> Part of the definition of MJ is that it doesn't use numeric scores. Also,
> it tends to use 5-7 categories, not 10. But OK; that's not important.
>
>>
>> #voters..A..B
>> 1000....9..6
>> 1.......5..6
>> 1000....5..0
>>
>> I believe that B wins the MJ election: median(A)=5 median(B)=6.
>>
>
> Right.
--yes, and various MJ example elections of this same general nature,
but more realistic, for example with all voters using full range, are
stated in
http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html
> It is theoretically possible for the MJ winner to not equal the Condorcet
> winner.
--which happened in France 2007, apparently:
http://rangevoting.org/France2007.html
> But in real elections, that will never happen unless the MJ winner
> was within a couple of percentage of beating the CW pairwise, AND
--Sorry, in France 2007, the pairwise victory of Bayrou over (the MJ
winner) Sarkozy was apparently 55:45 or 54:46.
> there is
> a dissimilar rival threatening both candidates.
--Segolene Royal?
> In other words, the
> real-world BR penalty for this kind of failure is very small.
--Jameson Quinn is being rather cavalier here. I'm unsure he's right.
Revisit the examples in the first part of
http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html
In my opinion though, the idea that MJ maybe can substantially avoid
the "Burr dilemma" problem gives MJ a lot of new energy, and an
exciting research prospect that JQ might want to undertake (in my
dreams) is to figure out how to model "partly strategic" voters,
modify IEVS while at the same time cleaning it up and making it nicer
and more user-friendly, and then rerun IEVS and see what happens re
Bayesian regret. Conclusions about MJ, or about something else, might
change.
Also, the fact I think we understand why MJ had that problem in France 2007
makes you wonder if there is a way to fix it. [I haven't thought of
any ways to fix MJ except ugly ones that make it even more
disgustingly complicated, but...]