mathematical objects.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
You can kick it and it kicks back.
Math kicks back too. If you come up with a proposition, it kicks back with either true or false.
Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.
Explain then why one is mistaken in supposing mathematical objects exist, when they can be inferred according to some models of reality.
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?
This was my point. You say math exists only in our minds. But an immaterialist could say the same of the chair.
To escape this we need some model of reality which postulates more exists "out there" than can be found in one's mind.
Your model seems to assume an external world exists, but it stops exactly where our instruments and inferences from their observations end.
Humanity's model of reality has over the centuries, been repeatedly extended. Therefore I think it is more conservative to believe there is more "out there" than we can see or imagine.
Brent
Jason Resch
For example, computers are instruments that let us observe and study the properties of various Turing machines, which themselves are mathematical objects.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
You can kick it and it kicks back.
Math kicks back too. If you come up with a proposition, it kicks back with either true or false.
Only metaphorically.
Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.
Explain then why one is mistaken in supposing mathematical objects exist, when they can be inferred according to some models of reality.
Explain why Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist according to Conan Doyle's model of reality.
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?
This was my point. You say math exists only in our minds. But an immaterialist could say the same of the chair.
He could say it, but he would be redefining what 'exists' means.
To escape this we need some model of reality which postulates more exists "out there" than can be found in one's mind.
Materialism generally postulates more than what exists in your mind. That's how it explains the intersubjective agreement of perceptions.
Your model seems to assume an external world exists, but it stops exactly where our instruments and inferences from their observations end.
Not at all. That's whole point of having a model and not just an encyclopedia of data. A model makes predictions beyond the data on which it was based.
Humanity's model of reality has over the centuries, been repeatedly extended. Therefore I think it is more conservative to believe there is more "out there" than we can see or imagine.
I'm not a conservative.
meekerdb
Numbers and Turing machines are part of Bruno's theory. I don't see the difference. Why can't Turing machines exist?
For example, computers are instruments that let us observe and study the properties of various Turing machines, which themselves are mathematical objects.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
You can kick it and it kicks back.
Math kicks back too. If you come up with a proposition, it kicks back with either true or false.
Only metaphorically.
The whole "it's real if it kicks back" idea is a metaphor. I think the point of the metaphor is that to be real something needs to have its own properties which we have limited or no control over. It is not malleable to our whims or will, but resists attempts to change it.
Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.
Explain then why one is mistaken in supposing mathematical objects exist, when they can be inferred according to some models of reality.
Explain why Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist according to Conan Doyle's model of reality.
Sherlock holmes does exist, but then what is Sherlock holmes? A character described in some books.
Conan could have changed anything he wanted about Sherlock holmes, and therefore he doesn't "kick back".
If you asked two people what properties Sherlock holmes has that were not answered in the book there would be no agreement, and no way to study Sherlock holmes as an objectively real object. Only the texts can be studied.
This is not true of mathematical objects. Properties are not enumerated in some text. They are not subject to be defined or changed by some authority. Two mathematicians, whether on earth or on different planets can make the same discoveries about the same objects.
Further, mathematical realism is a useful scientific theory. It provides explanations for scientific questions. Why you don't see it as a legitimate theory is a mystery to me.
If you don't support the theory, that is fine, but it seems like you discount it's possibility altogether because only "real physical things" can be real.
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?
This was my point. You say math exists only in our minds. But an immaterialist could say the same of the chair.
He could say it, but he would be redefining what 'exists' means.
What is your definition?
Bruno says digital computation is unique because all the different models of computation seem equivalent. That makes his theory interesting, but it doesn't make it true. After all it was invented to model what people can do by rote using pencil and paper - and finite resources; the infinite tape is just a theoretical convenience, just like the assumption of infinitely many integers. If you're going to elevate mathematics to ontology then there's no reason it has to be constrained by human understanding. We could take geometry, or set theory, or hypercomputers to be fundamental.
Brent
Jason Resch
They are real according to the math of QM, which is one of the most solidly established theories. You can doubt they are real, but it is like doubting the theory of evolution.
In any case, my point was that there are many things in science we cannot perceive that are given the status of "real" or "extant", so perceptibility cannot be a requirement.
If you need more examples, consider no instrument has ever observed a quark. Nor has any instrument peered beyond the cosmological horizon. Yet most particle physicists believe quarks are real, and most cosmologists believe the universe is more vast than the Hubble volume.
Sure they can. I can program this computer to be one - except it might run out of 'tape'.
Numbers and Turing machines are part of Bruno's theory. I don't see the difference. Why can't Turing machines exist?
No one disagrees that we can make physical approximations of Turing machines. The Turing machines I am referring to are the ones you deny the existence of. From above:
Brent: Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations.
Bruno: Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the number 17 exists.
Brent: Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.
To be specific, those Turing machines that exist in the same sense as the number 17. Those that are neither physical realizations nor ideas or patterns in brain processes.
We use instruments (physical computers) in the study of computer science. As Edsger Dijkstra said: "Computer science is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes."
Regarding things that exist yet we cannot see directly, you said: "We access them indirectly via instruments and theories of those instruments." What is computer science studying if not these mathematical objects? As Dijkstra said, computer science isn't about computers. These are merely the instruments of computer scientists, in the same sense telescopes are instruments for astronomers.
Are computer scientists really spending all their time studying objects that are merely "patterns in brain processes" or is there something more fundamental being studied? Something that is brain pattern independent?
But we can interact with it and potentially change it.
For example, computers are instruments that let us observe and study the properties of various Turing machines, which themselves are mathematical objects.
You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.
You can kick it and it kicks back.
Math kicks back too. If you come up with a proposition, it kicks back with either true or false.
Only metaphorically.
The whole "it's real if it kicks back" idea is a metaphor. I think the point of the metaphor is that to be real something needs to have its own properties which we have limited or no control over. It is not malleable to our whims or will, but resists attempts to change it.
We can't interact with the past, things beyond the cosmological horizon, objects in other branches of the wave function, things outside our light cone, etc. Clearly, the potential for interaction is not required for something to be considered real. No where in the definition of exists or real is there any mention of potential for interaction:
re·al
adjective
1. true; not merely ostensible, nominal, or apparent: the real reason for an act.
2. existing or occurring as fact; actual rather than imaginary, ideal, or fictitious: a story taken from real life.
3. being an actual thing; having objective existence; not imaginary: The events you will see in the film are real and not just made up.
4. being actually such; not merely so-called: a real victory.
5. genuine; not counterfeit, artificial, or imitation; authentic: a real antique; a real diamond; real silk.
You forget how he was forced to revive Holmes by the public after he killed him off.
Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.
Explain then why one is mistaken in supposing mathematical objects exist, when they can be inferred according to some models of reality.
Explain why Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist according to Conan Doyle's model of reality.
Sherlock holmes does exist, but then what is Sherlock holmes? A character described in some books.
Conan could have changed anything he wanted about Sherlock holmes, and therefore he doesn't "kick back".
Exactly. Anything goes for some textual description of an imaginary setting and character. This is not true in computer science or math. I can't change which numbers are prime or not. These are objective properties, like the gravitational constant.
That's right. We can discover properties of real things that are not part of their defining description - unlike say the number 17.
If you asked two people what properties Sherlock holmes has that were not answered in the book there would be no agreement, and no way to study Sherlock holmes as an objectively real object. Only the texts can be studied.
Not true. There are millions of properties that one could state about 17, which are not part of 17's definition, which states merely that 17 is the successor of 16.
For example, was it obvious to you from the description of 17 that 17 is the only prime number that is a Genocchi number ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocchi_number )?
Of course you can say it was possible to have determined that from some axioms, but what axioms to use are as much discovered and evolved as our laws of physics. We can discover more powerful axiomatic systems just like Relativity was a more powerful physical theory than Newtonian physics. Having the complete definition for an apple as a Newtonian object will not yield us all the actual properties of the apple (such as time dilation and length contraction when the apple accelerats to a high velocity) because we are operating in an incomplete system. Likewise, we cannot derive all true facts about 17 with a fixed set of axioms.
I see arithmetic as a legitimate theory of things you can count, i.e. it describes the results of some operations with them, provided you map the theory to the things in a valid way. But the same it true of say the theory of elastic bodies.
This is not true of mathematical objects. Properties are not enumerated in some text. They are not subject to be defined or changed by some authority. Two mathematicians, whether on earth or on different planets can make the same discoveries about the same objects.
Further, mathematical realism is a useful scientific theory. It provides explanations for scientific questions. Why you don't see it as a legitimate theory is a mystery to me.
Arithmetic is much richer than you you give it credit for.
I don't discount the possibility that Bruno's 'everything is arithmetic' might be a good model, I just haven't seen any predictive power yet.
If you don't support the theory, that is fine, but it seems like you discount it's possibility altogether because only "real physical things" can be real.
Everything theories explain quantum randomness, explain the appearance of fine tuning, and in general, are in line with the trend of science which has gradually been expanding our concept of reality:
1. Our world and the sky above it are all that exist (since ancient times)
2. Our world is one of many worlds orbiting the Sun (Nicolaus Copernicus in 1543)
3. Our sun is one of many stars in this galaxy (Friedrich Bessel in 1838)
4. Our position in time is just one of all equally real points in time (Einstein in 1905)
5. Our galaxy is one of many galaxies (Edwin Hubble in 1920)
6. Our history is just one of many possible histories (Hugh Everett in 1957)
7. The observable universe is a tiny fraction of the whole (Alan Guth in 1980)
8. Our laws are one of 10^500 possible solutions in string theory (Steven Weinberg in 1987)
9. String theory is just one among the set of all valid structures (Max Tegmark in 1996)
My metaphysical view is that only some things are real. When you start from premises like 'everything exists' you've just set yourself the task of saying why we have only the experiences we do, the ones for which we invented the word 'real'. If you can't satisfy that task, then you haven't gotten anywhere.
I agree that solving one problem (ontology) has created a new one (predicting experiences), but if solutions to old problems didn't bring new questions, science would have hit a dead end long ago. But just because we are faced with a new problem does not mean we haven't gotten anywhere.
Of course we could all be deluded and living the Matrix, but that idea has no predictive power. I already gave a definition of exists, that which we can interact with;
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?
This was my point. You say math exists only in our minds. But an immaterialist could say the same of the chair.
He could say it, but he would be redefining what 'exists' means.
What is your definition?
I don't think "potential for interaction" works, given the examples I listed above for things thought to exist, but are impossible to interact with.
although it's more than that since we interact with things in our dreams. Have you ever read one of those adventure novels written for kids in which at various points you make a choice and it says go to page xx, so that the continuation of the story depends on your choice? That's the way math textbooks are. You start with axioms and you deduce things from them or a while, then you introduce a new axiom and see where it leads, then you consider a contrary axiom and consider what it implies.
Axioms are like theories in physics. Some lead to dead ends, some lead to deeper truths. Your concept of mathematics is like what Hilbert had hoped for but Godel showed could not be.
Jason
meekerdb
Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and people and numbers, sets, classes, homomorphisms, adjectives? Whether you want to bestow the honorific 'exists' on these things, only a philosopher can wonder whether they are all the same kind of thing.
But we can interact with it and potentially change it.
We can't interact with the past, things beyond the cosmological horizon, objects in other branches of the wave function, things outside our light cone, etc.
Clearly, the potential for interaction is not required for something to be considered real. No where in the definition of exists or real is there any mention of potential for interaction:
re·al
adjective
1. true; not merely ostensible, nominal, or apparent: the real reason for an act.
2. existing or occurring as fact; actual rather than imaginary, ideal, or fictitious: a story taken from real life.
3. being an actual thing; having objective existence; not imaginary: The events you will see in the film are real and not just made up.
4. being actually such; not merely so-called: a real victory.
5. genuine; not counterfeit, artificial, or imitation; authentic: a real antique; a real diamond; real silk.
You forget how he was forced to revive Holmes by the public after he killed him off.
Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.
Explain then why one is mistaken in supposing mathematical objects exist, when they can be inferred according to some models of reality.
Explain why Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist according to Conan Doyle's model of reality.
Sherlock holmes does exist, but then what is Sherlock holmes? A character described in some books.
Conan could have changed anything he wanted about Sherlock holmes, and therefore he doesn't "kick back".
Exactly. Anything goes for some textual description of an imaginary setting and character. This is not true in computer science or math. I can't change which numbers are prime or not. These are objective properties, like the gravitational constant.
That's right. We can discover properties of real things that are not part of their defining description - unlike say the number 17.
If you asked two people what properties Sherlock holmes has that were not answered in the book there would be no agreement, and no way to study Sherlock holmes as an objectively real object. Only the texts can be studied.
Not true. There are millions of properties that one could state about 17, which are not part of 17's definition, which states merely that 17 is the successor of 16.
For example, was it obvious to you from the description of 17 that 17 is the only prime number that is a Genocchi number ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocchi_number )?
Of course you can say it was possible to have determined that from some axioms, but what axioms to use are as much discovered and evolved as our laws of physics. We can discover more powerful axiomatic systems just like Relativity was a more powerful physical theory than Newtonian physics. Having the complete definition for an apple as a Newtonian object will not yield us all the actual properties of the apple (such as time dilation and length contraction when the apple accelerats to a high velocity) because we are operating in an incomplete system. Likewise, we cannot derive all true facts about 17 with a fixed set of axioms.
I see arithmetic as a legitimate theory of things you can count, i.e. it describes the results of some operations with them, provided you map the theory to the things in a valid way. But the same it true of say the theory of elastic bodies.
This is not true of mathematical objects. Properties are not enumerated in some text. They are not subject to be defined or changed by some authority. Two mathematicians, whether on earth or on different planets can make the same discoveries about the same objects.
Further, mathematical realism is a useful scientific theory. It provides explanations for scientific questions. Why you don't see it as a legitimate theory is a mystery to me.
Arithmetic is much richer than you you give it credit for.
I don't discount the possibility that Bruno's 'everything is arithmetic' might be a good model, I just haven't seen any predictive power yet.
If you don't support the theory, that is fine, but it seems like you discount it's possibility altogether because only "real physical things" can be real.
Everything theories explain quantum randomness, explain the appearance of fine tuning,
and in general, are in line with the trend of science which has gradually been expanding our concept of reality:
1. Our world and the sky above it are all that exist (since ancient times)
2. Our world is one of many worlds orbiting the Sun (Nicolaus Copernicus in 1543)
3. Our sun is one of many stars in this galaxy (Friedrich Bessel in 1838)
4. Our position in time is just one of all equally real points in time (Einstein in 1905)
5. Our galaxy is one of many galaxies (Edwin Hubble in 1920)
6. Our history is just one of many possible histories (Hugh Everett in 1957)
7. The observable universe is a tiny fraction of the whole (Alan Guth in 1980)
8. Our laws are one of 10^500 possible solutions in string theory (Steven Weinberg in 1987)
9. String theory is just one among the set of all valid structures (Max Tegmark in 1996)
My metaphysical view is that only some things are real. When you start from premises like 'everything exists' you've just set yourself the task of saying why we have only the experiences we do, the ones for which we invented the word 'real'. If you can't satisfy that task, then you haven't gotten anywhere.
I agree that solving one problem (ontology) has created a new one (predicting experiences), but if solutions to old problems didn't bring new questions, science would have hit a dead end long ago. But just because we are faced with a new problem does not mean we haven't gotten anywhere.
Of course we could all be deluded and living the Matrix, but that idea has no predictive power. I already gave a definition of exists, that which we can interact with;
Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?
How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?
This was my point. You say math exists only in our minds. But an immaterialist could say the same of the chair.
He could say it, but he would be redefining what 'exists' means.
What is your definition?
I don't think "potential for interaction" works, given the examples I listed above for things thought to exist, but are impossible to interact with.
although it's more than that since we interact with things in our dreams. Have you ever read one of those adventure novels written for kids in which at various points you make a choice and it says go to page xx, so that the continuation of the story depends on your choice? That's the way math textbooks are. You start with axioms and you deduce things from them or a while, then you introduce a new axiom and see where it leads, then you consider a contrary axiom and consider what it implies.
Axioms are like theories in physics. Some lead to dead ends, some lead to deeper truths.
Your concept of mathematics is like what Hilbert had hoped for but Godel showed could not be.
Brent