Science, Philosophy, Mysticism, Art, Mathematics, and Physics
Lester Zick
Science, Philosophy, Mysticism, Art, Mathematics, and Physics
---------------
Allow me to summarize certain lines of reasoning relating to the
definition of science, philosophy, and mysticism so as to make these
ideas explicit.
Science argues that A is C because A is B and B is C.
Philosophy argues that A is C either because A is B and "let me tell
you a little story about B and C" or because "let me tell you a little
story about A and B" and B is C.
Mysticism just postulates that A is C because X is Y and the two are
connected by "let me tell you a little story".
Art just argues that X is Y.
Mathematics just argues that A is C because they have dibs on it.
Physics aruges that A is C cuz they don't need no stinkin reasons.
Regards - Lester
Uncle Al
>
> Science, Philosophy, Mysticism, Art, Mathematics, and Physics
> ---------------
Stupidity, Sciolism, Ignorance, Insanity, Drivel, and Zick.
http://www.apa.org/journals/psp/psp7761121.html
http://insti.physics.sunysb.edu/~siegel/quack.html
<http://www.firehead.org/~jessh/film/kubrick/Kubrick-Psycho.html>
<http://www.naturalchild.com/elliott_barker/prisons.html>
Hey Zick - if empirical reality calls you an idiot, then you are an
empirical idiot.
Uncle Al says, "Mystics are baffled by the obvious yet possess a
complete understanding of the nonexistent."
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf
Lester Zick
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>> Science, Philosophy, Mysticism, Art, Mathematics, and Physics
>> ---------------
>
>Stupidity, Sciolism, Ignorance, Insanity, Drivel, and Zick.
Ah, the Oxymoron cometh. Last time I checked he could see something
different from differences through Galileo's telescope.
>http://www.apa.org/journals/psp/psp7761121.html
>http://insti.physics.sunysb.edu/~siegel/quack.html
><http://www.firehead.org/~jessh/film/kubrick/Kubrick-Psycho.html>
><http://www.naturalchild.com/elliott_barker/prisons.html>
>
>Hey Zick - if empirical reality calls you an idiot, then you are an
>empirical idiot.
Wherein Oxymoron confuses himself with empirical reality.
>Uncle Al says, "Mystics are baffled by the obvious yet possess a
>complete understanding of the nonexistent."
I'll take your word for it.
Regards - Lester
none
I'd say science argues A appears to correlate with C because A appears
to correlate with B and B appears to correlate with C and the chain is
not so long so if the probability of good enough correlation is high
enough for each link we still have a high probablity of correlation
between A and C for the whole chain.
Lester Zick
Ooooooooooooooooooooookay.
Regards - Lester
zerkanX
>
>
> Science, Philosophy, Mysticism, Art, Mathematics, and Physics
> ---------------
>
> Allow me to summarize certain lines of reasoning relating to the
> definition of science, philosophy, and mysticism so as to make these
> ideas explicit.
>
> Science argues that A is C because A is B and B is C.
===========================================
Very amusing.. I'll try some....
Science argues that A is C because of a "A=C grant". B is window dressing.
Mysticism just postulates that A is C because C is unknowable and makes us
afraid and so all things including B must be subject to it.
Art just argues that A is anything I want it to be.. just watch and listen!
Physics argues that A is C cuz it just got a new A=C scope.
Philosophy argues that A is A, B is B and C is C. They are all part of an
didactic letternomic set with has been assigned arbitrary cultural and
cognitive importance... at least that's what it says here... in this book.
Lester Zick
All very amusing as well, ZerkanX.
Regards - Lester
AngleWyrm
news:41bd1833...@netnews.att.net...
> >Science argues that A is C because of a "A=C grant". B is window dressing.
> >Mysticism just postulates that A is C because C is unknowable and makes us
> >afraid and so all things including B must be subject to it.
> > Art just argues that A is anything I want it to be.. just watch and listen!
> > Physics argues that A is C cuz it just got a new A=C scope.
> > Philosophy argues that A is A, B is B and C is C. They are all part of an
> >didactic letternomic set with has been assigned arbitrary cultural and
> >cognitive importance... at least that's what it says here... in this book.
I argue that "=" is an emergant generalization of distinguishing dissimilarity
between A and B, a conceptual positive to a physical negative.
-:|:-
AngleWyrm
Lester Zick
I believe I've argued myself along similar lines.
Regards - Lester
stlbl
multiplied by something very close to 1 most of the time". In computer
engineering it means, A is now B, until I tell you otherwise. The main
point is, nothing is identical to anything else, or may be so, for such
a short time as turns out to be not observable. But, we wouldnt get
anywhere is we couldnt identify things with names in systems of
knowledge (or belief). It is important for assigning meaning. So there
is the approximation of the adjective, "EQUALS", used in many systems,
with no general definition (a definition that holds true all of the
time)
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
I'm mostly interested in definitions that hold true all the time.
Regards - Lester
AngleWyrm
news:1102958973.7...@c13g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
> In physics "=" as in A=B, means "A is directly proportional to B
> multiplied by something very close to 1 most of the time". In computer
> engineering it means, A is now B, until I tell you otherwise.
Computer science might also describe '=' as A is copied from B.
How about:
'=' describes an proximity relationship between two measurements, where the
distance between A and B approaches zero to within some arbitrary threshhold?
Just by changing the threshhold, we can say that two things are equal. For
instance, my mom and dad live in different cities, but if I move the distance
threshhold up: They still live in different states, but they live in the same
country/continent/planet/galaxy. I would continue with same universe, but I
don't have the distance between two universes to work with in this implied
measurement of length.
I can therefore say that '=' is a partial description of a distance delta less
than a threshhold, which assumes the reader will know the scale of the
threshhold, usually based on S.O.P. for units of measure employed. Seems like it
might even be more appropriate to call it "less than e away from", but that's
just hard to pronounce.
Maybe a better symbol would include the distance threshold under which we choose
to ignore differences:
A =e= B
If we were free to designate the unit of measure for a given application, I
would propose using length e as unit length, resulting in integer math.
stlbl
is probably a poor choice for "=", which you have well described as an
approximate relationship, or at least a qualified relationship.
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Most words of any fundamental significance are. And the more we try
to specify them the vaguer they get. Maybe there's a conservation of
vagueness law at work akin to the uncertainty principle.
Regards - Lester
stlbl
I like that! They are very similar! Specifying definition increases
vagueness---and like in the subatomic world, we become part of the
experiment---we cannot stay outside the system we are measuring!
ele...@yahoo.gr
you forgot the most important one:
Lester = idiot in all science, philosophy, mysticism, art, math and
physics.
That's an invariant under any conceivable transformation local or
global. Seems you are an example of a unified theory of stupidity.
Mike
JPL Verhey
I don't think Lester likes quantum physics ;-)
Wolf Kirchmeir
[...]>
>
> I'm mostly interested in definitions that hold true all the time.
They do, Lester, they do. By definition. Whether a definition refers to
anything real is another question.
AngleWyrm
news:41be294a$0$44096$5fc...@dreader2.news.tiscali.nl...
> >>
> >> >My main point is that the word "equal", with all its secular meanings,
> >> >is probably a poor choice for "=", which you have well described as
> >> >an approximate relationship, or at least a qualified relationship.
> >> Most words of any fundamental significance are. And the more we try
> >> to specify them the vaguer they get. Maybe there's a conservation of
> >> vagueness law at work akin to the uncertainty principle.
> > I like that! They are very similar! Specifying definition increases
> > vagueness---and like in the subatomic world, we become part of the
> > experiment---we cannot stay outside the system we are measuring!
> I don't think Lester likes quantum physics ;-)
I smell a cat...is it dead yet?
stlbl
AngleWyrm
> Half dead, half alive of course....
I tend to agree...half the time. When no one's looking.
Wolf Kirchmeir
[...]>
>
> I don't think Lester likes quantum physics ;-)
>
>
Lester thinks quantum theory is a fraud, or a joke, or both. He believes
it's a conspiracy by the elitist scientists who ignore his epoch-making
discovery of differences among difference (or between - I forget; not
that it would make much difference.)
Lester doesn't like anything he can't imagine. He doesn't like any
dimensions beyond the spatial three, either.
Lester believes that if he can't understand it, it must be wrong -
because of course whatever he understand must be true. (That's an
example of a vlaid but unsound argument, another thing Lester has
trouble with. See his talk about tautologies.)
Lester Zick
On the other hand, Wolf, it might be interesting to explore this
definition of definition a little more objectively to decide how they
can refer to anything unreal.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
wrote:
Yes. However, yours is only a particular definition and not of any
universal significance. When you get around to dealing in universals
for a change, do let us know, won't you, sport?
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
Actually, JPL, I think quantum mechanics relations are very important.
I just prefer to derive the uncertainty relation from scratch and
derive its implications mechanically from that derivation instead of
the "not stinkin reasons" method used in conventional quantum physics.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
<wwol...@sympatico.ca> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>JPL Verhey wrote:
>[...]>
>>
>> I don't think Lester likes quantum physics ;-)
>>
>>
>
>Lester thinks quantum theory is a fraud, or a joke, or both. He believes
>it's a conspiracy by the elitist scientists who ignore his epoch-making
>discovery of differences among difference (or between - I forget; not
>that it would make much difference.)
Not quite, Wolf. Lester thinks the application of quantum principles
is etc. etc. etc. and that quantum effects should be derived from
scratch according to particle properties and not just for the "no
stinkin reasons" guessing game used by conventional physics.
>Lester doesn't like anything he can't imagine. He doesn't like any
>dimensions beyond the spatial three, either.
Not quite, Wolf. Lester doesn't like anything you can imagine but
can't prove.
>Lester believes that if he can't understand it, it must be wrong -
>because of course whatever he understand must be true. (That's an
>example of a vlaid but unsound argument, another thing Lester has
>trouble with. See his talk about tautologies.)
Another vlaid faux pas, Wolf. What's unsound is that your argument
is particular and not universal. I may or may not like what I can't
understand but unlike yourself I much prefer what I can prove. The
only thing of universal significance you've ever said is that
tautologies are always true. Can I help it if I then extrapolate the
consequences of that uncharacteristic admission? It's your fault yet
you blame me. You shoulda stood in bed. The true behaviorist never
admits anything is true.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
wrote:
>I prefer Existential Qualifiers to Universals. I tend to think the
>latter hode som dogmatism. Anyway, no universally quantified
>propositions can be proved empirically so there you go, my particular
>definition may not be of universal significance but it's of
>significance to you:)
Well, it may apply to me but it is hardly of significance to me. The
problem is that it doesn't apply to anyone but me; so, it is only of
particular significance in any event whereas what I say is applicable
across the board whence I say it. You might consider getting your
words straight before you say them.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>One thing you may not be aware of in the history of quantum (or what
>they used to call , atomic) physics, is that the theoreticians were
>forced to change their descriptions of the atomic and subatomic world
>(mathematical and otherwise, like Dirac delta functions) because of the
>theretofore unexplainable observations from the laboratory, i.e.
>absorption and emission spectra, radiative decay, etc. So I'm not sure
>of what "from scratch" means. And also particles behave as particles
>sometimes and waves other times, depending on how they are constrained.
>The wave/particle duality we always hear about. All we can do is
>describe---"no stinkin reason" is the frustrated exclamation of "no
>reason I can see!".
Of course. My primary complaint is the kind of philosophizing quantum
theorists are willing to accept as a substitute for knowledge and as
collateral for their ignorance.
By the phrase "from scratch" what I have in mind is the definition of
an ideal particle and the deduction of Planck's Constant from that
definition and the further deduction of Heisenberg's Uncertainty
relation from it. I posted my analysis of the first over a year ago
and will append a copy. If you're interested, take a gander.
>My favorite bit of prose---whoever can identify its source get the
>kewpie doll:
>The lofty prize,
>Of Science lies
>Hidden today as ever.
>Who, with no thought-
>To him it's brought,
>To own without endeavor!
>on the flip side...
>stlbl
>
As I've received no analytical objections to the following post I'm
appending several historical observations.
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 15:33:42 GMT, lester...@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) wrote:
>
> Planck's Constant
>
>Previously in the thread Angular Momentum in Rotating Bodies, I
>presented an analytical framework for the interpretation of dr/dt in
>circular rotation of a point mass m at velocity v and radius r. No one
>I know of agrees with my interpretation of dr/dt. However, in the
>interests of further establishing this general framework, I would like
>to pursue general developement of the idea which culminates in the
>analytical definition of Planck's constant.
>
>We begin by noting that in cases of circular rotation at constant
>angular velocity we have a centripetally directed dr/dt acting on
>point mass m of a magnitude equal to tangential velocity v. This is
>what causes the rotation of v and produces r as a consequence of
>rotation.
>
>We then integrate dr/dt along r which produces 1/2 mvr/2pi with units
>of measure equal to rr/t. Now, I have been cautioned on several
>occasions not to suggest that this quantity represents angular
>momentum in conventional terms and I agree. Perhaps we should simply
>call it rotational momentum to prevent confusion.
>
>What we notice immediately however is that it bears the same form as
>what is conventionally referred to as particle angular momentum, with
>the quantity mvr corresponding to Planck's constant. However, we have
>to straighten certain things out in this connection.
>
>In conventional macro angular rotation such as flywheels we have a
>centripetal dr/dt and tangential v which are equal to each other. They
>are effectively bound up through tensile forces internal to the body
>undergoing rotation. In celestial angular mechanics on the other hand
>we have a wide variety of potential dr/dt's and tangential orbital
>velocities operating in various combinations.
>
>But in the context of particle rotational dynamics we have a somewhat
>different situation. The tangential velocity of rotation v is constant
>under all circumstances. In other words, v = c. Thus dr/dt operates
>centripetally on tangential velocity v to produce elementary particles
>of different radii and in the process acts as an index to particle
>mass.
>
>Therefore we can index particle mass to a rotational frequency, n (per
>second) times an analytical masslet, m0 (kg-sec) and interpret the
>quantity mvr as a multiple of nm0vr. Further we can interpret r as a
>function of c/n such that Planck's constant = m0cc. In other words, m0
>is roughly on the order of 10^-50 kg-sec in magnitude and Planck's
>constant corresponds to the multiple of m0 and the square of the
>velocity of light.
>
>We notice several things about rotational momentum. In linear motion
>at constant velocity rotational momentum is zero because dr/dt and mvr
>are both zero. And in circular rotation at a constant angular velocity
>rotational momentum is constant because mvr is constant. This
>represents the analytical distinction between circular and linear
>motion.
>
>Further we notice that dr/dt can be of any magnitude. It is not bound
>by the constancy of the velocity of light as an upper limit because it
>doesn't go anywhere. It only produces rotation in relation to actual
>tangential motion v = c.
>
>And because particle mass and dr/dt share a conjugal relationship, it
>should be intuitively obvious to the casual observer that particle
>mass and radius of rotation are inversely proportional, that is that
>the more massive a particle the smaller it is.
>
>
>Regards - Lester
>
>remove DEL in address for email
Linear versus Analytical Mechanics
One of the really unfortunate aspects of Newton's choice of a linear
frame of reference for the analysis of mechanics is that r is poorly
defined and t is not defined at all. In other words, r is only defined
in direction and t is not defined by any consideration pertinent to
the analytical frame of reference.
And this had a pernicious impact on the subsequent development of
angular mechanics as well as relativistic considerations and quantum
mechanics in the twentieth century.
The problem is that r and t and their combinations are all we have to
work with. Taken to the second level of compounding we have six
combinations: r, 1/t, r/t, r/tt, rr/t, and rr/tt. However, in the
linear analytical frame of reference the next to last combination rr/t
was overlooked because there is no apparent application for it in
linear mechanical contexts.
On the other hand, in angular frames of reference we have applications
for all combinations and all the elements are well defined. The radius
of rotation is well defined in terms of direction and magnitude and
time is well defined in analytical terms as whatever time is needed
for 2pi radians of rotation.
The rr/t combination is also well defined in angular terms. However,
in extrapolating the idea of rr/t from linear to angular contexts in
classical mechanics, whoever devised the analytical approach made the
mistake of trying to emulate linear mechanics in the sense of
explaining rotation as a linear progression of r instead of a simple
radial v in combination with tangential v.
This is more akin to an anachronistic pre Newtonian view of mechanics.
Kepler thought that some force of angels was needed to keep planets in
orbit around the sun and regarded that force as tangential in
direction. Newton on the other hand recognized that the only force
needed was centripetal in nature and not tangential. But whoever
devised the analytical considerations underlying angular mechanics
apparently never considered the Newtonian perspective and presumably
relied on the pre Newtonian rationale.
Thus we wind up with a conceptual schism among the various realms of
angular mechanics. On the one hand we have orbital angular mechanics,
the macro realm of ordinary angular mechanics, and the micro realm of
quantum effects. And unfortunately there is no conceptual integration
among them. We are convinced that all represent mechanical realms but
we have no basis for comprehending each in terms of the others.
Orbital angular mechanics represents the realm of remote interactions
dealt with in terms of inverse square centripetal forces and
tangential orbital velocities. Whereas the macro realm of ordinary
angular mechanics deals with linear analogs such as moments of inertia
instead of mass, torque instead of force, and angular acceleration and
velocity instead of their linear analogs.
The micro realm of angular mechanics on the other hand is dealt with
on the merely descriptive basis of formalisms. This is the realm of
quantum mechanics - QM - or as I prefer to call it quantum magic where
things don't seem to happen for any definite mechanical reason at all.
However with the redefinition of macro angular momentum and Planck's
constant in circular rotation we are at last in a position to
understand the mechanical differences among the realms in conceptual
terms.
The micro realm of quantum effects is one of constant tangential
velocity of rotation v = c and a variable radial dr/dt.
The macro realm of ordinary angular mechanics on the other hand is one
in which the tangential velocity of rotation is variable but
tangential v = radial dr/dt and both are kept in strict
synchronization by internal tensile forces.
And finally orbital angular mechanics is defined by various
combinations of tangential v and radial dr/dt. This is normally
thought of in celestial terms but in point of fact applies equally to
the atomic realm as well.
Regards - Lester
Wolf Kirchmeir
"A unicorn is...."
Wolf Kirchmeir
> This is all interesting stuff and I'll have to reread it during the
> day. As you know the word quanta refers to something discreet and
> "grainy",
I don't know whether a quantum is discreet or not, never having imparted
any of my secrets to it. :-) It is discrete, however.
Lester Zick
Someone took his funny pill this morning. Very good. But at issue is
the way in which a quantum is discrete and why. I can't say as I've
ever seen a quantum much less two or three.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
<wwol...@sympatico.ca> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Oh, I get it. A unicorn is like a definition. Definitions refer to
anything unreal if and only if what they refer to is unreal. Bit
circular but I daresay quite useful for defending circular
definitions.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>This is all interesting stuff and I'll have to reread it during the
>day. As you know the word quanta refers to something discreet and
>"grainy", and the big deal in the 1920's and later was that energy and
>mass had a fundamental unit and only seemed to be measurable in integer
>multiples of some fundamental quantities---eigen values were invoked to
>help explain things. Particle spin should not be thought of as an
>observable rotation like a ball on a string or a phonograph. Electrons
>have their spin direction either up or down, or A and B or yes and no
>(to refer to some sort of symmetry)---its too late in the evening for
>me to make sense---I'll try to recall my book learnin' from 10-15 years
>ago tomorrow--to help us find common ground...oh, the poem is from
>Faust, Pt.1, in the witch's kitchen. The poem makes Faust angry, but
>Mephisto exclaims (to the witch that says it),"Well done..." The
>serpent was "the first friend to knowledge" as we know.
>Ideas that come into people's heads probably are not in integer
>form, but most likely when tried to come to expression through
>words---we can count them, as in I had an Idea, I had another idea. In
>truth they are each one multifaceted. We like to assign integer
>numbers to things so that we can be good accountants and keep track of
>things, use binary math, etc... All theoreticians must be good
>accountants. We experimentalists can let detectors, graphs etc do it
>for us. But we probably design them to measure that way.
I strongly suspect that I dis quantum theory primarily because it
morphed physics from "no stinkin reasons we can see" into just plain
ol' "no stinkin reasons".
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
Science, Philosophy, etc. and Truth
---------------
Allow me to summarize certain lines of reasoning relating to the
definitions of science, philosophy, etc. so as to make the idea of
truth more explicit.
Science argues that certain things are true.
Philosophy argues that certain things are true; we just can't tell
which ones.
Mysticism postulates that everything is true.
Art just argues that truth is beauty and beauty truth; that is all ye
know and all ye need to know.
Mathematics argues that in the highly unlikely event that anything
turns out to be true, they have dibs on it.
Physics argues that they don't need no stinkin truth.
Quantum theory maintains that quanta are discrete but that I shall
never see a quantum pretty as a tree, or at all.
Computationalism argues that truth returns a truth function of 1.
Behaviorism argues that truth returns a truth function of 0.
Regards - Lester
Gregory L. Hansen
So you want to reduce quantum mechanics to classical mechanics, I suppose.
But ignoring whether that's even possible, which unanswered questions
about classical mechanics have you chosen not to ask?
It's easy to think of some, since we have quantum mechanics to contrast
with it. Why would an object take just a single trajectory out of the
infinite trajectories available to it?
Why is it possible to develop a mechanics based on the concept of the
particle?
When an object goes from point A to point B, why should we expect it to
occupy in succession every point along a path from A to B rather than
teleporting to its destination?
Why should time move forward at the same rate at all points in the
universe? Why should time always move forward at all points in the
universe?
The first two questions, at least, can be answered by quantum mechanics.
Classical trajectories are found in the expectation values of particles
whose position and momentum uncertainties are much smaller than the
dimensions of the system in question. And the very notion of particle
can get dubious in quantum field theory, but a natural particle
interpretation of the fields is available in the mostly flat and quiescent
spacetime we find ourselves in.
All theories have things that are true for no stinkin' reason, including
classical mechanics. They're called postulates. If they could be
derived from more basic notions they wouldn't be postulates. But
sometimes people reach their comfort zone and it doesn't even occur to
them to keep asking what the stinkin' reasons are.
--
"We don't grow up hearing stories around the camp fire anymore about
cultural figures. Instead we get them from books, TV or movies, so the
characters that today provide us a common language are corporate
creatures" -- Rebecca Tushnet
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> Science, Philosophy, etc. and Truth
>> ---------------
>>
>> Allow me to summarize certain lines of reasoning relating to the
>> definitions of science, philosophy, etc. so as to make the idea of
>> truth more explicit.
>
>Allow?
>>
>> Science argues that certain things are true.
>
>Wrong
OK. Science argues that certain things aren't true.
>> Philosophy argues that certain things are true; we just can't tell
>> which ones.
>
>Wrong
So which ones are true?
>> Mysticism postulates that everything is true.
>
>Mysticism advocates a direct contact with 'reality' by spiritual means.
So you say.
>> Art just argues that truth is beauty and beauty truth; that is all ye
>> know and all ye need to know.
>
>You know nothing about art that is.
Probably why I had to give up painting, I didn't know anything about
"art that is" whatever that may be.
>> Mathematics argues that in the highly unlikely event that anything
>> turns out to be true, they have dibs on it.
>
>Which mathematics? Platonic, Formalistic or Constructivistic?
Whichever.
>> Physics argues that they don't need no stinkin truth.
>
>You are now identified as failed liberal arts major.
BSME, U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, thirteen years senior
systems programmer. Anything else I've failed besides yourself?
>> Quantum theory maintains that quanta are discrete but that I shall
>> never see a quantum pretty as a tree, or at all.
>
>Better you talk about art:)
Better you talk about nothing.
>> Computationalism argues that truth returns a truth function of 1.
>
>Liberal arts majors do not take numerial analysis
Apparently you skipped Truth 101 in the course of taking numerical
analysis.
>> Behaviorism argues that truth returns a truth function of 0.
>
>Which Behaviorism, Metaphysical, Linguistic, Logical or Functional?
Whichever.
>Allow me to say that you don't know what you're talking about
>biiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiig tiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiime
It would be the first time.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>There are some macro observable quantum effects such as superfuidity
>(Of liquid He)--a liquid moving with no viscosity. Quantum theorists
>might argue that everything you see is a collection of quanta, that in
>any thing there are an integer number of very small units that make the
>observable---albeit a huge unwieldy number, with no continuity in terms
>of fractional units---but to see a single quantum (of charge, of mass,
>energy) we get back to Heisenburg. But I dont believe you have to (or
>may even be able to) see everything that exists. Another aspect of QM
>says that the probability of some things being in a particular state is
>never certain or impossinble (value of 1 or 0).
Well, almost everything we see is the result of a quantum effects. I
don't argue otherwise. It's this discrete quantum itself that I long
to see or at least visualize according to its discreet discreteness.
Regards - Lester
JGCASEY
A unicorn is a mythical creature. It does exist, like God, in the
human mind and has an observable effect on behaviour. Apparently
Queen Elizabeth in the 16th century paid 10,000 pounds for the
horn of a unicorn. It was of course the spiraled tusk of the narwhal,
an artic whale.
-john
ele...@yahoo.gr
latter hode som dogmatism. Anyway, no universally quantified
propositions can be proved empirically so there you go, my particular
definition may not be of universal significance but it's of
significance to you:)
Mike
stlbl
they used to call , atomic) physics, is that the theoreticians were
forced to change their descriptions of the atomic and subatomic world
(mathematical and otherwise, like Dirac delta functions) because of the
theretofore unexplainable observations from the laboratory, i.e.
absorption and emission spectra, radiative decay, etc. So I'm not sure
of what "from scratch" means. And also particles behave as particles
sometimes and waves other times, depending on how they are constrained.
The wave/particle duality we always hear about. All we can do is
describe---"no stinkin reason" is the frustrated exclamation of "no
reason I can see!".
JGCASEY
stlbl
day. As you know the word quanta refers to something discreet and
"grainy", and the big deal in the 1920's and later was that energy and
mass had a fundamental unit and only seemed to be measurable in integer
multiples of some fundamental quantities---eigen values were invoked to
help explain things. Particle spin should not be thought of as an
observable rotation like a ball on a string or a phonograph. Electrons
have their spin direction either up or down, or A and B or yes and no
(to refer to some sort of symmetry)---its too late in the evening for
me to make sense---I'll try to recall my book learnin' from 10-15 years
ago tomorrow--to help us find common ground...oh, the poem is from
Faust, Pt.1, in the witch's kitchen. The poem makes Faust angry, but
Mephisto exclaims (to the witch that says it),"Well done..." The
serpent was "the first friend to knowledge" as we know.
Ideas that come into people's heads probably are not in integer
form, but most likely when tried to come to expression through
words---we can count them, as in I had an Idea, I had another idea. In
truth they are each one multifaceted. We like to assign integer
numbers to things so that we can be good accountants and keep track of
things, use binary math, etc... All theoreticians must be good
accountants. We experimentalists can let detectors, graphs etc do it
for us. But we probably design them to measure that way.
goodnight
stlbl
we'll can.
Mike
Lester Zick wrote:
> Science, Philosophy, etc. and Truth
> ---------------
>
> Allow me to summarize certain lines of reasoning relating to the
> definitions of science, philosophy, etc. so as to make the idea of
> truth more explicit.
Allow?
>
> Science argues that certain things are true.
Wrong
>
> Philosophy argues that certain things are true; we just can't tell
> which ones.
Wrong
>
> Mysticism postulates that everything is true.
Mysticism advocates a direct contact with 'reality' by spiritual means.
>
> Art just argues that truth is beauty and beauty truth; that is all ye
> know and all ye need to know.
You know nothing about art that is.
>
> Mathematics argues that in the highly unlikely event that anything
> turns out to be true, they have dibs on it.
Which mathematics? Platonic, Formalistic or Constructivistic?
>
> Physics argues that they don't need no stinkin truth.
You are now identified as failed liberal arts major.
>
> Quantum theory maintains that quanta are discrete but that I shall
> never see a quantum pretty as a tree, or at all.
Better you talk about art:)
>
> Computationalism argues that truth returns a truth function of 1.
Liberal arts majors do not take numerial analysis
>
> Behaviorism argues that truth returns a truth function of 0.
Which Behaviorism, Metaphysical, Linguistic, Logical or Functional?
>
> Regards - Lester
Allow me to say that you don't know what you're talking about
biiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiig tiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiime
Mike
stlbl
Lester Zick
glha...@steel.ucs.indiana.edu (Gregory L. Hansen) in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
This is interesting. I think I expect quantum theory can be reduced to
mechanics even if it can't be exactly reduced to classical mechanics.
Don't forget that Planck's constant was a product of classical not
quantum mechanics. But classical mechanics had problems especially in
its treatment of the orbital characteristics of the newly discovered
atom, and I think these can be directly tied to a misunderstanding in
classical interpretation of angular momentum. It also obviously had
problems in the interpretation of electrodynamics of moving bodies,
but I think these can be laid to inexperience with the phenomena under
consideration.
As to which problems in classical mechanics I choose not to ask, I'm
not sure there are any. There are many problems in classical mechanics
and there are many problems in quantum theory and there are at least
some critical issues in relativity, and I would just as soon we ask
them all even if we cannot resolve them all out of hand.
>It's easy to think of some, since we have quantum mechanics to contrast
>with it. Why would an object take just a single trajectory out of the
>infinite trajectories available to it?
Conservation of angular momentum?
>Why is it possible to develop a mechanics based on the concept of the
>particle?
I suspect it would be a lot easier to develop a quantum mechanics
based on the concept of a particle, and I suspect once having
developed such a mechanics it will be a lot easier to develop a
mechanics consistent with the electrodynamics of moving bodies.
>When an object goes from point A to point B, why should we expect it to
>occupy in succession every point along a path from A to B rather than
>teleporting to its destination?
We don't necessarily. It's just that the extrapolation of a mechanics
in which a particle moves from A to B explains how we can refer to A
and B in the same terms we describe every point in between. If you or
anyone else can explain teleportation in such terms consistent with
the designation of A and B as points of properties common to those in
between A and B, we can certainly re examine the issue in mechanical
terms.
>Why should time move forward at the same rate at all points in the
>universe? Why should time always move forward at all points in the
>universe?
Well, time in what I choose to call material terms is just a temporal
metric we commonly analyze in terms of EM frequency. In the past it
has been measured in other terms of pendulum, balance wheel, or solar
frequency. So, if these metrics change throughout the universe in
response to velocity or gravitation, I, if not classical mechanics,
see no reason our measures of time should not change as well.
>The first two questions, at least, can be answered by quantum mechanics.
>Classical trajectories are found in the expectation values of particles
>whose position and momentum uncertainties are much smaller than the
>dimensions of the system in question. And the very notion of particle
>can get dubious in quantum field theory, but a natural particle
>interpretation of the fields is available in the mostly flat and quiescent
>spacetime we find ourselves in.
Well, you don't eliminate issues by failing to address them. You posit
certain failings of classical mechanics and then assert that these can
be resolved by quantum theory because quantum theory doesn't rely on
the issues you posit for classical mechanics. Quantum theory just says
it has no idea what these things mean in mechanical terms: they're
just so many empirical ad hoc observations that quantum theory fails
to justify on any basis of mechanical interconnectedness either.
>All theories have things that are true for no stinkin' reason, including
>classical mechanics. They're called postulates. If they could be
>derived from more basic notions they wouldn't be postulates. But
>sometimes people reach their comfort zone and it doesn't even occur to
>them to keep asking what the stinkin' reasons are.
Yes, well, that's a common failing of axiomatic systems. When axioms
fail we do indeed tend to move into comfort zones where such questions
are no longer asked because we no longer feel comfortable asking
questions our axioms can't answer or even address. That's exactly what
happened to classical physics. So we replaced these postulates with
more comfortable ones known as quantum theory and relativity instead
of resolving the issue of failed axioms.
>--
>"We don't grow up hearing stories around the camp fire anymore about
>cultural figures. Instead we get them from books, TV or movies, so the
>characters that today provide us a common language are corporate
>creatures" -- Rebecca Tushnet
Regards - Lester
Gregory L. Hansen
Quantum mechanics already is a mechanics. It's not classical mechanics,
but it's quantum mechanics. Classical mechanics can be shown to be a
specialization of quantum mechanics. And my understanding is that it's
impossible to reduce quantum to classical mechanics because classical
mechanics doesn't have the concept of a superposition of states. It has
statistical mixtures of states, but not superpositions.
>Don't forget that Planck's constant was a product of classical not
>quantum mechanics.
Blackbody radiation, as I recall. To handle the integration, Plack
threw an exp(h) term in there with the intention of letting h->0 after
the integration was completed, but the result was only physically
reasonable for a finite h. There are a lot of problems that can be
usefully analyzed semiclassically-- not quite classical, but not quantum
enough that we have to resort to Schroedinger's equation.
>But classical mechanics had problems especially in
>its treatment of the orbital characteristics of the newly discovered
>atom, and I think these can be directly tied to a misunderstanding in
>classical interpretation of angular momentum. It also obviously had
>problems in the interpretation of electrodynamics of moving bodies,
>but I think these can be laid to inexperience with the phenomena under
>consideration.
>
>As to which problems in classical mechanics I choose not to ask, I'm
>not sure there are any. There are many problems in classical mechanics
>and there are many problems in quantum theory and there are at least
>some critical issues in relativity, and I would just as soon we ask
>them all even if we cannot resolve them all out of hand.
>
>>It's easy to think of some, since we have quantum mechanics to contrast
>>with it. Why would an object take just a single trajectory out of the
>>infinite trajectories available to it?
>
>Conservation of angular momentum?
Feynman's path integral is equivalent to wave mechanics, and classical
electromagnetic radiation still conserves angular momentum.
>
>>Why is it possible to develop a mechanics based on the concept of the
>>particle?
>
>I suspect it would be a lot easier to develop a quantum mechanics
>based on the concept of a particle, and I suspect once having
>developed such a mechanics it will be a lot easier to develop a
>mechanics consistent with the electrodynamics of moving bodies.
>
>>When an object goes from point A to point B, why should we expect it to
>>occupy in succession every point along a path from A to B rather than
>>teleporting to its destination?
>
>We don't necessarily. It's just that the extrapolation of a mechanics
>in which a particle moves from A to B explains how we can refer to A
>and B in the same terms we describe every point in between. If you or
>anyone else can explain teleportation in such terms consistent with
>the designation of A and B as points of properties common to those in
>between A and B, we can certainly re examine the issue in mechanical
>terms.
It's a generalization of our experience. We see a baseball occupy a
succession of points from A to B. A Volkswagon Quantum has never been
observed to pass safely through a bridge support or another car. When
I've seen, um, free-thinkers rail against relativity and cry "Illogical!",
sometimes the only reasonable interpretation seems to be that they don't
see baseballs acting the way near-c particles are predicted to behave,
and take a postulate inspired by experience to be a logical necessity
rather than a postulate. But we know that the very fast and the very
small don't act like little baseballs, and I don't know why we should
expect "common sense" to extend beyond the common phenomena that inspired
it.
>
>>Why should time move forward at the same rate at all points in the
>>universe? Why should time always move forward at all points in the
>>universe?
>
>Well, time in what I choose to call material terms is just a temporal
>metric we commonly analyze in terms of EM frequency. In the past it
>has been measured in other terms of pendulum, balance wheel, or solar
>frequency. So, if these metrics change throughout the universe in
>response to velocity or gravitation, I, if not classical mechanics,
>see no reason our measures of time should not change as well.
You're not thinking dramatically enough! It's not a priori impossible for
someone to visit The Vortex in Oregon and come back ten years younger than
when he had left. It's not something we observe in practice, but that
sort of thing can't be ruled out a priori.
But when you look for stinkin' reasons, you either have to derive them
from a priori necessities, or you've only given a reason in terms of other
postulates that have no stinkin' reason. And like I've suggested above,
a lot of what some people consider a priori necessities are only personal
preferences.
Consider also the well known point that even if there was a One True
Theory that exists, and even if we find it, we can never really prove that
we've found it. And that's really my basis for a distaste of finding the
"real reasons" for fundamental physics-- anyone who claims they've found
the "real reasons" as opposed to the fake reasons that merely make all the
right predictions have duped themselves; they're just guessing, and can
never do more.
>
>>The first two questions, at least, can be answered by quantum mechanics.
>>Classical trajectories are found in the expectation values of particles
>>whose position and momentum uncertainties are much smaller than the
>>dimensions of the system in question. And the very notion of particle
>>can get dubious in quantum field theory, but a natural particle
>>interpretation of the fields is available in the mostly flat and quiescent
>>spacetime we find ourselves in.
>
>Well, you don't eliminate issues by failing to address them. You posit
>certain failings of classical mechanics and then assert that these can
>be resolved by quantum theory because quantum theory doesn't rely on
>the issues you posit for classical mechanics. Quantum theory just says
>it has no idea what these things mean in mechanical terms: they're
>just so many empirical ad hoc observations that quantum theory fails
>to justify on any basis of mechanical interconnectedness either.
The philosophical lesson to take away is that a definite trajectory, and
even the very existence of particles, are not a priori necessities, and
not something the metaphysician can just take for granted. An explanation
of quantum mechanics in terms of particles with trajectories will just
shift us to a different set of unanswered questions.
>
>>All theories have things that are true for no stinkin' reason, including
>>classical mechanics. They're called postulates. If they could be
>>derived from more basic notions they wouldn't be postulates. But
>>sometimes people reach their comfort zone and it doesn't even occur to
>>them to keep asking what the stinkin' reasons are.
>
>Yes, well, that's a common failing of axiomatic systems. When axioms
>fail we do indeed tend to move into comfort zones where such questions
>are no longer asked because we no longer feel comfortable asking
>questions our axioms can't answer or even address. That's exactly what
>happened to classical physics. So we replaced these postulates with
>more comfortable ones known as quantum theory and relativity instead
>of resolving the issue of failed axioms.
Axioms don't fail-- sets of axioms can fail. They can lead to internal
contradictions, or they can be empirically falsified. Falsification
doesn't tell you which axiom was wrong, or even that a single axiom was to
blame. And virtually any axiom can be asserted true if you change the
remainder of the set appropriately.
--
"Experiments are the only means of knowledge at our disposal. The rest is
poetry, imagination." -- Max Planck
Rotes Sapiens
>>Conservation of angular momentum?
The way I remember it is that
1=1
iff 1 is defined as being equal to 1.
or more generally:
n = n
iff n(left) is def'd as being equal to n(right).
Sig:
I have a brain the size of a planet. It's not much good to me, however. It's on a different planet.
Lester Zick
>In article <41c13ddb...@netnews.att.net>,
>Lester Zick <lester...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
[. . .]
>>>>I strongly suspect that I dis quantum theory primarily because it
>>>>morphed physics from "no stinkin reasons we can see" into just plain
>>>>ol' "no stinkin reasons".
>>>
>>>So you want to reduce quantum mechanics to classical mechanics, I suppose.
>>>But ignoring whether that's even possible, which unanswered questions
>>>about classical mechanics have you chosen not to ask?
>>
>>This is interesting. I think I expect quantum theory can be reduced to
>>mechanics even if it can't be exactly reduced to classical mechanics.
>
>Quantum mechanics already is a mechanics. It's not classical mechanics,
>but it's quantum mechanics. Classical mechanics can be shown to be a
>specialization of quantum mechanics. And my understanding is that it's
>impossible to reduce quantum to classical mechanics because classical
>mechanics doesn't have the concept of a superposition of states. It has
>statistical mixtures of states, but not superpositions.
Yeah, here I'd like to say that I consider quantum mechanics not a
mechanics at all because it is really just a series of principles not
relating things defined by those principles. I consider that there are
certainly quantum effects and there is certainly quantum theory. But I
don't see quantum theory explaining transitions between and among
various quantum effects. And that's what I consider a mechanics does.
Newtonian and classical mechanics generally rested their mechanics not
on general observations alone but explanations for transitions between
and among observations. That's mechanics. QM maintains there is no
necessary explanation for any path a particle may anthropomorphically
choose of those open to it as long as conservation principles apply in
aggregate whereas classical mechanics considers those conservation
laws apply in particular as well as in general. And without particular
conservation you have no mechanical explanation for particle choices.
You just wind up with a non material anthropomorphic probability.
As far as superposition of states is concerned, I don't know of any
tenet of classical mechanics that precludes it if I understand the
point correctly. Certainly there is a superposition of properties.
[. . .]
I agree it's a generalization from experience but that it is also a
very poorly analyzed generalization because what is being generalized
is an amalgm of geometric and material circumstances having no
necessary connection to one another. Our experience superimposes
geometric spatiality on material circumstances and then maintains that
the cause of material circumstances is only certain aspects of the
geometry and not the geometry as a whole. We are the ones who
characterize some object as existing at point A and then point B
according to experience and then we blithely ellide the points in
between as if our geometry of paths weren't based on all points along
the path of motion to begin with.
The point of lack of experience is often raised against putative
debunkers of relativity when they cry foul. But the point is that
Einstein's own suppositions debunk SR contraction hypotheses and not
any extrapolated material consequences.
The logic is simple if not intuitively obvious to the casual observer:
A frame of reference in SR is defined in terms of velocity alone (some
would argue the term should be relative velocity, but the point is
nugatory since velocities are always relative) because all bodies of a
common velocity occupy a common frame of reference because they all
have zero relative velocity, and bodies with different velocities
occupy different frames of reference because they have different
relative velocities. Thus the sole mechanical determinant for any
frame of reference in SR is velocity and not anything else.
However, palpable bodies represent composites of interstitial bodies
moving at different velocities relative to one another which means
they occupy different frames of reference geometrically overlapping
one another. Hence there can be no uniform geometric contraction
applying to the body as a whole and thus no geometric explanation for
an isotropic frequency dilation as supposed by Einstein in SR.
Consequently, as a practical matter there is no geometric contraction
at velocity and observed frequency dilations cannot be isotropic and
must therefore be anisotropic and be explained by the bidirectional
relative velocity of light at right angles to the direction of motion
because this factor has exactly the same magnitude as the observed
frequency dilation whereas the same factor in the directions of motion
does not.
Now, the rest of the world can rail against the heavens, but this is
what I consider a mechanical explanation for relativistic effects and
a mechanical reductio argument against geometric contraction and
isotropic frequency dilation in defintive logical form.
>>>Why should time move forward at the same rate at all points in the
>>>universe? Why should time always move forward at all points in the
>>>universe?
>>
>>Well, time in what I choose to call material terms is just a temporal
>>metric we commonly analyze in terms of EM frequency. In the past it
>>has been measured in other terms of pendulum, balance wheel, or solar
>>frequency. So, if these metrics change throughout the universe in
>>response to velocity or gravitation, I, if not classical mechanics,
>>see no reason our measures of time should not change as well.
>
>You're not thinking dramatically enough!
This is exactly what makes physicists into drama queens uttering the
immortal line: "we don't need no stinkin reasons". If you want drama,
go on stage. A collateral objective of mine is to get scientists out
of drama and back into mundane elementary mechanics instead of acting
like a bunch of fairy queens preening and primping on a universal
stage.
> It's not a priori impossible for
>someone to visit The Vortex in Oregon and come back ten years younger than
>when he had left. It's not something we observe in practice, but that
>sort of thing can't be ruled out a priori.
I think you mean ten years younger than we are when he gets back.
Nothing will make him any younger than he was when he left. In any
event there is nothing apriori preventing this as long as he transits
all the space in between at velocities probably not exceeding that of
light.
>But when you look for stinkin' reasons, you either have to derive them
>from a priori necessities, or you've only given a reason in terms of other
>postulates that have no stinkin' reason. And like I've suggested above,
>a lot of what some people consider a priori necessities are only personal
>preferences.
No stinkin reason regressions are one of the greatest problems in
conventional science. We have to find some logical necessity and way
to preclude infinite regression or we have no mechanics or science; we
only have more or less self consistent plausibilities.
>Consider also the well known point that even if there was a One True
>Theory that exists, and even if we find it, we can never really prove that
>we've found it. And that's really my basis for a distaste of finding the
>"real reasons" for fundamental physics-- anyone who claims they've found
>the "real reasons" as opposed to the fake reasons that merely make all the
>right predictions have duped themselves; they're just guessing, and can
>never do more.
Quoth the raven, nevermore. And you know this how? All you can really
know empirically is what has been found and not what can't be found.
What can't be found is a matter of proof and self contradiction and
there is none here not born of the frustration of empirical failure to
explain..
>>>The first two questions, at least, can be answered by quantum mechanics.
>>>Classical trajectories are found in the expectation values of particles
>>>whose position and momentum uncertainties are much smaller than the
>>>dimensions of the system in question. And the very notion of particle
>>>can get dubious in quantum field theory, but a natural particle
>>>interpretation of the fields is available in the mostly flat and quiescent
>>>spacetime we find ourselves in.
>>
>>Well, you don't eliminate issues by failing to address them. You posit
>>certain failings of classical mechanics and then assert that these can
>>be resolved by quantum theory because quantum theory doesn't rely on
>>the issues you posit for classical mechanics. Quantum theory just says
>>it has no idea what these things mean in mechanical terms: they're
>>just so many empirical ad hoc observations that quantum theory fails
>>to justify on any basis of mechanical interconnectedness either.
>
>The philosophical lesson to take away is that a definite trajectory, and
>even the very existence of particles, are not a priori necessities, and
>not something the metaphysician can just take for granted. An explanation
>of quantum mechanics in terms of particles with trajectories will just
>shift us to a different set of unanswered questions.
That all depends on what you mean by particles: what is particulated
according to what mechanical necessity. As long as metaphysicians and
physicists insist on treating particles as irreducible atomic monads,
this will undoubtedly remain the case. When they get around to
analyzing the stinkin reasons for their beliefs and what they imagine
to be true, however, all that can change.
>>>All theories have things that are true for no stinkin' reason, including
>>>classical mechanics. They're called postulates. If they could be
>>>derived from more basic notions they wouldn't be postulates. But
>>>sometimes people reach their comfort zone and it doesn't even occur to
>>>them to keep asking what the stinkin' reasons are.
>>
>>Yes, well, that's a common failing of axiomatic systems. When axioms
>>fail we do indeed tend to move into comfort zones where such questions
>>are no longer asked because we no longer feel comfortable asking
>>questions our axioms can't answer or even address. That's exactly what
>>happened to classical physics. So we replaced these postulates with
>>more comfortable ones known as quantum theory and relativity instead
>>of resolving the issue of failed axioms.
>
>Axioms don't fail-- sets of axioms can fail.
A distinction without a difference. The plural of axiom is axioms
meaning sets of axioms.
> They can lead to internal
>contradictions, or they can be empirically falsified. Falsification
>doesn't tell you which axiom was wrong, or even that a single axiom was to
>blame. And virtually any axiom can be asserted true if you change the
>remainder of the set appropriately.
I have yet to see axioms emprically falsified. They're usually only
logically contradicted by other axioms when one set fails to explain
empirical observations the way another set does. And every set of
axioms can be asserted true but that does not make them true.
>--
>"Experiments are the only means of knowledge at our disposal. The rest is
>poetry, imagination." -- Max Planck
Yeah, well empirical observation is only one part of tautologies, and
the raveled sleeve of reality is knit up by both halves and not by the
emprirical pretense of people who substitute axioms for explanations.
-- Lester Zick
Regards - Lester
Gregory L. Hansen
Apply the time evolution operator.
>
>Newtonian and classical mechanics generally rested their mechanics not
>on general observations alone but explanations for transitions between
>and among observations. That's mechanics. QM maintains there is no
>necessary explanation for any path a particle may anthropomorphically
>choose of those open to it as long as conservation principles apply in
>aggregate whereas classical mechanics considers those conservation
>laws apply in particular as well as in general. And without particular
>conservation you have no mechanical explanation for particle choices.
>You just wind up with a non material anthropomorphic probability.
Again I warn you against falling prey to your own hidden assumptions.
Quantum mechanics maintains that there is no defined path! Not that the
reason the particle takes a path is unknown, but that the path doesn't
even exist in the first place. By insisting that a path be taken, you've
already inserted a postulate of your own preference, and I'll immediately
ask you the reason that a single path can be taken.
>[. . .]
>>>>Why should time move forward at the same rate at all points in the
>>>>universe? Why should time always move forward at all points in the
>>>>universe?
>>>
>>>Well, time in what I choose to call material terms is just a temporal
>>>metric we commonly analyze in terms of EM frequency. In the past it
>>>has been measured in other terms of pendulum, balance wheel, or solar
>>>frequency. So, if these metrics change throughout the universe in
>>>response to velocity or gravitation, I, if not classical mechanics,
>>>see no reason our measures of time should not change as well.
>>
>>You're not thinking dramatically enough!
>
>This is exactly what makes physicists into drama queens uttering the
>immortal line: "we don't need no stinkin reasons". If you want drama,
>go on stage. A collateral objective of mine is to get scientists out
>of drama and back into mundane elementary mechanics instead of acting
>like a bunch of fairy queens preening and primping on a universal
>stage.
Then let your clock come back from The Vortex rewound. Whatever.
>
>> It's
>not a priori impossible for
>>someone to visit The Vortex in Oregon and come back ten years younger than
>>when he had left. It's not something we observe in practice, but that
>>sort of thing can't be ruled out a priori.
>
>I think you mean ten years younger than we are when he gets back.
>Nothing will make him any younger than he was when he left. In any
>event there is nothing apriori preventing this as long as he transits
>all the space in between at velocities probably not exceeding that of
>light.
>
>>But when you look for stinkin' reasons, you either have to derive them
>>from a priori necessities, or you've only given a reason in terms of other
>>postulates that have no stinkin' reason. And like I've suggested above,
>>a lot of what some people consider a priori necessities are only personal
>>preferences.
>
>No stinkin reason regressions are one of the greatest problems in
>conventional science. We have to find some logical necessity and way
>to preclude infinite regression or we have no mechanics or science; we
>only have more or less self consistent plausibilities.
What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
plausibilities?
>
>>Consider also the well known point that even if there was a One True
>>Theory that exists, and even if we find it, we can never really prove that
>>we've found it. And that's really my basis for a distaste of finding the
>>"real reasons" for fundamental physics-- anyone who claims they've found
>>the "real reasons" as opposed to the fake reasons that merely make all the
>>right predictions have duped themselves; they're just guessing, and can
>>never do more.
>
>Quoth the raven, nevermore. And you know this how? All you can really
>know empirically is what has been found and not what can't be found.
>What can't be found is a matter of proof and self contradiction and
>there is none here not born of the frustration of empirical failure to
>explain..
I know this because you cannot measure every part of every phenomenon with
infinite precision from the beginning to the end of time. We've already
missed 15 billions years' worth of phenomena! There may be discrepencies
hiding a few sig-figs lower than your most precise measurements. There
may be conflicts with phenomena that you haven't explored yet. Physical
constants might change on time scales that are very long compared with
the times over which you've made detailed measurements. May be, might--
you don't know, and you can't know. And measurements aside, different
words can be used to describe the same quantitative predictions. E.g.
Lorentz's aether theory and special relativity make identical predictions
about the observable quantities in electrodynamics. Lorentz's theory has
an aether whose properties drop out by the time an observable is
calculated. We could call that surplus metaphysical baggage, but we
certainly can't say it's been empirically falsified.
A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
[...]
>>
>>The philosophical lesson to take away is that a definite trajectory, and
>>even the very existence of particles, are not a priori necessities, and
>>not something the metaphysician can just take for granted. An explanation
>>of quantum mechanics in terms of particles with trajectories will just
>>shift us to a different set of unanswered questions.
>
>That all depends on what you mean by particles: what is particulated
>according to what mechanical necessity. As long as metaphysicians and
>physicists insist on treating particles as irreducible atomic monads,
>this will undoubtedly remain the case. When they get around to
>analyzing the stinkin reasons for their beliefs and what they imagine
>to be true, however, all that can change.
Quantum field theory is a theory of fields, and it is the field, not the
particle, that is taken as the irreducible atomic monad. Throw in
DeBroglie's relation and the superposition principle and you can get
sudden and finite changes in a momentum or energy or something, that can
be interpreted as particles.
But that's really just a concrete illustration of the more abstract point
that if you're going to try to explain something in terms of particles,
then particles themselves will remain unexplained.
--
"I'm giving you the chance to look fate in those pretty eyes of hers
and say, 'Step off, bitch. This is my party and you're not invited.'"
-- Chris Shugart, _Testosterone Magazine_
Lester Zick
Operators are just substitutes for explanations. I understand that
Star Trek often employs a Heisenberg compensator. Same principle.
>>Newtonian and classical mechanics generally rested their mechanics not
>>on general observations alone but explanations for transitions between
>>and among observations. That's mechanics. QM maintains there is no
>>necessary explanation for any path a particle may anthropomorphically
>>choose of those open to it as long as conservation principles apply in
>>aggregate whereas classical mechanics considers those conservation
>>laws apply in particular as well as in general. And without particular
>>conservation you have no mechanical explanation for particle choices.
>>You just wind up with a non material anthropomorphic probability.
>
>Again I warn you against falling prey to your own hidden assumptions.
>Quantum mechanics maintains that there is no defined path!
Then what QM maintains is at odds with the geometry underlying your
empirical observation of the existence of the same material object at
point A then at point B. That empirical observation is what defines
the geometry involved. Points A and B don't actually exist any more
than the path between them. They're products of geometry in our minds.
And if what QM maintains is at variance with the geometry you employ
to define points A and B, it is going to need a new geometry with non
linear non contiguous points. Then, of course, it'll be difficult to
define space. But, what the hey, you can't have everything.
> Not that the
>reason the particle takes a path is unknown, but that the path doesn't
>even exist in the first place. By insisting that a path be taken, you've
>already inserted a postulate of your own preference, and I'll immediately
>ask you the reason that a single path can be taken.
Because you define it with points A and B. Unless you're inserting a
postulate of your own preference to the effect that points can exist
without lines, and I'll immediately ask you how that trick is done in
mechanically geometric rather than merely arbitrary postulated terms.
[. . .]
>>No stinkin reason regressions are one of the greatest problems in
>>conventional science. We have to find some logical necessity and way
>>to preclude infinite regression or we have no mechanics or science; we
>>only have more or less self consistent plausibilities.
>
>What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
>plausibilities?
Well, the point of my observation was the standard of plausibility
and not self consistency. If all science is based on is plausibility,
it, like Euclidean geometry, rests on a rather sandy foundation.
>>>Consider also the well known point that even if there was a One True
>>>Theory that exists, and even if we find it, we can never really prove that
>>>we've found it. And that's really my basis for a distaste of finding the
>>>"real reasons" for fundamental physics-- anyone who claims they've found
>>>the "real reasons" as opposed to the fake reasons that merely make all the
>>>right predictions have duped themselves; they're just guessing, and can
>>>never do more.
>>
>>Quoth the raven, nevermore. And you know this how? All you can really
>>know empirically is what has been found and not what can't be found.
>>What can't be found is a matter of proof and self contradiction and
>>there is none here not born of the frustration of empirical failure to
>>explain..
>
>I know this because you cannot measure every part of every phenomenon with
>infinite precision from the beginning to the end of time.
You're talking empiricism not knowledge. Precisely what's wrong with
positivism. A thousand years of observations do not an idea make.
> We've already
>missed 15 billions years' worth of phenomena! There may be discrepencies
>hiding a few sig-figs lower than your most precise measurements. There
>may be conflicts with phenomena that you haven't explored yet. Physical
>constants might change on time scales that are very long compared with
>the times over which you've made detailed measurements. May be, might--
>you don't know, and you can't know. And measurements aside, different
>words can be used to describe the same quantitative predictions. E.g.
>Lorentz's aether theory and special relativity make identical predictions
>about the observable quantities in electrodynamics. Lorentz's theory has
>an aether whose properties drop out by the time an observable is
>calculated. We could call that surplus metaphysical baggage, but we
>certainly can't say it's been empirically falsified.
Well, since you chose not comment on my discussion of contraction
hypotheses, I can't comment on Lorentz except to say that MM can be
performed successfully with radiation polarized normal to the plane of
rotation and the absolute motion of the earth through space detected.
>A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
>is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
>data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
>experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
Probably the same way you can know that you're not standing on your
head: logical inference. Science should try it some time.
>>>The philosophical lesson to take away is that a definite trajectory, and
>>>even the very existence of particles, are not a priori necessities, and
>>>not something the metaphysician can just take for granted. An explanation
>>>of quantum mechanics in terms of particles with trajectories will just
>>>shift us to a different set of unanswered questions.
>>
>>That all depends on what you mean by particles: what is particulated
>>according to what mechanical necessity. As long as metaphysicians and
>>physicists insist on treating particles as irreducible atomic monads,
>>this will undoubtedly remain the case. When they get around to
>>analyzing the stinkin reasons for their beliefs and what they imagine
>>to be true, however, all that can change.
>
>Quantum field theory is a theory of fields, and it is the field, not the
>particle, that is taken as the irreducible atomic monad.
The problem lies in considering anything an irreducible atomic monad.
> Throw in
>DeBroglie's relation and the superposition principle and you can get
>sudden and finite changes in a momentum or energy or something, that can
>be interpreted as particles.
Yes, but can they be interpreted as irreducible atomic monads?
>But that's really just a concrete illustration of the more abstract point
>that if you're going to try to explain something in terms of particles,
>then particles themselves will remain unexplained.
On the other hand, if you explain the particles themselves first, you
will find yourself in the enviable position of being able to explain
other things in terms of particles without regression.
>"I'm giving you the chance to look fate in those pretty eyes of hers
>and say, 'Step off, bitch. This is my party and you're not invited.'"
> -- Chris Shugart, _Testosterone Magazine_
I'm not allowed out much anyway because I step on too many toes.
robert j. kolker
Lester Zick wrote:
> Operators are just substitutes for explanations. I understand that
> Star Trek often employs a Heisenberg compensator. Same principle.
How about predictions. Quantum Field Theory predicts everything that
happens outside the atomic nucleus except gravity to accuracies of 12 to
15 decimal places. And it doesn't explain a thing in the sense that
causes are not postulated.
I am of the opinion that explanations (so called) are no more than
hypotheses and the only thing that matters is that all quantitative
predictions flowing therefrom are experimentally correct.
Bob Kolker
Wolf Kirchmeir
[...]
>
> Because you define it with points A and B. Unless you're inserting a
> postulate of your own preference to the effect that points can exist
> without lines, and I'll immediately ask you how that trick is done in
> mechanically geometric rather than merely arbitrary postulated terms.
>
[...]
Lester once again displaying his unwillingness to believe that concepts
he can't understand nevertheless makes sense.
Lester, Lester, you're turning into a first class crank.
Gregory L. Hansen
Did you think F=ma is any more explanatory?
The potential in quantum mechanics has the same role as the index of
refraction in optics. And, in a sense, the same role as force in
classical mechanics. A wave packet will tend to be drawn toward low spots
of the potential and pushed away from high spots. Electrons are bound to
atoms because of the attractive force between the two; an atom can
transition to a higher energy state when, e.g., another atom bumps into it
and pushes the peices around.
I didn't realize you were assuming a linear path from A to B even in the
classical sense. Paths, linear or otherwise, can be defined in quantum
mechanics. But they are, as you said, geometry. It in no way implies
that a particle must choose one of them. It's like asking which path a
wave takes.
>
>[. . .]
>
>>>No stinkin reason regressions are one of the greatest problems in
>>>conventional science. We have to find some logical necessity and way
>>>to preclude infinite regression or we have no mechanics or science; we
>>>only have more or less self consistent plausibilities.
>>
>>What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
>>plausibilities?
>
>Well, the point of my observation was the standard of plausibility
>and not self consistency. If all science is based on is plausibility,
>it, like Euclidean geometry, rests on a rather sandy foundation.
Get used to it. As Poincare said, science doesn't tell you what things
are. It organizes relationships between them, and any theory is a true
theory to the extent that if faithfully describes those relationships
within the theory's valid regime of application. Read "Science and
Hypothesis" by Poincare, which is usefully close to modern views on the
philosophy of science despite being a hundred years old.
>
>>>>Consider also the well known point that even if there was a One True
>>>>Theory that exists, and even if we find it, we can never really prove that
>>>>we've found it. And that's really my basis for a distaste of finding the
>>>>"real reasons" for fundamental physics-- anyone who claims they've found
>>>>the "real reasons" as opposed to the fake reasons that merely make all the
>>>>right predictions have duped themselves; they're just guessing, and can
>>>>never do more.
>>>
>>>Quoth the raven, nevermore. And you know this how? All you can really
>>>know empirically is what has been found and not what can't be found.
>>>What can't be found is a matter of proof and self contradiction and
>>>there is none here not born of the frustration of empirical failure to
>>>explain..
>>
>>I know this because you cannot measure every part of every phenomenon with
>>infinite precision from the beginning to the end of time.
>
>You're talking empiricism not knowledge. Precisely what's wrong with
>positivism. A thousand years of observations do not an idea make.
Science is an empirical practice. A theory is good if and only if it
stands up to empirical scrutiny. If it can't, the theory is flawed. And
if you can't measure every part of every phenomenon with infinite
precision from the beginning to the end of time, then you might never know
you have a flawed theory.
> We've already
>>missed 15 billions years' worth of phenomena! There may be discrepencies
>>hiding a few sig-figs lower than your most precise measurements. There
>>may be conflicts with phenomena that you haven't explored yet. Physical
>>constants might change on time scales that are very long compared with
>>the times over which you've made detailed measurements. May be, might--
>>you don't know, and you can't know. And measurements aside, different
>>words can be used to describe the same quantitative predictions. E.g.
>>Lorentz's aether theory and special relativity make identical predictions
>>about the observable quantities in electrodynamics. Lorentz's theory has
>>an aether whose properties drop out by the time an observable is
>>calculated. We could call that surplus metaphysical baggage, but we
>>certainly can't say it's been empirically falsified.
>
>Well, since you chose not comment on my discussion of contraction
>hypotheses, I can't comment on Lorentz except to say that MM can be
>performed successfully with radiation polarized normal to the plane of
>rotation and the absolute motion of the earth through space detected.
Okay, I'll comment on it. The Lorentz transforms form a group, which
means if you think you find a contradiction in them, you owe it to
yourself to figure out why you're wrong.
In your particular example, the length of an object is defined by the
front and back of the object. If some particle, like a gas molecule in a
hollow cube, is moving around in there, that doesn't make a bit of
difference as long as you know what you want to call the front and what
you want to call the back. The gas molecule might itself have a different
length contraction than the block as a whole, but if it's between the
front and back in any frame, it will be between the front and back in all
frames. The object itself isn't even necessary. Pick any two points.
>
>>A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
>>is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
>>data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
>>experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
>
>Probably the same way you can know that you're not standing on your
>head: logical inference. Science should try it some time.
How is your logical inference different from the way you want things to
be?
Logic doesn't tell you what your premises have to be, which is why it's
always bugged me when Vulcans in Star Trek go running around saying
"That's illogical." It's pragmatic to suppose that you're not a brain in
a jar being fed false experiences, but you can't prove it from a priori
considerations.
>
>>>>The philosophical lesson to take away is that a definite trajectory, and
>>>>even the very existence of particles, are not a priori necessities, and
>>>>not something the metaphysician can just take for granted. An explanation
>>>>of quantum mechanics in terms of particles with trajectories will just
>>>>shift us to a different set of unanswered questions.
>>>
>>>That all depends on what you mean by particles: what is particulated
>>>according to what mechanical necessity. As long as metaphysicians and
>>>physicists insist on treating particles as irreducible atomic monads,
>>>this will undoubtedly remain the case. When they get around to
>>>analyzing the stinkin reasons for their beliefs and what they imagine
>>>to be true, however, all that can change.
>>
>>Quantum field theory is a theory of fields, and it is the field, not the
>>particle, that is taken as the irreducible atomic monad.
>
>The problem lies in considering anything an irreducible atomic monad.
Well, I don't ask a model to be a monad. But isn't a monad exactly what
you were looking for with a sort-of classical description of quantum
mechanics?
>
>>
> Throw in
>>DeBroglie's relation and the superposition principle and you can get
>>sudden and finite changes in a momentum or energy or something, that can
>>be interpreted as particles.
>
>Yes, but can they be interpreted as irreducible atomic monads?
www.dictionary.com describes a monad as "An indivisible, impenetrable unit
of substance viewed as the basic constituent element of physical reality
in the metaphysics of Leibnitz."
No, a field cannot be interpreted literally as a monad. It's not
impenetrable, it probably doesn't make sense to call it divisible or
indivisible. And Leibnitz probably had a stronger opinion of the
ultimate truthness of it than I would admit in a theory. But more
loosely, as the basic quantity in a model from which electrons and atoms
and baseballs can be derived, sure.
>
>>But that's really just a concrete illustration of the more abstract point
>>that if you're going to try to explain something in terms of particles,
>>then particles themselves will remain unexplained.
>
>On the other hand, if you explain the particles themselves first, you
>will find yourself in the enviable position of being able to explain
>other things in terms of particles without regression.
I've already explained the particles; they're an interpretation of
interacting quantum fields.
I think you must have meant an explanation with elements that nobody
thinks to ask the explanation of.
--
"Suppose you were an idiot... And suppose you were a member of
Congress... But I repeat myself." - Mark Twain
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
at 02:11 AM, glha...@steel.ucs.indiana.edu (Gregory L. Hansen)
said:
>Quantum mechanics already is a mechanics. It's not classical
>mechanics, but it's quantum mechanics. Classical mechanics can be
>shown to be a specialization of quantum mechanics.
Not if you take gravity into account. Or, at least, not yet.
>And my understanding is that it's impossible to reduce quantum to
>classical mechanics because classical mechanics doesn't have the
>concept of a superposition of states.
Classical EM theory has it, and you can do nonrelativistic QM as a
hidden variables theory. Of course, you need "spooky action at a
distance" to do it.
>Axioms don't fail-- sets of axioms can fail. They can lead to
>internal contradictions, or they can be empirically falsified.
What you empirically falsify is not the set of axioms, but rather the
claim that it applies in a specific way to a specific physical system.
That doesn't keep the axiom system from being Mathematically
interesting and relevant, or even keep it from being appropriate for a
different physical system.
--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz, SysProg and JOAT <http://patriot.net/~shmuel>
Unsolicited bulk E-mail subject to legal action. I reserve the
right to publicly post or ridicule any abusive E-mail. Reply to
domain Patriot dot net user shmuel+news to contact me. Do not
reply to spam...@library.lspace.org
Lester Zick
Yes, yes, Wolf, but at least I don't have the pompous effrontery to
reply to others with exactly the point they're making then instruct
them to do some reading.
What I display is not my unwillingness to believe in concepts that I
don't understand but my unwillingness to believe in concepts that you
don't understand. I just have a tough time believing in your beliefs.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
<now...@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> Operators are just substitutes for explanations. I understand that
>> Star Trek often employs a Heisenberg compensator. Same principle.
>
>How about predictions. Quantum Field Theory predicts everything that
>happens outside the atomic nucleus except gravity to accuracies of 12 to
>15 decimal places. And it doesn't explain a thing in the sense that
>causes are not postulated.
Well, that's exactly the complaint. Science is about explanations and
not just calculations in which we can't tell what is being calculated.
>I am of the opinion that explanations (so called) are no more than
>hypotheses and the only thing that matters is that all quantitative
>predictions flowing therefrom are experimentally correct.
Well, it would help to know what the objects of empirically correct
calculations are so we know what empirically correct calculations
apply to. Of course, we can always just say that empirically correct
calculations apply to whatever they apply to and let it go at that.
Just not very satisfying scientifically to say we have a 3.14159 . . .
here and a 6.27 there. Oh well, I suppose we all do the best we can.
Close enough for government work I expect.
Regards - Lester
Albert
<snip>
> Lester once again displaying his unwillingness to believe that concepts
> he can't understand nevertheless makes sense.
>
> Lester, Lester, you're turning into a first class crank.
Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his
arguments make sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my
science seasoned with magic.
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
robert j. kolker
Albert wrote:
> Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his arguments make
> sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my science seasoned with
> magic.
What is an example of that. All physical current mainline physical
theories are well supported by experiment and none of them have been
empirically falsified. That is the very opposite of magic. A physical
theory is exactly as good as its agreement with experiment.
Bob Kolker
>
>
ste...@nomail.com
: Wolf Kirchmeir wrote:
: <snip>
:> Lester once again displaying his unwillingness to believe that concepts
:> he can't understand nevertheless makes sense.
:>
:> Lester, Lester, you're turning into a first class crank.
: Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his
: arguments make sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my
: science seasoned with magic.
Do you think that the set {1,2,3} contains the element 0? :)
Stephen
AngleWyrm
>
> Do you think that the set {1,2,3} contains the element 0? :)
Trick question :)
The set {1,2,3} contains { }. Some people confuse Null with Empty with Zero; the
concepts are in the same general vicinity.
Like accidentally putting salt in your coffee, or thinking you woke up late for
work when it's your day off.
-:|:-
AngleWyrm
ste...@nomail.com
: <ste...@nomail.com> wrote in message news:cptm3k$2akt$2...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...
:>
:> Do you think that the set {1,2,3} contains the element 0? :)
: Trick question :)
No. Just part of the definition of Lesternality.
: The set {1,2,3} contains { }. Some people confuse Null with Empty with Zero; the
: concepts are in the same general vicinity.
{ } is a subset of { 1, 2, 3}. {} is not an element of { 1, 2, 3 }.
Stephen
zerkanX
> Philosophy argues that A is A, B is B and C is C. They are all part of an
> didactic letternomic set with has been assigned arbitrary cultural and
> cognitive importance... at least that's what it says here... in this book.
Obviously I missed this...
Philosophy argues that A is A, B is B and C is C but is 'is' =?
Albert
Do you think that is what I was talking about?
Albert
>
>
> Albert wrote:
>
>> Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his arguments
>> make sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my science
>> seasoned with magic.
>
>
> What is an example of that. All physical current mainline physical
> theories are well supported by experiment
Well, in you only include those 'current mainline physical
theories' that 'are well supported by experiment,' then we don't
have anything to talk about, do we?
> and none of them have been
> empirically falsified.
So what. There are any number of theories that cannot be
empirically falsified, yet science discards them out of hand.
> That is the very opposite of magic. A physical
> theory is exactly as good as its agreement with experiment.
No argument here.
Wolf Kirchmeir
[...]
>
> Well, that's exactly the complaint. Science is about explanations and
> not just calculations in which we can't tell what is being calculated.
The "calculations", as you call them, _are_ the explanations.
What is explained by saying F = m * a? Nothing. The statement, whether
rendered in alegbra or in English merely asserts a relationship between
measurable quantities.
And what's a "measurable quantity", anyhow? The end result of a peculiar
behaviour we call "measuring." EG, when I measure the length of a piece
of wood, I put a tape measure up alongside it, and look at the numbers
at both ends of the tape measure, and perform a calculation. To make it
easier, tape measures have a zero at one end, so the calculation amounts
to reading the second number. If I use a metric tape, I might get 904mm.
If I use an imperial tape, I might get 2ft 11-1/2" plus a smidgen. Does
this procedure explain what "length" is? Nope. Does it explain why some
objects, such as sticks of wood, have length and others, such as
electric curtrents, don't? Nope. "Length is what we measure with meter
sticks" my physics teacher told us. "That's all we know about it." I
think he was right.
The scientific attitude is one of profound humility in the face of the
unknowable. It requires accepting the limits of our knowledge. It
refuses to deal with things we cannot know, or to answer questions that
can have no answers. It's scientific to say "Length is what we measure
with meter sticks." It's unscientifc to say "Length is really....."
(finish that sentence any way you like.)
St Augustine commented that "How long is a piece of string?" has no
answer, while "How long is this piece of string?" does. Good comment IMO.
Wolf Kirchmeir
[...]
>
> Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his arguments make
> sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my science seasoned with
> magic.
>
>
Where's the magic?
Lester Zick
Oh, hell, yes. F, m, and a are explained in terms of one another. QM
merely asserts there is some explanation but can't say what it is.
>The potential in quantum mechanics has the same role as the index of
>refraction in optics. And, in a sense, the same role as force in
>classical mechanics. A wave packet will tend to be drawn toward low spots
>of the potential and pushed away from high spots. Electrons are bound to
>atoms because of the attractive force between the two; an atom can
>transition to a higher energy state when, e.g., another atom bumps into it
>and pushes the peices around.
Yes, yes, this is all very interesting. I always imagined there was
some reason electrons didn't go marching down Main Street in unison on
New Years Day. QM just doesn't explain what all this anthropomorphism
really amount to.
So, your references to points A and B were metaphorical? I don't
imagine particles choose any path. Apparently neither do waves.
>>>>No stinkin reason regressions are one of the greatest problems in
>>>>conventional science. We have to find some logical necessity and way
>>>>to preclude infinite regression or we have no mechanics or science; we
>>>>only have more or less self consistent plausibilities.
>>>
>>>What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
>>>plausibilities?
>>
>>Well, the point of my observation was the standard of plausibility
>>and not self consistency. If all science is based on is plausibility,
>>it, like Euclidean geometry, rests on a rather sandy foundation.
>
>Get used to it. As Poincare said, science doesn't tell you what things
>are. It organizes relationships between them, and any theory is a true
>theory to the extent that if faithfully describes those relationships
>within the theory's valid regime of application. Read "Science and
>Hypothesis" by Poincare, which is usefully close to modern views on the
>philosophy of science despite being a hundred years old.
No, no. Science tells us what things are. That's why we keep it
around. It's mysticism that doesn't tell us what things are but
maintains it needs to be kept around as a substitute for science.
>>>>>Consider also the well known point that even if there was a One True
>>>>>Theory that exists, and even if we find it, we can never really prove that
>>>>>we've found it. And that's really my basis for a distaste of finding the
>>>>>"real reasons" for fundamental physics-- anyone who claims they've found
>>>>>the "real reasons" as opposed to the fake reasons that merely make all the
>>>>>right predictions have duped themselves; they're just guessing, and can
>>>>>never do more.
>>>>
>>>>Quoth the raven, nevermore. And you know this how? All you can really
>>>>know empirically is what has been found and not what can't be found.
>>>>What can't be found is a matter of proof and self contradiction and
>>>>there is none here not born of the frustration of empirical failure to
>>>>explain..
>>>
>>>I know this because you cannot measure every part of every phenomenon with
>>>infinite precision from the beginning to the end of time.
>>
>>You're talking empiricism not knowledge. Precisely what's wrong with
>>positivism. A thousand years of observations do not an idea make.
>
>Science is an empirical practice. A theory is good if and only if it
>stands up to empirical scrutiny. If it can't, the theory is flawed. And
>if you can't measure every part of every phenomenon with infinite
>precision from the beginning to the end of time, then you might never know
>you have a flawed theory.
And my point is empiricists never empirically know anything.
You mean different geometries apply to interstitial particles? Then
how do we average all these different frames of reference since any
average of v's would be linear but the effect is non linear?
Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis applies to a body moving
at any particular velocity. Different v's, different contraction
factors. So, which geometry applies to the group of interstitial
bodies that constitute the body as a whole that Einstein uses to
explain frequency dilation at v when there are numerous different v's?
Surely, you're not going to say net v for the body as whole because
there is no body as a whole; there are only aggregates of interstitial
frames of reference with v's of their own. And v's average linearly
whereas frequency dilation factors are non linear.
>>>A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
>>>is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
>>>data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
>>>experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
>>
>>Probably the same way you can know that you're not standing on your
>>head: logical inference. Science should try it some time.
>
>How is your logical inference different from the way you want things to
>be?
It doesn't. It's just different from empirical observation. Empirical
observation isn't knowledge. Logical inference is. It may be right or
wrong knowledge, but it's the only form of knowledge there is.
>Logic doesn't tell you what your premises have to be, which is why it's
>always bugged me when Vulcans in Star Trek go running around saying
>"That's illogical." It's pragmatic to suppose that you're not a brain in
>a jar being fed false experiences, but you can't prove it from a priori
>considerations.
Well, you are a brain in a jar, the skull, being fed experiences by
the senses, and it's up to the brain in the jar to decipher truth from
falsity through logical inference. I don't know what a priori
considerations are and neither does anyone else except to say that
they're assumptions, neither true nor false.
>>>>>The philosophical lesson to take away is that a definite trajectory, and
>>>>>even the very existence of particles, are not a priori necessities, and
>>>>>not something the metaphysician can just take for granted. An explanation
>>>>>of quantum mechanics in terms of particles with trajectories will just
>>>>>shift us to a different set of unanswered questions.
>>>>
>>>>That all depends on what you mean by particles: what is particulated
>>>>according to what mechanical necessity. As long as metaphysicians and
>>>>physicists insist on treating particles as irreducible atomic monads,
>>>>this will undoubtedly remain the case. When they get around to
>>>>analyzing the stinkin reasons for their beliefs and what they imagine
>>>>to be true, however, all that can change.
>>>
>>>Quantum field theory is a theory of fields, and it is the field, not the
>>>particle, that is taken as the irreducible atomic monad.
>>
>>The problem lies in considering anything an irreducible atomic monad.
>
>Well, I don't ask a model to be a monad. But isn't a monad exactly what
>you were looking for with a sort-of classical description of quantum
>mechanics?
Yeah, therein lies a tale of woe for classical and contemporary
physics. What I'm looking for is an Einstein compensator, an effect
called anisotropic time, that explains relativistic frequency dilation
without the mystic mumbo jumbo of longitudinal contraction and
nonsensical geometric distortion, and a Planck compensator that
explains the origin of Planck's constant in purely analytical terms of
particle structure from which Heisenberg's uncertainty relation is
deducible instead of postulated. And both compensators exist.
>> Throw in
>>>DeBroglie's relation and the superposition principle and you can get
>>>sudden and finite changes in a momentum or energy or something, that can
>>>be interpreted as particles.
>>
>>Yes, but can they be interpreted as irreducible atomic monads?
>
>www.dictionary.com describes a monad as "An indivisible, impenetrable unit
>of substance viewed as the basic constituent element of physical reality
>in the metaphysics of Leibnitz."
>
>No, a field cannot be interpreted literally as a monad. It's not
>impenetrable, it probably doesn't make sense to call it divisible or
>indivisible. And Leibnitz probably had a stronger opinion of the
>ultimate truthness of it than I would admit in a theory. But more
>loosely, as the basic quantity in a model from which electrons and atoms
>and baseballs can be derived, sure.
As long as they aren't atomic monads. What's irreducible about
particles is the description and not the particle itself.
>>>But that's really just a concrete illustration of the more abstract point
>>>that if you're going to try to explain something in terms of particles,
>>>then particles themselves will remain unexplained.
>>
>>On the other hand, if you explain the particles themselves first, you
>>will find yourself in the enviable position of being able to explain
>>other things in terms of particles without regression.
>
>I've already explained the particles; they're an interpretation of
>interacting quantum fields.
Particles are particles and interpretations require interpreters. It's
nice that interacting quantum fields can be interpreted one way or
another, but I prefer particles that don't require interpretation.
>I think you must have meant an explanation with elements that nobody
>thinks to ask the explanation of.
No, I mean an explanation with elements that nobody needs to ask the
explanation of because the explanation is evident in the explanation
without interpretation or the divine intercession of an interpreter.
>--
>"Suppose you were an idiot... And suppose you were a member of
>Congress... But I repeat myself." - Mark Twain
Regards - Lester
robert j. kolker
Lester Zick wrote:
> No, I mean an explanation with elements that nobody needs to ask the
> explanation of because the explanation is evident in the explanation
> without interpretation or the divine intercession of an interpreter.
You are out of date in your attitude. Physics theories are very abstract
mathematically and necessarily so. Physics has been abstract since at
least the middle of the 19-th century, and that is before relativity and
quantum theory. You seem to long after the old days of mechanical
explanations. You are doomed to disappointment.
Bob Kolker
Albert
Well, one good example is available in my reply to your reply to
Stlbl above: your assertion that any unfalsified theory was
evidence.
A second example might be your statement to Lester that: "The
'calculations', as you call them, _are_ the explanations." This
assumed link between arbitrary calculations and reality is pretty
magical sounding to me. But I'm sure that Lester will explain
that to you.
Gregory L. Hansen
Lester Zick <lester...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 21:29:00 +0000 (UTC),
>glha...@steel.ucs.indiana.edu (Gregory L. Hansen) in
>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>>In article <41c287c2...@netnews.att.net>,
>>Lester Zick <lester...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>>>On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 18:40:26 +0000 (UTC),
>>>glha...@steel.ucs.indiana.edu (Gregory L. Hansen) in
>>>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
[...]
>>Did you think F=ma is any more explanatory?
>
>Oh, hell, yes. F, m, and a are explained in terms of one another. QM
>merely asserts there is some explanation but can't say what it is.
>
>>The potential in quantum mechanics has the same role as the index of
>>refraction in optics. And, in a sense, the same role as force in
>>classical mechanics. A wave packet will tend to be drawn toward low spots
>>of the potential and pushed away from high spots. Electrons are bound to
>>atoms because of the attractive force between the two; an atom can
>>transition to a higher energy state when, e.g., another atom bumps into it
>>and pushes the peices around.
>
>Yes, yes, this is all very interesting. I always imagined there was
>some reason electrons didn't go marching down Main Street in unison on
>New Years Day. QM just doesn't explain what all this anthropomorphism
>really amount to.
If you like F=ma, then I don't know why you'd have a problem with a
wavefunction attracted to lows and repelled from highs in the potential.
Do you know how force and potential energy are related?
And did you, by any chance, notice that force in classical mechanics isn't
itself explained, but simply defined as that which causes an acceleration?
[...]
>>>>What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
>>>>plausibilities?
>>>
>>>Well, the point of my observation was the standard of plausibility
>>>and not self consistency. If all science is based on is plausibility,
>>>it, like Euclidean geometry, rests on a rather sandy foundation.
>>
>>Get used to it. As Poincare said, science doesn't tell you what things
>>are. It organizes relationships between them, and any theory is a true
>>theory to the extent that if faithfully describes those relationships
>>within the theory's valid regime of application. Read "Science and
>>Hypothesis" by Poincare, which is usefully close to modern views on the
>>philosophy of science despite being a hundred years old.
>
>No, no. Science tells us what things are. That's why we keep it
>around. It's mysticism that doesn't tell us what things are but
>maintains it needs to be kept around as a substitute for science.
Science has grown out of that viewpoint after a few theories that say what
things are have fallen away.
But to claim to know what things REALLY are seems far more akin to
claiming knowledge about spirits and other unmeasurables to me.
[...]
>>>You're talking empiricism not knowledge. Precisely what's wrong with
>>>positivism. A thousand years of observations do not an idea make.
>>
>>Science is an empirical practice. A theory is good if and only if it
>>stands up to empirical scrutiny. If it can't, the theory is flawed. And
>>if you can't measure every part of every phenomenon with infinite
>>precision from the beginning to the end of time, then you might never know
>>you have a flawed theory.
>
>And my point is empiricists never empirically know anything.
You can't have missed the existence of modern technology, so I think you
must be using a personal, restrictive definition of what it means to know
something.
[...]
>>>Well, since you chose not comment on my discussion of contraction
>>>hypotheses, I can't comment on Lorentz except to say that MM can be
>>>performed successfully with radiation polarized normal to the plane of
>>>rotation and the absolute motion of the earth through space detected.
>>
>>Okay, I'll comment on it. The Lorentz transforms form a group, which
>>means if you think you find a contradiction in them, you owe it to
>>yourself to figure out why you're wrong.
>>
>>In your particular example, the length of an object is defined by the
>>front and back of the object. If some particle, like a gas molecule in a
>>hollow cube, is moving around in there, that doesn't make a bit of
>>difference as long as you know what you want to call the front and what
>>you want to call the back. The gas molecule might itself have a different
>>length contraction than the block as a whole, but if it's between the
>>front and back in any frame, it will be between the front and back in all
>>frames. The object itself isn't even necessary. Pick any two points.
>
>You mean different geometries apply to interstitial particles? Then
>how do we average all these different frames of reference since any
>average of v's would be linear but the effect is non linear?
If you want to calculate a length from the frame of each individual
particle, that's up to you, and the process is straightforward. But an
observer is not oberving simultaneously from all those different reference
frames. The observer observes from his own rest frame.
>Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis applies to a body moving
>at any particular velocity. Different v's, different contraction
>factors. So, which geometry applies to the group of interstitial
>bodies that constitute the body as a whole that Einstein uses to
>explain frequency dilation at v when there are numerous different v's?
>Surely, you're not going to say net v for the body as whole because
>there is no body as a whole; there are only aggregates of interstitial
>frames of reference with v's of their own. And v's average linearly
>whereas frequency dilation factors are non linear.
Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis relates a length measured in
one frame to a length measured in another frame. When you, Lester,
measure (taking an example from in front of me) the diameter of a
Vanilla Pepsi can, do you need to measure the speeds of each individual
atom within the can? Review the derivation of length contraction and the
definition of length that is used.
>>>>A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
>>>>is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
>>>>data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
>>>>experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
>>>
>>>Probably the same way you can know that you're not standing on your
>>>head: logical inference. Science should try it some time.
>>
>>How is your logical inference different from the way you want things to
>>be?
>
>It doesn't. It's just different from empirical observation. Empirical
>observation isn't knowledge. Logical inference is. It may be right or
>wrong knowledge, but it's the only form of knowledge there is.
Logical inference without data is fantasy. If you're not beholden to
empirical observation, you can build any kind of abstract world that you
like.
>
>>Logic doesn't tell you what your premises have to be, which is why it's
>>always bugged me when Vulcans in Star Trek go running around saying
>>"That's illogical." It's pragmatic to suppose that you're not a brain in
>>a jar being fed false experiences, but you can't prove it from a priori
>>considerations.
>
>Well, you are a brain in a jar, the skull, being fed experiences by
>the senses, and it's up to the brain in the jar to decipher truth from
>falsity through logical inference. I don't know what a priori
>considerations are and neither does anyone else except to say that
>they're assumptions, neither true nor false.
A priori means knowable without reference to particular facts or
experience. Your logical inference is something that is done with
postulates. Where do those postulates come from? As far as I can tell,
you want postulates that do not appeal to any particular facts or
experiences, and yet say something useful about particular facts or
exeriences. Good luck.
[...]
>
>>I think you must have meant an explanation with elements that nobody
>>thinks to ask the explanation of.
>
>No, I mean an explanation with elements that nobody needs to ask the
>explanation of because the explanation is evident in the explanation
>without interpretation or the divine intercession of an interpreter.
The explanation is "evident" in the explanation? Go right ahead, but I
urge you again to be careful of unstated assumptions without which the
explanation would not be so evident.
I'll revisit particles. I've already mentioned how they can be seen as an
interpretation of quantum fields. There's another view advanced by a
gentleman on sci.physics that particles are excitations in a fluid. It's
a basic result in fluid mechanics, for instance, that two vortices will
attract or repel each other, according to the relative directions of their
spin axes, analogously to a Coulomb force. He likes to think of a fluid
that's ultimately particulate, but fluid mechanics is typically done in
the continuum limit and I see no logical problem with assuming the fluid
is itself a continuum.
So if, for instance, you take the existence of particles as self-evident
and necessary, you're fooling yourself. First, because you know from
experience that there are particle-like things to be described. But I've
given you two concrete examples of how particles can seem to exist when
no particles have ever existed. That's the problem with claiming a
priori knowledge. Even if there were no concrete examples there will
always be possibilities that just haven't occured to you yet, or the
possibility that there are possibilities that haven't occured to you yet.
--
"Then they placed the ark of the Lord on the cart; along with the box
containing the golden mice and the images of the hemorrhoids."
-- 1 Samuel 6:11
ste...@nomail.com
:> In sci.math Albert <albert...@cox.net> wrote:
:> : Wolf Kirchmeir wrote:
:> : <snip>
:> :> Lester once again displaying his unwillingness to believe that concepts
:> :> he can't understand nevertheless makes sense.
:> :>
:> :> Lester, Lester, you're turning into a first class crank.
:>
:> : Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his
:> : arguments make sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my
:> : science seasoned with magic.
:>
:> Do you think that the set {1,2,3} contains the element 0? :)
: Do you think that is what I was talking about?
You mentioned Lester's arguments and that is one of Lester's arguments.
Stephen
robert j. kolker
Albert wrote:
> Well, one good example is available in my reply to your reply to Stlbl
> above: your assertion that any unfalsified theory was evidence.
I never said or implied that. We can never know when a theory is true.
We can only know when it is falsified. A non-falsified theory with a
good record of predictions (many kinds of things predicted or related)
is sufficient reason for staying with the theory. If the theory leads to
good technology that is even more reason for staying with the theory. We
stay with a theory because it is productive and useful, not because it
is true.
Bob Kolker
robert j. kolker
Albert wrote:
> A second example might be your statement to Lester that: "The
> 'calculations', as you call them, _are_ the explanations." This assumed
> link between arbitrary calculations and reality is pretty magical
> sounding to me. But I'm sure that Lester will explain that to you.
It isn't magic when it leads to good technology. Technology is solid and
sound reason for using a theory. That is why quantum field theory is a
winner. It is behind most of our best technology.
And theories do not -explain- anything. They predict. They also function
as good intuition pumps for making more good theories and promoting
engineering and applications. We cannot know the Real Reality (i.e. the
reality beyond the appearences). The only things we really -know- (as
opposed to guess at or infer or hypothesize) is direct experience.
Bob Kolker
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Wolf Kirchmeir wrote:
><snip>
>> Lester once again displaying his unwillingness to believe that concepts
>> he can't understand nevertheless makes sense.
>>
>> Lester, Lester, you're turning into a first class crank.
>
>Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his
>arguments make sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my
>science seasoned with magic.
Very, very good, Albert. lol (lots of hilarity). I begin to think very
well of you.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
Well, I'm certainly out of date with your attitude. Physics has been
abstract ever since Newton stopped using examples to calculate the
location of planets in the celestial realm and started using f=ma to
calculate material interactions. That's what it means to be abstract.
The abstraction is from particular examples philosophers use to argue
their interpretation of truth.
What relativity does is to divorce its abstractions from the spatial
geometry of material interactions generally. And what quantum
mysticism does is divorce the specification its abstractions from
mechanical relations among effects and replace it with a grammar of
symmetry as opposed to a grammar of mechanical cause and effect. For
the life of me I just can't recall this kind of magic abstraction in
the mid 19th century.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
Which elicits the question whether speculative theories are evidence?
Certainly there are speculative theories in QM, the lack of mechanical
determinism among particle motions and interactions, among others.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
wrote:
One of many of Lester's arguments relating to mathematics and
differences and differences between differences, none of which you
seem to prefer to conventional mathematical mysticism, sometimes
known as pythagoreanism or platonism.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Wolf Kirchmeir wrote:
>> Albert wrote:
>> [...]
>>
>>>
>>> Actually, the more of Lester's posts I read, the more his arguments
>>> make sense. I guess I'm a crank also. I don't like my science
>>> seasoned with magic.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Where's the magic?
>
>Well, one good example is available in my reply to your reply to
>Stlbl above: your assertion that any unfalsified theory was
>evidence.
>
>A second example might be your statement to Lester that: "The
>'calculations', as you call them, _are_ the explanations." This
>assumed link between arbitrary calculations and reality is pretty
>magical sounding to me. But I'm sure that Lester will explain
>that to you.
Wolf is rather difficult to reach on issues in mechanics. He prefers
philosophy to science both in behavior analysis and mathematics and
constantly regales us with his beliefs instead of his knowledge and
berates me, at least, for failing to believe in his beliefs as opposed
to his science.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
<wwol...@sympatico.ca> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>[...]
>>
>> Well, that's exactly the complaint. Science is about explanations and
>> not just calculations in which we can't tell what is being calculated.
>
>The "calculations", as you call them, _are_ the explanations.
Sure, just like behaviorism's dictum to wit the history of behavior is
the explanation of behavior. I should have thought you would have
jumped for joy at my discovery of an extensional rationale for
cardinality and some theoretical confirmation for naturalized
epistemology. Of course, that would take us back to counting on our
fingers and toes. But positivism, materialism, and behaviorism have
pretty much done that already.
>What is explained by saying F = m * a? Nothing. The statement, whether
>rendered in alegbra or in English merely asserts a relationship between
>measurable quantities.
Sunofagun! I'll be sure to pass the word that f=ma explains nothing
about f, m, and a in relation to one another. Maybe that relationship
is an explanation? But if you insist on calculation, how about f=2
dynes? That's an empirical calculation that I defy you to falsify.
>And what's a "measurable quantity", anyhow? The end result of a peculiar
>behaviour we call "measuring." EG, when I measure the length of a piece
>of wood, I put a tape measure up alongside it, and look at the numbers
>at both ends of the tape measure, and perform a calculation. To make it
>easier, tape measures have a zero at one end, so the calculation amounts
>to reading the second number. If I use a metric tape, I might get 904mm.
>If I use an imperial tape, I might get 2ft 11-1/2" plus a smidgen. Does
>this procedure explain what "length" is? Nope. Does it explain why some
>objects, such as sticks of wood, have length and others, such as
>electric curtrents, don't? Nope. "Length is what we measure with meter
>sticks" my physics teacher told us. "That's all we know about it." I
>think he was right.
No doubt you both do. Not too keen on geometric inference, are you?
>The scientific attitude is one of profound humility in the face of the
>unknowable.
Yes, I've routinely noticed your profound humility in the face of all
my suggestions. I would sure hate to see your pride.
> It requires accepting the limits of our knowledge. It
>refuses to deal with things we cannot know, or to answer questions that
>can have no answers.
Well, it's clear at least that there are questions than can have no
answers for you, among others the length of a piece of string, and the
mechanics of intelligence. However, I'm not so sure such questions
have no answers for others of greater acumen.
> It's scientific to say "Length is what we measure
>with meter sticks." It's unscientifc to say "Length is really....."
>(finish that sentence any way you like.)
>
>St Augustine commented that "How long is a piece of string?" has no
>answer, while "How long is this piece of string?" does. Good comment IMO.
And I'm sure this parable is noted in canonic apologetics everywhere.
The length of a piece of string is a piece. You just said that was the
metric just like the length of a foot of string is a foot. But please
don't tell canon authorities or I might be called before some unholy
office of the inquisition.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
Decent observation, but I prefer my collateral reply to Stephen
regarding differences in sets and the determination of cardinality.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
wrote:
>In sci.math Albert <albert...@cox.net> wrote:
When you suggested a photograph of a class as a set, I asked what the
cardinality of a photograph of 42 students was and suggested that 0
just photograph very well. With a cardinality of equal differences, we
find that 1-1=0 and that 1-(1-1) is equal to 2-1 and 3-2. Of course,
if your particular brand of cardinality contains unequal differences
or no differences, I can readily appreciate that you have a problem.
Regards - Lester
AngleWyrm
news:0YCwd.17930$pb.12...@news20.bellglobal.com...
>
> And what's a "measurable quantity", anyhow? The end result of a peculiar
> behaviour we call "measuring." EG, when I measure the length of a piece
> of wood, I put a tape measure up alongside it, and look at the numbers
> at both ends of the tape measure, and perform a calculation. To make it
> easier, tape measures have a zero at one end, so the calculation amounts
> to reading the second number. If I use a metric tape, I might get 904mm.
> If I use an imperial tape, I might get 2ft 11-1/2" plus a smidgen. Does
> this procedure explain what "length" is? Nope. Does it explain why some
> objects, such as sticks of wood, have length and others, such as
> electric curtrents, don't? Nope. "Length is what we measure with meter
> sticks" my physics teacher told us. "That's all we know about it." I
> think he was right.
My definition of measuring:
A communication, where the sender relates a description of a subject to the
receiver in terms that the receiver can recognize, but with an additional
convenient property: The comparison between subject and familiar ground is
indirectly related to the receiver's knowledge.
Outside my window right now, the sky is 100% overcast.
The thermometer on the wall reads 74 degrees.
Something I don't seem to have a good measurement for is the amount of
disorganization I see in the things laying about on my desk. My desk is 10%
organized? 90% entropy? 2 standard deviations from organized?
-:|:-
AngleWyrm
JGCASEY
What you write is exactly what I understand science to be.
You end with "The only things we really -know- ... is direct
experience." I would say all we really -know- is our conscious
experience Now, (qualia). We don't really -know- anything
beyond that. Without that there is, for the individual, nothing.
John Casey
Tom Kirke
I once had a Physics Prof announce that "In Physics meaning
has no meaning, the only thing that matters is whether we can
manipulate the formalisms".
I'm not sure what this contributes to the thread, but it's
an interesting quote.
Dark skies,
tom
--
We have discovered a therapy ( NOT a cure )
for the common cold. Play tuba for an hour.
Wolf Kirchmeir
>>The "calculations", as you call them, _are_ the explanations.
>
>
> I once had a Physics Prof announce that "In Physics meaning
> has no meaning, the only thing that matters is whether we can
> manipulate the formalisms".
>
> I'm not sure what this contributes to the thread, but it's
> an interesting quote.
>
> Dark skies,
>
> tom
>
He was right.
But of course the really odd thing is that those manipulated formalisms
somehow refer to the real world....
Albert
>
>
> Albert wrote:
>
>> Well, one good example is available in my reply to your reply to Stlbl
>> above: your assertion that any unfalsified theory was evidence.
>
>
> I never said or implied that.
I never said you did, Bob. There is something wrong with your
reader. I was replying to Wolf.
> We can never know when a theory is true.
> We can only know when it is falsified. A non-falsified theory with a
> good record of predictions (many kinds of things predicted or related)
> is sufficient reason for staying with the theory. If the theory leads to
> good technology that is even more reason for staying with the theory. We
> stay with a theory because it is productive and useful, not because it
> is true.
Agreed.
Albert
>
>
> Albert wrote:
>
>> A second example might be your statement to Lester that: "The
>> 'calculations', as you call them, _are_ the explanations." This
>> assumed link between arbitrary calculations and reality is pretty
>> magical sounding to me. But I'm sure that Lester will explain that to
>> you.
>
>
> It isn't magic when it leads to good technology.
Damn, Bob. Please read for comprehension and note the context. I
never said nor implied otherwise.
> Technology is solid and
> sound reason for using a theory. That is why quantum field theory is a
> winner. It is behind most of our best technology.
You talk about QM as if it were explained by a monolithic single
theory and all aspects of that single theory have been
empirically proven.
> And theories do not -explain- anything. They predict.
And are useful *only* to the extent they predict. Please explain
this to Wolf.
> They also function
> as good intuition pumps for making more good theories and promoting
> engineering and applications. We cannot know the Real Reality (i.e. the
> reality beyond the appearences). The only things we really -know- (as
> opposed to guess at or infer or hypothesize) is direct experience.
Please explain this to Wolf et al.
Albert
Somehow? LOL. Well, sometimes they do and sometimes they don't.
That area between mathematics and the real world that you refer
to as 'somehow' I assume defines where your faith comes into play.
Lester Zick
I assume you know how they are related. Do you know why they are
related?
>And did you, by any chance, notice that force in classical mechanics isn't
>itself explained, but simply defined as that which causes an acceleration?
Well, force causes acceleration; it doesn't cause an acceleration
unless mediated by mass. What kind of explanation do you expect for
force? What kind of explanation for force or mass or even acceleration
is possible? I don't say no better explanation for force etc. is
possible. I do say that Newton explained what he could of force pretty
effectively. Mechanics engages in a mechanical reduction of causes by
explaining factors in terms of one another.
>[...]
>
>>>>>What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
>>>>>plausibilities?
>>>>
>>>>Well, the point of my observation was the standard of plausibility
>>>>and not self consistency. If all science is based on is plausibility,
>>>>it, like Euclidean geometry, rests on a rather sandy foundation.
>>>
>>>Get used to it. As Poincare said, science doesn't tell you what things
>>>are. It organizes relationships between them, and any theory is a true
>>>theory to the extent that if faithfully describes those relationships
>>>within the theory's valid regime of application. Read "Science and
>>>Hypothesis" by Poincare, which is usefully close to modern views on the
>>>philosophy of science despite being a hundred years old.
>>
>>No, no. Science tells us what things are. That's why we keep it
>>around. It's mysticism that doesn't tell us what things are but
>>maintains it needs to be kept around as a substitute for science.
>
>Science has grown out of that viewpoint after a few theories that say what
>things are have fallen away.
None of the macro cause and effect theories I'm familiar with have
fallen away. They have merely been supplanted at the micro level by QM
postulates which turn out to be true but of ambiguous origin in the
sense that they don't explain what they explain or fail to explain. If
classical mechanics had taken a similar route, we would still be doing
classical mechanics supplemented by arbitrary postulates of dubious
orign and ambiguous mechanical significance.
>But to claim to know what things REALLY are seems far more akin to
>claiming knowledge about spirits and other unmeasurables to me.
Not necessarily although I have to admit that such a conclusion
certainly mirrors contemporary thinking. Personally I consider that if
one can show that alternatives of a specific empirical theory are
inherently self contradictory truth of the theory itself is necessary.
Conversely, showing self contradiction within an empirical theory
shows the theory to be false regardless of what experiments fail to
contradict, which is the approach I've taken with special relativity.
>[...]
>>>>You're talking empiricism not knowledge. Precisely what's wrong with
>>>>positivism. A thousand years of observations do not an idea make.
>>>
>>>Science is an empirical practice. A theory is good if and only if it
>>>stands up to empirical scrutiny. If it can't, the theory is flawed. And
>>>if you can't measure every part of every phenomenon with infinite
>>>precision from the beginning to the end of time, then you might never know
>>>you have a flawed theory.
>>
>>And my point is empiricists never empirically know anything.
>
>You can't have missed the existence of modern technology, so I think you
>must be using a personal, restrictive definition of what it means to know
>something.
I think you'll find development of modern technology is largely a
reflection of classical mechanics with the enhancement of quantum
theories. I don't know many machines that inherently rely on quantum
ambiguity. We certainly have things like tunneling diodes that rely on
quantum suppositions. But those suppositions themselves are not based
on any mechanical understanding of the forces at work. They are just
suppositions that turn out to reflect poorly understood mechanisms.
>[...]
>>>>Well, since you chose not comment on my discussion of contraction
>>>>hypotheses, I can't comment on Lorentz except to say that MM can be
>>>>performed successfully with radiation polarized normal to the plane of
>>>>rotation and the absolute motion of the earth through space detected.
>>>
>>>Okay, I'll comment on it. The Lorentz transforms form a group, which
>>>means if you think you find a contradiction in them, you owe it to
>>>yourself to figure out why you're wrong.
>>>
>>>In your particular example, the length of an object is defined by the
>>>front and back of the object. If some particle, like a gas molecule in a
>>>hollow cube, is moving around in there, that doesn't make a bit of
>>>difference as long as you know what you want to call the front and what
>>>you want to call the back. The gas molecule might itself have a different
>>>length contraction than the block as a whole, but if it's between the
>>>front and back in any frame, it will be between the front and back in all
>>>frames. The object itself isn't even necessary. Pick any two points.
>>
>>You mean different geometries apply to interstitial particles? Then
>>how do we average all these different frames of reference since any
>>average of v's would be linear but the effect is non linear?
>
>If you want to calculate a length from the frame of each individual
>particle, that's up to you, and the process is straightforward. But an
>observer is not oberving simultaneously from all those different reference
>frames. The observer observes from his own rest frame.
OK. Back to the observer paradox. I guess we've regressed to ground
zero for relativistic explanations because I don't need an observer to
explain and justify my geometric conclusions but relativity does.
>>Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis applies to a body moving
>>at any particular velocity. Different v's, different contraction
>>factors. So, which geometry applies to the group of interstitial
>>bodies that constitute the body as a whole that Einstein uses to
>>explain frequency dilation at v when there are numerous different v's?
>>Surely, you're not going to say net v for the body as whole because
>>there is no body as a whole; there are only aggregates of interstitial
>>frames of reference with v's of their own. And v's average linearly
>>whereas frequency dilation factors are non linear.
>
>Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis relates a length measured in
>one frame to a length measured in another frame. When you, Lester,
>measure (taking an example from in front of me) the diameter of a
>Vanilla Pepsi can, do you need to measure the speeds of each individual
>atom within the can? Review the derivation of length contraction and the
>definition of length that is used.
I don't need to measure anything in my spatial geometry because the
problem is logic and not geometry. You, on the other hand, need to
resort to observers and personalized measurement because the spatial
geometry in relativity contradiction hypotheses is self contradictory
on its own terms.
>>>>>A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
>>>>>is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
>>>>>data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
>>>>>experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
>>>>
>>>>Probably the same way you can know that you're not standing on your
>>>>head: logical inference. Science should try it some time.
>>>
>>>How is your logical inference different from the way you want things to
>>>be?
>>
>>It doesn't. It's just different from empirical observation. Empirical
>>observation isn't knowledge. Logical inference is. It may be right or
>>wrong knowledge, but it's the only form of knowledge there is.
>
>Logical inference without data is fantasy. If you're not beholden to
>empirical observation, you can build any kind of abstract world that you
>like.
I never suggested inference without data. Empirical observations are
the data. Logical inference is what we make of the data interrelated.
>>>Logic doesn't tell you what your premises have to be, which is why it's
>>>always bugged me when Vulcans in Star Trek go running around saying
>>>"That's illogical." It's pragmatic to suppose that you're not a brain in
>>>a jar being fed false experiences, but you can't prove it from a priori
>>>considerations.
>>
>>Well, you are a brain in a jar, the skull, being fed experiences by
>>the senses, and it's up to the brain in the jar to decipher truth from
>>falsity through logical inference. I don't know what a priori
>>considerations are and neither does anyone else except to say that
>>they're assumptions, neither true nor false.
>
>A priori means knowable without reference to particular facts or
>experience. Your logical inference is something that is done with
>postulates. Where do those postulates come from? As far as I can tell,
>you want postulates that do not appeal to any particular facts or
>experiences, and yet say something useful about particular facts or
>exeriences. Good luck.
Goodness has nothing to do with it. Nor do postulates. What you do
need is mechanically irreducible and unregressable truth, by which I
mean some empirical observation which is irreducible because
alternatives are self contradictory. Logical inference is then done
with that mechanism on other reducible empirical observations to
determine their relations to one another.
>[...]
>>
>>>I think you must have meant an explanation with elements that nobody
>>>thinks to ask the explanation of.
>>
>>No, I mean an explanation with elements that nobody needs to ask the
>>explanation of because the explanation is evident in the explanation
>>without interpretation or the divine intercession of an interpreter.
>The explanation is "evident" in the explanation? Go right ahead, but I
>urge you again to be careful of unstated assumptions without which the
>explanation would not be so evident.
Well, you just start with the empirical observation [not] and work up
from there. T:[not][not not] is a tautology and tautologies are always
true because they include all possibilities and exclude no
possibilities. Then we find that the empirical observation [not] is
itself always true because its logical regression [not not] is self
contradictory. Which implies that [not] is the logic mechanism we're
looking for because it is irreducible and unregressable.
>I'll revisit particles. I've already mentioned how they can be seen as an
>interpretation of quantum fields. There's another view advanced by a
>gentleman on sci.physics that particles are excitations in a fluid. It's
>a basic result in fluid mechanics, for instance, that two vortices will
>attract or repel each other, according to the relative directions of their
>spin axes, analogously to a Coulomb force. He likes to think of a fluid
>that's ultimately particulate, but fluid mechanics is typically done in
>the continuum limit and I see no logical problem with assuming the fluid
>is itself a continuum.
I agree completely and I'll even give it a name: the ether.
>So if, for instance, you take the existence of particles as self-evident
>and necessary, you're fooling yourself. First, because you know from
>experience that there are particle-like things to be described. But I've
>given you two concrete examples of how particles can seem to exist when
>no particles have ever existed. That's the problem with claiming a
>priori knowledge. Even if there were no concrete examples there will
>always be possibilities that just haven't occured to you yet, or the
>possibility that there are possibilities that haven't occured to you yet.
There are always possibilities that just haven't occurred to me yet or
to you or to others. Quantum theory is filled with them and their
symmetries and with quantum theorists hunting for them. I take nothing
except basic truth T:[not][not not] as self evident and that only
because the term self evident means evident of itself in that
alternatives are inherently self contradictory. Maybe there are other
definitions for self evidence, but that is the one I use.
You seem to think I'm whistling in the dark regarding the existence of
particles; so, on the off chance you haven't read my brief description
of the mechanical origin of Planck's constant, I'm enclosing a copy:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 15:33:42 GMT, lester...@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) wrote:
>
> Planck's Constant
>
>Previously in the thread Angular Momentum in Rotating Bodies, I
>presented an analytical framework for the interpretation of dr/dt in
>circular rotation of a point mass m at velocity v and radius r. No one
>I know of agrees with my interpretation of dr/dt. However, in the
>interests of further establishing this general framework, I would like
>to pursue general developement of the idea which culminates in the
>analytical definition of Planck's constant.
>
>We begin by noting that in cases of circular rotation at constant
>angular velocity we have a centripetally directed dr/dt acting on
>point mass m of a magnitude equal to tangential velocity v. This is
>what causes the rotation of v and produces r as a consequence of
>rotation.
>
>We then integrate dr/dt along r which produces 1/2 mvr/2pi with units
>of measure equal to rr/t. Now, I have been cautioned on several
>occasions not to suggest that this quantity represents angular
>momentum in conventional terms and I agree. Perhaps we should simply
>call it rotational momentum to prevent confusion.
>
>What we notice immediately however is that it bears the same form as
>what is conventionally referred to as particle angular momentum, with
>the quantity mvr corresponding to Planck's constant. However, we have
>to straighten certain things out in this connection.
>
>In conventional macro angular rotation such as flywheels we have a
>centripetal dr/dt and tangential v which are equal to each other. They
>are effectively bound up through tensile forces internal to the body
>undergoing rotation. In celestial angular mechanics on the other hand
>we have a wide variety of potential dr/dt's and tangential orbital
>velocities operating in various combinations.
>
>But in the context of particle rotational dynamics we have a somewhat
>different situation. The tangential velocity of rotation v is constant
>under all circumstances. In other words, v = c. Thus dr/dt operates
>centripetally on tangential velocity v to produce elementary particles
>of different radii and in the process acts as an index to particle
>mass.
>
>Therefore we can index particle mass to a rotational frequency, n (per
>second) times an analytical masslet, m0 (kg-sec) and interpret the
>quantity mvr as a multiple of nm0vr. Further we can interpret r as a
>function of c/n such that Planck's constant = m0cc. In other words, m0
>is roughly on the order of 10^-50 kg-sec in magnitude and Planck's
>constant corresponds to the multiple of m0 and the square of the
>velocity of light.
>
>We notice several things about rotational momentum. In linear motion
>at constant velocity rotational momentum is zero because dr/dt and mvr
>are both zero. And in circular rotation at a constant angular velocity
>rotational momentum is constant because mvr is constant. This
>represents the analytical distinction between circular and linear
>motion.
>
>Further we notice that dr/dt can be of any magnitude. It is not bound
>by the constancy of the velocity of light as an upper limit because it
>doesn't go anywhere. It only produces rotation in relation to actual
>tangential motion v = c.
>
>And because particle mass and dr/dt share a conjugal relationship, it
>should be intuitively obvious to the casual observer that particle
>mass and radius of rotation are inversely proportional, that is that
>the more massive a particle the smaller it is.
>
>
>Regards - Lester
>
>remove DEL in address for email
Linear versus Analytical Mechanics
One of the really unfortunate aspects of Newton's choice of a linear
frame of reference for the analysis of mechanics is that r is poorly
defined and t is not defined at all. In other words, r is only defined
in direction and t is not defined by any consideration pertinent to
the analytical frame of reference.
And this had a pernicious impact on the subsequent development of
angular mechanics as well as relativistic considerations and quantum
mechanics in the twentieth century.
The problem is that r and t and their combinations are all we have to
work with. Taken to the second level of compounding we have six
combinations: r, 1/t, r/t, r/tt, rr/t, and rr/tt. However, in the
linear analytical frame of reference the next to last combination rr/t
was overlooked because there is no apparent application for it in
linear mechanical contexts.
On the other hand, in angular frames of reference we have applications
for all combinations and all the elements are well defined. The radius
of rotation is well defined in terms of direction and magnitude and
time is well defined in analytical terms as whatever time is needed
for 2pi radians of rotation.
The rr/t combination is also well defined in angular terms. However,
in extrapolating the idea of rr/t from linear to angular contexts in
classical mechanics, whoever devised the analytical approach made the
mistake of trying to emulate linear mechanics in the sense of
explaining rotation as a linear progression of r instead of a simple
radial v in combination with tangential v.
This is more akin to an anachronistic pre Newtonian view of mechanics.
Kepler thought that some force of angels was needed to keep planets in
orbit around the sun and regarded that force as tangential in
direction. Newton on the other hand recognized that the only force
needed was centripetal in nature and not tangential. But whoever
devised the analytical considerations underlying angular mechanics
apparently never considered the Newtonian perspective and presumably
relied on the pre Newtonian rationale.
Thus we wind up with a conceptual schism among the various realms of
angular mechanics. On the one hand we have orbital angular mechanics,
the macro realm of ordinary angular mechanics, and the micro realm of
quantum effects. And unfortunately there is no conceptual integration
among them. We are convinced that all represent mechanical realms but
we have no basis for comprehending each in terms of the others.
Orbital angular mechanics represents the realm of remote interactions
dealt with in terms of inverse square centripetal forces and
tangential orbital velocities. Whereas the macro realm of ordinary
angular mechanics deals with linear analogs such as moments of inertia
instead of mass, torque instead of force, and angular acceleration and
velocity instead of their linear analogs.
The micro realm of angular mechanics on the other hand is dealt with
on the merely descriptive basis of formalisms. This is the realm of
quantum mechanics - QM - or as I prefer to call it quantum magic where
things don't seem to happen for any definite mechanical reason at all.
However with the redefinition of macro angular momentum and Planck's
constant in circular rotation we are at last in a position to
understand the mechanical differences among the realms in conceptual
terms.
The micro realm of quantum effects is one of constant tangential
velocity of rotation v = c and a variable radial dr/dt.
The macro realm of ordinary angular mechanics on the other hand is one
in which the tangential velocity of rotation is variable but
tangential v = radial dr/dt and both are kept in strict
synchronization by internal tensile forces.
And finally orbital angular mechanics is defined by various
combinations of tangential v and radial dr/dt. This is normally
thought of in celestial terms but in point of fact applies equally to
the atomic realm as well.
Regards - Lester
Wolf Kirchmeir
> Wolf Kirchmeir wrote:
>
>> Tom Kirke wrote:
>>
>>>> The "calculations", as you call them, _are_ the explanations.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I once had a Physics Prof announce that "In Physics meaning has no
>>> meaning, the only thing that matters is whether we can manipulate the
>>> formalisms".
>>>
>>> I'm not sure what this contributes to the thread, but it's
>>> an interesting quote.
>>>
>>> Dark skies,
>>>
>>> tom
>>>
>>
>> He was right.
>>
>> But of course the really odd thing is that those manipulated
>> formalisms somehow refer to the real world....
>
>
> Somehow? LOL. Well, sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. That
> area between mathematics and the real world that you refer to as
> 'somehow' I assume defines where your faith comes into play.
To quote you:
"Damn, Albert, read for comprehension."
"Somehow" does not deny "sometimes they do and sometimes they don't."
The issue is, why do they refer to the real world at all, not what
proportion does so.
Though it is odd, isn't it, that so much math that began as "pure"
manipulation of the formalisms turned out and still turns out to be
applicable to the real world.
I guess I must be on your bad-guy list, since you react with foaming
mouth and irrelevant comments to just about everything I say - even when
I make a point that doesn't disagree with you.
robert j. kolker
Lester Zick wrote:
>
> I think you'll find development of modern technology is largely a
> reflection of classical mechanics with the enhancement of quantum
> theories. I don't know many machines that inherently rely on quantum
> ambiguity. We certainly have things like tunneling diodes that rely on
> quantum suppositions. But those suppositions themselves are not based
> on any mechanical understanding of the forces at work. They are just
> suppositions that turn out to reflect poorly understood mechanisms.
These suppositions which reflect poorly understood mechanisms produce
predictions good to 15 decimal places.
Secondly, you presume the existence of mechanisms. What is your
evidence. If a theory that does not presume so predicts so well, why
should one think that mechanisms are required?
Machanisms were the chrochett and bugbear of 19-th century physics which
turned out to be an empricial failure in many respects.
Bob Kolker
Lester Zick
<now...@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>Albert wrote:
>> A second example might be your statement to Lester that: "The
>> 'calculations', as you call them, _are_ the explanations." This assumed
>> link between arbitrary calculations and reality is pretty magical
>> sounding to me. But I'm sure that Lester will explain that to you.
>
>It isn't magic when it leads to good technology. Technology is solid and
>sound reason for using a theory. That is why quantum field theory is a
>winner. It is behind most of our best technology.
Sure. Behind most of our best and worst technology lie intuition
pumps.
>And theories do not -explain- anything. They predict. They also function
>as good intuition pumps for making more good theories and promoting
>engineering and applications. We cannot know the Real Reality (i.e. the
>reality beyond the appearences). The only things we really -know- (as
>opposed to guess at or infer or hypothesize) is direct experience.
Is all this theory or speculation? The difference between speculation
and theory is that theory tells us how speculations actually work. All
speculation is is educated guesses based on collateral factors. Theory
makes speculation explicit by making various middle terms objective.
So far as I know, QM is still pretty much stuck in the speculation
phase unable to say how or why various symmetries work or don't work.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>The "calculations", as you call them, _are_ the explanations.
>
>I once had a Physics Prof announce that "In Physics meaning
>has no meaning, the only thing that matters is whether we can
>manipulate the formalisms".
The "we don't need no stinkin reasons" school of physics.
>I'm not sure what this contributes to the thread, but it's
>an interesting quote.
>
>Dark skies,
>
>tom
>
>--
>We have discovered a therapy ( NOT a cure )
>for the common cold. Play tuba for an hour.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
Unfortunately, QM doesn't explain the somehow, which is what a
mechanics is supposed to do. And I daresay there are a multitude of
formalisms that somehow don't apply for reasons QM is too busy
providing intuition pumps to supply.
Regards - Lester
Lester Zick
<now...@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>
>>
>> I think you'll find development of modern technology is largely a
>> reflection of classical mechanics with the enhancement of quantum
>> theories. I don't know many machines that inherently rely on quantum
>> ambiguity. We certainly have things like tunneling diodes that rely on
>> quantum suppositions. But those suppositions themselves are not based
>> on any mechanical understanding of the forces at work. They are just
>> suppositions that turn out to reflect poorly understood mechanisms.
>
>These suppositions which reflect poorly understood mechanisms produce
>predictions good to 15 decimal places.
When you have a constant defined to 34 decimal places, it's scarcely
remarkable that phenomena defined on a scale of 10-20 decimal places
will yield predictions good to 15 decimal places.
>Secondly, you presume the existence of mechanisms. What is your
>evidence. If a theory that does not presume so predicts so well, why
>should one think that mechanisms are required?
Well, on a practical level, even quantum theory uses mechanisms in the
form of symmetries. They just aren't very good mechanisms because no
one in quantum theory can explain why one symmetry applies and another
doesn't. That's what mechanics is supposed to be all about. And that's
what theories are when they graduate from mere speculation. Quantum
theory doesn't predict all that well either because there as vastly
more symmetries in nature of no predictive value than there are of
predictive value. So, regarding the idea of symmetry in general, one
would have to conclude that the epistemological foundation of quantum
theory is practically useless.
However, on a theoretical level, I could just as easily ask you why
you need mechanisms to ask questions about mechanisms? Same answer.
>Machanisms were the chrochett and bugbear of 19-th century physics which
>turned out to be an empricial failure in many respects.
Not nearly as big a failure as quantum theory. And the constant
forming the basis for quantum theory's predictive successes was a
product of classical mechanics.
Regards - Lester
robert j. kolker
Lester Zick wrote:
>
> Unfortunately, QM doesn't explain the somehow, which is what a
> mechanics is supposed to do.
Tell me. How does a Lagrangian formulation of mechanics explain
anything? What it does is imply some laws which when applied produce
good predictions. What makes you think there are entities behind the
appearences that behave mechanically? What evidence do you have.
Classical physics which was solidly mechanics is an empirical failure
which is why we have quantum theory and relativity. The truly mechanical
theories such as statistical mechanics are heuristics, not fundemental
models of reality. QM works. Relativity works. What more do you want?
Bob Kolker
Wolf Kirchmeir
[...]
>
> Well, on a practical level, even quantum theory uses mechanisms in the
> form of symmetries. They just aren't very good mechanisms because no
> one in quantum theory can explain why one symmetry applies and another
> doesn't.
Why should it?
That's what mechanics is supposed to be all about. And that's
> what theories are when they graduate from mere speculation. Quantum
> theory doesn't predict all that well either because there as vastly
> more symmetries in nature of no predictive value than there are of
> predictive value.
At least two notions of "symmetry" mixed up here.
So, regarding the idea of symmetry in general, one
> would have to conclude that the epistemological foundation of quantum
> theory is practically useless.
"Whenever you use "in general" you're mixing several meanings and/or
categories. The result is more or less entertaining nonsense.
> However, on a theoretical level, I could just as easily ask you why
> you need mechanisms to ask questions about mechanisms? Same answer.
>>Machanisms were the chrochett and bugbear of 19-th century physics which
>>turned out to be an empricial failure in many respects.
>
>
> Not nearly as big a failure as quantum theory. And the constant
> forming the basis for quantum theory's predictive successes was a
> product of classical mechanics.
If QM is such a failure, how come it works?
Wolf Kirchmeir
Lester want to be recognised as the one who explains the _reasons why_
everything is the way it is. But just why "mecvhanism" should be the
reasons why, he can't say; nor why the mechnaism of "differences between
doifferences" is the fundamental mechanism.
IOW, Lester can't accept that things are simply what they are, and the
best we can do is describe how things happen. IOW, he can't accept what
I call the Fundamnetal Ignorance Theorem (first expressed by Bertrand
Russell): When we know that we say is true, we don't know what it means.
When we know what mean, we don't know if it's true.
Now, I wonder how Lester will blast me for that piece of heresy. :-)
Lester Zick
<wwol...@sympatico.ca> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>[...]
>>
>> Well, on a practical level, even quantum theory uses mechanisms in the
>> form of symmetries. They just aren't very good mechanisms because no
>> one in quantum theory can explain why one symmetry applies and another
>> doesn't.
>
>Why should it?
There you go with the "why's" again, Wolf. Are you asking for cause or
history? If you want history, hit the books. If you want cause ask MN,
mother nature, who runs the show. She can probably show you
godzillions of symmetries without predictive significance.
> That's what mechanics is supposed to be all about. And that's
>> what theories are when they graduate from mere speculation. Quantum
>> theory doesn't predict all that well either because there as vastly
>> more symmetries in nature of no predictive value than there are of
>> predictive value.
>
>At least two notions of "symmetry" mixed up here.
Well, perhaps you'll enlighten us.
> So, regarding the idea of symmetry in general, one
>> would have to conclude that the epistemological foundation of quantum
>> theory is practically useless.
>
>"Whenever you use "in general" you're mixing several meanings and/or
>categories. The result is more or less entertaining nonsense.
It would be to those who ask "why" but claim no cause and effect.
>> However, on a theoretical level, I could just as easily ask you why
>> you need mechanisms to ask questions about mechanisms? Same answer.
>
>>>Machanisms were the chrochett and bugbear of 19-th century physics which
>>>turned out to be an empricial failure in many respects.
>>
>>
>> Not nearly as big a failure as quantum theory. And the constant
>> forming the basis for quantum theory's predictive successes was a
>> product of classical mechanics.
>
>If QM is such a failure, how come it works?
Why do educated guesses work? Let's just say that educated guesses
work better than uneducated guesses. Mechanics works best of all.
Regards - Lester