Bruce Hoult wrote: > In article <3233361124321...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> > wrote:
> > I get pissed off when people remind me too much, though. > > I recall a brilliant retort to a whining loser who clamored for someone's > > opinion on him. "But what do you think of me?" "I don't think of you."
> That's an exchange in Casablanca, between Rick and the soon to be late > Ugarte. But I'm sure that's not the first or last time it's been said.
> -- Bruce
There was an exchange like this in Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead between architect Howard Roark and an architectural critic.
Marco Antoniotti <marc...@cs.nyu.edu> writes: > There was an exchange like this in Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead > between architect Howard Roark and an architectural critic.
I think it would be interesting to see how many programmers know their Objectivism by comparison to the population as a whole, as well as the same test for Common Lisp programmers vs. programmers of other fait^H^H^H^Hlanguages.
It might go a long way toward explaining the kinds of idioms that have developed over time about how to build software with Common Lisp.
-- Matt Curtin Interhack Corp +1 614 545 HACK http://web.interhack.com/ Author, Developing Trust: Online Privacy and Security (Apress, 2001) Knight of the Lambda Calculus | Quod scripsi scripsi. --Pontius Pilate
> In article <3233361124321...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote: > > I recall a brilliant retort to a whining loser who clamored for someone's > > opinion on him. "But what do you think of me?" "I don't think of you." Bruce Hoult <br...@hoult.org> writes: > That's an exchange in Casablanca, between Rick and the soon to be late > Ugarte. But I'm sure that's not the first or last time it's been said.
It also occurs in Ayn Rand's "The Fountainhead". The novel has a journalist who spends most of the book trying to ruin the career of the hero, an architect, by reviewing all of his innovative and masterful buildings and labeling them as terrible. Near the end the two meet, and the journalist asks the architect what he thinks of him, much as written above.
-- Don ___________________________________________________________________________ ____ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org d...@geddis.org To me, boxing is like ballet, except there's no music, no choreography, and the dancers hit each other. -- Deep Thoughts, by Jack Handey [1999]
> > > I get pissed off when people remind me too much, though. > > > I recall a brilliant retort to a whining loser who clamored for > > > someone's > > > opinion on him. "But what do you think of me?" "I don't think of > > > you."
> > That's an exchange in Casablanca, between Rick and the soon to be late > > Ugarte. But I'm sure that's not the first or last time it's been said.
> Minor nitpick. It's close, but the exchange in Casablanca is:
> "You despise me, don't you?" > "Well, if I gave you any thought I probably would."
You're quite right. And the others also about _The Fountainhead_.
> > There was an exchange like this in Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead > > between architect Howard Roark and an architectural critic.
> I think it would be interesting to see how many programmers know their > Objectivism by comparison to the population as a whole, as well as the > same test for Common Lisp programmers vs. programmers of other > fait^H^H^H^Hlanguages.
I'll freely admit to owning copies of three novels (and a play) by Rand, and quite a number of non fiction books as well. Plus works by Peikoff (who I find boring, didactic, and frequently mistaken) and Kelley (who I think makes a lot of sense).
Something I noted about fifteen years ago and should probably look into more deeply sometime is an apparently extremely good fit and mesh between Rand's ideas and those expressed by Persig in _Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance_.
* Bruce Hoult | I'll freely admit to owning copies of three novels (and a play) by Rand, | and quite a number of non fiction books as well. Plus works by Peikoff | (who I find boring, didactic, and frequently mistaken) and Kelley (who I | think makes a lot of sense).
I would less freely admit to this, but since you do :), I own everything she ever published. (I am like that -- like one work of an author, place an order for the rest of that author's production.) The single biggest reason I have come to think of the whole Rand/Peikoff/Kelley thing as a waste of time is not that what they write is wrong, it is that the very useful means of deciding what is important from what is not, which is what a real philosophy should be about, is insufficient to determine whether what they write is right or wrong really is -- in other words: if the philosophy is right, I am quite certain I would arrive at a different philosophy if I applied it fully, except, probably, from some fairly sizable core that would be inapplicable as such and not very interesting to talk about except with other philosphers, but they refuse to deal with all the ludicrous nonsense that Rand and Peikoff claim follow from the premises and principles, so there is little point in that. (A very good friend of mine _is_ a philosopher and she and I have these amazingly deep discussions that scare people in restaurants, but from which we usually remember nothing in particular.) Furthermore, what Rand writes is wrong and bad, is often right according to the very same principles she explicitly favors, only starting from other values that do not appear to be contradicting anything she says, so either she was not very good at applying these principles, or they are somehow broken. I did not have the time to sort out how these things worked because it appeared that the crucial element of a philosophy -- that it be time-saving -- was absent, to put it diplomatically. Peikoff is clearly an unstable nutcase. I do not consider Kelley an objectivist at all (Peikoff is right about that), _because_ what he writes and argues makes so much sense -- except for the part where he wants to be an objectivist, the purpose of which I completely fail to grasp. If I were in his shoes, I would just have replied "OK, be that way" to Peikoff and went on to establish a name for myself, which is unfortunately much harder since he insists on his attachment to Rand. I have met with him and talked with him for a while, and he is at least smarter than I am, which is a good starting point for a philosopher, but Peikoff is not. And (almost) all the objectivists I have ever known or heard of have shown that her philosophy and general outlook on things has a curiously stable "mental half-life" of about 10 years -- the point at which you realize that less than half of what you believed to be true still is part of what you as basis for your decisions. -- Guide to non-spammers: If you want to send me a business proposal, please be specific and do not put "business proposal" in the Subject header. If it is urgent, do not use the word "urgent". If you need an immediate answer, give me a reason, do not shout "for your immediate attention". Thank you.
In article <3233700015752...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote:
> * Bruce Hoult > | I'll freely admit to owning copies of three novels (and a play) by Rand, > | and quite a number of non fiction books as well. Plus works by Peikoff > | (who I find boring, didactic, and frequently mistaken) and Kelley (who I > | think makes a lot of sense).
> I would less freely admit to this, but since you do :), I own > everything she ever published.
I can't claim that. A majority, certainly, but not all.
> The single biggest reason I have come to think of the whole > Rand/Peikoff/Kelley thing as a waste of time is not that what they > write is wrong, it is that the very useful means of deciding what > is important from what is not, which is what a real philosophy > should be about, is insufficient to determine whether what they > write is right or wrong really is -- in other words: if the > philosophy is right, I am quite certain I would arrive at a > different philosophy if I applied it fully, except, probably, from > some fairly sizable core that would be inapplicable as such and not > very interesting to talk about except with other philosphers, but > they refuse to deal with all the ludicrous nonsense that Rand and > Peikoff claim follow from the premises and principles, so there is > little point in that.
I believe that a person and their works can have value even if they are imperfect. I find little fault in the early works of Rand, but after 1960 or so things went downhill. The whole 60's "cult" thing is repugnant to me, along with the attendent principle that "if Rand said it then it must be correct". She still has to make a proper argument rather than a pronouncement and there are a number of instances in which it seems pretty clear to me that she failed to properly apply her own principles. The issues of pollution, smoking, and women in positions of political power are obvious examples. All of which are from the last 15 or so years of her life.
> I did not have the time to sort out how these things worked > because it appeared that the crucial element of a philosophy -- > that it be time-saving -- was absent, to put it diplomatically.
Do you mean that for a philosophy to be useful (true?), it must provide canned solutions to a large class of problems, and thus save you the bother of thinking?
That seems incorrect on the face of it. It's also valid to say that no canned solution exists, but that certain principles should be applied together with reason.
> Peikoff is clearly an unstable nutcase.
Not very bright, I would have said. There is the germ of a good idea in _Parallels_, but the man just belabours it so, and uses repeated assertions in place of logic.
> I do not consider Kelley an objectivist at all (Peikoff is right > about that), _because_ what he writes and argues makes so much > sense -- except for the part where he wants to be an objectivist, > the purpose of which I completely fail to grasp.
Well, I'd say he's an "objectivist", but not an "Objectivist". Is he trying to horn in on Rand's legacy? I shouldn't have thought there was much benefit to that these days. Or is he just paying homage to his philosophical roots?
> And (almost) all the objectivists I have ever known or heard of > have shown that her philosophy and general outlook on things has a > curiously stable "mental half-life" of about 10 years -- the point > at which you realize that less than half of what you believed to be > true still is part of what you as basis for your decisions.
Hmm. It's about twenty years since I first idly thumbed through a copy of _Capitalism, the Unknown Ideal_ that was lying on a coworker's desk. I borrowed it, then _Atlas Shrugged_, and then bought the rest. So I should be down to 25% by now. But I don't think so. The things that my bullshit filter passed as being good or interesting ideas back then are, as far as I can tell, still now deeply rooted in my value system.
The one thing I could *never* get into was _Introduction to Objectivist Epistomology_. Somehow it just didn't ring true. I mean, *parts* of it did, but to me Persig's ideas in ZATAOMM form a better foundation for Rand's ethics and politics than do Rand's own writings. And they agree on just an amazing number of points, including (perhaps most striking), the relationship between conscious decisions, unconscious decisions, and one's internalised value system.
Bruce Hoult <br...@hoult.org> writes: > In article <3233700015752...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> > wrote:
> > I did not have the time to sort out how these things worked > > because it appeared that the crucial element of a philosophy -- > > that it be time-saving -- was absent, to put it diplomatically.
> Do you mean that for a philosophy to be useful (true?), it must > provide canned solutions to a large class of problems, and thus > save you the bother of thinking?
> That seems incorrect on the face of it. It's also valid to say > that no canned solution exists, but that certain principles > should be applied together with reason.
It would already be a great time-saver if philosophers provided us with some pinciples together with methods of discussing and reasoning that can be trusted to be correct and not totally incomplete or contradictory, so we can /start/ trying to find answers to questions that bother us, without constantly having to adjust and question those very principles themselves. ``There is no solution'' would be a perfectly fine answer to some given question, of course, but without a working framework you won't be able to prove even that.
Regards, -- Nils Goesche Ask not for whom the <CONTROL-G> tolls.
* Bruce Hoult | I believe that a person and their works can have value even if they are | imperfect.
This is very true. However, there is a difference between relevant and irrelevant traits that affect how you have to interpret principles they espouse. E.g., did Ayn Rand lead the kind of life that she said her philosophy had made possible? No, she did not. She actually lied about several important aspects of her life. She wanted so very much to be a self-made success, she made parts of it up herself, instead, and denied that people had helped her at crucial points in her life. This, to me, was quite important -- the standards she set were obviously extremely hard to follow, yet when she faced problems following them, she made them even harder to follow. This is the "it's right because I say so" principle of truth, which flies directly in the face of everything she wanted to build and defend. Indeed, it is such things that caused me to consider possible inherent, serious problems in her philosophy. (Peikoff is even worse, he believes something is right because Rand said so, and if there ever were a worse way to insult her philosophy, none of her detractors have managed to make it.)
| I find little fault in the early works of Rand, but after 1960 or so things | went downhill. The whole 60's "cult" thing is repugnant to me, along with | the attendent principle that "if Rand said it then it must be correct".
Yes, precisely. But we must remember that Rand herself was very much opposed to all this cult thing, until there was evidently lots of money in it, at which point some other curious thing happened to her ethics and philosophy.
| Do you mean that for a philosophy to be useful (true?), it must provide | canned solutions to a large class of problems, and thus save you the bother | of thinking?
No, not at all. The time-saving function of a philosophy are at a much higher level. I would argue that Aristotle's syllogisms are time-saving devices of this kind -- laying down principles of logic means that you waste so much less time with random noise that can lead anywhere except where you want to go. I recently mentioned that relevance is orthogonal to truth, which sprung up in a discussion with my father over the role of Kant's philosophy in the development of equally strong anti-religious philosophies despite the fact that he intended to protect religion from the onset of science. Kant seems to have confounded truth and relevance, because the religious belief he wanted to defend also does. I have argued that a religion or a philosophy cannot speak about facts of the world -- if it does, it is now or will eventually be wrong -- but it can and should speak about the relevance and ranking of facts and observations. A philosophy or method of scientific inquiry and the like will give you the means to establish the relevance of the facts you have observed, instead of you trying all sorts of ranking orders and stumbling on various ones that makes sense some of the time. So on the contrary, it does _not_ save you the bother of thinking, it makes sure that you make thinking mistakes so more seldom if you know what you are doing than if you simply try to "think" without a method or a guiding principle.
| Hmm. It's about twenty years since I first idly thumbed through a copy of | _Capitalism, the Unknown Ideal_ that was lying on a coworker's desk. I | borrowed it, then _Atlas Shrugged_, and then bought the rest. So I should be | down to 25% by now. But I don't think so. The things that my bullshit | filter passed as being good or interesting ideas back then are, as far as I | can tell, still now deeply rooted in my value system.
Most of the people I have known who have read Rand have done so at an impressionable age. My data set could be skewed by this, but the stuff that remains is definitely stable at this time with me, too. I have no idea how much or little it might be, however.
What struck me in many "believers" (it is, unfortunately, the right term) was that they did not manage to sift the arbitrary choices from the central ones. E.g., one guy I know colored his hair the same as Roark's, which I considered _nuts_. Peikoff once had to "admit" that he liked horror movies and was not all that thrilled with skyscrapers. *GASP* So somewhere along the lines, people got the wrong message, they hung on to her conclusions, not to the method of discovery and reasoning from important observation to conclusion.
| The one thing I could *never* get into was _Introduction to Objectivist | Epistomology_. Somehow it just didn't ring true. I mean, *parts* of it did, | but to me Persig's ideas in ZATAOMM form a better foundation for Rand's | ethics and politics than do Rand's own writings. And they agree on just an | amazing number of points, including (perhaps most striking), the relationship | between conscious decisions, unconscious decisions, and one's internalised | value system.
But this was her first attempt to do "real" philosophy. Yes, it failed. This is where I decided it would be more worth my while to seek additional problems to ponder and additional thoughts of giants elsewhere. I happen to find Pirsig most fascinating myself. Probably not an accident. -- Guide to non-spammers: If you want to send me a business proposal, please be specific and do not put "business proposal" in the Subject header. If it is urgent, do not use the word "urgent". If you need an immediate answer, give me a reason, do not shout "for your immediate attention". Thank you.
> [...] I have argued that a religion or a philosophy cannot speak > about facts of the world -- if it does, it is now or will eventually > be wrong -- but it can and should speak about the relevance and > ranking of facts and observations. A philosophy or method of > scientific inquiry and the like will give you the means to establish > the relevance of the facts you have observed, instead of you trying > all sorts of ranking orders and stumbling on various ones that makes > sense some of the time. So on the contrary, it does _not_ save you > the bother of thinking, it makes sure that you make thinking mistakes > so more seldom if you know what you are doing than if you simply > try to "think" without a method or a guiding principle.
The method or guiding principle you're describing sounds similar to what was once called "culture" (as opposed to modern "kulcha" -- fashion/food/entertainment). Culture, in the sense of collective confidence or 'certainty' in the assignment of value to observations and deeds, has (for better AND worse) been eroded by the rise of reason. Reason is unable to ascribe value/relevance to its own observations and conclusions without becoming caught in an infinite recursion.
It seems to me that the "system" or "method" you're seeking must eventually short-circuit reason. (The method may be consistent with rational thought, but can it be _generated_ by reason? I don't think so). As far as my puny brain can determine, instead of "this is TRUE because I SAY it is", sooner or later we must encounter "this is VALUABLE because I (or we) WILL have it thus". I hear this whispered between the lines of almost all philosophers. (Except Ayn Rand, who quietly *shrieks* it ;-).
I'm curious to know how far you've travelled in your quest for this "system" or "method". Do you regard the development of a system of ranking to be an act of creation or of discovery? Or have you hit upon something new that makes this a false dichotomy?
* "Patrick W" | Culture, in the sense of collective confidence or 'certainty' in the | assignment of value to observations and deeds, has (for better AND worse) | been eroded by the rise of reason.
I think it just became more abstract. We no longer have consensus on what the facts are, we have consensus on the method of ascertaining that some claim is true. The scientific method has a bad habit of shaking people's beliefs in what is true if they fail to grasp what _remains_ true as the precise facts change. I believe that consensus is even more important now than it was in monocultural dictatorshiplike structures, because we no longer have any useful consensus of facts, public policy, values, etc, so we need a consensus on higher principles. E.g., instead of _which_ laws to have, we agree on the rule of law principle. Instead of having to agree on specific things, we instead agree on how to resolve our differences. Instead of agreeing on which programming language to use, we agree on the need for specifications for those we choose, and how to write those specifications. Instead of agreeing on what to do, we are often satifisfied with agreeing on what _not_ to do.
| Reason is unable to ascribe value/relevance to its own observations and | conclusions without becoming caught in an infinite recursion.
Precisely. You have to _choose_ some core values and axioms for your system. To find them, you can reason from things you "like" before you started to think about them back to some fundaemental values and from those forward to logical consequences, but then you will probably have to repeat this process as you wind up with things you do not like that much after all, and change your values in this iterative process.
Like, my favorite line of reasoning is that I may be frightened by the news I read of violent people from the Middle East who form gangs in Oslo and kill people in their own gang and in other gangs, and momentarily feel threatened by some superficial quality like skin color. Many people here remain at this stage. Then I may notice that there are non-dangerous people who look exactly the same, but that the people who _are_ dangerous all emit the same signals as the dangerous "natives" that I have already learned to avoid and that there was no need to update my threat sensors at all. Then I realize that the very concept of attaching values to superficial qualities was wrong and proceed to search for other instances of same, and then I come across a curious group of people who only realized that attaching values to _one_ superficial quality was wrong. Instead of racists, they became anti-racists -- people who are willing to mistreat others they _believe_ are racists based on some superficial quality like a choice of word or disliking bad people who just happen to have a different skin color -- and they never understand that the basic principle of reacting to other people based on your fears of the group _you_ think they belong to, is bad. They cannot even understand that this could be wrong. "Racists are bad, yes? So what's wrong with beating them up?" They do not realize that this is _exactly_ what racists think about people with a different skin color. The same goes with those moronic black racists, who, instead of getting the point that mistreating people based on race is wrong, only think that mistreating _blacks_ based on race is wrong, and turn around to mistreat other races based on race. I _marvel_ at the lack of intelligence in both anti-racists and black racists, who I consider about twice as bad as racists, because they have seen how bad racism is, and they _still_ employ the principles they so despise, but the fact that many people have _not_ figured out that reacting to an _individual_ based on your feelings towards a group you _think_ they belong to is wrong, shows me that thinking in principles requires effort and serious consideration, and that most people have never learned a method of thinking and deliberation -- they just along with whatever they feel like, and end up incredibly wrong.
I happen to like the fundamental value of "human life" as a starting point and "personal happiness" and "intelligence and reason" go with it, as I see it. Other people evidently value "feeling safe" over "happiness" and that means that "reason" is no longer a value, either, because reasoning requires effort and thinking tends to involve risk, disappointment, failure, and the opposite of "safe" -- you may realize that what you once thought to be good is in fact really bad, not by itself, but because of ramifications you had not thought about. E.g., if sexism is bad, using "he" to refer to any man(!) is bad, so you use "they", but then make the very grave mistake of thinking that those who still use "he" are sexist (because of this superficial quality of appearance and stupid, stupid groupthink), upon which conclusion you have just killed off your entire cultural heritage as "sexist". This is so bad and so stupid that the decision to use "they" instead of "he" _must_ be reconsidered in light of its horrible consequences. It is now using "they" instead of "he" that is sexist, because those who use "they" consider those who _innocently_ use "he" as sexist and they _wrongly_ sensitize a culture to an issue that was not there. Sure, there were sexists, too, but you can find those by other and much more accurate means than by counting occurrences of "he". In fact, the real sexists go scot free, because they can just adapt to a "they" form while any reader would understand that they denigrate females and tolerate only males and use the "they" form ironically and sarcastically, which the stupid word-counting anti-sexists would not understand because the simple formulaic detector they use is provides as many false positives as it produces false negatives. Sufficiently advanced political correctness is indistinguishable from sarcasm.
| It seems to me that the "system" or "method" you're seeking must eventually | short-circuit reason.
Yes, of course. Logic by itself does not produce valid conclusions -- it only says that conclusions from invalid logic are useless and that only conclusions from good premises lead to good conclusions. How you find those good premises is another task entirely, but at least you can work within a secure framework where you know that your conclusions will hold and that if you do not "like" your conclusions, it is not your reasonsing that you have to examine, but your premises. You can thus show that something is bad somewhere "down there" if you can arrive at bad conclusions through logic. This is an very valuable debugging tool that people who do not consider reason to be valuable do not have. Thus, they tolerate bad premises and just switch the conclusions around as they like, disregaring their bad logic.
| (The method may be consistent with rational thought, but can it be | _generated_ by reason? I don't think so.)
Well, I think it can, but not with a uni-directional application of reason and logic from some a priori principles. (The funny thing with a priori principles is that they are _discovered_ through what _must_ have been identical to that of a posteriori principles, but because some people are hysterical about induction, they invent all these complex things to wrap it up in something that looks to the unwary eye like deduction. I find that most humorous.)
So when you say "short-circuit", I tend to interpret that as that you do not like feedback loops in your system. I disagree. I think feedback loops are just wonderful. Circular reasoning is not invalid if there is some external input to it in each step, i.e., if you apply exactly the same steps round and round, you will not end up in the same place. More than that, I think this is a wonderful way of discovering "strange attractors" in human thinking. I would venture that if you kept at this process long enough, you would find that certain things are reached no matter where you start, and that those are the real fundamental principles of human philosophy. In all likelihood, they are quite counterintuitive.
| As far as my puny brain can determine, instead of "this is TRUE because I SAY | it is", sooner or later we must encounter "this is VALUABLE because I (or we) | WILL have it thus". I hear this whispered between the lines of almost all | philosophers. (Except Ayn Rand, who quietly *shrieks* it ;-).
Most philosophers start out from believing that Good sort of exists a priori. I think this is entirely false. I think good arises out of knowing that most people would not like to be hurt or die, and then you find ways to erect a system of defense mechanisms that is such that anyone who tries to be bad is more hurt than he can hurt others. That is, if you had evil in mind, you would know that not only the person you hurt would respond, but his community would hurt you back. (Anarchy is the absence of this community right to respond through a recognized authority, and it is the worst aspect of USENET. It leads to "I feel bad, therefore I am allowed to defend myself"-responses instead of the much more mature "I feel bad, how can I avoid that"-responses that you do in a community that seriously frowns up those who take the law into their own hands.¹)
The feeling of safety in society comes from the fact that you know that the police, defense, etc, will pummel the bad guys and that the bad guys know this. You can feel safe because there is a much greater evil ready to crush those who try to be evil on their own, and you know that this greater evil is used only measured and controlled ways and with many safety precautions, quite unlike the
In article <3233852330539...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes: >Curiously, Norwegian has a > short word, "selvtekt", for taking the law into your own hands.
We non-Vikings make do with a longer word: vigilantism (which is pronounced vigilante-ism.
-- Attaining and helping others attain "Aha!" experiences, as satisfying as attaining and helping others attain orgasms.
* Dvd Avins | We non-Vikings make do with a longer word: vigilantism
Sorry, it is not the same thing at all. It is a crucial matter of intent and premeditation. Vigilance committees and he like are organized to take care of some problem. A person who just decides not to wait for the police and take revenge or "clean up" on his own, is not a vigilante. If he brings a gun on the subway for the express purpose of defending himself, he would be a vigilante, but that is a subset of what "selvtekt" covers. -- Guide to non-spammers: If you want to send me a business proposal, please be specific and do not put "business proposal" in the Subject header. If it is urgent, do not use the word "urgent". If you need an immediate answer, give me a reason, do not shout "for your immediate attention". Thank you.
In article <3233855243901...@naggum.net>, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes: >| We non-Vikings make do with a longer word: vigilantism
> Sorry, it is not the same thing at all. It is a crucial matter of intent >and > premeditation. Vigilance committees and he like are organized to take care > of some problem. A person who just decides not to wait for the police and > take revenge or "clean up" on his own, is not a vigilante. If he brings a > gun on the subway for the express purpose of defending himself, he would be >a > vigilante, but that is a subset of what "selvtekt" covers.
I've never heard of a vigilance committee, but people who take revenge (including most especially those who do so out of after-the-fact anger) on those who harm the revengers neighbors are commonly referred to as vigilantes.
-- Attaining and helping others attain "Aha!" experiences, as satisfying as attaining and helping others attain orgasms.
Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> writes: > Logic by itself does not produce valid conclusions -- it only says > that conclusions from invalid logic are useless and that only > conclusions from good premises lead to good conclusions.
This is so horribly misunderstood by so many people. Confusion among logical, reasonable, and correct is so rampant that having a discussion that deals with matters of opinion is difficult unless you know your company ahead of time.
Usenet is a great example of this. Read an advocacy newsgroup sometime. Ugh.
> (Ayn Rand made several serious mistakes in not understanding this > difference (I was told Russian does not have separate words for the > two)
Correct. Russian-English dictionaries will offer /razumnyj/ for something based on reason under the head-word "rational". It can also be used to describe a person endowed with reason, or someone who is intelligent.
"Reasonable" would also be /razumnyj/, or perhaps /blagorazumnyj/ (literally, "good" + "reasonable"). The important part of all of these constructions is /um/, which by itself means "mind", and as a stem for another word will carry the connotation of using the mind.
/Myslayacshij/ can also be used to describe someone who has reason. My Russian isn't good enough to break that down further. I don't understand its connotations or how the word gets built up. Perhaps someone more expert could enlighten us.
Russian also has /ratsional'yj/ but if you try to use the word to mean Rational as Rand would use it, the listener won't understand what you mean, and probably offer you a correction of /razumnyj/. It seems to have meaning only in a mathematical context.
> ¹ Is there a (legal) term for this in English? Curiously, Norwegian > has a short word, "selvtekt", for taking the law into your own > hands.
"Vigilante" might be the best option. Originally, vigilantes were members of volunteer "vigilance committees" (in the U.S. in the nineteenth century), but now the word is often used as an adjective to describe someone who decides to do things himself. I've seen this most often online, but it seems present elsewhere.
In particular, a search for "vigilante" on www.FindLaw.com shows a few usages that suggest it might be a good equivalent for Norwegian's "selvtekt". In all three of the uses quoted here, "vigilante" suggests self-appointed power or authority. Note that in the first case, it even draws a distinction between a bounty hunter and a vigilante.
Does this plan constitute establishment of a "bounty hunter" system? Certainly. It does not, however, constitute a vigilante system. Concomitant with the authority to grant licenses, Congress would place in the tribunal the authority to promulgate strict requirements and guidelines for private entities to qualify for such licenses. This authority would be based on whatever parameters Congress chose to enact, just as statutes authorize a government agency to promulgate rules to effect the beneficent purposes of the statute. Therefore, it is incorrect [*402] and simplistic to assert that this control system, in which violators would risk loss of their license and their prize, would spawn gangs of reckless international gunslingers rather than foster an entrepreneurial cadre of trained professionals.
In 1995, staff at a federal prison in Florence, Colorado banded together to systematically beat prisoners whom they believed disrespected their authority. Mike McPhee, Vigilante Guards May Do Time, Denver Post, July 27, 2000, at http://www.denverpost.com/news/news0727.htm.
There has been a new rash of hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, or anyone thought by the uninformed vigilante to be a potential terrorist or sympathizer.
/Oxford English Dictionary/ online offers some quotes that might be helpful.
Hence vigi {sm} lantism (orig. U.S.), the principles or activities of vigilantes or vigilance committees.
1937 Sun (Baltimore) 27 Sept. 2/7 A public investigation of `vigilantism' in strike areas was announced today through the American League Against War and Fascism. 1942 W. STEGNER Mormon Country 96 Perhaps even those incidents were purely unofficial and spontaneous acts of devout Mormons, the Mormon equivalent of lynch law and vigilantism. 1953 Economist 19 Sept. 775/3 In the United States, neither private vigilantism nor the government seems prepared to treat a favourable verdict as final. 1979 Times 6 Dec. 3/1 Africa was confronted, he said, with a choice between a system of collective security and a system of international vigilantism. 1985 Listener 10 Jan. 9/1 The one genuine, spontaneous popular institution in the West was vigilantism.
-- Matt Curtin Interhack Corp +1 614 545 HACK http://web.interhack.com/ Author, Developing Trust: Online Privacy and Security (Apress, 2001) Knight of the Lambda Calculus | Quod scripsi scripsi. --Pontius Pilate
Matt Curtin <cmcur...@interhack.net> writes: > > (Ayn Rand made several serious mistakes in not understanding this > > difference (I was told Russian does not have separate words for the > > two)
> Correct. Russian-English dictionaries will offer /razumnyj/ for > something based on reason under the head-word "rational". It can also > be used to describe a person endowed with reason, or someone who is > intelligent.
This is true, but not 100% true: we also have the word /racional'nyj/, which first appeared, I think, about two centuries ago, adopted from Latin via either Polish or German. To my native speaker's ear it sounds like rather technical, sometimes with connotations of "productivity".
When given this word as a query, Google retrieves pages where this word appears in the following contexts: as a name of a mobile telephony rate plan of a dozen different providers [tarif "racional'nyj"]; in the name of a Belorussian savings fund ["Racional'nyj dom" = "Rational house"]; in the title of a translation of the book "Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational", by Paul Hollander; in a page with advice on cough treatment in children [Protivokashlevaja terapija: racional'nyj vybor = Cough therapy: a rational choice]; in an article on the organisation of medical insurance in the City of Moscow [racional'nyj podhod = a rational approach]; in an advertisement of a "School of Rational Yoga" ["Shkola Racional'noj Jogi"]; etc. (these results are from the first 20 matches).
> "Reasonable" would also be /razumnyj/, or perhaps /blagorazumnyj/ > (literally, "good" + "reasonable"). <...>
A better translation of /blagorazumnyj/ is "prudent".
> <...> The important part of all of > these constructions is /um/, which by itself means "mind", and as a > stem for another word will carry the connotation of using the mind.
Again, this is more complex: the stem of the word is /razum/ ("mind"), while /um/, which is the principal part of the stem, is rather something along the lines of "wits" or "intellect".
> /Myslayacshij/ can also be used to describe someone who has reason. > My Russian isn't good enough to break that down further. <...>
Rather, /mysljaschij/. It is a participle of the verb /myslit'/ which is a rather exalted word that means "to think". E.g. Descartes's "Cogito ergo sum" ("I think therefore I am") is commonly translated as "Ja myslju -- sledovatel'no, ja suschestvuju"; the everyday word for "think" is /dumat'/. On the other hand, the related noun /mysl'/ is just the very standard translation of "thought" or "idea".
> Russian also has /ratsional'yj/ but if you try to use the word to mean > Rational as Rand would use it, the listener won't understand what you > mean, and probably offer you a correction of /razumnyj/. It seems to > have meaning only in a mathematical context.
I must apologise: I started my reply before reading this part of your article. See my remarks on the usage of /racional'nyj/ above.
Certainly, it is also the word which is used for "rational" as in "rational numbers".
> > ¹ Is there a (legal) term for this in English? Curiously, Norwegian > > has a short word, "selvtekt", for taking the law into your own > > hands.
Btw., Russian has a word for this which is /samoupravstvo/; it is defined by the article 330 of the Criminal code of the Russian Federation (see, e.g., http://zakon.kolokol.ru/R/L/6581/) as "an unauthorised action, contrary to the order instituted by a law or another legal document, whose [i.e. action's -B.Sm] rightfulness has been brought in question by an organisation or a citizen, if said action had caused substantial damage".
Curiously, the Administrative offences code of the RF (specifically, its article 19.1 -- see http://zakon.kolokol.ru/R/P/11097) gives another definition of the same word: "an unauthorised execution [by a person] of his actual or assumed right, contrary to the order instituted by a federal law or another normative legal document, which has not caused substantial damage to citizens or juridical persons". Feel the subtlety here?!
The translations in both cases are mine, so please don't try to bring them up before a Russian court (-;
>> There was an exchange like this in Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead >> between architect Howard Roark and an architectural critic.
>I think it would be interesting to see how many programmers know their >Objectivism by comparison to the population as a whole, as well as the >same test for Common Lisp programmers vs. programmers of other >fait^H^H^H^Hlanguages.
>It might go a long way toward explaining the kinds of idioms that have >developed over time about how to build software with Common Lisp.
>-- >Matt Curtin Interhack Corp +1 614 545 HACK http://web.interhack.com/ >Author, Developing Trust: Online Privacy and Security (Apress, 2001) >Knight of the Lambda Calculus | Quod scripsi scripsi. --Pontius Pilate
May I recommend "Where the Action is - The Foundations of Embodied Interaction" by Paul Dourish (2001) MIT Press.
" ... 'embodiment' is at the centre of phenomenology, an important strain of philosophical thought beginning at the end of the nineteenth century. Phenomenology rejects the Cartesian separation between mind and body on which most traditional philosophical approaches are based..."
"Drawing from the writings of a number of phenomenologists, and especially from Heidegger, Schutz and Wittgenstein, Where the Action Is develops an understanding of embodied interaction organised in terms of the creation, manipulation and communication of meaning, and the establishment and maintenance of practice. Rather than embedding fixed notions of meaning within technologies, embodied interaction is based on the understanding that users create and communicate meaning through their interaction with the system (and with each other, through the system)."
> More than that, I think this is a wonderful way of discovering > "strange attractors" in human thinking.
This is a fascinating idea. I have come to accept that our more or less arbitrarily chosen axioms have only limited temporal and cultural validity, but strange attractors could, if they exist, provide firmer ground to base a more durable value system upon. I must explore this line of thought further.
> [...] The scientific method has a bad habit of shaking people's > beliefs in what is true if they fail to grasp what _remains_ true as the > precise facts change. I believe that consensus is even more important now > than it was in monocultural dictatorshiplike structures, because we no longer > have any useful consensus of facts, public policy, values, etc, so we need a > consensus on higher principles.
Sure. We tease out the relatively stable generalities from unstable particulars. In theory we can do this for principles of evaluation, as well as for principles of truth. Obviously this is very difficult when methods of evaluation are intimitely dependent on 'facts' of unstable veracity. So, yes, the idea that relevance/value is (or ought to be) orthogonal to truth is, I think, a very good one.
> E.g., instead of _which_ laws to have, we agree on the rule of law
principle.
Indeed, this provides the framework for the _exercise_ of a set of principles, but it necessarily postpones the formulation of a global ranking system for the resolution of specific controversies, which is its ultimate purpose. We might as well leap up to the next level of abstraction and declare: "we agree to the principle of living by best principles, and shall in due course determine what these best principles may be". And work downwards from there ;-)
I wonder if there is *always* a higher level of abstraction to which we can ascend in order to resolve tensions between currently incompatible values? I don't know; I'm only improvising, but it seems to me that sooner or later the arbitrary exercise of power will intervene; and that which has been ordained by a power *subsequently* becomes valued by virtue of having won. Law is a highly sublimated form of this kind of power. It actually depends quite heavily on the *stability* of our table of values, but provides little in the way of guidance for formulating them (other than precedent, which itself has a questionable principle hard-wired into it). But obviously I agree that the principle *of* law is orthogonal to the principles *in* law.
> Precisely. You have to _choose_ some core values and axioms for your system. > To find them, you can reason from things you "like" before you started to > think about them back to some fundaemental values and from those forward to > logical consequences, but then you will probably have to repeat this process > as you wind up with things you do not like that much after all, and change > your values in this iterative process.
Yes. this is a perfectly adequate process for a personal philosophy.
> So when you say "short-circuit", I tend to interpret that as that you do not > like feedback loops in your system.
Personally? It's probably more correct to say that I like them too much. This is, for me, the most fascinating phenomenon in the universe.
"short-circuit" was a bad choice of words, because I was actually referring to the beginning of the process, not the end of the process. In other words, interrupting the circuit of tail-chasing indecision and choosing some core axioms and values to _begin_ with is what I meant by "short-circuiting".
> [...] I think this > is a wonderful way of discovering "strange attractors" in human thinking. I > would venture that if you kept at this process long enough, you would find > that certain things are reached no matter where you start, and that those are > the real fundamental principles of human philosophy. In all likelihood, they > are quite counterintuitive.
I had not thought of them in terms of "strange attractors", but I have long been fascinated by these latent patterns of mind. I also find it quite interesting to track the changing metaphors we use to point to these suspected patterns. It's interesting that the 'gods' and 'demons' that became internalised with the dawn of science are now being projected outwards again with metaphors like 'archetypes' and 'memes'. Even 'viruses'.
> [...] I believe the feedback loop that is consciousness > makes creation and discovery a false dichotomy for certain aspects of > philosophy and psychology, that is, I believe that we tend to do something > and explain why it was good after the fact -- rationalization instead of > rational argumentation.
I wish I had something new to add here, but much of my life's experience confirms this.
> (For instance, certain psychological theories are > obviously false for any shade of normal people, yet turn true for those who > believe in them, much like some religions do, upon which these psychologists > do an _amazing_ amount of harm to people who have been defined as "patients", > so they lose their normal set of human rights. Quite interesting,
really.)
I'm not sure whether you're referring to mainstream psychiatry or to crazy/ier sects within it. But since we can't get much further away from Lisp, I might as well pitch in here. I would very much like to see a revival of interest in the existential/phenomenological approach to psychiatry investigated by Laing and Esterson (among others) in the 1960s (before Laing himself went a little too far toward the deep end). They had some marvellous ideas which have, unfortunately, been swallowed up by the biological / mechanistic 'disease model' of mental illness. One crucial point, that many genuinely stupid researchers overlook, is that their work on the interpersonal relationships was (and is) completely orthogonal to the question of whether (or how) the brains of psychotic people function differently from those of typical people. It's a pity that these ideas have, for all practical purposes, have been lost to psychiatry -- and, strangely, even psychology to a large extent.
But now we're wandering _too_ far astray.
Erik, thanks for sharing your ideas. As always, much food for thought.
On Sun, 23 Jun 2002 20:18:52 GMT, Erik Naggum <e...@naggum.net> wrote: > I generally believe that it is impossible to learn what is right unless you > make lots of mistakes and are willing to make lots of mistakes, but the key > is to make the most intelligent mistakes and make them only once, if you can.
Some time ago a friend of mine gave me as a gift the book "To Engineer is Human - The Role of Failure in Successful Design" by Henry Petroski. He jotted down the following dedication on the inside cover: "Paolo: may all your mistakes be meaningful ones".
Kenny Tilton wrote: > "Christopher C. Stacy" wrote:
> > Where are the flying cars? There were supposed to be flying cars?
> Yes. And moving sidewalks. John Prine did some good work in this area.
> In a way the predictions have all come true, except the win has been in > the transportation of information (the Web), not people. Back then when > those Jetson predictions were being made, folks were limited by their > idea of the forms progress could take. The astonishing things of the day > were jet airplanes and rocketships and even the automobile was making > rapid advances; predictions blindly got stamped in the same coin of > personal transportation.
Whereas now, of course, the same thing could never happen. Dear me, no. :-)
-- Gareth McCaughan Gareth.McCaug...@pobox.com .sig under construc
Barry Margolin <bar...@genuity.net> wrote in message <news:gTIN8.2$O26.191@paloalto-snr1.gtei.net>... > In article <MPG.17707948c065384989...@news.teranews.com>, > Clark Wilson <wilson...@hotmail.com> wrote: > >Green is "Active: thousands of users" > >Orange is "Protected: taught at universities, compilers available" > >Red is "Endangered: usage dropping off"
> >So my reading of the three entries on the Lisp branch (in chronological > >order) was:
> >Lisp -- protected > >Common Lisp -- active > >ANSI Common Lisp -- protected
> Well, I'd think that Lisp should be closer to Green, because of Emacs Lisp > and AutoLisp.