Media Monitor, Thursday 26 November 2009

Teachers and government reached an OSD agreement in September. But the Department of Education had said it would not be able to implement it imediately because of a lack of cash.

A task team was then formed to source funds to pay for the increases agreed between the unions and the department. “This means that the partial payment will not be implemented by the end of November,” said South African Democratic Teachers Union general secretary Mugwena Maluleke. “The payment system will be loaded on December 14 for payment on December 18 for the recognition of experience, pay progression (3percent) – backdated to July 1 2009, and a once-off 3percent bonus for all senior and master teachers.“The supplementary payment for the upgrade of teachers will occur on December 24. “After months of waiting, teachers will finally receive their OSDs, not partially, but in full. “Sadtu leadership continued to fight in order to secure the full amount in the current financial year – as opposed to the initial proposal of April 1 2010,” Maluleke said.

An OSD is a system of salary progression. Key aspects of the agreement include:

· A review of salary structures;

· Recognition of experience where teachers, with effect from July 1, will receive a 1percent increase for every three years of service;

· All teachers will receive a 3 percent pay rise backdated to July 1 and a 1percent annual pay progression thereafter; and

· Senior and master teachers will receive a once-off cash bonus of 3 percent of their annual salary.

1.2 Satawu ponders ruling on T-Sytems

By Ann Crotty, Business Report, 26 November 2009

THE SA Transport and Allied Workers' Union (Satawu) is considering whether or not to appeal the Competition Commission's decision to approve unconditionally the sale of Arivia.kom to T-Systems, the local subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom.

Arivia.kom is the information technology services provider owned by Eskom Enterprises and Transnet. The sale to T-Systems, which was initially announced in late 2006, has been delayed by a variety of difficulties, including Satawu's opposition.

In addition there were reportedly complicated negotiations over the inclusion of two of Arivia.kom's largest contracts, one with Eskom and one with Transnet.

The sale to T-Systems includes five-year outsourcing agreements with Eskom, reportedly valued at R400 million a year, and Transnet, valued at R200m a year.

The value of the transaction has not been disclosed, but because it is classified as an intermediate one, it does not require confirmation by the Competition Tribunal.

Norma Craven, the head of Satawu's legal department, said yesterday the union was extremely disappointed that the commission had not appeared to give any consideration to issues that it had raised in its discussion with the commission.

Craven also said she was disturbed that she had to find out about the commission's decision from a journalist.

"While we respect the limitations under which the commission has to operate, as a participant in these proceedings we should have been informed before the media."

Craven added that although Satawu had raised the fact that a resolution at Polokwane had prohibited further privatisations, she accepted that this was outside the commission's jurisdiction.

"However we had other concerns, which appear not to have been addressed." One of the concerns related to the fact that the merging parties had claimed wide-ranging confidentiality and the union had not been given the information necessary to express a view on competition-related aspects of the transaction.

"In the past confidential information has been given to us and we have signed undertakings, but this time we were not given the information and not told why."

A second concern was that the new employer, T-Systems, was guaranteeing the Arivia.kom jobs for only one year. "The implication was that if the company needs to retrench employees in a year's time that it would be Arivia.kom employees who would be retrenched. We wanted an undertaking that all of the employees would be treated equally in the event of any retrenchments."

She said there was now a situation in which Arivia.kom employees were transferred to a new firm not knowing if they would have a job later.

1.2 Sadtu slams plan for education in Cape

Cape Times, 25 November 2009

The Western Cape government's new 10-year plan for education will have officials, including teachers and principals, sign performance contracts.

Announcing a new strategic plan for education in the province yesterday, Premier Helen Zille said that, for the first time, the province would be able to hold teachers, principals and schools accountable for failure to achieve set targets.

But the SA Democratic Teachers' Union (Sadtu) has poured cold water on the new plan, saying any change to the conditions of employment for teachers would have to be negotiated nationally.

Sadtu provincial secretary Jonavon Rustin said there were no national provisions for teachers and principals to sign performance contracts.

"The setting of targets is good, but we will oppose any plan to change the conditions of service for teachers," Rustin said.

This came as the province battles an increased number of failing schools with diminished literacy and numeracy levels. In July, Education MEC Donald Grant released shock figures, indicating that 900 schools in the province achieved a pass rate of less than 40 percent between 2004 and 2008.

For 2010, the plan envisions an improvement in literacy in Grade 3 of 1.5 (55) percent, then 10,5 (65) percent in 2012; 20,5 (75) percent in 2014 and ultimately 36,5 (90) percent in 2019 as opposed to the current level of 53,5 percent.

Numeracy in Grade 3, currently at 35 percent across schools in the province, would ultimately be at 80 percent by 2019.

The plan also envisions the matric pass rate in 2019 at 87 percent for 50 000 learners as opposed to the current 76,67 percent for 34 577 learners writing the senior exam.

Increased numbers of matriculants, Grant said, would be as a result of improvements in the school system, stemming the number of high school drop-outs. Of the 94 784 children who enrolled for public schools in 1997, only 43 470 made it to matric with only 33 percent of those qualifying for an exemption, Grant said.

Apart from increased accountability for teachers and principals at individual schools, the management of schools will also come under increased control from district offices.

Zille described the four-page document which contains the plan as one that was "comprehensive, clear and simple" in articulating the provincial government's vision for an improved education system.

She said the provincial government was committed to transparency and would be held to account for the plan.

The provincial government would also insist that tests gauging numeracy and literacy of learners would be taken externally through a third-party service provider.

Zille said the process of establishing the plan would be completed by the end of February 2010, saying its implementation would be done in a "comprehensible, comprehensive manner".

"These are the first for any (provincial) government department. These are stretched targets but they('re) in the realms of possibility," said Zille.

The provincial Education Department's newly appointed head of department, Penny Vinjevold, said the Western Cape's economy required "top end" skills which explained the plan's emphasis on maths and science.

"We've set modest targets for 2010... this is a massive ship which turns (very) slow," said Vinjevold of the task undertaken by her department.

2. South Africa

2.1 Big surprise: Cosatu wants wholesale change to the economy

By Stephen Grootes, Eyewitness News, 26 November 2009

Cosatu clearly belongs to those who believe this economic crisis is a terrible thing to waste. It wants a massive structural change to the economy, claiming that’s the only way out of the crisis.

Cosatu’s central executive committee met earlier this week, and after being briefed by three cabinet ministers (difficult to imagine that happening under Mbeki), decided to “report back”. Zwelinzima Vavi being Zwelinzima Vavi, wasn’t going to let his “policy” press conference be hijacked by talking politics. So he split them up, and he’ll talk politics next week. Brilliant player that he is, he now gets two bites at the media cherry pie.

Vavi and his fellow workers are always going to call for “wholesale” change. After all, if you’re a worker belonging to Cosatu, you’re hardly likely to be one of capitalism’s big winners. But this time, Vavi has come armed with an economic plan. It contains something old, something new, something borrowed, and of course, something red. Quite a bit red, actually.

Let’s start with that old Cosatu saw, “inflation targeting has killed this economy and killed jobs”. And Cosatu believes government “has no dubious motives” when it says it’s willing to discuss the mandate of the Reserve Bank. Currently, the finance ministry’s letter to the bank asks it to keep inflation between three and six percent, thus it uses interest rates to keep it there. Cosatu is now to “debate vigorously” with the finance ministry on this. Cosatu’s not wrong, in that lowering interest rates would lead to more jobs. It would also lead to higher inflation and people with jobs would find they have less money in their pockets, and that’s worth avoiding. When asked directly if he thinks the end of inflation targeting is near, Vavi doesn’t appear to be confident enough to say “yes”. He hedges a little.

The something slightly new is the currency. Vavi believes the rand is simply too strong. He wants it to go back to R10 to the dollar. And this time, he says Cosatu’s willing to enter “tactical alignments” with business and other sectors of society. An interesting alliance that, Cosatu and business. Being unholy enough, it might just work.

And on to the something borrowed; power, in this case. Cosatu doesn’t really have it, and the ANC does. So, to borrow Business Day’s Karima Brown’s favourite question (and it’s a goodie); how is Cosatu going to get the ANC to do what it wants? This elicits exasperated sighs around the table. Well, from the officials at least; a slight quickening from the journos. Eventually, Cosatu’s president Sdumo Dlaimini gives a half answer. “It took us 10 years to get policy changed on Aids, 10 years to get it changed on Zimbabwe”. In essence, he says, change will come, but it’s a slow process.

He’s borrowed that line from the communists, who still claim “socialism will come eventually”. But it does beg the question then, what about comments like those from ANC treasurer Mathews Phosa, who told investors in London recently, “we will stick to conservative macro-economic policies”. That really does seem to make nonsense of Cosatu’s claims, doesn’t it?. “Aha,” says Vavi, “if you take every utterance from an ANC leader seriously, you’ll end up in a mental hospital. The ANC is a broad church, and we rely on what we hear in the alliance summits.” Ok, that clears it up then. So, you believe what you’re told behind closed doors, and not what is said in public. Basically, Vavi says Phosa is talking rubbish.

Cosatu is clearly very conscious that there are those who claim the nationalists in the ANC are beginning to win the war against the leftists. That its supporters, and certain cheerleaders in the media are realising that Jacob Zuma is now president, and the economy is still almost exactly the same. It also knows that if you push too hard, you’ll get a massive response. And so it’s got to thread a needle carefully, lose a battle here and there, and hopefully you’ll win the war in the end. Vavi knows this too, and is quick to say, “those who have been singing of the death of the left; I hope they’ll be eating their words soon”.

Is he right? How much influence does Cosatu actually have? Watch the argument over the Reserve Bank’s mandate.

2.2 A reply to Julius Malema - Jeremy Cronin

Jeremy Cronin, SACP Deputy General Secretary and Deputy Minister of Transport, 26 November 2009

SACP deputy leader responds to ANCYL criticism of his article on nationalisation

Nationalisation of the Mines... let's try that again

Well...it's not easy these days to have a robust but comradely discussion. The Sowetan of November 20 demonstrated this point graphically. On page four of last Friday's edition of the paper a brief single column story was head-lined "Cronin backs Malema". This story correctly quotes me agreeing with cde Malema that the Freedom Charter, in calling for the "wealth to be shared", was effectively demanding nationalisation as one important means for achieving this objective.

But turn the page of the very same issue of the Sowetan and there you will find a five-column story head-lined "You're no messiah - Malema attacks Cronin over nationalisation". Both stories are referring to exactly the same original intervention (see here) that I made in last week's Umsebenzi On-Line!

I don't blame the journalists involved. (But what were the senior editorial staff smoking on the Thursday night the edition went to the printers?) The confusion in the Sowetan reflects cde Malema's own misunderstanding of what I and many other alliance comrades have been trying to argue on the question of the nationalisation of the mines.

I have no interest in cde Malema's personalised diatribes (see article). They only serve to distract from what are important positive and constructive points that the ANCYL collective, at least, has been making on the topic of nationalisation. Let's rather focus on what I take to be the substantive matters that cde Malema imagines he is raising in his response to me.

Nationalisation vs. socialisation?

"Cde Jeremy Cronin", he writes, "takes issue with the fact that the ANCYL has called for the nationalisation of mines, instead of socialisation". He then quotes from SACP resolutions that call for the re-nationalisation of SASOL, for instance.

But I never said the SACP is opposed to, or doesn't ever use the word "nationalisation". What I did say is that fascist, apartheid and progressive states have all implemented nationalisation programmes. Even neo-liberal states have recently implemented massive "nationalisation" programmes. George W Bush jnr, for instance, took over the giant US mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the tune of $5.4 trillion dollars. This is a national debt with which ordinary US citizens will now be saddled for generations to come.

When we call for nationalisation we need to spell out what KIND of nationalisation we have in mind. We should closely examine whose CLASS interests nationalisation in any particular case serves. And that is why I think it is always useful to link nationalisation to socialisation.

The ANCYL's important July 15 framework document "ANCYL's Position on the Nationalisation of Mines" (which, I admit, I had not properly re-read before writing last week) makes the same basic point in different words: "Nationalisation is not a panacea for SA's developmental challenges, but it should in the manner we are proposing it, entail democratising the commanding heights of the economy, to ensure they are not just legally owned by the state, but that they are thoroughly democratised and controlled by the people" (see here).

I think that makes the point more clearly than I did. No disagreement.

Is the Freedom Charter calling for nationalisation?

In my original intervention, I spent some time AGREEING with cde Malema and the ANCYL on this point. Although the Charter doesn't literally use the word "nationalisation", it is patently obvious to anyone who knows the mid-1950s context in which it was adopted that the relevant clause had in mind that the mines, banks and other monopoly industries should be nationalised.

Drawing from the ANCYL framework document, cde Malema quotes both President Albert Luthuli (in 1956) and President OR Tambo (in 1969) making this fact absolutely clear. They are wonderful quotations from great leaders, and we should thank the ANCYL for reminding us of them.

Again, no disagreement.

Mineral beneficiation

It is here that I made my own misstep. I was trying to introduce a touch of polemical spice into what can sometimes be a dry topic. I suggested, more in jest than seriously, that cde Malema possibly thought of beneficiation largely in terms of bling. It was a silly comment, and I apologise. I had not realised that cde Malema had such a delicate skin.

But, again, let's not allow polemical flourishes (in this case my own) to obscure substantive issues. Cde Malema correctly asserts that: "Mining as a critical component of the South African economy should necessarily be used to expand and industrialise the South African economy in a more developmental [way], instead [of] a parasitic mechanism pursued by the current owners of mining activities in SA."

I agree. I also agree that the majority of our mineral production continues to be exported largely unprocessed and that this reproduces our semi-colonial economic status in the world economy. It also costs SA many potential jobs.

So where, then, if at all, do we actually begin to part ways?

Whose class interests?

When I briefly described the seriously problematic features of the actual beneficiation that occurs currently with Eskom, Sasol, Arcelor Mittal and aluminium smelters, I WASN'T saying "we have already got beneficiation, so let's not worry about more beneficiation." I was making an entirely different point. It is a point that cde Malema seems, for whatever reason, not to want to grasp.

The SACP firmly supports the principle and objectives of broad based black economic empowerment. In fact, it was the Communist Party in 1929 that first pioneered the strategic perspective of black majority empowerment in SA. But the moment you disconnect a class analysis from a national (or, if you like, "race") analysis, then BEE inevitably starts to lose its broad-based Charterist character. If you disconnect a class analysis from a race analysis you run the danger of wittingly or unwittingly serving the interests of monopoly capital in SA and its comprador and parasitic allies - many of whom have been close to, or actually within our movement.

Take the case of the "Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act" (2002). During the parliamentary hearings on the Bill, COSATU and other progressive forces argued that commitment to downstream beneficiation should be made a mandatory requirement for any 30-year mining licence. However, the Department of Minerals and Energy and its then minister, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, resisted this amendment. Many comrades had the distinct impression that key ministerial advisers (some of them now in COPE) were keen to use the legislation as leverage to force mining conglomerates to provide a slice of action to aspirant black share-holders. But they were less keen to "burden" the profit-maximising aspirations of incumbent mining corporations and their future partners with responsibilities for beneficiation.

As a result, the present Act is weak when it comes to requiring beneficiation. We now have a sad irony. The Chinese, for instance, are willing and keen to invest in manganese beneficiation manufacturing plants here in SA. But this possibility is compromised by the fact that many of our manganese deposits have been leased out for 30 years to the same old established mining conglomerates and their new "patriotic" bourgeois hangers-on.

This example raises a number of related issues. For instance, would a legislative amendment to the Act not be a more effective (and affordable) way to leverage developmental beneficiation, at least for any new licences? This is a practical question, not a desperate attempt to avoid nationalisation at any cost.

There are many other job-creating, down-stream possibilities where the use of democratic state power to leverage transformation out of the mining sector should be considered. For instance, some genuinely patriotic emerging black entrepreneurs have been asking me why we do not impose national shipping quotas on the mine monopoly sector. More than 90% by volume of all of our exports (mostly minerals) are by sea. Yet all of the shipping involved is foreign-owned, the crews are overwhelming non-South African, and the shipping lines pay taxes in other countries. SA's once relatively significant maritime sector is now down to one single registered ship. Meanwhile, the rest of our logistics network (roads, freight rail and ports) still dedicates billions of rands of public money to lowering the cost to doing business for the mining conglomerates and their new allies.

None of this means that we should simply rule out the question of nationalising the mines. And the SACP has never ruled this out. But it does mean that you don't necessarily need to nationalise mining operations to achieve major immediate transformational objectives.

The ANCYL's framework discussion document does a good job in defending the broad principles of the Freedom Charter against all kinds of reformist back-sliding. It does a good job of defending the principled right of a democratic state to nationalise the commanding heights of the economy to advance democratisation. But it remains vague when it comes to the actual detail of what mines should be nationalised, and how they should be nationalised. It doesn't address itself to the question of whether nationalisation would be the most strategic and sustainable use of massive public resources at this point in time.

Above all, the ANCYL's document is not able to allay suspicions about whose class interests would (perhaps unwittingly) be served by nationalising mines in the midst of the current recession.

As the still exploratory shipping example above should illustrate, the SACP has never argued that there cannot be shared, multi-class points of strategic patriotic convergence. Multi-class alliances are exactly what a national democratic revolution is about. But the possibility of convergence does not mean that each and every promotion of black-owned capital always advances national liberation. Such promotion (or bailing out) might result, in specific cases, in substantial broad based black economic DIS-empowerment.

The SACP certainly wants to pursue the discussion around the ownership and control of the economy with the ANCYL and with the rest of our alliance. Hopefully cde Malema in his busy schedule will find time to be part of this discussion some time before June next year.

Asikhulume!!

2.3 Critique of a critic

Stanley Uys & George Palmer Politicsweb, 26 November 2009

Stanley Uys & George Palmer say Anthony Butler is creating confusion not clarity.

Critics of the "new" ANC come in three flavours. There are those who view it as fundamentally racist, absolutist, corrupt and power-hungry. Those who offer a more benign assessment of the way it is implementing its "liberation theology". And those who like to have it both ways.

Anthony Butler, professor of political science at Witwatersrand University, is in the third category. Writing in Business Day, he tells us - and presumably his students too - that "Critics sometimes argue that political uncertainty has been created by a new fluidity in ANC politics" (see article).

Jacob Zuma "is supposedly pulled this way and that by members of the unruly Polokwane coalition that elected him...collisions of complex and unfathomable forces leave us with no real basis for prediction Such ideas have resulted in refreshingly exciting political reportage. It is questionable, however, whether institutional and political realities have changed much."

The "new fluidity" at Polokwane in December 2007 was "refreshingly exciting." For those at the receiving end, as well as those who created it? For those who suffered the trauma of defeat? For the 40 percent who supported the loser, Thabo Mbeki? "Refreshingly exciting" are not sensitive words.

The most important of the "institutional and political realities" that Butler seems to have overlooked is that Jacob Zuma is now the ANC's and South Africa's president - and Thabo Mbeki is not. And other events followed, like the appointment of Zuma's first cabinet, the hysteria it evoked among the Left, the changes Zuma had to make (real or tactical), the attempted crucifixion of Trevor Manuel, etc.?

Butler says Zuma "supposedly" was pulled "this way and that". There was nothing "supposed" about the way Cosatu secretary general Zwelinzima Vavi brushed Zuma aside as no "messiah," making it plain that he did not speak for the ANC?

Butler advises readers to "adjust to the diversity of voices that is necessary in a democratic society". How do they do this when Zuma's two principal backers, the ANCYL and SACP, are trading blows with each other?

Does the ANCYL now support those who think the SACP is making a take-over bid for the ANC leadership, and that it should be cut off at the knees? Is the SACP, with its small membership, still needed now that Zuma is installed as president? Do loyal "ANC" members (whatever that means today) take sides, or look the other way? How do they "adjust to diversity"?

Also, by diversity of voices, Butler cannot avoid including the stinging exchange between the ANCYL, led by Julius Malema, and the SACP's deputy general secretary, Jeremy Cronin. Malema calls Cronin no "white messiah", the SACP retorts that Malema is "racist", and the ANCYL counter-responds by labelling Cronin as "reactionary."

Meanwhile, Malema practices ethnic cleansing (in the name of "diversity") by putting the "minorities" (whites, coloureds, Indians) in Zuma's first cabinet in their place. They are on notice that all blacks are equal, but Africans are more equal than others - and should have those ministerial jobs.

Butler explains that "diversity" was Zuma's fault. Zuma's "laissez-faire approach has encouraged an explosion of ideological and racial background noise" with the result that "The politics of the ‘new' ANC may look more tumultuous than they really are". What many of us see as fierce infighting, Butler looks on as "refreshingly exciting."

So Butler stumbles from one contradiction to another: Zuma has delivered on his promise of a "collective leadership," but because of his greater tolerance for dissension than Mbeki's, he has created confusing "background noise". Also, although Butler questions whether "Institutional and political realities have changed much", nevertheless "realities are closing in rapidly on a liberation movement that has found it hard to modernise its ideas and energise its political and organisational systems."

What this means is that although nothing much of importance has changed, change is fast approaching, and the ANC is not up to dealing with it. Butler would have us believe that the ANC's weakness is due to "a fast-changing external environment including growing unemployment. deindustrialisation, water and electricity system crises, community protest and soaring AIDS deaths...".

The ANC's real problem, says Butler, is not the ideological infighting, divisions and disputes that some critics suggest, but "a sort of paralysis of action because the ANC finds it hard to modernise its ideas and energise its political and organisational systems". Butler appears to be suggesting here that the "paralysis" is taking place within a common ideology - that the ideology itself is not under acute strain.

Now comes Butler's real clanger: "Once we recognise the background noise for what it is, it is no longer credible to claim that a radical and interventionist state is emerging".

In other words, the years spent by Cosatu and the SACP, and the hundreds of thousands of words they have spoken and written demanding an interventionist state, were not only wasted, but irrelevant? The clamour for an interventionist state is at a peak now. Scarcely a day passes without a leading member of Cosatu, SACP, ANCYL or YCL, or a document issued by of them, or an affiliated trade union, demanding exactly what Butler scoffs at: an interventionist state.

As far as Butler is concerned, it seems the battle for interventionism has been lost already. Finished and klaar, as Jackie Selebei would say. All that is left is just "background noise"? Butler is right when he says much of ANC politics is "noise," but beyond the "noise," at the heart of the new battle for control of South Africa, is the interventionist state. Will it be won, lost or mediated? Casually to proclaim the battle as lost already is an analysis too far.

We have not come across a single South African analyst (and there are some very perceptive ones among them, particularly black analysts, who are at the rock face) who can tell at this stage who (when the bells ring) will support Zuma; who constitute his biggest threat and why? What would their threat/appeal be to a) Luthuli House and b) the rank and file or the majority of ANC decision-makers? Could it be Zulu versus Xhosa? Or radicals versus conservatives/traditionalists?

How can it be just "background noise" when Zuma appoints his cabinet and overnight, under pressure from the Left, immediately has to reshuffle portfolios? When Trevor Manuel and his National Planning Commission are moved around like chess pawns? When Cosatu secretary general Zwelinzima Vavi sings the praises of the SACP as the "vanguard" of a socialist future? When the president of the YCL clashes with the president of the ANCYL over whether or not Thabo Mbeki should be charged with genocide? When "policing cronies" shout "shoot-to-kill" are only having "hysterics," despite what happened at Kennedy Road in Durban? When ANCYL "attack poodle" Julius Malema "has barked up the tree of mine nationalization"? (The quotations are Butler's words).

If the Democratic Alliance, which daily chronicles the ups and downs of ANC "realities" (an invaluable service), can analyse Manuel's Green Paper as effectively as it did and pinpoint the real motives behind and implications of Manuel's proposed centralized planning power, do all analysts share Butler's view that "complex and unfathomable forces leave us with no real basis for prediction"?

What the Green Paper implies is that the ANC, as a political party, ultimately is seeking absolute power over the state and its citizens, and over both the private and public sectors. The ANC's ultimate achievement then would be absolute power over "deployment" and that would make a mockery of parliamentary government, of accountability of the legislature, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, not to mention the right of citizens to vote the ANC or anyone else out of office (is this Manuel's compromise to keep his job?).

Butler predicts that "it is no longer credible to claim that a radical and interventionist state is emerging". Yet he also says "a complex of unfathomable forces leaves us with no real basis for prediction."

But is there a single activist in any of the ANC factions who does not subscribe to the Green Paper's one over-riding objective? Is this not the one bond common to the whole package of ANC factions: pursuit of power? This is the one aim that cuts across almost all differences, infighting, personal abuse. This is the factor that makes political prediction difficult, not the "explosion of ideological and racial background noise" that took place at Polokwane.

2.4 Former mayor dumps Cope, returns ‘home’ to ANC

Frank Maponya, Sowetan, 25 November 2009

Teboho Mohapi, Former mayor of the Modimolle municipality in Limpopo, proved to be the proverbial prodigal son when he returned to the ANC.

Mohapi left the ANC to join Cope in February following allegations of serious purging.

He was the mayor from 2000 until his “untimely” departure.

But his decision to “go back home” is not without controversy.

It is believed Mohapi was “shown the light” by his relative and former Premier of North West Edna Molewa.

Molewa is the Minister for Social Development.

Mohapi yesterday confirmed he was a cousin of Molewa’s, but denied that she influenced him to rejoin the ANC.

“The ANC has always been my home and Molewa had nothing to do with my decision.

“I took the decision myself after considering that the situation in the ANC then was not conducive for me,” said Mohapi.

“ I took a calculated decision to terminate my membership of the ANC to join Cope.”

He said given another chance, he would still react the way he did by terminating his membership of the ANC, “and as hastily as I did in the same circumstances that I found myself in”.

“I unequivocally assert that I would not do so,” he said.

Mohapi returns to the party with immediate effect.

Mohapi was welcomed back yesterday by Premier Cassel Mathale, provincial secretary Joe Maswanganyi, and party spokesperson Ishmael Kgetjepe.

Also in attendance at the event at the parliamentary village in Polokwane were the secretary of the ANC Waterberg region Andries Lekalakala, and sub-regional secretary Matome Mokoka.

“We welcome Mohapi back and will give him responsibilities in the organisation,” said Maswanganyi.

Mluleki Mntungwa (Communications Officer)

COSATU ICT Unit

1-5 Leyds Cnr Biccard Street

Braamfontein

2007

P.O.Box 1019

Johannesburg

2000

South Africa

Tel: +27 11 339-4911/24

Fax: +27 11 339-5080/6940

E-Mail: mlu...@cosatu.org.za

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