The free will function

[ronaldheld]

arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]

Abstract
It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
will and
the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics.

comments?
Ronald

[1Z]

I am not sure they have entirely avoided metaphysics, inasmcuh as
their considerations
relate to laws of nature.

[John Clark]

On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld <ronal...@gmail.com> wrote:

> An agent in possession of free will is able to perform an action that was possible to predict by nobody but the agent itself.

There are a number of things wrong with this:

1) In theory there is no reason to think that the agent would be better at predicting its own actions than a outsider, and indeed its easy to imagine circumstances where the exact opposite is true.

2) In practice the subjective meaning of the word "free" would seem to be incompatible with the ability to predict that you would do X tomorrow for certain and nothing can change that fact, its certain, it's just the way things are, you're on a path to X and there is no way to get off, you're stuck. In other words "freedom" and "no choice" don't fit. If you want a definition try the opposite:

 "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a outsider can make such a prediction";

 That's the only definition of free will that isn't gibberish or circular but unfortunately nobody except me uses it.  

3) If you can always predict your actions then you must be deterministic and have had a reason for doing so, because otherwise it was random and if you can predict randomness then its not random. And if you did it for a reason it's deterministic. I mean, if you weren't deterministic you couldn't determine what you would do next. 

 John K Clark

 

[1Z]

On Feb 6, 6:39 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > An agent in possession of free will is able to perform an action that was
> > possible to predict by nobody but the agent itself.
>
> There are a number of things wrong with this:
>
> 1) In theory there is no reason to think that the agent would be better at
> predicting its own actions than a outsider, and indeed its easy to imagine
> circumstances where the exact opposite is true.

In terms of the paper, that would be a kind of oracular (as in Oracle
Machine) knowledge.
But then why wouldn;t agents have knowledge of each others FW
functions.

> 2) In practice the subjective meaning of the word "free" would seem to be
> incompatible with the ability to predict that you would do X tomorrow for
> certain and nothing can change that fact, its certain, it's just the way
> things are, you're on a path to X and there is no way to get off, you're
> stuck. In other words "freedom" and "no choice" don't fit. If you want a
> definition try the opposite:

That doesn't quite follow. Your action can be free as far as the
outside
worlds in concerned, but known to you. Suppose you sat in a room
deciding the the nexgt days actions on the roll of a die. You would
no what you were going to do tomorrow, but not one else would have
observed the die rolls.

>  "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a
> outsider can make such a prediction";
>
>  That's the only definition of free will that isn't gibberish or circular
> but unfortunately nobody except me uses it.

I can see why.

> 3) If you can always predict your actions then you must be deterministic
> and have had a reason for doing so, because otherwise it was random and if
> you can predict randomness then its not random. And if you did it for a
> reason it's deterministic. I mean, if you weren't deterministic you
> couldn't determine what you would do next.

Doing things for reasons is compatible with indeterminism.

[meekerdb]

Whether it is operational depends on the free-will function.  Suppose you guessed my free-will function and the start time t_0.  Then each time I had to make a decision, you could predict my decision.  But how could this be distinguished from a deterministic decision function that depends on information along my past light-cone.  This information is unavailable, even in principle, until the decision time.

Note that if Sarkissian's free-willl exists, then by the Free Will theorem it must be possessed by elementary particles too.

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
capacity which we associate with living organisms, particularly if
they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
translate meaningfully into the language of physics.

Craig

[1Z]

On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]
>
> > Abstract
> > It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
> > will and
> > the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics.
>
> > comments?
>
> It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> capacity which we associate with living organisms,

rightly or wrongly

> particularly if
> they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> translate meaningfully into the language of physics.

That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
What's the counterargument?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Feb 2012, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld <ronal...@gmail.com> wrote:

> An agent in possession of free will is able to perform an action that was possible to predict by nobody but the agent itself.

There are a number of things wrong with this:

1) In theory there is no reason to think that the agent would be better at predicting its own actions than a outsider, and indeed its easy to imagine circumstances where the exact opposite is true.

2) In practice the subjective meaning of the word "free" would seem to be incompatible with the ability to predict that you would do X tomorrow for certain and nothing can change that fact, its certain, it's just the way things are, you're on a path to X and there is no way to get off, you're stuck. In other words "freedom" and "no choice" don't fit. If you want a definition try the opposite:

 "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a outsider can make such a prediction";

 That's the only definition of free will that isn't gibberish or circular but unfortunately nobody except me uses it.  

I am glad that you are able to have a non gibberish definition of free-will, after all.

It is not a long way from mine. I define a very general notion of free-will as the ability to take decision in absence of complete information. God can predict that I will go to the movie tonight, but I cannot, so I feel free to go or not for it.

I think that the notions of determinism and indeterminism have nothing to do with free-will, even if free-will introduces a notion of first person self-indeterminacy (unrelated to the usual first person indeterminacy based on self-duplication).

Bruno

3) If you can always predict your actions then you must be deterministic and have had a reason for doing so, because otherwise it was random and if you can predict randomness then its not random. And if you did it for a reason it's deterministic. I mean, if you weren't deterministic you couldn't determine what you would do next. 

 John K Clark

 

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 7, 12:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]
>
> > > Abstract
> > > It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
> > > will and
> > > the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics.
>
> > > comments?
>
> > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> rightly or wrongly

There may not be a rightly or wrongly. Free will, as an aspect of
consciousness, may be subjective. The degree to which we infer the
other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself. Judged from a
distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of
civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules
and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an
objective point of view.

>
> > particularly if
> > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> > translate meaningfully into the language of physics.
>
> That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
> What's the  counterargument?

We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any
association to begin with. What purpose would such an association
serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal? This doesn't prove the
validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of
defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms.

Craig

[John Clark]

On Mon, Feb 6, 2012   <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> But then why wouldn;t agents have knowledge of each others FW functions.

I can't answer that question because I don't know what "FW functions" are, and forget functions I don't even know what you mean by "FW".

> Your action can be free as far as the outside worlds in concerned, but known to you.

If I always knew what I was going to do I sure wouldn't feel very free. But consider the opposite situation, your future actions were known by the outside world but not to you. You are walking down a road and see a fork in the road a half mile ahead, both lead to your destination however the left path is shorter but the right path is more beautiful; which path do you take? You think about it, you haven't decided, but a outsider can observe all the neurons in your brain and as the outsider's mind works much faster than yours he calculates that by the time you will reach the fork you will decide to go right. Meanwhile you haven't finished the calculation and you still don't know if you will go left or right, you're still thinking about it. By the time you reach the fork you find yourself walking  down the right path and conclude you decided of your own free will to go right. The fact that an outsider knew what I was going to do does not diminish the feeling of being free as a bird one bit because I did not know what I would do until I did it.

To have any hope of free will making any sense you've got to turn around your definition by 180 degrees.  

> Suppose you sat in a room deciding the the nexgt days actions on the roll of a die. You would
no what you were going to do tomorrow, but not one else would have observed the die rolls.

Then there was no reason for your decision it was random. That's perfectly logical but is it really what you mean by free will?

>>  "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a outsider can make such a prediction"; That's the only definition of free will that isn't gibberish or circular but unfortunately nobody except me uses it.

> I can see why.

Then I wish you could do me the great favor of explaining why to me.

> Doing things for reasons is compatible with indeterminism.

I see, doing something for a reason is compatible with doing something for no reason so there is no difference between determinism and indeterminism. No I take that back, I don't see.

  John K Clark

[John Mikes]

I wrote it several times before and write it again: there is NO SUCH THING as a FREE WILL in a world of total interconnectedness and continual change. The term has been invented by religious potentates to keep gulligible people under their thumb for FEAR of repraisals if they

committ "CRIMES" (as they identified). Gullible people believed it including physicists who tried to justify it in their math-ways - no matter how.

To make a decision is either consciously dependent on the 'givens' (i.e. circumstances as we see them, as compared to our situation - interest - or possibilities) - OR - it is unconsciously so.

We can decide AGAINST our known interest or survival: that, too, is a consequence of our conscious, or subconscious mindset. Nothing FREE.

Bruno's: "...free-will as the ability to take decision in absence of complete information..." is perfect: nobody CAN have PERFECT info.

We are living in a model of our ad hoc knowledge while the not yet received "rest of the infinite complexity of the world" also influences our existence (decisions?) beyond the portion we know of.

As is the rest of his reply.

 

John Mikes

 

 

On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld <ronal...@gmail.com> wrote:

[L.W. Sterritt]

Isn't a "decision" just the result / output of a probably subconscious computation in the neural network,  given some exogenous and endogenous inputs ?  Indeed the neural net must do what it can with incomplete information, being mostly what there is.  That is, the nature of reality is unknown.  

Gandalph

[meekerdb]

On 2/7/2012 4:11 PM, L.W. Sterritt wrote:

Isn't a "decision" just the result / output of a probably subconscious computation in the neural network,  given some exogenous and endogenous inputs ?  Indeed the neural net must do what it can with incomplete information, being mostly what there is.  That is, the nature of reality is unknown. 

Yes, I wonder why Bruno says consciousness is the ability to make decisions with incomplete information.  All decisions are made with incomplete information, yet they are almost all made unconsciously.  As John Clark notes it is rare to know exactly why you make a decision and when you do it lacks the feeling of 'free will'.  If you could be aware of your own decision processes at the 'substitution' level it seems it would entail an infinite regress of awareness. 

Brent

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 7, 6:31 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I wrote it several times before and write it again: there is NO SUCH THING
> as a FREE WILL in a world of total interconnectedness and continual change.
> The term has been invented by religious potentates to keep gulligible
> people under their thumb for FEAR of repraisals if they
> committ "CRIMES" (as they identified). Gullible people believed it
> including physicists who tried to justify it in their math-ways - no matter
> how.
> To make a decision is either consciously dependent on the 'givens' (i.e.
> circumstances as we see them, as compared to our situation - interest - or
> possibilities) - OR - it is unconsciously so.

If it were completely dependent though, there would no experience of
decision at all. I agree that nothing can be FREE in an absolute
sense, but it can be free in a relative sense. This is why US law
includes a continuum of possibilities of intention, like premeditated
murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary
manslaughter, criminally negligent manslaughter, and not guilty. Not
to cite the law as some kind of authoritative canon, but to recognize
the utility and civility of the concept.

,

> We can decide AGAINST our known interest or survival: that, too, is a
> consequence of our conscious, or subconscious mindset. Nothing FREE.

Our will extends beyond mere decision making though. We can create new
options. We can decide that we don't like the options and seek novel,
ever conceived of before approaches. If artistic and scientific genius
isn't an example of free will, what is the point of recognizing it?

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 7, 7:11 pm, "L.W. Sterritt" <LANNYSTERR...@comcast.net> wrote:
> Isn't a "decision" just the result / output of a probably subconscious computation in the neural network,  given some exogenous and endogenous inputs ?

No, that's not a decision, it's an inevitable result. Our hypothalamus
does that kind of computation for us, but our cortex does not. It
invites our participation.

Craig

[L.W. Sterritt]

A properly "trained" neural network does pattern recognition; why not pattern creation? I don't see artistic genius as requiring the notion of free will. Scientific genius is just more pattern recognition, isn't it?

Gandalph

[L.W. Sterritt]

Inevitable result? A neural network is a complex statistical processor (as opposed to being tasked to sequentially process and execute). The brain may be partitioned but it's all neurons. Given stochastic processes in the brain, not much is an inevitable result - just probable results. "Invites our participation:" To whom / what does "our" refer? The networks in our heads are us, not something "we" posses.

Gandalph

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 7, 8:15 pm, "L.W. Sterritt" <LANNYSTERR...@comcast.net> wrote:
> A properly "trained" neural network does pattern recognition; why not pattern creation?  I don't see artistic genius as requiring the notion of free will.  Scientific genius is just more pattern recognition, isn't it?

I don't know that neural networks do pattern recognition in a
meaningful way, I only understand that they do trivial pattern
matching. To create a something intentionally, you have to be able to
generate an authentic motive, which requires a whole other capability
than even understanding. You have to have an opinion and a personal
investment. You have to care.

>Inevitable result? A neural network is a complex statistical processor (as opposed to being tasked to sequentially process and execute).

It still arrives at a result as the inevitable consequence of
statistical parameters. It doesn't decide, it just eliminates the
possibilities which least match the given criteria. It processes in
parallel rather than only in series, but it's still an eliminative,
mechanical teleonomy rather than an imaginative, animistic teleology.

> The brain may be partitioned but it's all neurons. Given stochastic processes in the brain, not much is an inevitable result - just probable results.

Awareness or even perception can't be understood in terms of neuronal
processes alone. That's only the form of our capacity for
consciousness, not the content. The content can drive the form as much
as the form determines the content. That's why describing the brain as
a computer is ultimately too reductionist to be useful.

> "Invites our participation:" To whom / what does "our" refer?

To us. The natural persons having this discussion. We exist as surely
as any neuron or tide pool or aurora borealis.

> The networks in our heads are us, not something "we" posses.

That is true in a sense, but I think that the networks also can be
seen as the vehicle which defines our form but not our content, just
as the pages of a book and it's typefaces and letters are the vehicle
of the story but not the story itself. We possess our brain and body,
and they are characters in our life. It can be seen from the other
perspective as well, that we are processes of our brain and body, but
that is an indirect perception - a logical model based on a consensus
of facts. We cannot doubt the reality of the former, but we can doubt
it's veracity. We cannot doubt the veracity of the latter, but we can
doubt it's reality.

Craig

[1Z]

On Feb 7, 5:54 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 6, 2012   <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > But then why wouldn;t agents have knowledge of each others FW functions.
>
> I can't answer that question because I don't know what "FW functions" are,
> and forget functions I don't even know what you mean by "FW".

I was referring to the paper linked in the first post.

> > Your action can be free as far as the outside worlds in concerned, but
> > known to you.
>
> If I always knew what I was going to do I sure wouldn't feel very free.

I didn't say "always known", I said know.

> But
> consider the opposite situation, your future actions were known by the
> outside world but not to you. You are walking down a road and see a fork in
> the road a half mile ahead, both lead to your destination however the left
> path is shorter but the right path is more beautiful; which path do you
> take? You think about it, you haven't decided, but a outsider can observe
> all the neurons in your brain and as the outsider's mind works much faster
> than yours he calculates that by the time you will reach the fork you will
> decide to go right. Meanwhile you haven't finished the calculation and you
> still don't know if you will go left or right, you're still thinking about
> it. By the time you reach the fork you find yourself walking  down the
> right path and conclude you decided of your own free will to go right.

Nope. Since it is predictable, it is deterministic, since it is
determiniistic
it is no free.

> The
> fact that an outsider knew what I was going to do does not diminish the
> feeling of being free

Feeling free is not being free. That was bait and switch.

>as a bird one bit because I did not know what I would
> do until I did it.

> To have any hope of free will making any sense you've got to turn around
> your definition by 180 degrees.

You are confusing makign sense with agreeing with your prejudices.

> > Suppose you sat in a room deciding the the nexgt days actions on the roll
> > of a die. You would
> > no what you were going to do tomorrow, but not one else would have
> > observed the die rolls.
>
> Then there was no reason for your decision it was random.

Actions and reasons for actions can be chosen in pairs. Indeterminism
is compatible with doing things for reasons because reasons are
final causes (ends), whereas indeterminism only means lack
of efficient causes.

>That's perfectly
> logical but is it really what you mean by free will?
>
>
>
> >>  "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a
> >> outsider can make such a prediction"; That's the only definition of free
> >> will that isn't gibberish or circular but unfortunately nobody except me
> >> uses it.
>
>  > I can see why.
>
> Then I wish you could do me the great favor of explaining why to me.

If an outsider can make such a prediction, then my actions are
determined, then they are not free.

> > Doing things for reasons is compatible with indeterminism.
>
> I see, doing something for a reason is compatible with doing something for
> no reason

indeterminism means no (efficient) cause, not no reason.

Causes are not reasons.

[1Z]

On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 7, 12:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]
>
> > > > Abstract
> > > > It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
> > > > will and
> > > > the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics.
>
> > > > comments?
>
> > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > rightly or wrongly
>
> There may not be a rightly or wrongly.

Neither rightly nor wrongly?

> Free will, as an aspect of
> consciousness, may be subjective.


> The degree to which we infer the
> other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.

That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to ourselves.

>Judged from a
> distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of
> civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules
> and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an
> objective point of view.

Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on
grounds that are not clear to me.

>
> > > particularly if
> > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics.
>
> > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
> > What's the  counterargument?
>
> We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any
> association to begin with.

Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong.
That doesn't entail FW exists.

> What purpose would such an association
> serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal?

There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them
are Error Theories.

> This doesn't prove the
> validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of
> defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms.

I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 8, 6:45 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> Neither rightly nor wrongly?

Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
which are similar to the (any) observer. My hunch is that there
probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
very good judge of that kind of thing.

>
> > Free will, as an aspect of
> > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > The degree to which we infer the
> > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
>
> That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.

It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP. It would
be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
invisible palm tree. The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
which would be meaningless under determinism.

>
> >Judged from a
> > distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of
> > civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules
> > and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an
> > objective point of view.
>
> Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on
> grounds that are not clear to me.

I dispute it on the grounds that dispute is only possible with FW to
begin with. We can only doubt the depth of the freedom of our will in
relation to our 3p view of our behavior - which is why I say there is
a direct proportion relation there; the further we focus outside of
ourselves in microcosm, macrocosm, or unfamiliarity (as when we
confront another culture for the first time), the less we are able to
identify personally, and the more we focus on the logic of the
behavior.

Logic is impersonal, not by accident, but ontologically: Logic is the
personal experience of the inversion of personal experience. It elides
the 'show' of the universe into a description of the patterns
underlying the show. Living with only logic would be paralysis (there
was a study of a patient who lost part of his limbic system so that he
had limited emotional capacity...he would stand frozen the cereal
aisle in the grocery store because he couldn't figure out what his
preference is).

Contrast this with your imagination. Here we are most interior and
here, not coincidentally, our will is most free. My idea then is that
the experience of free will is the same thing as the feeling of
subjectivity, and the deeper subjectivity you have, the more freedom
you can exercise, both internally and potentially externally.

>
>
>
> > > > particularly if
> > > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> > > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> > > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> > > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> > > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> > > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> > > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics.
>
> > > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
> > > What's the  counterargument?
>
> > We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any
> > association to begin with.
>
> Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong.
> That doesn't entail FW exists.

No, but the universality of the association says something
consistently true either about the mind (or the brain, individuals,
culture, species, scale of body, etc) or about the reality which the
mind is considering.

>
> > What purpose would such an association
> > serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal?
>
> There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them
> are Error Theories.

Errors is an interpretation made on the association, the association
itself can't ultimately be an error. That's why I say rightly or
wrongly we still have to explain why most everyone on Earth feels that
they have free will (whether or not they have chosen to interpret it
as an illusion of mechanism) and why they also feels that inanimate
objects do not have free will (whether or not they choose to interpret
that as illusion of spirituality).

>
> > This doesn't prove the
> > validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of
> > defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms.
>
> I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian.

What is your 3p definition of 1p free will?

Craig

[John Clark]

On Tue, Feb 7, 2012 at 8:00 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If it were completely dependent though, there would no experience of decision at all.

I don't understand why people insist on infusing great mystery and significance and resort to mystical crap like "free floating glow" to explain the commonplace observation that you don't know what the result of a calculation will be until you've finished the calculation and you don't know what you will decide to do until you have decided to do it. 

> This is why US law

And there is no better place to seek answers to existential questions than to ask a lawyer.

> includes a continuum of possibilities of intention, like premeditated murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, criminally negligent manslaughter, and not guilty.

And that's why US criminal law makes absolutely no sense. You are not responsible for your crime, that is to say you should not be punished, if you did the crime because you had bad genes or because you had bad potty training when you were a baby, or because of random circumstances and were just unlucky; so you should not be punished if you did it for a reason or if you did it for no reason, and yet US laws nevertheless finds millions of people worthy of punishment. Idiotic! 

> If artistic and scientific genius isn't an example of free will, what is the point of recognizing it?\

 

No point whatsoever, I said it before I'll say it again, free will is a idea so bad it's not even wrong.

  John K Clark


 

[1Z]

On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 6:45 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
>
> Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> which are similar to the (any) observer.

And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
will be wrong too.

>My hunch is that there
> probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
> and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
> very good judge of that kind of thing.
>
>
>
> > > Free will, as an aspect of
> > > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > > The degree to which we infer the
> > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
>
> > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.
>
> It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
> fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
> determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP.

It's conceivable. I just conceived it.

> It would
> be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> invisible palm tree.

???????

> The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> which would be meaningless under determinism.

No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
without some sort of freedom. But that is question begging.
But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.

[John Clark]

On Wed, Feb 8, 2012  <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Since it is predictable, it is deterministic

Yes.

> since it is determiniistic it is no free.

Cannot comment because your definition of free will was nonsensical and the problem seems to be more with the "free" part than the "will" part. I have no problem with "will", it's a perfectly clear concept, but whenever somebody hooks it up with the F word things turn into gibberish.  

> Feeling free is not being free. That was bait and switch.

I know what it means to feel free, not knowing what I will do next; but I don't know what you mean by "being free".

>>  To have any hope of free will making any sense you've got to turn around our definition by 180 degrees.

> You are confusing makign sense with agreeing with your prejudices.

 

No, I'm talking about the difference between being self contradictory and not being self contradictory.
It's not as if I disagree with your definition, it's not good enough to allow disagreement, its gibberish. 

> Indeterminism is compatible with doing things for reasons

Bullshit.

> because reasons are final causes

OK, but that "final cause" happened for a reason or it did not happen for a reason and if the name is appropriate and it really is final then there are no more causes in the chain and the final cause happened for no reason. In other words the final cause was random.

>whereas indeterminism only means lack of efficient causes.

All that means is that the efficient cause and the final cause are the same thing; if the chain of "what causes that?" is not infinite (and there is no logical reason it couldn't be) then eventually you will always find a case where the efficient cause is the final cause.

> Causes are not reasons.

Yes, one has 6 letters and the other has 7.

 John K Clark

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 8, 10:45 am, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 7, 2012 at 8:00 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
> > If it were completely dependent though, there would no experience of
> > decision at all.
>
> I don't understand why people insist on infusing great mystery and
> significance and resort to mystical crap like "free floating glow" to
> explain the commonplace observation that you don't know what the result of
> a calculation will be until you've finished the calculation and you don't
> know what you will decide to do until you have decided to do it.

That supposes there is a 'you' to not know but to care about the
calculation one way or another. To ascribe a 'you'-ness to a room or a
rule book is where you would need to resort to some metaphysical
pseudosubstance (not me, but defenders of comp).

>
> > This is why US law
>
> And there is no better place to seek answers to existential questions than
> to ask a lawyer.

Lawyers exist too, last time I checked.

>
> > includes a continuum of possibilities of intention, like premeditated
> > murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary
> > manslaughter, criminally negligent manslaughter, and not guilty.
>
> And that's why US criminal law makes absolutely no sense. You are not
> responsible for your crime, that is to say you should not be punished, if
> you did the crime because you had bad genes or because you had bad potty
> training when you were a baby, or because of random circumstances and were
> just unlucky; so you should not be punished if you did it for a reason or
> if you did it for no reason, and yet US laws nevertheless finds millions of
> people worthy of punishment. Idiotic!

I agree that the particular laws and their enforcement is often
corrupt and barbaric, but that's not what I'm talking about. I only
mention the law to point out that we do indeed make not only a
distinction between intentional and unintentional, but that it is
widely understood that there is a broad range of mitigating factors,
shades of guilt and innocence. If you are going to hold all citizens
harmless for their offenses, then why not hold the government, which
is just an organized group of citizens, as blameless for their actions
as well? The US government was traumatized by various wars and
depressions...it's lonely and misunderstood. How can you blame it if
it puts millions of people in prison for trivial reasons and rewards
the privileged for high crimes?

>
> > If artistic and scientific genius isn't an example of free will, what is
> > the point of recognizing it?\
>
> No point whatsoever, I said it before I'll say it again, free will is a
> idea so bad it's not even wrong.
>

Oh, problem solved then. No point in trying to do anything new or
interesting, because new or interesting can't exist. In comp Bizarro
world.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 8, 11:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> > > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
>
> > Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> > and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> > which are similar to the (any) observer.
>
> And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
> will be wrong too.

If they are relative there is no wrong. If I am very cold and I walk
into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >My hunch is that there
> > probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
> > and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
> > very good judge of that kind of thing.
>
> > > > Free will, as an aspect of
> > > > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > > > The degree to which we infer the
> > > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
>
> > > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> > > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> > > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.
>
> > It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
> > fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
> > determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP.
>
> It's conceivable. I just conceived it.

I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
it"

>
> > It would
> > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> > invisible palm tree.
>
> ???????

I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
determinism. You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
that there could be any other theoretical possibility. It would be to
imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named. If there
were no such thing as color, you could not imagine color simply by
trying to conceive of 'not black and white'. Without free will in the
first place, there is no possibility of conceiving anything or
wondering about anything. The entire universe would be a machine that
'simply is' with no possibility for awareness (what would be the point
of awareness?)

>
> > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> > which would be meaningless under determinism.
>
> No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
> without some sort of freedom.

Why? If you have some sort of freedom, then you don't have
determinism.

> But that is question begging.

No, it's question answering. You have a question? Then you have free
will, otherwise there would be no point at all in the possibility of
any sort of question. There would only be known and unknown, with no
significant difference between them (again, what would be the point?
if you can't do anything about your question except be a helpless
spectator to see whether it gets answered or not, what would be the
point?)

> But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.

What the palm tree? I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
and free will would both be non-sequiturs in a deterministic universe.
It would be a name for darkness in a universe without light. No
distinction = no sense.
>

Craig

[1Z]

On Feb 8, 4:27 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Feb 8, 2012  <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Since it is predictable, it is deterministic
>
> Yes.
>
> > since it is determiniistic it is no free.
>
> Cannot comment because your definition of free will was nonsensical and the
> problem seems to be more with the "free" part than the "will" part. I have
> no problem with "will", it's a perfectly clear concept, but whenever
> somebody hooks it up with the F word things turn into gibberish.
>
> > Feeling free is not being free. That was bait and switch.
>
> I know what it means to feel free, not knowing what I will do next; but I
> don't know what you mean by "being free".

It means your actions are not determined by external forces
(and a few other conditions).

> >>  To have any hope of free will making any sense you've got to turn
> >> around our definition by 180 degrees.
>
> > You are confusing makign sense with agreeing with your prejudices.
>
> No, I'm talking about the difference between being self contradictory and
> not being self contradictory.
> It's not as if I disagree with your definition, it's not good enough to
> allow disagreement, its gibberish.

What is my defintion, IYO? I don't believe I've
offered one in the current discussion.

> > Indeterminism is compatible with doing things for reasons
>
> Bullshit.

I can argue my point, not just swear.

> > because reasons are final causes
>
> OK, but that "final cause" happened for a reason or it did not happen for a
> reason a

Meaning it was caused or uncased. But an uncaused aim or
goal still counts as a reason, because it is an answer
to the question "what did you do that for". However, only
a very select group of entities can answer such questions.
so most causes are not reasons.

>and if the name is appropriate and it really is final

That's not what "final" means in context. Read
yer Aristotle.

> then there are
> no more causes in the chain and the final cause happened for no reason. In
> other words the final cause was random.
>
> >whereas indeterminism only means lack of efficient causes.
>
> All that means is that the efficient cause and the final cause are the same
> thing;

Nope. You have misunderstood "final cause".

[meekerdb]

On 2/8/2012 7:45 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Feb 7, 2012 at 8:00 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If it were completely dependent though, there would no experience of decision at all.

I don't understand why people insist on infusing great mystery and significance and resort to mystical crap like "free floating glow" to explain the commonplace observation that you don't know what the result of a calculation will be until you've finished the calculation and you don't know what you will decide to do until you have decided to do it. 

> This is why US law

And there is no better place to seek answers to existential questions than to ask a lawyer.

> includes a continuum of possibilities of intention, like premeditated murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, criminally negligent manslaughter, and not guilty.

And that's why US criminal law makes absolutely no sense. You are not responsible for your crime, that is to say you should not be punished, if you did the crime because you had bad genes or because you had bad potty training when you were a baby, or because of random circumstances and were just unlucky; so you should not be punished if you did it for a reason or if you did it for no reason, and yet US laws nevertheless finds millions of people worthy of punishment. Idiotic! 

You think it's idiotic to provide different punishment for killing someone in a fight as compared to killing them in a plan to collect insurance?  I don't see that your rant against considering mitigating backgrounds has anything to do with the categories of crime Craig listed.  None of them depend on potty training.

Brent

[1Z]

On Feb 8, 6:41 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 11:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > > > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > > > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> > > > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
>
> > > Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> > > and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> > > which are similar to the (any) observer.
>
> > And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
> > will be wrong too.
>
> If they are relative there is no wrong.

If you say a value has a great-than-zero value when it actually jut
has
a zero value, that would be wrong.

> If I am very cold and I walk
> into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> works.  My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.

Hopelessly vague.

>
>
> > >My hunch is that there
> > > probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
> > > and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
> > > very good judge of that kind of thing.
>
> > > > > Free will, as an aspect of
> > > > > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > > > > The degree to which we infer the
> > > > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > > > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
>
> > > > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> > > > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> > > > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.
>
> > > It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
> > > fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
> > > determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP.
>
> > It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
>
> I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
> it"

No. The two are not synonymous.

> > > It would
> > > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> > > invisible palm tree.
>
> > ???????
>
> I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> determinism.

You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
forces.

> You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> that there could be any other theoretical possibility.

That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
exist. Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.

> It would be to
> imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.

Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?

> If there
> were no such thing as color, you could not imagine color simply by
> trying to conceive of 'not black and white'.

But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
of determinism.

>Without free will in the
> first place, there is no possibility of conceiving anything or
> wondering about anything.

>The entire universe would be a machine that
> 'simply is' with no possibility for awareness (what would be the point
> of awareness?)

What is the point of anything?

>
> > > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> > > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> > > which would be meaningless under determinism.
>
> > No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
> > without some sort of freedom.
>
> Why? If you have some sort of freedom, then you don't have
> determinism.
>
> > But that is question begging.
>
> No, it's question answering. You have a question? Then you have free
> will, otherwise there would be no point at all in the possibility of
> any sort of question.

Oh good grief. You have now gone to assumijng,
with no evidence, that everythig has a point.

>There would only be known and unknown, with no
> significant difference between them (again, what would be the point?
> if you can't do anything about your question except be a helpless
> spectator to see whether it gets answered or not, what would be the
> point?)
>
> > But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.
>

> What the palm tree? #

No, the arguments that "you have choices/opinions/concepts therefore
FW exists".

>I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
> and free will would both be non-sequiturs

Things aren't non sequiturs. Purported arguments are.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 8, 2:32 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 6:41 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 8, 11:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > > > > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > > > > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> > > > > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
>
> > > > Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> > > > and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> > > > which are similar to the (any) observer.
>
> > > And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
> > > will be wrong too.
>
> > If they are relative there is no wrong.
>
> If you say a value has a great-than-zero value when it actually jut
> has a zero value, that would be wrong.

That would be an absolute value rather than a relative value. Our
expectations of free will would be a comparison only to our
expectation of our own free will. If something is 100% similar to
ourselves, then we expect it to have 100% of the free will that we
have. It would have no bearing on our expectation of any objective
parameter of freedom, it's just an aspect of self-similarity.

>
> > If I am very cold and I walk
> > into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> > right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> > works.  My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> > busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> > but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> > that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> > which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.
>
> Hopelessly vague.

Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague? Perception of
temperature is relative, is it not? All I'm saying is that perception
of free will might be exactly the same way. Is 110 degrees hot? Not if
you are boiling water, but it is hot for ice cream. Do we have a lot
of free will? Compared to a TV set, sure. Compared to some abstract
idea of Libertarian Free Will? Probably not. Not sure it matters. The
capacity to even conceive of that idea though is decidedly impossible
in a deterministic universe.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > >My hunch is that there
> > > > probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
> > > > and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
> > > > very good judge of that kind of thing.
>
> > > > > > Free will, as an aspect of
> > > > > > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > > > > > The degree to which we infer the
> > > > > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > > > > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
>
> > > > > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> > > > > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> > > > > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.
>
> > > > It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
> > > > fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
> > > > determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP.
>
> > > It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
>
> > I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
> > it"
>
> No. The two are not synonymous.

Why not? Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it? That
you are a passive bystander to it's conception?

>
> > > > It would
> > > > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> > > > invisible palm tree.
>
> > > ???????
>
> > I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> > there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> > determinism.
>
> You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
> forces.

No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be
in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything
else.

>
> > You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> > that there could be any other theoretical possibility.
>
> That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
> cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
> exist.

They do exist, they just exist within your experience. It's the same
even without LSD. What you experience isn't what exists objectively,
it is what you are capable of and conditioned to experience.

>Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.

Deterministic forces can suggest false beliefs, but they can't truly
cause any beliefs, otherwise they wouldn't be beliefs, but mechanisms.
Belief can only be finally caused by a believer.

>
> > It would be to
> > imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.
>
> Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?

Probably from Lovecraft or something. But it's entirely appropriate. A
deterministic universe means that determinism cannot be named. What
name does an engine have for being something other than a non-engine?

>
> > If there
> > were no such thing as color, you could not imagine color simply by
> > trying to conceive of 'not black and white'.
>
> But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
> of determinism.

But free will means a positive assertion of intentionality - hence,
color is not mere non-monochrome, and intentionality is not mere
indeterminism.

>
> >Without free will in the
> > first place, there is no possibility of conceiving anything or
> > wondering about anything.
> >The entire universe would be a machine that
> > 'simply is' with no possibility for awareness (what would be the point
> > of awareness?)
>
> What is the point of anything?

Everything has all kinds of points. Generally I think the inside of
things wants to accumulate significance and the outside of things
doesn't want anything, which negates significance as entropy.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> > > > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> > > > which would be meaningless under determinism.
>
> > > No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
> > > without some sort of freedom.
>
> > Why? If you have some sort of freedom, then you don't have
> > determinism.
>
> > > But that is question begging.
>
> > No, it's question answering. You have a question? Then you have free
> > will, otherwise there would be no point at all in the possibility of
> > any sort of question.
>
> Oh good grief. You have now gone to assumijng,
> with no evidence, that everythig has a point.

What evidence do you have that evidence has a point? A question
literally embodies a point. It is a motive to elicit sense. I don't
assume that everything has a point, I assume that sensorimotive
experience has many points, and that electromagnetic relativity is its
'pointless' container.

>
> >There would only be known and unknown, with no
> > significant difference between them (again, what would be the point?
> > if you can't do anything about your question except be a helpless
> > spectator to see whether it gets answered or not, what would be the
> > point?)
>
> > > But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.
>
> > What the palm tree? #
>
> No, the arguments that "you have choices/opinions/concepts therefore
> FW exists".

That isn't a non-sequitur in any sense. It's a coherent and accurate
explanation of the absurdity of arguing an opinion which, when taken
literally, explicitly eliminates the possibility of any opinion at
all. How does a gear or lever have an opinion? I don't see how this
isn't obvious. What is an opinion? Is it mandatory and involuntary? Or
is it by definition intentional? What is determinism? Is it subject to
your opinion or is it by definition independent of all voluntary
cause? I don't understand how I am getting accused of not making
sense, when this is elementary and crystal clear to me.

>
> >I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
> > and free will would both be non-sequiturs
>
> Things aren't  non sequiturs. Purported arguments are.

Any communication can be a non sequitur if it fails to communicate
coherently. Your association of the phrase non-sequitur with purported
arguments for example is not a non-sequitur, since I can understand
what you mean and you are not saying 'purported frog delicious are',
but it is a factually incorrect assertion.

Craig

[1Z]

On Feb 8, 8:31 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 2:32 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 8, 6:41 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Feb 8, 11:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > > > > > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > > > > > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> > > > > > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
>
> > > > > Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> > > > > and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> > > > > which are similar to the (any) observer.
>
> > > > And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
> > > > will be wrong too.
>
> > > If they are relative there is no wrong.
>
> > If you say a value has a great-than-zero value when it actually jut
> > has a zero value, that would be wrong.
>
> That would be an absolute value rather than a relative value. Our
> expectations of free will would be a comparison only to our
> expectation of our own free will. If something is 100% similar to
> ourselves, then we expect it to have 100% of the free will that we
> have. It would have no bearing on our expectation of any objective
> parameter of freedom, it's just an aspect of self-similarity.

Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer
of interest.

> > > If I am very cold and I walk
> > > into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> > > right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> > > works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> > > busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> > > but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> > > that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> > > which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.
>
> > Hopelessly vague.
>
> Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague?

"may not be"...."may not be"...

Semantics and grammar.

> Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it?

Are you saying causation is coercion?

> That
> you are a passive bystander to it's conception

> > > > > It would
> > > > > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> > > > > invisible palm tree.
>
> > > > ???????
>
> > > I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> > > there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> > > determinism.
>
> > You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
> > forces.
>
> No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be
> in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything
> else.

>

I can't see why. Mistakes are possbile under determinism.
so, under determinsim, one could be mistaken about determinism.

> > > You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> > > that there could be any other theoretical possibility.
>
> > That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
> > cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
> > exist.
>
> They do exist, they just exist within your experience.

Existing only in ones experience is for all practical purposes exactly
equivalent to
not existing. One cannot deny the existence of that which one has
never
imagined or conceived.

>It's the same
> even without LSD. What you experience isn't what exists objectively,
> it is what you are capable of and conditioned to experience.


> >Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.
>
> Deterministic forces can suggest false beliefs, but they can't truly
> cause any beliefs, otherwise they wouldn't be beliefs, but mechanisms.
> Belief can only be finally caused by a believer.

That's your belief

> > > It would be to
> > > imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.
>
> > Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?
>
> Probably from Lovecraft or something. But it's entirely appropriate. A
> deterministic universe means that determinism cannot be named.

Nope.

> What
> name does an engine have for being something other than a non-engine?

The problem with an piece of clockwork is that it is dumb,
not that it is deterministic.

> > > If there
> > > were no such thing as color, you could not imagine color simply by
> > > trying to conceive of 'not black and white'.
>
> > But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
> > of determinism.
>
> But free will means a positive assertion of intentionality - hence,
> color is not mere non-monochrome, and intentionality is not mere
> indeterminism.

I was talking about indeterminism.

> > >Without free will in the
> > > first place, there is no possibility of conceiving anything or
> > > wondering about anything.
> > >The entire universe would be a machine that
> > > 'simply is' with no possibility for awareness (what would be the point
> > > of awareness?)
>
> > What is the point of anything?
>
> Everything has all kinds of points. Generally I think the inside of
> things wants to accumulate significance and the outside of things
> doesn't want anything, which negates significance as entropy.

That's opinion.

> > > > > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> > > > > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> > > > > which would be meaningless under determinism.
>
> > > > No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
> > > > without some sort of freedom.
>
> > > Why? If you have some sort of freedom, then you don't have
> > > determinism.
>
> > > > But that is question begging.
>
> > > No, it's question answering. You have a question? Then you have free
> > > will, otherwise there would be no point at all in the possibility of
> > > any sort of question.
>
> > Oh good grief. You have now gone to assumijng,
> > with no evidence, that everythig has a point.
>
> What evidence do you have that evidence has a point?

I don't have to answer that. Evertyhing-has-a-point is your schtick.

>A question
> literally embodies a point. It is a motive to elicit sense. I don't
> assume that everything has a point, I assume that sensorimotive
> experience has many points, and that electromagnetic relativity is its
> 'pointless' container.

Blimey

> > >There would only be known and unknown, with no
> > > significant difference between them (again, what would be the point?
> > > if you can't do anything about your question except be a helpless
> > > spectator to see whether it gets answered or not, what would be the
> > > point?)
>
> > > > But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.
>
> > > What the palm tree? #
>
> > No, the arguments that "you have choices/opinions/concepts therefore
> > FW exists".
>
> That isn't a non-sequitur in any sense. It's a coherent and accurate
> explanation of the absurdity of arguing an opinion which, when taken
> literally, explicitly eliminates the possibility of any opinion at
> all.


>
> How does a gear or lever have an opinion?

The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.

> I don't see how this
> isn't obvious. What is an opinion? Is it mandatory and involuntary?

Deterministic doesn't mean mandatory or involuntary.

>Or
> is it by definition intentional? What is determinism? Is it subject to
> your opinion or is it by definition independent of all voluntary
> cause? I don't understand how I am getting accused of not making
> sense, when this is elementary and crystal clear to me.
>
>
>
> > >I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
> > > and free will would both be non-sequiturs
>
> > Things aren't non sequiturs. Purported arguments are.
>
> Any communication can be a non sequitur if it fails to communicate
> coherently. Your association of the phrase non-sequitur with purported
> arguments for example is not a non-sequitur, since I can understand
> what you mean and you are not saying 'purported frog delicious are',
> but it is a factually incorrect assertion.

So you say.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Feb 2012, at 17:27, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Feb 8, 2012  <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Since it is predictable, it is deterministic

Yes.

> since it is determiniistic it is no free.

Cannot comment because your definition of free will was nonsensical and the problem seems to be more with the "free" part than the "will" part. I have no problem with "will", it's a perfectly clear concept, but whenever somebody hooks it up with the F word things turn into gibberish.  

With the exception of freedom, I do think that the prefix "free" might be a gibberish prefix, like in free-will, free-market, free-mason, free-exam, free-speech, etc. It often call for the kind of good intentions which pave the hell, and leads to much less freedom. 

But free-will is often just meaning will, in some context of freedom. It is a generalization of responsibility. 

I guess you understand the difference between a premeditated crime and an non premeditated crime. A lawyer cannot defend someone accused of a premeditated crime by arguing that his client was just obeying to the physical laws. That would be a confusion of level, and in fine, an elimination of the person, and of person's right.

Free-will is when we are conscious of making decision without complete information. I basically think that all animals have some amount of free-will, but higher animals can be tormented by it, like with conflictual pulses. I said once that human free-will is the ability to start smoking, and the ability to stop smoking. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 8, 10:14 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer
> of interest.

That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously.

>
> > > > If I am very cold and I walk
> > > > into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> > > > right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> > > > works.  My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> > > > busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> > > > but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> > > > that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> > > > which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.
>
> > > Hopelessly vague.
>
> > Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague?
>
> "may not be"...."may  not be"...

If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know'
and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague.
This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are
saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to
criticize how you write instead.

Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would
be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing.

>
> > Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it?
>
> Are you saying causation is coercion?

If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of
course.

>
> > That
> > you are a passive bystander to it's conception
> > > > > > It would
> > > > > > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> > > > > > invisible palm tree.
>
> > > > > ???????
>
> > > > I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> > > > there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> > > > determinism.
>
> > > You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
> > > forces.
>
> > No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be
> > in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything
> > else.
>
> I can't see why.

Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of
darkness?

> Mistakes are possbile under determinism.

It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a
universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free
will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention,
accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way.
Everything would be purely automatic and unconscious and have no way
to conceive of any other possibility.

> so, under determinsim, one could be mistaken about determinism.
>
> > > > You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> > > > that there could be any other theoretical possibility.
>
> > > That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
> > > cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
> > > exist.
>
> > They do exist, they just exist within your experience.
>
> Existing only in ones experience is for all practical purposes exactly
> equivalent to
> not existing.

That is the most common way to look at it, but it's backwards. Nothing
exists unless it exists in something's experience (directly or
indirectly). That is what existence is. Detection and participation.

> One cannot deny the existence of that which one has
> never
> imagined or conceived.

There is nothing to deny if you haven't experienced its existence in
some way. We experience molecules indirectly through description and
inference, therefore they seem like they exist to us. We imagine what
they are based on models and experiments which have allowed us to feel
like we have closed the gap between our indirect experience of
mathematics and physics and our direct experience of microscopy and
materials science. All of these things are contingent solely on
detection and interpretation. We could find out in 10 years or 100
years that the molecular model is only the tip of the iceberg.

>
> >It's the same
> > even without LSD. What you experience isn't what exists objectively,
> > it is what you are capable of and conditioned to experience.
> > >Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.
>
> > Deterministic forces can suggest false beliefs, but they can't truly
> > cause any beliefs, otherwise they wouldn't be beliefs, but mechanisms.
> > Belief can only be finally caused by a believer.
>
> That's your belief

Only if my belief is true. Otherwise I can't have a belief.

>
> > > > It would be to
> > > > imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.
>
> > > Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?
>
> > Probably from Lovecraft or something. But it's entirely appropriate. A
> > deterministic universe means that determinism cannot be named.
>
> Nope.

How could it be named if there is no alternative quality to
distinguish it from? Whenever someone resorts to saying 'Nope' or 'No,
it isn't' I know that they have nothing to support their opinion and
won't admit it. I've seen it many times.

>
> > What
> > name does an engine have for being something other than a non-engine?
>
> The problem with an piece of clockwork is that it is dumb,
> not that it is deterministic.

Ok, so what is an intelligent machine's word for a non-machine?

>
> > > > If there
> > > > were no such thing as color, you could not imagine color simply by
> > > > trying to conceive of 'not black and white'.
>
> > > But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
> > > of determinism.
>
> > But free will means a positive assertion of intentionality - hence,
> > color is not mere non-monochrome, and intentionality is not mere
> > indeterminism.
>
> I was talking about indeterminism.

Since the thread is named 'The free will function', I was thinking we
were talking about that. I would say that indeterminism is a pseudo-
position because it simultaneously assumes an omniscient voyeur and an
arbitrary subject for orientation. Indeterminism is a comment on
access to knowledge, implying that there is something other than the
universe as a whole to either possess or lack that access.

>
> > > >Without free will in the
> > > > first place, there is no possibility of conceiving anything or
> > > > wondering about anything.
> > > >The entire universe would be a machine that
> > > > 'simply is' with no possibility for awareness (what would be the point
> > > > of awareness?)
>
> > > What is the point of anything?
>
> > Everything has all kinds of points. Generally I think the inside of
> > things wants to accumulate significance and the outside of things
> > doesn't want anything, which negates significance as entropy.
>
> That's opinion.

You asked a question that can only be answered with an opinion.
'Points' are subjective.

>
> > > > > > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> > > > > > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> > > > > > which would be meaningless under determinism.
>
> > > > > No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
> > > > > without some sort of freedom.
>
> > > > Why? If you have some sort of freedom, then you don't have
> > > > determinism.
>
> > > > > But that is question begging.
>
> > > > No, it's question answering. You have a question? Then you have free
> > > > will, otherwise there would be no point at all in the possibility of
> > > > any sort of question.
>
> > > Oh good grief. You have now gone to assumijng,
> > > with no evidence, that everythig has a point.
>
> > What evidence do you have that evidence has a point?
>
> I don't have to answer that. Evertyhing-has-a-point is your schtick.

Then you do have a perfectly good answer for it but you would rather
not say it. Sounds legit. But yet I'm the one with a schtick.

>
> >A question
> > literally embodies a point. It is a motive to elicit sense. I don't
> > assume that everything has a point, I assume that sensorimotive
> > experience has many points, and that electromagnetic relativity is its
> > 'pointless' container.
>
> Blimey
>
> > > >There would only be known and unknown, with no
> > > > significant difference between them (again, what would be the point?
> > > > if you can't do anything about your question except be a helpless
> > > > spectator to see whether it gets answered or not, what would be the
> > > > point?)
>
> > > > > But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.
>
> > > > What the palm tree? #
>
> > > No, the arguments that "you have choices/opinions/concepts therefore
> > > FW exists".
>
> > That isn't a non-sequitur in any sense. It's a coherent and accurate
> > explanation of the absurdity of arguing an opinion which, when taken
> > literally, explicitly eliminates the possibility of any opinion at
> > all.
>
> > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.

Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?

>
> > I don't see how this
> > isn't obvious. What is an opinion? Is it mandatory and involuntary?
>
> Deterministic doesn't mean mandatory or involuntary.

How could it not? Can you give a counter example?

>
> >Or
> > is it by definition intentional? What is determinism? Is it subject to
> > your opinion or is it by definition independent of all voluntary
> > cause? I don't understand how I am getting accused of not making
> > sense, when this is elementary and crystal clear to me.
>
> > > >I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
> > > > and free will would both be non-sequiturs
>
> > > Things aren't  non sequiturs. Purported arguments are.
>
> > Any communication can be a non sequitur if it fails to communicate
> > coherently. Your association of the phrase non-sequitur with purported
> > arguments for example is not a non-sequitur, since I can understand
> > what you mean and you are not saying 'purported frog delicious are',
> > but it is a factually incorrect assertion.
>
> So you say.

I would have no choice but to say, if I had no free will.

Craig

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>

Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them less dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?

>
> > I don't see how this
> > isn't obvious. What is an opinion? Is it mandatory and involuntary?
>
> Deterministic doesn't mean mandatory or involuntary.

How could it not? Can you give a counter example?

>
> >Or
> > is it by definition intentional? What is determinism? Is it subject to
> > your opinion or is it by definition independent of all voluntary
> > cause? I don't understand how I am getting accused of not making
> > sense, when this is elementary and crystal clear to me.
>
> > > >I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
> > > > and free will would both be non-sequiturs
>
> > > Things aren't  non sequiturs. Purported arguments are.
>
> > Any communication can be a non sequitur if it fails to communicate
> > coherently. Your association of the phrase non-sequitur with purported
> > arguments for example is not a non-sequitur, since I can understand
> > what you mean and you are not saying 'purported frog delicious are',
> > but it is a factually incorrect assertion.
>
> So you say.

I would have no choice but to say, if I had no free will.

Craig

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[John Clark]

On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 1Z <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> It [being free] means your actions are not determined by external forces

So a external force like light that has reflected off a wall does not effect your actions and you crash into the wall. If that's what being free means then I don't want to be free. 

> What is my defintion, IYO?

You're asking me??! You want me to tell you what you're talking about?

> I don't believe I've offered one in the current discussion.

As you've been arguing passionately that free will exist and even claim to have proven it I think its odd that now you refuse to even say what the hell it is. Before you can prove something you must know what the hell you're trying to prove. First tell me what "free will" means and only then we can debate if human beings have this property or not.

> Meaning it was caused or uncased.

Meaning it was deterministic or random.

> an uncaused aim or goal still counts as a reason,

Yes certainly, in that case you did X because of goal Y and so X was deterministic. But what caused goal Y? Nothing caused goal Y, it was random.

> because it is an answer to the question "what did you do that for". However, only a very select group of entities can answer such questions.

But human beings don't seem to be members of that "very select group" because very soon after you start firing off a chain of "what did you do that for" questions at them all they can do is come up with a standard rubber stamp reply of "I don't know, I just wanted to".

>> and if the name is appropriate and it really is final

> That's not what "final" means in context.

Bullshit.

 

> Read yer Aristotle.

Actually I have read Aristotle when I was young and foolish and it was a complete waste of time. Unlike Plato his literary style was really bad, and even by the standards of the day Aristotle was a dreadful physicist, just awful, a good high school physics student today knows far more philosophy than Aristotle did. Progress has been made in the last 2500 years. And I've got to tell you that just dropping the name of a ancient Greek philosopher doesn't impress me very much, especially when there is no evidence you know a damn thing about him.
 

> Nope. You have misunderstood "final cause".

I'm curious, does anybody think that the above is a satisfactory rebuttal to my argument, or to any argument for that matter? I think if he knew of a more compelling thing to say he would state it without hesitation. I think that's just the best he can do.

 John K Clark

 

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

> > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them less
> dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?

No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not
gears. A billion dead neurons doesn't makes something that can have an
opinion either, but living neurons either have opinions or sense/
motives which scale up to opinions. No amount of gear motives scale up
to opinions. There is no 'they' to a gear, because humans have cast
them mechanically in molds to act as gears for our sense/motives.
Innately they are not gears, but metal molecules in solid form. Their
sense/motive is to respond to temperature, force, acceleration, etc in
a relatively uniform fashion which does not scale up to being a living
organism.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 9, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> But free-will is often just meaning will, in some context of freedom.
> It is a generalization of responsibility.

Yes.

>
> I guess you understand the difference between a premeditated crime and
> an non premeditated crime. A lawyer cannot defend someone accused of a
> premeditated crime by arguing that his client was just obeying to the
> physical laws. That would be a confusion of level, and in fine, an
> elimination of the person, and of person's right.

Right.

> Free-will is when we are conscious of making decision without complete
> information.

This I don't like as much as this:

> I said once that human free-will is the ability to
> start smoking, and the ability to stop smoking.

because the former doesn't apply to the latter, since the completeness
of information does not figure into being able to smoke or not to
smoke. Knowing that you don't have complete information isn't really
part of will (agnosticism doesn't generate the capacity for will where
there is none) or even freedom (not knowing the answer to a particular
math problem doesn't create license to believe that an answer can be
made up), but it is a necessary aspect of subjectivity in general.

Craig

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>

On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

> > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them less
> dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?

No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not
gears.

At which point does it start having an opinions ? Why simulated neurons couldn't have opinions at that same point ? Vitalism ?
 

A billion dead neurons doesn't makes something that can have an
opinion either, but living neurons either have opinions or sense/
motives which scale up to opinions. No amount of gear motives scale up
to opinions. There is no 'they' to a gear, because humans have cast
them mechanically in molds to act as gears for our sense/motives.
Innately they are not gears, but metal molecules in solid form. Their
sense/motive is to respond to temperature, force, acceleration, etc in
a relatively uniform fashion which does not scale up to being a living
organism.

Craig

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
> > On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
> > > > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > > > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > > > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> > > Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them less
> > > dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?
>
> > No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not
> > gears.
>
> At which point does it start having an opinions ?

At every point when it is alive. We may not call them opinions because
we use that word to refer to an entire human being's experience, but
the point is that being a living cell makes it capable of having
different capacities than it does as a dead cell. When it is dead,
there is no biological sense going on, only chemical detection-
reaction, which is time reversible. Biological sense isn't time
reversible.

> Why simulated neurons
> couldn't have opinions at that same point ? Vitalism ?

No, because there is no such thing as absolute simulation, there is
only imitation. Simulation is an imitation designed to invite us to
mistake it for genuine - which is adequate for things we don't care
about much, but awareness cannot be a mistake. It is the absolute
primary orientation, so it cannot ever be substituted. If you make
synthetic neurons which are very close to natural neurons on every
level, then you have a better chance of coming close enough that the
resulting organism is very similar to the original. A simulation which
is not made of something that forms a cell by itself (an actual cell,
not a virtual sculpture of a cell) probably has no possibility of
graduating from time reversible detection-reaction to other categories
of sense, feeling, awareness, perception, and consciousness, just as a
CGI picture of a neuron has no chance of producing milliliters of
actual serotonin, acetylcholine, glutamate,etc.

Craig

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>

On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
> > On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > 2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
> > > > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > > > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > > > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> > > Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them less
> > > dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?
>
> > No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not
> > gears.
>
> At which point does it start having an opinions ?

At every point when it is alive.

That's not true, does a single neuron has an opinion ? two ? a thousand ?
 

We may not call them opinions

Don't switch subject.
 

because
we use that word to refer to an entire human being's experience, but
the point is that being a living cell makes it capable of having
different capacities than it does as a dead cell.

Yes and so what ? a dead cell *does not* behave like a living cell, that's enough.
 

When it is dead,
there is no biological sense going on, only chemical detection-
reaction, which is time reversible. Biological sense isn't time
reversible.

> Why simulated neurons
> couldn't have opinions at that same point ? Vitalism ?

No, because there is no such thing as absolute simulation,

There is no need for an "absolute" simulation... what do you mean by "absolute" ?

 

there is
only imitation. Simulation is an imitation

no, simulation is not imitation.
 

designed to invite us to
mistake it for genuine - which is adequate for things we don't care
about much, but awareness cannot be a mistake. It is the absolute
primary orientation, so it cannot ever be substituted. If you make
synthetic neurons which are very close to natural neurons on every
level, then you have a better chance of coming close enough that the
resulting organism is very similar to the original. A simulation which
is not made of something that forms a cell by itself (an actual cell,
not a virtual sculpture of a cell) probably has no possibility of
graduating from time reversible detection-reaction to other categories
of sense, feeling, awareness, perception, and consciousness, just as a
CGI picture

A CGI picture *is a picture* not a simulation.
 

of a neuron has no chance of producing milliliters of
actual serotonin, acetylcholine, glutamate,etc.

Is it needed for consciousness ? why ?
 

Craig

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[Stephen P. King]

Hi,

    How would your reasoning work for a virus? Is it "alive"? I think that the notion of "being alive" is not a property of the parts but of the whole.

Onward!

Stephen

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/2/10 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>

Is it a question directed to craig or to me ?

Quentin
 

Onward!

Stephen

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[Stephen P. King]

Hi,

    It is directed at both of you. :-)

Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

Which is the very basic idea sustaining comp. But Craig seems to defend the opposite idea. He believes that life, sense, and consciousness must be present in the part to sum up in the whole. A mechanist will insist that it is the property of the whole which is responsible for the higher order aptitude, like being able to play chess, or having a private experience. 

Yet, the case of "living" and "conscious" are not entirely equivalent, and should be treated differently. The definition of life seems to me conventional, but being conscious is everything but conventional.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Bruno,

    No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter. His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the content of a "simulation".

Yet, the case of "living" and "conscious" are not entirely equivalent, and should be treated differently. The definition of life seems to me conventional, but being conscious is everything but conventional.

    We agree on that! "Living" does seem to be 3p definable while "conscious" is only 1p definable.

Onward!

Stephen

[David Nyman]

On 10 February 2012 14:08, Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> wrote:

> No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
> Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
> physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter.
> His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the content of
> a "simulation".

I disagree with this assessment, I think. ISTM that equating
consciousness with other physical properties inevitably puts one in
the position of having to "build up" composite entities from the
properties of their components - hence the notorious "grain" and
"binding" problems. The "theology" of comp, on the other hand, seems
to imply that at some "ultimate" level consciousness is a symmetric
unity, but that this symmetry is broken, by the internal logic of
comp, into an infinity of views. Of course, this latter idea can only
make sense in terms of 1p; from the 3p perspective, all that exists is
computation.

David

[Quentin Anciaux]

I did not do a reasoning about "being alive", craig did... But in my opinion "alive" is a fuzzy concept and does not help in understanding consciousness. A virus without a host is a "crippled" body... it need a host to reproduce. But I don't think reproduction either define what's alive. I prefer to focus on consciousness.

Quentin
 

Onward!

Stephen

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[Stephen P. King]

On 2/10/2012 9:24 AM, David Nyman wrote:
> On 10 February 2012 14:08, Stephen P. King<step...@charter.net> wrote:
>
>> No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
>> Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
>> physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter.
>> His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the content of
>> a "simulation".
> I disagree with this assessment, I think. ISTM that equating
> consciousness with other physical properties inevitably puts one in
> the position of having to "build up" composite entities from the
> properties of their components - hence the notorious "grain" and
> "binding" problems. The "theology" of comp, on the other hand, seems
> to imply that at some "ultimate" level consciousness is a symmetric
> unity, but that this symmetry is broken, by the internal logic of
> comp, into an infinity of views. Of course, this latter idea can only
> make sense in terms of 1p; from the 3p perspective, all that exists is
> computation.
>
> David
>

Hi David,

I don't disagree with your remark but you are addressing a
different but related issue from Craig's. The idea of Chalmer's claim is
that consciousness is not an emergent property, like temperature for
example, but this is not in principle incompatible with the idea that

"at some "ultimate" level consciousness is a symmetric unity, but that
this symmetry is broken, by the internal logic of comp, into an infinity

of views" except that at the level of "symmetric unity" consciousness
per se vanishes as the distinctions of and between the infinity of
"views" (those are the 1p!) disappears. This is the idea of neutrality
that I have been discussing, as in "neutral monism". The idea of vacuum
gauge symmetry as it is used in physics is analogous. There was a fellow
that published a paper a similar idea to this and chatted with us for a
bit early last year, if I recall correctly. Russell Standish had some
interesting comments on this.
My difficulty is that at the level of the unbroken symmetry we have
to be careful that we do not consider implications that are only
meaningful in the broken or fragmented perspective.

Onward!

Stephen

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 10, 7:25 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

>
> > > > > > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > > > > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > > > > > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > > > > > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> > > > > Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them
> > less
> > > > > dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?
>
> > > > No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not
> > > > gears.
>
> > > At which point does it start having an opinions ?
>
> > At every point when it is alive.
>
> That's not true, does a single neuron has an opinion ? two ? a thousand ?

You asked me a question, I answered it, and now you claim that 'it's
not true', then you go on asking the same question again. On what do
you base your accusation?

>
> > We may not call them opinions
>
> Don't switch subject.

I'm not in any way switching the subject. I'm clarifying that the
question relies on a straw man of consciousness which reduces a
complex human subjective phenomenon like 'opinions' to a binary
silhouette. Do cats have opinions? Do chimpanzees? At what point do
hominids begin to have opinions? When do they begin to have
personality? When do humans become human? All of these are red
herrings because they project an objective function on a subjective
understanding.

The point of multisense realism is to show how our default
epistemologies are rooted in our own frame of reference so that there
is no objective point where a person becomes a non-person through
injury or deficiency, or a neuron has a human feeling by itself. These
questions make the wrong assumptions from the start.

What we do know is that human opinions are associated with one thing
only - living human brains. We know that living human brains are only
made of living neurons. We have not yet found anything that we can do
to inorganic molecules will turn them into living neurons. This means
that we have no reason to presume that an inorganic non-cell can ever
be expected to do what cells do, any more than we can expect ammonia
to do what milk does.

>
> > because
> > we use that word to refer to an entire human being's experience, but
> > the point is that being a living cell makes it capable of having
> > different capacities than it does as a dead cell.
>
> Yes and so what ? a dead cell *does not* behave like a living cell, that's
> enough.

How do you know? What makes you think that things can be defined only
by their behaviors? A person can behave like a brick wall, does that
make it enough to make them a brick wall?

>
> > When it is dead,
> > there is no biological sense going on, only chemical detection-
> > reaction, which is time reversible. Biological sense isn't time
> > reversible.
>
> > > Why simulated neurons
> > > couldn't have opinions at that same point ? Vitalism ?
>
> > No, because there is no such thing as absolute simulation,
>
> There is no need for an "absolute" simulation... what do you mean by
> "absolute" ?

A copy which simulates the original in every way.

>
> > there is
> > only imitation. Simulation is an imitation
>
> no, simulation is not imitation.

Please explain.

>
> > designed to invite us to
> > mistake it for genuine - which is adequate for things we don't care
> > about much, but awareness cannot be a mistake. It is the absolute
> > primary orientation, so it cannot ever be substituted. If you make
> > synthetic neurons which are very close to natural neurons on every
> > level, then you have a better chance of coming close enough that the
> > resulting organism is very similar to the original. A simulation which
> > is not made of something that forms a cell by itself (an actual cell,
> > not a virtual sculpture of a cell) probably has no possibility of
> > graduating from time reversible detection-reaction to other categories
> > of sense, feeling, awareness, perception, and consciousness, just as a
> > CGI picture
>
> A CGI picture *is a picture* not a simulation.

Neither is an AGI application. That's what I'm saying. Simulation is a
casual notion that doesn't stand up to further inspection.

>
> > of a neuron has no chance of producing milliliters of
> > actual serotonin, acetylcholine, glutamate,etc.
>
> Is it needed for consciousness ? why ?

It's needed for human consciousness I think because consciousness is
an event, and those molecules are like the BIOS of the whole human OS.
Not the molecules themselves, but the band of experiences/qualia which
those molecules can tune into. Think of those experiences as the
ancestors of our contemporary whole-brain scale experiences.

Craig

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>

On Feb 10, 7:25 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

>
> > > > > > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > > > > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > > > > > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > > > > > make them less dumb? Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> > > > > Does putting a billions neurons together in an arrangement make them
> > less
> > > > > dumb ? Does it start having opinions at some point ?
>
> > > > No, because neurons are living organisms in the first place, not
> > > > gears.
>
> > > At which point does it start having an opinions ?
>
> > At every point when it is alive.
>
> That's not true, does a single neuron has an opinion ? two ? a thousand ?

You asked me a question, I answered it, and now you claim that 'it's
not true', then you go on asking the same question again. On what do
you base your accusation?

On the fact that a single neuron has no opinions whatsoever... You asked how many gears was required... the straw man is there.
 

>
> > We may not call them opinions
>
> Don't switch subject.

I'm not in any way switching the subject.

you are
 

I'm clarifying that the
question relies on a straw man of consciousness

You did begin with the straw man...
 

which reduces a
complex human subjective phenomenon like 'opinions' to a binary
silhouette. Do cats have opinions? Do chimpanzees? At what point do
hominids begin to have opinions? When do they begin to have
personality? When do humans become human? All of these are red
herrings because they project an objective function on a subjective
understanding.

Do a complex program with deep self reference computation connected to the workd can be conscious like a human is ? You answer no, without giving any reason for that. So it's just bullshit... I'm awaiting your proof that it is not possible... not your usual way to slip out the subject.
 

Craig

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 10, 8:17 am, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

> >     Hi,
>
> >         How would your reasoning work for a virus? Is it "alive"? I
> >     think that the notion of "being alive" is not a property of the
> >     parts but of the whole.
>
> > Is it a question directed to craig or to me ?
>
> Hi,
>
>      It is directed at both of you. :-)
>
> Onward!

Hi Stephen,

Right, not the parts but the whole, but also who is looking at the
whole. It's the same question as substitution level. Where does yellow
green end and green yellow begin? It depends what color it's sitting
next to and how sensitive someone's vision is to color. It's all
indexical and relative. A virus is more associated with life than a
glucose molecule alone, but less living than a living cell.

Here's an extended metaphor: Medieval walled city with a castle in the
middle. Peasants work the land for the lord in the castle and there
are invasions of rogue peasants from other territories who steal, beg,
etc. To pick out these virus peasants and ask 'are they feudal' is
framing it objectively when it can only be subjective. There is no
'simply is', only many 'seems like' interpretations. The threat of
invasion strengthens the benefit of the Lord's protection, which in
turn encourages the loyalty and productivity of the peasants. In that
way, the rogue bandits are indeed a part of Feudalism.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 10, 9:08 am, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

>      No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
> Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
> physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from
> matter. His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the
> content of a "simulation".

Right. I pick up where Chalmers leaves off:

1. It is not a fundamental property of the physical exactly but
rather, the physical and the experiential are the fundamental
modalities of 'sense'.
2. The modalities are necessarily symmetric but anomalous, so that
mind is not the opposite of brain directly, but that both mind and
brain are opposite modalities of sense
3. Sense is anomalous symmetry itself: sameness on one level,
difference on another, and a third invariance (self) that straddles
the 'levels'.

There are emergent properties in matter and emergent properties in
awareness, but they develop out of their own momentum. When we tell a
story, the plot of the story builds the experience, not the ambivalent
activities of our neurotransmitters. Changes on the neurotransmitter
level can inspire certain kinds of thoughts or stories too, and the
literal and figurative influences can play off of each other too, but
the neither physical nor experiential supervene fully and completely
on the other.

Craig

[John Clark]

On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Why simulated neurons couldn't have opinions at that same point ? Vitalism ?

Yes, the only way Craig could be right is if vitalism is true, and its pretty sad that well into the 21'st century some still believe in that crap. What's next, bring back medieval alchemy?  

 On Fri, Feb 10, 2012  Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> there is no such thing as absolute simulation, there is only imitation.

So not only is a computer incapable of performing arithmetic you can't do it either, all you can do is a pale imitation of arithmetic, so neither we nor a computer can ever know how much 2 +2 is. And I've asked you before, when you reply to this please don't send a imitation Email to the list, nobody wants to see a mere simulation, send your REAL ORIGINAL EMAIL! Undoubtedly the only reason you haven't convinced everybody of your brilliance is that we've only seen copies of you messages, we want the originals.

  John K Clark

 

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 10, 4:16 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Why simulated neurons couldn't have opinions at that same point ?
> > Vitalism ?
>
> Yes, the only way Craig could be right is if vitalism is true, and its
> pretty sad that well into the 21'st century some still believe in that
> crap. What's next, bring back medieval alchemy?

Apparently what's next is imagining that machines are people and
people are machines. We'll be imprisoning software soon I suppose.

>
>  On Fri, Feb 10, 2012  Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > there is no such thing as absolute simulation, there is only imitation.
>
> So not only is a computer incapable of performing arithmetic you can't do
> it either, all you can do is a pale imitation of arithmetic, so neither we
> nor a computer can ever know how much 2 +2 is.

What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but to the computer it's
billions of separate electronic or mechanical events that signify
nothing to it. It's no different from saying that CD player 'performs
music'. We hear music, but the CD player hears nothing at all.
Obviously.

> And I've asked you before,
> when you reply to this please don't send a imitation Email to the list,
> nobody wants to see a mere simulation, send your REAL ORIGINAL EMAIL!

The original email is my subjective experience of composing it,
therefore it cannot be sent. What can be sent is neither a simulation
nor an imitation but rather a completely separate semiotic text which
can be used by human beings to communicate with other human beings who
share a common language. The email server does not share that common
language and cannot participate in the communication, even though it
provides the communication channel.

> Undoubtedly the only reason you haven't convinced everybody of your
> brilliance is that we've only seen copies of you messages, we want the
> originals.

I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining
why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are
misguided.

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

"Free your mind!"

Just sayin'...

Onward!

Stephen

[1Z]

On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining
> why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are
> misguided.

You need to explain, non-question-beggingly..

> What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but to the computer it's
> billions of separate electronic or mechanical events that signify
> nothing to it.

...why that is a problem
with the computer being a computer and not with the computer being
too dumb.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 11, 12:01 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining
> > why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are
> > misguided.
>
> You need to explain, non-question-beggingly..

I have been accused of that sometimes, but I have never been guilty of
it that I have seen.

>
> > What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but to the computer it's
> > billions of separate electronic or mechanical events that signify
> > nothing to it.
>
>  ...why that is a problem
> with the computer being a computer and not with the computer being
> too dumb.

All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run
the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that.

Craig

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>

It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.
 

Craig

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[1Z]

And not of you don't.. We have made a little progress here. You think
computers are dumb because you think in terms of the hardware,
and not in terms of the software, despite the fact that the latter can
be of any degree of complexity.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

>
> > All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run
> > the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that.
>
> It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a
> thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.

That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
anything else than what you already do. Intelligence is the ability to
make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it, which
is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not
be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and
versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and
human life.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 12, 7:14 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> And not of you don't.. We have made a little progress here. You think
> computers are dumb because you think in terms of the hardware,
> and not in terms of the software, despite the fact that the latter can
> be of any degree of complexity.

Complexity isn't intelligence, and conflating the two obscures the
more relevant issue of understanding. A DVD player exports a pattern
of bits as pixels on a video screen. That is software interfacing
between two hardware platforms. Neither the screen, the TV, the
pixels, the microprocessors, the room, the couch, or the neighborhood
is watching the movie. Only the human audience is watching the movie.
The software is not watching anything, because it is not a thing
anywhere except in our understanding. We are the ones who are writing
it to satisfy our own human motives and we are the only ones in the
universe who enjoy the results. On every other level, the software has
no signal, no semantic content. It is purely a syntactic mechanism
that runs on the basic detection-response level of sense.

This view of intelligence recognizes subtle differences between
actions and experience that scale up to be crucially important issues
when considering AI. I'm not sure what alternative you are offering to
this view, but it appears to be blind to these distinctions by
presuming the neuron doctrine in the first place.If you start out
thinking that consciousness can only be the software of the brain then
you wind up having to conjure awareness for every program or
mathematical function we can imagine.

Craig

[John Clark]

On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 8:24 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Apparently what's next is imagining that machines are people and people are machines.

I certainly hope so. In the last 3 or 4 centuries we have gradually (too gradually for my taste) gotten away from the idea that things happened because of the soul or gods or God or vague amorphous free floating glows that nobody can see, instead we have started to embrace the notion that everything happens because of natural law, including life. The discovery in the 1950's about how DNA can not only duplicates itself but contains the program that tells cellular machinery how to assemble enormously complex proteins confirms the idea that a living cell is a purely mechanical factory. And invoking God or stooping so low as to resort to vital life forces to explain its operation is no more necessary than saying you can't understand how a steel mill works unless there is a steel mill god or a mysterious steel mill force that nobody can see.    
 

> We'll be imprisoning software soon I suppose.

It's already happened, web browsing software is banned in North Korea and until a few weeks ago it looked like certain types of file sharing programs were about to be banned in the USA. But long term the far more important scenario is AI  software imprisoning us.

> What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but [...] 

To hell with the "but", just answer the simple question "is computer math simulated arithmetic or real arithmetic to us?". For once give me a straight yes or no answer. And don't try to weasel out with its real to X but not to Y because then it would be subjective and "real" means objective. 

If your answer is "yes" then there is no reason the computer couldn't also do geometry that is real to us, or real algebra, or real logic, or real physics, or real poetry or do anything that seems intelligent to us. 

If your answer is "no" then there is no unique answer to the question "how much is 2+2?", the value of 2+2 varies from person to person and its true value can be anything you want it to be. I'll tell you one thing, I'd refuse to walk over a bridge designed by a engineer that had that philosophy because in the end nature always wins out over delusion. 

> The original email is my subjective experience of composing it, therefore it cannot be sent. What can be sent is neither a simulation nor an imitation but rather a completely separate semiotic text which can be used by human beings to communicate

And that very semiotic stuff is how we tell the difference between stupid human beings and brilliant human beings; and if the semiotic stuff is really good we also judge that the thing that produced it was conscious.
 

  John K Clark

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 12, 12:55 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 8:24 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
> > Apparently what's next is imagining that machines are people and people
> > are machines.
>
> I certainly hope so. In the last 3 or 4 centuries we have gradually (too
> gradually for my taste) gotten away from the idea that things happened
> because of the soul or gods or God or vague amorphous free floating glows
> that nobody can see, instead we have started to embrace the notion that
> everything happens because of natural law, including life.

What's the difference? We've only changed the name from God's Will to
evolution/mechanism/probability and see the universe as the absence of
soul or gods instead. It's the same unreality only turned on it's
head.

> The discovery in
> the 1950's about how DNA can not only duplicates itself but contains the
> program that tells cellular machinery how to assemble enormously complex
> proteins confirms the idea that a living cell is a purely mechanical
> factory.

Which would have solved the problem, except that we don't experience
ourselves as enormously complex proteins. We don't experience the
world as irrelevant spectators to a purely mechanical process. The
complete failure of mechanism to generate any possible explanation for
consciousness or experience, let alone a possible mechanism by which
biochemical gears can seem like anything other than what they are
cannot be brushed aside. If the discovery of DNA explained the
existence of the feeling and awareness of life, then we would not be
having this conversation, but it didn't explain anything, it only
opened the door to more complex mechanisms, which may actually be
taking us further away from understanding the wholeness and simplicity
of "I".

> And invoking God or stooping so low as to resort to vital life
> forces to explain its operation is no more necessary than saying you can't
> understand how a steel mill works unless there is a steel mill god or a
> mysterious steel mill force that nobody can see.

Invoking vitalism or religion to characterize my views is a similar
low stooping resort. I have specifically argued against
pseudosubstance conceptualizations to model life or awareness. It is
not a phlogiston, an elan vital, aether, etc. It is exactly what it
seems to be. Experience, feeling...private, signifying sensorimotive
events. My view has no woo or religion at all. It is a description of
the cosmos precisely as we experience it, nothing more and nothing
less.

>
> > > We'll be imprisoning software soon I suppose.
>
> It's already happened, web browsing software is banned in North Korea

What does that have to do with imprisonment? Does North Korea intend
to rehabilitate the software? Does it employ behavior modification
techniques to discourage recidivism? Censorship is not incarceration
of software, and the fact that your argument is that desperate to make
a connection like that tells me that there is nothing there to defend.

> and
> until a few weeks ago it looked like certain types of file sharing programs
> were about to be banned in the USA. But long term the far more important
> scenario is AI  software imprisoning us.

It has already happened. It's called corporatism.

>
> > What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but [...]
>
> To hell with the "but", just answer the simple question "is computer math
> simulated arithmetic or real arithmetic to us?". For once give me a
> straight yes or no answer.

It's real arithmetic to us, but not to the computer. Just as a traffic
signal is a real signal to us, but not to the signal itself.

> And don't try to weasel out with its real to X
> but not to Y because then it would be subjective and "real" means
> objective.

Do you think that a traffic signal understands traffic? And don't try
to weasel out by saying "it's the whole system" or some other
apologetic.

>
> If your answer is "yes" then there is no reason the computer couldn't also
> do geometry that is real to us, or real algebra, or real logic, or real
> physics, or real poetry or do anything that seems intelligent to us.

It seems real to us, of course. That was never my argument. Our entire
subjective experience is a 'seems like', so that a realistic imitation
accomplishes the goal of allowing us to suspend disbelief of the
imitation. We see through the medium. This is photography, movies,
books, music, drugs, etc. A trash can that says THANK YOU seems polite
to us in one sense, but we can also understand that literally,
objectively, it's only a plastic lid, and the other things are only
emulsions, pixels, ink in paper, grooves or pits in a plastic disc,
psychoactive molecules, etc.

>
> If your answer is "no" then there is no unique answer to the question "how
> much is 2+2?", the value of 2+2 varies from person to person and its true
> value can be anything you want it to be.

No, it doesn't vary from person to person as long as the logic of the
system matches. 2+2 is meaningless if you are talking about drops of
liquid. I can divide one drop into an arbitrary number. There are many
aspects of the cosmos that are not served well by arithmetic
reductionism. Emotion, feeling, symbolism, etc.

> I'll tell you one thing, I'd
> refuse to walk over a bridge designed by a engineer that had that
> philosophy because in the end nature always wins out over delusion.

Absolutely. I agree. But bridge building does not explain everything
in the universe. The fact that engineering cannot account for
consciousness is indisputable as far as I can tell, and that does not
make it a delusion.

>
> > The original email is my subjective experience of composing it, therefore
> > it cannot be sent. What can be sent is neither a simulation nor an
> > imitation but rather a completely separate semiotic text which can be used
> > by human beings to communicate
>
> And that very semiotic stuff is how we tell the difference between stupid
> human beings and brilliant human beings; and if the semiotic stuff is
> really good we also judge that the thing that produced it was conscious.

That's why a good AI program reflects on the brilliance of it's human
programmers, rather than the dumb device which articulates their
recordings.

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Craig,

Great post! Check this out!
http://newempiricism.blogspot.com/2009/02/symbol-grounding-problem.html

Onward!

Stephen

[Terren Suydam]

Stephen,

In my mind, autopoeitic cognitive systems (advanced enough to use
symbols to do cognition) do not have a symbol grounding problem. In
these organizationally-closed systems, symbols can only be grounded in
internal patterns - patterns that emerge from the way the world
perturbs its boundaries. As far as I know the only examples of
autopoeitic cognitive systems capable of symbol manipulation are
higher animals... nothing artificial yet.

Terren

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 12, 8:09 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

>
> Hi Craig,
>
>      Great post! Check this out!http://newempiricism.blogspot.com/2009/02/symbol-grounding-problem.html
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

Thanks Stephen,

That's a great one. It does a better job saying what I'm trying to say
on this than I did.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 12, 11:03 pm, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:

>patterns that emerge from the way the world
>perturbs its boundaries

Yes, or as I call it..."sense".

It need not be cognitive or higher animal, I think semantic grounding
is innate in all material systems as experiential qualia. We get
confused however, when we assume that low level physical processes can
ground high level neurological symbols. They can store and retrieve
them syntactically but it can't make human sense of them.

Craig

[meekerdb]

"The symbol grounding problem does not seem to apply to us. Unlike a digital computer, we know what we are doing, for instance if I fill a hole by digging soil with a spade my mind contains the directedness of the loaded spade towards the hole as a real extension in time (see Time and conscious experience). It is this extension in time that allows me to know my own symbols.

Harnad (1990) shows that symbols can be grounded by association with real objects in the world but this demonstration only means that we can construct machines that work, not that the machines have any internal conscious experience."

It doesn't apply to us because we exist in an environment (where there are spades and soil).  It doesn't apply to the Chinese room either, because there is a world outside the room in which Chinese is spoken and children are taught Chinese ostensively and by example.

This goes to my point that, in spite of ones feeling of separation, consciousness exists relative to an environmental context.  The successful substitution of a silicon based AI module for part (or even all) of a brain depends on its interaction with the environment.

Brent

[Stephen P. King]

--

Hi Brent,

    Your point does not counter Craig's point at all. It actually supports it! To actually implement digital substitution, we would have to not only match the functionally of the module internally but also match the interactions of that module with the environment. Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as carbon.... In effect, digital substitution requires that the laws of physics be alterable for the transformations implicit in functional equivalence. Digital substitution is not a local symmetry.

Onward!

Stephen

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2012 9:17 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/13/2012 12:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2012 8:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 12, 8:09 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

Hi Craig,

     Great post! Check this out!http://newempiricism.blogspot.com/2009/02/symbol-grounding-problem.html

Onward!

Stephen

Thanks Stephen,

That's a great one. It does a better job saying what I'm trying to say
on this than I did.

Craig

"The symbol grounding problem does not seem to apply to us. Unlike a digital computer, we know what we are doing, for instance if I fill a hole by digging soil with a spade my mind contains the directedness of the loaded spade towards the hole as a real extension in time (see Time and conscious experience). It is this extension in time that allows me to know my own symbols.

Harnad (1990) shows that symbols can be grounded by association with real objects in the world but this demonstration only means that we can construct machines that work, not that the machines have any internal conscious experience."

It doesn't apply to us because we exist in an environment (where there are spades and soil).  It doesn't apply to the Chinese room either, because there is a world outside the room in which Chinese is spoken and children are taught Chinese ostensively and by example.

This goes to my point that, in spite of ones feeling of separation, consciousness exists relative to an environmental context.  The successful substitution of a silicon based AI module for part (or even all) of a brain depends on its interaction with the environment.

Brent
--

Hi Brent,

    Your point does not counter Craig's point at all. It actually supports it! To actually implement digital substitution, we would have to not only match the functionally of the module internally but also match the interactions of that module with the environment.

I'm aware of that.  It doesn't follow though that you must match every interaction (e.g. cross-section for cosmic gamma rays) or that every match is equally important.  I've already speculated that a silicon based substitute might produce subtle or occasional differences in conscious thoughts.  Craig however denies that a silicon based brain can be conscious at all.

Brent

Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as carbon.... In effect, digital substitution requires that the laws of physics be alterable for the transformations implicit in functional equivalence. Digital substitution is not a local symmetry.

Onward!

Stephen

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2112/4806 - Release Date: 02/12/12

[Stephen P. King]

Hi,

    BTW, Craig is in the room... let him speak for himself.

Onward!

Stephen

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 13, 12:29 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> I'm aware of that.  It doesn't follow though that you must match every interaction (e.g.
> cross-section for cosmic gamma rays) or that every match is equally important.  I've
> already speculated that a silicon based substitute might produce subtle or occasional
> differences in conscious thoughts.  Craig however denies that a silicon based brain can be
> conscious at all.

No, I think that silicon is already 'conscious', only to a very
limited extent (detection-reaction). My view is that it cannot be
scaled up mechanically to become human consciousness. If you can make
a silicon based cell that lives and breathes, then we very well might
be able to make a conscious brain out of that...but we probably won't
be able to control it any better than we can control an animal.

Our definition of consciousness is entirely human. If we talk about
something being conscious, we are really talking about it being human.
All I'm saying is that we cannot discount the possibility that there
is a good reason why humans are only made of DNA and not sand.

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2012 10:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Feb 13, 12:29 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> I'm aware of that. It doesn't follow though that you must match every interaction (e.g.
>> cross-section for cosmic gamma rays) or that every match is equally important. I've
>> already speculated that a silicon based substitute might produce subtle or occasional
>> differences in conscious thoughts. Craig however denies that a silicon based brain can be
>> conscious at all.
> No, I think that silicon is already 'conscious', only to a very
> limited extent (detection-reaction). My view is that it cannot be
> scaled up mechanically to become human consciousness. If you can make
> a silicon based cell that lives and breathes,

What does "live and breathes" mean? A silicon based neuron wouldn't reproduce...but
neither do biological neurons. A biological neuron metabolizes...but so would a silicon
based neuron. So you're just speculating that there are some essential functions of
biological based neurons that can't be realized by silicon based neurons.

> then we very well might
> be able to make a conscious brain out of that...but we probably won't
> be able to control it any better than we can control an animal.
>
> Our definition of consciousness is entirely human. If we talk about
> something being conscious, we are really talking about it being human.

That's begging the question.

> All I'm saying is that we cannot discount the possibility that there
> is a good reason why humans are only made of DNA and not sand.

You've been asserting that it's the case...not just cautioning about possibilities. So
let's hear one of those 'good reasons'; one that is not just a speculative possibility.

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 13, 12:05 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
> It doesn't apply to us because we exist in an environment (where there are spades and
> soil).  It doesn't apply to the Chinese room either, because there is a world outside the
> room in which Chinese is spoken and children are taught Chinese ostensively and by example.

You know there is a world outside the room, but the room doesn't. The
room doesn't know anything.

>
> This goes to my point that, in spite of ones feeling of separation, consciousness exists
> relative to an environmental context.  The successful substitution of a silicon based AI
> module for part (or even all) of a brain depends on its interaction with the environment.

If it's only a part of the brain, then a silicon module could act as a
prosthetic. The more of the brain you replace though, the less is left
to make use of anything. The problem with talking about 'context' and
'interaction' as entities divorced from any concrete orientation is
the same issue brought up with the symbol grounding problem. There is
no 'there' there. Environments and interactions are conceptual
generalizations. They have no interiority, no perspective or
orientation.

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2012 11:36 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Feb 13, 12:05 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> It doesn't apply to us because we exist in an environment (where there are spades and
>> soil). It doesn't apply to the Chinese room either, because there is a world outside the
>> room in which Chinese is spoken and children are taught Chinese ostensively and by example.
> You know there is a world outside the room, but the room doesn't. The
> room doesn't know anything.

So you say.

>
>> This goes to my point that, in spite of ones feeling of separation, consciousness exists
>> relative to an environmental context. The successful substitution of a silicon based AI
>> module for part (or even all) of a brain depends on its interaction with the environment.
> If it's only a part of the brain, then a silicon module could act as a
> prosthetic. The more of the brain you replace though, the less is left
> to make use of anything. The problem with talking about 'context' and
> 'interaction' as entities divorced from any concrete orientation is
> the same issue brought up with the symbol grounding problem. There is
> no 'there' there. Environments and interactions are conceptual
> generalizations. They have no interiority, no perspective or
> orientation.

But they have ground.

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 13, 2:04 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 2/13/2012 10:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Feb 13, 12:29 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
>
> >> I'm aware of that.  It doesn't follow though that you must match every interaction (e.g.
> >> cross-section for cosmic gamma rays) or that every match is equally important.  I've
> >> already speculated that a silicon based substitute might produce subtle or occasional
> >> differences in conscious thoughts.  Craig however denies that a silicon based brain can be
> >> conscious at all.
> > No, I think that silicon is already 'conscious', only to a very
> > limited extent (detection-reaction). My view is that it cannot be
> > scaled up mechanically to become human consciousness. If you can make
> > a silicon based cell that lives and breathes,
>
> What does "live and breathes" mean?

Literally that. It lives the life of a cell. It has cellular
respiration which cannot be suspended for long without killing the
cell. It has to be able to experience mortality first hand.

>  A silicon based neuron wouldn't reproduce...but
> neither do biological neurons.  A biological neuron metabolizes...but so would a silicon
> based neuron.

But the silicon based neuron doesn't die when it's metabolism is
interrupted, and the silicon based neuron is not produced by silicon
stem cells. It may be important for consciousness that all processes
are derived organically from a single dividing cell.

>  So you're just speculating that there are some essential functions of
> biological based neurons that can't be realized by silicon based neurons.

Essential to human consciousness, yes. Just as there are some
essential functions of DNA that can't be realized by silicon based
molecules for creating biological cells.

>
> > then we very well might
> > be able to make a conscious brain out of that...but we probably won't
> > be able to control it any better than we can control an animal.
>
> > Our definition of consciousness is entirely human. If we talk about
> > something being conscious, we are really talking about it being human.
>
> That's begging the question.

No, I'm talking about how we conceive of consciousness, not the
possibility of it existing outside of humans. I'm making a distinction
between consciousness and something like height. We know what height
is and we can be sure that it can be generalized to any solid object.
In that case, it would be begging the question to say that human
height can only come from humans. I'm not saying that though. I'm
saying that without human consciousness as an example, we don't know
what we are talking about if we try to define it. It's not a matter of
saying only humans can be conscious like a human, it's a matter of
realizing that they are one and the same thing as far as we know for
sure.

>
> > All I'm saying is that we cannot discount the possibility that there
> > is a good reason why humans are only made of DNA and not sand.
>
> You've been asserting that it's the case...not just cautioning about possibilities.  So
> let's hear one of those 'good reasons'; one that is not just a speculative possibility.

How do you go from me saying 'we cannot discount the possibility...'
to demanding an answer that is not a speculative possibility? If I say
we cannot discount the possibility that cigarettes cause cancer, does
that mean that you can demand that I produce the precise mechanism by
which they cause cancer or else it invalidates the possibility that it
does?

Craig

[meekerdb]

Well humans aren't made of DNA, and there are good reasons they are made of carbon
compounds (mostly) instead of silicon ones. But the question is about consciousness, not
evolution.

>> You've been asserting that it's the case...not just cautioning about possibilities. So
>> let's hear one of those 'good reasons'; one that is not just a speculative possibility.
> How do you go from me saying 'we cannot discount the possibility...'
> to demanding an answer that is not a speculative possibility? If I say
> we cannot discount the possibility that cigarettes cause cancer, does
> that mean that you can demand that I produce the precise mechanism by
> which they cause cancer or else it invalidates the possibility that it
> does?

Yes, you were circumspect in that response. But referred to what you've said in other posts.

"That's because awareness is not mechanical. That's
what makes a machine a machine, a lack of capacity to transcend
recursive behavior or deviate from universal behavior."

"A silicon semiconductor does have an experience, just not the
incomprehensible human experience that we superimpose on it's nature."

"No amount of gear motives scale up
to opinions. There is no 'they' to a gear, because humans have cast
them mechanically in molds to act as gears for our sense/motives.
Innately they are not gears, but metal molecules in solid form. Their
sense/motive is to respond to temperature, force, acceleration, etc in
a relatively uniform fashion which does not scale up to being a living
organism."

So do I now take it you have abandoned these bold assertions and no concede that maybe a
silicon or mechanical brain could instantiate human-like consciousness and that's a
reasonable research goal and you were just cautioning against assuming the outcome?

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 13, 3:51 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Well humans aren't made of DNA, and there are good reasons they are made of carbon
> compounds (mostly) instead of silicon ones.  But the question is about consciousness, not
> evolution.

I'm using DNA as an example that physical properties are influential
for the possibilities of life, not just abstract functions.
Consciousness is, as far as we know, limited to things made through
the activities of DNA. I am saying we can't assume that there is no
reason for that to be the case.

>
> >> You've been asserting that it's the case...not just cautioning about possibilities.  So
> >> let's hear one of those 'good reasons'; one that is not just a speculative possibility.
> > How do you go from me saying 'we cannot discount the possibility...'
> > to demanding an answer that is not a speculative possibility? If I say
> > we cannot discount the possibility that cigarettes cause cancer, does
> > that mean that you can demand that I produce the precise mechanism by
> > which they cause cancer or else it invalidates the possibility that it
> > does?
>
> Yes, you were circumspect in that response. But referred to what you've said in other posts.

I don't see anything wrong with speculating on the possibilities.

>
> "That's because awareness is not mechanical. That's
> what makes a machine a machine, a lack of capacity to transcend
> recursive behavior or deviate from universal behavior."
>
> "A silicon semiconductor does have an experience, just not the
> incomprehensible human experience that we superimpose on it's nature."
>
> "No amount of gear motives scale up
> to opinions. There is no 'they' to a gear, because humans have cast
> them mechanically in molds to act as gears for our sense/motives.
> Innately they are not gears, but metal molecules in solid form. Their
> sense/motive is to respond to temperature, force, acceleration, etc in
> a relatively uniform fashion which does not scale up to being a living
> organism."
>
> So do I now take it you have abandoned these bold assertions

No, not at all. It is clear to me that there are different sense
making capacities associated with different levels of physical
substance and relation. It is not all interchangeable, although there
are many functions which can be imitated successfully. There is room
for many different ways of doing the same thing and many different
things that can be done in the same way. Consciousness overlaps with
the body in some ways and it diverges in other ways. They are
independent, they overlap, they influence each other, and they are in
another sense, inseparable. No amount of steel gears is going to ever
add up to a chicken. Only a chicken made of chicken cells is a chicken
and has chicken consciousness.

> and no concede that maybe a
> silicon or mechanical brain could instantiate human-like consciousness and that's a
> reasonable research goal and you were just cautioning against assuming the outcome?

It's a reasonable research goal because of the collateral knowledge
that will come out of it, but no, I think in reality this goal will
always be a pipe dream of alchemical proportions. Mortality is a
fundamental experience of all life. As long as a brain is based on
time-reversible, non-mortal mechanisms, it can never feel what any
living thing can feel. Not that time irreversibility and mortality are
the only criteria - but I suspect that they are part of the minimum
requirements involved in stepping up from the molecular to the
cellular level of sense making.

Craig

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 7:56 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> We've only changed the name from God's Will to evolution/mechanism/probability

A good theory explains how something simple can produce something more complex and is very explicit about the details. A bad theory describes how something more complex can produce something less complex and waves its metaphorical hands around about the details. Darwin explained how something as simple as natural selection and random mutation can produced ever more complex varieties of life and he went into details; that's why many say that Charles Darwin had the single best idea that any human being ever had and I agree with them. The God hypothesis explains how something infinity complex (God) produced something finitely complex (you and me) and gives no details about how He did it except that He (God has a sex apparently) did it all in 6 days and the process of making finite stuff was exhausting for this infinite being and He needed to rest for a day.

>> The discovery in the 1950's about how DNA can not only duplicates itself but contains the program that tells cellular machinery how to assemble enormously complex proteins confirms the idea that a living cell is a purely mechanical factory.

> Which would have solved the problem, except that we don't experience ourselves as enormously complex proteins.

Exactly, we don't experience the world as proteins so I don't understand why only they and not transistors can be at the root of experience when we don't experience them. We don't experience the world as neurons either and would not even be conscious of them unless we read about them in a book, so I don't understand why only neurons and not microprocessors can be at the root of experience when we don't experience them. Therefore the key thing must be what those proteins and neurons and transistors and microprocessors do rather than what they are, and there can be things other than proteins and neurons that can do those things. We are not directly conscious of atoms or proteins or neurons, we are conscious at the level of symbols, and computers can manipulate symbols just fine, if they could not nobody would even bother to make computers.

> We don't experience the world as irrelevant spectators to a purely mechanical process.

True, because we don't know what we will do until we do it, just as we don't know what the result of a calculation will be until we have finished calculating it.

> The complete failure of mechanism to generate any possible explanation for consciousness or experience

If mechanism can't explain it then non-mechanism can't explain it either, a free floating glow is not a explanation. And a paucity of explanations for consciousness has not prevented human beings from making judgments about what is conscious and what is not, humans have been doing it for many thousands of years and they do it by using the only tool they had for such things, determining if the thing in question behaved intelligently or not.

> If the discovery of DNA explained the existence of the feeling and awareness of life, then we would not be having this conversation,

DNA was discovered in 1869 but in the 1950's it was discovered how DNA could make things that DID have the feeling and awareness of life, things like you and me. And there was nothing mystical about this construction process, it was purely mechanical. And after these things got made no new laws of physics were needed to explain their operation, in every brain ever examined all that is seen is very very complex electro-chemistry; and all that machinery is hidden from consciousness because as I've said it operates at the symbol level not the chemistry level. I agree completely when you said "we don't experience ourselves as enormously complex proteins", so protein is not essential for experience.

> Invoking vitalism or religion to characterize my views is a similar low stooping resort. [...] It is exactly what it  seems to be. Experience, feeling...private, signifying sensorimotive events. [...] It is a description of the cosmos precisely as we experience it, nothing more and nothing less.

So your revolutionary new theory is that experience is experience and feelings are feelings and "sensorimotive" is a fine sounding word that tends to impress the rubes. Well there is not much in your theory to disagree with, but I don't see how you go from there to the inability of computers to do what brains can do because they are not squishy squashy and don't smell bad.

>What does that have to do with imprisonment? Does North Korea intend to rehabilitate the software?

Yes it does, North Korea insists that programs it does not like be rewritten.

> Does it employ behavior modification

You bet! Programs behave very differently after North Korea is through with them.

> It's real arithmetic to us, but not to the computer.

So arithmetic is subjective it's nature changes according to who looks at it and 2+2 can be anything at all.

> Do you think that a traffic signal understands traffic?

You just hit a raw nerve, that's one of my pet peeves, the damn things should! A traffic signal understands signal lights well enough to turn a electric light on or off and it should certainly understand traffic too, but unfortunately most of them do not and in this day and age there is just no excuse for that sort of incompetence. It makes me mad to sit at a red light when I can see that there are no cars on the cross street for miles. If signal lights understood the nature of traffic, if they knew when it was heavy and when it was light then they could make far more intelligent decisions about when to turn from red to green; they would not need to know where every car came from or where every car was going, that would be overkill, even I don't have a understanding of traffic as deep as that.

> Our entire subjective experience is a 'seems like', so that a realistic imitation accomplishes the goal of allowing us to suspend disbelief of the imitation.

OK, but then a computer that seemed like a realistic imitation of having outsmarted us would be indistinguishable to us from a computer that really did outsmart us. If the computer is not smart from it's point of view that is of no concern to us, it's the computer's problem not ours, from our point of view the computer made a fool of us and can order us around.

> A trash can that says THANK YOU seems polite to us in one sense, but we can also understand that literally, objectively, it's only a plastic lid,

That's because "THANK YOU" is all it can do; if it could do more I would conclude that it understood more. The average person can do more than "THANK YOU" so I believe they know more than the trash can. Einstein could do more than the average person so I conclude that he understood more than the average person. However you feel that behavior tells us nothing about understanding so I don't understand why you're so certain a trash can is not conscious, or a cadaver for that matter.

>>the value of 2+2 varies from person to person and its true value can be anything you want it to be.

> No, it doesn't vary from person to person as long as the logic of the system matches.

So if the logic of a computers operation is consistent with human logic, and it is, then the computer will get the same answer to 2+2 as you do, so it's objective and independent of who or what is doing the arithmetic, so computers can do real arithmetic, so it should be able to do other things that are real too. And I must say that if a computer could not do real things there would be no point in humans building computers.

  John K Clark

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
>>
>>> All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will
>>> run
>>> the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that.
>>
>> It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to
>> do a
>> thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.
>
> That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
> anything else than what you already do.

But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you
don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot
assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning?
A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss
further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you
are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your
opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then.

> Intelligence is the ability to
> make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,

I can agree, although then even human might have a limited
intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you
are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an
already very long and fuzzy list.

> which
> is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
> trivially for specific functions).

And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the
diagonalization routine.

> If it weren't that way we would not
> be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and
> versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and
> human life.

You confuse the conceptually possibility that some machine can think,
the possibility that actual machine can thing. You might have said
that the DNA will never reach the moon by looking at bacteria or
insects. That is not reasoning.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[1Z]

On Feb 9, 2:45 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 10:14 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer
> > of interest.
>
> That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously.

Why would your subjective concerns matter to me? I take *my*
subjectivity as seriously as anything!

> > > > > If I am very cold and I walk
> > > > > into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> > > > > right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> > > > > works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> > > > > busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> > > > > but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> > > > > that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> > > > > which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.
>
> > > > Hopelessly vague.
>
> > > Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague?
>
> > "may not be"...."may not be"...
>
> If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know'
> and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague.

Philosophy is difficult.

> This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are
> saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to
> criticize how you write instead.

> > > > > > It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
>
> > > > > I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
> > > > > it"
>
> > > > No. The two are not synonymous.
>
> > > Why not?
>
> > Semantics and grammar.
>
> Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would
> be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing.

You are not pointing out a fact to the effect that they mean
ther same thing "figurativelty". They seem to mean the same
thing to you because of baggage you are brigning to the issue
that other people are not bringing.

>
> > > Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it?
>
> > Are you saying causation is coercion?
>
> If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of
> course.

If no other agents, humans, individuals is overrding
their will, they are not being coerced. Coercion is
a deliberate act. Gravity does not coerce objects into
falling.


> > > > > I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> > > > > there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> > > > > determinism.
>
> > > > You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
> > > > forces.
>
> > > No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be
> > > in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything
> > > else.
>
> > I can't see why.
>
> Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of
> darkness?


No. We can conceive of the existence of the non-existent and
vice versa.

> > Mistakes are possbile under determinism.
>
> It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a
> universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free
> will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention,
> accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way.

Except determinism itself.

> Everything would be purely automatic and unconscious and have no way
> to conceive of any other possibility.


Non-sequitur. You would be determined to conceive whatever
you were determined to conceive, rightly or wrongly.

Let's say they brain state of someone who believes in
free will is state S. Does it really make a difference whether
S is arrived at by a history involving indeterminism and free will,
or by a history involving involving strict determinism? It's the
same state either way.

> > so, under determinsim, one could be mistaken about determinism.
>
> > > > > You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> > > > > that there could be any other theoretical possibility.
>
> > > > That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
> > > > cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
> > > > exist.
>
> > > They do exist, they just exist within your experience.
>
> > Existing only in ones experience is for all practical purposes exactly
> > equivalent to
> > not existing.
>
> That is the most common way to look at it, but it's backwards. Nothing
> exists unless it exists in something's experience (directly or
> indirectly).

Unsupported assertion.

>That is what existence is. Detection and participation.
>
> > One cannot deny the existence of that which one has
> > never
> > imagined or conceived.
>
> There is nothing to deny if you haven't experienced its existence in
> some way. We experience molecules indirectly through description and
> inference, therefore they seem like they exist to us. We imagine what
> they are based on models and experiments which have allowed us to feel
> like we have closed the gap between our indirect experience of
> mathematics and physics and our direct experience of microscopy and
> materials science. All of these things are contingent solely on
> detection and interpretation. We could find out in 10 years or 100
> years that the molecular model is only the tip of the iceberg.

You mean we could discover the existence of something we
have not at this point in time experienced?

> > >It's the same
> > > even without LSD. What you experience isn't what exists objectively,
> > > it is what you are capable of and conditioned to experience.
> > > >Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.
>
> > > Deterministic forces can suggest false beliefs, but they can't truly
> > > cause any beliefs, otherwise they wouldn't be beliefs, but mechanisms.
> > > Belief can only be finally caused by a believer.
>
> > That's your belief
>
> Only if my belief is true. Otherwise I can't have a belief.

Sure you can. it's just that your theory of belief would be wrong. It
would
be a false belief.

> > > > > It would be to
> > > > > imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.
>
> > > > Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?
>
> > > Probably from Lovecraft or something. But it's entirely appropriate. A
> > > deterministic universe means that determinism cannot be named.
>
> > Nope.
>
> How could it be named if there is no alternative quality to
> distinguish it from?

Because naming is lingusitic, and language allows
us to negate concepts even if we don;t have
experience of their negations. We can conceive
the im-material in a material universe, the im-mortal,
the a-temporal, the in-finite, etc, etc.


You seem to be runnign off a theory of concept-formation
whereby concepts are only ever recongnitions of percerived
realities. That does not remotely do justice to human thought and
language. Language is combinatorial, it allows you to stick a
pair of wings on a horse.

>Whenever someone resorts to saying 'Nope' or 'No,
> it isn't' I know that they have nothing to support their opinion

or they haven;t got the energy to explain the bleedin' obvious.


> > > What
> > > name does an engine have for being something other than a non-engine?
>
> > The problem with an piece of clockwork is that it is dumb,
> > not that it is deterministic.
>
> Ok, so what is an intelligent machine's word for a non-machine?

"Non machine", if it speaks English.


> > > > But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
> > > > of determinism.
>
> > > But free will means a positive assertion of intentionality - hence,
> > > color is not mere non-monochrome, and intentionality is not mere
> > > indeterminism.
>
> > I was talking about indeterminism.
>
> Since the thread is named 'The free will function', I was thinking we
> were talking about that. I would say that indeterminism is a pseudo-
> position because it simultaneously assumes an omniscient voyeur and an
> arbitrary subject for orientation.

I can't imagine why you would think that.

> Indeterminism is a comment on
> access to knowledge, implying that there is something other than the
> universe as a whole to either possess or lack that access.

Blimey!


> > > > What is the point of anything?
>
> > > Everything has all kinds of points. Generally I think the inside of
> > > things wants to accumulate significance and the outside of things
> > > doesn't want anything, which negates significance as entropy.
>
> > That's opinion.
>
> You asked a question that can only be answered with an opinion.


it could have been answered: "actually, there is no good reason
to think nothing can exist without having a point. My argument fails".

You think opinion is the only option because you think admitting you
are wrong is not an option.


> > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> make them less dumb?

Why not?

>Does it start having opinions at some point?

You were a single cell once. Now you are billions, and you started
having opinions
at some point.


> > Deterministic doesn't mean mandatory or involuntary.
>
> How could it not? Can you give a counter example?

I am not physically determined to pay taxes, but it is mandatory.

I am physically determined to fall under the influence of gravity, but
no one mandated it.

[1Z]

On Feb 12, 2:22 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > 2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
> > > All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run
> > > the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that.
>
> > It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a
> > thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.
>
> That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
> anything else than what you already do.

Then no AI is fully dumb, since all are adaptive to some extent.

> Intelligence is the ability to
> make sense of any given context

"Any"? Then no human is fully intelligent.

> and to potentially transcend it, which
> is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
> trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not
> be having this discussion.

That we are having this discussion does not prove we
are infinitely adaptable, as your definition "intelligent" requires.

[1Z]

On Feb 13, 5:17 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Digital substitution
> is not a local symmetry.

hence flight simulators do not fly.

[1Z]

On Feb 9, 4:43 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > It [being free] means your actions are not determined by external forces
>
> So a external force like light that has reflected off a wall does not
> effect your actions and you crash into the wall. If that's what being free
> means then I don't want to be free.

You substituted "effect" for "determine".

> > What is my defintion, IYO?
>
> You're asking me??! You want me to tell you what you're talking about?

You wrote as if you knew.

> > I don't believe I've offered one in the current discussion.
>
> As you've been arguing passionately that free will exist and even claim to
> have proven

No and no.



>
>it I think its odd that now you refuse to even say what the
> hell it is.

Are you asking? I thought you knew.

> Before you can prove something you must know what the hell
> you're trying to prove. First tell me what "free will" means and only then
> we can debate if human beings have this property or not.

Free Will is defined as "the power or ability to rationally choose and
consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought
about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances".

> > Meaning it was caused or uncased.
>
> Meaning it was deterministic or random.
>
> > an uncaused aim or goal still counts as a reason,
>
> Yes certainly, in that case you did X because of goal Y and so X was
> deterministic. But what caused goal Y? Nothing caused goal Y, it was
> random.

And you did X to achieve goal Y, so X had a reason, even if Y didn't
have a cause.

> > because it is an answer to the question "what did you do that for".
> > However, only a very select group of entities can answer such questions.
>
> But human beings don't seem to be members of that "very select group"
> because very soon after you start firing off a chain of "what did you do
> that for" questions at them all they can do is come up with a standard
> rubber stamp reply of "I don't know, I just wanted to".

FW only requires people to be as rational as people
generally are , so that doens't matter.

> >> and if the name is appropriate and it really is final
>
> > That's not what "final" means in context.
>
> Bullshit.

Bullshit yourself, I intorduced the term and I know what I meant by it

> > > Read yer Aristotle.
>
> Actually I have read Aristotle when I was young and foolish and it was a
> complete waste of time. Unlike Plato his literary style was really bad, and
> even by the standards of the day Aristotle was a dreadful physicist, just
> awful, a good high school physics student today knows far more philosophy
> than Aristotle did. Progress has been made in the last 2500 years. And I've
> got to tell you that just dropping the name of a ancient Greek philosopher
> doesn't impress me very much, especially when there is no evidence you know
> a damn thing about him.

I was establishing a meaning, not a claim. But there;s no reasoining
with the unreasonable.

> > > Nope. You have misunderstood "final cause".
>
> I'm curious, does anybody think that the above is a satisfactory rebuttal
> to my argument, or to any argument for that matter?

Yes, it is a satisfactory rebuttal to say that you did not understand
the claim in the first place, and therefore did not relevantly refute
it.

[John Clark]

On Mon, Feb 13, 2012  Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> wrote:

> To actually implement digital substitution, we would have to not only match the functionally of the module internally but also match the interactions of that module with the environment.

No, you'd only have to match  he interactions with the environment, what happens internally is inaccessible to us by direct observation. And before you start yelling objections to that reflect on the fact that other human beings are black boxes to us, we can hypothesize that they have a internal life and we can hypothesize what it feels like to be that other person, but we have no direct access to such things and we can never know for sure if our hypothesis is right.

> Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as carbon

Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as the element germanium either (although they are in the same column in the periodic table as is carbon) and yet you can make transistors out of both and in fact the first transistors were germanium. So is arithmetic performed on a germanium computer different from arithmetic performed on a silicon computer?  Or can the atoms be treated as black boxes and the important thing being the logic in the way the atoms are arranged and thus the "4" a silicon computer produces to the question "how much is 2+2" is the same "4" that a germanium computer produces?

The thing I don't understand is that everybody agrees that our conscious experience is not at the level of carbon or silicon or germanium atoms, or atoms of any sort for that matter, we are not conscious of them and until a few centuries ago no conscious being even knew they existed, and yet one and only one of those 3 atoms is supposed to produce consciousness even though we are no more conscious of that atom than the other two atoms. Quite frankly I think the idea that 6 protons 6 electrons and 6 neutrons (carbon) is conscious but 14 protons 14 electrons and 14 neutrons (silicon) is not and can never be no matter how you put such objects together is nuts.

  John K Clark  

[John Clark]

On Tue, Feb 14, 2012  1Z <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Free Will is defined as "the power or ability to rationally choose

If its rational then there is a reason for it and thus it's deterministic.
 

> and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances.

So a hand calculator hooked up to a roulette wheel so that one time in 37 it gives the wrong answer has free will.

 John K Clark

[Bruno Marchal]

That's very funny, Peter.

That reminds us of a quite good typical comp exercise: can a virtual
typhoon makes you wet? Related here to "Can you flight with a
computer?".

Let me ask a question to Stephen. I think I know the answer of all
participants on this, I think, except for Stephen, where I am less sure.
The question is: do you agree with the, now common and rather obvious
comp answer to that exercise.
The comp answer is "yes you can be made wet by a virtual typhoon, but
you have to virtualize yourself, or more precisely you need only to
virtualize your skin-interfaces with the virtual typhoon.

Stephen, do you agree with this? Do you agree that with comp, we can
in principle, make you feel like being under a tempest, by virtue of
running a computer in room. Craig would clearly answer that this is
not possible, given that for him, comp is not possible in the first
place. But you acknowledge that you believe in comp, or that you can
assume it, or at least that you do not assume that comp is false. But
my question does not bear on the truth or falsity of comp, but on the
experience of feeling wet by Stephen King in case his brain has been
digitalized and interfaces in a virtual environment of the kind
tempest. Do you agree that if comp is correct then Stephen King has
experienced the quite physical-material experience of being quite wet
due to violent raining winds in a tempest. OK?

If you agree with this we can proceed step by step, and perhaps, jump
quickly to step 8, the MGA-Maudlin stuff, which is at the heart of the
difficulty of linking consciousness to the physical objects, unless,
like Craig, you abandon comp and you make both consciousness and the
physical infinitely complex. That prevents indeed the unavoidable
metaphysical dissociation brought by betting on a substitution level.

Bruno

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[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2012 10:48 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Feb 14, 2012  1Z <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Free Will is defined as "the power or ability to rationally choose

If its rational then there is a reason for it and thus it's deterministic.

Except that game theory shows that the rational strategy may be to make random choices.

 

> and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances.

So a hand calculator hooked up to a roulette wheel so that one time in 37 it gives the wrong answer has free will.

I don't see that would count as an "ability to rationally choose" unless the calculator was smart enough to understand game theory.

Brent

 John K Clark

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will
> >>> run
> >>> the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that.
>
> >> It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to
> >> do a
> >> thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.
>
> > That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
> > anything else than what you already do.
>
> But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you
> don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot
> assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning?

My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every idea, it
is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas.

> A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss
> further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you
> are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your
> opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then.

I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and
philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the
universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all have
in common - sense.

>
> > Intelligence is the ability to
> > make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,
>
> I can agree, although then even human might have a limited
> intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you
> are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an
> already very long and fuzzy list.

I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart
monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others.

>
> > which
> > is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
> > trivially for specific functions).
>
> And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the
> diagonalization routine.

Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the only
way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels us
to accept it's evidence. Faith does the same thing in reverse. It says
you have to see through logic and embrace a deeper truth.

>
> > If it weren't that way we would not
> > be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and
> > versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and
> > human life.
>
> You confuse the conceptually possibility that some machine can think,
> the possibility that actual machine can thing. You might have said
> that the DNA will never reach the moon by looking at bacteria or
> insects. That is not reasoning.
>

But I still would have said that DNA has a better chance to reach the
moon by looking at bacteria or insects then silicon dioxide has of
reaching the moon. The problem is that machines show no signs of being
anything other than emotionally inert. If it weren't for that fact,
and the nature of that fact as a defining feature of AI thus far, I
would not have a problem with it. I agree that in theory it shouldn't
be a problem, but in theory, DNA shouldn't need to make consciousness
either. Once we allow the common sense notion of inanimate objects
being unconscious to be possibly true, then we can look to understand
why that might be the case, rather than adopting a 'don't ask'
attitude ;)

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>>> All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will
>>>>> run
>>>>> the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do
>>>>> that.
>>
>>>> It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to
>>>> do a
>>>> thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.
>>
>>> That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
>>> anything else than what you already do.
>>
>> But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you
>> don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot
>> assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning?
>
> My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every idea, it
> is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas.

You write well, but I'm afraid that you have to develop your learning
ability, and it is only by exploring the implications of different set
of ideas that you will learn the difference between arguing and
advertizing an opinion.

>
>> A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss
>> further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you
>> are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your
>> opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then.
>
> I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and
> philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the
> universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all have
> in common - sense.

That is not what I am doing. On the contrary I wish the philosophy and
religion adopt the standard of science, which is modest hypothetical
communication, without *ever* claiming the truth, but trying valid
reasoning in hypothetical frames. It is the only way to progress.

>
>>
>>> Intelligence is the ability to
>>> make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,
>>
>> I can agree, although then even human might have a limited
>> intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you
>> are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an
>> already very long and fuzzy list.
>
> I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart
> monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others.
>
>>
>>> which
>>> is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
>>> trivially for specific functions).
>>
>> And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the
>> diagonalization routine.
>
> Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the only
> way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels us
> to accept it's evidence.

On the contrary. Comp leads to a counter-intuitive view of reality,
doubly so for Aristotelians, and it does not ask to accept its
evidence, but only for its refutation. You get it all wrong, Craig.

> Faith does the same thing in reverse. It says
> you have to see through logic and embrace a deeper truth.

It suggests a theory, and derive propositions, accepted in the frame
of that theory.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 9:58 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

>
> > > Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer
> > > of interest.
>
> > That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously.
>
> Why would your subjective concerns matter to me? I take *my*
> subjectivity as seriously as anything!

You don't have to care about my subjectivity to care about
subjectivity in general. I feel like Pulp Fiction:

Jules: You know the shows on TV?
Vincent: I don't watch TV.
Jules: Yeah, but, you are aware that there's an invention called
television, and on this invention they show shows, right?

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > > > If I am very cold and I walk
> > > > > > into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> > > > > > right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> > > > > > works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> > > > > > busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> > > > > > but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> > > > > > that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> > > > > > which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.
>
> > > > > Hopelessly vague.
>
> > > > Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague?
>
> > > "may not be"...."may not be"...
>
> > If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know'
> > and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague.
>
> Philosophy is difficult.

and accusations are easy.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are
> > saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to
> > criticize how you write instead.
> > > > > > > It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
>
> > > > > > I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
> > > > > > it"
>
> > > > > No. The two are not synonymous.
>
> > > > Why not?
>
> > > Semantics and grammar.
>
> > Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would
> > be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing.
>
> You are not pointing out a fact to the effect that they mean
> ther same thing "figurativelty". They seem to mean the same
> thing to you because of baggage you are brigning to the issue
> that other people are not bringing.

If by baggage you mean understanding, then yes, that could be true.

>
>
>
> > > > Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it?
>
> > > Are you saying causation is coercion?
>
> > If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of
> > course.
>
> If no other agents, humans, individuals is overrding
> their will, they are not being coerced. Coercion is
> a deliberate act. Gravity does not coerce objects into
> falling.

You're right from a 3p perspective. From a 1p perspective anything
that winds up changing your mind can be said to convince you or coerce
your decision. We can project intention on unconscious agents. You can
say, "I was coerced into joining a gym by my expanding gut".

>
> > > > > > I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> > > > > > there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> > > > > > determinism.
>
> > > > > You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
> > > > > forces.
>
> > > > No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be
> > > > in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything
> > > > else.
>
> > > I can't see why.
>
> > Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of
> > darkness?
>
> No. We can conceive of the existence of the non-existent and
> vice versa.

We can conceive of non-existence because things can cease to exist. If
there were no light, then nothing could be imagined to be lacking
light. It would be no more possible than it is for us to conceive of
Non-Gromwalschedness in our universe.

>
> > > Mistakes are possbile under determinism.
>
> > It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a
> > universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free
> > will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention,
> > accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way.
>
> Except determinism itself.

Not even determinism. It could not be defined, it would simply be the
way that the universe is. We can talk about determinism only because
we extend beyond it.

>
> > Everything would be purely automatic and unconscious and have no way
> > to conceive of any other possibility.
>
> Non-sequitur. You would be determined to conceive whatever
> you were determined to conceive, rightly or wrongly.

Why would anything be determined to conceive of anything?

>
> Let's say they brain state of someone who believes in
> free will is state S. Does it really make a difference whether
> S is arrived at by a history involving indeterminism and free will,
> or by a history involving involving strict determinism? It's the
> same state either way.

There is no state S. Each person's 'belief' isn't arrived at at all.
That is not how it works. Opinions are dynamic impressions driven by
motive. (Another movie reference is helpful: Zelig). The reality of
belief is context dependent fugues of memory and influence with
feeling and sense in the moment. What we believe arises organically
from who we are and how we feel. When we assume instead from the
beginning that there is this abstract entity of 'belief in free will'
then it turns reality upside down and we end up thinking we have to
justify reality to the abstraction.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > so, under determinsim, one could be mistaken about determinism.
>
> > > > > > You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> > > > > > that there could be any other theoretical possibility.
>
> > > > > That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
> > > > > cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
> > > > > exist.
>
> > > > They do exist, they just exist within your experience.
>
> > > Existing only in ones experience is for all practical purposes exactly
> > > equivalent to
> > > not existing.
>
> > That is the most common way to look at it, but it's backwards. Nothing
> > exists unless it exists in something's experience (directly or
> > indirectly).
>
> Unsupported assertion.

No more unsupported than the opposite assertion.

>
> >That is what existence is. Detection and participation.
>
> > > One cannot deny the existence of that which one has
> > > never
> > > imagined or conceived.
>
> > There is nothing to deny if you haven't experienced its existence in
> > some way. We experience molecules indirectly through description and
> > inference, therefore they seem like they exist to us. We imagine what
> > they are based on models and experiments which have allowed us to feel
> > like we have closed the gap between our indirect experience of
> > mathematics and physics and our direct experience of microscopy and
> > materials science. All of these things are contingent solely on
> > detection and interpretation. We could find out in 10 years or 100
> > years that the molecular model is only the tip of the iceberg.
>
> You mean we could discover the existence of something we
> have not at this point in time experienced?

Of course. But we can never discover the existence of something that
nothing has experienced, unless we create it ourselves - which
wouldn't be discovery.

>
> > > >It's the same
> > > > even without LSD. What you experience isn't what exists objectively,
> > > > it is what you are capable of and conditioned to experience.
> > > > >Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.
>
> > > > Deterministic forces can suggest false beliefs, but they can't truly
> > > > cause any beliefs, otherwise they wouldn't be beliefs, but mechanisms.
> > > > Belief can only be finally caused by a believer.
>
> > > That's your belief
>
> > Only if my belief is true. Otherwise I can't have a belief.
>
> Sure you can. it's just that your theory of belief would be wrong. It
> would
> be a false belief.

How could any belief be possible under determinism? Belief implies a
voluntary epistemological investment. To be a believer is to choose to
believe.

>
> > > > > > It would be to
> > > > > > imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.
>
> > > > > Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?
>
> > > > Probably from Lovecraft or something. But it's entirely appropriate. A
> > > > deterministic universe means that determinism cannot be named.
>
> > > Nope.
>
> > How could it be named if there is no alternative quality to
> > distinguish it from?
>
> Because naming is lingusitic, and language allows
> us to negate concepts even if we don;t have
> experience of their negations. We can conceive
> the im-material in a material universe, the im-mortal,
> the a-temporal, the in-finite, etc, etc.

You don't know that our universe doesn't extend beyond qualities that
seem material, mortal, temporal, and finite to us though. The only
example that could be used is a nonsense example. The universe could
actually be 100% X-istic but we have no way of knowing it. The ability
of the mind (which is part of the universe) to conceive of X in the
first place means that the mind can figuratively extend beyond it.

>
> You seem to be runnign off a theory of concept-formation
> whereby concepts are only ever recongnitions of percerived
> realities.

Not perceived realities, but ontological possibilities. We can't
imagine a square circle, not because we haven't seen one, but because
the two figures are mutually exclusive. The most basic requirement of
any pattern we can recognize or conceive is to discern the difference
between it's presence and it's absence. We cannot know finite without
there being the possibility of in-finite. We cannot know determinism
without there being the possibility of in-determinism. Light without
dark, sanity without insanity, etc. Without a foreground, there can be
no background (and vice versa).

>That does not remotely do justice to human thought and
> language. Language is combinatorial, it allows you to stick a
> pair of wings on a horse.

Of course. Provided that wings and horses are conceivable in that
combination in the first place. It does not allow you to stick wings
on irony. You can put them together in the trivial sense,
syntactically, but there's no semantic referent.

>
> >Whenever someone resorts to saying 'Nope' or 'No,
> > it isn't' I know that they have nothing to support their opinion
>
> or they haven;t got the energy to explain the bleedin' obvious.

Then why bother saying anything?

>
> > > > What
> > > > name does an engine have for being something other than a non-engine?
>
> > > The problem with an piece of clockwork is that it is dumb,
> > > not that it is deterministic.
>
> > Ok, so what is an intelligent machine's word for a non-machine?
>
> "Non machine", if it speaks English.

What does it think it means by that though?

>
> > > > > But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
> > > > > of determinism.
>
> > > > But free will means a positive assertion of intentionality - hence,
> > > > color is not mere non-monochrome, and intentionality is not mere
> > > > indeterminism.
>
> > > I was talking about indeterminism.
>
> > Since the thread is named 'The free will function', I was thinking we
> > were talking about that. I would say that indeterminism is a pseudo-
> > position because it simultaneously assumes an omniscient voyeur and an
> > arbitrary subject for orientation.
>
> I can't imagine why you would think that.

Because it makes sense?

>
> > Indeterminism is a comment on
> > access to knowledge, implying that there is something other than the
> > universe as a whole to either possess or lack that access.
>
> Blimey!

Same as 'no' or 'nope'.

>
> > > > > What is the point of anything?
>
> > > > Everything has all kinds of points. Generally I think the inside of
> > > > things wants to accumulate significance and the outside of things
> > > > doesn't want anything, which negates significance as entropy.
>
> > > That's opinion.
>
> > You asked a question that can only be answered with an opinion.
>
> it could have been answered: "actually, there is no good reason
> to think nothing can exist without having a point. My argument fails".

That would still be an opinion. There is no good reason to think that
having a point is some kind of static commodity. If I pick up a rock
and throw it through a window, then it could be said that there was a
point to my picking up the rock.

>
> You think opinion is the only option because you think admitting you
> are wrong is not an option.

It's an option, but it's still an opinion. You criticized my answering
with an opinion, then you disqualify my pointing out that any answer
to that question is necessarily an opinion, then you make a special
case exception for that disqualification in the event that my answer
makes me wrong about something (anything, everything apparently).

>
> > > > How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
>
> > > The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
>
> > Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
> > make them less dumb?
>
> Why not?

Because then intelligence becomes a magical power that appears
inexplicably. You would have the reverse of the zombie problem -
conjured qualia...Pinocchio providence.

>
> >Does it start having opinions at some point?
>
> You were a single cell once. Now you are billions, and you started
> having opinions
> at some point.

I'm saying that point was at the beginning. Mitosis.

>
> > > Deterministic doesn't mean mandatory or involuntary.
>
> > How could it not? Can you give a counter example?
>
> I am not physically determined to pay taxes, but it is mandatory.

It's not physically mandatory either. It's only legally compulsory.

>
> I am physically determined to fall under the influence of gravity, but
> no one mandated it.

It's mandated by the laws of physics, if you want to get that
technical on the meaning of mandatory. The main thing is that it's not
within your power to refuse, or more importantly, that it cannot be
refused without awareness of the possibility of refusing.

Craig

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2012 1:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

We can conceive of non-existence because things can cease to exist. If
there were no light, then nothing could be imagined to be lacking
light. It would be no more possible than it is for us to conceive of
Non-Gromwalschedness in our universe.

So you can't conceive of the non-existence of Russell's teapot that's orbiting Jupiter because it never existed and so cannot have ceased to exist?

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 10:37 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 12, 2:22 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
> > anything else than what you already do.
>
> Then no AI is fully dumb, since all are adaptive to some extent.

It doesn't adapt intentionally, it is programmed to imitate
adaptation. In a sense it's not fully dumb, but it's the trivial sense
of dumb. In the deeper sense, it literally devoid of understanding or
awareness.

>
> > Intelligence is the ability to
> > make sense of any given context
>
> "Any"? Then no human is fully intelligent.

Right. We have no intelligence in contexts which we can't make sense
of. We could be as dumb as computers are relative to some higher
sentience.

>
> > and to potentially transcend it, which
> > is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
> > trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not
> > be having this discussion.
>
> That we are having this discussion does not prove we
> are infinitely adaptable, as your definition "intelligent" requires.

We're not infinitely adaptable nor even is intelligence infinitely
adaptable, but sense is. Even non-sense is a kind of sense. That we
are having this discussion proves only that we have the potential to
transcend our own programming. Machines don't gather together while we
aren't watching and try to improve their programming.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 2:21 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The comp answer is "yes you can be made wet by a virtual typhoon, but
> you have to virtualize yourself, or more precisely you need only to
> virtualize your skin-interfaces with the virtual typhoon.
>
> Stephen, do you agree with this? Do you agree that with comp, we can
> in principle, make you feel like being under a tempest, by virtue of
> running a computer in room. Craig would clearly answer that this is
> not possible, given that for him, comp is not possible in the first
> place.

To be clear, I think it may very well be possible to imitate the
experience of a typhoon virtually*, but only through a physical
interface to the sense organs or the brain directly. This does not
mean though that it is possible to imitate the experience of
experience itself. Full sensory virtual typhoon animation? Absolutely.
Virtual consciousness, understanding, feeling? Possibly in a living
tissue bank or something, but not in a glass brain.

*true virtual reality is one of best things that I can imagine. I have
nothing against astonishingly realistic virtual experiences, if
anything, I think one of my reasons for wanting to point out the
problems with strong AI is to get on with the business of making
sensory prosthetics and not worry so much about simulating
intelligence.

Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 3:41 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>>>> All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will
> >>>>> run
> >>>>> the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do
> >>>>> that.
>
> >>>> It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to
> >>>> do a
> >>>> thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a "program" mean.
>
> >>> That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
> >>> anything else than what you already do.
>
> >> But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you
> >> don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot
> >> assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning?
>
> > My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every idea, it
> > is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas.
>
> You write well, but I'm afraid that you have to develop your learning
> ability, and it is only by exploring the implications of different set
> of ideas that you will learn the difference between arguing and
> advertizing an opinion.

A superficial survey of the total set of ideas is what I'm after. I
was an anthropology major. I'm not trying to understand the customs
and truths of any particular culture, I'm trying to see through all
cultures to the underlying universals.

>
>
>
> >> A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss
> >> further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you
> >> are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your
> >> opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then.
>
> > I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and
> > philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the
> > universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all have
> > in common - sense.
>
> That is not what I am doing. On the contrary I wish the philosophy and
> religion adopt the standard of science, which is modest hypothetical
> communication, without *ever* claiming the truth, but trying valid
> reasoning in hypothetical frames. It is the only way to progress.

But science doesn't put itself in the hypothetical frame - which is
fine for specific inquiries, but inquiries into consciousness in
general or the cosmos as a whole have to include science itself, it's
assumptions, it's origins and motives. There was progress before
science, so it is not true that it is the only way to progress.
Science itself may be just the beginning.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> Intelligence is the ability to
> >>> make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it,
>
> >> I can agree, although then even human might have a limited
> >> intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you
> >> are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an
> >> already very long and fuzzy list.
>
> > I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart
> > monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others.
>
> >>> which
> >>> is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
> >>> trivially for specific functions).
>
> >> And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the
> >> diagonalization routine.
>
> > Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the only
> > way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels us
> > to accept it's evidence.
>
> On the contrary. Comp leads to a counter-intuitive view of reality,
> doubly so for Aristotelians, and it does not ask to accept its
> evidence, but only for its refutation. You get it all wrong, Craig.

That's what I'm saying is that it is reverse psychology. Comp seduces
with humility. It is the ultimate anthropomorphism to see the entire
cosmos as completely real except for our own experience which is
somehow completely illusory yet has ability to precisely understand
its own illusory reasoning. Instead of the special child of God, we
become the insignificant consequence of an immense non-god.

>
> > Faith does the same thing in reverse. It says
> > you have to see through logic and embrace a deeper truth.
>
> It suggests a theory, and derive propositions, accepted in the frame
> of that theory.

The theory and propositions can be arbitrary and contradictory. It is
more about charismatic identification and ritual participation.

Craig

[1Z]

On Feb 14, 6:35 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as the element germanium
> either (although they are in the same column in the periodic table as is
> carbon) and yet you can make transistors out of both and in fact the first
> transistors were germanium. So is arithmetic performed on a germanium
> computer different from arithmetic performed on a silicon computer?  Or can
> the atoms be treated as black boxes and the important thing being the logic
> in the way the atoms are arranged and thus the "4" a silicon computer
> produces to the question "how much is 2+2" is the same "4" that a germanium
> computer produces?

No one knows. It is quite coherent to suppose that consc. critically
depends on unique features of human hardware. The universality of
computation
is rather exceptional.

> The thing I don't understand is that everybody agrees that our conscious
> experience is not at the level of carbon or silicon or germanium atoms, or
> atoms of any sort for that matter, we are not conscious of them and until a
> few centuries ago no conscious being even knew they existed, and yet one
> and only one of those 3 atoms is supposed to produce consciousness even
> though we are no more conscious of that atom than the other two atoms.

I cannot imagine why the "conscious of which atom" would be relevant.
It takes certain very specific atoms to have magnetic properties, and
it takes them in bulk. No indiividual atom is ferromagnetic in itself.
To say that substance N is a necessary precursor of consc. is not
to say atoms of substance N are mini-consciousnesses.

[1Z]

On Feb 14, 6:48 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 14, 2012  1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Free Will is defined as "the power or ability to rationally choose
>
> If its rational then there is a reason for it and thus it's deterministic.

False, because causes need not be reasons, and reasons need
not be causes.

> > > and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought
> > about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances.
>
> So a hand calculator hooked up to a roulette wheel so that one time in 37
> it gives the wrong answer has free will.

There's nothing particularly rational about giving the wrong answer
one in 37 times. However, naturalistic libertarianism holds that
more complex combinations of chance and determinism can do the trick.
Your objection is a like Craig's claims that, since a toaster is dumb
and unconscious, so is Big Blue and all its successors.

[1Z]

On Feb 14, 9:47 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 14, 9:58 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer
> > > > of interest.
>
> > > That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously.
>
> > Why would your subjective concerns matter to me? I take *my*
> > subjectivity as seriously as anything!
>
> You don't have to care about my subjectivity to care about
> subjectivity in general.

You mean subjectivity is objectively important?

>I feel like Pulp Fiction:
>
> Jules: You know the shows on TV?
> Vincent: I don't watch TV.
> Jules: Yeah, but, you are aware that there's an invention called
> television, and on this invention they show shows, right?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > > > > If I am very cold and I walk
> > > > > > > into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> > > > > > > right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> > > > > > > works.  My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> > > > > > > busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> > > > > > > but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> > > > > > > that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> > > > > > > which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.
>
> > > > > > Hopelessly vague.
>
> > > > > Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague?
>
> > > > "may not be"...."may  not be"...
>
> > > If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know'
> > > and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague.
>
> > Philosophy is difficult.
>
> and accusations are easy.

It was an observation, not an accusation.

> > > This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are
> > > saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to
> > > criticize how you write instead.
> > > > > > > > It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
>
> > > > > > > I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
> > > > > > > it"
>
> > > > > > No. The two are not synonymous.
>
> > > > > Why not?
>
> > > > Semantics and grammar.
>
> > > Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would
> > > be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing.
>
> > You are not pointing out a fact to the effect that they mean
> > ther same thing "figurativelty". They seem to mean the same
> > thing to you because of baggage you are brigning to the issue
> > that other people are not bringing.
>
> If by baggage you mean understanding, then yes, that could be true.

Or everyone else could understand better.
That's subjectivity for you.

> > > > > Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it?
>
> > > > Are you saying causation is coercion?
>
> > > If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of
> > > course.
>
> > If no other agents, humans, individuals is overrding
> > their will, they are not being coerced. Coercion is
> > a deliberate act. Gravity does not coerce objects into
> > falling.
>
> You're right from a 3p perspective. From a 1p perspective anything
> that winds up changing your mind can be said to convince you or coerce
> your decision.

>We can project intention on unconscious agents. You can
> say, "I was coerced into joining a gym by my expanding gut".

You can say your gut tells you things. But it doens;t.
That is just figurative language.

> > > > > > > I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> > > > > > > there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> > > > > > > determinism.
>
> > > > > > You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
> > > > > > forces.
>
> > > > > No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be
> > > > > in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything
> > > > > else.
>
> > > > I can't see why.
>
> > > Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of
> > > darkness?
>
> > No. We can conceive of the existence of the non-existent and
> > vice versa.
>
> We can conceive of non-existence because things can cease to exist. If
> there were no light, then nothing could be imagined to be lacking
> light.

if there were no light, everything we imagined would be lacking light.

> It would be no more possible than it is for us to conceive of
> Non-Gromwalschedness in our universe.



> > > > Mistakes are possbile under determinism.
>
> > > It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a
> > > universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free
> > > will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention,
> > > accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way.
>
> > Except determinism itself.
>
> Not even determinism. It could not be defined, it would simply be the
> way that the universe is.

And we can't get a handle on the way the universe is?
You seem to think you can.

> We can talk about determinism only because
> we extend beyond it.

Gee, I guess you extend beyond everything then.

Or your initial premise is wrong.

> > > Everything would be purely automatic and unconscious and have no way
> > > to conceive of any other possibility.
>
> > Non-sequitur. You would be determined to conceive whatever
> > you were determined to conceive, rightly or wrongly.
>
> Why would anything be determined to conceive of anything?

Why not? You say that if you are deterrmined, you cannot conceive
of non-determinism. i say that if you are determined, you will
necessarily and inevitably conceive of whatever you are determined
to conceive of. That may or may not include indeterminism.
I don't have to argue that the conception of indeterminism
is inevitable.

> > Let's say they brain state of someone who believes in
> > free will is state S. Does it really make a difference whether
> > S is arrived at by  a history involving indeterminism and free will,
> > or by a history involving involving strict determinism? It's the
> > same state either way.
>
> There is no state S.

You know that how?

>Each person's 'belief' isn't arrived at at all.
> That is not how it works. Opinions are dynamic impressions driven by
> motive. (Another movie reference is helpful: Zelig). The reality of
> belief is context dependent fugues of memory and influence with
> feeling and sense in the moment. What we believe arises organically
> from who we are and how we feel. When we assume instead from the
> beginning that there is this abstract entity of 'belief in free will'
> then it turns reality upside down and we end up thinking we have to
> justify reality to the abstraction.

Vague. FMRI contradicts you.

> > > > so, under determinsim, one could be mistaken about determinism.
>
> > > > > > > You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> > > > > > > that there could be any other theoretical possibility.
>
> > > > > > That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
> > > > > > cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
> > > > > > exist.
>
> > > > > They do exist, they just exist within your experience.
>
> > > > Existing only in ones experience is for all practical purposes exactly
> > > > equivalent to
> > > > not existing.
>
> > > That is the most common way to look at it, but it's backwards. Nothing
> > > exists unless it exists in something's experience (directly or
> > > indirectly).
>
> > Unsupported assertion.
>
> No more unsupported than the opposite assertion.

You contradict it below.

> > >That is what existence is. Detection and participation.
>
> > > > One cannot deny the existence of that which one has
> > > > never
> > > > imagined or conceived.
>
> > > There is nothing to deny if you haven't experienced its existence in
> > > some way. We experience molecules indirectly through description and
> > > inference, therefore they seem like they exist to us. We imagine what
> > > they are based on models and experiments which have allowed us to feel
> > > like we have closed the gap between our indirect experience of
> > > mathematics and physics and our direct experience of microscopy and
> > > materials science. All of these things are contingent solely on
> > > detection and interpretation. We could find out in 10 years or 100
> > > years that the molecular model is only the tip of the iceberg.
>
> > You mean we could discover the existence of something we
> > have not at this point in time experienced?
>
> Of course.

that;s the contradiction.

> But we can never discover the existence of something that
> nothing has experienced, unless we create it ourselves - which
> wouldn't be discovery.

Another unsupported assertion. what witnessed the dark side
of the moon before we did?

>
>
> > > > >It's the same
> > > > > even without LSD. What you experience isn't what exists objectively,
> > > > > it is what you are capable of and conditioned to experience.
> > > > > >Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.
>
> > > > > Deterministic forces can suggest false beliefs, but they can't truly
> > > > > cause any beliefs, otherwise they wouldn't be beliefs, but mechanisms.
> > > > > Belief can only be finally caused by a believer.
>
> > > > That's your belief
>
> > > Only if my belief is true. Otherwise I can't have a belief.
>
> > Sure you can. it's just that your theory of belief would be wrong. It
> > would
> > be a false belief.
>
> How could any belief be possible under determinism?

Deterministically.

>Belief implies a
> voluntary epistemological investment.

Nope. Eg brainwashing.

>To be a believer is to choose to
> believe.

Nope

> > > > > > > It would be to
> > > > > > > imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.
>
> > > > > > Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?
>
> > > > > Probably from Lovecraft or something. But it's entirely appropriate. A
> > > > > deterministic universe means that determinism cannot be named.
>
> > > > Nope.
>
> > > How could it be named if there is no alternative quality to
> > > distinguish it from?
>
> > Because naming is lingusitic, and language allows
> > us to negate concepts even if we don;t have
> > experience of their negations. We can conceive
> > the im-material in a material universe, the im-mortal,
> > the a-temporal, the in-finite, etc, etc.
>
> You don't know that our universe doesn't extend beyond qualities that
> seem material, mortal, temporal, and finite to us though.

Re-read the above. " language allows

us to negate concepts even if we don;t have experience of their
negations."

That's "we don't have experience", not "they exist
unexperienced" (although
that;s impossible too, according to you...)

> The only
> example that could be used is a nonsense example. The universe could
> actually be 100% X-istic but we have no way of knowing it.

According to you.

> The ability
> of the mind (which is part of the universe) to conceive of X in the
> first place means that the mind can figuratively extend beyond it.

That's not figurative, it's just meaningless.

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2012 1:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

How could any belief be possible under determinism? Belief implies a
voluntary epistemological investment. To be a believer is to choose to
believe.

Is it?  Can you choose believe you are floating in the air?  Can you believe you're not reading this?

Brent

[1Z]

On Feb 14, 10:01 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 14, 10:37 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 12, 2:22 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do
> > > anything else than what you already do.
>
> > Then no AI is fully dumb, since all are adaptive to some extent.
>
> It doesn't adapt intentionally,

You know it doens't? You know we do?

> it is programmed to imitate
> adaptation. In a sense it's not fully dumb, but it's the trivial sense
> of dumb. In the deeper sense, it literally devoid of understanding or
> awareness.

You know that?

> > > Intelligence is the ability to
> > > make sense of any given context
>
> > "Any"? Then no human is fully intelligent.
>
> Right. We have no intelligence in contexts which we can't make sense
> of. We could be as dumb as computers are relative to some higher
> sentience.
>
>
>
> > > and to potentially transcend it, which
> > > is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated
> > > trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not
> > > be having this discussion.
>
> > That we are having this discussion does not prove we
> > are infinitely adaptable, as your definition "intelligent" requires.
>
> We're not infinitely adaptable nor even is intelligence infinitely
> adaptable,

So you didn;t mean "any"?

> but sense is. Even non-sense is a kind of sense.

Ermm...

>That we
> are having this discussion proves only that we have the potential to
> transcend our own programming.

AIs can transcend their programming by following
their programming-transcending programming.