* Kaz Kylheku | Software is duplicated whenever it is used; the stored representation | isn't used directly by a data processor. Ordinary objects are not | duplicated prior to use.
Well, if software is duplicated prior to use, a book that is read by a human reader is duplicated in that the light reflected from the book is a fresh copy, a movie is "performed" by duplication, a TV program or a piece of recorded music likewise.
| Bits can have many representations and is easily and automatically | converted among them. An ordinary object is usually created by a single | process, and thereafter keeps its representation.
Non sequitur. In between each bit's representation it also keeps its representation, exactly the same way everything else does. Given enough time, everything has been and can be everything else. Being confused by the short timespan is as silly as being confused by the low cost.
| Duplication of bits can be done today with very little cost using | consumer-grade equipment.
The cost is completely irrelevant to the process. In fact, it is that it is almost cost-less that has led people to confuse cost with process, but the fact that people drag in the cost highlights the _existence_ of a process by which it is copied, almost for free, so the key must be the process, not the cost.
| That kind of duplication of ordinary objects is the subject of Star Trek.
Only because you think in too short a timeframe. Think about it.
| If you know of a matter replicator, I'd love to hear about it.
Quit the stupid game you play.
| Mass production of objects is not duplication; it's an optimized, | specialized process for making specific kinds of new instances of things | out of raw materials.
Non sequitur.
| A given process can't be trivially readjusted to make a completely | different thing. But a bit replicator will copy any bit sequence.
Irrelevant.
| Lastly, when an ordinary object is traded, the value is usually assigned | to the *instance*.
Sufficiently many objects are traded based on the same valuation as software, yet still exist, that this is completely irrelevant.
| When bits are traded, it's not the concrete representation, or instance | that is being traded, but rather the *class*: the abstract program which | all representations are instances of.
Non sequitur. The same goes for movies, books, recorded music, etc.
| It's no use denying differences that are real, just because they don't | agree with your political view.
Oh, christ, if you have nothing better to dredge up when you have no argument to offer, at least admit that you have none.
| Reality must be the starting point of all rational thought.
Quit the stupid game you play. Just because you see things in a bogus, mythological way, does not mean that have any right to assume that reality _is_ only what you want it to be. Pretending to have a monopoly on the proper interpretation of reality is the hallmark of the believers in mythology who cannot defend their faith. Quit the stupid game and get back to the rational thought.
/// -- Norway is now run by a priest from the fundamentalist Christian People's Party, the fifth largest party representing one eighth of the electorate. -- Carrying a Swiss Army pocket knife in Oslo, Norway, is a criminal offense.
In article <u4ches87qna....@cs.rose-hulman.edu>, Edward O'Connor wrote: >> I dont have a problem with there licence, I don't agree with it and >> that is a seperate issue, because they have the right to release >> there code under what ever licence they want. What I have a problem >> with is that the gpl is not free for any normal definition of free >> and they know this because they *redefine* free to suit there agenda >> and this is dishonest and I have a problem with lie's and/or >> deliberate misrepresentation.
> Please, for the love of Bob, learn and use the distinction between > "they're," "there," and "their," when to use the apostrophe, how to > capitalize acronyms, and how to construct non run-on sentences.
thanks for the grammer lession
> Also, please take this discussion to gnu.misc.discuss, or somewhere > else appropriate. I suspect that I'm not alone among c.l.l lurkers in > my irritation.
It started here and I think it should finish here, if you dont like it just ignore it.
In article <3213991880970...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum wrote: >* Kaz Kylheku >| That kind of duplication of ordinary objects is the subject of Star Trek.
> Only because you think in too short a timeframe. Think about it.
I predict that if matter replicators ever become reality, they will make a lot of people upset. I envision that copying a loaf of bread to feed yourself will infringe on some bakery's intellectual property. :)
>| If you know of a matter replicator, I'd love to hear about it.
> Quit the stupid game you play.
Fair enough; I shall watch for the use of vacuous rhetorical devices when conversing with you in the future. The above is really crap, I agree.
> Sufficiently many objects are traded based on the same valuation as > software, yet still exist, that this is completely irrelevant.
>| When bits are traded, it's not the concrete representation, or instance >| that is being traded, but rather the *class*: the abstract program which >| all representations are instances of.
> Non sequitur. The same goes for movies, books, recorded music, etc.
I have been using the term ``program'', but, to be clear, I did not intend to exclude other types of software artifacts.
I have some ASCII text files of classic literature; for some reason I still refer to them simply as books.
In article <3213990934511...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote: > * Erann Gat > | Yes it is. Software isn't made of matter. (The media in which software > | resides are made of matter, but the software itself is not.) The > | "physics" of software are different from the physics of material objects.
> This is completely bogus. There is no physical way to separate software > from the medium. Copying it requires a physical process, just like any > other physical object does. The so-called "abstraction" of meaning is no > different from that performed by illuminating a page full of ink blots > and understanding the reflected photons as letters and words and meaning > in some language the reader understands. However, both the books and the > literature contained in them are physically existing objects. Software > is just like that literature. Again, it is only because it is convenient > to some political and ideological ends that software is somehow regarded > as this mystical, non-physical, magical thing. It is, in fact, not true.
I agree, software is not much different from literature. It is, however, different from, say, a car. The difference is this: it is possible to take the information content of a book and render it in a computer in a way that does not lose the book's essential value. That is not possible with a car. No matter how I render a car's information content in a computer it loses (at least some of) its essential value in that it can no longer physically transport me from place to place.
> | > In the case of GNU GPL'ed stuff, they can, in theory, force me to > | > give away stuff that is not related to the object whose license I have > | > supposedly violated. > | > | No, they can't. From the GPL paragraph 2: > | > | If identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program, > | and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in > | themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those > | sections when you distribute them as separate works.
> Sigh. The context here is when the GNU GPL applies but is violated, > obviously not when it does not apply, so the context was _obviously_ when > distributing them not as separate works, but together. It is _not_ the > intention, nor the letter of the GNU GPL, to make it possible for people > to separate works from eachother merely because they violate the license. > So, if you distribute them together and thus fall under the license > agreement, you have to give it away because you have violated the license.
Distributing something "as a separate work" does not mean that you have to distribute it separately, you just have to identify it as a separate work with its own licence. (That's how bundled software works.)
In any case, I don't see how "they can force [you] to give away stuff that is not related" because if it's not related then, as you say, the licence does not apply. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "not related."
g...@jpl.nasa.gov (Erann Gat) writes: > In article <3213912667651...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote:
> > * cbbro...@acm.org > > | The comparisons being drawn relate to software;
> > Software is not materially different from any other object being traded.
> Yes it is. Software isn't made of matter. (The media in which software
I think that Erik was using "material" in the sense of "relevant" rather than "of matter".
My time is not made of matter, but that does not imply that there is any material difference beteeen it and any other object I own that I would wish to trade.
Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes: > * Erann Gat > | Yes it is. Software isn't made of matter. (The media in which software > | resides are made of matter, but the software itself is not.) The > | "physics" of software are different from the physics of material objects.
> This is completely bogus. There is no physical way to separate software > from the medium. Copying it requires a physical process, just like any > other physical object does. > [SNIP]
> However, both the books and the > literature contained in them are physically existing objects. Software > is just like that literature. Again, it is only because it is convenient > to some political and ideological ends that software is somehow regarded > as this mystical, non-physical, magical thing. It is, in fact, not true.
I don't understand this argument. Surely the `literature' is not "the glyphs on the piece of paper"? Surely the `software' is not "the alignment of magnetic domains on a piece of metal"?
Clearly, literature and software share a property with each other that they do not share with loaves of bread: the ability to be reproduced (or transferred to a new owner) at little or no cost, without depriving the original owner of the possession of the object. (Think memorizing poems in an oral tradition, for example.)
Indeed, the assignment of monetary value to something _so_ intangible is one of the turning points of modern economies, IMO.
I do not understand the physical nature of software (nor of literature). Could you elaborate/clarify?
-- It would be difficult to construe Larry Wall, in article this as a feature. <1995May29.062427.3...@netlabs.com>
Alain Picard <apic...@optushome.com.au> writes: > Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes:
> > * Erann Gat > > | Yes it is. Software isn't made of matter. (The media in which software > > | resides are made of matter, but the software itself is not.) The > > | "physics" of software are different from the physics of material objects.
> > This is completely bogus. There is no physical way to separate software > > from the medium. Copying it requires a physical process, just like any > > other physical object does. > > [SNIP]
> > However, both the books and the > > literature contained in them are physically existing objects. Software > > is just like that literature. Again, it is only because it is convenient > > to some political and ideological ends that software is somehow regarded > > as this mystical, non-physical, magical thing. It is, in fact, not true.
> I don't understand this argument. Surely the `literature' is not > "the glyphs on the piece of paper"? Surely the `software' is not > "the alignment of magnetic domains on a piece of metal"?
> Clearly, literature and software share a property with each other that > they do not share with loaves of bread: the ability to be reproduced > (or transferred to a new owner) at little or no cost, without > depriving the original owner of the possession of the object. (Think > memorizing poems in an oral tradition, for example.)
> Indeed, the assignment of monetary value to something _so_ intangible > is one of the turning points of modern economies, IMO.
> I do not understand the physical nature of software (nor of literature). > Could you elaborate/clarify?
As I see it -- the cost of copying is irrelevant to the software existence. And you cannot have the software without a medium to keep it on. This is in short what I unerstood and it explains a lot of things I have not thought about.
> This is convenient mythology for some political and ideological ends, but > it is bogus all the way through. There is _nothing_ in the creation and > duplication of bits that differs one hoot from creation and duplication > of any other kind of object. Think about it, please.
I haven't really followed this thread, so this should be seen as just me stating my opinion on some subject, FWIW:
I find it useful to think of the world as being composed of two inherently different essences: matter/energy and information. As energy and refined matter still are scarce resources, I think it's only reasonable that objects carrying much matter/energy can be owned and traded. Informational objects OTOH, such as software, literature and music, have become so easy to copy that IMO it does not make much sense to treat such objects the same way as material objects. This is not a moral statement (there are no such things as "natural rights"), I merely believe that an economy based on proprietorship of informational objects is bound to either fail or to protect it's information using ever more totalitarian methods. (I don't like the saying, but information really wants to be free. :-)
Until the emergence of super-intelligent machines, however, _knowledge_ will have nonzero market value, even without totalitarian regimes to protect it.
> > > * Erann Gat > > > | Yes it is. Software isn't made of matter. (The media in which software > > > | resides are made of matter, but the software itself is not.) The > > > | "physics" of software are different from the physics of material objects.
> > > This is completely bogus. There is no physical way to separate software > > > from the medium. Copying it requires a physical process, just like any > > > other physical object does. > > > [SNIP]
> > > However, both the books and the > > > literature contained in them are physically existing objects. Software > > > is just like that literature. Again, it is only because it is convenient > > > to some political and ideological ends that software is somehow regarded > > > as this mystical, non-physical, magical thing. It is, in fact, not true.
> > I don't understand this argument. Surely the `literature' is not > > "the glyphs on the piece of paper"? Surely the `software' is not > > "the alignment of magnetic domains on a piece of metal"?
> > Clearly, literature and software share a property with each other that > > they do not share with loaves of bread: the ability to be reproduced > > (or transferred to a new owner) at little or no cost, without > > depriving the original owner of the possession of the object. (Think > > memorizing poems in an oral tradition, for example.)
> > Indeed, the assignment of monetary value to something _so_ intangible > > is one of the turning points of modern economies, IMO.
> > I do not understand the physical nature of software (nor of literature). > > Could you elaborate/clarify?
> As I see it -- the cost of copying is irrelevant to the software > existence. And you cannot have the software without a medium to keep > it on. This is in short what I unerstood and it explains a lot of > things I have not thought about.
Making software is somewhat like making an automobile in that making the first instance is _frightfully_ expensive.
Apparently designing an all-new automobile costs on the order of a billion dollars.
In both cases, making successive copies is rather a lot less expensive. For software, there's the difference that the result, a form of "digital knowledge," can _trivially_ be copied, generally at minscule cost, whereas for automobiles, there is the requirement of having a factory, and bringing in parts and such. Software distribution can involve no transfer of physical material, only the transfer of the resonance of moving electrons/photons.
The crucial difference seems to be that making extra copies of software doesn't have to cause any noticeable disturbance, whilst for cars, toasters, or digital watches, there is a difference of materiels. Whether that represents a material difference may be in the eye of the beholder...
As always, analogies involving automobiles are fatal... -- (reverse (concatenate 'string "ac.notelrac.teneerf@" "454aa")) http://www.ntlug.org/~cbbrowne/languages.html "Cars move huge weights at high speeds by controlling violent explosions many times a second. ...car analogies are always fatal..." -- <westp...@my-dejanews.com>
* Erann Gat | The difference is this: it is possible to take the information content of | a book and render it in a computer in a way that does not lose the book's | essential value.
This begs the question of why a computer is so special. What, exactly, makes electricity non-real? What kind of magic wand does a computer possess that makes that which is stored within it _materially_ different from any other reality? The fact that we can no longer _see_ it is no different from a lot of other very real things that we cannot see.
And who _values_ things? How come a particular aspect of a book is designated an "essential value" just because a computer can retain it?
If I model a car down to its smallest details in some form that is not usable as a car, but from which a working car may again be built, it is completely irrelevant to the owners of the car design that I had a non-usable intermediate model. The same goes for books, actually, and whether the intermediate, non-book model can be _read_ through _yet_ another duplication process is also irrelevant.
We can already give industrial robots computerized drawings of a lot of things and they will happily reproduce them faithfully. The _amount_ of work that goes into the duplication process is completely immaterial. The fact that _some_ work is required is the essential issue.
/// -- Norway is now run by a priest from the fundamentalist Christian People's Party, the fifth largest party representing one eighth of the electorate. -- Carrying a Swiss Army pocket knife in Oslo, Norway, is a criminal offense.
* Alain Picard <apic...@optushome.com.au> | Clearly, literature and software share a property with each other that | they do not share with loaves of bread: the ability to be reproduced (or | transferred to a new owner) at little or no cost, without depriving the | original owner of the possession of the object. (Think memorizing poems | in an oral tradition, for example.)
This is because _somebody_ is willing to supply the electricity and the hardware that does the copying. Suppose I supplied all the ingredients of a loaf of bread and the energy and hardware required to mix them and bake the result, then it would essentially be free to copy a loaf of bread, right? Suppose we had lots of people who had vast stores of ingredients and an enormous surplus of energy and unlimited access to hardware, what would materially differ between a loaf of bread and a piece of software as we see it today? Hinging the issue on _cost_ is no more than a means of relating it to the surplus of the ingredients in the economy. Then again, an incredibly large fraction of science fiction can be summarized in the very simple idea "what if energy were free?".
| Indeed, the assignment of monetary value to something _so_ intangible is | one of the turning points of modern economies, IMO.
It is no less intangible than anything else we assign monetary values to. It is just that we have decided at some particular time, not to think about certain real, physical things as "tangible", even though they are.
| I do not understand the physical nature of software (nor of literature). | Could you elaborate/clarify?
Perhaps we should dispell with the equivocation first. There exists a notion of "meaning" that is that which is obtained when a human being is exposed to something and experiences something, and this "meaning" is often considered to be the _real_ purpose of something, the medium somehow being discounted as being irrelevant. This is just like the idea that in computer programming languages, syntax is irrelevant, because some make the confusion between "no _particular_ syntax is reqeuired", and "_no_ syntax is required", because, clearly, _some_ syntax _is_ required. The same is true of software and literature -- without medium, it ceases to exist. Also, clearly, the medium is not the software or the literature, but this is the same argument as software for a different machine or literature in a different language or script. If it has no meaning, what _is_ it, when only its meaning is valuable? When the last person to read a language dies, does all the literature of that language become non-existent?
Simply put, an interaction between two physical things is also physical, even though it ceases to exist if you remove some of the physical things, so you cannot take something apart to "find" it. Gravitation is real. Magnetism is real. Software is real. It took physicists several hundred years from discovery of the consequences of the interaction to figure out how these interactions had a nature of their own. Culturally, we are still looking at software like the kind of "magic" that people who do not understand the nature of magnetism and gravitation would think they are.
/// -- Norway is now run by a priest from the fundamentalist Christian People's Party, the fifth largest party representing one eighth of the electorate. -- Carrying a Swiss Army pocket knife in Oslo, Norway, is a criminal offense.
* Erik Haugan | I find it useful to think of the world as being composed of two inherently | different essences: matter/energy and information.
For what purposes is it useful?
/// -- Norway is now run by a priest from the fundamentalist Christian People's Party, the fifth largest party representing one eighth of the electorate. -- Carrying a Swiss Army pocket knife in Oslo, Norway, is a criminal offense.
Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes: > * Erik Haugan > | I find it useful to think of the world as being composed of two inherently > | different essences: matter/energy and information. > For what purposes is it useful?
> If you look at my previous posts I said mistakenly included gpled > code in my app and releases a rpm. Now I did not make a deliberate > decision to use gpled code, I made a deliberate decision not to use > gpled code and messed up on implamentation. But I am stuck with the > consaquences of having released a binary based on gpled code(rpm) so > I ma in the code maintenance business for the next 3 years.
You can just re-implement the offending part. If I remember correctly, in the past the FSF has agreed that if there is a replacement module, the application doesn't fall under the GPL. I think this was in a case where someone used the gmp library, though my recollection is hazy.
> The ends justify the means? As far as I know they never have, in > the long run.
Some people believe this; I don't. But nobody lives completely consistently.
-- Fred Gilham gil...@csl.sri.com Ah, the 20th century, when the flight from reason crash-landed into the slaughterhouse. --- James Ostrowski
> * Alain Picard <apic...@optushome.com.au> | Clearly, literature and > software share a property with each other that | they do not share with > loaves of bread: the ability to be reproduced (or | transferred to a new > owner) at little or no cost, without depriving the | original owner of > the possession of the object. (Think memorizing poems | in an oral > tradition, for example.)
> This is because _somebody_ is willing to supply the electricity and > the hardware that does the copying. Suppose I supplied all the > ingredients of a loaf of bread and the energy and hardware required to > mix them and bake the result, then it would essentially be free to > copy a loaf of bread, right? Suppose we had lots of people who had > vast stores of ingredients and an enormous surplus of energy and > unlimited access to hardware, what would materially differ between a > loaf of bread and a piece of software as we see it today? Hinging the > issue on _cost_ is no more than a means of relating it to the surplus > of the ingredients in the economy. Then again, an incredibly large > fraction of science fiction can be summarized in the very simple idea > "what if energy were free?".
The energy and materials are not supplied for free by some third party. People buy their own computers, and pay for the electricity to run them, and pay for the network connections to connect them. These are all scarce items, and have the property that there is a free market (approximately) for the items.
So by making a copy of a CD (for example) I deprive no-one of anything that they were not compensated fairly for (at market price) yet I get at small total cost, an identical copy of the information stored on that CD, as well as a physical approximate copy of the artifact, for a net marginal cost of about 1 dollar US.
>This is just like the > idea that in computer programming languages, syntax is irrelevant, > because some make the confusion between "no _particular_ syntax is > reqeuired", and "_no_ syntax is required", because, clearly, _some_ > syntax _is_ required. The same is true of software and literature -- > without medium, it ceases to exist. Also, clearly, the medium is not > the software or the literature, but this is the same argument as > software for a different machine or literature in a different language > or script. If it has no meaning, what _is_ it, when only its meaning > is valuable? When the last person to read a language dies, does all > the literature of that language become non-existent?
The market value of the medium can't be what you're getting at though. It's a complete false start. The only reason one can charge say $15 US for a CD is because of the monopoly value of the information stored on that CD. The alternative would be around $0.50 US.
I think the whole thing comes down to people saying that the political notion of creating a government guaranteed monopoly on information is not beneficial economically, contrary to free-market economics, and the wrong way for producers of these goods to be compensated, in large part because of the jack booted enforcement required to make it effective in an age when the actual market cost of copies is a few pennies.
One obvious alternative is to create a financial futures market in informational goods, and to sell forward contracts on the delivery of such goods to the people who want the goods. This requires no jack booted thugs, and no restrictions on the use or redistribution of the goods after delivery. And no artificial market destruction by government protection... It also provides a way to enforce delivery or compensation for non-delivery through well understood contract and tort laws.
Fred Gilham <gil...@snapdragon.csl.sri.com> writes: > If I remember correctly, in the past the FSF has agreed that if there > is a replacement module, the application doesn't fall under the GPL. > I think this was in a case where someone used the gmp library, though > my recollection is hazy.
No- gmp is LGPL'ed; which use to be the "recommended" license for code libraries that have existing non-GPL counterparts. The difference is that you may use libraries like gmp to distribute (dynamically-linked?) non-GPL binaries without violating the LGPL. Many libraries (like glibc) use the LGPL, as it addresses a deficiency in the GPL with regard to "fair use" of a code library; but GNU advocates probably no longer see it that way. However, some libraries that are GPL'd also explicitly state that linking constitutes "fair use".
In my view the GPL is a license that tries to establish a reasonable notion of "community property"; it is specifically meant to prevent entities from redistributing "community" code in a derivative work from which the "community" derives no benefit. For the linux kernel, that means things like kernel modules, patches and add-ons must be shared (as per GPL) with the kernel developers (if they are provided to anyone else). It also protects people that contribute to the linux kernel, since the copyright holders (i.e. Linus) could not use those contributions to produce a non-GPL'd version of the kernel without permission.
AFAIK, no other license offers such egalitarian protections- many other free-ish licenses (like apache's) require contributors to forfeit their copyrights if they'd like to contribute anything. By way of comparison, book publishers and record distributors typically seek forfeiture of copyright from their authors, whereas newspapers and magazines do not. Sadly transfer of copyright is required by most academic journals as well; and IMO it prevents a lot of publicly funded, published research from ever hitting the worldwide web.
In article <3214045436594...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote: > * Erann Gat > | The difference is this: it is possible to take the information content of > | a book and render it in a computer in a way that does not lose the book's > | essential value.
> This begs the question of why a computer is so special. What, exactly, > makes electricity non-real? What kind of magic wand does a computer > possess that makes that which is stored within it _materially_ different > from any other reality? The fact that we can no longer _see_ it is no > different from a lot of other very real things that we cannot see.
I never said electricity isn't real. Electricity is just as real as anything else. But *bits* aren't "real" in the sense that computers, electricity, cars, ink, and paper are real. Electrons and silicon atoms are *things*. They have mass. They obey conservation laws. Bit's are not things. They do not have mass. They do not obey conservation laws. Bits *states* of things. (Sometimes they aren't even states of things, but merely correlations between states of things.)
Put another way (this point has been made before by another poster, but it bears repeating) there is a fundamental distinction between energy and information. Energy (or mass) is the stuff that things are made of. Information is the configuration or the state of the stuff. The value of some things, like raw materials, lies mostly in their energy content, not their information content. It's the *stuff*, not the arrangement of the stuff that matters. The value of other things, like cars, lies in a combination of their energy and information content. The fact that there is steel and plastic there matters, but the particular arrangement of the steel and plastic matters too.
I'll answer what makes computers special below.
> And who _values_ things? How come a particular aspect of a book is > designated an "essential value" just because a computer can retain it?
People value things. And while I don't have any hard data, I'll wager long odds that most people assign most of the value of most books to their information content and not to their physical embodiments. If you had a choice between having all your books changed to a different physical format, or retaining the same physical format but translated into some language you didn't understand, which would you choose?
> If I model a car down to its smallest details in some form that is not > usable as a car, but from which a working car may again be built, it is > completely irrelevant to the owners of the car design that I had a > non-usable intermediate model. The same goes for books, actually, and > whether the intermediate, non-book model can be _read_ through _yet_ > another duplication process is also irrelevant.
> We can already give industrial robots computerized drawings of a lot of > things and they will happily reproduce them faithfully. The _amount_ of > work that goes into the duplication process is completely immaterial. > The fact that _some_ work is required is the essential issue.
I disagree. What makes computers special is precisely the amount of work (energy) required to add information content. That amount is vastly less -- many, many orders of magnitude less -- than for non-computer artifacts, even if they are fabricated by robots.
* Daniel Lakeland | So by making a copy of a CD (for example) I deprive no-one of anything [...]
It seems that some people consider property as "that which you can deprive other people of". This is commensurate with the "all property is theft" line of reasoning, but it is fundamentally silly and offers no way to reason about property.
| The market value of the medium can't be what you're getting at though.
No, you are quite right, it is not.
| It's a complete false start.
Then it is a really good idea not to think people begin with completely false starts. It make a conversion _so_ much more intelligent if people would not assume that the other party is an utter moron and believes easily refutable positions. It is fantastically annoying when people do believe in the easily refuable and do not stop doing so even after it has been refuted, repeatedly.
| I think the whole thing comes down [economics].
The value system of any economy is founded on the ontology of the objects valued and people's willingness to prioritize their acquistion. Starting with economics is like studying language by watching how people react emotionally to each word or phrase. It may give you some information, but what you learn form it is not _meaning_.
It is _not_ the economy.
/// -- Norway is now run by a priest from the fundamentalist Christian People's Party, the fifth largest party representing one eighth of the electorate. -- Carrying a Swiss Army pocket knife in Oslo, Norway, is a criminal offense.
* Erann Gat | But *bits* aren't "real" in the sense that computers, electricity, cars, | ink, and paper are real. Electrons and silicon atoms are *things*. They | have mass. They obey conservation laws. Bit's are not things.
What is a bit? Can you explain what it is?
| They do not have mass.
Well, is a thought real? Or is it mystical? Is it ideal? Is my idea that bits are real real? Is the expression of that idea real? Which of these have mass?
| Put another way (this point has been made before by another poster, but | it bears repeating) there is a fundamental distinction between energy and | information.
Nonsense. I politely asked the poster if he could explain the purposes for which this distinction is useful, but you go ahead and say there is a fundamental distinction, and that is simply _wrong_, unphilosophical, and begs the question, which I think you do not realize, but would if you thought about this instead of defending an unsupportable notion.
| Energy (or mass) is the stuff that things are made of. Information is | the configuration or the state of the stuff.
Does magnetism have mass? Is it "energy"? How about gravitation? Does _distances_ exist? Do distancaes have mass?
| People value things. And while I don't have any hard data, I'll wager | long odds that most people assign most of the value of most books to | their information content and not to their physical embodiments.
Philosophy meets democracy. What a wonderful way to think!
| If you had a choice between having all your books changed to a different | physical format, or retaining the same physical format but translated | into some language you didn't understand, which would you choose?
If you had a cube and you could choose between retaining all the edges or all the sides, which would you choose?
| What makes computers special is precisely the amount of work (energy) | required to add information content. That amount is vastly less -- many, | many orders of magnitude less -- than for non-computer artifacts, even if | they are fabricated by robots.
So again, we have an economy-based ontological ordering. I am amused, frankly. It is so ridiculously obvious that this must be wrong, simply by looking at where _values_ are in the order of things. How can you at all _believe_ in economy as an ontological primary? Even rabid marxists do not actually believe in that, if _they_ still exist.
/// -- Norway is now run by a priest from the fundamentalist Christian People's Party, the fifth largest party representing one eighth of the electorate. -- Carrying a Swiss Army pocket knife in Oslo, Norway, is a criminal offense.
>>>>> "Joe" == Joe Schaefer <joe+use...@sunstarsys.com> writes:
Joe> Fred Gilham <gil...@snapdragon.csl.sri.com> writes: >> If I remember correctly, in the past the FSF has agreed that if there >> is a replacement module, the application doesn't fall under the GPL. >> I think this was in a case where someone used the gmp library, though >> my recollection is hazy.
Joe> No- gmp is LGPL'ed; which use to be the "recommended" license for code Joe> libraries that have existing non-GPL counterparts. The difference is
My fuzzy memory of this issue is in line with Fred. There was a fairly big discussion about this in gnu.misc.discuss (I think) a long time ago. FSF demanded that the other code be "released" as well because it was specifically written to use gmp and no other library would work. It was some kind of crypto code like RSA or some such.
Eventually the code was changed to support some other bignum implementation, perhaps, as Fred says, written for the sole purpose of replacing gmp. I think the FSF finally said it was ok by either saying it was ok or by changing the license to LGPL. Don't remember the exact reason.
Raymond Toy <t...@rtp.ericsson.se> writes: > >>>>> "Joe" == Joe Schaefer <joe+use...@sunstarsys.com> writes:
> Joe> Fred Gilham <gil...@snapdragon.csl.sri.com> writes: > >> If I remember correctly, in the past the FSF has agreed that if > >> there is a replacement module, the application doesn't fall > >> under the GPL. I think this was in a case where someone used > >> the gmp library, though my recollection is hazy.
> Joe> No- gmp is LGPL'ed; which use to be the "recommended" > Joe> license for code libraries that have existing non-GPL > Joe> counterparts. The difference is
> My fuzzy memory of this issue is in line with Fred. There was a > fairly big discussion about this in gnu.misc.discuss (I think) a long > time ago. FSF demanded that the other code be "released" as well > because it was specifically written to use gmp and no other library > would work. It was some kind of crypto code like RSA or some such.
Ah, sorry about that. You are quite right- gmp was changed from GPL to LGPL and there was lots of discussion of this on usenet:
In article <3214068424351...@naggum.net>, "Erik Naggum" <e...@naggum.net> wrote:
> * Daniel Lakeland > | So by making a copy of a CD (for example) I deprive no-one of anything > [...]
> It seems that some people consider property as "that which you can > deprive other people of". This is commensurate with the "all property > is theft" line of reasoning, but it is fundamentally silly and offers > no way to reason about property.
Your previous argument was based on the notion of someone giving away for free (ie. being deprived of) electrons or flour and water (bread ingredients). You seemed to be making the analogy that in fact making copies of information/software was tantamount to making copies of bread under the assumption that there was some large free resource of ingredients around.
I'm not sure that I understand what you're saying. The fact of the matter is that none of the ingredients of a COPY of a piece of software are "free" they are just cheap because of our current market conditions.
Now the original creation is still limited by time and effort on the part of the designers, programmers, and soforth.
On the other hand I haven't heard anyone argue that in the conditions described (a large free source of ingredients) the making and eating of copies of some loaf of bread should be punishable by several hundred thousand dollars in fines and various jail sentences. That is what we are talking about when we consider copyright enforcement.
The common notion of property torts under the law is that when one person is deprived of their property, then there is a legally enforceable recourse under law. That is where the notion of deprivation comes in. Without deprivation there is no tort.
So what is it that you believe should be considered a tort/deprivation/damage?
> Then it is a really good idea not to think people begin with > completely false starts. It make a conversion _so_ much more > intelligent if people would not assume that the other party is an > utter moron and believes easily refutable positions. It is > fantastically annoying when people do believe in the easily refuable > and do not stop doing so even after it has been refuted, repeatedly.
I don't want to argue whether you are an utter moron. Clearly you aren't, and I never intended to imply that. I merely pointed out that though you seemed to be defending the notion that the medium's physical reality was important for your argument, there must be something ELSE about your argument that doesn't involve the value of the medium, but I couldn't exactly see what it was.
> | I think the whole thing comes down [economics].
> The value system of any economy is founded on the ontology of the > objects valued and people's willingness to prioritize their > acquistion. Starting with economics is like studying language by > watching how people react emotionally to each word or phrase. It may > give you some information, but what you learn form it is not > _meaning_.
This seems a bit abstruse.
> It is _not_ the economy.
What isn't?
Perhaps it would help if you re-iterated your argument in concise form. Because I'm afraid (at least to me) it isn't clear.
In article <3214071115786...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote: > What is a bit? Can you explain what it is?
Yes, I can.
> | They do not have mass.
> Well, is a thought real? Or is it mystical? Is it ideal? Is my idea > that bits are real real? Is the expression of that idea real? Which of > these have mass?
Who knows? Who cares? This isn't about whether things are "real" or not (I honestly don't know what that means, which is why I put the word in scare quotes and qualified my intention). This is about whether or not there are useful distinctions to be made. I claim that there is a useful distinction to be made between electrons, computers, books, cars, ink etc. on the one hand, and bits, thoughts, ideas, etc. on the other, i.e. that there is a useful distinction between energy and information. Whether you choose to use the label of "reality" to identify this distinction I really don't care.
> | Put another way (this point has been made before by another poster, but > | it bears repeating) there is a fundamental distinction between energy and > | information.
> Nonsense. I politely asked the poster if he could explain the purposes > for which this distinction is useful, but you go ahead and say there is a > fundamental distinction, and that is simply _wrong_, unphilosophical, and > begs the question, which I think you do not realize, but would if you > thought about this instead of defending an unsupportable notion.
The purpose for which the distinction is useful is to identify the applicable laws that govern their respective behaviors. They are different.
> | Energy (or mass) is the stuff that things are made of. Information is > | the configuration or the state of the stuff.
> Does magnetism have mass? Is it "energy"? How about gravitation? Does > _distances_ exist? Do distancaes have mass?
"Magnetism" and "gravitation" are not really well defined terms in the realm of physics. (Does Common Lisp have mass?) Magnetic fields and regions of curved spacetime have energy content and therefore mass. But we are getting far afield here.
> | People value things. And while I don't have any hard data, I'll wager > | long odds that most people assign most of the value of most books to > | their information content and not to their physical embodiments.
> Philosophy meets democracy. What a wonderful way to think!
Thank you.
> | What makes computers special is precisely the amount of work (energy) > | required to add information content. That amount is vastly less -- many, > | many orders of magnitude less -- than for non-computer artifacts, even if > | they are fabricated by robots.
> So again, we have an economy-based ontological ordering. I am amused, > frankly. It is so ridiculously obvious that this must be wrong, simply > by looking at where _values_ are in the order of things. How can you at > all _believe_ in economy as an ontological primary? Even rabid marxists > do not actually believe in that, if _they_ still exist.
I don't know what you mean by "ontological primary" (the "primary" part, I know what ontological means) nor "looking at where values are in the order of things."
Yes, I am basing my distinctions at least to some extent on economic concepts. (It's not just economic -- there are physical (in the sense of Physics) distinctions too.) I don't know how you can coherently deal with the world without referring to economic concepts. The very notion of a *useful* distinction is inherently economic. A thing is useful if it has utility. Utility is an economic concept. Sorry, but that's how I think. I don't believe I'm alone in this.
Tell me: do you believe that there is a useful distinction to be made between a steam engine and a tea kettle? If so, how do you make this distiction without an ontology based at least to some extent on economy?
In article <3214069997186...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum wrote: >* k...@ashi.footprints.net (Kaz Kylheku) >| Fair enough; I shall watch for the use of vacuous rhetorical devices >| when conversing with you in the future. The above is really crap, >| I agree.
> Of all the stupid crap in this newgroup where people accuse me of not > seperating a person from his opinions, which I do as a matter of course, > it bugs me to find someone go so dramatically wrong. It is probabbly > just another flippant figure of speech, of course, since it appears that > some people get _really_ ticked off by treated more seriously than they > want to be
To be clear, my remark above is perfectly serious; It is reasonable of you to ask, in a debate, that others not address you with inane rhetoric devices that don't contribute anything useful. So I apologize for that.
Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes: > * cbbro...@acm.org > | The comparisons being drawn relate to software;
> Software is not materially different from any other object being traded.
I'm not sure wether you mean "materially" in the sense of significance, or in the sense of a fundamental, qualitative difference.
I think software differs from debt, futures, and insurance risk, which are traded, and those differ from oil, gold, sexual organs, and water. They are tied together by exchange value, but exchange value doesn't erase all of their difference, wether they be qualitative or quantitative.
-- Craig Brozefsky <cr...@red-bean.com> http://www.red-bean.com/~craig All around the world hearts pound with the rythym. Fear not of men because men must die. - Mos Def