Rép : The Meaning of Life
Bruno Marchal
post,
Hi Brent,
1a) Brent meeker wrote (quoting Jim Heldberg) :
> Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
> building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a
> religion.
> --- Jim Heldberg
It seems to me that Jim Heldberg confuse the scientist (indeed)
attitude of agnosticism and atheism.
Let D = the proposition "God exists", "~" = NOT, B = believes.
An agnostic is someone for which the proposition "~BD" is true. (And
"~B~D" could be true as well)
An atheist is someone for which "B~D" is true.
The atheist is a believer. As John M often says, an atheist already has
some notion of God such as to be able to believe it does not exist.
Now most atheist are already "believer" in believing "religiously" in
Primary Matter (a metaphysical entity).
I'am agnostic in both sense. I do not believe in God, nor do I believe
in Matter. Those terms are not enough well defined.
I do neither believe in the inexistence of God, nor in the inexistence
of Matter. I wait for more data.
But assuming comp, I must confess that I have *reason* to put some more
credo on Plotinus, and other platonist approaches, on "mind/god/matter"
and fundamental principle, than on the aristotelian primitive matter
theory. Actually, I infer the same belief from the empirical quantum
data.
1b) Brent wrote to John M:
> Values existed longer before humans.
So you are a bit Platonist too .... :)
1c) Brent wrote (to Stathis):
> How is this infinite regress avoided in our world? By consciousness
> not representing the rest of the world.
That is an interesting idea. You could elaborate a bit perhaps? I do
agree with your most of your recent replies to Stathis about the
question "does a rock think?". But perhaps not entirely for the same
reason as you. We will see.
> The world is what it is and representation is not essential. I
> suppose this is somewhat like Peter's "primitive substance" whose only
> function is to distinguish things that exist from their
> representation.
yes, but then the question is "what are you assuming to exist?"
1d) Brent wrote to Mark Peaty (in Jason's thread about
"irreversibility):
> I think there is a confusion creeping in here. I don't think
> "logically reversible" is misleading. It is only physical processes
> that can be termed reversible or irreversible. Logic lives in a
> timeless Platonia. Computers operated irreversibly, they dissipate
> heat when they they erase data. Feynman pointed out that this was not
> necessary and a computer that did not erase data could operate without
> dissipating heat (no increase in entropy).
The logician Hao Wang, is, as far as I know, the first to prove that a
universal machine can operate without ever erasing information, and
this is enough for developping notion of logical reversibility (quite
useful in quantum computing). I say more in term of "combinators" in my
Elsevier paper. The one which is not yet on my web page. People
interested can ask me a preprint.
Grosso modo you lose universality if both "eliminating info" is
prohibited and "duplicating info".
2a) John wrote to Jamie:
> Sponging the 'gedanken..' - the falling treebranch reflects in your
> version the omniscient arrogant reductionist position. I go with
> Popper: no evidence, because we cannot encompass 'totality' (my
> conclusion).
Cute. And admitting to represent "totality" by the set of codes of
total (everywhere defined) computable functions, this can be made very
precise in term of the Wi and the Fi, as I try to explain from time to
time in the list.
>
> I would'nt go to the primitive mechanistic AI-levels to learn about
> mentality unlimited. Bits (and pieces) for unrestricted relations.
> AI simulates (mechanically?) certain aspects of human mentality - up
> to a limited fashion.
You seem quite sure about that. How do you know? Why couldn'it be that
*you* find this "limited" due to your own prejudice about numbers and
machines?
2b) John wrote to Brent:
> So noted. (However: in my feeble English 'bias' means
> '~prejudice' and I have yet to learn about prejudicial
> instruments. Unless we accept the "conscious
> instrument e.g. a thinking yardstick). I, as a
> Loebian machine, may well be prejudicial).
That is true!!! Are you serious about being a lobian machine? As a
matter of fact, lobian machine can know and prove that they are lobian.
To prove being a *consistent* lobian machine is quite another matter,
though ....
It is not impossible. *Inconsistent* lobian machine *can* prove that
they are consistent lobian machine, but then they can prove the
existence of Santa Klaus, and also, to be sure, of 0 = 1.
3a) Stathis wrote (to me):
> Regarding consciousness being generated by physical activity, would it
> help if
> I said that if a conventional computer is conscious, then, to be
> consistent, a
> rock would also have to be conscious?
I think you could be right ... It is difficult because terms like
"conventional" and "physical" are quite fuzzy.
I do think that if a conventional (material in the mundane sense) is
conscious, most probably anything *is* conscious, and that is related
to the fact that I think (assuming the comp hypothesis) that a
conventional computer is *not* conscious. Consciousness is a first
person attribute, and the UDA shows that it has to be associated with
an (infinity) of (mathematical) computations. This 1-person has no
shape, and can even be considered as not being a machine. I guess we
will have to discuss this with more details.
> It's difficult to find the right words here. I think we can all agree
> on the appearance
> of a physical reality as a starting point.
Yes.
> The common sense view is that there is an
> underlying primitive physical reality generating this appearance,
> without which the
> appearance would vanish and relative to which dream and illusion can
> be defined.
> If this is so, it is not a scientifically testable theory.
I think it is testable indirectly. Recall that although I disagree
with Penrose godelian argument, I do arrive at similar conclusion: you
cannot have both "computationalism" and "materialism".
> We can't just switch off the
> physical reality to see whether it changes the appearance, and the
> further we delve
> into matter all we see is more appearance (and stranger and stranger
> appearance at
> that). Moreover, dream and illusion are defined relative to the
> appearance of regular
> physical reality, not relative to the postulated primitive physical
> reality.
I would say "relative to a theory explaining the appearances", not just
to the appearances.
3b) Stathis wrote to John M:
> Not really: the people who claim they saw Elvis after his alleged
> death are more
> numerous and more credible than the second-hand (at best) Biblical
> accounts of
> Jesus being sighted after his crucifixion. When I have put this to
> Christians they
> answer that Elvis did not claim to be God etc. Well, if he had done,
> would that
> make a difference?
I'm afraid it would have!
Reciprocally, would Jesus have been only a musician, things would have
been different, I guess :)
3c) Stathis wrote to John in another post:
> The constraint on meaning and
> syntax would then go, and the vibration of atoms in a rock could be
> implementing
> any computation, including any conscious computation, if such there
> are.
>
> John Searle, among others, believes this is absurd, and that therefore
> it disproves
> computationalism. Another approach is that it shows that it is absurd
> that consciousness
> supervenes on physical activity of any sort, but we can keep
> computationalism and
> drop the physical supervenience criterion, as Bruno has.
Yes.
3d) Stathis wrote to Brent:
> Any serial computation can be made up of multiple parallel
> computations, and vice versa. You can't say, aha, we've used that
> string for "dog" so we can't now use it for "cat", because who is
> going to patrol the universe to enforce this rule? This is what you
> are left with if you eliminate the constraint that the computation has
> to interact with an external observer.
> I am aware that this is a very strange idea, perhaps even an absurd
> idea, but I don't see any way out of it without ruining
> computationalism, as by saying that it's all bunk, or only
> computations that can interact with the environment at the level of
> their implementation can be conscious. Because if you insist on the
> latter, it implies something like ESP: the computer will know the
> difference between a false sensory stimulus and one emanating from the
> environment... possible, but not very Turing-emulable.
I agree with Brent's remark on that: "I find that doubtful - do you
have a reference? Isn't it the definition of "incompressible"
computation that there is no way faster than executing each step in
sequence (Brent Meeker).
3e) Stathis' answer to Brent:
> I'm not referring to speed, just to doing it. For example, a serial
> stream of consciousness can be emulated by multiple shorter parallel
> streams; there is no way of knowing whether you're being run in
> serial, parallel, how fast the real world clock is running, etc.
I agree there is no way to know whether you are being run in serial,
parallel, etc. But mathematically multiple shorter parallel streams
have to be able to be glued, at least mathematically, for constituting
a proper computation. If not literally anything can be described as a
computation. That is why I explicitly use a mathematical definition of
computation, and then(and only then) try to figure out what is a rock,
for example.
4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
> As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as
> things.
I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp,
thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine
and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their
third person description.
> On another tack: it seems to me the extent and scope of suffering in
> the world is one of the most powerful arguments in favour of the total
> irrelevance of the concept of G/god/s. However it is not for me to go
> around telling those who believe in some G/god/s that they are
> deluded.
Do you agree that those who believe in a primitive physical universe
could be deluded in the same manner than those who believe in some
notion of God. Perhaps even in a worse manner, because many people
believe that the existence of a primitive material universe is a
"scientific fact". Of course not. At least in many theological text,
the word "God" is used in a more axiomatic way than "Matter" is by some
scientist (at lunch or during the week-end). Most religious people will
never say that the existence of God is a scientific fact, and in that
sense are less deluded than many materialist.
Wei Dai wrote :
> As for the simulation argument itself, I've suggested previously that
> instead of thinking "which kind of universe am I likely to be in", it
> makes more sense to consider myself as being "simultaneously" in all
> universes that contain me, and to decide my actions based on their
> effects on the overall multiverse.
I agree. It is not even just an option with the comp hyp. With comp we
just cannot belongs to a universe or to a computational history, we
always "belong" to an infinity of them.
Bruno
PS to Mark Peaty: I will address you last post soon (Friday, I guess).
John M
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Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes:
>[SP] It's difficult to find the right words here. I think we can all agree on the appearance
of a physical reality as a starting point.
>Yes.
>[SP] The common sense view is that there is an
underlying primitive physical reality generating this appearance, without which the
appearance would vanish and relative to which dream and illusion can be defined.
If this is so, it is not a scientifically testable theory.
>I think it is testable indirectly. Recall that although I disagree with Penrose godelian argument, I do arrive at similar conclusion: you cannot have both "computationalism" and "materialism".
>[SP] We can't just switch off the
physical reality to see whether it changes the appearance, and the further we delve
into matter all we see is more appearance (and stranger and stranger appearance at
that). Moreover, dream and illusion are defined relative to the appearance of regular
physical reality, not relative to the postulated primitive physical reality.
>I would say "relative to a theory explaining the appearances", not just to the appearances.
Well, it is relative to appearance, but people go on to theorise that these appearances are
"true reality".
>3b) Stathis wrote to John M:
>[SP] Not really: the people who claim they saw Elvis after his alleged death are more
numerous and more credible than the second-hand (at best) Biblical accounts of
Jesus being sighted after his crucifixion. When I have put this to Christians they
answer that Elvis did not claim to be God etc. Well, if he had done, would that
make a difference?
>I'm afraid it would have!
Reciprocally, would Jesus have been only a musician, things would have been different, I guess :)
Had Elvis predicted that he would rise from the dead there would have been even more Elvis
post-mortem sightings, but this would not in itself have made any of it more credible.
>3c) Stathis wrote to John in another post:
>[SP] The constraint on meaning and
syntax would then go, and the vibration of atoms in a rock could be implementing
any computation, including any conscious computation, if such there are.
>[SP] John Searle, among others, believes this is absurd, and that therefore it disproves
computationalism. Another approach is that it shows that it is absurd that consciousness
supervenes on physical activity of any sort, but we can keep computationalism and
drop the physical supervenience criterion, as Bruno has.
>Yes.
Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain activity, not Turing emulable.
This theory is in keeping with the facts and allows us to keep materialism as well. The main
problem I see with it is that it allows for the existence of philosophical zombies, such as computers
that act conscious but aren't. If this were possible it would mean that consciousness was an
optional evolutionary development, i.e. we could all have evolved to live in a world exactly like
our own, except we would be zombies. It's not a knock-down argument, but it strikes me as odd
that something as elaborate as consciousness could have evolved with no real benefit.
>3d) Stathis wrote to Brent:
>[SP] Any serial computation can be made up of multiple parallel computations, and vice versa. You can't say, aha, we've used that string for "dog" so we can't now use it for "cat", because who is going to patrol the universe to enforce this rule? This is what you are left with if you eliminate the constraint that the computation has to interact with an external observer.
I am aware that this is a very strange idea, perhaps even an absurd idea, but I don't see any way out of it without ruining computationalism, as by saying that it's all bunk, or only computations that can interact with the environment at the level of their implementation can be conscious. Because if you insist on the latter, it implies something like ESP: the computer will know the difference between a false sensory stimulus and one emanating from the environment... possible, but not very Turing-emulable.
>I agree with Brent's remark on that: "I find that doubtful - do you have a reference? Isn't it the definition of "incompressible" computation that there is no way faster than executing each step in sequence (Brent Meeker).
>3e) Stathis' answer to Brent:
>[SP] I'm not referring to speed, just to doing it. For example, a serial stream of consciousness can be emulated by multiple shorter parallel streams; there is no way of knowing whether you're being run in serial, parallel, how fast the real world clock is running, etc.
>I agree there is no way to know whether you are being run in serial, parallel, etc. But mathematically multiple shorter parallel streams have to be able to be glued, at least mathematically, for constituting a proper computation. If not literally anything can be described as a computation. That is why I explicitly use a mathematical definition of computation, and then(and only then) try to figure out what is a rock, for example.
Would you speculate that there is some indivisible atom of conscious computation? Because
it doesn't seem that you need any "glue" to have a continuous stream of conscious in
teleportation and mind uploading thought experiments.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Brent Meeker
> To avoid to much posts in your mail box, I send all my comments in this
> post,
>
> Hi Brent,
>
> 1a) Brent meeker wrote (quoting Jim Heldberg) :
>
> Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
> building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a
> religion.
> --- Jim Heldberg
>
>
>
> It seems to me that Jim Heldberg confuse the scientist (indeed) attitude
> of agnosticism and atheism.
> Let D = the proposition "God exists", "~" = NOT, B = believes.
>
> An agnostic is someone for which the proposition "~BD" is true. (And
> "~B~D" could be true as well)
> An atheist is someone for which "B~D" is true.
But what does "true" mean? Does it mean provable? and on what basis? Does it mean "our best guess"
>
> The atheist is a believer. As John M often says, an atheist already has
> some notion of God such as to be able to believe it does not exist.
> Now most atheist are already "believer" in believing "religiously" in
> Primary Matter (a metaphysical entity).
>
> I'am agnostic in both sense. I do not believe in God, nor do I believe
> in Matter. Those terms are not enough well defined.
> I do neither believe in the inexistence of God, nor in the inexistence
> of Matter. I wait for more data.
Right. "God exists" is not well enough defined to believe or disbelieve - both "God" and "exists" being ill defined. But I think "theism" is well enough defined. Theism is the belief in an immortal, supernaturally powerful person, who is concerned with the welfare and behavior of human beings. I believe this god of theism does not exist. As to other gods, such as the god of deism or pantheism, I'm agnostic - I don't believe they exist and I don't believe they don't exist. In all the above "believe" means my considered opinion - not something mathematically provable, but something I think is provable in the legal sense of "preponderance of the evidence" or in the scientific sense of "in accordance with our best model".
So atheism is not a religion - it's the belief that a particular class of religion is mistaken. To reject a belief that is contrary to the evidence is not a matter of faith. It doesn't take faith to believe there is no Santa Claus.
> But assuming comp, I must confess that I have *reason* to put some more
> credo on Plotinus, and other platonist approaches, on "mind/god/matter"
> and fundamental principle, than on the aristotelian primitive matter
> theory. Actually, I infer the same belief from the empirical quantum data.
>
>
> 1b) Brent wrote to John M:
>
> Values existed longer before humans.
>
>
>
> So you are a bit Platonist too .... :)
Yes, I'm willing to contemplate different kinds of existence - so that mathematical structures made be said to exist and statements like "Sherlock Holmes was a detective." are in some sense true while "Sherlock Holmes was a Russian." are false.
But whether arithmetic is more fundamental than matter - I'm agnostic.
> 1c) Brent wrote (to Stathis):
>
> How is this infinite regress avoided in our world? By consciousness
> not representing the rest of the world.
>
>
>
> That is an interesting idea. You could elaborate a bit perhaps? I do
> agree with your most of your recent replies to Stathis about the
> question "does a rock think?". But perhaps not entirely for the same
> reason as you. We will see.
It's a half-baked idea, so I'm not sure I can fill it out. But it is similar to Stathis's point that language (and all symbolic representation) must be grounded in ostentive definition. In Stathis example the conscious computer is conscious by virtue of reference to a real world - which has now been replaced by a simulator. But in a closed system, with no outside reference, the ostensive definition itself must be represented computationally. And in what sense is it a representation of an ostensive definition? Only in virtue of some meta-dictionary that defines it as such in terms of still other representations.
> The world is what it is and representation is not essential. I
> suppose this is somewhat like Peter's "primitive substance" whose
> only function is to distinguish things that exist from their
> representation.
>
>
> yes, but then the question is "what are you assuming to exist?"
Our best model seems to be the quantum fields of the standard model. But I think it is the wrong question to ask "what do you assume to exist". You don't start with assuming something to exist, that's a mathematician's axiomatic approach; you start with what you observe, with appearances. You may be able to model them with different ontologies and then the question is, "How can you test them." As Thales said, "The question is not what exists, but how can we know." It may be that different ontologies produce the same empirical results - as quantum fields and elementary particle theories seem to - and there is nothing to choose between them.
>
> 1d) Brent wrote to Mark Peaty (in Jason's thread about "irreversibility):
>
> I think there is a confusion creeping in here. I don't think
> "logically reversible" is misleading. It is only physical processes
> that can be termed reversible or irreversible. Logic lives in a
> timeless Platonia. Computers operated irreversibly, they dissipate
> heat when they they erase data. Feynman pointed out that this was
> not necessary and a computer that did not erase data could operate
> without dissipating heat (no increase in entropy).
>
>
>
> The logician Hao Wang, is, as far as I know, the first to prove that a
> universal machine can operate without ever erasing information, and this
> is enough for developping notion of logical reversibility (quite useful
> in quantum computing). I say more in term of "combinators" in my
> Elsevier paper. The one which is not yet on my web page. People
> interested can ask me a preprint.
If it's in English I'm interested.
Why isn't the computer (or rock) associated with an infinity of computations? I'm assuming you mean a potential countable infinity in the future.
That's a reductio argument and when you've reached an absurdity it can be anyone of your premises that is wrong - including comp.
>That is why I explicitly use a mathematical definition of
> computation, and then(and only then) try to figure out what is a rock,
> for example.
>
>
>
>
> 4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
>
> As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons
> as things.
>
>
>
> I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp, thus)
> you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine and some
> (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their third person
> description.
>
>
>
> On another tack: it seems to me the extent and scope of suffering in
> the world is one of the most powerful arguments in favour of the
> total irrelevance of the concept of G/god/s. However it is not for
> me to go around telling those who believe in some G/god/s that they
> are deluded.
>
>
> Do you agree that those who believe in a primitive physical universe
> could be deluded in the same manner than those who believe in some
> notion of God. Perhaps even in a worse manner, because many people
> believe that the existence of a primitive material universe is a
> "scientific fact". Of course not. At least in many theological text, the
> word "God" is used in a more axiomatic way than "Matter" is by some
> scientist (at lunch or during the week-end). Most religious people will
> never say that the existence of God is a scientific fact, and in that
> sense are less deluded than many materialist.
They say the existence of God is a matter of faith and that is a more certain kind of knowledge than scientific knowledge. Because faith is independent of evidence religion is a much more resistant delusion than erroneous science.
Brent Meeker
stefa...@yahoo.com
> >[SP] The common sense view is that there is an
> underlying primitive physical reality generating this appearance
Your assumption of "underlying primitive physical reality" puts you
in the line of believers. It is not necessary to make such assumption
to build predictive theories to model/describe the observations.
Brent Meeker
True. But it's not necessarily an assumption. You can look at it as a metaphysical inference: an answer to the question, "Why do these models seem to work so well at describing our intersubjective agreement?"
Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal
Le 17-janv.-07, à 18:11, John M a écrit :
> Dear Bruno,
> may I ask you to spell out your "B" and "D"?
> in your:
> >Let D = the proposition "God exists", "~" = NOT, B = believes.<
> Where I think I cannot substitute your "~" for the "=NOT" - or, if
> the entire line is meaning ONE idea, that "B" believes both the
> affirmative and the negatory.
> Also: the difference between ~BD and ~B~D?
In this paragraph you should interpret B by "believes" or by "the
subject believes". And D is an abbreviation of "God exists" (careful!
in other context D is an abbreviation of "~B~", that is "the subject
does not believe in the negation of ".
Example: B(it rains) = the subject believes it rains.
BD = the subject believes that God exists.
the tilde symbol ~ represents the classical negation. A logician
will write ~(it rains) for saying that it does not rain. So we
recover the four modal negation cases already known by Aristotle (as
the aristotelian square):
BD = the subject believes that God exists
B(~D) = the subject believes that God does not exist
~BD = the subject does not believe that God exists
~B~D = the subject does not believe that God does not exist.
We have:
BD is true for the so-called "believer" (in God)
B(~D) is true for the atheist (he is a believer: he believes that God
does not exist)
~BD is true for a (consistent) atheist or for an agnostic
~B~D is true for a (consistent) believer or for an agnostic.
To characterize an agnostic, you have to say that both ~BD and ~B~D are
true for him. He does neither believe in God, nor in the inexistence of
God.
If you replace God by Santa-Klaus, or by "Primary matter" you get the
corresponding notion of believer, atheist, agnostic relatively to Santa
Klaus existence or Matter existence ...
>
> I have the feeling that we both are on the same ground in our
> nonexistent beliefs and I expressed that also as being an agnostic,
> rather than the atheist (who needs a god-concept (incl. matter, for
> that matter) to DENY.)
We agree on this, and I think we even agree that we agree on this :)
> It is contrary to the German common usage of "gottlos" (same in my
> language) - but we try to step further than the conventional common
> historically used vocabulary.
Yes.
> Br:
> >I do neither believe in the inexistence of God, nor in the
> >inexistence of Matter. I wait for more data.<
> I took a more straightforward stance when a 'believer' challenged me
> to prove: there is NO god, I said I can disprove only if he proved the
> existence.
This is the quasi-definitive proof that you are a lobian machine ... in
case, you accept to interpret arithmetically Plotinus' ONE by "truth".
Lobian machine can disprove any attempt to define truth ... (this is
mainly a consequence of Tarski theorem)
>
> Another (redface) ignorance of mine: it seems that your Wi and Fi
> references appeared in the parts more technical than I could
> consciously absorb, so I am at a loss.
It is not very difficult. According to Norman Samish it looks too much
technical for the list, but I am not sure. In general those who have
some problem with the technical stuff have just some lack of elementary
"modern math". I will have to come back on the Wi and the Fi, if people
are interested in the real stuff ....
> Computable must mean more than "Turing emulable" (R.Rosen) since the
> unrestricted totality is not available in toto for this later concept.
"total computable" means more than "turing emulable" (partially
computable). Let us not enter in the technics right now, but keep
insisting :-)
> Br asked:
> >You seem quite sure about that. How do you know? >Why couldn'it be
> that *you* find this "limited" due to your >own prejudice about
> numbers and machines? <
> I was impregnated by some commi dialectic materialism over 2 decades
> and found a perspective of things developing gradually reasonable. AI
> emulates (some) human mental characteristics and I don't believe that
> this process has been completed.
Of course, but I am a theoretician interested in guessing where
"matter" and "mind" comes from. Also I have theoretical reasons to
believe that AI will never proVably succeed. Comp can be used to
predict that even some of the AI products will never believe in AI.
Some machine will be anticomputationalist.
> I see additional possibilities to extend into, especially in mental
> events we have not yet discovered.
Hmmm... Careful with this type of argument. It is like saying that I
don't believe in quantum mechanics because it does not explain how Uri
Geller can change the shape of a fork without touching it. I mean few
theories can explain things not yet discovered (even theoretically).
> This 'feeling' is not due to my - as you say - prejudice about numbers
> and machines.
> I could not spell out such 'prejudice', not in the least because of my
> above argument in agnosticism: I did not get so far a firm support for
> the 'numbers' being the foundation of everything, so I cannot argue
> against such unproven idea (neither to believe).
> *
> Lobian machine: I follow a deterministic view: everything that happens
> is entailed by originating processes (whether we know them or not), so
> a 'mechanism' can be thought of (machine). I accept your (Bruno)
> teaching about Loeb's original description (I tried to read 'him', but
> it was too 'technical) so I feel free to call myself a 'loebian
> machine' truthfully. Especially since it is the expression used by
> Bruno et al. on this list.
> Consistent I am in MY common sense (which may be fallse).
Again, you talk like a lobian entity!
What I like with lobian machines (or entities) is exactly this: they
arise from the attempt, made by mathematicians, to build the Leibnizian
universal reasoning machine capable of answering all questions in
mathematics.
But now, when we build anything being close to prove the most
elementary truth about numbers, such machine, when asked if they will
ever say some stupidity, instead of saying arrogantly "no, I never say
stupidities", say exactly the contrary: they say ``either I will say a
stupidity, or I might say a stupidity". (For the modalist: "B(0 = 1)
or DB(0 = 1)"; this is a version of the second incompleteness theorem).
Here D = ~B~
And all their (nameable) consistent extensions are like that !!!!!!!!
.... !!!!!!!
I have already shown that the price of being an universal machine is
the possibility to "die/dream/crash/assert-stupidities...".
A lobian machine, roughly speaking is a universal machine having the
very basic introspective ability to prove this about herself.
> *
> About the "underlying physical reality"? it became physical only by
> our interpretation into matter-based model-view. Reality may be
> underlying - I know nothing about that - but we DO base our figments
> on something. Then we build up a world 'physical'
OK.
> (I really do not want to tease you: "or mathematical - numbers based).
No problem,
Regards,
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
I must go, so I will just comment one line before commenting the other
paragraph (tomorrow, normally).
Le 18-janv.-07, à 06:38, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> Why isn't the computer (or rock) associated with an infinity of
> computations? I'm assuming you mean a potential countable infinity in
> the future.
I don't know if computers or rocks "really exist", nor what you mean
exactly by such words, but as far as you can associate a computational
state to the computer or to the rocks, it belongs to a (first person
actual) NON COUNTABLE infinity of computational histories, including
quite dummy one, like a program which dovetails on some loopy local
simulation of the rock (or the computer) together with a (infinite)
dovetailing on the real numbers. Cf my old conversation with Jurgen
Schmidhuber. OK?
That is why comp predicts a priori not only some white rabbits, but
continua of white rabbits. QM eliminates them by "destructive
interference", and my point is just that if we take comp seriously
enough, then we have to justify those destructive interference by
classical computer science/number theory alone.
Now, a way to see what happens ( a shortcut!) consists in interviewing
a correct lobian machine which looks inward, and, because such a
machine has to take into account the modal nuances forced by the
incompleteness phenomenon, i.e. the nuance between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp
& Dp, etc., the structure of the space of possible histories appears to
be arithmetically quantized in some way. Enough to associate a
universal quantum field in the neighborhood of universal machine? Well,
that is still an open problem.
Bruno
John Mikes
I read with joy your long and detailed 'teaching' reply (Hungarian slogan: like a mother to her imbecil child) and understood a lot (or so I think).
I am not entusiastic about a sign-language (gesticulated or written) instead of words, because I did not familiarize myself into its 'underwstanding' understanding.
About your warning (Uri Geller's fork): I abhor 'righteous' conclusions based on actual half-information and always leave open a slot for things to be learned (discovered) later.
In my 7+ decades of watching the world around me (7 in science) I saw "changes" that made me a "~" for firm conclusions. I am not for including the unknowable, but nobody taught about DNA when I first learned biochemical compounds or irreversible thermodynamics when I first learned Carnot.- And the Moon was for the poets. Computer was a slide-rule. We had a phone ("please, Mam, connect me to Mr Brown") and I had a radio in 1927 - it spoke(!) through an earphone 2 hours a day.Hallo Radio Budapest,
Hence my belief in further surprises.I experienced all kinds of belief systems changing around me, in science, art, politics, economy, so the latest is not so impressive either.
Thanks again for your kind explanations - and am ready for Wi Fi.
John
Dear John,
Le 17-janv.-07, ŕ 18:11, John M a écrit :
> Dear Bruno,
> may I ask you to spell out your "B" and "D"?
> in your:
> >Let D = the proposition "God exists", "~" = NOT, B = believes.<
> Where I think I cannot substitute your "~" for the "=NOT" - or, if
> the entire line is meaning ONE idea,that "B" believes both the
> on something. Then we build up aworld 'physical'
Bruno Marchal
Le 18-janv.-07, à 06:38, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> To avoid to much posts in your mail box, I send all my comments in
>> this post,
>> Hi Brent,
>> 1a) Brent meeker wrote (quoting Jim Heldberg) :
>> Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
>> building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a
>> religion.
>> --- Jim Heldberg
>> It seems to me that Jim Heldberg confuse the scientist (indeed)
>> attitude of agnosticism and atheism.
>> Let D = the proposition "God exists", "~" = NOT, B = believes.
>> An agnostic is someone for which the proposition "~BD" is true. (And
>> "~B~D" could be true as well)
>> An atheist is someone for which "B~D" is true.
>
> But what does "true" mean? Does it mean provable? and on what basis?
> Does it mean "our best guess"
I am using "true" in its usual informal sense here. To be more precise
here would be a 1004 fallacy. In the technical part, all proposition
are purely arithmetical, and if you want you can defined that notion of
arithmetical truth in set theory for example. But the Tarski definition
of truth is enough in the present context. The proposition P intended
by the sentence A is true when it is the case that A.
>
>> The atheist is a believer. As John M often says, an atheist already
>> has some notion of God such as to be able to believe it does not
>> exist.
>> Now most atheist are already "believer" in believing "religiously" in
>> Primary Matter (a metaphysical entity).
>> I'am agnostic in both sense. I do not believe in God, nor do I
>> believe in Matter. Those terms are not enough well defined.
>> I do neither believe in the inexistence of God, nor in the
>> inexistence of Matter. I wait for more data.
>
> Right. "God exists" is not well enough defined to believe or
> disbelieve - both "God" and "exists" being ill defined. But I think
> "theism" is well enough defined. Theism is the belief in an immortal,
> supernaturally powerful person, who is concerned with the welfare and
> behavior of human beings. I believe this god of theism does not
> exist. As to other gods, such as the god of deism or pantheism, I'm
> agnostic - I don't believe they exist and I don't believe they don't
> exist. In all the above "believe" means my considered opinion - not
> something mathematically provable, but something I think is provable
> in the legal sense of "preponderance of the evidence" or in the
> scientific sense of "in accordance with our best model".
OK, but here you do the inverse of the 1004-fallacy. I was thinking we
were already more precise than that. There is a problem of vocabulary.
You continue to use the word "God" as related to our particular
history. I just defined "theology of a machine" by the truth about that
machine (whatver that truth is). Given that I limit myself to
self-referentially correct machine, the provable sentences by the
machine are included in the truth about the machine. The inclusion has
to be proper due to incompleteness of all such machines. Unlike the
christian theologians, I have no (not yet) evidence that "God" (truth,
the ONE, ...) is dedicated to the welfare of man (although I have
evidence that man, or at least some man, are dedicated too the serach
of truth.
Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe.
With the present definition of theology, the belief in a physical
primitive universe *is* a theological proposition. And I have shown
that such a belief is epistemologically incompatible with the belief in
comp (that there is a level where "I" am Turing emulable).
The Mechanist position in the philosophy of mind is just
(epistemologically) incompatible with, not the belief in a physical
universe", but with the belief in the primary nature of that physical
universe.
>
> So atheism is not a religion - it's the belief that a particular class
> of religion is mistaken. To reject a belief that is contrary to the
> evidence is not a matter of faith. It doesn't take faith to believe
> there is no Santa Claus.
It does not take faith to NOT believe in Santa Klaus. It does take
faith (if only in your own consistency) to believe that you will never
believe in Santa Klaus. Now I (re) define locally and in a first
approximation GOD as the ultimate reality, for which I do have
evidence. Thanks to Plotinus and Augustin there is case that this
notion of GOD is closer to the christian notion than a "primitive
physical universe", for which I have no evidence at all (beyond the
usual extrapolation of self-consistency that all higher mammal seems to
do all the time).
I am closer to the atheist when I say that the GOD is not a person (or
is a zero-person). But with comp, I have to abandon "materialism", even
in the weak sense that there is a primary notion of matter.
Materialism, for a computationalist (who has understand the complete
UDA) is a form of vitalism: it invokes something nobody can verify, and
which (by UDA) is shown to explain absolutely nothing. Like the
collapse of the wave, it is not even defined.
The use of materialism in physics, since Aristotle, is just a provisory
metaphysics used to postpone the delicate questions. I have not yet
find a paper by physicist (except Bunge) which really assumes, in some
scientist modest way, the hypothesis of materialism.
>> But assuming comp, I must confess that I have *reason* to put some
>> more credo on Plotinus, and other platonist approaches, on
>> "mind/god/matter" and fundamental principle, than on the aristotelian
>> primitive matter theory. Actually, I infer the same belief from the
>> empirical quantum data.
>> 1b) Brent wrote to John M:
>> Values existed longer before humans.
>> So you are a bit Platonist too .... :)
>
> Yes, I'm willing to contemplate different kinds of existence - so
> that mathematical structures made be said to exist and statements like
> "Sherlock Holmes was a detective." are in some sense true while
> "Sherlock Holmes was a Russian." are false.
OK.
>
> But whether arithmetic is more fundamental than matter - I'm agnostic.
Then you would be kind to point exactly where you miss the point in the
UDA. Or perhaps you are just saying that you are agnostic with respect
to comp? That is ok, I am too, and that is why I have work hard to
distill a testable version of comp.
>
> > 1c) Brent wrote (to Stathis):
>> How is this infinite regress avoided in our world? By
>> consciousness
>> not representing the rest of the world.
>> That is an interesting idea. You could elaborate a bit perhaps? I do
>> agree with your most of your recent replies to Stathis about the
>> question "does a rock think?". But perhaps not entirely for the same
>> reason as you. We will see.
>
> It's a half-baked idea, so I'm not sure I can fill it out. But it is
> similar to Stathis's point that language (and all symbolic
> representation) must be grounded in ostentive definition. In Stathis
> example the conscious computer is conscious by virtue of reference to
> a real world - which has now been replaced by a simulator. But in a
> closed system, with no outside reference, the ostensive definition
> itself must be represented computationally. And in what sense is it a
> representation of an ostensive definition? Only in virtue of some
> meta-dictionary that defines it as such in terms of still other
> representations.
When you ask your computer to print a document, the computer typically
does not search the meaning of the words "print" or "document" in a
dictionary. Other more subtile self-reference are handled by the
diagonalization technic which makes it possible to cut the infinite
regresses. IF and when I come back on the Fi and Wi, I will give you
Kleene second recursion theorem which solves all those infinite regress
appearing in computer self-reference.
>
>> The world is what it is and representation is not essential. I
>> suppose this is somewhat like Peter's "primitive substance" whose
>> only function is to distinguish things that exist from their
>> representation.
>> yes, but then the question is "what are you assuming to exist?"
>
> Our best model seems to be the quantum fields of the standard model.
Quantum field theory (QFT) does assume numbers, and strictly speaking
relates numbers with numbers (actually they appear also mathematically
as invariant of knots, but this is out-of-topic right now). QFT, like
QM compress a lot of information concerning our local appearances, but
it does not tackle the fundamental question (that is: it postulates
quanta, and does not address qualia at all). Quantum thermodynamic can
be said closer to the qualia, but in a still very implicit way, and
almost by chance.
> But I think it is the wrong question to ask "what do you assume to
> exist".
When we got startling results, or address very fundamental questions, I
think there is a time where we should be able to put all the cards on
the table. I think we have to accept the axiomatic method. If not we
could realize one day that we are just mislead by vocabulary, and that
is a waste of time relatively to the question of the content of our
theories/assumption.
> You don't start with assuming something to exist, that's a
> mathematician's axiomatic approach; you start with what you observe,
> with appearances.
I don't believe in "just appearance". Those "appearance" is the result
of both observation together with theories. Even a baby who begins to
distinguish its hands and its mother's hand relies on theories whose
results from millions years of researches.
> You may be able to model them with different ontologies and then the
> question is, "How can you test them."
Hmmm.... OK (logicians and physicians use different word here, but OK).
> As Thales said, "The question is not what exists, but how can we
> know." It may be that different ontologies produce the same empirical
> results - as quantum fields and elementary particle theories seem to -
> and there is nothing to choose between them.
This is not obvious at all, unless you start directly from a
physicalist assumption. Of course a more general theory is needed if
you want to *explain* where the laws of physics come from. And such a
more general theory has to be non physical, as John Archibald Wheeler
has already quite convincingly explained. But the UDA proves that if
comp is true, then Wheeler's idea are not an option, just an
unavoidable consequence.
>
> >
>> 1d) Brent wrote to Mark Peaty (in Jason's thread about
>> "irreversibility):
>> I think there is a confusion creeping in here. I don't think
>> "logically reversible" is misleading. It is only physical
>> processes
>> that can be termed reversible or irreversible. Logic lives in a
>> timeless Platonia. Computers operated irreversibly, they dissipate
>> heat when they they erase data. Feynman pointed out that this was
>> not necessary and a computer that did not erase data could operate
>> without dissipating heat (no increase in entropy).
>> The logician Hao Wang, is, as far as I know, the first to prove that
>> a universal machine can operate without ever erasing information, and
>> this is enough for developping notion of logical reversibility (quite
>> useful in quantum computing). I say more in term of "combinators" in
>> my Elsevier paper. The one which is not yet on my web page. People
>> interested can ask me a preprint.
>
> If it's in English I'm interested.
Done.
Marchal, B., Theoretical Computer Science & the Natural Sciences,
Physics of Life Reviews, Elsevier, Vol 2/4 pp 251-289, 2005.
(for the other: ask if you want a pdf). I will not put it soon in my
web page for copyright reason.
BTW I have finish my paper on the arithmetical interpretation of
Plotinus. And I have submit it.
I have answered this in my preceding post to you. I will come back on
this difficult point in my conversation with Stathis.
That is my point.
Personal pain/pleasure: that is what we can believe without act of
faith. All the rest need an act of faith, by which I mean the ability
to believe in assumptions, that is in proposition without a proof. To
go from "I see the moon" to "there is a moon" you need faith or ...,
well by being non truring emulable perhaps .... (up to you to show me
how ...).
This is provable for any monist theory. In a monist theory you have to
embed the "theoretician" in its object of study (like Everett embeds
the physicist in the physical world (described by the SWE), see also
the work of the physicist Otto Rossler: his endophysics is really an
endomathematics once we assume comp). If the "theoretician" is emulable
by a turing machine, any everything-theory he can build has the
property that the consistency of the big picture entails its own
consistency, and this can only be inferred, never proved.
Our theories are counterintuitive and do handle very subtle questions,
I really think than the axiomatic method can help. You cannot explain
General Relativity to people who believes the Euclid fifth axiom is a
consequence of the fourth preceding one. The same occur in our context.
It is impossible to understand the consequences of comp for those who
believed comp needs materialism when it is actually incompatible with
(weak) materialism, as it has been justified.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 18-janv.-07, à 04:10, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>> I would say "relative to a theory explaining the appearances", not
>> just to the appearances.
>
> Well, it is relative to appearance, but people go on to theorise that
> these appearances are "true reality".
From Pythagoras to Proclus, "intellectuals" were proud not making that
error. Aristotle is in part responsible for having made "appearance"
reality, coming back to the (provably wrong assuming comp) common sense
in those matters.
(of course as you know we have to rely on common sense to go beyond
common sense).
> Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain
> activity, not Turing emulable.
Nooooo....... True: Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result
of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle pretend that brain is not
turing emulable. He just implicitly assume there is a notion of
actuality that no simulation can render, but does not address the
question of emulability. Then Searle is known for confusing level of
description (this I can make much more precise with the Fi and Wi, or
with the very important difference between computability (emulability)
and provability.
> This theory is in keeping with the facts
Ah?
> and allows us to keep materialism as well.
Abandoning the comp hyp. OK.
> The main problem I see with it is that it allows for the existence of
> philosophical zombies, such as computers that act conscious but
> aren't. If this were possible it would mean that consciousness was an
> optional evolutionary development, i.e. we could all have evolved to
> live in a world exactly like our own, except we would be zombies. It's
> not a knock-down argument, but it strikes me as odd that something as
> elaborate as consciousness could have evolved with no real benefit.
OK. Of course COMP admits local zombie. One day it will be possible to
build an artificial museum tourist, looking and commenting picture and
art like a real tourist, which nobody will be able to distinguish from
a real tourist, but which will be only a sophisticated machine looking
for presence of bomb in the museum.
With comp, consciousness has a big role, many big role (relative
sped-up of computations, give the ability to face personal relative
ignorance and alternate reality guessing and contemplation, ...). Cf I
define in first approximation "consciousness" as the quale which
accompanies the instinctive believe in reality/self-consistency.
>
>> I agree there is no way to know whether you are being run in serial,
>> parallel, etc. But mathematically multiple shorter parallel streams
>> have to be able to be glued, at least mathematically, for
>> constituting a proper computation. If not literally anything can be
>> described as a computation. That is why I explicitly use a
>> mathematical definition of computation, and then(and only then) try
>> to figure out what is a rock, for example.
>
> Would you speculate that there is some indivisible atom of conscious
> computation?
Not at all. Consciousness, or instinctive belief in a reality (or in
oneself) and/or its associated first person quale needs an infinity
(even non countable) of computational histories. It depends in fine of
all nameable and unameable relations between number. Nothing deep here,
the primeness of 17 is also dependent in some logical way of the whole
mutilicative structure of the natural numbers. Machine are lucky to be
able to prove the primeness of 17 in a finite time, because the *truth*
of even something as mundane than 17's primeness already escapes the
machine capability of expression.
> Because it doesn't seem that you need any "glue" to have a continuous
> stream of conscious in teleportation and mind uploading thought
> experiments.
One day I will have to ask you what you really mean by computation. An
arbitrary sequence of sign can be interpreted as a computation (cf your
"rock"). I am OK with that if, and only if you can show me the
universal machine for which this sequence describes a computation. And
if you do that, each of those sign will need to have, at least, an
arithmetical connection: there will be a number (finite piece of
information) capable of relying all the signs. This makes computations
non trivial object, and it is easy to prove that arbitrary sequence of
numbers/signs are NOT computations (there is an uncountable number of
arbitrary sequences, and a countable number of third person
computations. The glue I was thinking about is not physicalist glue,
but already arithmetical glue. Does that help?
The real question is not "does a rock implement computations", the
question is "does a rock implement computations in such a way as to
changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant
way?" And for answering such question we need to know what a rock
really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer
this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify any
primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally
from many non material computations.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 21-janv.-07, à 23:16, John Mikes a écrit :
> Thanks again for your kind explanations -
You are welcome.
> and am ready for Wi Fi.
Thanks for telling. I will come back on this ASAP (tomorrow).
Bruno
Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes:
An association has been made between "print" and "document" with objects
in the real world. You can work out what the print command is on an unknown
computer by experimenting with different inputs and observing outputs. But
if the real world is internalised, even if you could work out regularities in the
syntax of an unknown computer (and I don't know if this is necessarily possible:
it might be a military computer with syntax deliberately scrambled with a one-time
pad) you would be unable to work out what it originally meant - what the computer
is thinking. It is like finding an unknown language without a Rosetta stone or any
cultural background which might help you with a translation. This reminds me of the
impossibility of sharing 1st person experience: you can only do so if you share some
3rd person quality allowing at least some interaction.
Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 18-janv.-07, à 04:10, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> >> I would say "relative to a theory explaining the appearances", not
> >> just to the appearances.
> >
> > Well, it is relative to appearance, but people go on to theorise that
> > these appearances are "true reality".
>
>
> From Pythagoras to Proclus, "intellectuals" were proud not making that
> error. Aristotle is in part responsible for having made "appearance"
> reality, coming back to the (provably wrong assuming comp) common sense
> in those matters.
> (of course as you know we have to rely on common sense to go beyond
> common sense).
OK, but we have to start with some basic observation. It looks like objects
are pulled to the Earth by a force - that is a basic observation, with a minimal
implicit theory. General Relativity explains this differently, but it takes a rather
complex series of arguments to arrive at GR. You can't call Newton stupid because
of this. Similarly, your conclusion that there is no separate physical reality follows
from a number of carefully argued steps, and at the start of the chain is the fact
that there does appear to be a physical world... if there did not, we would not be
having this or any other discussion.
> > Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain
> > activity, not Turing emulable.
>
> Nooooo....... True: Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result
> of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle pretend that brain is not
> turing emulable. He just implicitly assume there is a notion of
> actuality that no simulation can render, but does not address the
> question of emulability. Then Searle is known for confusing level of
> description (this I can make much more precise with the Fi and Wi, or
> with the very important difference between computability (emulability)
> and provability.
Searle seems to accept that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable, but he
does not believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any
more than a simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a computer
that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.
See here for example:
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.comp.html
> > This theory is in keeping with the facts
>
> Ah?
At least, it isn't contradicted by any empirical facts, although neither is comp.
> > and allows us to keep materialism as well.
>
> Abandoning the comp hyp. OK.
Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - but he does
believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.
You seemed to be disputing the idea that a serial computation cannot be broken
up arbitrarily into parallel components, or suggesting that they need to be glued
together in some way if they are. This seems to contradict most of the teleportation
thought experiments we have discussed, in which it is sufficient for continuity of
conscious that I vanish at A and a copy with close enough brain be created at B:
there need be no glue, no causal connection (although of course it would help to
make the copy if you had the right information, the result would be the same if the
copy just came about by random processes), no regard for temporal or spatial
displacement.
> > Because it doesn't seem that you need any "glue" to have a continuous
> > stream of conscious in teleportation and mind uploading thought
> > experiments.
>
> One day I will have to ask you what you really mean by computation. An
> arbitrary sequence of sign can be interpreted as a computation (cf your
> "rock"). I am OK with that if, and only if you can show me the
> universal machine for which this sequence describes a computation. And
> if you do that, each of those sign will need to have, at least, an
> arithmetical connection: there will be a number (finite piece of
> information) capable of relying all the signs. This makes computations
> non trivial object, and it is easy to prove that arbitrary sequence of
> numbers/signs are NOT computations (there is an uncountable number of
> arbitrary sequences, and a countable number of third person
> computations. The glue I was thinking about is not physicalist glue,
> but already arithmetical glue. Does that help?
If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations, how
does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?
Simplistically, I conceive of computations as mysterious abstract objects, like
all other mathematical objects. Physical computers are devices which reflect
these mathematical objects in order to achieve some practical purpose in the
substrate of their implementation. A computer, an abacus, a set of fingers,
pencil and paper can be used to compute 2+3=5, but these processes do not
create the computation, they just make it accessible to the user. The fact that
2 birds land on a tree in South America and 3 elephants drink at a watering hole
in Africa, or 2 atoms move to the left in a rock and 3 atoms move to the right
is essentially the same process as the abacus, but it is useless, trivial, lost in
randomness, escapes the notice of theories of computation - and rightly so.
However, what about the special case where a more complex version of 2+3=5
on the abacus is conscious? Then I see no reason why the birds and the elephants
or the atoms in a rock should not also implement the same consciousness, even
though there is no possibility of interaction with the outside world due to the
computation being lost in noise. What this really does is destroy the whole notion
of physical supervenience: if you shot the elephants or smashed the rock, the
computation could as easily spring from the new noise situation. Thus, it would
appear that consciousness comes from computation as pure mathematical object,
and is no more created by the physical process that addition is created by the
physical process. Either that, or it isn't computational at all.
> The real question is not "does a rock implement computations", the
> question is "does a rock implement computations in such a way as to
> changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant
> way?" And for answering such question we need to know what a rock
> really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer
> this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify any
> primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally
> from many non material computations.
No, as I implied above, a rock makes no difference whatsoever to the measure of
computation it might be seen as implementing.
Bruno Marchal
Le 23-janv.-07, à 04:36, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
First, I do agree we cannot extract semantics from syntax, or behavior
of a program from their codes. There is a well know theorem (Rice
theorem) explaining why, and I could come back on this when I come back
on the Fi and Wi. But so we agree. This does not depend on "cultural
background" unless you define "cultural background" by "most probable
universal neighborhood history".
Now I am not sure this is directly related to the 1-3 distinction.
Also, I have no clue of what you mean by "real world".
>>
>> From Pythagoras to Proclus, "intellectuals" were proud not making
>> that
>> error. Aristotle is in part responsible for having made "appearance"
>> reality, coming back to the (provably wrong assuming comp) common
>> sense
>> in those matters.
>> (of course as you know we have to rely on common sense to go beyond
>> common sense).
>
> OK, but we have to start with some basic observation. It looks like
> objects
> are pulled to the Earth by a force - that is a basic observation, with
> a minimal
> implicit theory.
I agree. I call that sometimes "grandmother physics". Even physicists
use it in everyday life.
> General Relativity explains this differently, but it takes a rather
> complex series of arguments to arrive at GR.
Already Galilee makes grandmother's physics globally wrong. Now
Galilee, Newton and GR works because they does not contradict
grandmother physics, and recast it in frame compatible with larger set
of data.
> You can't call Newton stupid because
> of this.
Not at all. Especially not Newton, who wrote some text showing that he
was aware on the lack of serious metaphysical foundations for his
physics.
> Similarly, your conclusion that there is no separate physical reality
> follows
> from a number of carefully argued steps, and at the start of the chain
> is the fact
> that there does appear to be a physical world... if there did not, we
> would not be
> having this or any other discussion.
I think we agree. I have never doubted the appearances of a physical
reality, even assuming comp.
What I do pretend, is that IF we assume the comp hyp, then the
appearance of a physical reality does not reflect the existence of a
*primary* physical reality. It is simpler to describe the
epistemological consequences (albeit probably looking more
provocative), which is that physics cannot be the fundamental science.
It really means that the laws of physics, not only can be derived from
computer science/number theory, but has to be derived from computer
science number theory if we are asssuming comp. All stable appearances
must emerge through a notion of first person plural observation.
Now such "first person plural observation" can be described in the
language of a Universal Machine, and this gives a way to test the comp
hypothesis.
I am before all an empiricist. True, I'm saying that if comp is true
then the "laws of physics" are in your head (actually in any universal
machine's "head"). So let us test comp by 1) deriving the
"comp-physics" (the physics in the head), 2) let us compare it with the
usual observations. If the empirical data contradict comp: comp is
refuted. If the data are coherent with comp, comp is not refuted. If
comp is correct, the data will never be contradicted, and we will never
know if comp is correct, but may be we will bet on it according to
possible circumstances.
Note that in the UDA I do start, not only from the appearances of a
physical world, but from its primary existence. But this assumption is
eliminated in the course of the reasoning (by the movie graph/maudlin).
> You seemed to be disputing the idea that a serial computation cannot
> be broken
> up arbitrarily into parallel components, or suggesting that they need
> to be glued
> together in some way if they are. This seems to contradict most of the
> teleportation
> thought experiments we have discussed, in which it is sufficient for
> continuity of
> conscious that I vanish at A and a copy with close enough brain be
> created at B:
> there need be no glue, no causal connection (although of course it
> would help to
> make the copy if you had the right information, the result would be
> the same if the
> copy just came about by random processes), no regard for temporal or
> spatial
> displacement.
Let us call S my digital (generalized) brain state here and now, in
Brussels for example.
Let us call S' the state of "consistent extension" of that state "me in
Moscow" or "me in Washington" to take those examples.
What the thought experiments show indeed is that we don't need (and
even cannot use) a causal or physical connection between those states S
and S'. But S' has to be a state "near S" for me having a feeling like
"I am in Washington, and I come from Brussels", so as to say yes to the
doctor and continue to say yes to the doctor. This works if S-S'
belongs to a "normal" computational history, that is a third person
computation having the "right" probability (if that exists, if not comp
is already incorrect). But then, by definition of computation S and S'
have to be mathematically related, even arithmetically related. If not
there would be too much white rabbits at the start.
In UD*, i.e. the entire (countably infinite) dovetailing work of the
Universal Dovetailer UD, we must distinguish third person computations
and all possible first person data, which can indeed, from a first
person perspective (which abstracts all delays in the running of the
UD) contained all arbitrary sequences. But almost all such sequences
are NOT computable. They are never generated by the UD, except by local
dovetaling on the finite initial segment of (all) real numbers, but
this perturbs only the measure (which we are searching) in the limit.
This limit makes a first person sense only in the limit.
Consciousness supervenes on computational histories which are immune
for that "real" unavoidable first person (plural) randomization.
The UDA (UD Argument) illustrates that we have to take into account
only the arithmetical gluing. But we have to take account of that
gluing. If not, everything is a computation, and this would make Church
thesis false (among many things ...).
> If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations,
> how
> does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?
Stathis, I must go now, I will answer this later. I will comment the
rest of your post + a commentary on your kind reference to Searle. We
agree on many things. I am afraid we have to dig in slightly more
technical stuff for making the remaining posts understandable. I have
to explain those "arithmetical (first person/third person) glues".
Bruno
1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe.
Or of a Platonia
John M
Bruno Marchal
Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit :
Call it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But
we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress.
Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine I extract a "theology"
from her personal discourses. The discourses of the machine refers to
something NOT describable in its language (actually "truth"). That is,
each correct lobian machine refers to a reality which has no name for
her.
Now, it happens that a very-rich machine, like ZF, *can* refer and give
name to the unnameable reality of a simpler correct lobian machine. So
the machine ZF can name and prove the whole theology of a simpler than
herself correct lobian machine. For example ZF can define "arithmetical
truth", which is just the "Platonia/God/Universe..." of the (rather
simple) lobian machine PA. If you add to the machine ZF (seen as any
reasonable theorem prover of the ZF theory) a very simple (trivial)
inductive inference ability, she can bet/hope that she is, not only
lobian, but "correct", and so she can lift (but NOT PROVE, 'course)
PA's theology to herself, and "knows" (relatively to her hopes!) that
her "big reality" has no name.
Note this: everyone (human) know that PA is correct. Everyone (human)
can name PA's Platonia. This is enough to prove that as a lobian
machine every human is more rich than PA. Now, I don't know if I am
richer than ZF. Not only ZF cannot name "set-theoretical truth", but I
am not sure human can do that. A case can be given that ZF is already
too much rich. Set theoretical truth, unlike arithmetical truth *is* a
bit problematic.
Note this: all the theologies of all consistent lobian machines and
even of all consistent lobian entities (like "angels", those
generalized NON-machine provability system like Analysis+omega-rule)
are isomorphic. They are all described by G and G* and the intensional
variants: the 8 hypostases (with Plotinus' vocabulary). But the modal
connector "B" is an indexical: it is a notion of third-person "I". It
means ZF when B is the provability in ZF, and it means PA when B
represents the provability in PA (like "I" = Bruno when asserted by
Bruno, and John when asserted by John). But all third-person "I" obeys
the same hypostase-logics, where "I" refers to any correct lobian
entity (machine or not).
Remark: I say that PA is simpler than ZF. By this I mean that 1) you
can translate any theorems of PA in ZF, and 2) ZF can prove those
theorems. Put in another way, it means that ZF contains PA, modulo that
translation.
Now ZF is not simpler that PA: this means the reverse is not true:
there are theorems of ZF that either you cannot translate in PA's
language, and there are proposition of ZF that you can translate in PA
but that PA cannot prove. Example: PA cannot name its "platonia", but
ZF can name PA's platonia. PA can name its own consistency, but cannot
prove it. ZF can name PA's consistency and prove it (but 'course,
cannot prove it).
Last and absolutely important remark: I have just said that ZF can
prove the consistency of PA. And PA cannot prove the consistency of PA,
making ZF more powerful than PA. The point is that PA can prove that!
That is, PA can prove that ZF can prove the consistency of PA. But PA
has no reason at all to trust or even just "understand" ZF.
This means that PA can simulate ZF, like the non-chinese in Searle's
room can "talk" chinese, actually without any understanding. Like I can
solve Einstein's Gravity Equation, if you give me a correct description
of its brain and the time to process it (!).
So the distinction between computability/emulabity and PROVABILITY is
already enough for preventing us to do "Searle's fundamental error":
its confusion between genuine personal understanding of chinese by the
emulated chinese, and the non understanding of the simulator itself.
Searles' error is a fundamental error to meditate on. Usually I don't
insist because I tend to consider that Hofstadter and Dennett, in
Minds'I, are quite good and sufficient on it.
(Please, note that when I say a philosopher is wrong, this should be
taken as a compliment; and sometimes the error is fundamental, I will
probably refer a lot of times to that "Searles' Error"). Science is
just philosophy made refutable.
As computer/simulator, both PA and ZF are universal and equivalent. As
believer or theorem prover, ZF is far more powerful (although
incomplete and necessarily so by Godel II) than PA. The price of
universality in computation/simulation (Church Thesis) is the lack of
universality in theorem proving, belief systems, etc. cf the Fi and Wi:
I'l come back on this.
Note that PA is described here as "simple", but actually PA is rather
gifted, and I could argue that 98% of today math, including 98% of
Ramanujan's work, belongs to its discourse. It is possible to build or
define lobian machine much simpler than PA, but PA is more easy to
describe, and so I take her as a simple example of simple machine, but
this should be relativize a little bit. See any texbook in mathematical
logic for a description of PA, or click here:
http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/gt3.html
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>>> Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain
>>> activity, not Turing emulable.
>>
>> Nooooo....... True: Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result
>> of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle pretend that brain is not
>> turing emulable. He just implicitly assume there is a notion of
>> actuality that no simulation can render, but does not address the
>> question of emulability. Then Searle is known for confusing level of
>> description (this I can make much more precise with the Fi and Wi, or
>> with the very important difference between computability (emulability)
>> and provability.
>
> Searle seems to accept that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable,
> but he
> does not believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any
> more than a simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a
> computer
> that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.
Yes. It confirms my point. And Searle is coherent, he has to refer to a
notion of "physically real" for his non-computationalism to proceed.
He may be right. Now his naturalistic explanation of consciousness
seems rather ad hoc.
But all what I say is that IF comp is correct, we have to abandon
physicalism.
> Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - but
> he does
> believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.
Yes. In that way Searle is "not even wrong".
<snip: see my preceding post to you>
> If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations,
> how
> does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?
I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not
obvious that "if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person
computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not
computations".
Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is
computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates
specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and
nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem
the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable
sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.
Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non computable
sequence?
Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite
sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special
purpose, specific, program) and the non computable one (how? by
generating them all).
I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer
scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits
capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of
length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.
Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable of
generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,
THAT STRING.
But it is really easy to write a little program capable of generating
that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the
program COUNT is enough.
I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a
miniature version of it if you want.
Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third
person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at
the start.
A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except
that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
I am not satisfied by this answer if only because my motivation is to
understand where that quantum comes from.
Is complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal
nature into the shorter path?
Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we have to justify
the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too much white
rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an argument in
favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal machine on
this question you can realize at least that this question is far from
being settled.
Hope you don't mind I continue to comment your post tomorrow,
Bruno
Brent Meeker
...
> Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third
> person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
> But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
> stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
> one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
> any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
> into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at
> the start.
>
> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except
> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
> universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
But only relative some particular bases. Why the quantum mechanical world has the classical world as an approximation (instead of a white rabbit world) is not a solved problem - though there are proposed, possible solutions.
Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal
Here is the follow up of my comments on your post. It seems we
completely agree. Sorry.
Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Simplistically, I conceive of computations as mysterious abstract
OK, so we do agree.
>
>> The real question is not "does a rock implement computations", the
>> question is "does a rock implement computations in such a way as to
>> changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant
>> way?" And for answering such question we need to know what a rock
>> really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer
>> this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify any
>> primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally
>> from many non material computations.
>
> No, as I implied above, a rock makes no difference whatsoever to the
> measure of
> computation it might be seen as implementing.
OK.
So, now, we have to extract "physics" from computations if we assume
(even just standard comp). Do you agree with the UDA informal
conclusion? That is, that physics will be given by relative (cf RSSA)
measure on computational histories from some internal point of views?
Such a measure has to be observer invariant (I am not talking about the
content of what is measured, but about the general math of that
measure). In any case we must dig on computations and provability, if
only to get reasonable mathematical definition of those different
"person point of view".
Bruno
PS Could someone give me the plural of "point of view" ?
Bruno Marchal
Le 24-janv.-07, à 19:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I agree. But I am also convinced by the decoherence justification of
why the position base get his importance in information processing. The
very idea is already in Everett (imo).
To be sure, decoherence makes sense only in the MWI. I know some are
trying to use it to explain the "other world" away, but that is non
sense. IF QM (without collapse) is true, decoherence explains only the
extreme speed of the relative differentiation of the histories.
Bruno
Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
Meaning what? I thought you agreed his position was coherent.
> <snip: see my preceding post to you>
>
>
> > If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations,
> > how
> > does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?
>
>
> I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not
> obvious that "if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person
> computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not
> computations".
OK, but my concern was to find room in the arbitrary sequences for all
computations, not the other way around (perhaps I didn't make this clear).
Every rational number is also a real number.
> Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is
> computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates
> specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and
> nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem
> the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable
> sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.
>
> Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non computable
> sequence?
>
> Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite
> sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special
> purpose, specific, program) and the non computable one (how? by
> generating them all).
>
> I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer
> scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits
> capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of
> length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.
> Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable of
> generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,
> THAT STRING.
> But it is really easy to write a little program capable of generating
> that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the
> program COUNT is enough.
>
> I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a
> miniature version of it if you want.
Yes, and there are many related examples, like Borges' library; I would include
the computations that might be hiding in noise as another such example. The
significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person perspective, the
information or computation is inaccessible. You need to have the book you want
already before you can find it in the Library of Babel. However, if computations
(or books) can be conscious, then they will still be conscious despite being unable
to communicate with the world at the level of their implementation. The first person
perspective makes these situations non-trivial.
> Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third
> person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
> But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
> stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
> one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
> any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
> into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at
> the start.
Can you explain again why only the countable stories appear to the 3rd person
but the 1st person sees the uncountable ones as well? Also, why should the
white rabbits prefer the uncountable habitat?
> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except
> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
> universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
>
> I am not satisfied by this answer if only because my motivation is to
> understand where that quantum comes from.
>
> Is complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal
> nature into the shorter path?
>
> Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we have to justify
> the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too much white
> rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an argument in
> favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal machine on
> this question you can realize at least that this question is far from
> being settled.
If QM emerges from comp, does that solve the problem?
> Hope you don't mind I continue to comment your post tomorrow,
I appreciate that you are taking the time to reply to my posts; even though
you are probably repeating yourself, I think I understand things a little better
every time.
Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ...
> > Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third
> > person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
> > But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
> > stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
> > one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
> > any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
> > into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at
> > the start.
> >
> > A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except
> > that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
> > universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
>
> But only relative some particular bases. Why the quantum mechanical world has the classical world as an approximation (instead of a white rabbit world) is not a solved problem - though there are proposed, possible solutions.
Doesn't the SWE make some events much more likely than others, whether that
involves CI collapse or distribution of histories in the MWI?
Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno marchal writes:
> Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
Yes, I agree, *given* comp.
> PS Could someone give me the plural of "point of view" ?
"points of view"
John Mikes
as another chap with learned English "in vertical stance" I "partially" agree with your 'plural' as would all English mother-tongued people, but I also consider the gramatically probably inproper "points of views", since WE allow different 'views' in our considerations. Stathis may choose his preference<G>.
"Points of view" assumes THE one view we allow. "MATTER OF FACTlLY" (plural: 'matters-of factly'? - if it really HAS a plural. Is there an English "singulare tantum"? ) I still speculate what "point of views" may refer to, however I would volunteer a "point-of-views" in the conventional sense.
Alas, no 'utmost' authority OVER the hundreds of live English versions.
John
Bruno Marchal
Le 25-janv.-07, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>> Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI -
>>> but
>>> he does
>>> believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.
>>
>> Yes. In that way Searle is "not even wrong".
>
> Meaning what? I thought you agreed his position was coherent.
In the sense that if you predict that weak AI is possible and strong AI
is not, then he can no more be refuted. At least Penrose can be refuted
by a success of weak AI, at least in principle. Now you can note that
both Penrose and Searle are coherent with respect to comp (called
"strong AI" by Searle) in the sense that they are aware of some
difficulty between comp and materialism. Of course they are both
materialist and so believes that comp must be abandoned. I prefer to
abandon materialism which I have practically always suspect of
incoherence even before I learned about QM (which I take as confirming
that the notion of primary matter is at least not well defined).
Just to be clear on vocabulary:
COMP = I am a digital machine (roughly)
STRONG AI = digital machine can have qualia/subjective life
WEAK AI = digital machine can behave exactly like if they does have
qualia/subjective life.
A lot of people confuse COMP and STRONG AI. But obviously, it is
logically possible that a digital machine could have subjective
experience, without me being a machine. Of course if machine can
think, this could be taken as an inductive inference argument for
*guessing* that I could be a machine myself, but deductively "Machine
can think" does not entail that *only* machine can think, perhaps
angels and supergods could too, or whatever. So COMP => STRONG AI =>
WEAK AI, but in principle none of those arrows are reversible.
>
>> <snip: see my preceding post to you>
>>
>>
>>> If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations,
>>> how
>>> does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?
>>
>>
>> I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not
>> obvious that "if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person
>> computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not
>> computations".
>
> OK, but my concern was to find room in the arbitrary sequences for all
> computations, not the other way around (perhaps I didn't make this
> clear).
> Every rational number is also a real number.
We certainly agree on that. And all computable sequences are indeed
contained in the set of all sequences.
We will have to go back on this. I would compare the Borges' library
(or its countable infinite generalization) as equivalent with the
counting algorithm. It generates all (finite) strings, and a lot of
computations can be considered as being embedded in those strings.
Still I consider that the counting algorithm is not equivalent with a
universal dovetailer. I will try to explain the difference with some
details, but roughly speaking, what the UD does, and what neither the
rock nor the counting algorithm really do, is that the UD generates
both the program codes and their finite and infinite running. Saying
that all computations are generated by the counting algorithm makes
sense only if we add a universal interpreter in the description.
I can anticipate that you will say this does not change anything from
inside. But remember that once we abandon the "physical" supervenience
thesis, we will replace it by the computational supervenience thesis
which ask us to be precise of what is a mathematical computations. We
can no more relate on notion of time space, energy, etc.
The easy way to do that consists in defining in some axiomatics what
will be necessary for both the existence of computations and the
existence of internal observer related to those computations. In that
case a counting algorithm is just equivalent to the first three axiom
of Peano Arithmetic. This is provably not enough to define or execute
all programs. It appears that by adding the definition of addition and
multiplication (and order) you get the turing universal level (and then
with the induction axioms you get the internal lobian observer.
Everything will emerge from (mathematical interrelation between those
beings).
I'm afraid I'm not clear, and I will think how to make this clearer
without going to much into the technics.
> The
> significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person
> perspective, the
> information or computation is inaccessible. You need to have the book
> you want
> already before you can find it in the Library of Babel. However, if
> computations
> (or books) can be conscious, then they will still be conscious despite
> being unable
> to communicate with the world at the level of their implementation.
> The first person
> perspective makes these situations non-trivial.
OK, but as far as they can communicate from their inside points of view
(btw: thanks for the spelling!) you are adding implicitly some addition
and multiplication laws. Once we stop to take for granted what exists
or not, such little nuance have some importance, especially for
deriving concretely physics from something else.
>
>> Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the
>> third
>> person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
>> But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
>> stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
>> one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
>> any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
>> into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories
>> at
>> the start.
>
> Can you explain again why only the countable stories appear to the 3rd
> person
> but the 1st person sees the uncountable ones as well? Also, why should
> the
> white rabbits prefer the uncountable habitat?
The computable stories can be said to be generated by programs, and
thus are enumerable (countable).
But the UD generates not only all programs and their execution, it
generates also all data, including all streams, all oracle, etc.
Of course he never generates a complete streams in one strike, but by
dovetailing on the reals (which can be defined by a finite subroutine,
he can present such real streams through finite but enough big portion
to some program who "want to read them".
Now, for an external observer everything at any time (or number of
steps of the running of the UD) is countable. We can see finite portion
of the stream to be generated with some advance and then presented to
the program, then we have to wait a billion years (say) to see the
"same program" getting a larger portion of its stream datum.
Now, put yourself in front of a concrete UD, like in step 7 of the
version of UDA in 8 steps.
cf the pdf slide:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf
To predict your "future history", and taking into account the first
person is unaware of delays of computation introduced by the UD (due to
its dovetaling), and taking into account that the UD generates all
programs infinitely often (necessarily), and taking into account that
the "probability measure" cannot bear on the computational states but
only on the (infinite) computational histories: all that entails that
you have to take into account ALL computational histories going through
your current state. Well, now take just into account the infinite
dumbness of the UD, which is that for all programs it will generate its
execution on all streams, and thus on all arbitrary sequences
(including first person descrition of white rabbits) which makes a non
countable set (!!!, by Cantor) then, well, then it *seems* we cannot
avoid white noise and flying pigs and all slight variants, etc... OK ?
(don't hesitate to say NO, I'm quick and it is not easy). Are you OK
with any "taking into account" described above?
Of course, such measure is a bit too much intuitive: a priori all
probabilities of histories add up, and we could a bit naively take this
as a refutation of comp. What refrains us to jump toward that
conclusion, is that such intuitive probabilities have not enough taken
into account the difference between the points of view, something any
self-referentially correct universal machine can be shown to be able to
do, thanks, not really to incompleteness, but thanks to the fact that
machine can reason about their own incompleteness (leading to the
arithmetical points of view/hypostases). This motivates then the AUDA
(Arithmetical version of UDA, ... or of Plotinus, actually).
>
>> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics,
>> except
>> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
>> universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
>>
>> I am not satisfied by this answer if only because my motivation is to
>> understand where that quantum comes from.
>>
>> Is complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal
>> nature into the shorter path?
>>
>> Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we have to justify
>> the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too much white
>> rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an argument in
>> favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal machine on
>> this question you can realize at least that this question is far from
>> being settled.
>
> If QM emerges from comp, does that solve the problem?
As far as QM is confirmed by nature, if QM can be justified by comp, it
would mean nature confirms comp, and thus its immateriality. In this
sense the problem would be solved: materialism would be false. If QM is
confirmed by nature (an infinite process, note) and if comp predicts
something different, then it will depend. Some circumstances could lead
to argument in favor of materialism. I mean I can speculate about this.
>
>> Hope you don't mind I continue to comment your post tomorrow,
>
> I appreciate that you are taking the time to reply to my posts; even
> though
> you are probably repeating yourself, I think I understand things a
> little better
> every time.
Thanks for saying. Don't hesitate to ask precisions. When I reread
myself I am not just ashamed of my spelling, I realize I forget
arguments or points, or, often, that I miss the relevant emphasis.
Things will be clearer when I will describe the UD in term of the Fi
and Wi.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 25-janv.-07, à 16:48, John Mikes a écrit :
> Bruno,
> as another chap with learned English "in vertical stance" I
> "partially" agree with your 'plural' as would all English
> mother-tongued people, but I also consider the gramatically probably
> inproper "points of views", since WE allow different 'views' in our
> considerations. Stathis may choose his preference<G>.
> "Points of view" assumes THE one view we allow. "MATTER OF FACTlLY"
> (plural: 'matters-of factly'? - if it really HAS a plural. Is there
> an English "singulare tantum"? ) I still speculate what "point of
> views" may refer to, however I would volunteer a "point-of-views" in
> the conventional sense.
> Alas, no 'utmost' authority OVER the hundreds of live English
> versions.
OK thanks. I think I will follow mostly Stathis' suggestion, but you
just put the finger on why I have a problem. Sometimes I want to talk
on many first (say) person pointS of view. But sometimes I want to
speak about all person (first, third, singular, plural) pointS of
ViewS. So indeed there is a little nuance depending on the number of
points and views :-)
(Note all this is a bit useless because there are few correlation
between what I think and write especially when in hurry)
Another solution which I have apparently already used consists in
saying "hypostase" in the place of person point of view ...
Bruno
Brent Meeker
Or you may regard it as a reductio against the proposition that a consciousness can be encapsulated. Perhaps consciousness is only relative to an open system. If the universe started from nothing, or very little in terms of information, then the unitary evolution of the wave function preserves information. Hence the information of the universe is very small. The apparent information, including that which describes conscious processes, is a consequence of projecting out onto a reduced basis.
Me too - I think. :-)
Brent Meeker
Brent Meeker
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> ...
>>> Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third
>>> person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
>>> But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
>>> stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
>>> one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
>>> any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
>>> into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at
>>> the start.
>>>
>>> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except
>>> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
>>> universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
>> But only relative some particular bases. Why the quantum mechanical world has the classical world as an approximation (instead of a white rabbit world) is not a solved problem - though there are proposed, possible solutions.
>
> Doesn't the SWE make some events much more likely than others, whether that
> involves CI collapse or distribution of histories in the MWI?
That's in the approximation in which separate worlds are orthogonal - something they only approach asymptotically (unless my speculation that there is a smallest unit of probability is true). The amplitudes of the projections onto these almost-orthogonal subspaces is interpreted by the Born axiom as being the probability of that "branch". But I don't believe this can be proven to follow from the other axioms of QM; it has to be assumed separately as part of the formalism.
Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou
> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 16:52:01 -0800
> From: meek...@rain.org
> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
>
>
with no I/O interaction with the "outside" ? Also (an unrelated question), is it thought
that structure and organisation in the universe will be evident at every scale, or if you
stand back far enough might it look like a gas at a uniform temperature looks on a
macroscopic scale?
Stathis Papaioannou
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Brent Meeker
And as such it would not be conscious. You could pick out relative conscious processes within it (i.e. "you" being conscious of "that"), but only if you already knew about them.
>Also (an unrelated
> question), is it thought
> that structure and organisation in the universe will be evident at every
> scale, or if you
> stand back far enough might it look like a gas at a uniform temperature
> looks on a
> macroscopic scale?
In the Everett interpretation the Hilbert space of the universe might look like a gas in high dimension - if you could see something with lots of dimensions.
Stathis Papaioannou
> > The
> > significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person
> > perspective, the
> > information or computation is inaccessible. You need to have the book
> > you want
> > already before you can find it in the Library of Babel. However, if
> > computations
> > (or books) can be conscious, then they will still be conscious despite
> > being unable
> > to communicate with the world at the level of their implementation.
> > The first person
> > perspective makes these situations non-trivial.
>
> (btw: thanks for the spelling!) you are adding implicitly some addition
> and multiplication laws. Once we stop to take for granted what exists
> or not, such little nuance have some importance, especially for
> deriving concretely physics from something else.
> >> Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the
> >> third
> >> person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
> >> But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable
> >> stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable
> >> one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of
> >> any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself
> >> into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories
> >> at
> >> the start.
> >
> > person
> > but the 1st person sees the uncountable ones as well? Also, why should
> > the
> > white rabbits prefer the uncountable habitat?
>
>
> >> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics,
> >> except
> >> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter
> >> universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
> >>
> >> understand where that quantum comes from.
> >>
> >> Is complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal
> >> nature into the shorter path?
> >>
> >> Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we have to justify
> >> the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too much white
> >> rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an argument in
> >> favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal machine on
> >> this question you can realize at least that this question is far from
> >> being settled.
> >
> > If QM emerges from comp, does that solve the problem?
>
>
> would mean nature confirms comp, and thus its immateriality. In this
> sense the problem would be solved: materialism would be false. If QM is
> confirmed by nature (an infinite process, note) and if comp predicts
> something different, then it will depend. Some circumstances could lead
> to argument in favor of materialism. I mean I can speculate about this.
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Mark Peaty
As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as things.
I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp, thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their third person description. "
For example: by 'machine' do you mean, generically, any hypothetical self-referencing, sufficiently complex device - or virtual emulation of such - smart enough to think it knows who it is?
and
Which numbers have anything BUT a third person description?
I am of course very ignorant about higher mathematics, so the way I use words is that a number is a mathematical object that has/is a [or of a] particular value. I guess that means that a number, for me anyway, is a thing not a process. People use processes to generate, define and compare numbers. These processes are to mathematica what verbs, adverbs, adjectives, complex nouns and all the phrases [noun phr, adjectival phr, etc.] are to natural languages. Because of the precise specifications required for such mathematical processes, which I suppose means their algorithmic qualities, many of them are mathematical objects in their own right, so they do what they do and not anything else.
Bruno [quote continued]:
" On another tack: it seems to me the extent and scope of suffering in the world is one of the most powerful arguments in favour of the total irrelevance of the concept of G/god/s. However it is not for me to go around telling those who believe in some G/god/s that they are deluded.
Do you agree that those who believe in a primitive physical universe could be deluded in the same manner than those who believe in some notion of God. Perhaps even in a worse manner, because many people believe that the existence of a primitive material universe is a "scientific fact". Of course not. At least in many theological text, the word "God" is used in a more axiomatic way than "Matter" is by some scientist (at lunch or during the week-end). Most religious people will never say that the existence of God is a scientific fact, and in that sense are less deluded than many materialist. "
For me a very important aspect of this latter issue is that any purported supernatural being cannot have a coherent explanation in terms of natural science and, if taken of itself to be an explanation for any of that which is and/or that which transpires, it disempowers the believers concerned and any of those in their care. Why? Because, as I think I said before, one of the several Earth shaking things that the advent of scientific method has brought to the human race is the objective demonstration that no publicly stated belief or public assertion of the nature of things is immune from sceptical examination which is conducted in an ethical manner.
That said, I can now return to the deeper question which is: Is it coherent to assert that there is no universe? In common sense, plain English terms that is pretty much like saying that 'Nothing really exists!' ... which Does not compute! Like dividing or multiplying by zero, you either lock up your system or get no useful extra result. It is therefore necessary to accept that one exists, with the bookmarked proviso that 'exists' needs further research, and accept that for the time being there is no really coherent substitute for taking as given one's own existence in a world of some sort. In fact as I said somewhere else it is one of only two completely free things in life. [The other if you remember is the benefits which come from saying 'Think positive, it is better for you' and acting as if you believe it.]
My point in harping on in this way is simply so as to point out that:
whilst it IS necessary to assert an assumption of existence beyond oneself, and to be ethical it is necessary to acknowledge the independent existence of the other people one meets, there is no such more-or-less a priori reason for positing the existence of supernatural beings of any sort whatever. The assertion of the existence of G/god/s is gratuitous, and the very concept is characteristically pre-scientific.
Furthermore, the very concept of an omniscient being, never mind omnipotent, depends for its credibility upon the acceptance of some kind of naive realism. That is to say, the truth concerning the types of awareness we actually experience and for which credible sceptically proficient observation has been made, always entails a very limited, circumscribed apprehension of self and world. This is consistent with the most reasonable conceptions of consciousness and sentience which entail the absolutely necessary activity of some kind of neural network, however instantiated. In other words, the only real evidence we have that stands up to reasonable scrutiny, supports only the idea that consciousness is either embodied or it doesn't exist! I will go yet further and assert that not only is embodiment essential for the occurrence of consciousness but the process REQUIRES the representation in some form of both the observer and the observed plus representation of the current salient relationships between them. When this occurs then, and only then, is there something [or a somethinggoingon, for the purists] which can be 'like being something', as opposed to simply being it without knowing it.
The radical and apple cart damaging entailment of this is that by the very nature of the process - by definition if you like - the subjective experience which occurs cannot possibly be all of simply being the entity in question. The process is one of construction, in fact I think the word 'updating' has an important place here too, and this process involves overheads, in the form of structures and processes which must be and occur just to keep the system running, adapting to its environment and repairing itself. From this it follows that even the biggest brains in the universe, wherever they may be and however old, will share with us the limitations of not being able to see the backs of our own eyeballs or, as George Gurdjieff put it: they too cannot jump over their own knees! :-) Who needs G/god/s like that!
Bruno Marchal wrote:
To avoid to much posts in your mail box, I send all my comments in this post,
Hi Brent,
4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating ... etc,
Bruno Marchal
Le 26-janv.-07, à 11:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> It seems to me that abstract machines have been created for our
> benefit, rather like mathematical notation or human language. That is,
> they allow us to think about algorithms and to consider how we might
> build a physical machine to carry them out, even if this is not
> actually done in practice.
I could agree that mathematical notation are our own invention, unlike
number, OK?
Now, and I know I have to come back on this with more details, if you
get what really is CHURCH'S THESIS, I can explain that "abstract
machine" are mathematical object like numbers, having objective and
general mathematical properties which does not depend on the choice of
language or notation. There is an intrinsical, machine independent
computer science.
> If you do away with the possibility of physical implementation and if
> you consider only first person experience, what purpose is served by
> an abstract machine?
But I do not consider only first person experiences. I consider the
0-person (roughly: truth), the 3-person (roughly: provability), the
1-person captured by the conjunction of provability and truth, the
first person plural or "intelligible matter" (conjunction of
provability and consistency) and the "sensible matter" (conjunction of
provability, consistency and truth). This makes five notion of person
points of view.
And thus it makes 10 such notion when you distinguish machine discourse
on them and divine (true) discourse on them (you can do that by using G
and G*). And then, for technical but important reason, two of them
collapse, so in reality there are 8 hypostases.
I don't either do completely away with the physical implementation,
only they are "abstract" or "immaterial" themselves, by relating
"abstract machine state" with their possible abstract computational
"most probable" continuations.
> The quotient of two numbers does not depend on a long division
> algorithm, or any algorithm running on any machine; it simply *is*.
Yes, but with Church thesis, the many abstract machine computing the
quotient simply *are*, too. And the first person observer, if he
believe in comp, know that if he want to take localise himself in its
most probable computational history has to take those many machine into
considerations. The UD compute the quotient in all possible way (a
little bit like an electron who follows all possible path).
> > OK, but as far as they can communicate from their inside points of
> view
> > (btw: thanks for the spelling!) you are adding implicitly some
> addition
> > and multiplication laws. Once we stop to take for granted what exists
> > or not, such little nuance have some importance, especially for
> > deriving concretely physics from something else.
>
> Communicating with the outside world changes everything, but we can
> put a box around the whole system and declare it closed. This closed
> system (which may contain many interacting conscious entities) exists
> somewhere in the Library of Babel, in the output of the "count"
> program, in noise, in the decimal expansion of pi, etc., and even
> though we outside the the system cannot find it or interact with it,
> its inhabitants are going about their business regardless.
Yes but, after the UDA, unless we abandon comp, we just cannot refer to
an outside world so easily, nor can we reify any piece of matter. Then
if comp allows such rich piece of matter, embedding interacting
consciousness (which I doubt) will be relevant only as far as they
perturb the relative first person (plural) SSA measure.
>
> > Of course, such measure is a bit too much intuitive: a priori all
> > probabilities of histories add up, and we could a bit naively take
> this
> > as a refutation of comp. What refrains us to jump toward that
> > conclusion, is that such intuitive probabilities have not enough
> taken
> > into account the difference between the points of view, something any
> > self-referentially correct universal machine can be shown to be able
> to
> > do, thanks, not really to incompleteness, but thanks to the fact that
> > machine can reason about their own incompleteness (leading to the
> > arithmetical points of view/hypostases). This motivates then the AUDA
> > (Arithmetical version of UDA, ... or of Plotinus, actually).
>
> OK, I think I understand why you can see all the arbitrary sequences
> from inside the UD but not the outside (it relates to the irrelevance
> of delays from the inside), but I don't see why these extra sequences
> should be more likely to encode white rabbit universes than the 3rd
> person observable ones.
Because the arbitrary sequences are much more numerous (a continuum)
than the computable one. Matter, Nature and Life "occur" on the
boundary of the computable and the uncomputable, where the first person
view and the third person view get conflicting. Frankly, here computer
science provides many (subtle and counterintuitive) clues.
> Also, I still don't understand how you will avoid the white rabbits.
By extracting the physical laws from some 1-person machine measure.
This one can be extracted from some interview of an honest
self-observing machine. Well, to be sure, I'm saying this since 1973
but it is only in 1991 that I have find a "formal" clue of the reason
why the rabbits could disappear: the logic of certainty, corresponding
to the godelian sort of undeterminateness, allows a formal quantization
of the true Sigma_1 propositions (= those corresponding to the
accessible state of the UD). This is by far NOT enough for already
pretending that comp will avoid the white rabbits, but, imo, it is
enough to make very plausible they can disappear through purely number
theoretical reason, so that we don't have to rely on some material
assumption, which puts the mind body problem (my basic motivation)
under the aristotelian rug.
But sure, the disappearance of white rabbits with comp is still an open
problem. Brent seems to believe it is yet open in QM too, which is
coherent with the fact that most MWI relies implicitly or not on some
comp assumption. I sum up this sometimes by saying that decoherence +
MWI avoids 3-person rabbits, but not the 1-person one. Actually I have
argue that ASSA does the same. Some bayesian stuff seems to be able to
eliminate the 3-rabbits (or the first plural person one), but hardly
the first person one (I refer to my oldest post to this list, but I can
repeat, especially when encouraged, the subject matter is tricky).
Bruno
Tom Caylor
Why do we need to eliminate first-person white rabbits? For purposes
of science, is not elimination of third-person (or first-person plural)
white rabbits sufficient? So what if we hallucinate, or dream about a
talking white rabbit? We can come back to "scientific reality" through
the third-person or first-person plural, i.e. methods of "objectivity"
(third-person/first-person plural view by our own definition).
By the way, I'm not implying that scientific reality is sufficient for
meaning of life. ;) My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in
this sense. I think the answer is that we long to find meaning solely
through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to
erect science as the god over all meaning.
Tom
Bruno Marchal
Le 26-janv.-07, à 15:13, Mark Peaty a écrit :
> Bruno:
> " 4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
>
>> As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as
>> things.
>
> I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp,
> thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine
> and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their
> third person description. "
>
> MP: There is too much packed in this for me to be clear of the scope.
> For example: by 'machine' do you mean, generically, any hypothetical
> self-referencing, sufficiently complex device - or virtual emulation
> of such - smart enough to think it knows who it is?
> and
> Which numbers have anything BUT a third person description?
I can explain (see UDA) why if you assume comp, numbers get private
first person relation with respect to other numbers or with unameable,
from their point of view, set of numbers. I have to use the Wi and Fi
to explain this. I do identify machine and their godel numbers (or any
finite description of the machine) at some point.
> I am of course very ignorant about higher mathematics, so the way I
> use words is that a number is a mathematical object that has/is a [or
> of a] particular value. I guess that means that a number, for me
> anyway, is a thing not a process. People use processes to generate,
> define and compare numbers. These processes are to mathematica what
> verbs, adverbs, adjectives, complex nouns and all the phrases [noun
> phr, adjectival phr, etc.] are to natural languages. Because of the
> precise specifications required for such mathematical processes, which
> I suppose means their algorithmic qualities, many of them are
> mathematical objects in their own right,
All right.
> so they do what they do and not anything else.
Universal machine can mirror all machine, and nobody can built a theory
predicting, for any of their inputs, what they will or can do.
>
> Bruno [quote continued]:
>>
>
> Do you agree that those who believe in a primitive physical universe
> could be deluded in the same manner than those who believe in some
> notion of God. Perhaps even in a worse manner, because many people
> believe that the existence of a primitive material universe is a
> "scientific fact". Of course not. At least in many theological text,
> the word "God" is used in a more axiomatic way than "Matter" is by
> some scientist (at lunch or during the week-end). Most religious
> people will never say that the existence of God is a scientific fact,
> and in that sense are less deluded than many materialist. "
>
> MP: I don't see how people who believe in 'some notion of God' can
> honestly get past the intelligent child's question of 'Well alright,
> where did G/god/s come from then'. It is a simple question without an
> answer except something like: 'Shut up you little smart a*se!' or
> 'BLASPHEMY!! Thou deservest to be burnt at the stake!'
I don't see how people who believe in 'some notion of Primary Matter'
can honestly get past the child's question of "Well all right, where
did that Physical Matter come from then' It is a simple question
without an answer except something like: 'Shut up you little smart,
...".
Mark, what I say is that if someone say "the physical universe exists
in some primitive sense" I call it a theologian. If he acknowledge it
is an assumption, I call it "honest theologian", dishonest, if not.
>
> For me a very important aspect of this latter issue is that any
> purported supernatural being cannot have a coherent explanation in
> terms of natural science and,
I agree there is no need for assuming supernatural. But pretending
"Matter" *is* primitive, makes Matter and Nature already supernatural.
It is an extrapolation from our most old animals instinctive guess.
> if taken of itself to be an explanation for any of that which is
> and/or that which transpires, it disempowers the believers concerned
> and any of those in their care.
I think we agree, at some level.
> Why? Because, as I think I said before, one of the several Earth
> shaking things that the advent of scientific method has brought to the
> human race is the objective demonstration that no publicly stated
> belief or public assertion of the nature of things is immune from
> sceptical examination which is conducted in an ethical manner.
OK. I prefer not to believe in science but in scientific attitude (this
is field independent). To say "science has prove the existence of a
physical universe" can only come from an unscientific attitude.
>
> That said, I can now return to the deeper question which is: Is it
> coherent to assert that there is no universe?
Actually it could be, according to the lobian machine, but ok, it would
be not really interesting. But primarily physical or not, it is an
assumption, at some level.
> In common sense, plain English terms that is pretty much like saying
> that 'Nothing really exists!'
You know I believe in many things. The point is just that if comp is
true then physics has to be derived from number theory. It is a
technical point, not a personal opinion.
> ... which Does not compute!
No. Comp entails that not only uncomputable things exists, but that
uncomputable things interfere in a verifiable way with "me", assuming
"me" is locally computable.
> Like dividing or multiplying by zero, you either lock up your system
> or get no useful extra result. It is therefore necessary to accept
> that one exists, with the bookmarked proviso that 'exists' needs
> further research, and accept that for the time being there is no
> really coherent substitute for taking as given one's own existence in
> a world of some sort.
I agree 100%. But many concludes for this that PRIMARY MATTER exists.
Like if we knew Aristotle correct and Plato wrong. It is prematured to
say the least.
> In fact as I said somewhere else it is one of only two completely free
> things in life. [The other if you remember is the benefits which come
> from saying 'Think positive, it is better for you' and acting as if
> you believe it.]
I agree. Actually I can prove to you that somehow "lobianity" is a form
of self-positive thinking.
>
> My point in harping on in this way is simply so as to point out that:
> whilst it IS necessary to assert an assumption of existence beyond
> oneself, and to be ethical it is necessary to acknowledge the
> independent existence of the other people one meets, ...
OK,
> ... there is no such more-or-less a priori reason for positing the
> existence of supernatural beings of any sort whatever.
I agree. Completely. That is why I do not posit "nature" which in many
philosophical text play the role of the old "supernature".
As scientist we have to be agnostic on things like GOD, PRIMITIVE
REALITY, PRIMARY MATTER, etc.
> The assertion of the existence of G/god/s is gratuitous, and the very
> concept is characteristically pre-scientific.
Well, it all depends what you intend to mean with "universe", God" etc.
With comp, Plotinus's God is more coherent with the facts, that the
Aristotelian primary matter.
If we decide to keep the scientific mind/attitude, let us not stop on
the half of it.
>
> Furthermore, the very concept of an omniscient being, never mind
> omnipotent, depends for its credibility upon the acceptance of some
> kind of naive realism.
Right.
> That is to say, the truth concerning the types of awareness we
> actually experience and for which credible sceptically proficient
> observation has been made, always entails a very limited,
> circumscribed apprehension of self and world.
... relative to some theories.
> This is consistent with the most reasonable conceptions of
> consciousness and sentience which entail the absolutely necessary
> activity of some kind of neural network, however instantiated.
I do agree with this. I am interested in the question "where does those
neural things come from?".
> In other words, the only real evidence we have that stands up to
> reasonable scrutiny, supports only the idea that consciousness is
> either embodied or it doesn't exist!
I agree. Completely. Consciousness is mainly (instinctive) belief in a
reality. It needs a "body", which means a relative interpretation. It
does not mean neural nets have an eventually real substrate. That would
be a non rational jump.
> I will go yet further and assert that not only is embodiment essential
> for the occurrence of consciousness but the process REQUIRES the
> representation in some form of both the observer and the observed plus
> representation of the current salient relationships between them.
Yes. But machine cannot specify which machine they are, still less
which computational story they belong to. This entails some testable
indeterminacy.
> When this occurs then, and only then, is there something [or a
> somethinggoingon, for the purists] which can be 'like being
> something', as opposed to simply being it without knowing it.
Yes.
>
> The radical and apple cart damaging entailment of this is that by the
> very nature of the process - by definition if you like - the
> subjective experience which occurs cannot possibly be all of simply
> being the entity in question.
That is the essence of not confusing the third person description of a
machine, and her personal first person view the machine can have about
herself.
> The process is one of construction,
Exactly. This is what the lobian machine can prove about some third
person description of the notion of first person.
> in fact I think the word 'updating' has an important place here too,
> and this process involves overheads, in the form of structures and
> processes which must be and occur just to keep the system running,
> adapting to its environment and repairing itself.
As far as you don't reify the environment (which with comp is just the
most probable mathematical computational history), I continue to agree.
Well said!
> From this it follows that even the biggest brains in the universe,
> wherever they may be and however old, will share with us the
> limitations of not being able to see the backs of our own eyeballs or,
> as George Gurdjieff put it: they too cannot jump over their own
> knees! :-) Who needs G/god/s like that!
To be sure the lobian machine-itself (G), here, is mute. But its
guardian angels (G*) says something like that. The machine can say: as
far as I am consistent I will share those limitations of not being able
to see the backs of our own eyeballs. But the machine says more; she
says she can see the border of the blind spot, and that if comp is
correct the physical laws emerge there, even in a arithmetical sort of
darwinian way, and actually in a completely verifiable way.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 26-janv.-07, à 19:00, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> Why do we need to eliminate first-person white rabbits? For purposes
> of science, is not elimination of third-person (or first-person plural)
> white rabbits sufficient?
That would be dishonest. You could eliminate the very idea of first
person, like the eliminativist materialist.
> So what if we hallucinate, or dream about a
> talking white rabbit?
It is because of those dreams that we have to take into account the
consistent but incorrect theories, and thus modalities or situations
with truth of Bp & Dp & ~p.
> We can come back to "scientific reality" through
> the third-person or first-person plural, i.e. methods of "objectivity"
> (third-person/first-person plural view by our own definition).
We can have objective talk on first person once we share definitions.
Recall that my motivation is the mind body problem.
Hiding that a theory is wrong for the experiences is cheating, a little
bit like physicalist explanation of the mind which most of the time
explains it away.
>
> By the way, I'm not implying that scientific reality is sufficient for
> meaning of life. ;)
I hope so.
> My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in
> this sense. I think the answer is that we long to find meaning solely
> through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to
> erect science as the god over all meaning.
That is just scientism, not science. And then lobian machine are
already able to guess correctly that meaning or truth is much vaster
than reason or proof. You should love comp :-)
Bruno
Tom Caylor
> Le 26-janv.-07, à 15:13, Mark Peaty a écrit :
>
> > Bruno:
> > " 4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
>
> >> As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as
> >> things.
>
> > I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp,
> > thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine
> > and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their
> > third person description. "
>
> > MP: There is too much packed in this for me to be clear of the scope.
> > For example: by 'machine' do you mean, generically, any hypothetical
> > self-referencing, sufficiently complex device - or virtual emulation
> > of such - smart enough to think it knows who it is?
> > and
> > Which numbers have anything BUT a third person description?
> I can explain (see UDA) why if you assume comp, numbers get private
> first person relation with respect to other numbers or with unameable,
> from their point of view, set of numbers. I have to use the Wi and Fi
> to explain this. I do identify machine and their godel numbers (or any
> finite description of the machine) at some point.
>
The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the
existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core
the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"?
By the way, the problem of evil that I am referring to is simply the
problem of the existence of evil. We just know it exists. We see
people treated as things. We know it is wrong. The simple existence
of evil is a problem. I'm not talking about the wrongness of a
logical contradiction. I'm talking about something that is even
"wronger than" that. When I talk about the problem of evil, I'm
talking about something that is *really* wrong, down at the core level
of reality. The reason that something defined by persons (such as a
person being treated as a "non-person") can be "really wrong" at the
deepest level is that the essence of a person is something that lies
at the deepest level of reality. This is why the "problem of evil" in
general has been so hard to "figure out". It's because the very
definition of the problem is illusive without defining what a person
is. We try to define the problem by saying evil is a logical
contradiction with whatever theory someone has, but this actually only
proves even more how lost we are in figuring it out, and even more
lost in solving it.
In the same way the "meaning of life" question on one hand seems
nebulous and unuseful from a scientific viewpoint. But it is the
ultimate question. We may ask, "What is the meaning of the 'meaning
of life'?" But that just illustrates the meaning of the question
itself. Perhaps this is one of the attributes of a "person", that we
continually, recursively, as the question of meaning. We just *know*
what the meaning is of the question, "What is the meaning of life?"
Thus, the essence of what a person is is key to this question, and key
to the answer!
Now when it comes to mathematical/logical systems, and Bruno's
arguments, I think that we can see a "type", or analogy, of what is
going on here. Through arguments that use things such as Church's
Thesis, diagonalization, the excluded middle, we can see that there
are always some systems or sets which are provably not describable by
other systems or sets. I don't think this ultimately resolves the
problem of evil or the meaning of life. But I do think that it is
perhaps a "picture" of the limitlessness that is possible, even
necessary. It shows us the infinite proportions of these problems.
They are intractable by human persons, and yet have at their core the
essence of what a person is.
Tom
Tom Caylor
> Le 26-janv.-07, à 19:00, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> > Why do we need to eliminate first-person white rabbits? For purposes
> > of science, is not elimination of third-person (or first-person plural)
> > white rabbits sufficient?
> That would be dishonest. You could eliminate the very idea of first
> person, like the eliminativist materialist.
>
I agree with you. As you saw below my question was rhetorical. :)
> > So what if we hallucinate, or dream about a
> > talking white rabbit?
> It is because of those dreams that we have to take into account the
> consistent but incorrect theories, and thus modalities or situations
> with truth of Bp & Dp & ~p.
>
> > We can come back to "scientific reality" through
> > the third-person or first-person plural, i.e. methods of "objectivity"
> > (third-person/first-person plural view by our own definition).
> We can have objective talk on first person once we share definitions.
> Recall that my motivation is the mind body problem.
> Hiding that a theory is wrong for the experiences is cheating, a little
> bit like physicalist explanation of the mind which most of the time
> explains it away.
>
>
>
> > By the way, I'm not implying that scientific reality is sufficient for
> > meaning of life. ;)
> I hope so.
>
> > My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in
> > this sense. I think the answer is that we long to find meaning solely
> > through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to
> > erect science as the god over all meaning.
> That is just scientism, not science. And then lobian machine are
> already able to guess correctly that meaning or truth is much vaster
> than reason or proof. You should love comp :-)
>
> Bruno
I'm glad I agree with you that the existence of the first-person (or
meaning or truth) cannot be ignored through an eliminative proof. But
your comp seems also to be only eliminative in nature, noting the
words above "vaster". Thus meaning and truth are simply proved to be
things that are beyond reach. This doesn't seem to be very useful.
And yet you (have to?) believe that meaning and truth are "out there"
somewhere and that these systems/sets of proof are headed in the right
direction. This seems to be saying that a fractal, as it gets
increasingly complex, is approaching the truth. This is not simply an
analogy. You are saying that a mathematical entity is approaching
*the truth*, all the kinds of truth that there are, including the
solution to the problem of evil, and the answer to the meaning of
life.
Tom
Brent Meeker
>>
>>> �Bruno:
If you don't believe in an omnipotent, benevolent God who orders the universe it isn't a problem. It's just a consequence of different people having competing values.
>I'm not talking about the wrongness of a
> logical contradiction. I'm talking about something that is even
> "wronger than" that. When I talk about the problem of evil, I'm
> talking about something that is *really* wrong, down at the core level
> of reality. The reason that something defined by persons (such as a
> person being treated as a "non-person"
What it mean to treat a person as a non-person? Even Kant's categorical imperative was not to treat a person *only* as a means. It's not evil to fail to ask your bank teller how they feel about cashing your check.
>) can be "really wrong" at the
> deepest level is that the essence of a person is something that lies
> at the deepest level of reality.
It's words or concepts that are defined by people. What people judge as right or wrong seems far from "basic reality" since they so often disagree about it.
>This is why the "problem of evil" in
> general has been so hard to "figure out". It's because the very
> definition of the problem is illusive without defining what a person
> is. We try to define the problem by saying evil is a logical
> contradiction with whatever theory someone has, but this actually only
> proves even more how lost we are in figuring it out, and even more
> lost in solving it.
>
> In the same way the "meaning of life" question on one hand seems
> nebulous and unuseful from a scientific viewpoint. But it is the
> ultimate question. We may ask, "What is the meaning of the 'meaning
> of life'?" But that just illustrates the meaning of the question
> itself. Perhaps this is one of the attributes of a "person", that we
> continually, recursively, as the question of meaning. We just *know*
> what the meaning is of the question, "What is the meaning of life?"
> Thus, the essence of what a person is is key to this question, and key
> to the answer!
The trouble with "the meaning of life" question is that it implicitly assumes that life has some external referent that gives it meaning, the way "grass" is given a meaning by pointing to grass. People who ask about the meaning of life usually want something like "the purpose of my life", "what goals should I pursue", etc. Thus reformulated this has a simple answer, "Whatever you want!". The problem is that people want their lives to have purpose without providing it themselves.
Brent Meeker
"Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law"
--- motto of the Hellfire Club, B. Franklin, member
Bruno Marchal
Le 29-janv.-07, à 06:07, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>>
>>> My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in
>>> this sense. �I think the answer is that we long to find meaning
>>> solely
>>> through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to
>>> erect science as the god over all meaning.
>
>> That is just scientism, not science. And then lobian machine are
>> already able to guess correctly that meaning or truth is much vaster
>> than reason or proof. You should love comp :-)
>>
>> Bruno
>
> I'm glad I agree with you that the existence of the first-person (or
> meaning or truth) cannot be ignored through an eliminative proof. But
> your comp seems also to be only eliminative in nature, noting the
> words above "vaster". Thus meaning and truth are simply proved to be
> things that are beyond reach.
ZF can prove that PA-meaning and PA-truth is beyond PA. PA cannot prove
that, but can guess it, or bet on it.
Actually all machine M1 can prove that M2-meaning is beyond M2.
Some machine cn prove this about herself in some conditional way.
No machine can prove its limitation in some absolute way (that would be
akin to proving self-consistency).
> This doesn't seem to be very useful.
Well, about meaning and truth it is even beyond expression or
definability. It is not less useful than saying that G... has no name
...
> And yet you (have to?) believe that meaning and truth are "out there"
> somewhere ...
This can help. Hopefully only ...
> and that these systems/sets of proof are headed in the right
> direction. ...
You can prove it for a simpler lobian machine. Simpler than you. For
*you*, relatively to you, indeed, IF comp is correct, you can only hope
*you* are headed in the right direction. This can make you modest and
cautious in fundamental matter, which could be good ethically (when you
think about all the bads done by the uncartesian enemies of doubt.
> This seems to be saying that a fractal, as it gets
> increasingly complex, is approaching the truth.
This is correct for some algorithmic way to approach the Mandelbrot set
(which can be considered as Truing equivalent, actually). But in
provability matter things are more rich (cf the hypostases, etc.)
> This is not simply an
> analogy. You are saying that a mathematical entity is approaching
> *the truth*, all the kinds of truth that there are, including the
> solution to the problem of evil, and the answer to the meaning of
> life.
Some machine can do that, but never in a provable way. I you want, this
gives an universal algorithm for never moving away from God: never
listen to anyone giving you an algorithm for approaching God ...
> The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the
> existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core
> the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"?
Like Plotinus, I define the first person by the knower, and I define
the incorrigible knower like Theaetetus and Plotinus as the correct
believer, following the tradition who those who knows that, when awake,
they cannot believe for sure they are awake, albeit we can know to be
dreaming, wrong, etc.. Russell said once this is debatable, and indeed
it is.
Oops I must go,
See you in two/three days,
Bruno
BTW, I do think that the problem of evil is related to the fact that it
is consistent that we could be inconsistent (= Godel II theorem in case
"we" = a consistent lobian machine): Dt -> DBf (cf also Benacerraf:
God, Godel, and the Devil, ref in my Lille thesis). Possible Evil could
be a comp price to pay for Possible Freedom.
1Z
On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical
> >> universe.
>
> > Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But
> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress.
>
> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine
Where are these machines? Platonia? I prefer to assume what I can see.
Tom Caylor
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the
> > existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core
> > the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"?
>
> > By the way, the problem of evil that I am referring to is simply the
> > problem of the existence of evil. We just know it exists. We see
> > people treated as things. We know it is wrong. The simple existence
> > of evil is a problem.
>
> If you don't believe in an omnipotent, benevolent God who orders the universe
> it isn't a problem. It's just a consequence of different people having competing values.
>
You are talking about a different "problem of evil" than I am. You
are using the word "problem" in the sense of a logical contradiction.
I think you saw below that by "the problem of evil" I mean "evil"
itself. It is something that is more direct and palpable, something
that requires a *person* to be conscious of its existence, rather than
just a mathematical processor cranking out a logical inference. Evil
*is* the problem.
At the risk of overkill, but I don't want to take any more chances,
let's take an analogy: weeds on a lawn. You are looking at the
classical "problem of evil" in the sense that if you believe that a
benevolent and all-powerful gardener is in charge of this lawn, then
(if you narrow the scope of all of the definitions enough) the
existence of weeds is a contradiction. A mathematical processor could
infer that. I'm just looking at the weeds themselves, independent of
any gardener, and saying, "This is bad." Being able to make that
judgment requires a person.
>
> >I'm not talking about the wrongness of a
> > logical contradiction. I'm talking about something that is even
> > "wronger than" that. When I talk about the problem of evil, I'm
> > talking about something that is *really* wrong, down at the core level
> > of reality. The reason that something defined by persons (such as a
> > person being treated as a "non-person"
>
> What it mean to treat a person as a non-person?
> Even Kant's categorical imperative was not to treat a person *only* as a means.
> It's not evil to fail to ask your bank teller how they feel about cashing your check.
>
This illustrates my point that the core of these problems and
questions is the essence of personhood.
>
> >) can be "really wrong" at the
> > deepest level is that the essence of a person is something that lies
> > at the deepest level of reality.
>
> It's words or concepts that are defined by people. What people judge as right or wrong seems far from "basic reality" since they so often disagree about it.
>
This is my point. Personhood is at the core of these concepts. It is
irreducible (personhood, that is).
>
> >This is why the "problem of evil" in
> > general has been so hard to "figure out". It's because the very
> > definition of the problem is illusive without defining what a person
> > is. We try to define the problem by saying evil is a logical
> > contradiction with whatever theory someone has, but this actually only
> > proves even more how lost we are in figuring it out, and even more
> > lost in solving it.
>
> > In the same way the "meaning of life" question on one hand seems
> > nebulous and unuseful from a scientific viewpoint. But it is the
> > ultimate question. We may ask, "What is the meaning of the 'meaning
> > of life'?" But that just illustrates the meaning of the question
> > itself. Perhaps this is one of the attributes of a "person", that we
> > continually, recursively, as the question of meaning. We just *know*
> > what the meaning is of the question, "What is the meaning of life?"
> > Thus, the essence of what a person is is key to this question, and key
> > to the answer!
>
> The trouble with "the meaning of life" question is that it implicitly assumes that life has some external referent that gives it meaning, the way "grass" is given a meaning by pointing to grass. People who ask about the meaning of life usually want something like "the purpose of my life", "what goals should I pursue", etc. Thus reformulated this has a simple answer, "Whatever you want!". The problem is that people want their lives to have purpose without providing it themselves.
The question of "the meaning of life" I am referring to is deeper than
a "what" question. It is a "why" question. For instance, why is it
that a person is able to somehow create meaning? At the core is the
essence of personhood.
Tom
Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker
OK. But in that case your question is just half of the question, "Why do people have values?" If you have values then that mean some things will be good and some will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place you don't want it. You must already know the obvious answer to this given by Darwin. And it doesn't even take a person; even amoebas have values. I suspect you have a set answer in mind and you're looking for the question to elicit it.
Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal
Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit :
Where is the universe?
> I prefer to assume what I can see.
Fair enough. I think we can sum up the main difference between
Platonists and Aristotelians like that:
Aristotelians believe in what they see, measure, etc. But platonists
believe that what they see is the shadow of the shadow of the shadow
... of what could *perhaps* ultimately exists.
The deeper among the simplest argument for platonism, is the dream
argument. Indeed, dreaming can help us to take some distance with the
idea that seeing justifies beliefs. Put in another way, I believe in
what I understand, and I am agnostic (and thus open minded) about
everything else.
Now to be sure, I am not convinced that someone has ever "seen"
*primary matter*.
Bruno
Brent Meeker
>
> Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit :
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical
>>>>> universe.
>>>> Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer,
>>>> we don' t care. But
>>> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress.
>>>
>>> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine
>> Where are these machines? Platonia?
>
>
>
> Where is the universe?
Here.
Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux
Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ?
Quentin Anciaux
Jef Allbright
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Where is the universe?
>
> Here.
>
And here (in this machine) too, of course.
I thought I would just pop in and also say that I very much appreciated
your recent post, Brent, where you made some very good points including
the one about amoebas having values. I was soooo tempted to post a "me
too" at that point.
- Jef
Brent Meeker
I'm right here.
Brent
Quentin Anciaux
Mouarf...
I don't see you around... strange, maybe you're somewhere else.
That remind me of my post about my impression of the locality of the mind
inside the body... it is right inside the phenomenal scene... the phenomenal
scene is right here.... or "here" is the phenomenal scene itself...
Quentin
Brent Meeker
> On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit :
>>>>>> On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit :
>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical
>>>>>>>>> universe.
>>>>>>>> Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer,
>>>>>>>> we don' t care. But
>>>>>>> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine
>>>>>> Where are these machines? Platonia?
>>>>> Where is the universe?
>>>> Here.
>>> Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ?
>>>
>>> Quentin Anciaux
>> I'm right here.
>
> Mouarf...
>
> I don't see you around... strange, maybe you're somewhere else.
No. It's because you're not here.
>
> That remind me of my post about my impression of the locality of the mind
> inside the body... it is right inside the phenomenal scene... the phenomenal
> scene is right here.... or "here" is the phenomenal scene itself...
Space and time are attributes of our model of the world - as is our concept of self and our locality.
Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux
In the same though... where are "you" where you're dead or before you're
born... does it have meaning ? Or the reverse, where will be/was the universe
after your death/before your birth ?
Quentin
John Mikes
has anybody ever seen "numbers"? (except for Aunt Milly who dreamed up the 5 numbers she saw in her dream - for the lottery).
"Where is the universe" - good question, but:
Has anybody ever seen "Other" universes?
Have we learned or developed (advanced) NOTHING since Pl & Ar?
It is amazing what learned savant scientists posted over the past days.
Where are they indeed?
John
Mark Peaty
1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right',
2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not.
In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe should be described as ultimately numeric in nature.
I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated AND gone just that little bit further out of reach!
John Mikes
I did not reflect lately to your posts (good for you?) because you seemed to merge into the topics on hand.
Descartes? a funny story. He was under the thumb of the Inquisition-times and HAD to write idealistically. My version is not so humble as yours: "I think, therefore I think I am".
Speaking of "HUMBLE" reminds me of HUBBLE you mentioned.
His ingenious (unconfirmed) idea to simulate the redshift with an (optical) Doppler infected the minds of all 20th c. scientists into an extensive(?) cosmology religion. You even dream up a psych metaphor from it. (I like it).
Accurately: just as those millions of experiments slanted to prove the BB-related tale led to 'accurate' scientific conclusions. Circularity: 'I' design an experiment within the 'expanding' circumstances and indeed find that the universe expands.(If not: the experiment was wrong).
With Hubble invoking magnetic/electric (or whatever) fields(?) to slow down the alleged (= calculated upon primitive measurements) 'wavelength' (whatever that is) would have altered not only our cosmic, but also the other -including philosophical- sciences by now.
'Being' anything? maybe 'becoming' part of a process...
Where? space is just a motion-coordinate in our (explanatory) view as time. Motion (change) is harder to catch.
I agree with describing the universe numerically: if someone takes such position, it is a fair description - I just don't know "of what".
(Map vs. the territory).
I think you set your goals too high: I want to speculate as well as I can within the cognitive inventory we achieved by today, irrespective of "the TRUTH" which is unattainable. So far.
Less-tenaciously yours
John M
Stathis Papaioannou
As Bertrand Russell comented on Descartes' cogito, it's even going a bit far to deduce "I think, therefore I am"; all you can say with certainty is "I think, therefore there is a thought". There is a difference in kind between certainty and a reasonable model, as there is a difference in kind between zero and a very small number or infinity and a very large number.
Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2007 01:12:42 +0900
From: mpe...@arach.net.au
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno Marchal
Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit :
>
> John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look
> at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in
> the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly
> prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this
> at too levels:
> 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I
> am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say
> something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I
> say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right',
That is good for you. I would say that Descartes gives a correct but
useless proof of the existence of Descartes' "first person". It is
useless because He knew it before his argument.
> 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just
> mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just
> seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find
> myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and
> work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition
> about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not.
Nobody has ever said that nothing exist. I do insist that "even me" has
a strong belief in the existence of a universe, "even" in a physical
universe. But then I keep insisting that IF the comp hyp is correct,
then materialism is false, and that physical universe is neither
material nor primitively physical. I am just saying to the
computationalist that they have to explain the physical laws, without
assuming any physics at the start.
It is a "technical point". If we are digital machine then we must
explain particles and waves from the relation between numbers, knots,
and other mathematical object.
Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the
whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by
themselves.
>
> In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now,
> and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be
> wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on
> in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe
> should be described as ultimately numeric in nature.
You are right. Actually if comp is correct, what you are saying here
can be justified.
>
> I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep
> and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer
> Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be
> expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to
> follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated
> AND gone just that little bit further out of reach!
Keep asking. Have you understood the first seven steps of the UD
Argument ? Look at my SANE paper. I think this makes available the
necessity of the reversal physics/math without technics.
Most in this list were already open to the idea that a "theory of
everything" has the shape of a probability calculus on "observer
moment". Then some of us believe it is a relative measure, and some of
us accept the comp hyp which adds many constraints, which is useful for
making things more precise, actually even falsifiable in Popper sense.
I must go. I am busy this week, but this just means I will be more slow
than usual. Keep asking if you are interested. Don't let you abuse by
possible jargon ...
Just don't let things go out of reach ... (but keep in mind that
consciousness/reality questions are deep and complex, so it is normal
to be stuck on some post, etc.).
Best,
Bruno
Tom Caylor
> OK. But in that case your question is just half of the question, "Why do people have values?" If you have values then that mean some things will be good and some will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place you don't want it. You must already know the obvious answer to this given by Darwin. And it doesn't even take a person; even amoebas have values. I suspect you have a set answer in mind and you're looking for the question to elicit it.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> Sure, logic and science are silent on the question of the value of weeds or anything else. You need a person to come along and say "let x=good", and then you can reason logically given this. Evolutionary theory etc. may predict what x a person may deem to be good or beautiful, but this is not binding on an individual in the way laws governing the chemistry of respiration, for example, are binding. Unlike some scientific types, I am quite comfortable with ethics being in this sense outside the scope of science. Unlike some religious types, I am quite comfortable without looking for an ultimate source of ethics in the form of a deity. Even if this conclusion made me very unhappy, that might be reason to try self-deception, but it has no bearing on the truth.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
Brent and Stathis exemplify two possible answers to meaning. Brent
reduces meaning to something based on mere existence or survival. Thus
amoebas can have such meaning.
Stathis says that meaning is an unanswered (unanswerable?) mystery.
We just somehow self-generate meaning.
My introduction of the "Meaning Of Life" thread asked if the
Everything perspective could provide any answers to this question.
Looking at the contributions since then, it looks like the answer is
apparently not. This is what I expected. Thus, meaning is either
limited to trivial (non-normative) values or is without basis (the
Noble Lie). If you really read the modern philosophers seriously this
is their conclusion. Of course there is a third possible answer to
this question: Meaning is based on a source outside of ourselves, by
"making connections with others based on such ideals as honour and
obligation" (a quote I read from Dr. Laura Schlesinger off of a
Starbucks coffee cup this morning!) Of course people can poo-poo such
ideals as simply "sentiments", debunking them on a surface level
(which is the only level there is without them), just as C.S. Lewis
pointed out in his lectures on "The Abolition of Man". And indeed,
without such ideals, man will be discretized into a trivial skeleton
of his true self.
Tom
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou
Live Search: New search found Try it!
John Mikes
is it not a misplaced effort to argue from one set of belief system ONLY with a person
who carries two (or even more)? I had a brother-in-law, a devout catholic and an excellent
biochemist and when I asked him how can he adjust the two in one mind, he answered:
"I never mix the two together". Tom is an excellent natural scientist and has brilliant
arguments in it, as long as it comes to his 'other' belief system - what he, quite
inderstandably - does not want to give up.
We all have 'second belief bases' in our multiple schizophrenia of intelligence.
Some have 'Platonia', some 'primitive matter view' - it is your profession.
Do you really think you can penetrate one by arguments from another?
John M
Stathis Papaioannou
You shouldn't have one criterion for your own beliefs and a different criterion for everyone else's. If Christians said, "those old Greeks sang songs about their gods' miraculous exploits, really seemed to believe in them, and on top of that were pretty smart, so I guess everything in the Iliad and Odyssey must be true", then they would be consistently applying the standards they apply to the Bible. Of course, they don't: other peoples' religious beliefs are subjected to rational scrutiny and (rightly) found wanting, but their own beliefs are special.
Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2007 09:17:57 -0500
From: jam...@gmail.com
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
John M
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Brent Meeker
> Stathis:
>
> is it not a misplaced effort to argue from one set of belief system ONLY
> with a person
> who carries two (or even more)? I had a brother-in-law, a devout
> catholic and an excellent
> biochemist and when I asked him how can he adjust the two in one mind,
> he answered:
> "I never mix the two together". Tom is an excellent natural scientist
> and has brilliant
> arguments in it, as long as it comes to his 'other' belief system - what
> he, quite
> inderstandably - does not want to give up.
> We all have 'second belief bases' in our multiple schizophrenia of
> intelligence.
> Some have 'Platonia', some 'primitive matter view' - it is your profession.
> Do you really think you can penetrate one by arguments from another?
>
> John M
>
>
>
>
> Tom Caylor writes:
>
> > On Jan 31, 10:33 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@rain.org
> > > OK. But in that case your question is just half of the
> question, "Why do people have values?" If you have values then that
> mean some things will be good and some will be bad - a weed is just
> a flower in a place you don't want it. You must already know the
> obvious answer to this given by Darwin. And it doesn't even take a
> person; even amoebas have values. I suspect you have a set answer in
> mind and you're looking for the question to elicit it.
> > >
> > > Brent Meeker
> > >
> > Also Stathis wrote:
> > > Sure, logic and science are silent on the question of the value
> of weeds or anything else. You need a person to come along and say
> "let x=good", and then you can reason logically given this.
> Evolutionary theory etc. may predict what x a person may deem to be
> good or beautiful, but this is not binding on an individual in the
> way laws governing the chemistry of respiration, for example, are
> binding.
True. But evolution does predict that an individual of an evolved species will have values, will find some things good and some bad, and further that, with high probability, these values will comport with reproductive success. You could for example fairly easily distinguish a race of robots who were engineered to serve human beings (angels?) from an evolved race of robots simply by their behavior and implied values.
The former do have lives with meaning - their purposes refer outside themselves. The later have their own purposes. I'm content to be one of the latter.
Brent Meeker
John Mikes
maybe I shoot too high, but I was expecting something better from you, at least referring to what I said.
John
Stathis Papaioannou
Some people, including the mentally ill, do have multiple inconsistent belief systems, but to me that makes it clear that at least one of their beliefs must be wrong - even in the absence of other information. You're much kinder to alternative beliefs than I am, but in reality, you *must* think that some beliefs are wrong, otherwise you would hold those beliefs! For example, if you say you don't personally believe the earth was created in six days, but respect the right of others to believe that it was, what you're really saying is that you respect the right of others to have a false belief. I have no dispute with that, as long as it is acknowledged.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: jam...@prodigy.net
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2007 11:07:52 -0500
Stathiws,no question about that. What I was trying to stress was the futility of arguing from one belief system (and stressing its solely expanded "truth") against a different "truth and evidence" carrying OTHER belief system.BTW: don't schyzophrenics (maybe multiple personalitics) accept (alternately) ALL the belief systems they carry? (=layman asking the professional).IMO we all (i.e. thinking people) are schizophrenix with our rather elastic ways of intelligence. Beatus ille qui est "onetrackminded"..(the 9th beatitude).To your initial sentence: do you believe (in YOUR criteria of your beliefs) that TWO people may have absolutely identical beliefs? I am almost certain that as your immune system, DNA, fingerprint and the other zillion characteristics are not identical to those of other animals, the mental makeup is similarly unique.We are not zombies of a mechanically computerized machine-identity (Oops, no reference to Loeb). Duo si faciunt (cogitant?) idem, non est idem.John M
----- Original Message -----From: Stathis PapaioannouSent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 9:38 AMSubject: RE: The Meaning of Life
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Stathis Papaioannou
> > > Also Stathis wrote:
> > > > Sure, logic and science are silent on the question of the value
> > of weeds or anything else. You need a person to come along and say
> > "let x=good", and then you can reason logically given this.
> > Evolutionary theory etc. may predict what x a person may deem to be
> > good or beautiful, but this is not binding on an individual in the
> > way laws governing the chemistry of respiration, for example, are
> > binding.
>
>
> The former do have lives with meaning - their purposes refer outside themselves. The later have their own purposes. I'm content to be one of the latter.
>
> Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou
Get connected - Use your Hotmail address to sign into Windows Live Messenger now. Connect now!
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2007 16:03:05 -0500
From: jam...@gmail.com
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
Stathis,
maybe I shoot too high, but I was expecting something better from you, at least referring to what I said.
John
On 2/6/07, Stathis Papaioannou <stathispa...@hotmail.com> wrote:
Brent Meeker
> Sorry, I thought I was replying to what you said. It's possible of
> course to be right about one thing and wrong about another, and people
> do keep different beliefs differently compartmentalized in their head,
> like your brother-in-law. However, this is *inconsistent*, and
> inconsistent is even worse than wrong.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
I'm not sure I agree with that last. Being consistent means you're either all right or all wrong. :-)
Brent Meeker
Tom Caylor
I'm saying that there is no meaning at all if there is no ultimate
meaning. Again, I haven't just pulled this out of thin air. If you
really read the modern thinkers and writers, that is what they were
saying. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Russell, Camus, Sartre,
Dostoyevsky, Orwell, Godel, Monod, Lewis, Schaeffer... I hope that
people who are trying to be on the cutting edge of "theories of
everything" will go back and pick up from where these thinkers left
off. Not just stand on the shoulders of the physics giants, but also
the philosophy (and spiritual!) giants. I know that the modern
philosophy road is depressing and unlivable. They bring us to the
edge of the cliff. It was depressing for people like the young genius
Nick Drake who was found dead on his bed in his 20's after a drug
overdose, with Camus' Myth of Sysiphus beside him. But we have to
face the reality of where the modern age has brought us in order to
find the answer before we all exterminate ourselves. ...taking the
"leap of faith" that it is bad to exterminate ourselves. In light of
modern thought, your argument about the sky god society begs the
question of meaning by assuming that they *shouldn't* "be miserable
and kill each other". This is not a dilemma to pass over lightly. I
believe it is at the heart of the matter for where mankind is at
today, on the brink of something great or terrible. Or is it REALLY
all just meaningless? (What would "REALLY" mean in that case? ;)
Isn't that what this Everything stuff is (ultimately ;) all about? We
want to solve the modern schizo dilemma of nature vs. grace and bring
about wholeness. I'm tired of hearing questions about scientifically
*proving* which god is the right one, as if the question is supposed
to show that it isn't worth it to pursue the answers to the *ultimate*
questions. While we're busy trying to scientifically *prove* which
way to go, or show that you can't scientifically prove which way to go
(which has been done already cf above thinkers), we're gonna walk off
the edge of the cliff. And, pardon my presumptuous risking the danger
of a false belief, but "that wouldn't be very nice."
Tom
Brent Meeker
> On Feb 5, 4:37 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
> <stathispapaioan...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> Tom Caylor writes:
>>> On Jan 31, 10:33 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@rain.org> wrote:> > OK. But in that case your question is just half of the question, "Why do people have values?" If you have values then that mean some things will be good and some will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place you don't want it. You must already know the obvious answer to this given by Darwin. And it doesn't even take a person; even amoebas have values. I suspect you have a set answer in mind and you're looking for the question to elicit it.> >> > Brent Meeker> >> Also Stathis wrote:> > Sure, logic and science are silent on the question of the value of weeds or anything else. You need a person to come along and say "let x=good", and then you can reason logically given this. Evolutionary theory etc. may predict what x a person may deem to be good or beautiful, but this is not binding on an individual in the way laws governing the chemistry of respiration, for example, are binding. Unlike some scientific type
s, I am quite comfortable with ethics being in this sense outside the scope of science. Unlike some religious types, I am quite comfortable without looking for an ultimate source of ethics in the form of a deity. Even if this conclusion made me very unhappy, that might be reason to try self-deception, but it has no bearing on the truth.> >> > Stathis Papaioannou> >> > Brent and Stathis exemplify two possible answers to meaning. Brent> reduces meaning to something based on mere existence or survival. Thus> amoebas can have such meaning.> Stathis says that meaning is an unanswered (unanswerable?) mystery.> We just somehow self-generate meaning.> > My introduction of the "Meaning Of Life" thread asked if the> Everything perspective could provide any answers to this question.> Looking at the contributions since then, it looks like the answer is> apparently not. This is what I expected. Thus, meaning is either> limited to trivial (non-normative) values or is without basis (the> No
ble Lie). If you really read the modern philosophers seriously this> is their conclusion. Of course there is a third possible answer to> this question: Meaning is based on a source outside of ourselves, by> "making connections with others based on such ideals as honour and> obligation" (a quote I read from Dr. Laura Schlesinger off of a> Starbucks coffee cup this morning!) Of course people can poo-poo such> ideals as simply "sentiments", debunking them on a surface level> (which is the only level there is without them), just as C.S. Lewis> pointed out in his lectures on "The Abolition of Man". And indeed,> without such ideals, man will be discretized into a trivial skeleton> of his true self.> > Tom
>> You seem to keep arguing that it wouldn't be very nice if there were no ultimate meaning. Is there any actual evidence that this alleged meaning exists? For example, suppose a society believes that the Sky God provides ultimate meaning and live their lives happily, whereas it could be shown that they would all be miserable and kill each other if they believed it were not true. On this basis there may be reason to think that belief in the Sky God is useful, but is there any reason to think that belief in the Sky God is true?
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> _________________________________________________________________
>
> I'm saying that there is no meaning at all if there is no ultimate
> meaning.
So you say. I see no reason to believe it.
>Again, I haven't just pulled this out of thin air. If you
> really read the modern thinkers and writers, that is what they were
> saying. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Russell, Camus, Sartre,
> Dostoyevsky, Orwell, Godel, Monod, Lewis, Schaeffer...
I don't think you've read these writers. Russell, Camus, and Sartre were definitely advocates of each person providing their own purpose. Incidentally they hardly qualify as "modern" anymore.
>I hope that
> people who are trying to be on the cutting edge of "theories of
> everything" will go back and pick up from where these thinkers left
> off. Not just stand on the shoulders of the physics giants, but also
> the philosophy (and spiritual!) giants. I know that the modern
> philosophy road is depressing and unlivable. They bring us to the
> edge of the cliff. It was depressing for people like the young genius
> Nick Drake who was found dead on his bed in his 20's after a drug
> overdose, with Camus' Myth of Sysiphus beside him. But we have to
> face the reality of where the modern age has brought us in order to
> find the answer before we all exterminate ourselves. ...taking the
> "leap of faith" that it is bad to exterminate ourselves.
It's not modern existential angst that threatens our existence. It's the religious zealotry of worshippers of the sky god - in Iran, Pakistan, and the bible belt.
>In light of
> modern thought, your argument about the sky god society begs the
> question of meaning by assuming that they *shouldn't* "be miserable
> and kill each other". This is not a dilemma to pass over lightly. I
> believe it is at the heart of the matter for where mankind is at
> today, on the brink of something great or terrible. Or is it REALLY
> all just meaningless? (What would "REALLY" mean in that case? ;)
Not to me it isn't. I'm all for not exterminating ourselves and I've got grandchildren to prove it.
> Isn't that what this Everything stuff is (ultimately ;) all about? We
> want to solve the modern schizo dilemma of nature vs. grace and bring
> about wholeness.
Sounds like a problem invented in the Vatican.
>I'm tired of hearing questions about scientifically
> *proving* which god is the right one, as if the question is supposed
> to show that it isn't worth it to pursue the answers to the *ultimate*
> questions. While we're busy trying to scientifically *prove* which
> way to go, or show that you can't scientifically prove which way to go
> (which has been done already cf above thinkers), we're gonna walk off
> the edge of the cliff. And, pardon my presumptuous risking the danger
> of a false belief, but "that wouldn't be very nice."
Scientists never "prove" anything; they observe, invent theories, collect evidence, test,... Only mathematicians prove things - and then only relative to axioms they assume.
Brent Meeker
"It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter."
--- Thomas Nagel
Tom Caylor
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > I'm saying that there is no meaning at all if there is no ultimate
> > meaning.
>
> So you say. I see no reason to believe it.
>
> >Again, I haven't just pulled this out of thin air. If you
> > really read the modern thinkers and writers, that is what they were
> > saying. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Russell, Camus, Sartre,
> > Dostoyevsky, Orwell, Godel, Monod, Lewis, Schaeffer...
>
> I don't think you've read these writers. Russell, Camus, and Sartre were definitely advocates of each person providing their own purpose. Incidentally they hardly qualify as "modern" anymore.
They each came to the edge of the cliff, but they responded in
different ways. Some took the "leap of faith" (!) to say that somehow
providing our own purpose is legitimate. Bertrand Russell said this
was "incredible", but he believed it anyway. We are in the post-
modern age now.
>
> >I hope that
> > people who are trying to be on the cutting edge of "theories of
> > everything" will go back and pick up from where these thinkers left
> > off. Not just stand on the shoulders of the physics giants, but also
> > the philosophy (and spiritual!) giants. I know that the modern
> > philosophy road is depressing and unlivable. They bring us to the
> > edge of the cliff. It was depressing for people like the young genius
> > Nick Drake who was found dead on his bed in his 20's after a drug
> > overdose, with Camus' Myth of Sysiphus beside him. But we have to
> > face the reality of where the modern age has brought us in order to
> > find the answer before we all exterminate ourselves. ...taking the
> > "leap of faith" that it is bad to exterminate ourselves.
>
> It's not modern existential angst that threatens our existence. It's the religious zealotry of worshippers of the sky god - in Iran, Pakistan, and the bible belt.
Solshenitzyn said that the line between good and evil does not run
between cultures, beliefs, etc. but right down the center of every
human being. (Don't know if I remembered the quote exactly.)
>
> >In light of
> > modern thought, your argument about the sky god society begs the
> > question of meaning by assuming that they *shouldn't* "be miserable
> > and kill each other". This is not a dilemma to pass over lightly. I
> > believe it is at the heart of the matter for where mankind is at
> > today, on the brink of something great or terrible. Or is it REALLY
> > all just meaningless? (What would "REALLY" mean in that case? ;)
>
> Not to me it isn't. I'm all for not exterminating ourselves and I've got grandchildren to prove it.
Congratulations (honestly).
However, your having grandchildren shows that you BELIEVE IN not
exterminating ourselves, but it doesn't PROVE that we SHOULD NOT
exterminate ourselves.
>
> > Isn't that what this Everything stuff is (ultimately ;) all about? We
> > want to solve the modern schizo dilemma of nature vs. grace and bring
> > about wholeness.
>
> Sounds like a problem invented in the Vatican.
>
Modern science has attempted to explain away the reality of what man
is, both the good and the bad. However, explaining it away doesn't
eliminate it. Thus the dichotomy.
> >I'm tired of hearing questions about scientifically
> > *proving* which god is the right one, as if the question is supposed
> > to show that it isn't worth it to pursue the answers to the *ultimate*
> > questions. While we're busy trying to scientifically *prove* which
> > way to go, or show that you can't scientifically prove which way to go
> > (which has been done already cf above thinkers), we're gonna walk off
> > the edge of the cliff. And, pardon my presumptuous risking the danger
> > of a false belief, but "that wouldn't be very nice."
>
> Scientists never "prove" anything; they observe, invent theories, collect evidence, test,... Only mathematicians prove things - and then only relative to axioms they assume.
I agree.
>
> Brent Meeker
> "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter."
> --- Thomas Nagel
We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
Tom
Tom Caylor
That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now will
matter.
Brent Meeker
Brent Meeker
> On Feb 6, 11:20 pm, "Tom Caylor" <Daddycay...@aol.com> wrote:
>> On Feb 6, 10:25 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@rain.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Tom Caylor wrote:
>>>> I'm saying that there is no meaning at all if there is no ultimate
>>>> meaning.
>>> So you say. I see no reason to believe it.
>>>> Again, I haven't just pulled this out of thin air. If you
>>>> really read the modern thinkers and writers, that is what they were
>>>> saying. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Russell, Camus, Sartre,
>>>> Dostoyevsky, Orwell, Godel, Monod, Lewis, Schaeffer...
>>> I don't think you've read these writers. Russell, Camus, and Sartre were definitely advocates of each person providing their own purpose. Incidentally they hardly qualify as "modern" anymore.
>> They each came to the edge of the cliff, but they responded in
>> different ways. Some took the "leap of faith" (!) to say that somehow
>> providing our own purpose is legitimate. Bertrand Russell said this
>> was "incredible", but he believed it anyway. We are in the post-
>> modern age now.
I don't see how anyone can provide you purpose *except* you. If I say you should do thus and so, it's still your decision to do it or not. If an Imam says you should kill infidels for Allah, it's still up to you decide wether he's right or not. If Bruno says the universe is an illusion of arithmetic, you have make up your own mind. To talk of ultimate purpose is just a diversion to avoid you own responsibility for your own life. Even if Yaweh appeared out of a cloud and told you to spread his gospel - you'd still have to decide whether or not to do it (unless of course he coerced you with threats of hellfire).
>>>> I hope that
>>>> people who are trying to be on the cutting edge of "theories of
>>>> everything" will go back and pick up from where these thinkers left
>>>> off. Not just stand on the shoulders of the physics giants, but also
>>>> the philosophy (and spiritual!) giants. I know that the modern
>>>> philosophy road is depressing and unlivable. They bring us to the
>>>> edge of the cliff. It was depressing for people like the young genius
>>>> Nick Drake who was found dead on his bed in his 20's after a drug
>>>> overdose, with Camus' Myth of Sysiphus beside him. But we have to
>>>> face the reality of where the modern age has brought us in order to
>>>> find the answer before we all exterminate ourselves. ...taking the
>>>> "leap of faith" that it is bad to exterminate ourselves.
>>> It's not modern existential angst that threatens our existence. It's the religious zealotry of worshippers of the sky god - in Iran, Pakistan, and the bible belt.
>> Solshenitzyn said that the line between good and evil does not run
>> between cultures, beliefs, etc. but right down the center of every
>> human being. (Don't know if I remembered the quote exactly.)
A good saying.
>>
>>
>>
>>>> In light of
>>>> modern thought, your argument about the sky god society begs the
>>>> question of meaning by assuming that they *shouldn't* "be miserable
>>>> and kill each other". This is not a dilemma to pass over lightly. I
>>>> believe it is at the heart of the matter for where mankind is at
>>>> today, on the brink of something great or terrible. Or is it REALLY
>>>> all just meaningless? (What would "REALLY" mean in that case? ;)
>>> Not to me it isn't. I'm all for not exterminating ourselves and I've got grandchildren to prove it.
>> Congratulations (honestly).
>>
>> However, your having grandchildren shows that you BELIEVE IN not
>> exterminating ourselves, but it doesn't PROVE that we SHOULD NOT
>> exterminate ourselves.
I can live without proof of that. I do in everything else.
>>>> Isn't that what this Everything stuff is (ultimately ;) all about? We
>>>> want to solve the modern schizo dilemma of nature vs. grace and bring
>>>> about wholeness.
>>> Sounds like a problem invented in the Vatican.
>> Modern science has attempted to explain away the reality of what man
>> is, both the good and the bad. However, explaining it away doesn't
>> eliminate it. Thus the dichotomy.
On the contrary science has explicated the evolutionary basis of good and bad. Why we think some things are good and some bad. Why there are societal rules and why not everyone obeys them. Try reading some writers that *are* modern: "The Origins of Virtue" by Matt Ridley, "The Lucifer Principle" by Howard Bloom , "Game Theory Evolving" by Ginitis, "Elbow Room" by Daniel Dennett.
>>
>>>> I'm tired of hearing questions about scientifically
>>>> *proving* which god is the right one, as if the question is supposed
>>>> to show that it isn't worth it to pursue the answers to the *ultimate*
>>>> questions. While we're busy trying to scientifically *prove* which
>>>> way to go, or show that you can't scientifically prove which way to go
>>>> (which has been done already cf above thinkers), we're gonna walk off
>>>> the edge of the cliff. And, pardon my presumptuous risking the danger
>>>> of a false belief, but "that wouldn't be very nice."
>>> Scientists never "prove" anything; they observe, invent theories, collect evidence, test,... Only mathematicians prove things - and then only relative to axioms they assume.
>> I agree.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Brent Meeker
>>> "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter."
>>> --- Thomas Nagel
>> We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
>>
>> Tom
>
> That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now will
> matter.
How do you know?
Brent Meeker
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
--- David Hume
Stathis Papaioannou
> > > On Jan 31, 10:33 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@rain.org> wrote:> > OK. But in that case your question is just half of the question, "Why do people have values?" If you have values then that mean some things will be good and some will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place you don't want it. You must already know the obvious answer to this given by Darwin. And it doesn't even take a person; even amoebas have values. I suspect you have a set answer in mind and you're looking for the question to elicit it.> >> > Brent Meeker> >> Also Stathis wrote:> > Sure, logic and science are silent on the question of the value of weeds or anything else. You need a person to come along and say "let x=good", and then you can reason logically given this. Evolutionary theory etc. may predict what x a person may deem to be good or beautiful, but this is not binding on an individual in the way laws governing the chemistry of respiration, for example, are binding. Unlike some scientific types, I am quite comfortable with ethics being in this sense outside the scope of science. Unlike some religious types, I am quite comfortable without looking for an ultimate source of ethics in the form of a deity. Even if this conclusion made me very unhappy, that might be reason to try self-deception, but it has no bearing on the truth.> >> > Stathis Papaioannou> >> > Brent and Stathis exemplify two possible answers to meaning. Brent> reduces meaning to something based on mere existence or survival. Thus> amoebas can have such meaning.> Stathis says that meaning is an unanswered (unanswerable?) mystery.> We just somehow self-generate meaning.> > My introduction of the "Meaning Of Life" thread asked if the> Everything perspective could provide any answers to this question.> Looking at the contributions since then, it looks like the answer is> apparently not. This is what I expected. Thus, meaning is either> limited to trivial (non-normative) values or is without basis (the> Noble Lie). If you really read the modern philosophers seriously this> is their conclusion. Of course there is a third possible answer to> this question: Meaning is based on a source outside of ourselves, by> "making connections with others based on such ideals as honour and> obligation" (a quote I read from Dr. Laura Schlesinger off of a> Starbucks coffee cup this morning!) Of course people can poo-poo such> ideals as simply "sentiments", debunking them on a surface level> (which is the only level there is without them), just as C.S. Lewis> pointed out in his lectures on "The Abolition of Man". And indeed,> without such ideals, man will be discretized into a trivial skeleton> of his true self.> > Tom
> >
> > You seem to keep arguing that it wouldn't be very nice if there were no ultimate meaning. Is there any actual evidence that this alleged meaning exists? For example, suppose a society believes that the Sky God provides ultimate meaning and live their lives happily, whereas it could be shown that they would all be miserable and kill each other if they believed it were not true. On this basis there may be reason to think that belief in the Sky God is useful, but is there any reason to think that belief in the Sky God is true?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> > _________________________________________________________________
>
> really read the modern thinkers and writers, that is what they were
> saying. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Russell, Camus, Sartre,
> people who are trying to be on the cutting edge of "theories of
> everything" will go back and pick up from where these thinkers left
> off. Not just stand on the shoulders of the physics giants, but also
> the philosophy (and spiritual!) giants. I know that the modern
> philosophy road is depressing and unlivable. They bring us to the
> edge of the cliff. It was depressing for people like the young genius
> Nick Drake who was found dead on his bed in his 20's after a drug
> overdose, with Camus' Myth of Sysiphus beside him. But we have to
> face the reality of where the modern age has brought us in order to
> find the answer before we all exterminate ourselves. ...taking the
> modern thought, your argument about the sky god society begs the
> question of meaning by assuming that they *shouldn't* "be miserable
> and kill each other". This is not a dilemma to pass over lightly. I
> believe it is at the heart of the matter for where mankind is at
> today, on the brink of something great or terrible. Or is it REALLY
> all just meaningless? (What would "REALLY" mean in that case? ;)
> want to solve the modern schizo dilemma of nature vs. grace and bring
> *proving* which god is the right one, as if the question is supposed
> to show that it isn't worth it to pursue the answers to the *ultimate*
> questions. While we're busy trying to scientifically *prove* which
> way to go, or show that you can't scientifically prove which way to go
> (which has been done already cf above thinkers), we're gonna walk off
> the edge of the cliff. And, pardon my presumptuous risking the danger
> of a false belief, but "that wouldn't be very nice."
>
Suppose, as a thought experiment, that a world exists that was not created by a loving God. It might have been created by a deistic god, by advanced aliens, or even by the devil. This world contains intelligent beings who arrive at exactly the same beliefs about science, religion, ethics etc. as we do in our world, because the design parameters are such that they have a similar capacity to reason as we do and are fed similar data about the world, even though some of it is false data. The question is, will this society differ from ours as a result of the fact that they only *think* they have an ultimate purpose? Would it necessarily fall apart if it were revealed to them after centuries that they are in fact just an experiment? What would you say to those who, after the revelation, dismiss it as interesting but irrelevant as far as their personal lives are concerned, and carry on as usual?
Stathis Papaioannou
Tom Caylor writes:
> > > Brent Meeker
> > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter."
> > > --- Thomas Nagel
> >
> > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
> >
> > Tom
>
> That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now will
> matter.
Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker
>
> Tom Caylor writes:
>
> > > > Brent Meeker
> > > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now
> will matter."
> > > > --- Thomas Nagel
> > >
> > > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
> > >
> > > Tom
> >
> > That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now will
> > matter.
>
> Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would anyone want
> it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a million years?
They've really really screwed up?
Brent
Mark Peaty
MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to understand 'it' to be able to exist within it!
SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'?
And next: what do you mean by 'exist'?
These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb' questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are using these words, I don't think I can go any further.
"I think therefore I am right!" - Angelica
[Rugrat]
Torgny Tholerus
And next: what do you mean by 'exist'?
Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist.
--
Torgny Tholerus
Brent Meeker
But what is "mathematical possibility"? Is it the same as "logically possible"? Does it rule out, "The book is green and the book is red."? Or does it only rule out, "The book is green and the book is not green."?
Brent Meeker
Torgny Tholerus
> Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>> Mark Peaty skrev:
>>
>>> And next: what do you mean by 'exist'?
>>>
>> 'Exist' is exactly the same as 'mathematical possibility'.
>>
>> Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe
>> exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way.
>> But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our
>> point of view does the other Universes not exist.
>>
>
Game of Life, with some starting configuration. This simple Universe
exists in the same way as our Universe, even if nobody ever tries this
starting configuration.
--
Torgny Tholerus
Brent Meeker
But that doesn't answer the question. Can a thing be both red and green? Is that logically impossible or only nomologically impossible? It seems to me there is a problem with talking about logically possible. I can adopt some axioms including an axiom that says a thing can be any two different colors at the same time and then proceed with logical inferences to derive a lot of theorems and so long as I don't have another axiom that says a thing can only be one color at a time I won't run into an inconsistency. Does that mean it is possible for the a thing to be two different colors at the same time - I don't think so. But the reason I don't think so is an inductive inference about the physical world and the meaning of words by reference to it (as Bruno would say, the absence of white rabbits), not with logic.
Also, "logically possible" is the same as "logically consistent" (at least under most rules of inference). But except for simple systems you cannot know when a logical system is consistent. I think that's why Bruno builds on arithmetic; because he can ask you to "bet" it is true and you probably will even though it cannot be proven consistent (internally). If he asked you to bet on metric manifolds over the octonions you might bet the other way.
Brent Meeker
John M
John M
With 'physical' I take a more primitive stance: I consider it epistemological over our past history, to put primitive and unsatisfactory experiences (observations?) into position of the premature image we formed about the world in the past (including now). Matter-concept is still an imprtant part of it, even in E~m relations. Sensorial - in it - still has the upper hand over mental.
----- Original Message -----From: Mark PeatySent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 11:34 AMSubject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
John M
Russell Standish
>
> I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions.
>
> John M
>
My take on physical and existence.
Physical: that which "kicks back" in the Samuel Johnson sense. It
doesn't rule out idealism, because the virtual reality in a VR
simulation also kicks back.
Existence: This is a word with many meanings. To use it, one should
first say what type of existence you mean. For instance mathematical
existence means a property of a number that is true - eg "47 is
prime". Anthropic existence might mean something that "kicks back" to
some observer somewhere in the plenitude of possibilities. There is
another type of existence referring to that which "kicks back" to me
here, right now. And so on.
It is possible to say "physical existence = mathematical existence" as
Tegmark does, but this is almost a definition, rather than a statement
of metaphysics.
Cheers
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou
From: jam...@prodigy.net
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2007 18:28:25 -0500
John M
No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG Free Edition.
Version: 7.5.432 / Virus Database: 268.17.30/674 - Release Date: 2/7/2007 3:33 PM
Stathis Papaioannou
I agree: being open-minded is more important than being "right".
Stathis.
From: jam...@prodigy.net
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2007 17:09:25 -0500
</HTML
Bruno Marchal
Le 07-févr.-07, à 17:34, Mark Peaty a écrit :
> Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have
> understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having
> figure this out by themselves.'
>
> MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to
> understand 'it' to be able to exist within it!
Of course! Like babies can use their brain without understanding it ...
>
> SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'?
It concerns the stable appearance described by hypothetical "physical
theories" (like classical mechanics, QM, etc.).
I found an argument showing that IF comp(*) is correct THEN those
stable appearances emerge from arithmetic as seen from internalized
point of views. Those can be described in computer science, and It
makes the comp hyp falsifiable: just extract the physical appearance
from comp and compare with nature. I will say more in a reply to
Stathis.
(*) comp means there exist a tuiring emulable level of description of
"myself" (whatever I am), meaning I would notice a functional
substitution made at that level).
>
> And next: what do you mean by 'exist'?
There are mainly two sort of existence. The absolute fundamental one,
and the internal or phenomenological one.
If you understand the Universal Dovetailer Argument, you can understand
that, assuming the comp hypothesis, it is enough to interpret existence
by the existential quantifier in some first order logic description of
arithmetic. (like when you say "it exist a prime number").
All the other existence (like headache, but also bosons, fermions,
anyons, ...) are phenomelogical, and can be described by "It exist a
stable and coherent collection of machines correctly believing from
their point of view in "bosons", etc. (I simplify a bit).
If you want, I say that IF comp is true, only numbers exist, all the
rest are dreams with relative degree of stability.
>
> These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb'
> questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are
> using these words, I don't think I can go any further.
You are welcome, and I don't believe there is dumb questions. I have
developed the Universal dovetailer argument, in the seventies, and it
was a pedagogical tools for explaining the mathematical theory which
consist in interviewing an universal machine on its possible physics.
I have published all this in the eighties and defend it as a thesis in
the nineties. I am aware it goes against materialism (based on the
concept of primary (aristotelian) materialism.
All this provides mathematical clean interpretation of neoplatonist
researchers (like Plato, Plotinus, Proclus). If you want I show that
concerning machine's theology it is wrong to reify matter or nature.
Note that I am using the term "materialism" in a weaker sense than its
use in philosophy of mind. But materialism I mean the metaphysical
reification of Matter. The idea that some primitive matter exists.
Hope this helps a bit. Perhaps you could study my last version of UDA
in my SANE04 paper to see the point. You can ask question for any step.
Then if you are willing to invest in mathematical logic, you will see
how the UDA can be made entirely mathematical *and* falsifiable.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 07-févr.-07, à 18:06, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
> Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'?
>
>
> Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our
> Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the
> same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other
> Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not
> exist.
If comp is true, the "physical" universe is not a mathematical
possibility. It is something much more deeply related to mathematics.
With the comp hyp "physical universes" emerge necessarily from the
interference of all mathematical possibilities, and the physical laws
are the invariant of such possibilities for their internal local
observers.
This entails we *are* in touch with the other universes, and they do
exist from our point of view. It is just an open problem if QM really
confirms this easily (cf UDA+movie-graph) derivable, from comp, fact.
This is what I try to explain in this list since the beginning (and
elsewhere before). Tegmark and Schmidhuber have missed this fundamental
point. Schmidhuber missed it by his refusal to distinguish between 1
and 3 person points of view, and Tegmark missed it by not postulating
the comp hyp (making a little bit "physics" just a geography.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 08-févr.-07, à 00:10, John M a écrit :
> Mark:
> fascinating. I like to ask such stupid questions myself.
>
> On my question 'what is consciousness' the best answer I got was:
> "everybody knows it" from a prof-fessional.
> (Yes, but everybody knows it differently).
>
> Existence??? I wonder how the honored listers will vote, I would
> resort to "the process (we think) we are in." What process? I can't
> see it from the inside.
See my posts to Mark and Torgny.
>
> With 'physical' I take a more primitive stance: I consider it
> epistemological over our past history, to put primitive and
> unsatisfactory experiences (observations?) into position of the
> premature image we formed about the world in the past (including now).
> Matter-concept is still an imprtant part of it, even in E~m relations.
> Sensorial - in it - still has the upper hand over mental.
Then, all what I say, is that comp would be false. I am open to that
idea, and that is why I try to show comp being falsifiable (but surely
not yet falsified).
> I try to include ideation into matterly. And (after Planck) in the
> reverse order. My firm opinion is: I dunno. We are not yet epistemized
> enough to form an educated guess.
I think a excellent "epistemization" has been done from Pythagorus to
Proclus, but then on this matter (!) we have been brainwashed by 1500
years of authoritative aristotelianism. the scientific field of
theology has regressed, but at the same time I would like to insist
that even christian theology has been able to keep intact a large part
of Plotinus. Alas, christian theology is incorrect on the part where
they agree with the atheists.
> *
> If I combine the two: "physical existence" (no 'primitive' included,
> rather implying it to ourselves) I visualize the unrestricted
> complexity of 'everything' (already known or not) so any teleported
> remnant of 'us' sounds impossible without 'all' of the
> combined ingredients we are part of.
Yes. That is provably comp-correct (if I understand you well).
> *
> I carry an intrauniverse view as a human, product of the
> churnings "here and now" and a BIG "complexity-view" as a
> spaceless-timeless multiverse
OK.
> BY the 'plenitude' about which we cannot know much. In between I
> allow a 'small' complexity-view as pertinent to our universe. For this
> I violate my scepticism against the Big Bang fable - and consider our
> universe from BB to dissipation, the entire history, as evolution.
Hmmmm..... To be sure comp is not enough developed so as to say
anything precise on the big bang, but it is hard to believe the big
bang could be a "beginning", with comp.
> I am nowhere ready to outline these superstitions.
I'm not sure why.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 08-févr.-07, à 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> John,
>
> I agree: being open-minded is more important than being "right".
OK, but being open-minded would be meaningless if the notion of being
right was meaningless. Being open-minded means being open to the idea
that someone else can be right (independently of the fact that in
practice we can only judge personally someone to be interesting or not,
but the notion of being right has to be implicit in the background. "To
be right" entails we *could* be wrong.
Bruno
>
> Stathis.
>>>>>>>> Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2007 09:17:57 -0500
>>>>>>>> From: jam...@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Stathis:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is it not a misplaced effort to argue from one set of belief
>>>>>>>> system ONLY with a person
>>>>>>>> who carries two (or even more)? I had a brother-in-law, a
>>>>>>>> devout catholic and an excellent
>>>>>>>> biochemist and when I asked him how can he adjust the two in
>>>>>>>> one mind, he answered:
>>>>>>>> "I never mix the two together". Tom is an excellent natural
>>>>>>>> scientist and has brilliant
>>>>>>>> arguments in it, as long as it comes to his 'other' belief
>>>>>>>> system - what he, quite
>>>>>>>> inderstandably - does not want to give up.
>>>>>>>> We all have 'second belief bases' in our multiple schizophrenia
>>>>>>>> of intelligence.
>>>>>>>> Some have 'Platonia', some 'primitive matter view' - it is your
>>>>>>>> profession.
>>>>>>>> Do you really think you can penetrate one by arguments from
>>>>>>>> another?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> John M
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> </HTML
>>>>
>>>> No virus found in this incoming message.
>>>> Checked by AVG Free Edition.
>>>> Version: 7.5.432 / Virus Database: 268.17.30/674 - Release Date:
>>>> 2/7/2007 3:33 PM
>>
>> >>
>>
John Mikes
"Because I feel my head in all these ideas - back-and-forth - like looking at a busy beehive and trying to follow ONE particular bee in it."
John
Le 08-févr.-07, ŕ 00:10, John M a écrit :
> Mark:
> fascinating. I like to ask such stupid questions myself.
>
> On my question 'what is consciousness' the best answer I got was:
> "everybody knows it" from a prof-fessional.
> (Yes, but everybody knows it differently).
>
> Existence??? I wonder how the honored listers will vote, I would
> resort to "the process (we think) we are in." What process? I can't
> see it from the inside.
See my posts to Mark and Torgny.
>
> With 'physical' I take a more primitive stance:I consider it
> epistemological over our past history, to put primitive and
> unsatisfactory experiences (observations?) into position of the
> premature image we formed about the world in the past (including now).
> Matter-concept is still an imprtant part of it, even in E~m relations.
> Sensorial - in it- still has the upper hand over mental.
Then, all what I say, is that comp would be false. I am open to that
idea, and that is why I try to show comp being falsifiable (but surely
not yet falsified).
> I try to include ideation into matterly. And (after Planck) in the
> reverseorder. My firm opinion is: I dunno. We are not yet epistemized
> enough to form an educated guess.
I think a excellent "epistemization" has been done from Pythagorus to
Proclus, but then on this matter (!) we have been brainwashed by 1500
years of authoritative aristotelianism. the scientific field of
theology has regressed, but at the same time I would like to insist
that even christian theology has been able to keep intact a large part
of Plotinus. Alas, christian theology is incorrect on the part where
they agree with the atheists.
> *
> If I combine the two: "physical existence" (no 'primitive' included,
> rather implying it to ourselves) I visualize the unrestricted
> complexity of 'everything' (already known or not) so any teleported
> remnant of 'us' sounds impossible without 'all' of the
> combinedingredients we are part of.
Yes. That is provably comp-correct (if I understand you well).
> *
> I carry an intrauniverse view as a human, product of the
> churnings"hereand now" and a BIG"complexity-view" as a
>>> Le 03-févr.-07, ŕ 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit :
Tom Caylor
In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a basis
for meaning that is more universal than explaining and controlling
things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like our animal
instincts. (Such a local basis does not support doing things like
sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in the
future.) But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to
say that it doesn't matter.
Tom
Stathis Papaioannou
If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think wonder at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance of this observation is.
Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker
>
>
> On 2/12/07, *Tom Caylor* <Daddy...@aol.com
>
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > Tom Caylor writes:
> >
> > > > > > Brent Meeker
> > > > > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing
> we do now
> > > will matter."
> > > > > > --- Thomas Nagel
> >
> > > > > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
> >
> > > > > Tom
> >
> > > > That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do
> now will
> > > > matter.
> >
> > > Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would
> anyone want
> > > it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a
> million years?
>
> In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a basis
> for meaning that is more universal than explaining and controlling
> things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like our animal
> instincts.
But what we care about right now, may include anything we think of - including how things will be a million years from now, including an abstract principle, even including a fine point of theology.
>(Such a local basis does not support doing things like
> sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in the
> future.)
For the very good reason that one cannot foresee the benefits of such sacrifice so far in the future. But people sacrifice for others that they know all the time.
> But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to
> say that it doesn't matter.
>
> Tom
>
>
> If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think wonder
> at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its
> wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance of this
> observation is.
I don't think it's true. My exhibit A is the Aztecs.
Brent Meeker
There is a certain impertinence in allowing oneself
to be burned for an opinion.
-- Anatole France