How embryogenesis fits in the mind-body problem?
Evgenii Rudnyi
ALG, and other diverse points of view expressed here? What mind-body
research says about the development of mind from a single cell and then
its death?
Evgenii
P.S. By the way, in Second Life there is course where Prof Gordon &
Gordon teach Embryogenesis Explained
Embryo Physics Course, most Thursdays at 2-3pm Pacific Time, held online
at http://slurl.com/secondlife/Silver%20Bog/84/32/60
It gives a nice overview of the process in question.
Bruno Marchal
On 19 Feb 2011, at 22:14, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> A bit off topic question. How embryogenesis fits comp, digital
> physics, ALG, and other diverse points of view expressed here? What
> mind-body research says about the development of mind from a single
> cell and then its death?
Embryogenesis fits very well. The second recursion theorem of Kleene
provides the conceptual solution of a problem given by Descartes: how
to build a machine capable of self-reproduction. I have explained the
'trick' sometimes. I use a generalisation by John Case to program
'planarias", that is programs which are ble to regenerate themselves
when cut in parts. I illustrate that embryogenesis can be described by
case's generalization of Kleene's recursion theorem. In fact in
computer science, Kleene's theorem can be seen as the most fundamental
theorem of 'abstract biology'.
The quitessence of the trick is to apply a duplicator D to itself. If
Dx gives xx, DD gives DD.
The same trick is used for handling self-reference by machines and
theories, or belief systems, and this leads to G and G*, and their
variant.
Single complex cells like amoeba and paramecia or other sophisticated
protozoa have, imo, a mind, and I collect the evidences that there are
indeed complex infomation possible pathways implemented in those
cells. I tend to believe that bacteria could have a mind, or some
collective mind, but it is less obvious, unless you agree that a human
is already a complex society of bacteria (a eucaryote cell can be seen
as the house of bacteria, together perhaps one virus (the nucleus!).
The first person death of an amoeba? Hard question! I guess an amoeba
might not filter a lot of consciousness flux, nor much memories, but I
can't know that. With comp, consciousness might not be related to the
'brain volume'; those are very hard question, and they might depend on
the way the WR are eliminated, that is how the physical laws emerge.
Individual bacteria are (Turing) universal, but plausibly not Löbian.
Bruno
>
> Evgenii
>
> P.S. By the way, in Second Life there is course where Prof Gordon &
> Gordon teach Embryogenesis Explained
>
> Embryo Physics Course, most Thursdays at 2-3pm Pacific Time, held
> online at http://slurl.com/secondlife/Silver%20Bog/84/32/60
>
> It gives a nice overview of the process in question.
>
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Evgenii Rudnyi
Embryogenesis concerns a multicellular organism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embryogenesis
I am not sure if one can speak of embryogenesis of amoeba or bacteria.
So my question was actually about human being. I believe that I was
conceived by fertilization the ovum in my mother by sperm from my
father. Then the question is how my first person view has been developed
and what happens with it after my death?
Best wishes,
Evgenii
on 20.02.2011 18:21 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> L�bian.
Bruno Marchal
On 20 Feb 2011, at 19:46, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Dear Bruno,
>
> Embryogenesis concerns a multicellular organism
Obviously. But you ask for the *mind* of cells, which are unicellular,
(although I like currently to see them as bacteria (+ a virus)
occupying a sort of house).
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embryogenesis
>
> I am not sure if one can speak of embryogenesis of amoeba or bacteria.
I was talking on the multicellular planaria:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9EuFuJF9N0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vXN_5SPBPtM
My self-regenerating program PLANARIA was made of many cells,
subprograms occupying different locations (in the code), and having
different functions. Yet you can cut it in many pieces as little as
one cell, and any such one cell regenerates the entire program!
It is described in the volume 2, 2, here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html
(That work describes theorem provers, in LISP, for each hypostasis).
The recursion theoretic answer to self-regeneration gives the
conceptual solution to embryogenesis, as that one cell regenerating
complete "planaria" illustrates.
Of course the whole thing is far more sophisticated for the carbon
implemented local living beings.
>
> So my question was actually about human being. I believe that I was
> conceived by fertilization the ovum in my mother by sperm from my
> father. Then the question is how my first person view has been
> developed and what happens with it after my death?
That's the question I have always been interested in.
OK, I will "answer" it, but please add as many grains of salt as needed.
The answer is that it depends to what you identify your soul to.
If you identify yourself (your 1-self) as you in company of your dog
Pluto, you will already die the day Pluto dies.
So your first person view will go as far as the condition are met such
that you can say "OK, I survive this far".
Where is located your 'first person', your 'soul'. Well the theory (Bp
& p) says that is located both
- 'on earth', by which I mean 'effectively implemented', that is by a
number ( a 'body') incarnating (implementing itself) a set of beliefs
(Bp),
- and in Platonia (p), because the soul keep up the umbilical cord
between its body (Bp) and truth p.
How? Lucklily or because glued by an explosive sheaves of coherent
histories in the computational continuum (but this is more
sensibility: Bp & Dp & p).
So what happens after your death?
First there is no evidence that 'death' ever happens as a first person
experience. Second, as I said, it might depend on what you identify
yourself with.
You do "know", accepting the theory of the universal lobian machine,
that you have a part on Earth (Bp, provable) and a part in Heaven(Hell-
Platonia-truth) (p). And I said, you have the choice for the
identification.
I am not sure if you have followed the UDA from step 1 to step 8. It
is something that you can, if not understand the necessity (assuming
comp) at least understand the possibility. Your consciousness is not
related to the "physical brain state", it is related to the person,
itself related to the infinities of computational histories going
through their current digital states. Normally this is easier to
conceive for the quantum many-worlders than anyone else. Your
consciousness is related to a continuum of computational histories,
and below your substitution level, all universal machines competes,
with all oracles. Now, given that continuum; locally you can conceive
that your consciousness is a consciousness flux going through many
computations (which are all emulated by the additive and
multiplication relations among natural numbers).
So it is, with that view, even unclear if you can die in any way, or
at any time, from your first person view. In principle you survive
always in the most normal computation (comp-immortality).
But less us assume you can die. (What does that mean?). The relation
between provability (Bp) and truth (p) run very deep.
If you can survive the death of your dog, you might survive with less
memories, or, like in dreams, with other memories. Here this might
leads to thought experiment involving amnesia and memories
substitution, which can help, but also perturbates a little bit. And
the same can be said for "real" experimentation with drugs.
In principle, you might discover that you are already happy to be just
a modest universal machine, and what can seem to be amazing is that
could correspond to a sort of "enlightened-altered" state of
consciousness which is statical, that machine is in Platonia, and can
know it (it is outside of time space and numbers). Through amnesia
consciousness can backtrack on histories, and by remorse, might
undifferentiate you and redifferentiate you, wandeling on the coherent
multi-dreams until you make peace with your self, or just recognize
your self. This is speculative, AUDA gives the tools to ask the
machine. It is technically hard to answer those question todays.
Dissociative drugs are very interesting. Unlike cannabis which put oil
on all synapses and augment the relative activity of all neurons, a
dissociative drug like Salvia seems to cut the connection, very
selectively, between parts of your brain. It gives tool to discover
that we can identify ourselves to something more basic and primary,
even up to that state "out of time and space".
The "error" of many aristotelians consist in "attaching" consciousness
to the "the brain". It seems to me that a literal understanding of
comp leads to the understanding that consciousness is not related to
the brain, but to the infinity of similar brain (emulated in
arithmetic). If you assume a "big" universe, you don't need MGA (the
step 8) to see that. A body brain is more a filter of consciousness so
that a person evolves through "normal histories". Consciousness
accelerates the histories, it bends somehow the 1-computational space.
Evgenii, you ask the most difficult question, although I consider it
to be both very important, but also that it is important that we
cannot know the answer. It is not serious to be to much serious on
this. But we can propose theories, reason, experiments, and progress
in that field too, never pretending we have the truth. Experimentally,
through the mentally ill and their medication, many information can be
drawn, also. Listening to the other is a good heuristic.
Probably the Tibetans got the main point. After death, nothing is
easy, and there can be more death and more taxes. There is a whole
arithmetical bardo thodol, I think. Not all experiences are
memorizable, and comp keeps a part of the secret naturally. You might
after death, wake up as someone, in the year 9007 after JC, who was,
for a minute, emulating a moment of a life of Evgenii Rudnyi. And
that, might depend if we succeed to keep up teaching math to our
children.
It is ironical that with mechanism, when a machine has the cognitive
ability to get the point on its possibility to perpetuate its local
implementation (with an 'artificial' brain), she has the cognitive
ability to get the point that she will survive anyway, no matter what.
It is the comp-immortality stuff, and if things goes well, it should
explain the quantum immortality stuff. But with amnesia, immortality
itself get more, much more, than one meaning. The real question
concern first person plural immortality, and on this 'we are nowhere",
sorry.
Anyway, what matter are our values. To share them. To multiply them,
if only to make higher the credibility that they will apply to you who
ever you are.
Ah! I think I can say this, assuming two seconds that hell and heaven
exist. There is a good news and there is a bad news. The bad news is
that in Heaven, there are still (many) doors to Hell. The good news is
that in Hell there are (few) doors to Heaven. And this might be used
to comfort the harm-reduction philosophy on theoretical computer
science grounds.
I have probably asserted many propositions belonging to G* minus G,
which should be kept secret, and I hope some plant will forgiven me
from this :)
The key is that *you* add the grains of salt, and notably the comp
hypothesis, the local but interrogative self-correctness, etc.
Best,
Bruno
>> Löbian.
Stephen Paul King
Please set this aside as a stand alone synopsis of your idea. It is a
brilliant explanation that I cannot argue against. I would only append to it
additional considerations that must be taken into account if we are going to
consider how many minds (or many bodies) can be considered as interacting.
For example: each "body", as per your definition, would have at least one
"mind" that would have simulations of the possible behaviors of bodies,
dually every mind would have a collection of bodies that could implement it.
A Mind meets another Mind only via the simulations of bodies that they have
in common and a Body can met another Body only via the minds that they can
implement in common. This is what we see in Pratt's Chu space transform. :-)
Onward!
Stephen
Evgenii Rudnyi
"What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a
single cell and then its death?"
I have meant
"What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a
single cell and then the death of mind?"
So it was not about single cell organisms, it was just misplaced "its".
Right now I am not trying to follow your UDA, rather I am trying to
understand the consequences. I am a chemist by background and I prefer
follow my intuition rather than following proofs.
I agree with you in that what people refer to as "I" is not associated
with the brain only. Let me quote two citations from the book
Spontaneity of Consciousness by Russian scientist Vasily Nalimov that I
like a lot:
"Human consciousness is seen by us as a text."
"Personality is primarily the text that interprets itself."
The book seems not be translated in English but if you interested there
is a paper from Journal of Humanistic Psychology that introduces the author:
http://www.biometrica.tomsk.ru/nalimov/NALIMOV9.htm
Hence I would agree that when my body dies I will presumably remain in
my archives on the hard disc of my computer (or somewhere in Platonia),
or something like this. Yet, then let us consider the birth as it could
be even more interesting. Let me put it this way.
Some time ago my wife and I have conceived a daughter that now she is in
Netherlands where she likes making photos (http://fortunaa.viewbook.com/).
I guess that this is my first person view. Well, I also agree that there
are actually many my first person views, as I have changed a lot during
my life. Still in my current first person view there is some invariant
that I refer to as "I". By the way, how would you define such an
invariant in your theory?
Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others first
person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my daughter. Then
a question is how the first person view of my daughter has been formed
according to your theory.
Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my current
first person view with that before conceiving the daughter?
Thank you,
Evgenii
On 20.02.2011 22:16 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> Heaven(Hell-Platonia-truth) (p). And I said, you have the choice for
Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2011, at 21:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Thank you for your answer. I am also sorry for confusion as with
>
> "What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a
> single cell and then its death?"
>
> I have meant
>
> "What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a
> single cell and then the death of mind?"
>
> So it was not about single cell organisms, it was just misplaced
> "its".
I realize this eventually. No problem.
>
> Right now I am not trying to follow your UDA, rather I am trying to
> understand the consequences. I am a chemist by background and I
> prefer follow my intuition rather than following proofs.
But with computer science, intuition can be misleading. Intuition is
handled by the first person, and recover with the "soul hypostase (Bp
& p)". But G and G* are known as being counter-intuitive, like the UDA
illustrates already a bit "intuitively".
>
> I agree with you in that what people refer to as "I" is not
> associated with the brain only. Let me quote two citations from the
> book Spontaneity of Consciousness by Russian scientist Vasily
> Nalimov that I like a lot:
>
> "Human consciousness is seen by us as a text."
>
> "Personality is primarily the text that interprets itself."
OK. Except that consciousness is not literally a text. It is an
experience. A deep quale.
>
> The book seems not be translated in English but if you interested
> there is a paper from Journal of Humanistic Psychology that
> introduces the author:
>
> http://www.biometrica.tomsk.ru/nalimov/NALIMOV9.htm
>
> Hence I would agree that when my body dies I will presumably remain
> in my archives on the hard disc of my computer (or somewhere in
> Platonia), or something like this.
It makes no sense if the text is not interpreted. But arithmetic does
interpret it. Arithmetic emulates the computation, like a block-
universe in general relativity can be said to emulate the observer's
time.
> Yet, then let us consider the birth as it could be even more
> interesting. Let me put it this way.
>
> Some time ago my wife and I have conceived a daughter that now she
> is in Netherlands where she likes making photos (http://fortunaa.viewbook.com/
> ).
Nice pics :)
>
> I guess that this is my first person view. Well, I also agree that
> there are actually many my first person views, as I have changed a
> lot during my life. Still in my current first person view there is
> some invariant that I refer to as "I". By the way, how would you
> define such an invariant in your theory?
Bp & p (in AUDA)
Personal diary, being annihilated and reconstituted, in UDA. (as
opposed to the diary of the third person observers who does not enter
in the teleportation and self-multiplication device).
If comp is true, then the "real first person" is not definable by a
machine. Minsky is right about this: machines will be bewildered as we
are about who we "really" are.
>
> Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others
> first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my
> daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my
> daughter has been formed according to your theory.
Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could
manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia, they
only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul
falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think
that making love is a sin, to be clear!).
>
> Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my
> current first person view with that before conceiving the daughter?
I am not sure I understand the question. Third person views are
captured by what you can describe with numbers. But due to UDA, even
the physical reality is actually a first person (plural) view, which
limits the third person view to arithmetic, and makes things a bit
hard to describe in simple terms (first person plural looks like third
person views). The difference of your first person views is more or
less a difference of accessible memories, related to the infinities of
the most probable computations related to your histories.
You might try to articulate why this does not really answer your
question, as I feel it did not. Perhaps after you progress enough in
the UD stuff?
Best,
Bruno
Evgenii Rudnyi
> But with computer science, intuition can be misleading.
Intuition could be misleading not only in computer science. I know.
>> Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others
>> first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my
>> daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my
>> daughter has been formed according to your theory.
>
> Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could
> manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia, they
> only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul
> falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think
> that making love is a sin, to be clear!).
I am fine that souls live in Platonia. Let me put the question this way.
If I have understood you correctly, "I" is a combination of the first
person view and the diary. So, the question is when the first person
view of my daughter has started her diary? In other words, how her diary
is related to her birth?
>> Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my
>> current first person view with that before conceiving the
>> daughter?
>
> I am not sure I understand the question.
I am fine that the third person view is related to numbers and not to
physics. Let me put this question this way. My first person view has
diary and the question is what is the different with the third person
view now and then when in my diary has appeared a record about the birth
of my daughter?
You see, my goal is just to translate some typical statements of my
first person view to your language.
On 22.02.2011 10:39 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> block-universe in general relativity can be said to emulate the
Bruno Marchal
On 22 Feb 2011, at 19:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Thank you for your answers. I have still a coupled of questions.
>
> > But with computer science, intuition can be misleading.
>
> Intuition could be misleading not only in computer science. I know.
>
> >> Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others
> >> first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my
> >> daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my
> >> daughter has been formed according to your theory.
> >
> > Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could
> > manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia,
> they
> > only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul
> > falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think
> > that making love is a sin, to be clear!).
>
> I am fine that souls live in Platonia. Let me put the question this
> way. If I have understood you correctly, "I" is a combination of the
> first person view and the diary.
Precisely, I "define" the first person "I", 1-I, by the "knower", and
I define the knower, following Theaetetus, by the combination
(conjunction) of the "Bp" (I believe p, I assert p, I prove p,
equivalent in the toy theology of the ideally correct machine) and
"p". So I know p = I believe p & p is true.
> So, the question is when the first person view of my daughter has
> started her diary? In other words, how her diary is related to her
> birth?
Well, the problem is that we can not know that. For many reasons.
First we cannot know our substitution level. If the level is very low,
she might have start the diary before the big bang. If the level is
very low but not that low, she might have start the diary at the
moment of fecundation, like if her DNA is part of the diary. If the
level is high, she might start it when she get enough stable neuronal
connection, etc.
We cannot know that (assuming comp), but that is a good thing. It
makes her a respectable person who is the only judge in the matter,
but even herself cannot know when the diary started, and if it started
at all.
>
> >> Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my
> >> current first person view with that before conceiving the
> >> daughter?
> >
> > I am not sure I understand the question.
>
> I am fine that the third person view is related to numbers and not
> to physics. Let me put this question this way. My first person view
> has diary
Hmm... careful, it is when the content of the diary is true. The worst
case (total delusion) is when that truth coincide only with
consciousness, and all the rest (described in the diary) is a dream.
The first person is the "dreamer of reality". By definition it is when
her beliefs are correct. With "truth" = "God/One", the first person is
the believer (Bp) when and if, or in the circumstance that p is the
case (only "God knows" that).
> and the question is what is the different with the third person view
> now and then when in my diary has appeared a record about the birth
> of my daughter?
"You" go from the state "Peano-arithmetic" to "Peano-arithmetic + I
have a daughter". You can say: I believe I have a daughter. If it is
the case that you have a daughter, then you know you have daughter,
because it happens that your belief is true.
But this is bit stretching the "theory". The ideally correct machine
is to the human what a material point is to the sun. My answer tries
only to help you to understand what I mean by a knowing machine, not
really a knowing human. Human have non-monotonic layers, they can
update beliefs. The logic G and G*, and the six intensional variants
can be seen as the tangential theology, but we are variable machine. G
and G* remains invariant, but get each nanosecond (say) a different
arithmetical interpretations. To extract physics, you need only the
self-referential invariant.
>
> You see, my goal is just to translate some typical statements of my
> first person view to your language.
Which is what I try to do with the language of the "chatty" universal
machine, like (a theorem prover for) Peano arithmetic (remember that
by Bp I mean Gödel's Peano arithmetical (or any Löbian machine)
provability predicate (BEWEISBAR), and p is for some arithmetical
proposition. (Bp & p) is literally an arithmetical proposition, like
BEWEISBAR("2+2=4") & 2+2=4. "2+2=4" is for the Gödel number of a
sentence asserting that 2+2=4.
The (Gödelian) surprise about the ideally correct universal Löbian
machine, is that although it is an ultra-simplistic model of self-
reference, it is already incredibly complex in possibilities. Platonia
is definitely not the same before and after Gödel, we know now that
universal numbers lives there and put a huge mess. It is now, a bit
more that a perfect square and a perfect and a perfect circle, it is
all that + the Mandelbrot set. If you have the time, look at this
video which illustrates nicely the expressive richness of the M set:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I
In Plotinus and Plato, Platonia is not the ONE, which is "Truth", (in
the arithmetical interpretation), but platonia is the divine
intellect, or the Noûs, the realm of ideas (here: programs, machine,
numbers) and their interconnections, including numbers "having" or
"implementing" (with respect to some universal numbers) beliefs in
those ideas. Those numbers+beliefs are the "terrestrial intellects",
toy scientists----if you want, they are the owners of "p", "Bp", "Bp &
p", etc. when "B" is the arithmetical description of their "proving"
or "believing", predicates. etc. They are Plotinus' discursive
reasoner, or 'man' (human). Thay are the Lôbian machines or numbers
(combinators, ...).
A number might assert that "24 is even", but also that "24 is the
address of my grandmother". I use a Dennett-like intensional/
intentional stance toward that number, betting that it knows what it
talks about (in case I got myself evidence that 24 is even and that 24
is its grandmother address, relatively to some plausible universal
number(s).
Best,
Bruno
Dick Gordon
Half tongue in cheek, in:
Tuszynski, J.A. & R. Gordon (2008). A mean field Ising model for
cortical rotation in amphibian one cell stage embryos. In. Eds.
Toronto, Society for Mathematical Biology Conference, July 30 - August
2, 2008.
I used the following reasoning:
IF microtubules in the brain have coherence properties that equate to
consciousness
GIVEN that those microtubules map in the sense of a fate map from the
cortex of the one cell (amphibian) embryo to the brain
THEN we ought to be able to investigate those coherence properties
(consciousness?) in the one cell embryo.
Fits nicely with your thoughts on Paramecium, which has a cortex with
microtubules.
Yours, -Dick Gordon
Bruno Marchal
On 23 Feb 2011, at 21:29, Dick Gordon wrote:
> Dear Evgenii & Bruno,
> Half tongue in cheek, in:
>
> Tuszynski, J.A. & R. Gordon (2008). A mean field Ising model for
> cortical rotation in amphibian one cell stage embryos. In. Eds.
> Toronto, Society for Mathematical Biology Conference, July 30 - August
> 2, 2008.
Thanks for letting us know.
>
> I used the following reasoning:
>
> IF microtubules in the brain have coherence properties that equate to
> consciousness
> GIVEN that those microtubules map in the sense of a fate map from the
> cortex of the one cell (amphibian) embryo to the brain
> THEN we ought to be able to investigate those coherence properties
> (consciousness?) in the one cell embryo.
>
> Fits nicely with your thoughts on Paramecium, which has a cortex with
> microtubules.
May be. Do you think it is a quantum computer? I have doubt but who
knows. In any case I think it is plausibly Turing emulable (like
quantum computing is). But again, who knows?
Best,
Bruno
Evgenii Rudnyi
Thanks a lot for your answers. I am not sure though if I
agree/understand them. Well, I have to think it over.
Your position somewhat reminds me that of Erwin Schr�dinger in Mind and
Matter. A few quotes from Chapter 4: The Arithmetical Paradox: The
Oneness of Mind.
"The reason why our sentient, percipient and thinking ego is met nowhere
within our scientific world picture can easily be indicated in seven
words: because it is itself that world picture. It is identical with the
whole and therefore cannot be contained in it as a part of it. But, of
course, here we knock against the arithmetical paradox; there appears to
be a great multitude of these conscious egos, the world is however only
one."
"There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of
minds or consciousnesses, Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth
there is only one mind. This is the doctrine of the Upanishads."
"The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical
fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the
singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one
consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of
this ever happening anywhere in the world."
Well, I am afraid, I am not ready to accept this yet. I guess I am
closer to Sartre's "Hell is other people." (In the German audio book
that I have recently listened to, it was "Die H�lle, das sind die
anderen". I wonder what it looks like in French).
Best wishes,
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru
on 23.02.2011 19:06 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> by Bp I mean G�del's Peano arithmetical (or any L�bian machine)
> provability predicate (BEWEISBAR), and p is for some arithmetical
> proposition. (Bp & p) is literally an arithmetical proposition, like
> BEWEISBAR("2+2=4") & 2+2=4. "2+2=4" is for the G�del number of a
> sentence asserting that 2+2=4.
>
> The (G�delian) surprise about the ideally correct universal L�bian
> machine, is that although it is an ultra-simplistic model of
> self-reference, it is already incredibly complex in possibilities.
> Platonia is definitely not the same before and after G�del, we know
> now that universal numbers lives there and put a huge mess. It is
> now, a bit more that a perfect square and a perfect and a perfect
> circle, it is all that + the Mandelbrot set. If you have the time,
> look at this video which illustrates nicely the expressive richness
> of the M set: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I
>
> In Plotinus and Plato, Platonia is not the ONE, which is "Truth", (in
> the arithmetical interpretation), but platonia is the divine
> intellect, or the No�s, the realm of ideas (here: programs, machine,
> numbers) and their interconnections, including numbers "having" or
> "implementing" (with respect to some universal numbers) beliefs in
> those ideas. Those numbers+beliefs are the "terrestrial intellects",
> toy scientists----if you want, they are the owners of "p", "Bp", "Bp
> & p", etc. when "B" is the arithmetical description of their
> "proving" or "believing", predicates. etc. They are Plotinus'
> discursive reasoner, or 'man' (human). Thay are the L�bian machines
> or numbers (combinators, ...).
>
> A number might assert that "24 is even", but also that "24 is the
> address of my grandmother". I use a Dennett-like
> intensional/intentional stance toward that number, betting that it
Bruno Marchal
> Thanks a lot for your answers. I am not sure though if I agree/
> understand them. Well, I have to think it over.
You are welcome. You can ask any question. My point is that what I say
is a consequence of taking the comp hypothesis seriously into account.
We don't know the truth, but we can reason in the hypothetico-
deductive way.
>
> Your position somewhat reminds me that of Erwin Schrödinger in Mind
> and Matter. A few quotes from Chapter 4: The Arithmetical Paradox:
> The Oneness of Mind.
>
> "The reason why our sentient, percipient and thinking ego is met
> nowhere within our scientific world picture can easily be indicated
> in seven words: because it is itself that world picture. It is
> identical with the whole and therefore cannot be contained in it as
> a part of it. But, of course, here we knock against the arithmetical
> paradox; there appears to be a great multitude of these conscious
> egos, the world is however only one."
>
> "There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of
> minds or consciousnesses, Their multiplicity is only apparent, in
> truth there is only one mind. This is the doctrine of the Upanishads."
>
> "The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the
> empirical fact that consciousness is never experienced in the
> plural, only in the singular. Not only has none of us ever
> experienced more than one consciousness, but there is also no trace
> of circumstantial evidence of this ever happening anywhere in the
> world."
>
> Well, I am afraid, I am not ready to accept this yet. I guess I am
> closer to Sartre's "Hell is other people." (In the German audio book
> that I have recently listened to, it was "Die Hölle, das sind die
> anderen". I wonder what it looks like in French).
Well, if you ask me my private feeling I have to say I prefer
Schroedinger to Sartre. "Hell is other people" is really pessimism.
Europeans have many reasons to put some truth in that idea, but I hope
this is more contingent (and a result of separating science from
religion) than a deep feature of human.
Of course deep 'inside the head' of a universal machine there is
already a tension between the soul (Bp & p) and the intellect (Bp),
and this explains how all universal machine have already all what is
needed to build their own hell, and, alas, to share it with others.
But then some machine can learn to recognize themselves into other
machines, and the possibility of 'love' is not completely excluded.
Best,
Bruno
>> by Bp I mean Gödel's Peano arithmetical (or any Löbian machine)
>> provability predicate (BEWEISBAR), and p is for some arithmetical
>> proposition. (Bp & p) is literally an arithmetical proposition, like
>> BEWEISBAR("2+2=4") & 2+2=4. "2+2=4" is for the Gödel number of a
>> sentence asserting that 2+2=4.
>>
>> The (Gödelian) surprise about the ideally correct universal Löbian
>> machine, is that although it is an ultra-simplistic model of
>> self-reference, it is already incredibly complex in possibilities.
>> Platonia is definitely not the same before and after Gödel, we know
>> now that universal numbers lives there and put a huge mess. It is
>> now, a bit more that a perfect square and a perfect and a perfect
>> circle, it is all that + the Mandelbrot set. If you have the time,
>> look at this video which illustrates nicely the expressive richness
>> of the M set: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I
>>
>> In Plotinus and Plato, Platonia is not the ONE, which is "Truth", (in
>> the arithmetical interpretation), but platonia is the divine
>> intellect, or the Noűs, the realm of ideas (here: programs, machine,
>> numbers) and their interconnections, including numbers "having" or
>> "implementing" (with respect to some universal numbers) beliefs in
>> those ideas. Those numbers+beliefs are the "terrestrial intellects",
>> toy scientists----if you want, they are the owners of "p", "Bp", "Bp
>> & p", etc. when "B" is the arithmetical description of their
>> "proving" or "believing", predicates. etc. They are Plotinus'
>> discursive reasoner, or 'man' (human). Thay are the Lôbian machines
>> or numbers (combinators, ...).
>>
>> A number might assert that "24 is even", but also that "24 is the
>> address of my grandmother". I use a Dennett-like
>> intensional/intentional stance toward that number, betting that it
>> knows what it talks about (in case I got myself evidence that 24 is
>> even and that 24 is its grandmother address, relatively to some
>> plausible universal number(s).
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Bruno
>
Evgenii Rudnyi
amazed by expressions in mathematical logic. Yet, sometimes it is not
bad to start from the end, this might also help. Say I do not understand
how many first persons views are allowed in your theory and if this
number is more than one, how they interact with each other.
If to speak of love, we need at least two persons. Hence in my view love
cannot exist in the Schroedinger's The Oneness of Mind. Love is much
closer to Sartre who accepts that others also exist.
Evgenii
on 02.03.2011 10:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> Dear Evgenii,
>
>
>> Thanks a lot for your answers. I am not sure though if I
>> agree/understand them. Well, I have to think it over.
>
>
> You are welcome. You can ask any question. My point is that what I
> say is a consequence of taking the comp hypothesis seriously into
> account. We don't know the truth, but we can reason in the
> hypothetico-deductive way.
Bruno Marchal
Hi Evgenii,
> I understand how the hypothetico-deductive way is working and I am
> amazed by expressions in mathematical logic. Yet, sometimes it is
> not bad to start from the end, this might also help.
I agree. The amazing thing is that if we start from the end, we
get ... Plotinus or Plotinus-like platonist theology. For some people,
this is enough to stop the conversation. It just means that they
believe that some Aristotelian dogma cannot be criticized.
> Say I do not understand how many first persons views are allowed in
> your theory and if this number is more than one, how they interact
> with each other.
I start from the mind body problem, and from the digital mechanist
hypothesis. I show this makes us *very* ignorant.
So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all,
even between third person describable objects. And the problem of how
many first person "really" exist is also an open problem, although I
tend more and more to believe that there is only one first person: the
universal person described by the arithmetical hypostases. Although
personal consciousness is not an illusion, self-identity can be. But,
please note that I am speculating here. And there do exist some
evidence that the numbers of person could be at least two. That would
be the case if the "whole truth" is a sort of person. Very complex
question.
>
> If to speak of love, we need at least two persons. Hence in my view
> love cannot exist in the Schroedinger's The Oneness of Mind. Love is
> much closer to Sartre who accepts that others also exist.
Not necessarily. First a person might be able to love herself. Also, a
unique person might split in different person/memories (like in the WM
duplication) and "forget" she is the same person, so that a two
partners love relation could make sense. For love being manifest, we
need some relative differences, but also a form of more absolute self-
recognizance.
The problem is that the notion of 'first person' is absolute when seen
by the first person, and relative when observed in the third person
perspective.
But my point is more that with the comp hyp we can make those
questions mathematical and derived information from hypotheses. Then
we might or not appreciate the consequences, and decide if we like or
not the hypotheses, but when doing science we have to be prepared to
some friction with possible wishful thinking.
This leads to the question: is truth (unknown but approachable)
necessarily good to know? I have no answer, but I tend to bet that in
the long run it is better not to hide it. Hiding truth cost a lot, and
when the truth appears it is even more shocking when it has been
hidden for a long time. I defend an "harm reduction" ethical philosophy.
Bruno
Evgenii Rudnyi
Thanks for answers. As usual, they are very enjoyable.
From my side I can offer nothing more. I guess that at the moment my
point of view is some eclectic mixture, basically I am just collecting
different ideas and theories.
I should say that some long time ago I used to have Introduction to
Mathematical Logic by Church (in Russian) and I believe that I have even
read the introduction in the book. I admire the nice equations in
mathematical logic but I am not sure that I am able to comprehend them.
I wanted to read Introduction to the Theory of Computation by Sipser
that you recommend but now I take the course Embryogenesis Explained in
the Second Life and this is enough for the moment. Look for example here
http://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/wwwhuman/Stages/CStages.htm
Astonishing, isn't it?
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru
on 03.03.2011 10:48 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2011, at 13:05, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Thanks for answers. As usual, they are very enjoyable.
>
> From my side I can offer nothing more. I guess that at the moment my
> point of view is some eclectic mixture, basically I am just
> collecting different ideas and theories.
>
> I should say that some long time ago I used to have Introduction to
> Mathematical Logic by Church (in Russian) and I believe that I have
> even read the introduction in the book. I admire the nice equations
> in mathematical logic but I am not sure that I am able to comprehend
> them.
I have the book by Church, it is not the simplest one. I love his
smaller book on lambda-calculus though, but Church missed Church
thesis! "Church thesis" is a vocable made by Kleene, and it is really
people like Post, Turing, and Kleene who get the point, imo.
>
> I wanted to read Introduction to the Theory of Computation by Sipser
> that you recommend
I am not sure. i recommend usually Cutland, Rogers, or, Mendelson,
Boolos and Jeffrey (+ Burguess for later edition), or Epstein and
Carnielly.
Don't mind too much :)
> but now I take the course Embryogenesis Explained in the Second Life
> and this is enough for the moment. Look for example here
>
> http://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/wwwhuman/Stages/CStages.htm
>
> Astonishing, isn't it?
Beautiful and wonderful.
Astonishing? I know I will perhaps look presumptuous, but I think that
Kleene's second recursion theorem provides the conceptual solution of
the Descarte-Driesch self-reproduction problem, I can argue that a
generalization of Kleene's theorem provides the conceptual solution of
embryogenesis, even of self-regeneration. I wrote a paper on that for
the first european meeting on artificial life ("Amoeba, Planaria and
Dreaming Machine"). I wrote a program 'planaria', having a lot of
different subroutines, and which is such that when a subroutine (any
of them) is isolated and given some flag as input, it regenerates the
entire program. I even programmed an infinite planarian.
For theology, fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, all the use of
the second recursion theorem is encapsulated in the theorem by
Solovay, linking the modal logic G and G* to the self-reference
abilities of what I call the Löbian entities (notably the Löbian
numbers , the Löbian theories, the Löbian machines, and a large
spectrum of Löbian 'supermachine').
In "conscience et mécanisme", the long version of my PhD thesis, I do
both the abstract biology and the abstract theology. Abstract biology
takes the second recursion theorem as a fundamental theorem. Abstract
theology takes as fundamental theorem the fact that some machine can
prove a form of the second recursion theorem. It is known in the
literature as the "Gödel's diagonalization lemma".
You make a good choice to study embryogenesis, it is a fundamental and
deep process. My initial motivation comes from biology. I learned and
discovered computer science in the molecular genetics of bacteria,
notably through the famous paper by Jacob and Monod on the 'lactose
operon" (the genetical regulation of enzymes managing the sugar
"lactose").
Without the little book on Gödel's theorem by Nagel and Newman, I
might have become a molecular biologist :)
I still love Planarians.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0QzSYQGsnA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9EuFuJF9N0
And here a planarian with 8 heads!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ew3yupNMF8&NR=1
I was used to have planarian as pets, a long time ago.
Best wishes,
Bruno
Russell Standish
>
> So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all,
> even between third person describable objects. And the problem of
> how many first person "really" exist is also an open problem,
> although I tend more and more to believe that there is only one
> first person: the universal person described by the arithmetical
> hypostases. Although personal consciousness is not an illusion,
> self-identity can be. But, please note that I am speculating here.
> And there do exist some evidence that the numbers of person could be
> at least two. That would be the case if the "whole truth" is a sort
> of person. Very complex question.
>
The arithmetical hypostases strike me being but a skeleton shared by
all first persons - just like we share a common set of DNA (more 99%)
that makes us human, but there is sufficient variation that makes each
of us a unique human, even monozygotic twins.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2011, at 01:36, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 03, 2011 at 10:48:38AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all,
>> even between third person describable objects. And the problem of
>> how many first person "really" exist is also an open problem,
>> although I tend more and more to believe that there is only one
>> first person: the universal person described by the arithmetical
>> hypostases. Although personal consciousness is not an illusion,
>> self-identity can be. But, please note that I am speculating here.
>> And there do exist some evidence that the numbers of person could be
>> at least two. That would be the case if the "whole truth" is a sort
>> of person. Very complex question.
>>
>
> The arithmetical hypostases strike me being but a skeleton shared by
> all first persons - just like we share a common set of DNA (more 99%)
> that makes us human, but there is sufficient variation that makes each
> of us a unique human, even monozygotic twins.
I agree that the hypostases are plausibly describing a sort of
universal person, already conscious, and manifesting its consciousness
through all conscious persons (in a large sense, planarian are persons
imo). The first person itself should be more specifically related to
the fourth, and to the seventh and eight hypostases (Bp & p, and the
splitting (along G/G*) Bp & ~B~p & p. It is the connection with the
truth (the "& p") which makes those modalities private and
incommunicable, like a first person feels to be.
Bruno