Thesecond has been talked about for at least fifteen years now that
I've heard, being that grants from the NSF and other such government
agencies seem to select for your expected results as well as your
topic of study, abilities and planning process. What I mean there is
that if your science would show reveal an understanding of something
that the government has taken an opposite policy on, or if it would
produce a technology which is contrary to moral policies of the
administration currently in office, you're denied funding and never
given a chance to produce results which would support your non-"party
line" conclusions.
To me it seems as if relying on the government to produce independent
and ethically undiluted research and technologies seems to be a bad
idea. Not tommention the issue of what woukd happen to innovation when
it was constantly being subjected to bureacracy and that whole lot of
ambiguous but possibly valid questions. I think the issue with
licensing in the first place is that any licensing system carried out
to the logical extreme we see in the patent system today will stiffle
innovation and promote unfair advantages for the companies with the
most patent trolls.
I don't have an answer as to what system to choose, and I hope you
don't take offense to my critique of your ideas, but theres my
thoughts on the subject. Time for work :P
Jonathan Nesser
jonatha...@gmail.com
diybioandneurosci.blogspot.com
Written on a tablet, forgive any typos, I'm new to this :)
First, I think patenting, in the US, is a horribly broken concept and
needs revamped top to bottom. I'd say the fraud is bad and use the
terms like 'crisis', 'bubble', and 'robo-patenting' but it's not every
American Family's dream to have a multi-million dollar patent with a
white picket frame around it and if every patent in the world were
voided tomorrow, the losers would be lawyers losing their jobs.
Second, you overestimate the deterrence of licensing fees on the
market from a farmer's perspective. I'm not sure of the exact numbers
of farmers deterred by the fees, but it's few, they're small, and
typically more centered around phobia/skepticism/risk rather than
actual cost (large parts of the world don't even want GM 'stuff'). You
have a quaint view of farming. A decent farmer can usually offset fees
by splitting yields up between the market and producing seed for
whichever seed company he buys from. Farmers are an integral part of
the research and production systems; farmers were quite successfully
propagating genes and sterilizing seed corn before Watson discovered
the structure of DNA. Lastly, GM crops are hardly the ideal model, a
cloned lower intestine is going to need significantly different
regulation and testing than BT corn, and the profit structure to carry
the cost of regulation (for crops) is pretty well established.
Third, nepotism and cronyism are going to be a part of every system,
but your system seems ripe to foster it. With a glut of Gov't money,
you'll have a plethora of mediocre research being done at multiple
times the cost. This was obvious at the pinnacle of the HGP; Celera/
TIGR sequencing the same genome in less time for a lower cost than the
NHGRI. To this day, diploid sequencing is being carried out
overwhelmingly in private industry. IMO, this is one of the Clinton
Administration's most brilliant political moves, fomenting the
competition and then pulling the rug out from under the 'victor'. The
resulting 'pop' of 'Named Bubble X' in the market didn't do the
industry any favors, but it certainly wasn't the catastrophe(s) we've
seen lately. I wonder if, in other markets, a policy of 'disruptive
deregulation' would work as well as enhanced regulation. IMO, Barack's
moves were weak, it would be relatively easy to create a patent system
that protects industry AND fosters individual and small-business
growth, e.g. Any company or NFP that isn't obligated to comply with
federally regulated employment practices (<20-100 employees depending)
is also exempt from infringing on patent-holders' rights.
About nepotism and cronyism: Of course there needs to be transparency
and protocols put in place that keep conflicts of interest from
forming in the government, effectively separating the regulators from
the regulated. Laws that would keep tabs on communications between the
industry and regulators (may be very hard to implement, I admit but
it's just an idea). One of the big problems with regulators today is
that many are former (maybe even current) employees of the companies
they regulate. Maybe this could be turned around into something
positive: former employees of one company regulate that company's
competitors. Crazy enough to work?
Exempt from infringement is not an exemption from generation and
ownership. I'm talking about more of stratifying corporate class
conflict, transferring infringement away from idea ownership and
towards market competition. Merck wants to sue Abbott for patent
infringement? Okay. Merck wants to sue 20-employee biotech startup
XYZ, the onus is on Merck to establish how 20 employees infringed on
Merck's business. Now, if 20-employee biotech startup XYZ plans to
become a 20,000 employee company doing billions in revenues, they
should probably come with a few better and different ideas than the
ones that largely overlap with Merck's. On the flip side, Merck takes
an idea that destroys a 20 employee company, they'd better have AT
LEAST 20 employees generating more income/data off the idea than the
20 employee startup did AND they could probably still wind up owing
the startup money. This doesn't force a 'win-win' situation, but makes
more room for one.
> About nepotism and cronyism: Of course there needs to be transparency
> and protocols put in place that keep conflicts of interest from
> forming in the government, effectively separating the regulators from
> the regulated. Laws that would keep tabs on communications between the
> industry and regulators (may be very hard to implement, I admit but
> it's just an idea). One of the big problems with regulators today is
> that many are former (maybe even current) employees of the companies
> they regulate. Maybe this could be turned around into something
> positive: former employees of one company regulate that company's
> competitors. Crazy enough to work?
Academia is rampant with open and known cronyism and nepotism to the
point where it's encouraged. Grad students HAVE to get into the right
lab, regardless of their ideas, skills, preferences, or other merit.
The only effective treatment I've seen for eliminating cronyism and
nepotism is destitution. Not necessarily the most workable solution,
but kinda the opposite of making it rain. If we showered money on any
random schlub who wanted to do a biology experiment, DIY would be a
joke. Additionally, we'd quickly run out of money and produce poor
results.
Two of the big problems I see with regulation today is; 1.
Whistleblowers and individuals are near entirely powerless. You can
find all sorts of ways to legally violate a last will. Not so much
with the transfer of patent rights. If you yourself or someone you
know was unduly influenced to transfer their patent rights, there's
not a lot you can do. 2. Bilateral enforcement (this gets into
overhauling the patent process in general). Patents, rather than
behavioral concepts creativity, industriousness, or innovation, are
the atomic source of ideas, so if a generally industrial, creative,
and innovating company happens to violate the patent rights of a
patent troll, the investigation/legal proceedings is conducted solely
in the context of the patent. So a truly productive company gets sued
by a patent troll, rather than examining the company's IP practices
AND the patent trolls IP practices, only the company's IP is suspect.
Quite literally, a creative company produces no product and has lots
of patents. I don't see more laws and more lawyers changing this
problem.