In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist

[Roger Clough]

In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist 

 

Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge is derived from sense experience.  
Rationalism is the doctrine that reason alone is a  source of knowledge and is independent of experience.  

Materialism is a combination of both philosophies.

These may sound like completely diffierent doctrines, but my point here is that

all of these pursuits ultimately rely on intuition.

They  afre both subbranches of intjuitionism.

 

Why ? Concerning rationalism, even deductive logic requires intuition to arrive at a conclusilon.

Concering empiricism, it is fairly obvious to see that experience

alone cannot provide us any conclusion. If you dpoubt that,

consider Peirce's three categories, in which Secondness is

the category of intuion, leading us from an experience to a fact.

 

So Penrose's recent excursion into Platonism should be taken more seriously,

for ultimately his criticizers, the empiricists and the rationalists, are both Platonists.

 

Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/14/2013   
See my Leibniz site at  
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

[chris peck]

Hi Rog

As you have described them a materialist could not be a "combination of both" rationalism and empiricism,  because you have them as diametrically opposed. If "reason alone" is the source of knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be combined to be. Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't give much of a hoot about how knowledge is aquired.

More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches of intuitionism. The moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to the mind connecting with a realm of ideas is neither an act of reason nor sensory experience. Moreover, If logic is to be "deductive" then, by definition, conclusions must never follow from unexplainable leaps of intuition. If they do they have not been logically deduced, have they? And infact that is Penrose's point : leaps of intuition can not be modelled computationally. logic, ofcourse, can be. since, allegedly, minds can grope for and master facts beyond the scope of deduction, they must be qualitatively different from computer programs which can only deduce things logically.

You really seem to have things back to front in this post.

Regards

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[spudb...@aol.com]

I wonder if a more precise way of stating this is to say, that like Platonism, there must be an underlying programming to the cosmos. That would cover the Idealism central feature.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jun 2013, at 16:33, spudb...@aol.com wrote:

I wonder if a more precise way of stating this is to say, that like Platonism, there must be an underlying programming to the cosmos. That would cover the Idealism central feature.

Arithmetical realism entails the the experienceable cosmos *cannot* be programmed, as it emerges from a sort of competitions between all "digital approximations" of it. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 6/15/2013 12:40 AM, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Rog
>
> As you have described them a materialist could not be a "combination of both"
> rationalism and empiricism, because you have them as diametrically opposed. If "reason
> alone" is the source of knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be combined to be.
> Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't give much of a hoot about how
> knowledge is aquired.
>
> More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches of intuitionism. The
> moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to the mind connecting with a realm of ideas is
> neither an act of reason nor sensory experience. Moreover, If logic is to be "deductive"
> then, by definition, conclusions must never follow from unexplainable leaps of intuition.

Where does the persuasive power of logic come from? Why do you believe, "Either X or
not-X" is true? Is it not a matter of intuition? Isn't logic just an attempt to
formalize intuitive reasoning.

Brent

[spudb...@aol.com]

It would be nice if it somehow was programable (I think) since we could make things better, as well as destroy everything. But what is new about that? Do you thus, give this person any creedence then, or not really?

http://www.onbeing.org/program/uncovering-codes-reality/feature/symbols-power-adinkras-and-nature-reality/1460

 

Sincerely,

 

Mitch

[Roger Clough]

The missing perceiver in materialism and artificial intelligence and how to implement it

 

Unless you have a perceive (a subject) with a point of view, a broadband living mind, you have nothing.

 

The perceiver has the ability to see the world from his own pinpoint or narrow-band point of view

and scan it through all angles in nroadband.

 

Here;s what saomputer science has:

 

no consciousness, just a blind deaf and dumb description of an object = just data = an objective or public world. (what computers are confined to live in).

 

Here's what Leibniz gives us:

 

Personal consciousness, that being (subject + object) = a personal experience =  a personal or subjective worldc

 

Leibniz seems to be the only one who gives a fairly  understandable  account. Here's one of my versions of his view:

 

http://www.academia.edu/3661917/The_secret_of_perception._How_our_individual_minds_all_perceive_through_the_One_Mind

 

"The secret of perception. Particular minds and how they relate to the overall or Cosmic MindThe problem of perception in materialistic thinking is that it 

forces us tothink that there is a homunculo usLeibniz has a more complicated understanding of particular minds and how they relate toCosmic Mind.In 

Leibniz's metaphysics, there is only one mind (the Perceiver or Cosmic Mind or God) thatperceives and acts, doing this through the Surpreme (most dominant) monad.It perceives the whole universe with 

perfect clarity.Only it can perceive and act, because its monads (which includes our minds) have no windows.The monads (our minds) perceive only indirectly, as the Supreme Monad is the only--what we would call-- "conscious" mind. We only think and perceive indirectly,as the Supreme Monad continually and instantly updates its universe of monads. Thus there is no problem communing with God (the Cosmic Mind)as we do so continually and necessarily, although only aqccording to our own abilitiesand perspective. sThat we ourselves, not God, appear to be the perceiver is thus only apparent.Also,

 because Cosmic Mind sees the entire universe as viewed by a kaleidoscope of individual monads, the perceptions it returns to us contains not only whatwe see (the universe from our 

own individual perspectives) but what theperceptions of all of the other monads. Thus each monad knows everythingin the universe, but only from its own perspective, and monads 

being monads,not perfectly clear but distorted.Thus, as Paul says, “For now we see dimly, as in a mirror, but the n we shallsee cleasrly, face to face.Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/16/2013 

 

Also  see my Leibniz site at

http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jun 2013, at 07:20, Roger Clough wrote:

The missing perceiver in materialism and artificial intelligence and how to implement it

 

Unless you have a perceive (a subject) with a point of view, a broadband living mind, you have nothing.

Some machines have already discovered their own many different points of view.

 

The perceiver has the ability to see the world

Which world?

from his own pinpoint or narrow-band point of view

and scan it through all angles in nroadband.

 

Here;s what saomputer science has:

 

no consciousness, just a blind deaf and dumb description of an object = just data = an objective or public world. (what computers are confined to live in).

Most are just dualist. They are indeed easily shown inconsistent. But the problem is not the absence of mind, it is the believe in a primary physical reality, which is not sustained by any evidences.

 

Here's what Leibniz gives us:

 

Personal consciousness, that being (subject + object) = a personal experience =  a personal or subjective worldc

 

Leibniz seems to be the only one who gives a fairly  understandable  account. Here's one of my versions of his view:

 

http://www.academia.edu/3661917/The_secret_of_perception._How_our_individual_minds_all_perceive_through_the_One_Mind

 

"The secret of perception. Particular minds and how they relate to the overall or Cosmic MindThe problem of perception in materialistic thinking is that it 

forces us tothink that there is a homunculo usLeibniz has a more complicated understanding of particular minds and how they relate toCosmic Mind.In 

Leibniz's metaphysics, there is only one mind (the Perceiver or Cosmic Mind or God) thatperceives and acts, doing this through the Surpreme (most dominant) monad.It perceives the whole universe with 

perfect clarity.Only it can perceive and act, because its monads (which includes our minds) have no windows.The monads (our minds) perceive only indirectly, as the Supreme Monad is the only--what we would call-- "conscious" mind. We only think and perceive indirectly,as the Supreme Monad continually and instantly updates its universe of monads. Thus there is no problem communing with God (the Cosmic Mind)as we do so continually and necessarily, although only aqccording to our own abilitiesand perspective. sThat we ourselves, not God, appear to be the perceiver is thus only apparent.Also,

 because Cosmic Mind sees the entire universe as viewed by a kaleidoscope of individual monads, the perceptions it returns to us contains not only whatwe see (the universe from our 

own individual perspectives) but what theperceptions of all of the other monads. Thus each monad knows everythingin the universe, but only from its own perspective, and monads 

being monads,not perfectly clear but distorted.Thus, as Paul says, “For now we see dimly, as in a mirror, but the n we shallsee cleasrly, face to face.Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/16/2013 

Leibniz is still far late compared to the antic Platonists, which are the only one coherent with facts and theories (comp, QM, etc.)

Bruno

 

Also  see my Leibniz site at

http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jun 2013, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:

> On 6/15/2013 12:40 AM, chris peck wrote:
>> Hi Rog
>>
>> As you have described them a materialist could not be a
>> "combination of both" rationalism and empiricism, because you have
>> them as diametrically opposed. If "reason alone" is the source of
>> knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be combined to be.
>> Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't give much
>> of a hoot about how knowledge is aquired.
>>
>> More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches
>> of intuitionism.

Chris Peck is right here.

>> The moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to the mind connecting
>> with a realm of ideas is neither an act of reason nor sensory
>> experience. Moreover, If logic is to be "deductive" then, by
>> definition, conclusions must never follow from unexplainable leaps
>> of intuition.
>
> Where does the persuasive power of logic come from? Why do you
> believe, "Either X or not-X" is true? Is it not a matter of
> intuition?

Yes, but not in the sense of the intuitionist.

> Isn't logic just an attempt to formalize intuitive reasoning.

Only reasoning, where the intuition is used only in the choice of the
axiom, and not in the reasoning.

Basically intuitionism reject the idea that there is an independent
reality such that A v ~A applies to it. They accept only ~ ~(A V ~A).

If we limit reality to sigma_1 truth, like in the comp TOE, there is
no genuine difference between intuitionism and platonism. But an
intuitionist should still say no to the doctor, as the FPI is not
constructive. "Washington V Moscow" needs a non-intuitionist "OR".

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>> If they do they have not been logically deduced, have they? And
>> infact that is Penrose's point : leaps of intuition can not be
>> modelled computationally. logic, ofcourse, can be. since,
>> allegedly, minds can grope for and master facts beyond the scope of
>> deduction, they must be qualitatively different from computer
>> programs which can only deduce things logically.
>>
>> You really seem to have things back to front in this post.
>>
>> Regards
>

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jun 2013, at 22:29, spudb...@aol.com wrote:

It would be nice if it somehow was programable (I think) since we could make things better, as well as destroy everything.

We are not programmable by us, but comp just say that we are Turing emulable at some level (and we cannot know-for-sure what that level is).

But what is new about that? Do you thus, give this person any creedence then, or not really?

http://www.onbeing.org/program/uncovering-codes-reality/feature/symbols-power-adinkras-and-nature-reality/1460

 

Sincerely,

I am a machine ===> whatever is not me is not a machine.

This is not obvious to prove. It does not follow from simple logic, but from the FPI (first person indeterminacy).

See UDA 1-7, perhaps.

Don't confuse the thesis that "we" are machine (comp), and that the physical universe is a machine, as they are incompatible. Now if the universe is a machine, we are machine, but that is impossible (by UDA) so the physical universe cannot be a machine (with or without comp).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

This note is addressed to all materialists, especially Prof. Dennett. Getting from "me" to "I"'

Self-reference could be a subject/predicate relation. But that doesn't say enough because
there are two possible perspectives:

1) "He is a man." Here you are referencing yourself in the 3rd person or objective persepective. Bruno Marchall calls this "3p" .

2) "I am a man." This is 1st person. Marshall calls this "1p." 1p is the subjective form of self-reference.

Do you see the difference ? Materialism and computer language only gives us the objective (descriptive) or 3p format
because it does not contain a subjective element.

Leibniz gets around this problem by including a subjective element, which is
that which perceives the world through the top monad. This subjectrive
element is universal and isa what Plato called the One or Oversoul.

To include such a subjective element, you need to have a point in the
brain which is something like a king, that does all of the perceiving and
governing. He is not a simple homunculus, he makes sense of what the
visual signals in the optical nerves provides us with.

Am I making any sense to you materialists? Can you see the difference between
the "I" perspectiove (what i say above) and the  "me" of conventional materialistic theory ?

[Roger Clough]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jun 2013, at 15:11, Roger Clough wrote:

This note is addressed to all materialists, especially Prof. Dennett. Getting from "me" to "I"'

Self-reference could be a subject/predicate relation. But that doesn't say enough because
there are two possible perspectives:

1) "He is a man." Here you are referencing yourself in the 3rd person or objective persepective. Bruno Marchall calls this "3p" .

2) "I am a man." This is 1st person. Marshall calls this "1p." 1p is the subjective form of self-reference.

Do you see the difference ? Materialism and computer language only gives us the objective (descriptive) or 3p format
because it does not contain a subjective element.

You get it when you apply Theaetetus definition of knowledge to the description of the machine's belief (that's 3p, but then theaetetus' definition is Bp & p, and crazily enough, incompleteness makes it a working definition for a non nameable (by the subject) notion of 1p.

This is not obvious, as incompleteness is by itself not obvious, but it works, and refute your point. 

Leibniz gets around this problem by including a subjective element, which is
that which perceives the world through the top monad. This subjectrive
element is universal and isa what Plato called the One or Oversoul.

OK, but machines get it too.

To include such a subjective element, you need to have a point in the
brain which is something like a king, that does all of the perceiving and
governing. He is not a simple homunculus, he makes sense of what the
visual signals in the optical nerves provides us with.

Yes that "point" exists, for machine's too.

Am I making any sense to you materialists? Can you see the difference between
the "I" perspectiove (what i say above) and the  "me" of conventional materialistic theory ?

They can, but as long as they want to keep weak materialism (the belief in some primary matter), they are obliged to eliminate it to remain consistent.

But Leibniz still hold on some primary matter. It is better to backtrack to those who understood the first that "primary matter" is not supported by any evidences, as the dream argument already suggests.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 6/16/2013 12:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most are just dualist. They are indeed easily shown inconsistent. But the problem is not the absence of mind, it is the believe in a primary physical reality, which is not sustained by any evidences.

?? What's the evidence arithmetic is primary?� The only evidence for a theory is that it works.� You seem to criticize primary physical reality because it doesn't include a more fundamental theory showing that it's primary - but that would a contradiction.� Whatever the most fundamental model is cannot have a justification showing it is fundamental.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 6/16/2013 12:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 Jun 2013, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 6/15/2013 12:40 AM, chris peck wrote:
>>> Hi Rog
>>>
>>> As you have described them a materialist could not be a "combination of both"
>>> rationalism and empiricism, because you have them as diametrically opposed. If
>>> "reason alone" is the source of knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be combined
>>> to be. Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't give much of a hoot
>>> about how knowledge is aquired.
>>>
>>> More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches of intuitionism.
>
> Chris Peck is right here.
>
>
>
>>> The moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to the mind connecting with a realm of
>>> ideas is neither an act of reason nor sensory experience. Moreover, If logic is to be
>>> "deductive" then, by definition, conclusions must never follow from unexplainable
>>> leaps of intuition.
>>
>> Where does the persuasive power of logic come from? Why do you believe, "Either X or
>> not-X" is true? Is it not a matter of intuition?
>
> Yes, but not in the sense of the intuitionist.
>
>
>
>
>> Isn't logic just an attempt to formalize intuitive reasoning.
>
> Only reasoning, where the intuition is used only in the choice of the axiom, and not in
> the reasoning.

Why not in the rules of inference too? Rejecting non-constructive proofs is a change in
reasoning. I don't think there is such a sharp division between axioms and rules of
inference as you imply.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/16/2013 12:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most are just dualist. They are indeed easily shown inconsistent. But the problem is not the absence of mind, it is the believe in a primary physical reality, which is not sustained by any evidences.

?? What's the evidence arithmetic is primary?  The only evidence for a theory is that it works. 

No, it does not work. It fails since a long time on the mind-body problem, or it eliminates first person experiences and persons. It assumes also what I am trying to understand, the appearance of matter, and when I say that there are no evidences, I mean it: there are evidences for a physical reality, but *primitive* matter is like ether, phlogiston, or N rays: nobody has been able to provide evidences. It is just a simplifying assumption, and it is not used in any book of physics, even if it is assumed implicitly in some "fundamental physics". Don't confuse physics and physicalism.

The fact that Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent might be primary are overwhelming. First we don't have arithmetic, computer (the math object) or anything like that without assuming it. Second it is assumed in all pieces of any "exact science or human science", then we experience it everyday. We teach it without problem in all schools, etc. It is the only piece of knowledge on which all humans already agree (except a minority of philosophers, but they are easily shown inconsistent).

You seem to criticize primary physical reality because it doesn't include a more fundamental theory showing that it's primary - but that would a contradiction. 

Indeed. I criticize primary physical reality for the same reason that atheists are right when criticizing the use of God as explanation. Primitive matter explains nothing. And then it prevents the search for rational explanations.

Whatever the most fundamental model is cannot have a justification showing it is fundamental.

That's not correct. Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent theories can explain entirely why we cannot get the axioms from less. You can prove in arithmetic that without the arithmetical axioms you don't get them. You can prove in arithmetic that Pressburger arithmetic (addition, but no multiplication) is decidable and complete (in the Gödel 1930 sense). So you can prove in arithmetic that the fundamental theory is arithmetic or a consistent extension of arithmetic. Then with comp you can prove that we don't need to extend it for the ontology, and that from inside, you need and get *all* consistent exttension, leading to a many-world, or many-dreams, account of what we live.

Primitive matter is just a notion extrapolated from quite local perceptions. It is like "the earth is flat". It works for architects, but not for sailors and space explorers.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

I did not imply that. In most system, you can always limit the rules
of inference by adding axioms. With enough axioms, and the modus
ponens rule, you can derive all the other rules of inference. In
particular, quantum logic, intuitionist logic and classical logic can
be all formalized with only the modus ponens rules, and with the same
rules for the quantifiers, just by suppressing some axioms in the
Kleene's presentation of classical logic. You get quantum logic by
replacing "p->(q->p)" by (p->q) -> (r->t) -> (p -> q) (limiting the a
posteriori-axiom for implicative formula); you get intuitionist logic
by abandoning ~~p -> p.

Bruno

[meekerdb]

On 6/17/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/16/2013 12:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most are just dualist. They are indeed easily shown inconsistent. But the problem is not the absence of mind, it is the believe in a primary physical reality, which is not sustained by any evidences.

?? What's the evidence arithmetic is primary?  The only evidence for a theory is that it works. 

No, it does not work. It fails since a long time on the mind-body problem, or it eliminates first person experiences and persons.

That seems to me just a failure of imagination; like those who said chemistry fails to explain life because chemicals are alive.  Yes, chemistry failed for a long time - but then it succeeded.

It assumes also what I am trying to understand, the appearance of matter, and when I say that there are no evidences, I mean it: there are evidences for a physical reality, but *primitive* matter is like ether, phlogiston, or N rays: nobody has been able to provide evidences. It is just a simplifying assumption, and it is not used in any book of physics, even if it is assumed implicitly in some "fundamental physics". Don't confuse physics and physicalism.

I agree that nobody needs to assume matter is primitive - in fact physicists are continually looking for more fundamental stuff which is what led Tegmark to his "all mathematical objects" idea.  But this seems to me just semantics - what do we call the stuff that is fundamental "matter", "computation", "mathematical objects"...who cares!  All we care about is whether we can fit them into a coherent theory that explains the world.

The fact that Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent might be primary are overwhelming. First we don't have arithmetic, computer (the math object) or anything like that without assuming it. Second it is assumed in all pieces of any "exact science or human science", then we experience it everyday. We teach it without problem in all schools, etc. It is the only piece of knowledge on which all humans already agree (except a minority of philosophers, but they are easily shown inconsistent).

You seem to criticize primary physical reality because it doesn't include a more fundamental theory showing that it's primary - but that would a contradiction. 

Indeed. I criticize primary physical reality for the same reason that atheists are right when criticizing the use of God as explanation. Primitive matter explains nothing. And then it prevents the search for rational explanations.

Whatever the most fundamental model is cannot have a justification showing it is fundamental.

That's not correct. Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent theories can explain entirely why we cannot get the axioms from less. You can prove in arithmetic that without the arithmetical axioms you don't get them.

But that doesn't prove that they are true, nor does it prove than no other axioms might be true.  So how does that prove it's fundamental?  Your argument seems circular.

You can prove in arithmetic that Pressburger arithmetic (addition, but no multiplication) is decidable and complete (in the Gödel 1930 sense). So you can prove in arithmetic that the fundamental theory is arithmetic or a consistent extension of arithmetic. Then with comp you can prove that we don't need to extend it for the ontology, and that from inside, you need and get *all* consistent exttension, leading to a many-world, or many-dreams, account of what we live.

But you don't get all the stuff that physics has explained with the Standard Model and General Relativity.  You just *assume* it must be in there somewhere - which doesn't count as "explanation" in my mind.

Brent

Primitive matter is just a notion extrapolated from quite local perceptions. It is like "the earth is flat". It works for architects, but not for sailors and space explorers.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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