evidentialism & reliabilism
kedra marbun
please make your explanations as clear as if you're talking to a
dickhead (maybe i am indeed)
$ i was just bored & decided to read something that i've never read
before. somehow i ended up at
(1) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
(2) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
$ in matter of minutes, i *saw* the ghost of Plato laughing, then
saying "get lost, dumbass"
> i have a couple of questions, here's one
==================
I. diff between evidentialism & reliabilism (as theory of
justification)
$ evidentialism: for a belief to be justified, the believer must
possess evidence that allows her to be in a mental state that
represents the belief as being true
> (1) gives some examples, 1 of them is "if the coffe in your cup tastes sweet to you, then you have evidence for believing that the coffee is sweet"
> then (1) says that evidence consists of perceptual, introspective, memorial, intuitional experiences
$ (1) says that relibilism asserts that a belief is justified iff it's
produced from reliable cognitive process
> (1) also emphasizes that a belief is justified by the reliability of its cognitive origin, not the possession of evidence that supports it
> it gives me an impression that a belief can be produced & then justified without possessing evidence, while i thought, let alone justification, even just producing a belief requires possession of evidence
$ according to my *common sense*, a belief is produced 'after' /
'before' having evidence
1. belief after evidence
$ for instance, i order a particular type of coffee & have it served
right in from of me, then i suddenly *have* a belief "the coffee is
sweet". now how is this belief formed? i tend to think to have prior
experiences, such as
a. someone has told me that that particular type of coffee is sweet
(testimony + memory)
b. i saw the coffee-guy put much sugar into the coffee (visual
perception)
c. i remember having that type of coffee before, in the same coffee
shop (memory + perception)
> all count as evidence, if i find them reliable, then my belief is justified, if not, then i get more evidences through ones that i find reliable, such as tasting
$ for beliefs such as "3 is more than 4" / "whole is greater than any
of its parts", i admit that is hard to find experiences like the
above, but if i take intuition / innate knowledge to be a cognition,
then i can include such beliefs as ones that are formed after having
evidence
$ gee, after i lay it like this, it's more like discovering belief /
bringing belief to consciousness, rather than producing
2. belief before evidence
$ on the other hand, i find it hard to imagine how i can come to the
belief "the coffee is sweet" without prior evidences, it's more likely
that the question "is it sweet?" pops into my mind
$ i think beliefs that are formed this way are ones that arise due to
psychological factors, such as desire, prejudice, etc
> i usually avoid justifying such beliefs because frankly i don't know what to make out of them
> i believe trying to justify them is dangerous due to all the biases that psychology has / will found, & this belief is justified by the reliability of my memory for this particular case (ie. i've had alot of bad experience on such belief)
$ so my conclusions are
1. in either case, to justify a belief, i need to have evidences,
prior ones are used to form the belief, posterior ones are used to
bring the probability of the belief being true up to my satisfaction /
std
2. beliefs that are *worthwhile* are almost always formed after having
evidence (ignore this if you find it offensive)
$ now, what i'm asking is can i safely conclude that reliabilism
explicates evidentialism by requiring the cognitive faculties from
which evidences are acquired to be reliable, ie. reliabilism filters
evidences, discarding ones that come from unreliable origins?
> if i'm right, then what are cognitive faculties that are usually considered to be unreliable, ie. ones that are accepted by evidentialists but not reliabilists? my best bet is that they're the psychological factors like the above
> if i'm wrong, then what is the correct interpretation of the "producing belief from reliable cognition"? & please give example
Craig Weinberg
>
> $ gee, after i lay it like this, it's more like discovering belief /
> bringing belief to consciousness, rather than producing
presumptuous to me that we should assume that 'beliefs' exist in an
objective way. Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
the active sensorimotive experiences.
To be able to read these words, for example, is a capacity borne not
out of evidence and memory, it is a sensory experience which presents
semantically coherence to the subject. We don't say 'ah yes, I
remember learning that the word 'remember' looks like this and sounds
like this and means this - rather we see and understand the meaning
directly in our natural subjective language. We can infer that in fact
we did at some point learn these associations, probably many times in
many different ways, but this is a second order analysis of the
phenomenon. It is injecting a narrative where none is necessary.
Belief is the same way; it has causal properties which can be traced,
but these are not indicative of what constitutes belief any more than
a wavelength of electromagnetic radiation constitutes what a color
looks like. Belief is passive sensory participation. Like 'potential
energy', it's not really 'there', but rather can be deduced in
hindsight.
Craig
kedra marbun
> Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
> late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
> perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
> phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
> orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
> in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
> thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
> the active sensorimotive experiences.
> Belief is the same way; it has causal properties which can be traced,
> but these are not indicative of what constitutes belief any more than
> a wavelength of electromagnetic radiation constitutes what a color
> looks like. Belief is passive sensory participation. Like 'potential
> energy', it's not really 'there', but rather can be deduced in
> hindsight.
interactions in forming a belief is hard / even impossible, but it's
not important for what i'm trying to get at. what matters is the fact
that belief has cause(s), because then i can interpret reliabilism as
clarifying evidentialism
Craig Weinberg
> On Nov 17, 8:26 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
> > late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
> > perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
> > phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
> > orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
> > in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
> > thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
> > the active sensorimotive experiences.
>
> isn't this an example of psychologically caused belief?
>
> > Belief is the same way; it has causal properties which can be traced,
> > but these are not indicative of what constitutes belief any more than
> > a wavelength of electromagnetic radiation constitutes what a color
> > looks like. Belief is passive sensory participation. Like 'potential
> > energy', it's not really 'there', but rather can be deduced in
> > hindsight.
>
> i agree that for most cases, figuring out the causes & their
> interactions in forming a belief is hard / even impossible, but it's
> not important for what i'm trying to get at. what matters is the fact
> that belief has cause(s), because then i can interpret reliabilism as
> clarifying evidentialism
thinker thinks, the prover proves. Evidence can be manufactured after
the fact.
Craig
kedra marbun
> On Nov 17, 6:57 pm, kedra marbun <kedra.mar...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Nov 17, 8:26 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
> > > late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
> > > perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
> > > phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
> > > orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
> > > in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
> > > thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
> > > the active sensorimotive experiences.
>
> > isn't this an example of psychologically caused belief?
>
> How can you tell the difference subjectively, and why would it matter?
well for this particular case i simply deduce it from your premises
1. "no evidence, no memory, no perception, no testimony, etc"
2. "The belief in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of
anxiety and thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing
it, etc". i take it as desire
but, as i've already said i see your point that causality of belief is
complex
but, classifying the methods in which beliefs are formed & in which
justifying evidences are acquired, into at least reliable & not, is
important because otherwise i'd not be able to differentiate between
evidentialism & reliabilism
i think an easy way out of this discussion is presenting your
interpretations of the 2 ism, particulary the definition of 'evidence'
according to evidentialism
> > i agree that for most cases, figuring out the causes & their
> > interactions in forming a belief is hard / even impossible, but it's
> > not important for what i'm trying to get at. what matters is the fact
> > that belief has cause(s), because then i can interpret reliabilism as
> > clarifying evidentialism
>
> But the belief may be the cause in the first place. Whatever the
> thinker thinks, the prover proves. Evidence can be manufactured after
> the fact.
indeed, i don't exclude the possibility of a belief to be caused by
other beliefs
Craig Weinberg
> On Nov 18, 8:04 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Nov 17, 6:57 pm, kedra marbun <kedra.mar...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Nov 17, 8:26 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
> > > > late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
> > > > perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
> > > > phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
> > > > orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
> > > > in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
> > > > thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
> > > > the active sensorimotive experiences.
>
> > > isn't this an example of psychologically caused belief?
>
> > How can you tell the difference subjectively, and why would it matter?
>
> well for this particular case i simply deduce it from your premises
> 1. "no evidence, no memory, no perception, no testimony, etc"
> 2. "The belief in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of
> anxiety and thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing
> it, etc". i take it as desire
That wouldn't be subjective, it would be omniscient and voyeuristic.
The subject doesn't know the cause of the belief or even that there is
a belief necessarily.
>
> but, as i've already said i see your point that causality of belief is
> complex
That's not really my point though. My point is that causality of
belief is irrelevant.
>
> but, classifying the methods in which beliefs are formed & in which
> justifying evidences are acquired, into at least reliable & not, is
> important because otherwise i'd not be able to differentiate between
> evidentialism & reliabilism
Focusing on belief formation and reliability may obscure the truth
about belief as much as it reveals. Once we understand that belief can
and does manifest spontaneously in hindsight, with no evidence or
reliability, we can see it as a sense phenomenon and it's epistemology
is self-authoritative. The task then becomes understanding how sense
works, and how factual experience can be derived through fiction.
Evidentialism & reliabilism to me are just two different forms of
pattern recognition, no more valid than intuition, perception,
emotion, etc. depending on the context.
>
> i think an easy way out of this discussion is presenting your
> interpretations of the 2 ism, particulary the definition of 'evidence'
> according to evidentialism
Which 2 ism? I think that defining terms in linguistic accord with a
theory is (sorry) a waste of time. I'm really only interested in
reality.
Craig
Craig Weinberg
> On Nov 18, 8:04 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Nov 17, 6:57 pm, kedra marbun <kedra.mar...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Nov 17, 8:26 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
> > > > late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
> > > > perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
> > > > phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
> > > > orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
> > > > in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
> > > > thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
> > > > the active sensorimotive experiences.
>
> > > isn't this an example of psychologically caused belief?
>
> > How can you tell the difference subjectively, and why would it matter?
>
> well for this particular case i simply deduce it from your premises
> 1. "no evidence, no memory, no perception, no testimony, etc"
> 2. "The belief in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of
> anxiety and thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing
> it, etc". i take it as desire
That wouldn't be subjective thought, that's omniscient. The subject
would not be consciously aware of the premises or even of their own
belief.
>
> but, as i've already said i see your point that causality of belief is
> complex
That's not my point though. My point is that causality of belief is
irrelevant, or even an obstacle to understanding it.
>
> but, classifying the methods in which beliefs are formed & in which
> justifying evidences are acquired, into at least reliable & not, is
> important because otherwise i'd not be able to differentiate between
> evidentialism & reliabilism
Why is it important to differentiate evidentialism & reliabilism?
>
> i think an easy way out of this discussion is presenting your
> interpretations of the 2 ism, particulary the definition of 'evidence'
> according to evidentialism
>
I'm not sure what 2 ism you mean. In general though I don't pursue
linguistic definitions. I don't 'believe' in them.
Craig
kedra marbun
> Why is it important to differentiate evidentialism & reliabilism?
i don't know. the proponents of them are the ones doing the
differentiation
i just want to know what exactly the diffs are, if any, & whether
they're actually important
after reading the 2 articles above further, i believe the contention
is actually on their implications, namely internalism & externalism
(sorry about another set of ism, they just don't know how to resist,
don't they), but this belief isn't yet justified
btw, if you're interested, i found this paper by Alvin Goldman that
seeks to synthesize the 2 ism
http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/Toward%20a%20Synthesis%20of%20Reliabilism%20and%20Evidentialism.pdf
kedra marbun
> Focusing on belief formation and reliability may obscure the truth
> about belief as much as it reveals. Once we understand that belief can
> and does manifest spontaneously in hindsight, with no evidence or
> reliability, we can see it as a sense phenomenon and it's epistemology
> is self-authoritative. The task then becomes understanding how sense
> works, and how factual experience can be derived through fiction.
> Evidentialism & reliabilism to me are just two different forms of
> pattern recognition, no more valid than intuition, perception,
> emotion, etc. depending on the context.
that's one of the reason endorsed by reliabilists in rejecting
evidentialism.
reliabilists say that since we don't have a degree of control over
formation of our beliefs at the same level as we have for our actions,
which is presupposed by evidentialism, mental state alone isn't enough
to justify belief, instead, AIUI, we need to
(1) investigate through what processes the belief is formed, if we
regard them as reliable, then we're justified in holding the belief,
if we don't, then cast it into fire, if we can't determine the
reliability / we're not satisfied, then
(2) acquire more evidences from processes that are regarded reliable,
until we are in a mental state that represents the belief as being
true
i disagree with your saying that causality of belief is irrelevant,
because of (1); believing that belief B isn't worthy to be justified,
is justified by reasoning, where the main reason is B doesn't come
from reliable process. hence, the causality of belief, albeit complex,
isn't irrelevant, of course we don't need to determine how exactly a
belief is formed (no need to be an omniscient), skimming over memorial
experiences about the belief's formation is enough to approximate
whether the cognitive processes are reliable. i think it's easier to
practice rather than to theorize
so IMO, (1) is important because it's our first tool in filtering
beliefs; to get beliefs that are worthy to be justified, ie. ones that
people should spend efforts in proving. ones who assert causality of
belief is irrelevant simply have more beliefs to justify
> Which 2 ism? I think that defining terms in linguistic accord with a
> theory is (sorry) a waste of time. I'm really only interested in
> reality.
i believe we're in a misunderstanding here, i, too, don't like the
vagueness characteristic of lang, but what can we do? our ability to
conceptualize clearly surpass our ability to describe them
that's why i asked for help in determining what the correct, or at
least common, interpretation of 'evidence' is according to
evidentialism, i thought this google group carrying the name
'epistemology' is one of the right place
just for fun,
(1) the 1st statement of your 1st post: "I'm not sure about how Plato
should be interpreted, but it seems presumptuous to me that we should
assume that 'beliefs' exist in an objective way"
(2) the articles aren't about Plato's view on the matter, it's just
the domain name
---------
(3) "you haven't read the 2 articles i mentioned in my 1st post"
(4) one who isn't interested in something, probably won't read
articles about it
---------
(5) "you believe you don't need to know about evidentialism-
reliabilism"
(6) discussing something with someone who doesn't interested in it,
probably will lead to misunderstanding
---------
(7) "we're in misunderstanding"
of course, there're other causes of beliefs (3), (5), (7), but i don't
need them, these are enough, & because i regard induction as reliable
(which i believe you also do, because i believe you're a scientist),
thus my belief (7) is justified, i might try to obtain more evidences,
but i'm satisfied already
make no mistake, if my belief that "you believe you don't need to know
about evidentialism-reliabilism" is in fact true, IMO, you're rightly
so. after all i'm also just *playing* around with these stuffs
Craig Weinberg
> On Nov 19, 10:20 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Why is it important to differentiate evidentialism & reliabilism?
>
> i don't know.
Oh. In that case I would assume that the question is meaningless. It's
an argument between aether and phlogiston. They're both wrong.
Craig
kedra marbun
huh?
someone not knowing about something does render that something
meaningless, but only to her, she surely can't claim that something as
a mumble jumble full of hard-to-accept untestable axioms, where
argumentative leaps are the kings
what can one say about the importance of a distinction, when he
doesn't even understand the meanings of the things being
distinguished?
suppose you don't understand the meanings of democracy & aristoracy,
what can you say about the importance of their diffs? you can say it's
meaningless to you, but ones who know what they mean don't have to, or
even can't, agree with you
don't get the entailments reversed
i'll gladly tell you the importance, when i finally hopefully learn
the meanings of them, promise
gee, i believed the topic that i brought here was basic in
epistemology because it's discussed in overview of the subject, but
the belief isn't justified evidently
spend some time to read the stuffs will you, it'll take only a few
minutes, especially for you
Craig Weinberg
I'm questioning the entire concept of belief as a logical entity
though. My point is that belief can occur spontaneously in a dream
without cause, therefore, at a fundamental level, 'belief' is a
sensorimotive event, which will automatically be justified
retroactively. The reasoning can be reliable or a complete non-
sequitur and the subject will not know the difference.
> of course we don't need to determine how exactly a
> belief is formed (no need to be an omniscient), skimming over memorial
> experiences about the belief's formation is enough to approximate
> whether the cognitive processes are reliable. i think it's easier to
> practice rather than to theorize
>
> so IMO, (1) is important because it's our first tool in filtering
> beliefs; to get beliefs that are worthy to be justified, ie. ones that
> people should spend efforts in proving. ones who assert causality of
> belief is irrelevant simply have more beliefs to justify
>
> > Which 2 ism? I think that defining terms in linguistic accord with a
> > theory is (sorry) a waste of time. I'm really only interested in
> > reality.
>
> i believe we're in a misunderstanding here, i, too, don't like the
> vagueness characteristic of lang, but what can we do?
We can focus on experiential realities rather than theories rooted in
language.
> our ability to
> conceptualize clearly surpass our ability to describe them
>
> that's why i asked for help in determining what the correct, or at
> least common, interpretation of 'evidence' is according to
> evidentialism, i thought this google group carrying the name
> 'epistemology' is one of the right place
No worries, I'm not at all representative of this google group. I'm
just trying to present a different perspective. Sorry if I crashed
your inquiry, you're not in the wrong place - I might be, but I don't
so much care about that kind of thing.
>
> just for fun,
> (1) the 1st statement of your 1st post: "I'm not sure about how Plato
> should be interpreted, but it seems presumptuous to me that we should
> assume that 'beliefs' exist in an objective way"
> (2) the articles aren't about Plato's view on the matter, it's just
> the domain name
Right, yes, my bad. You mentioned Plato initially "$ in matter of
minutes, i *saw* the ghost of Plato laughing, then saying "get lost,
dumbass"" so I thought that your question had to do with Plato. Again,
I'm not so much interested in that, I'm only interested in
consciousness itself, rather than schools of thought.
> ---------
> (3) "you haven't read the 2 articles i mentioned in my 1st post"
> (4) one who isn't interested in something, probably won't read
> articles about it
I skimmed them enough to get the gist. You're right though, I'm mainly
interested in my own ideas.
> ---------
> (5) "you believe you don't need to know about evidentialism-
> reliabilism"
> (6) discussing something with someone who doesn't interested in it,
> probably will lead to misunderstanding
I'm not discussing evidentialism-reliabilism, I'm questioning their
usefulness and presenting an alternative.
> ---------
> (7) "we're in misunderstanding"
ok
>
> of course, there're other causes of beliefs (3), (5), (7), but i don't
> need them, these are enough, & because i regard induction as reliable
> (which i believe you also do, because i believe you're a scientist),
Scientists think I'm a crazy new ager, new agers think I'm a square
scientist.
> thus my belief (7) is justified, i might try to obtain more evidences,
> but i'm satisfied already
>
> make no mistake, if my belief that "you believe you don't need to know
> about evidentialism-reliabilism" is in fact true, IMO, you're rightly
> so. after all i'm also just *playing* around with these stuffs
Yes, I only responded because you indicated that you were just curious
about it. If you were working on an academic paper with a limited
scope I wouldn't have butted in.
Craig
Craig Weinberg
> On Nov 20, 10:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Nov 20, 7:30 am, kedra marbun <kedra.mar...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Nov 19, 10:20 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Why is it important to differentiate evidentialism & reliabilism?
>
> > > i don't know.
>
> > Oh. In that case I would assume that the question is meaningless. It's
> > an argument between aether and phlogiston. They're both wrong.
>
> huh?
>
> someone not knowing about something does render that something
> meaningless, but only to her, she surely can't claim that something as
> a mumble jumble full of hard-to-accept untestable axioms, where
> argumentative leaps are the kings
I meant in a case like this, where the concepts are philosophical
constructs that seem to be based on a narrow, isolated set of
assumptions, that I personally give them zero consideration by
default. They are just different prejudices about the concept of
beliefs to me.
>
> what can one say about the importance of a distinction, when he
> doesn't even understand the meanings of the things being
> distinguished?
Is it really that complicated though? Evidentialism is really the
assumption that propositions can be reliably related to external
indexes and reliabilism is the assumption that propositions can be
internally indexed by the reliability of their formation process. It
think that both views are critically flawed, as they frame the
construct of belief as an objective mechanism of logic rather than a
subjective perceptual experience.
> suppose you don't understand the meanings of democracy & aristoracy,
> what can you say about the importance of their diffs? you can say it's
> meaningless to you, but ones who know what they mean don't have to, or
> even can't, agree with you
You are assuming that because I don't care about the distinction means
that I don't understand what they are about. I understand enough to
know that I probably don't care about them is all. I have a completely
different way of looking at the underlying nature of the thing. If I
have a theory about political development which is rooted in
evolutionary biology, that might cause me to see the difference
between democracy and aristocracy as superficial and linguistic-
conceptual, which is more or less the case I find myself in here. I
think that the whole premise of either evidentialism or reliabilism is
obsolete.
>
> don't get the entailments reversed
>
> i'll gladly tell you the importance, when i finally hopefully learn
> the meanings of them, promise
>
> gee, i believed the topic that i brought here was basic in
> epistemology because it's discussed in overview of the subject, but
> the belief isn't justified evidently
> spend some time to read the stuffs will you, it'll take only a few
> minutes, especially for you
Yes, please don't take my feedback on this with any kind of consensus
around here. I just happened to see your questions and they got me
thinking about belief. I've only started following this group a couple
weeks ago. I'm sure that others who are more familiar with the
academic perspective would have more valuable feedback for you - I'm
only here to test my own ideas about consciousness.
Craig
kedra marbun
> Yes, please don't take my feedback on this with any kind of consensus
> around here. I just happened to see your questions and they got me
> thinking about belief. I've only started following this group a couple
> weeks ago. I'm sure that others who are more familiar with the
> academic perspective would have more valuable feedback for you - I'm
> only here to test my own ideas about consciousness.
too bad the others don't find my question interesting enough to be
answered
on the other hand, your timing couldn't get better, striking a beginer
is indeed effective, because i've become less interested in
philosophical perspective on the matter
so could you point me some resources that offer a whole diff point of
view, one that doesn't just fire up some axioms & build its way up?
introductory articles would be good
Thanks