At 02:03 PM 5/9/2013, Warren D Smith wrote:
> >> Which would you prefer:
> >>
> >> A great education for 1/2 the students and a poor education for the other
> >> 1/2?
> >> OR
> >> An okay education for all the students?
> >>
> >> Is there a formula that could help us decide which is more just?
>
>--interesting.
Yeah, interesting question with responses that say more about those
commenting than about society and utilitarianism.
Basically, ask a question which is unanswerable without specifying a
universe of assumptions, and the answers you get tell you about the
people answering, not about the supposed topic of the question. Which
in this case is extremely poorly defined.
Is education some critical survival condition? Are people happier
with an education or not? Is happiness a value, and is it correlated
with "great education"?
And what is this "justice' thing, anyway, and how do we measure it so
we can make comparisons?
>One could argue that (maybe) society is going to be way worse if NOBODY gets a
>really great education. (No scientific progress?)
Yes, it could be argued. There are an infinite number of accessory
conditions that could be asserted as possible.
I consider the value of scientific progress to still be
controversial. Yeah, there are some great benefits. But ... there are
also some costs.
Totally unconsidered in the question is cost. I could *guess* that
the question has set up a zero-sum game. There is a fixed amount of
this thing called "education," and it is to be divided up. So, should
everyone get an equal amount or should it be divided in some other way?
Does everyone *want* education? What if one student wants to sit in
the sun and enjoy the weather, and another wants to dive into the books?
"Justice," however is a concept with heavy moral implications.
Injustice is "bad." What does that mean? What does "bad" mean? Whose
idea of "bad"?
"Bad" isn't something discernable in reality, it's something we
create through interpretation. It's a story.
It's *very* human to create these stories. But that doesn't mean we
need to believe that they are merely something discovered in reality.
>One could counterargue that for any particular person, he'd rather take the
>mediocre education, than flip a coin to get {great, or zero} education.
Or lift a finger. Or spend a dime or the time.
Or ... education is inequitably made available, with this or that
group disadvantaged and oppressed. Just more story.
There is no cheese down this hole.
Education is valuable, my opinion, my choice. However, not all
education is equal. Some is cheap and extremely valuable, some is
expensive and next to useless.
Useless for what? That returns us to the fundamental question, the
source and definition of "value." I've pointed to happiness as some
kind of metric. Maybe we could make a happiness meter, it's not
impossible. Would we agree on what it indicates? How would you feel
about someone else telling you how happy you are?
And that hints at something else. We create happiness ourselves,
through what we declare. Very much, we value that freedom.
>So it is at least conceivable that the society will be better off with
>one course,
>but any particular individual is better off with the other course.
>
>There are certainly genuine examples of such contradictions. For example,
>you personally are probably better off if you pollute, or if you steal
>valuable stuff.
>But if everybody did that, society would be worse off than if nobody did.
Only a narrow and befogged mind would conclude that one is better off
by being a thief. While there are exceptions, to be sure, people
steal because they believe they are forced to. They are not happy
people. A normal human is a social animal; our own happiness is
linked to that of everyone around us.
Range voting works with certain assumptions about the relationship of
range votes with personal assessment of utility. It works with
*simulations* that use simplified models of utility and
"utilitarianism" that makes assmptions about utility summation over
the electorate. It is not necessary to conclude or believe in
"utilitarianism," that maximizing the raw sum is an absolute good,
and that *distribution* or *variance* is irrelevant.
If we set up a situation where a naive summation analysis allows
serious harm to a few, while spreading out some good to many, to
maximize the sum, we run the risk that the few who are seriously
harmed will then have high motivation to *respond*. One person can do
a great deal of damage, if they are sufficiently motivated. So there
is something to be balanced against simple summation.
The process starts with the concept of majority *consent,* but that's
inadequate. The *goal* should be, for a true social welfare
optimization, unanimous consent. In any given situation, that goal
may not be attainable, but it's worth an effort to approach it.