FREE WILL--is it really free?
selva
separate causal domain..
there is no domain shear between the different domains(different
parallel worlds)..i.e.there is decoherence..
It is known that in our causal domain,there is cause and effect
relationships..
everything is happening because of a cause..everything is as it is
because it ought to be such.
There is a grand flow in the varying positions of atoms constituting
the universe..
If this is right,then how can we say ,we have free will ?
why is there binary state at all ?
if there is free will,how can we say everything affects everything ?
why is the 50-50 probability arises ?
why is there probability functions at all ?
If the positions of the atoms in my mind(my thoughts) now affect the
positions of the atoms in your brain(your thoughts) ,then does it mean
you don't have a free will ?
Is our consciousness part of the grand consciousness (the universe).
Are we like the white cells(individually conscious) in our body,to the
universe..?
Then above all,the real question is why is there parallel worlds at
all ?
everything affects everything or not ?
P.S : i am just a student and i don't have real technical knowledge in
all these fields..i am just curious..what is these universe and why
does it exists at all..
so please bear with my ignorance.
Stephen Paul King
We are actively exploring exactly those kinds of questions. Please feel
free to jump in, the water is warm. ;-)
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
meekerdb
> Considering only our world in the many world interpretation,it is a
> separate causal domain..
> there is no domain shear between the different domains(different
> parallel worlds)..i.e.there is decoherence..
> It is known that in our causal domain,there is cause and effect
> relationships..
> everything is happening because of a cause..everything is as it is
> because it ought to be such.
> There is a grand flow in the varying positions of atoms constituting
> the universe..
> If this is right,then how can we say ,we have free will ?
>
See Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" for a good exposition of
compatibilist free will.
> why is there binary state at all ?
>
I don't understand that question? Computers use binary representations
because it physically more efficient, although there have been computers
that used base three, and of course analog computers.
> if there is free will,how can we say everything affects everything ?
>
That depends on what you mean by free will and whether you think the
world is deterministic. By "affects" do you mean "determines" or could
it mean "change the probability of"?
> why is the 50-50 probability arises ?
> why is there probability functions at all ?
>
Probability is a mathematical model. It can be used to model events
where we are ignorant of the causes, although we assume they exist.
That's how it was invented, by game players. But it isn't necessary to
assume there are unknown causes. The same model then describes inherent
randomness.
> If the positions of the atoms in my mind(my thoughts) now affect the
> positions of the atoms in your brain(your thoughts) ,then does it mean
> you don't have a free will ?
>
No.
> Is our consciousness part of the grand consciousness (the universe).
> Are we like the white cells(individually conscious) in our body,to the
> universe..?
>
I have no reason to believe the premise of that question.
> Then above all,the real question is why is there parallel worlds at
> all ?
>
It's convenient model of measurement in quantum mechanics to avoid the
question of why measurements need to be described by a physical process
(projection) different from all other physical processes (unitary
evolution by the Hamiltonian). Whether such worlds are "real" is
controversial.
> everything affects everything or not ?
>
In physics, things can only affect events in their future light cone and
events are only affected by events in their past light cone. There are
some theories, such as Bohm's quantum mechanics, which violate this
rule, but none that are accepted.
>
>
> P.S : i am just a student and i don't have real technical knowledge in
> all these fields..i am just curious..what is these universe and why
> does it exists at all..
> so please bear with my ignorance.
>
Brent
"Why is there something rather than nothing? Because nothing is unstable"
--- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate 2004
Evgenii Rudnyi
Love and free will
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/t/8ab31552cd18561c
Some citations you will find in my blog
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/04/love-and-free-will.html
You might be interested in Rex's
Intelligence and Nomologicalism
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/t/5ab5303cdb696ef5
On 16.05.2011 16:49 selva said the following:
scerir
Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
-Nicolas Gisin
http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3440
Abstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something about all
possible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations. Hence Nature is
nonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief review of some
recent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the existence of free
will is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics.
Evgenii Rudnyi
more money? Or, according to this paper, does it make sense even try to
earn more money?
On 17.05.2011 08:15 scerir said the following:
Bruno Marchal
On 16 May 2011, at 16:49, selva wrote:
> Considering only our world in the many world interpretation,it is a
> separate causal domain..
> there is no domain shear between the different domains(different
> parallel worlds)..i.e.there is decoherence..
> It is known that in our causal domain,there is cause and effect
> relationships..
> everything is happening because of a cause..everything is as it is
> because it ought to be such.
> There is a grand flow in the varying positions of atoms constituting
> the universe..
> If this is right,
This can't be right, if we assume that the brain (or whatever capable
of sustaining consciousness) can be emulated by a Turing machine, as
most people believe.
> then how can we say ,we have free will ?
A determinist theory of free will is possible. What counts is that no
machine can determine itself completely, so that the determinism of
his/her behavior is known only by "God", not by the machine, nor by
machine of equivalent complexity.
Now, if you mean that free will is the capacity to disobey to
arithmetic, then it does not exist, most probably.
> why is there binary state at all ?
OK. You could have asked equivalently: why is there natural numbers?
Logicians have shown last century that this is impossible to answer.
Actually we need the natural numbers to ask "why natural numbers".
They cannot be recover from any simpler theory. So we have to have
some faith in them. It is part of the initial postulates.
> if there is free will,how can we say everything affects everything ?
> why is the 50-50 probability arises ?
Such a probability can be explained by self-duplication. If you are a
machine, I can scan you (in principle) and duplicate you in two
different places. You cannot predict in advance what will be your
subjective experience after the duplication. BTW, this can be used to
explain that free-will is not explainable by the use of indeterminacy.
> why is there probability functions at all ?
Assuming we are digital machines, the answer is that the reality of
realities is very huge. There is an infinity of computations going
through your actual state of mind, and computer science explains why
no machine can know which computations, nor even which sheaf of
computations support it. There is automatically a statistics for the
observable.
> If the positions of the atoms in my mind(my thoughts) now affect the
> positions of the atoms in your brain(your thoughts) ,then does it mean
> you don't have a free will ?
Why? On the contrary. To have free will you must have some ability to
make change around you. You certainly need some amount of determinacy.
> Is our consciousness part of the grand consciousness (the universe).
If by universe you mean "physical universe", it is not clear if that
exist. Strictly speaking it is an open problem. With mechanism we can
say that there are many dreams, and we can say that some dreams glue
well together to form shared dreams. But it is not known if they glue
so well as to define a singular physical universe, or even just a
singular physical multiverse. Extremely hard question.
> Are we like the white cells(individually conscious) in our body,to the
> universe..?
You might be naive about "we", "body" and "universe". No problem, it
is a tradition since theology has been abandon to politics 1500 years
ago, in Occident. (Closure of Plato Academy in Athena, about 525 after
JC).
> Then above all,the real question is why is there parallel worlds at
> all ?
If you accept the idea that your brain can be simulated at some
correct level of substitution (so that you would survive a digital
brain substitution), then the additive and multiplicative structure of
numbers defines a vast "block mindscape", containing many dreams (as
seen from inside). Some dreams glue and generate sharable (among
collectivities of "universal numbers) deep histories, which are seen
as universe appearance from their points views. The physical realm
does not disappear, but is secondary to the "numbers dreams". The
physical realm is still fundamental, but it is epistemological, not
ontological.
You might read the shortest paper(*) I wrote to sum up the
consequences of taking seriously the *assumption* that we are Turing
emulable. We discussed it a lot. Some have not yet seen the point, I'm
afraid. I sum up it provocatively sometimes by saying that if we are
rational machine, then we have to abandon the theology of Aristotle
(atheism christianism etc.) for the theology of Plato (objective
idealism, Pythagorism, some budhist and indian school or thought). In
the first one there is an emphasis on the 'creation'. In the second
one the creation is a sign of something else (actually arithmetic).
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
> everything affects everything or not ?
In which sense? In our local physical realm even a big supernova
explosion far away, cannot affect you here and now.
In the arithmetical realm every truth is connected, but perhaps in a
more trivial sense. They are infinities of intermediate modalities.
Take it easy. We are in deep water. Ask any question.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
I appreciate Nicolas Gisin, like I appreciate a lot Conway and Kochen,
but they have in common that once they talk on free will they utter
non sense. I will probably read Gisin's paper, but I have not really
the time right now.
Let me says tell you why I doubt on the interest on this, from reading
just the abstract: the MWI has been invented notably for making
physics local, as Everett and Tipler have already explained, and as
Deutsch and Hayden have made even more clear. So I guess there is
either an error in Gisin, or that he has made a very interesting
discovery. But I doubt, especially that he might have a non
compatibilist theory of free will, which makes almost non sense for
me. You have already to postulate non-comp to get it. Hmm...
Of course if the goal is to make money, that can be a road. People
like wishful non-sense. But you might make more money with astrology
or with pseudo-religion.
Bruno
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com
> .
> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
> .
>
scerir
Evgenii writes:
> Could you please tell me if this paper will help me for example to earn
> more money? Or, according to this paper, does it make sense even try to
> earn more money?
Did you see "The Sting" (1973, Paul Newman and Robert Redford)?
I think that something like that is possible coupling Renninger's paradox
(null measurement) and MWI. Not so easy though.
meekerdb
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem
and
The Strong Free Will Theorem. Notices of the American
Mathematical Society 56, 226232 (2009).
and
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1006/1006.2485v1.pdf
Brent
Stephen Paul King
meekerdb
Hi Scerir and Friends,���� Thank you for posting this link to N. Gisin�s paper. In it Gisin makes a very eloquent and forceful argument against MWI based on the experience of free will.
Doesn't seem very forceful to me.� There's a contradiction between the MWI and free will because the MWI assumes deterministic evolution of the wave function.� But that doesn't show that there is a contradiction between MWI and the *experience* of free-will.� You could as well say that the feeling to time passage is a forceful argument for physical time.
Brent
�
You can find a talk that he gave on the subject here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnV7zUR9UA
����� I think that Gisin's argument is stunted by the fact that he does not consider the effects of multiple entities having free will and instead only considers a single entity having free will in the MWI picture. His point in the paper that "if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair produce a desired effect, this very same specific interaction with most of the other - equally real according to many-worlds - state of affairs would produce uncontrolled random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to maintain a possible window for free will in the many-worlds view" is correct but the "uncontrolled randomness" is only random because we can only resort to an equiprobable ensemble to do calculations of the effects of the interaction in that context.��� If we consider multiple observers within the MWI, it seems to me that in order for some measure of coherent communications to obtain between them there must be something like a super-selection rule on the branches of the superpositions such that only those mutually compatible observables are able to form a set of mutually true (in the bivalent Boolean sense) in the sense of relative commutativity of observables on each time-like (not just space-like) hypersurface of a foliation of space-time for those observers. I think that this is something that decoherence is pointing toward.���� Free will follows from the lack of a priori determinateness of the members of that set of observables. Just as we cannot demonstrate a computation that can compute whether or not a given computation will halt, we can similarly not demonstrate a finite Cauchy hypersurface of initial conditions that can uniquely determine both the order of measurements nor the mutual results of those measurements. Free Will is the freedom to chose the basis of a measurement.�Onward!�Stephen�
-----Original Message-----From: scerirSent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:15 AMSubject: Re: FREE WILL--is it really free?�Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time?Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"-Nicolas GisinAbstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something about allpossible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations. Hence Nature isnonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief review of somerecent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the existence of freewill is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics.
��
--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
John Mikes
On 5/19/2011 4:31 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Doesn't seem very forceful to me. There's a contradiction between the MWI and free will because the MWI assumes deterministic evolution of the wave function. But that doesn't show that there is a contradiction between MWI and the *experience* of free-will. You could as well say that the feeling to time passage is a forceful argument for physical time.Hi Scerir and Friends,Thank you for posting this link to N. Gisin’s paper. In it Gisin makes a very eloquent and forceful argument against MWI based on the experience of free will.
Brent
I think that Gisin's argument is stunted by the fact that he does not consider the effects of multiple entities having free will and instead only considers a single entity having free will in the MWI picture. His point in the paper that "if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair produce a desired effect, this very same specific interaction with most of the other - equally real according to many-worlds - state of affairs would produce uncontrolled random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to maintain a possible window for free will in the many-worlds view" is correct but the "uncontrolled randomness" is only random because we can only resort to an equiprobable ensemble to do calculations of the effects of the interaction in that context.
If we consider multiple observers within the MWI, it seems to me that in order for some measure of coherent communications to obtain between them there must be something like a super-selection rule on the branches of the superpositions such that only those mutually compatible observables are able to form a set of mutually true (in the bivalent Boolean sense) in the sense of relative commutativity of observables on each time-like (not just space-like) hypersurface of a foliation of space-time for those observers. I think that this is something that decoherence is pointing toward.
Free will follows from the lack of a priori determinateness of the members of that set of observables. Just as we cannot demonstrate a computation that can compute whether or not a given computation will halt, we can similarly not demonstrate a finite Cauchy hypersurface of initial conditions that can uniquely determine both the order of measurements nor the mutual results of those measurements. Free Will is the freedom to chose the basis of a measurement.
Onward!Stephen
-----Original Message-----From: scerirSent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:15 AMSubject: Re: FREE WILL--is it really free?
Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time?Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"-Nicolas GisinAbstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something about allpossible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations. Hence Nature isnonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief review of somerecent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the existence of freewill is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics.
--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Rex Allen
Penrose's paper “Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow - A Reply to
Commentaries on Shadows of the Mind”.
Offered without comment. I just thought it was interesting:
==
What kind of a theory might it be that determines these choices? Many
people who are unhappy with computationalism would be just as unhappy
with any other type of mathematical scheme for determining them. For
they might argue that it is here that "free will" makes its entry, and
they would be unhappy that their free-will choices could be determined
by any kind of mathematics. My own view would be to wait and see what
kind of non-computable scheme ultimately emerges. Perhaps a
sophisticated enough mathematical scheme will turn out not to be so
incompatible with our (feelings of) free will. However, McCarthy takes
the view that I am "quite confused" about free will, and that my ideas
are "not repairable". I am not really clear about which of my confused
ideas McCarthy is referring to. In Shadows, I did not say much about
the issue of free will, except to raise certain issues. Indeed, I am
not at all sure what my views on the subject actually are. Perhaps
that means that I am confused, but I do not see that these ideas are
remotely well enough defined to be irreparable!
==
Rex
Quentin Anciaux
Quentin
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
John Mikes
selva kumar
On 5/16/2011 7:49 AM, selva wrote:See Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" for a good exposition of compatibilist free will.
Considering only our world in the many world interpretation,it is a
separate causal domain..
there is no domain shear between the different domains(different
parallel worlds)..i.e.there is decoherence..
It is known that in our causal domain,there is cause and effect
relationships..
everything is happening because of a cause..everything is as it is
because it ought to be such.
There is a grand flow in the varying positions of atoms constituting
the universe..
If this is right,then how can we say ,we have free will ?
I don't understand that question? Computers use binary representations because it physically more efficient, although there have been computers that used base three, and of course analog computers.
why is there binary state at all ?
by binary state i mean the binary state of cat(alive and dead) in the thought experiment..there are no shades of gray there,only black or white..or so we assume.
selva kumar
can i argue that the my ability to make change around me arises from the changes around me..
If by universe you mean "physical universe", it is not clear if that exist. Strictly speaking it is an open problem. With mechanism we can say that there are many dreams, and we can say that some dreams glue well together to form shared dreams. But it is not known if they glue so well as to define a singular physical universe, or even just a singular physical multiverse. Extremely hard question.
Is our consciousness part of the grand consciousness (the universe).
You might be naive about "we", "body" and "universe". No problem, it is a tradition since theology has been abandon to politics 1500 years ago, in Occident. (Closure of Plato Academy in Athena, about 525 after JC).
Are we like the white cells(individually conscious) in our body,to the
universe..?
If you accept the idea that your brain can be simulated at some correct level of substitution (so that you would survive a digital brain substitution), then the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers defines a vast "block mindscape", containing many dreams (as seen from inside). Some dreams glue and generate sharable (among collectivities of "universal numbers) deep histories, which are seen as universe appearance from their points views. The physical realm does not disappear, but is secondary to the "numbers dreams". The physical realm is still fundamental, but it is epistemological, not ontological.
Then above all,the real question is why is there parallel worlds at
all ?
You might read the shortest paper(*) I wrote to sum up the consequences of taking seriously the *assumption* that we are Turing emulable. We discussed it a lot. Some have not yet seen the point, I'm afraid. I sum up it provocatively sometimes by saying that if we are rational machine, then we have to abandon the theology of Aristotle (atheism christianism etc.) for the theology of Plato (objective idealism, Pythagorism, some budhist and indian school or thought). In the first one there is an emphasis on the 'creation'. In the second one the creation is a sign of something else (actually arithmetic).
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.htmlIn which sense? In our local physical realm even a big supernova explosion far away, cannot affect you here and now.
everything affects everything or not ?
In the arithmetical realm every truth is connected, but perhaps in a more trivial sense. They are infinities of intermediate modalities.
Take it easy. We are in deep water. Ask any question.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
meekerdb
On 29 May 2011, at 20:22, selva kumar wrote:
On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 6:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Hi selva,Why? On the contrary. To have free will you must have some ability to make change around you. You certainly need some amount of determinacy.
On 16 May 2011, at 16:49, selva wrote:
If the positions of the atoms in my mind(my thoughts) now affect the
positions of the atoms in your brain(your thoughts) ,then does it mean
you don't have a free will ?
can i argue that the my ability to make change around me arises from the changes around me..
you are now thinking what you are thinking only because i asked you this....that is,with your so called ability i am changing some thing,and that changed things gives you the ability to change things around you..so going backwards..(events are affected only by the past occurences in the cone).wont we come to a single cause?
Brent
Constantine Pseudonymous
objects. numbers must refer to something... the symbol must have its
substaces, even if that substaces is relatively indeterminate
independent of the symbol, or only visible via the symbol. Numbers are
a relationship between "thinker" and something else which encompasses
and differentiates from it. There is an interaction going on and
number is the intermediary.
It seems to me that you are trying to resurrect some possibility of a
theosophical mysticism.... which is predicated on immortality or it
has no substance at all, and immortality is further predicated on some
kind of Other World that is the sum of all positive attributes.
Not that I criticize your attempt, anything that complicates a simple
common sense realism I am in favor of.... but I don't see how reading
Platos Republic or Timeaus or Parmenides is gonna help us move
forward.... neither do I see how mathematics equals "what is" and only
equals what is..... neither do I see how Pythagorean Tektraktys or
"source of nature in eternal motion" or Indianism is gonna help us
move forward?
you seem to optimistic about spiritualistic possibilities.
It seems that you Bruno, are trying to covertly resurrect a kind of
Platonism
On May 29, 12:15 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 29 May 2011, at 20:22, selva kumar wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > everything affects everything or not ?
>
> > In which sense? In our local physical realm even a big supernova
> > explosion far away, cannot affect you here and now.
> > In the arithmetical realm every truth is connected, but perhaps in a
> > more trivial sense. They are infinities of intermediate modalities.
>
> > Take it easy. We are in deep water. Ask any question.
>
> > Bruno
>
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> > Groups "Everything List" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com
> > .
> > For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
> > .
>
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> > Groups "Everything List" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com
> > .
Bruno Marchal
On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:06, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
> all is number? but was there not all before number? numbers need their
> objects.
Why. It looks to me I need numbers to distinguish object, even to
distinguish them form myself. I can easily conceive numbers without
object, but not vice versa.
Not also, that no one said that all is numbers. Indeed we know to day,
that if "3-all is number then 1-all is vasltly greater than all the
numbers".
> numbers must refer to something...
Why? I got the ffeliong that you assume a primitive physical reality.
I do not. (nor do I assume there is no such physical reality). But I
do show such a reality emerge from the numbers, once you assume that
the brain function like a machine.
> the symbol must have its
> substaces, even if that substaces is relatively indeterminate
> independent of the symbol, or only visible via the symbol. Numbers are
> a relationship between "thinker" and something else which encompasses
> and differentiates from it. There is an interaction going on and
> number is the intermediary.
>
> It seems to me that you are trying to resurrect some possibility of a
> theosophical mysticism.... which is predicated on immortality or it
> has no substance at all, and immortality is further predicated on some
> kind of Other World that is the sum of all positive attributes.
I just show that mechanism is incompatible with (weak) materialism.
>
> Not that I criticize your attempt, anything that complicates a simple
> common sense realism I am in favor of.... but I don't see how reading
> Platos Republic or Timeaus or Parmenides is gonna help us move
> forward.... neither do I see how mathematics equals "what is"
It does not. If my body is a machine, then neither mind nor matter are
completely mathematical (unless you enlarge the sense of mathematics).
The main point is that neither mind, nor matter are primitively
physical. I just show that mechanism does not solve the mind-body
problem per se, but on the contrary that it can help going to a
mathematical formulation of the problem.
> and only
> equals what is..... neither do I see how Pythagorean Tektraktys or
> "source of nature in eternal motion" or Indianism is gonna help us
> move forward?
>
> you seem to optimistic about spiritualistic possibilities.
>
> It seems that you Bruno, are trying to covertly resurrect a kind of
> Platonism
Have you study the UD Argument? It shows that if we assume that the
brain works like a universal machine at some description level, then
Aristotle theology get falsified. Not Plato's one.
I am a logician. I don't try to find some truth. I just show that if
you believe in this theory, then you have to believe in that theory. I
assume a minimal amount of rationality, which is made eventually
precise.
And yes, I do argue that comp, (not me) resurrect Plato and Plotinus.
I provide a clear arithmetical interpretation of those discourses. You
might take a look on my paper on Plotinus (on my url front page).
Bruno
Craig Weinberg
They are the same thing. We only perceive them to be different because
our subjectivity warps our perspective for us. Free will is ultimately
a feeling that it is us who is making the decision, while determinism
is ultimately a thought that free agency must be defined in terms of
objective facts. Whether or not that feeling or thought corresponds to
a universal reality is not falsifiable or relevant once we re-frame
the phenomenon as a single relation which has objective and subjective
topologies.
What I'm saying is that the existence of the feeling of free will,
illusion or not, is sufficient to negate the argument of pure
determinism. A mechanistic universe would have no conceivable method
of, or benefit by conjuring such an illusion. There is no function
that would serve an evolutionary machine to develop a fictional sense
of teleology were there not such a possibility already inherent in the
mechanics themselves. Not only would it be superfluous and
counterproductive from an efficiency standpoint, but there really is
no aspect of physics or biochemistry which could serve as a toolbox
for creating some kind of simulation of participation and agency. You
can make a machine seem like it has free will, but unless the machine
feels like it has free will - feels the risks of consequences of it's
words and actions to it's own survival - feels it's own survival with
visceral, overwhelming significance, then there is only the reflection
of our own free will.
When I look at another human being who is similar to myself, I
subconsciously qualify their agency with a shared sense of volition.
Someone much older or younger, from a radically different culture,
even someone with different physical characteristics are presented
with a narrower bandwidth of free will to me. I have to consciously
fight the default prejudice that steers me into stereotypical
associations, otherwise I tend to think that what I see of a person
and what I assume about them based on their appearance is what is
influencing their behavior. I think "This is how children behave.",
but I can still realize that any individual child has some capacity to
deviate from my generic expectations. The closer I get to a person,
the more that I know them, the deeper the subjective connection and
the higher quality of individuality I can resolve in my perception of
them, their life, etc.
Take that interpersonal phenomenon of prejudice and magnify it
exponentially to other species of animal, biology, and finally
physical phenomena of a vastly different scale such as planet or
molecule. I'm not suggesting that we should consider atoms to be
'people just like us' or something, I'm trying to explain how self-
similarity functions as an elemental principle which unites Perception
with General Relativity. Free will is a feature of subjective
perception, while determinism is how free will appears when it is
reflected through existential aperture as relativity.
Probability is the external view of Feeling or Mood. It's the same
thing, only probability is distanced as an a-signifying, generic,
automatic, unconscious phenomenon while mood is a sensorimotive
experience of the same thing. It is reflected through the essential
aperture as signifying, proprietary, volitional, sentient phenomenon.
As for trying to conceive of Many Worlds or a grand consciousness, I
prefer to think of the singularity as what you get when you suck out
all of the space and time from the cosmos. Once you realize that size
and distance have no meaning outside of their perceptual-relativism of
one phenomena to another, then the idea of a singularity from which
the big bang 'emerges' as an event in time becomes a phenomena outside
of timespace and embracing all matter-energy changes. It is a
phenomenon which is, therefore, always occurring and never occurring.
It is absolutely unconscious-deterministic and sentient-volitional at
the same time - but probably much more and much less than that. We can
only describe it as an ant might describe the workings of a microwave
oven... and yet we can understand fully it by not describing it at
all. Being. Doing. Feeling. Experiencing.
John Mikes
Craig Weinberg
As far as anthropocentricity, I think that it is escapable only
through the anthropocentric notion that we can de-anthropocentricize
our perspective. The world has limitlessness, but it also has
innumerable limits. Our experiences, ideas, logic, etc are limited by
the perception and cognition of the human nervous system, yet our
faculties are able to connect us with what convincingly appears to be
an external world in which we participate as agents on an individual
level.
To explain that, I propose that our experience is seamlessly
integrated fact and fiction, transparent and solipsistic. Our wiring
gives us the best transparency it can within the constraints of what
is physically is, but it must also deliver the signature qualities of
human awareness in it's every subjective function. Free will is part
of that software package, but if we go looking for it in that
software's native 'hardware analyzer', we're not going to see anything
because that viewer is only a command line text editor. Nothing looks
like it has free will when you use that.
On Jul 2, 10:52 am, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Deqr Craig,
>
> it makes a lot of sense what you expressed in (too many?) words. May I add
> some more?
> In general you take most of our 'human' concepts as final, fixed, defined
> FACTS (?) and look at the world through them. Such anthropocentric position
> denigrates the limitlessness of the world. There are innumerable aspects we
> did not (yet?) meet and so omit their influence on our thinking, behavior,
> emotions, events, whatever.
> Our 'mind' (undefined) is part of the totality (unlimited complexity) and so
> whatever we 'feel' as our own decision is a product of the combined
> influences we receive - including the input of our mental built. (That
> includes the felling of a falsifiability as well).
>
> In our 'ways' we may have choices and that adds to our 'free' feeling.
>
> An interesting idea for a singularity to have no space and time, the
> (physically perceived?) existence of the universe, a condition I take
> important for (my term) singularity.
>
> Regards
> John Mikes
>