Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

Brent wrote:

 

"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different sources.  One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that influences one through perception.  I don't think this affects the above analysis except to qualify the idea that external indeterminism is justly considered enslavement."

 

An enlightened Hungarian king wrote a royal order in the 13th c. (King Coloman, the bookworm) "De Strigiis quae non sunt..." i.e. "About the  sorcerers that do NOT exist..." - yet 1/2 millennium later they still burnt witches the World over. So is it with the ominous

Fre-Will, and many more atavistically developed meme-stuff. Especially in the theocratic religion chapters, but conventional science not exempted either. As much as I like Brent's remark, I point out the (conventional science) figment of the Physical World and its domains like a 'quantum random event' - which would make all our 'ordered' world (view) irrelevant and haphazardously changing, instead of following those 'oganized' physics- (and other scientific)- rules we 'beleive in" and apply. Even Brent's "quasi-classical action" is part of our scientific figment. Those "possibly deterministic" EXTERNAL events are within our 'model' of the so far known part we carry (in pesonalized adjustment) in our 'mind' - outside that SELF in our mini-solipsism. Part of our perceived reality.

 

I like  "the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic)'  distinction as pointing to the influences upon (our known) topics WITHIN the limited model of our perceived reality by the 'beyond model' infinite complexity of the everything. We have no way to learn what that infinite rest of the world may be, yet it influences the part we got access to so it is deterministic in our indeterministic - unpredictable  world. 

"Enslavement" is a term I would be careful to use in such discussion because of its historic - societal general meaning. We - in my opinion - are not slaves in the unlimited everything: we are part of it.Embedded into and influenced by all of it. 

 

We just do not see beyond our limitations - my agnosticism.

 

 

[1Z]

On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> *Brent wrote:*
>
> **
> *"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different sources.

> One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
> amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is the
> unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that influences
> one through perception.  I don't think this affects the above analysis
> except to qualify the idea that external indeterminism is justly considered

> enslavement*."

>
> An enlightened Hungarian king wrote a royal order in the 13th c. (King
> Coloman, the bookworm) "De Strigiis quae non sunt..." i.e. "About the
>  sorcerers that do NOT exist..." - yet 1/2 millennium later they still burnt
> witches the World over. So is it with the ominous
> Fre-Will, and many more atavistically developed meme-stuff. Especially in
> the theocratic religion chapters, but conventional science not exempted
> either. As much as I like Brent's remark, I point out the (conventional
> science) figment of the Physical World and its domains like a 'quantum
> random event' - which would make all our 'ordered' world (view) irrelevant
> and haphazardously changing, instead of following those 'oganized' physics-
> (and other scientific)- rules we 'beleive in" and apply.

Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
of
order emerges from randomness.

Even Brent's
> "quasi-classical action" is part of our scientific figment. Those "possibly
> deterministic" EXTERNAL events are within our 'model' of the so far known
> part we carry (in pesonalized adjustment) in our 'mind' - outside that SELF

> in our mini-solipsism. Part of our *perceived reality.*
>
> I like* * "*the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic)*'  distinction

[John Mikes]

IZ wrote:

 

"Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
of order emerges from randomness".

 

'Stochastic is no more than not assignable to our KNOWN rules of choice. This is a natural outcome within the view I discribed.

And the 'order' tha 'emerges' from randomness? maybe it is only a mathematical formula - just describing the experience, or - by additional input - the missing part that 'made' the "randomness" in the first place, dissipates by our knowledge being expanded (enriched).

I appreciate ONE true randomness (in math): "Take ANY number..." (puzzles).

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

[1Z]

On Apr 20, 8:53 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>
> *"Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
> of order emerges from randomness"*.

>
> 'Stochastic is no more than not assignable to our KNOWN rules of choice.

It's still rules. If there are no known rules BECAUSE the actual rules
"out there"
are not deterministic, science can still function with the sort of
rules it still
functions with. In you previous comment, ou sounded like you were
deriving the conclusion "everything
is deterministic" from the premise "science works on rules", and that
does not
in fact follow. Now you seem to be deriving "everything is
deterministic" from itself.

> This is a natural outcome within the view I discribed.

> And the 'order' tha '*emerges'* from randomness? maybe it is only a

> mathematical formula - just describing the experience,

Maybe a deterministic law "is just a mathematical formula". The point
is
whether we should have respect for the fact that these things work,
and whether we should do so in a biased or an even-handed way.
The determinist is impressed by Newton's deterministic laws,and happy
to reify them,
but not by the Law of Large Numbers, which shows how apparent
order can emerge from chaos. Yet both work. So it looks like
the determinist is running on bias.

> *or *- by additional

> input - the missing part that 'made' the "randomness" in the first place,
> dissipates by our knowledge being expanded (enriched).
> I appreciate ONE true randomness (in math): "Take ANY number..." (puzzles).
>

[John Mikes]

Peter,

if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in (my?) agnosticism:

We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted imaging and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because it widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable - acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.

In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and stochastic is sort of a random. What conventional science does is a compromise into the "almost": our technology is "almost perfect", some planes fall off from the sky, some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic mishaps occur, some theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent cute factors that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless series and at the end it is believed as a fact.

 

Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning, applying ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL ingredients of the Everything. We don't know what

are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited knowledge.

We don't know what kind of alterations the relations in the unlimited totality may undergo, we

only experience SOME and interpret them within our figment (physical world). Presumably -

and now I use this word as well <G> - there is an order in the wholeness and this encompasses all the totality in the alterations of the relationships - so I feel justified to use

the word 'deterministic'. Not to "understand" it, though. In limbo - you say: be my guest.

 

We cannot overstep our capabilities and think only within our models. By human logic, which has no claim to be the general characteristic of nature (the totality). We think human. Me, too.

A bit stepping further seems to be allowed in 'anticipation' what I just study how to get to it,

on the bases of Robert Rosen and Mihai Nadin. I am not there yet.

 

Rules, mathematical formula, quantum science, physics, other conventional sciences: all

figments of the human mind how to explain the partial phenomena we 'accepted' over the time of our existence here on Earth.

 

One more obstacle: users of different vocabularies cannot effectively argue with each other,

the meaning of the words is different. Bruno has a vocabulary, conventional sciences use another one, my concepts are differently identified, religions have their own versions, every

one understands arguments within their own vocabulary - the rest is 'stupid'.

 

Regards

John

[meekerdb]

On 4/22/2011 1:23 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Peter,

if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in (my?) agnosticism:

We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted imaging and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because it widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable - acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.

In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and stochastic is sort of a random.

Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance of some deeper level?

What conventional science does is a compromise into the "almost": our technology is "almost perfect", some planes fall off from the sky, some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic mishaps occur, some theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent cute factors that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless series and at the end it is believed as a fact.

 

Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning, applying ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL ingredients of the Everything. We don't know what

are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited knowledge.

But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is only presumption.

Brent

[1Z]

On Apr 22, 9:23 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Peter,
> if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences
> based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize
> the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in
> (my?) agnosticism:
> We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted imaging
> and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because it
> widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter
> influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable -
> acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.
> In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and
> stochastic is sort of a random.

Don't known what? The HIdden Variables that mean apparent
indeterminism
actually stems from determinism. Your position is completely
inconsistent. You
are saying we can't know or understand things we can see, they are
mere "models",
but we can know that there is this underlying determinism which we
can't see..

>What conventional science does is a
> compromise into the "almost": our technology is "almost perfect", some
> planes fall off from the sky, some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic
> mishaps occur, some theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent
> cute factors that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of
> trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless series and
> at the end it is believed as a fact.
>
> Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning,

Yep. And "some order" means "stochastic", not deteministic.

[John Mikes]

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

                

                  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."

BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance of some deeper level?

 

Please consider first my -  'in such view'  - furthermore may I remind you of all those "natural law" based (physical and other) conventional scientific tenets that (in our science) we can and do rely on? No haphazardly emerging counter-facts disturb the "scientific" picture by a 'random' input of the unexpect/ed/able.

I am not an expert in 'random': my mother tongue (not Indo-European) does not include such term (word) - we used earlier: the 'exbeliebig' translated (from Latino-German: as 'liked'). Now even in this language they apply the word "RANDOM" because 'we may not LIKE it<G>.

Russell S - if I remember well - spoke about some 'small?' random, identified within a topic - please correct me if I am wrong. I am talking about the "absolute?" random, having no math - or natural limitations.  Like: 'out of a blue'.

 

BM: But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is only presumption.

Brent, your slip is showing: "all our current knowledge" is restricted to our present  conventional sciences based on what I call

              JM: "...imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited knowledge."

 

I would call QM a brilliant adage within our present model-view (the physical world figment). 

And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it did not pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it

With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the total 'randomness' we happen to live in. Some origin - beyond my present knowledge-based imagination - and some course of the Everything - who knows where? - at a certain point of which we 'exist' and view the World as well as our capabilities allow.

 

John M

[1Z]

On Apr 23, 4:26 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>

>                 *  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
> is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."*
>
> *BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include

> the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of

> ignorance of some deeper level? *
> **
> Please consider first my - * 'in such view' * - furthermore may I remind you

> of all those "natural law" based (physical and other) conventional
> scientific tenets that (in our science) we can and do rely on? No
> haphazardly emerging counter-facts disturb the "scientific" picture by a
> 'random' input of the unexpect/ed/able.

Maybe not beyond what has already been marshalled under stochastic
laws.

> I am not an expert in 'random': my mother tongue (not Indo-European) does
> not include such term (word) - we used earlier: the 'exbeliebig' translated
> (from Latino-German: as 'liked'). Now even in this language they apply the
> word "RANDOM" because 'we may not LIKE it<G>.

If you can understand what determinism means, you can understand what
indeterminism means.

> Russell S - if I remember well - spoke about some 'small?' random,
> identified within a topic - please correct me if I am wrong. I am talking
> about the "absolute?" random, having no math - or natural limitations.
> Like: 'out of a blue'.
>

> *BM: But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with

> all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is
> only presumption.
>

> *Brent, your slip is showing: *"all our current knowledge"* is restricted

> to our present  conventional sciences based on what I call

> *              JM: "...imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited
> knowledge." *
>
> I would call QM a brilliant adage within our *present model-view* *(the
> physical world figment*).

> And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it did not
> pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it
> With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the total
> 'randomness' we happen to live in. Some origin - beyond my present
> knowledge-based imagination - and some course of the Everything - who knows
> where? - at a certain point of which we 'exist' and view the World as well
> as our capabilities allow.
>
> John M
>

> ...
>
> read more »

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

                

                  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."

BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance of some deeper level?

OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic behavior).

In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level computations) are random. With comp, determinism entaills first person and first person plural intrinsic randomness existence.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

This makes a false constrast between models and out current knowledge.
Our current knowledge, so called, is just embodied in our models which
we rely on, pending further discoveries. To recognize that the
intrinsic randomness of QM is just an element of our current model no
more justifies asserting that real reality must be deterministic than
noting that our current model of the Earth as a bumpy ellipsoid is
subject of refinement, justifies asserting the Earth is flat. It's is
fine, and scientific, to criticize our current knowledge - but it needs
to be supported by more than just the fact that our knowledge is
provisional, because it will *always* be provisional.

>> I would call QM a brilliant adage within our *present model-view* *(the
>> physical world figment*).
>> And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it did not
>> pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it
>> With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the total
>> 'randomness' we happen to live in.

I think this bespeaks a common misconception; perhaps related to the
indeterminism=not-determinism Peter points to above. Random doesn't
mean "anything can happen" or "nothing can be predicted". It can be
used to model something that is deterministic, but not worth the effort
to determine, or something that is not determined. But it may be very
constrained. Something may be random, but within a very small range.
And they may be very well described by know distributions - as is the
case for coin tosses and nuclear decays.

Brent

>> Some origin - beyond my present

[meekerdb]

On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

                

                  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."

BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance of some deeper level?

OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic behavior).

In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level computations) are random.

This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of conscious experience.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through
self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital
mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious
in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM
entails first person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy
(many worlds), first person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise
to show that it entials non cloning of matter, and non emulability of
matter (and thus the falsity of digital physics a priori).

It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it
should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is
already there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by
machine/numbers is indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already
implies that the bottom physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable.
The arithmetical qubit cannot be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a
digital machine, and this is perhaps not confirmed by QM!).

Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

Bruno,

 

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,

could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible worlds?

Richard Ruquist

On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

                 (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."

BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance of some deeper level?

OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic behavior).

In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level computations) are random.

This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of conscious experience.

This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity of digital physics a priori).

It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps not confirmed by QM!).

Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Mikes]

I am sure you write very smart things. I am not so familiar with the letters used as abbreviations (wf, DM and more) so I just listen to the music. 

One thing though I am sure:

 

all you include is included within our yesterdays knowledge-base what is for sure more than the knowledge base way back before yesterday - and LESS than it will be tomorrow (or say 1000 years from now). I formulate my 'opinions'  (oh, not arguments, for heaven's sake) in my agnosticism about such adages in the future invalidating some "nice and acceptable" TRUTH we pamper in our present thinking.

 

If there is 'random' in your worldview, how is it restricted in a way not to interfere with those "LAWS" conventional sciences formulated before such random changes occurred?

Also: it may be my imperfection in my vocabulary, but erasing 'random' - making every change in relations based on some 'originating' factor - shows a DETERMINISTIC  and not some indeterministic view. We may not clearly identify all those originating factors (e.g. in the so far not detected parts of the totality), but so works my agnosticism.

 

The PHYSICAL WORLD is a nice figment and we can live with it for now.

 

John

 

[meekerdb]

On 4/26/2011 12:50 PM, John Mikes wrote:

I am sure you write very smart things. I am not so familiar with the letters used as abbreviations (wf, DM and more) so I just listen to the music. 

One thing though I am sure:

 

all you include is included within our yesterdays knowledge-base what is for sure more than the knowledge base way back before yesterday - and LESS than it will be tomorrow (or say 1000 years from now).

One would hope so, although our knowledge may go to zero along with out numbers in less than 1000yrs.

I formulate my 'opinions'  (oh, not arguments, for heaven's sake) in my agnosticism about such adages in the future invalidating some "nice and acceptable" TRUTH we pamper in our present thinking.

 

If there is 'random' in your worldview, how is it restricted in a way not to interfere with those "LAWS" conventional sciences formulated before such random changes occurred?

I'm surprised you would appeal to "conventional sciences" since you express such agnosticism about their validity.  There was no prior, deterministic law dictating the decay of radioactive nuclei or the chemical reaction of two molecules.  But they were thought to obey stochastic laws that defined the probabilities of different possible events.  Quantum mechanics proved capable of calculating these stochastic laws from more fundamental variables.  The same QM predicts that some other events will occur with virtual certainty and some not at all; and that's what restricts 'random'.

Also: it may be my imperfection in my vocabulary, but erasing 'random' - making every change in relations based on some 'originating' factor - shows a DETERMINISTIC  and not some indeterministic view.

I think that is the standard meaning.

We may not clearly identify all those originating factors (e.g. in the so far not detected parts of the totality), but so works my agnosticism.

Certainly deterministic does not imply predictable.  Even if we possess a deterministic law, our ability to predict is limited by our knowledge of initial states and our ability to calculate.

 

The PHYSICAL WORLD is a nice figment and we can live with it for now.

But how can you know that unless you know the reality of which it's a figment?

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Richard,

On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno,

 

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,

could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible worlds?

Richard Ruquist

Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both happenings will happen, if I can say.

You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible as suppressing the existence of a number.

So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has to be both.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

Breuno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

 

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?

Richard

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Breuno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

 

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?

It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM is a universal theory.

The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.

In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.

With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the qualia).

To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more complex for unclear reason.

But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.

My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this is obvious.

I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

 

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?

It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM is a universal theory.

            (JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false and QM being-NOT-                     a universal  theory?

The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

             (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 'observer' reaistic as thought?

But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.

        (JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame was 'created???

In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.

        (JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the future.

With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the qualia).

To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more complex for unclear reason.

But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.

             (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.

                   

 

My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this is obvious.

I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.

Bruno

             (John)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,

On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

 

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?

It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM is a universal theory.

            (JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?

In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together, and the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them, because I like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices.

The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

             (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 'observer' reaistic as thought?

A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic. Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of his study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the world he is observing. With comp also. This allows monism: the researcher is embedded in the field that he searches. No need of a cut between subject and object. No need for an ontological dualism.

But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.

        (JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame was 'created???

God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)

In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.

        (JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the future.

We can, accepting a theory. With comp we can explain that science will never know for sure, and that knowing anything for sure, except one own consciousness, is a case of insanity. 

Of course comp might be false, in which case you might be right. Note also that there are many futures, both on the first person plane (hell, heaven, the Tibetan intermediate realms, etc.) and on the third person plane, as described by the wave function. All this by *conjecturing* comp and/or QM. 

With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the qualia).

To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more complex for unclear reason.

But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.

             (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.

You can thank the universal machine. I am just her messenger ;)

                   

 

My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this is obvious.

I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.

Bruno

             (John)

Have a good day, John,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John,

On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

 

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?

It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM is a universal theory.

            (JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?

In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together, and the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them, because I like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices.

The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

             (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 'observer' reaistic as thought?

A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic. Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of his study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the world he is observing.

Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf

and more recently Asher Peres

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf

The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an epistemic event in one's description of the system.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Apr 2011, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John,

On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

 

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?

It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM is a universal theory.

            (JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?

In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together, and the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them, because I like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices.

The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

             (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 'observer' reaistic as thought?

A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic. Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of his study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the world he is observing.

Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's

Yes, I agree. It is the main critic we can do about Bohr's interpretation. But Bohr is unclear, and quite different before and after 1935 EPR. 

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf

and more recently Asher Peres

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf

The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an epistemic event in one's description of the system.

It seems to me that this is what Everett illustrates. And of course, you can proceed like Omnès, who defend Everett theory, but eventually conclude that we have to be irrational (he says "anti-cartesian") at the end, so that we can eliminate the other realities.

Personally I take QM without collapse and quantum MW as equivalent theory. I just define a world as any set of events closed for interaction. Then the "other worlds" exist in the same way "our world" exist. So we don't need to really define what a world is, or to decide if worlds "really" exist ontologically or epistemologically. If I make a quantum choice, QM predicts that I will be in a superposition state, and whatever I touch will differentiate with me. That might be consciousness differentiating along orthogonal dream, or splitting of realties. Such distinction don't make much sense for me. Of course Asher Peres has never been too friendly with MW, and he belongs, if I remember well, to those who can reject both the collapse and the MW, but this does not make sense for me, given the informal way we are using the word "world". Ontologically I am not sure that there is anything more than true and false statements on numbers. A world is really a convenient fiction. MW just means that all computational number relation are realized in an infinity of number relations. The UD, like the Mandelbrot set, is intrinsically ultra-redundant.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno and Brent:

(not quite sure which 'open' par belongs to whom, since they are open in Bruno's text as well as in Brent's - but that is irrelevant at this moment: I don't intend to "argue")

I thank you for reflecting to my scribblings in a very professional spirit. I apologize for boring you by remarks (questions) derived from a different worldview (and vocabulary) from what you apply. I decided several times NOT to barge in, yet am fallible and in-disciplined. Sorry.

 

To Bruno's "they work well": I use 'almost' because of flaws that occur occasionally.

 Reason in my view: our so far learned (you may call it: observable, see below) 'world' is a portion of the wholeness and the entire totality is in relational exchange with everything - including those items we already know about. The rest of the interference is 'surprising' (i.e. out of our rulely - knowable expectations: considerable as flaws).

Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational connection with anything else,  not restricted to 'conscious' (horribile dictu: "human"?) observers. So I would not call 'it' a "he". My question was: can a mental object (thought?) be observing in my sense? (That would be an extension to a 'physical' view).

 

I appreciate Brent's remark restricting the collapse etc. as part of the "DESCRIPTION".

 

And I loved the sweet fairy-tale:

"God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)"  by the bearded supernatural inventor, way before it was applicable to human-identified time concept. Thank you.

 

Insanity: what is sanity?

 

I admit that your (and Brent's etc.) positions are the best available and decent, I am stubborn (maybe I learnt insufficient math-physics to join the choir) but look now from a perspective above my head into an unlimited complexity from which certain 'aspects' (maybe derived by the actual state of our understanding only) are composed into limited models for ourselves to think WITHIN. That is our perceived reality (just a word) and subject to relations from yonder.

Your boss, the universal machine (yes, it is feminine in French, Latin and German) is THERE, beyond my imagination and I don't force my flimsy mind to identify it in MY terms. She may be more than I can fathom. So I sit in my own schizophrenia: live in a restricted pool of ideas and think about an unrestricted everything beyond my capabilities.

I don't want to compromise, nor to accept what seems incomplete.

 

I hope to bother you less with my nightmares in the future (but don't count on it). .

 

John M

 

[meekerdb]

On 5/1/2011 1:05 PM, John Mikes wrote:
> Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational
> connection with anything else, not restricted to 'conscious'
> (horribile dictu: "human"?) observers. So I would not call 'it' a
> "he". My question was: can a mental object (thought?) be observing in
> my sense? (That would be an extension to a 'physical' view).

"Relational connection" is very broad, so I'd say it's certainly
possible for a mental object, a thought, to have a relational connection
to another mental object (one thought follows another) or to a physical
object (I thought of a chair). When we speak of observing and observers
there is usually an implication that others could also observe the
'same' thing (allowing for points of view differences). This is why
Bohr emphasized the logical priority of the classical in empirical science.

Brent

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi John,

 

    I love your comments!!!!!

 

Onward!

 

Stephen

 

 

Richard

Richard,

 

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to mailto:everything-list%2Bunsu...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

 

 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to mailto:everything-list%2Bunsu...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

 

 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to mailto:everything-list%2Bunsu...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

 

 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to mailto:everything-list%2Bunsu...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

[Stephen Paul King]

 

From: meekerdb

Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 4:46 PM

To: everyth...@googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: Love and Free Will

Hi Brent,

 

    What you are stating here is the first hint of the idea of diffeomorphism invariance that we are looking for! The fact that “

others could also observe the 'same' thing” is the essence of the idea that we can stitch coordinate systems to each other to make space-time manifold quilts. The trick is to show OMs are like coordinate systems.

 

Onward!

 

Stephen