Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter of
logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of what is
modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have perfection
reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the conviction that
perfect modeling is possible in principle - what Paul Teller calls the
"perfect model model" - does not have an a priori justification either!"

p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this
is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so. Then still,
before we can go on to use that model, to make predictions and build
bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect to that model. So
apparently we need to have something in addition to what science has
given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of location."

p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably doomed
to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is something
irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit to
objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

[meekerdb]

On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective by Bas C
> Van Fraassen.
>
> p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter of logic,
> mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of what is modeled, although
> models actually constructed cannot have perfection reachable in principle. But on the
> other hand, the conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what Paul
> Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a priori justification either!"
>
> p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively represents the world
> in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as
> knowing that it is so. Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
> predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect to that model.

If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what we will think about
it and do with it. But then this will run into Godelian incompleteness. If it is true it
will be unprovable within the model.

Brent

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 29.10.2012 19:21 meekerdb said the following:

> On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
>> Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
>>
>> p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
>> of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
>> what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
>> perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
>> conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
>> Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
>> priori justification either!"
>>
>> p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
>> represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
>> this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.
>> Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
>> predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
>> respect to that model.
>
> If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what
> we will think about it and do with it. But then this will run into
> Godelian incompleteness. If it is true it will be unprovable within
> the model.

The question would be how it should be done practically. Say let us
imagine that such a model is the M-theory (I am still impressed by Grand
Design by Hawking). How do I find myself in the M-theory?

Evgenii

[Roger Clough]

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

Science cannot give us the absolute truth because
the foundation on which science rests is contingent.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-29, 13:21:39
Subject: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

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[meekerdb]

In practice, which I'm sure you're familiar with, we don't 'locate ourselves in the
model'. The model is in the objective world that we share with others who are also not in
the model. An engineer designing an airliner considers the airliner carrying other
people, but he doesn't model them completely - only their weight, size, use of the
restrooms, entertainment, etc. He doesn't try to model their inner thoughts unrelated to
the airliner. So a model, to be useful, cannot be complete because part of its usefulness
is that it can be communicated and must be 3p, as Bruno would say. That's not to say that
someone's inner thoughts cannot be in some model (the often are in novels), but only that
they can't be in that same person's model; just like a Godel sentence unprovable in one
system can be provable in some other axiom system.

Brent

[John Mikes]

Brent, I think if a 'model' is complete, it is not a model, it is the real thing.

Consequently it (as the real thing) is not provable from within - Godel, or not. (dON'T ASK ME ABOUT "real", please <G>) 

JM

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 2:21 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

......(quot4s deleted)

If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what we will think about it and do with it.  But then this will run into Godelian incompleteness.  If it is true it will be unprovable within the model.

Brent

So apparently we need to have something in addition to what science has given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of location."

p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

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[meekerdb]

Right.  And even less than complete models can run afoul of Godel, e.g. if I created a model of myself.  It might be an accurate model, but I couldn't know that it was.  On the other hand, John Mikes could know that it was.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
> Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
>
> p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
> of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
> what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
> perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
> conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
> Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
> priori justification either!"

That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
"model", as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically associated
to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks to Church
thesis).

>
> p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
> represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
> this is so.

With comp it is so, for the realm. But it is a nonsense to use it to
represent "the world" in full detail, at least not effectively. The
expression "world in full detail" is very ambiguous.

> Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.

This is just impossible.

> Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
> predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect
> to that model. So apparently we need to have something in addition
> to what science has given us here. The extra is the self-ascription
> of location."

The taking into account of the first person view. yes, that is
important, but it might not be an extra. In comp it is a given.

>
> p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
> paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
> simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
> doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
> something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit
> to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."

Given that with comp both epistemology and physics are "objectively"
*subjective* (first person plural) construct (coherent person dreams),
that is hardly astonishing. Van Fraassen seems just discovering a part
of the difficulty of physicalism, by becoming aware of the importance
of the points of view of the creature described by the theory. With
comp it should be quickly clear that subjectivity is important, even
in the "making" of the physical laws.

Bruno

>
> Evgenii
> --
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen
>
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>

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 29.10.2012 20:44 meekerdb said the following:

In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model for a
typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well as a scientific
model, but to use the map one has to find out where on the map he/she is
located. I hope that you agree with that.

Yet, now this process, located oneself on a map, could be extended to
other scientific models. For example to those that engineers employ in
their practice. An engineer has a scientific model on one hand and real
things on the other hand. Similarly it is necessary to relate a model
and reality and one needs a human being to achieve this goal.

Along this line of thought we come to a "perfect model model" that also
is in the objective world, as for example the M-theory. The question
however remains.

Evgenii

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 30.10.2012 11:26 Bruno Marchal said the following:

>
> On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>> Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
>> Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
>>
>> p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
>> of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
>> what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
>> perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
>> conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
>> Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
>> priori justification either!"
>
> That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
> "model", as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically
> associated to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks
> to Church thesis).

I am afraid that you talk about another sort of a model. Van Fraassen
starts from a human being and he considers (also historically) how
scientific modeling is working.

Provided you assume comp, you still have to explain how science is
working in a human society. I am not sure if I understand how comp could
help at this point.

You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. Fine.
Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it development has
invented integers. How comp would help to answer this?

Evgenii

Evgenii

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> On 30.10.2012 11:26 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>>
>> On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>
>>> Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
>>> Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
>>>
>>> p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
>>> of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
>>> what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
>>> perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
>>> conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
>>> Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
>>> priori justification either!"
>>
>> That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
>> "model", as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically
>> associated to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks
>> to Church thesis).
>
> I am afraid that you talk about another sort of a model. Van
> Fraassen starts from a human being and he considers (also
> historically) how scientific modeling is working.

OK. What I said is not incompatible with this. It even give more sense
to this. It gives an example of perfect model model, for the ultimate
reality, with the explanation why this is impossible from the inside
of that reality. We have to trust ourselves, somehow, and be skeptical
with any authoritative arguments.

>
> Provided you assume comp, you still have to explain how science is
> working in a human society. I am not sure if I understand how comp
> could help at this point.

It does not, except that it warns us that a big part of it cannot been
studied formally, as comp does not reduce humans, or any entity more
complex than a universal machine, to any normative theory. It can only
encourage that kind of studies. But the big picture can help to make
it fits with other source of knowledge.

>
> You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything.
> Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it
> development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer this?

Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say,
evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is
born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal
numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and
manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining
everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in
philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body
problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from arithmetic/
computer science.

Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be
more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only
because we have wrongly separate the human science (including
theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp
provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract corpus
callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal, before
bridging mind and matter.

Bruno

[meekerdb]

I don't agree with it because it's obviously false. I just looked a map to see how close
Sandy came to my brother's home in Virginia. I didn't need to locate myself on that map.

Brent

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 30.10.2012 17:08 meekerdb said the following:

> On 10/30/2012 4:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

...

>> In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model for a
>> typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well as a
>> scientific model, but to use the map one has to find out where on
>> the map he/she is located. I hope that you agree with that.
>
> I don't agree with it because it's obviously false. I just looked a
> map to see how close Sandy came to my brother's home in Virginia. I
> didn't need to locate myself on that map.
>

In this case you need to locate your brother's home on that map. I do
not see too much difference.

I would agree with you that my statement does not cover all possible
cases that one could imagine to employ a map, but the act of location
should be there anyway. There is a correspondence between a real world
and a map but the map by itself does not coordinate the reality to
itself. This is done by a human being.

Let me recall Van Fraassen's definition of a representation

p. 21 �Z uses X to depict Y as F�

The map seems to fit this pattern pretty well.

Could you imagine some case, when you use a map as a map and you do not
need the act of location?

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 30.10.2012 16:25 Bruno Marchal said the following:

>
> On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>

...

>>
>> You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything.
>> Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it
>> development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer
>> this?
>
> Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say,
> evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is
> born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal
> numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and
> manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining
> everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in
> philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body
> problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from

> arithmetic/computer science.

>
> Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be
> more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only
> because we have wrongly separate the human science (including
> theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp
> provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract
> corpus callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal,
> before bridging mind and matter.

Below there is a couple of quotes about German idealism. Please replace
Absolute Spirit by Natural Numbers there. Then it may give one possible
answer to my question.

�Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the
world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense,
the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although
never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a
�falling away� from Spirit, as a �self-alienation� of Spirit, although
the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.�

�Having �fallen� into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the
process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit
to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original
�descent� (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of
Spirit; and the reverse movement of �ascent� (or evolution) is thus the
self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the
Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every
stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. �

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/evolution-and-german-idealism.html

[meekerdb]

Of course not. But in many cases I do not need to locate myself, which was crucial to van
Frassen's point about self reference.

Brent

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 01.11.2012 18:00 meekerdb said the following:

It was just a special case. It was my fault that I have not described it
better. In the general case this is The Problem of Coordination (chapter
5 in the book).

Evgenii

[Bruno Marchal]

Here there is a little difficulty. With comp, the "absolut Spirit" (or the one, or God, or the big thing without a name, etc...) can be the Natural Numbers (I would add structured by + and *, as it is not just "0, 1, 2, ...").

But then comp can prove that there is no way the creatures itself could ever know that, nor even completely able to explain what that could mean.

There is no paradox. There is only a remind that we cannot prove that comp is true. 

If ever we could prove comp, then we could give a name to God, and then we fall ... again.

Then it may give one possible answer to my question.

“Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a “falling away” from Spirit, as a “self-alienation” of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.”

Yes. This remind me of my quoting of Aurobindo, which suits so well something in both comp, and, swim has to say, the salvia divinorum experience:

<<

What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?

And it is this ...

Existence that multiplied itself

For sheer delight of being

And plunged into numberless trillions of forms

So that it might

Find 

Itself

Innumerably (Aurobindo)

>>

“Having “fallen” into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original “descent” (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of “ascent” (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ”

I can't agree more, Evgenii. 

It is also very close to Plotinus' emanation/conversion, which has influenced the Christians a lot, even if this has often taken the shape of fairy tales (which obviously should never been taken literally).

In Plotinus, and in comp we can say more: it is the process of conversion of the Soul toward the Spirit, which literally create the material reality. It is the indeterminateness of the border of the universal mind, where God loss control, so to speak, which makes it possible for the soul to start the conversion, and come back to the source. That conception of matter is already in Aristotle, but Plotinus gives the Platonist correction which makes it consistent, and even necessary I would say, with the theology, including physics, of the universal machines. 

Each individual universal machines is a window for the arithmetical truth to discover (partially) itself, but also losing itself, in itself. This entails  a double amnesia: God has to forget his identity to explore itself, and the creatures have to forget the window and the exploration  (the body and the environment) to remember who they are.

Likewise with salvia: you forget who you are here to remind who you are there, and vice versa, apparently from many reports, although you can also just disconnect, instead of forgetting (which is handy when the phone rings).

Indeed, the same with comp once you accept the greek definition of knowledge and dream---roughly speaking: true belief (knowledge) and consistent belief (dream).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 01.11.2012 18:30 Bruno Marchal said the following:

>
> On 01 Nov 2012, at 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>

...

>> �Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create

>> the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in
>> a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into
>> creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the

>> world is created as a �falling away� from Spirit, as a

>> �self-alienation� of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything
>> but a play of Spirit itself.�

>
> Yes. This remind me of my quoting of Aurobindo, which suits so well
> something in both comp, and, swim has to say, the salvia divinorum
> experience:
>
> << What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
>
> And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight
> of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it
> might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo)
>
>>>
>
>
>>

>> �Having �fallen� into the manifest and material world, Spirit

>> begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the
>> return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution

>> itself. The original �descent� (or involution) is a forgetting, a

>> fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of

>> �ascent� (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and

>> self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized,
>> all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution

>> as the process of evolution itself. �

Then you may like

Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion

as the quotes have been from this book. There is nothing about comp
there but the book is not that bad.

I should say that the author understands the religion pretty general: as
spirit and contemplation. It is an interesting overview of how science
has started to dominate over art and moral and what could be done
against it. The different would-be solutions from history are also
considered. Wilber�s solution, if I have understood correctly, goes like
a combination of German idealism (that you like) + Joga.

Evgenii
--

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/the-marriage-of-sense-and-soul.html

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno,

Could it not be that there is nothing especially sacred
about the natural numbers, that these are, as Hobbes
put it regarding words, "but counterfeit tokens" ?
And the real controlling force which uses them is
information theory ? That is to say, intelligence.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
11/2/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-01, 06:09:50
Subject: Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

?bsolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the

world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense,
the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although
never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a

?alling away? from Spirit, as a ?elf-alienation? of Spirit, although
the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.?

?aving ?allen? into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the

process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit
to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original

?escent? (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of
Spirit; and the reverse movement of ?scent? (or evolution) is thus the

self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the
Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every

stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ?

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/evolution-and-german-idealism.html

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Nov 2012, at 19:13, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> On 01.11.2012 18:30 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>>
>> On 01 Nov 2012, at 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>
>
> ...
>

>>> “Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create

>>> the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in
>>> a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into
>>> creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the

>>> world is created as a “falling away” from Spirit, as a

>>> “self-alienation” of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything
>>> but a play of Spirit itself.”

>>
>> Yes. This remind me of my quoting of Aurobindo, which suits so well
>> something in both comp, and, swim has to say, the salvia divinorum
>> experience:
>>
>> << What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
>>
>> And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight
>> of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it
>> might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo)
>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>>>

>>> “Having “fallen” into the manifest and material world, Spirit

>>> begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the
>>> return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution

>>> itself. The original “descent” (or involution) is a forgetting, a

>>> fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of

>>> “ascent” (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and

>>> self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized,
>>> all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution

>>> as the process of evolution itself. ”

This you cannot know. I just said that computer science shows that
Plotinus and Plato, and perhaps the German idealists (which I find
difficult to interpret, greek is more easy than german) are closer to
the consequence of comp, than aritstotle and naturalism.
I am mute on the fact that I like that or not. Comp is elegant, like
Everett-QM, but admittedly shocking and even frightening by many
aspect (besides being "new").
But science tries to avoid wishful thinking.

>
> Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and
> Religion

I will try to take a look. Nice titles, and the quotes were very nice
(= close to comp's consequences).

>
> as the quotes have been from this book. There is nothing about comp
> there but the book is not that bad.
>
> I should say that the author understands the religion pretty
> general: as spirit and contemplation.

OK, that is already close to Plato, Plotinus and the mystics
throughout the world.

> It is an interesting overview of how science has started to
> dominate over art and moral and what could be done against it. The
> different would-be solutions from history are also considered.

> Wilber’s solution, if I have understood correctly, goes like a

> combination of German idealism (that you like) + Joga.

There are many paths. But in the type of consumerism based on lies of
today, none can even begin. We have simpler problems to solve before,
like stopping criminals to think for us.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:42, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno,
>
> Could it not be that there is nothing especially sacred
> about the natural numbers, that these are, as Hobbes
> put it regarding words, "but counterfeit tokens" ?

Numbers, with + and * laws, is mainly the same things than digital
machines, and the laws making them working.

> And the real controlling force which uses them is
> information theory ? That is to say, intelligence.

Here you are far too quick. I can make sense, because I have some
favorable imagination. As I said, information theory is a tiny part of
computer science. It exploits the duality between immune/simple set,
where the self-reference logic exploits the duality creative/
productive set. The two dualities plays some rôle, but the creative/
productive set duality (the theory of universal machine) is much more
rich. The mathematical notion of information still disallows meaning
and person. It is more used for communication of signals, treatment of
noise, compression of data, etc.
You will also have the problem between choosing classical information
or quantum information, and how to relate them, etc.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

Yes, and keep in mind that there may be more than
one theory that gives the same results in the form of data.
So in this world, the truth must lie in the data, which is unique,
and not the theory, which may not be unique.

In this world, data is king.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
11/3/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-02, 13:34:22

Subject: Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:42, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno,
>
> Could it not be that there is nothing especially sacred
> about the natural numbers, that these are, as Hobbes
> put it regarding words, "but counterfeit tokens" ?

Numbers, with + and * laws, is mainly the same things than digital
machines, and the laws making them working.




> And the real controlling force which uses them is
> information theory ? That is to say, intelligence.

Here you are far too quick. I can make sense, because I have some
favorable imagination. As I said, information theory is a tiny part of
computer science. It exploits the duality between immune/simple set,
where the self-reference logic exploits the duality creative/

productive set. The two dualities plays some r?e, but the creative/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:09, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Yes, and keep in mind that there may be more than
> one theory that gives the same results in the form of data.

This plays the key role. That all data structuring admit infinities of
theories, like each state of mind can be associate to infinities of
machines.

> So in this world, the truth must lie in the data, which is unique,
> and not the theory, which may not be unique.

The inner truth, yes. But the outer truth it is more complex, not to
say on the fringe of the inconceivable.

>
> In this world, data is king.

Hmm... It is a question of taste, but personally I would say that the
interpreter of the data is more fundamental. Data are usually very
contingent, and sometimes they can hide reality more than
enlightening. Many data can put shadows and distort the view, and they
can also be biased. Data are important, sure.

Bruno

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

No connection, I was just looking at the meaning of

the Diophantine equations. Their meanings as categories possibly.

Ie, can numbers be categorized by the D eqns they fit ?

If some numbers fit these equations , do they have some particular meaning

(are categories) ?

 

Note also that the monads are individuals and so could

fit some of the D eqns. Then if the eqns have some meanings or

categories , that might be the

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/15/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-04, 07:17:08

Subject: Re: On uniqueness

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>
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[Stephen P. King]

On 11/15/2012 11:06 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

No connection, I was just looking at the meaning of

the Diophantine equations. Their meanings as categories possibly.

Ie, can numbers be categorized by the D eqns they fit ?

If some numbers fit these equations , do they have some particular meaning

(are categories) ?

 

Note also that the monads are individuals and so could

fit some of the D eqns. Then if the eqns have some meanings or

categories , that might be the

 

 

Dear Roger,

    Do you conceptualize Monads as primitive substances or actions?

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Roger Clough]

Hi Stephen P. King

 

Monads are as you say, but only potentially.

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/16/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Stephen P. King

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-15, 13:07:50

Subject: Re: Monads and the Diophantine equantions.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Nov 2012, at 17:06, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

No connection, I was just looking at the meaning of

the Diophantine equations. Their meanings as categories possibly.

Ie, can numbers be categorized by the D eqns they fit ?

If some numbers fit these equations , do they have some particular meaning

(are categories) ?

 

Note also that the monads are individuals and so could

fit some of the D eqns. Then if the eqns have some meanings or

categories , that might be the

the ?

What you say is a big vague. There is nothing special about the diophantine equation, I could have use LISP programs. The reasoning, and eventually the physical reality, and consciousness is invariant for the choice of the ontology, once it is Turing universal.

Bruno

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal \

 

Thanks. That answers my question. They're just

unique equations.

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/17/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-16, 11:29:18

Subject: Re: Monads and the Diophantine equantions.