Purpose and Nature (was Knowledge)
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and Nature and an introduction
Some time ago I had a thread about free will
which gave way to a thread about luck which
gave way to a thread about destiny which
gave way to a thread about truth which gave
way to a thread about knowledge. The
knowledge thread has become frayed with
many loose ends and so I am started this
new thread.
I might as well start from scratch and assume
that the reader has no foundation of my
assertions regarding free will, luck, destiny,
truth and knowledge.
There are several acceptable definitions of
the word purpose. The main definition that
I shall use involves the object towards which
something exists. An associated definition
is the matter at hand or the point of issue.
The definition of the word nature that I
am using are the intrinsic characteristics
and qualities of a thing.
A simple example would be an ice cube where a basic
analysis reveals that the nature of an ice cube is
to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
drinks. A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
their drinks to cool the drink.
Please note that ice cubes to not exist simply
to cool drinks. One object for which ice cubes
are placed and found in drinks is the purpose
of cooling the drink. One matter at hand and
one point of issue regarding ice cubes in drinks
is the cooling of the drink.
Also please note that the nature of an ice cube
involves considerably more characteristics and
qualities than simply being cold. One might
reasonably assert that ice cubes are non-toxic
and that quality of the nature of ice cubes
is involved with the choice of ice cubes for
cooling drinks. That quality, however, involves
a different purpose where one has the goal of
a non-toxic cooled drink and that is not the
simplest example with regard to presenting
the definitions of purpose and nature that
shall be used in this thread.
As usual, I shall pause and check if my assumptions
and direction thus far are acceptable.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Oliver Sparrow
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) wrote:
"" Please note that ice cubes to not exist simply
"" to cool drinks.
Which will be a relief to thousands of cholera bacteria the world across,
which use ice cubes as their favoured point of entry into foreign tourists.
You reach for the 'why' of nature, assuming much about the word "why".
Why - pointing past the teeming ice cubes - is that flower red? The
biochemist speaks of anthrocyanins, the evolutionary biologist of bird
pollination and the red-biassed vision of humming birds; the physiologist
of rods and cones, the neuro physiologist of V4s and limbic association.
The economist, by contrast, worries about why cut flowers add value, and
the market gardener about unseasonable hybiscus. The interior designer
curls his toes: *Why?*. Why **RED**?
All are seeking structures which relate some point or other (why the
delicate blue table cloth is being *insulted* by these hideous, quite
hideous red flower *things*). Each will regard a completely different frame
of reference as completely satisfactory. All answer the same question.
Children ask: "Dad. Why are trees?" What they mean is: put all of this into
context. Fit trees into the broader scheme of things. "Why is Nature?" is
probably best seen as a question of this sort, and it has been asked by a
wide group of people, from cave painters to Victorian naturalists, medieval
theocrats to Jorgenson.
AIs have questions asked for them. What are (why are) dogs? Teapots?
Invoices? Aileron control surfaces? Those posing these questions see what
they are doing as creating statements of truth in a patterns which will
allow constructive linkage to be built. I wonder if the smuggled
assumptions do not create a patchwork of unrelated models (differing
answers to 'why?').
______________________________________
Oliver Sparrow
Aaron Sloman See text for reply address
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
> Date: 17 Mar 1998 06:03:10 GMT
> Organization: Prodigy Services Company 1-800-PRODIGY
>
> Purpose and Nature and an introduction
> ...
> A simple example would be an ice cube where a basic
> analysis reveals that the nature of an ice cube is
> to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
> drinks. A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> their drinks to cool the drink.
> ...
Which reminds me of the time, many years ago, in a school in Cape
Town where I was taught physics by the person who was also (I think)
responsible for religious instruction (wasted on me).
He gave us something like the following explanation of the fact that
water expands on freezing (my memories are about 50 years old, so
details may be slightly inaccurate):
1. If water did not expand on freezing, but contracted, like
everything else, then ice formed on the surface would sink.
2. So ice produced in winter on seas, lakes, rivers, etc. would sink
to the bottom and because the sun could not shine on it in summer it
would never thaw.
3. Each year more and more ice would settle, and gradually the seas,
lakes, rivers, etc. would become solid ice, and there could be no
fish for us to eat.
4. Humans would therefore all die.
5. Therefore it is necessary for water to expand on freezing to keep
us alive.
QED
Sometimes, when I think back to some of the teachers I encountered
in my childhood I wonder at how my brain survived their
incompetence.
Maybe it didn't.
Aaron
====
--
Aaron Sloman, ( http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/ )
School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
EMAIL A.Sloman at cs.bham.ac . uk
Phone: +44-121-414-4775 (Sec 3711) Fax: +44-121-414-4281
Lewis Jorgenson
oh...@chatham.demon.co.uk wrote in part:
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) wrote:
Jorgenson:
"" Please note that ice cubes do not exist simply to cool drinks.
Sparrow:
Which will be a relief to thousands of cholera bacteria the world across,
which use ice cubes as their favoured point of entry into foreign
tourists.
You reach for the 'why' of nature, assuming much about the word "why".
<snip>
I wonder if the smuggled assumptions do not create a patchwork
of unrelated models (differing answers to 'why?').
Jorgenson:
My face should be red for having the audacity to make public
assertions regarding Purpose and Nature as if I had some
superior insight regarding answers to an underlying Why.
My comments are worth every penny or farthing or sou or
mark or fen or cent that you must pay for this data and I
will triple your money back if you are not completely
satisfied and do not reach intellectual nirvana.
Mr. Sparrow is correct and yet his approach was to explode
Nature into a zillion pieces and then locate individual
pieces of Purpose in the rubble each associated with
different Whys.
I am attempting to perform non-destructive analysis of
Purpose and Nature hence the limited definitions and
limited examples that I offered. The light at the
end of this tunnel appears to be wisdom or understanding;
both of which are also intimately related to the smuggled
assumptions that create a patchwork of unrelated models
or differing answers to 'why?'.
I am certainly traveling where quite a few persons have
gone before and yet this is my personal journey with my
personal encounters and my personal learning and my
personal discoveries set forth as I am able to describe
the journey. Once again:
>There are several acceptable definitions of the word purpose.
>The main definition that I shall use involves the object
>towards which something exists. An associated definition
>is the matter at hand or the point of issue.
>The definition of the word nature that I am using are the
>intrinsic characteristics and qualities of a thing.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Aaron....@cs.bham.ac.nospam wrote in part:
>LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
> Purpose and Nature and an introduction
Sloman:
Which reminds me of the time, many years ago,
<snip>
5. Therefore it is necessary for water to expand on freezing to keep
us alive.
QED
Sometimes, when I think back to some of the teachers I encountered
in my childhood I wonder at how my brain survived their
incompetence. Maybe it didn't.
Jorgenson:
Mr. Sloman, in his own manner, echoes the concern of Mr. Sparrow
that a discussion of Purpose and Nature shall fail due to
the incalculable, random, uncountable, diverse 'whys' that folks
can present.
I disagree. Purpose and Nature can be recognized and specified
for many things certainly within the limited definitions that
I have chosen. The discovery of steroisomers where apparently
identical chemicals did not show identical effects upon human
physiology involved knowledge being obtained where the known
purpose was not achieved due to hidden differences in the
nature of the chemical. The chemical substance had the
identical chemical formulas and reacted identically to
most if not all chemical reagent analysis. However, the
mirror structure of some structures was noticed by the
human locks that that chemical key was supposed to fit.
A philosophical discussion of Purpose and Nature appears
to be entirely appropriate to address the stumbling blocks
of AI research. Plus I am having fun.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and Nature and what
Now that we have our tools, namely Purpose
and Nature, we can choose what thing to apply
those tools upon.
The chose of thing is paramount and may require
trial and error. It seems reasonable then that
a good first thing to try our tools upon is
the thing called trial and error.
The purpose of trial and error is to complete
some task at hand. The nature of trial and error
involves persistence and serendipity and logic and
memory. This is just a trial and I may be in
error where I have left out some salient components
of trial and error. Feel free to point out additional
points.
It appears that the only stumbling block for computers
performing trial and error is serendipity. Computers
have impressive persistence and logic and memory
capabilities. Current computers lack the capacity
to deal with novel sorts of inputs for which their
logic has not been prepared. The human system is
constantly bombarded with novel sorts of inputs
from day one and deals with such inputs by ignoring
inputs, by changing or bypassing existing logic, by
translating the novel input into recognizable input,
and/or by moving the input into subconscious processing,
and basically finding some means to avoid halting.
The chosen means shall depend upon the nature of
the novel input and the demands placed upon the
system.
Humans exist with serendipity constantly where our
thoughts are fresh and new at every moment. This
arrangement is undoubtably related to the constant
input of data from our bodies where there are
various combinations of sensations originating from
our head to our toes including internal sensations
which are usually never presented to our conscious
mind. Indeed some folks have posited internal
societies such as id or ego or vision or digestion
entities that persist subconsciously and act as
the framework of mind.
The Helen Keller story indicates that the ability
to associate relies upon creating mechanisms to
address serendipity. The discovery of the power
of naming to name inputs and thus remove their
novelty is one important means of handling novel
inputs.
I recall watching a young child closely examining a
bug crawling on a fire hydrant. Adults need not
closely examine a bug crawling on a fire hydrant
lacking some advanced task at hand as the purpose
and nature of that situation is already understood.
It has been asserted that knowledge can be
communicated while wisdom cannot. This would
seem to indicate that trial and error produces
extra results not found by being spoon fed a
conclusion. Some of the attempted 'logics' of
various trials reveal information regarding purpose
and nature that is not apparent in a conclusion.
Anyone who has taken calculus develops a feel
for appropriate approaches of solution where
the logic of failed attempts has not been
remembered fully as it was a failed logic and
yet the insight has remained.
It feels like I tried to present too much at once
and I shall pause here.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
> Lewis Jorgenson writes:
>
> > A simple example would be an ice cube where a basic
> > analysis reveals that the nature of an ice cube is
> > to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
> > drinks. A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> > their drinks to cool the drink.
So would you say that knowing the scenario and purpose and
nature and intentions of ice cubes will certainly help with
our "artificial understanding" of their intensions in
natural language sentences ?
Aaron Sloman wrote:
> 5. Therefore it is necessary for water to
> expand on freezing to keep us alive. QED
>
> Sometimes, when I think back to some of the teachers
> I encountered in my childhood I wonder at how my
> brain survived their incompetence. Maybe it didn't.
I cannot parse your particular level of irony, Aaron, but I
believe your teacher's proof is valid wisdom :))
It's all in the point of view ... but then what else do we
have?
Seth
See "Bozo's Conjecture" at
http://www.clickshop.com/ai/conjecture.htm
And then on to the AI Jump List ...
David Longley
In article <6els7d$l6k$1...@soapbox.cs.bham.ac.uk>
Aaron....@cs.bham.ac.nospam
"Aaron Sloman See text for reply address" writes:
> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>
> > Date: 17 Mar 1998 06:03:10 GMT
> > Organization: Prodigy Services Company 1-800-PRODIGY
> >
> > Purpose and Nature and an introduction
>
> > ...
>
> > A simple example would be an ice cube where a basic
> > analysis reveals that the nature of an ice cube is
> > to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
> > drinks. A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> > their drinks to cool the drink.
>
> > ...
>
> Which reminds me of the time, many years ago, in a school in Cape
> Town where I was taught physics by the person who was also (I think)
> responsible for religious instruction (wasted on me).
>
> He gave us something like the following explanation of the fact that
> water expands on freezing (my memories are about 50 years old, so
> details may be slightly inaccurate):
>
> 1. If water did not expand on freezing, but contracted, like
> everything else, then ice formed on the surface would sink.
>
> 2. So ice produced in winter on seas, lakes, rivers, etc. would sink
> to the bottom and because the sun could not shine on it in summer it
> would never thaw.
>
> 3. Each year more and more ice would settle, and gradually the seas,
> lakes, rivers, etc. would become solid ice, and there could be no
> fish for us to eat.
>
> 4. Humans would therefore all die.
>
> 5. Therefore it is necessary for water to expand on freezing to keep
> us alive.
>
> QED
>
> Sometimes, when I think back to some of the teachers I encountered
> in my childhood I wonder at how my brain survived their
> incompetence.
>
> Maybe it didn't.
>
> Aaron
> ====
Of course, *now* you know that the all all sorts of problems
arise when we use intensional notions such as property,
subjuntunctive conditionals and modal operators ;-).
David Longley (check end reply line #)
Longley Consulting London, UK
Behaviour Assessment & Profiling Technology,
Research, Data Analysis and Training Services,
Small IT Systems http://www.longley.demon.co.uk
David Longley
Of course, *now* you know that all sorts of inferential problems
arise when we use non-truth functional or non quantifiable
intensional idioms such as properties, subjunctive conditionals
and modal operators ;-).
David Longley (check end reply line #)
Longley Consulting London, UK
Behaviour Assessment & Profiling Technology,
Research, Data Analysis and Training Services,
Small IT Systems http://www.longley.demon.co.uk
>
>
--
Lewis Jorgenson
I'd skip this one if I were you as there is no use
in both of us wasting our time.
Purpose and Nature and trial and error
I previously noted that the nature of the thing called trial and
error involved persistence, serendipity, logic and memory.
I observed that humans thrive upon serendipity while computers do
not. Humans can ignore data at will and humans can recognize data
as a matter of serendipity. Newton's apple served as a
concrete substantiation of some approaches that he had been
considering regarding force and mass. He assumed a formula could
be written and wrote it trying various relationships and inverse
relationships and squaring and cubing until he arrived at an
equation that adequately modeled the situation.
So I assume a formula can be written representing trial and
error and by trial and error I shall cobble together that
formula testing it against what is found.
TE = P+S+L+M is a bare bones starting point.
Some folks do not like infinity and so I shall arbitrarily denote
the range of each variable as being from 0 to 1
TE were 0 indicates no solutions and 1 indicates the TE has been
solved. We run into problems here as there are many ways to skin a
cat.
P were 0 indicates no trials are performed and 1 indicates all
possible trials are performed.
S were 0 indicates no luck and 1 indicates luck.
L were 0 indicate no clues and 1 indicates knowledge
M were 0 indicates no memory and 1 indicates complete memory
Now we can examine the various values of the variables and adjust
the formula.
Case 1:
If one has the memory of the proper result then one does not need
persistence or serendipity or logic where M=1 and so
TE = M
Case 2:
An attempt to solve something without any logic.
It may be obvious to some that sadly I have no logic
and so L=0. We arrive at
TE = P+S+M
It makes sense that one would need good persistence and good luck
and a good memory to succeed without logic.
Case 1:
A persistence value of 1 does not ensure success unless one has
logic and memory to adjust attempts and not repeat the
same attempt over and over and over. So P cannot equal 1 except
when permitted to do so by L and M or if serendipitiously
there was only one solution where S=1.
Perhaps TE = (S+L+M)/P or something like that.
I give up.
The unplanned result of this post explored the nature of formulas
who's purpose is to model something and if the formula
for trial and error had been easier I would have presented
the entire formulation. However, the actual formula
held that it would require more persistence and more logic
than I am prepared to expend. I also hold logic that
tells me that such a formula is silly and thus not worth
the expenditure of more persistence and logic.
I told you to skip this one.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
seth...@clickshop.com wrote:
> Lewis Jorgenson writes:
>
> > A simple example would be an ice cube where a basic
> > analysis reveals that the nature of an ice cube is
> > to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
> > drinks. A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> > their drinks to cool the drink.
Seth:
So would you say that knowing the scenario and purpose and
nature and intentions of ice cubes will certainly help with
our "artificial understanding" of their intensions in
natural language sentences ?
Jorgenson:
I gave a specific definition of purpose and have no
desire to confuse purpose and intent here. My approach
emphasizes 'use' rather than 'intent' where a specific
action acts towards a specific goal regardless of opinion.
The task at hand shall determine the approach and thus
the level of inquiry regarding purpose and nature of
the topics of inquiry. Ice sculptors and skating rink
operators and passenger ship operators and frost free
freezer manufacturers and Eskimos and airplane pilots and
such will emphasize or ignore certain aspects of the
purpose and nature of ice with regard to those specific
scenarios. The statement "We have ice." shall carry very
different meanings and implications in the above examples
that any artificial understanding computer would have to
grasp in context.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Da...@longley.demon.co.uk wrote in part:
Longley:
Of course, *now* you know that all sorts of inferential problems
arise when we use non-truth functional or non quantifiable
intensional idioms such as properties, subjunctive conditionals
and modal operators ;-).
Jorgenson:
I agree totally and suggest that everyone agree to stop using
natural language immediately. In honor of Mr. Longley I shall
let him go first and when he ceases to use non-truth functional
or non-quantifiable intensional idioms then so shall I.
Humanity awaits your leadership Mr. Longley.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and Nature and Scotch
The unusual and unexpected visits of those
distinguished Messrs Sparrow and Sloman to the
inauguration of this thread went to my head
and I must immediately rectify the situation.
Yowzah!
The crux of my approach is my choice of definitions
for purpose and nature. Those were:
>There are several acceptable definitions of
>the word purpose. The main definition that
>I shall use involves the object towards which
>something exists. An associated definition
>is the matter at hand or the point of issue.
>The definition of the word nature that I
>am using are the intrinsic characteristics
>and qualities of a thing.
It appears that I must repeat and emphasize my
observation that all research discussions must
relate to a certain task at hand or the participants
will talk past each other due to a lack of proper focus.
I applied the tools of purpose and nature to trial
and error and got two posts. The first was ok
and the second was an error. The first post revealed
that serendipity appears to be a key factor missing
from the capabilities of computers to achieve intelligence.
I shall now examine serendipity using purpose and nature
despite doing so previously in an informal fashion.
The purpose of serendipity is to provide the entity
with data (actual data or logical insight say regarding
relationships or such) that permits problem resolution.
The nature of serendipity involves active browsing
and/or active data retrieval where context is not a
necessary variable.
The retrieval of data without regard to context is
one stumbling block for computers to experience
serendipity. As noted previously, informally, computers
are unable to deal with novel inputs, that is, inputs
without a context.
The active retrieval of data is denied to most computers
where they are spoon fed data and/or only provided
access to data in context and keep that data in
strictly controlled contextual memory areas.
My next post might address the purpose and nature
of managing inputs that lack a context or active
data retrieval mechanisms.
I will note that back in my heavy drinking days I
was convinced that the purpose of ice cubes was to
dilute and ruin otherwise perfect scotch whiskey.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
David Longley
In article <6eov91$5aci$1...@newssvr04-int.news.prodigy.com>
LSV...@prodigy.com "Lewis Jorgenson" writes:
There's a time and a place for most things. Natural language is
neither rich enough nor reliable enough for science - hence the
characteristic languages "chemistry", "neurology", "physics",
"Statistics" etc etc. There's no need to look to me for teh lead:
'We think of a science as comprising those truths which are
expressible in terms of 'and', 'not', quantifiers, variables,
and certain predicates appropriate to the science in
question....To specify a science, within the described mold,
we still have to say what the predicates are to be, and what
the domain of objects is to be over which the variables of
quantification range.'
W.V.O. Quine (1954)
The Scope and Language of Science
The Ways of Paradox and other essays p.242
'Ultimately the objects referred to in a theory are to be
accounted not as the things named by the singular terms, but
as the values of the variables of quantification.'
W.V.O. Quine (1953,1961)
Reference and Modality
From a Logical Point of View p.144-145
'Beginning with a single sense of belief...let us think of
this at first as a relation between the believer and a
certain intension, named by the 'that-clause. Intensions are
creatures of darkness, and I shall rejoice with the reader
when they are exorcised...
......we can clap on a hard and fast rule against quantifying
into propositional-attitude idioms..'
W.V.O. Quine (1956)
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes
The Ways of Paradox and other essays p.188-189
In my view, much of what passes as "discussion" in the area of AI and
Cognitive Science, is just muddle. And it's a muddle through failure
to appreciate what can and can not be reliably discussed/researched.
Lewis Jorgenson
Da...@longley.demon.co.uk wrote:
Longley:
There's a time and a place for most things.
Jorgenson:
A time to Reap. A time to Sow. A time to Faugh.
A time to Doe.
Longley:
Natural language is neither rich enough nor reliable enough for
science - hence the characteristic languages "chemistry",
"neurology", "physics", "Statistics" etc etc.
Jorgenson:
Oops. Those are not languages as none of them have their
own semantics and syntax apart of the Natural Language in
which those topical areas are discussed. At best one
could say they have their own vocabularies that can and
do become part of the general vocabulary.
Longley:
There's no need to look to me for the lead:
Jorgenson:
Good. I am let off the hook.
Quiney (1954):
'We think of a science as comprising those truths which are
expressible in terms of 'and', 'not', quantifiers, variables,
and certain predicates appropriate to the science in
question....To specify a science, within the described mold,
we still have to say what the predicates are to be, and what
the domain of objects is to be over which the variables of
quantification range.'
Jorgenson:
Right. Using natural language "we still have to SAY" things
announcing our choices of data. One cannot jump in and
present that E=mc**2 without some accompanying discussion.
Quinetessence 1953,1961:
'Ultimately the objects referred to in a theory are to be
accounted not as the things named by the singular terms, but
as the values of the variables of quantification.'
Jorgenson:
Here Qunie and Lognley step away from reality where a thing
named is not a thing named and only exists as the values
of the variables of quantification. Qeuin throws his
quantification rope in the air, climbs up it and pulls
it up after him. KEWL!
Crying 1956:
'Beginning with a single sense of belief...let us think of
this at first as a relation between the believer and a
certain intension, named by the 'that-clause. Intensions are
creatures of darkness, and I shall rejoice with the reader
when they are exorcised...
......we can clap on a hard and fast rule against quantifying
into propositional-attitude idioms..'
Jorgenson:
Amen. It looks to me that intensions are exercised
out in the light of day all the time and only appear
as inner demons to Kwine and Longway.
Longlee:
In my view, much of what passes as "discussion" in the area of
AI and Cognitive Science, is just muddle. And it's a muddle
through failure to appreciate what can and can not be reliably
discussed/researched.
Jorgenson:
Horace Greeley once suggested that the youth who were
unsatisfied with the muddle should "Go West, young man!"
I think Longknee should "Go Quantify then" and come back
with the proof of your pudding to silence our 'muddled
discussion'. The history of naysayers is perfectly
clear and your chicken little warning about the
cognitive sky falling in due to the use of intension idioms
is at odds with reality.
Pseudo-David:
The cognitive sky is falling! The cognitive sky is falling!
Stop using intension idioms! Quantify! Quantify! Seek
behavioral documentation! The cognitive sky is falling!
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
David Longley
In article <6erf2v$43dg$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>
LSV...@prodigy.com "Lewis Jorgenson" writes:
>
> Jorgenson:
> Horace Greeley once suggested that the youth who were
> unsatisfied with the muddle should "Go West, young man!"
> I think Longknee should "Go Quantify then" and come back
> with the proof of your pudding to silence our 'muddled
> discussion'. The history of naysayers is perfectly
> clear and your chicken little warning about the
> cognitive sky falling in due to the use of intension idioms
> is at odds with reality.
>
> Pseudo-David:
> The cognitive sky is falling! The cognitive sky is falling!
> Stop using intension idioms! Quantify! Quantify! Seek
> behavioral documentation! The cognitive sky is falling!
>
> Lewis Vance Jorgenson
>
outlined at:
www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm
Why don't you (and genuinely interested others) take a long look,
and carefully read the other papers supporting the work outlined
and reviewed there?
I suspect it's because it's all far too much hard work..and what
all most people really want from newsgroups is just entertaining
"brain-candy".
Micheal VanPelt
>
> Purpose and Nature and Scotch
Scotch? oh ewwwwwwwwww
Purpose, Nature, and Kentucky Bourbon
>
> The crux of my approach is my choice of definitions
> for purpose and nature. Those were:
>
> >There are several acceptable definitions of
> >the word purpose. The main definition that
> >I shall use involves the object towards which
> >something exists.
Thus, things exist-with/got/have a purpose?
How do you know this?
> >The definition of the word nature that I
> >am using are the intrinsic characteristics
> >and qualities of a thing.
.. and so you begin by assuming that all things
have intrinsic characteristics and/or qualities.
Again, I must ask how you know this?
> The retrieval of data without regard to context is
> one stumbling block for computers to experience
> serendipity. As noted previously, informally, computers
> are unable to deal with novel inputs, that is, inputs
> without a context.
As a former mainframe tech, let me postulate that inputs
to a computer are simply mere input .. neither novel
nor otherwise, for the machine cannot/does not/will
not "care" (in the sense of feeling something towards)
about the input. Zum Beispiel - my little desktop receives
all kinds, types, and forms of input. How is it possible
that any of that is novel? Seems to me it's nothing
but mere stimuli without context. If we are in search
of some intelligence here, then I must suggest that
the state of my computer is similar to that of a
profoundly retarded newborn .. the input is there,
the stimuli pass over, thus all that stimuli are
either each and every one completely new and
different (and thus "novel") or they pass over
uninterpreted, thus unknown, and thus neither
novel nor familiar just stimuli.
For something to be "novel," it would seem that there
must be a context within with a stimulus can be given
a value within some other context: I experience the
50' condor outside my window as utterly other, out-
side the normative context of my world. Thus, one can
suppose that such is novel. On the other hand, the rain
that falls on my window is never novel, because it has
been a constant (though not continuous) part of my con-
text since earliest days. On the gripping hand, if I am
unable to construct or provide a context, then neither the
rain nor the condor have any possibility of meaning. Thus,
there is no question of novelty, only existence, and that
unrecognized and un-weighed.
> I will note that back in my heavy drinking days I
> was convinced that the purpose of ice cubes was to
> dilute and ruin otherwise perfect scotch whiskey.
ruining perfect scotch whiskey .. three oxymorons at once!
The winner and new champeen!!!!!
--
Have a good day.
http://us005330.home.mindspring.com
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Your keyboard has been towed.
Micheal VanPelt
> Natural language is neither rich enough nor reliable enough for
> science - hence the characteristic languages "chemistry",
> "neurology", "physics", "Statistics" etc etc.
>
> Jorgenson:
> Oops. Those are not languages as none of them have their
> own semantics and syntax apart of the Natural Language in
> which those topical areas are discussed. At best one
> could say they have their own vocabularies that can and
> do become part of the general vocabulary.
beg to disagree with you (just because I'm that sort of person).
each of these studies has its own semantic and syntax apart
from "natural" (whatever the hell that means) language. There
are things that can be stated in physics or statistics
which have no meaning or whose meaning is self-contradictory,
that is, cannot be properly "said."
Thus, that "a probability is 250% (or 2.50)" can be stated, but
has no meaning, for it violates the principles (and thus the
semantics) of that particular "language."
In an entirely different context, however (say politics), the
same "probability is 250%" can be stated and has some kind of
nebulous meaning for that context alone.
Micheal VanPelt
> > > to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
> > > drinks.
Excuze me, but I'm truly confused here (it's old age, don't
worry) - is it that ice has a desire to be cold? or is it that
water wishes to become cold so that it can be ice? Is the
purpose in the water, in the ice, or in the cube? Or perhaps
the nature is that of an object to have form?
> > > A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> > > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> > > their drinks to cool the drink.
Aha! The purpose or the nature is not OF the thing in
itself, the purpose or the nature is GIVEN the thing
by the human-person within a certain context; i.e., one
ought never to put ice in beer (well, in some beers).
Or have I misunderstood?
Lewis Jorgenson
In Knowledge of Iced Booze (yuck!)
drm...@mindspring.com wrote:
Jorgenson:
> > > A basic analysis reveals that the nature of an
> > > ice cube is to be cold and one purpose of an
> > > ice cube is to cool drinks.
Dr. Mikey:
Excuze me, but I'm truly confused here (it's old age, don't
worry) - is it that ice has a desire to be cold? or is it that
water wishes to become cold so that it can be ice? Is the
purpose in the water, in the ice, or in the cube? Or perhaps
the nature is that of an object to have form?
Jorgenson:
Oops. I clearly announced it was a basic analysis and you
are trying include everything including the kitchen sink.
No wonder you are confused.
> > > A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> > > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> > > their drinks to cool the drink.
Dr. Mikey:
Aha! The purpose or the nature is not OF the thing in
itself, the purpose or the nature is GIVEN the thing
by the human-person within a certain context; i.e., one
ought never to put ice in beer (well, in some beers).
Or have I misunderstood?
Jorgenson:
I presented a simple, limited description and did
not attempt to present the ultimate, infinite,
description of the purpose and nature of ice
cubes. I am suggesting that for research and
discussion it is advantageous to select a simple,
limited, specific topic of inquiry in terms of
select purpose and nature.
If the task at hand is to cool a drink then
knowing one tiny, itsy-bitsy natural property
of an ice cube to be cold can lead one to
use that coldness towards the purpose of
cooling the drink. Ice cubes do exist and
they can put in drinks such that ice cubes
exist in drinks with the purpose of cooling
the drink.
Control your imagination for a few seconds
and grasp the simplicity of my suggestion.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
drm...@mindspring.com wrote:
> Longley:
> Natural language is neither rich enough nor reliable enough for
> science - hence the characteristic languages "chemistry",
> "neurology", "physics", "Statistics" etc etc.
>
> Jorgenson:
> Oops. Those are not languages as none of them have their
> own semantics and syntax apart of the Natural Language in
> which those topical areas are discussed. At best one
> could say they have their own vocabularies that can and
> do become part of the general vocabulary.
Dr. Mikey:
beg to disagree with you (just because I'm that sort of person).
each of these studies has its own semantic and syntax apart
from "natural" (whatever the hell that means) language. There
are things that can be stated in physics or statistics
which have no meaning or whose meaning is self-contradictory,
that is, cannot be properly "said."
Jorgenson:
Baloney. The use of a language in different contexts does
not constitute a separate language. Do you speak Baseball
at a baseball game and Football at a football game and speak
Physics in the physics lab? No, you speak English and
use the vocabulary and terms and usage appropriate for
that context. Baseball and Statistics are simply not
separate languages by simple observation. Now mathematics
is arguably a separate language except I see no nomenclature
in that 'language' that connects it to reality.
Dr. Mikey:
Thus, that "a probability is 250% (or 2.50)" can be stated, but
has no meaning, for it violates the principles (and thus the
semantics) of that particular "language."
Jorgenson:
Baloney. Say something in Statistics that is distinct from
the English Language and then talk about something in
Statistics without using the English Language.
Dr. Mikey:
In an entirely different context, however (say politics), the
same "probability is 250%" can be stated and has some kind of
nebulous meaning for that context alone.
Jorgenson:
Your suggestion that there exists a different language for
every distinct context is ludicrous and ignores the
concept of vocabulary where individual terms may be different
to account for distinct contexts. Certainly semantics
involves recognizing the context to assure the proper
assignment of a vocabulary term within one language.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
In [1] Purpose, Nature, Knowledge.
drm...@mindspring.com wrote in part:
Jorgenson:
> The crux of my approach is my choice of definitions
> for purpose and nature. Those were:
>
> >There are several acceptable definitions of
> >the word purpose. The main definition that
> >I shall use involves the object towards which
> >something exists.
Dr. Mikey:
Thus, things exist-with/got/have a purpose?
How do you know this?
Jorgenson:
I'm sorry. Does your question exist and have a purpose?
What are you talking about?
> >The definition of the word nature that I
> >am using are the intrinsic characteristics
> >and qualities of a thing.
Dr. Mikey:
.. and so you begin by assuming that all things
have intrinsic characteristics and/or qualities.
Again, I must ask how you know this?
Jorgenson:
How do 'you' discern one thing from another thing?
What are you babbling about?
> The retrieval of data without regard to context is
> one stumbling block for computers to experience
> serendipity. As noted previously, informally, computers
> are unable to deal with novel inputs, that is, inputs
> without a context.
Dr. Mikey:
As a former mainframe tech, let me postulate that inputs
to a computer are simply mere input .. neither novel
nor otherwise, for the machine cannot/does not/will
not "care" (in the sense of feeling something towards)
about the input. Zum Beispiel - my little desktop receives
all kinds, types, and forms of input. How is it possible
that any of that is novel? Seems to me it's nothing
but mere stimuli without context. If we are in search
of some intelligence here, then I must suggest that
the state of my computer is similar to that of a
profoundly retarded newborn .. the input is there,
the stimuli pass over, thus all that stimuli are
either each and every one completely new and
different (and thus "novel") or they pass over
uninterpreted, thus unknown, and thus neither
novel nor familiar just stimuli.
Jorgenson:
Ok I guess. How about creating mechanisms that
elevate your computer from being a profoundly
retarded newborn into a normal newborn or an adult?
That is what I was groping towards.
Dr. Mikey:
For something to be "novel," it would seem that there
must be a context within with a stimulus can be given
a value within some other context: I experience the
50' condor outside my window as utterly other, out-
side the normative context of my world. Thus, one can
suppose that such is novel. On the other hand, the rain
that falls on my window is never novel, because it has
been a constant (though not continuous) part of my con-
text since earliest days. On the gripping hand, if I am
unable to construct or provide a context, then neither the
rain nor the condor have any possibility of meaning. Thus,
there is no question of novelty, only existence, and that
unrecognized and un-weighed.
Jorgenson:
You lost me. Please provide me with a single example
of an input for which a human is unable to construct or
provide a context. At the very minimum the human
could note the date and time and place that some
non-contextual input was encountered otherwise the
encounter took place in a dream and the context is
a dream.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Da...@longley.demon.co.uk wrote in part:
Longley:
I keep encouraging folk to read, and contribute to, the material
outlined at:
www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm
Why don't you (and genuinely interested others) take a long look,
and carefully read the other papers supporting the work outlined
and reviewed there?
I suspect it's because it's all far too much hard work..and what
all most people really want from newsgroups is just entertaining
"brain-candy".
Jorgenson:
Hi David. How are you doing? I already have read through
your fragments most of the way. I used to download them
when you posted 20 or 30 pages at a time before you learned
that was not proper netiquette.
I have already agreed that actuarial recording and processing
of data is a good and necessary approach and you are correct.
With regard to brain-candy you are also correct. Instead of
becoming a statistical psychologist and spending my time in
that worthwhile endeavor as you suggest; I shall remain
plugged into c.a.p reading and writing 'brain-candy'.
With regard to your fragments, I used to reply line by
line or paragraph by paragraph to those thoughtful
documents and you have no desire to honestly discuss
them. That is why you fail to provide summaries for
folks and fail to acknowledge the flaws of your approach.
I do not wish to browbeat you yet again into retreating
from my thread and if you have a creative perspective
regarding frag.html then I would be pleased to see your
contribution.
You are telling me that I am wasting my time. Now I
shall inform you that you are wasting my time and scoot!
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
David Longley wrote:
> There's a time and a place for most things. Natural language is
> neither rich enough nor reliable enough for science - hence the
> characteristic languages "chemistry", "neurology", "physics",
> "Statistics" etc etc. There's no need to look to me for teh lead:
Each technical field has its own natural language with its own jargon. Many
tech fields also have formal languages as well. If you do not appreciate the
richness and expressiveness of natural language for your communication needs,
then by all means have a go at not using it.
> W.V.O. Quine (1954)
> 'We think of a science as comprising those truths which are
> expressible in terms of 'and', 'not', quantifiers, variables,
> and certain predicates appropriate to the science in
> question....To specify a science, within the described mold,
> we still have to say what the predicates are to be, and what
> the domain of objects is to be over which the variables of
> quantification range.'
Yes, but all means speak clearly. The more precise you want your audience to
understand you the more precise you should code your meanings in your
communication. So what?
> W.V.O. Quine (1953,1961)
> 'Ultimately the objects referred to in a theory are to be
> accounted not as the things named by the singular terms, but
> as the values of the variables of quantification.'
There are many ways to point to things such that matching meaning from author to
qualified audience is sufficiently precise. The style an author chooses should
be appropriate to the task. Being obsessed with such things as the use of
"singular terms" or using only "values of variables of quantification" is to
miss the whole point of the nature of natural language communication and is
contra productive. These considerations are valid but should be factored into
the correct place in our communication channel logic.
> W.V.O. Quine (1956)
> 'Beginning with a single sense of belief...let us think of
> this at first as a relation between the believer and a
> certain intension, named by the 'that-clause. Intensions are
> creatures of darkness, and I shall rejoice with the reader
> when they are exorcised...
> ......we can clap on a hard and fast rule against quantifying
> into propositional-attitude idioms..'
Sir Quine, go rejoice with another reader - not this one. I have no intention
of exorcising my intensions. So please put those dark thoughts where the sun
won't be shining on them.
> David Longley
> In my view, much of what passes as "discussion" in the area of AI and
> Cognitive Science, is just muddle. And it's a muddle through failure
> to appreciate what can and can not be reliably discussed/researched.
Reliable discussion entails responding directly to the author's intended
intensions as best one can parse them. Failures can happen at any point in the
channel. I seem to remember a number of direct questions asked of you which
were never answered directly. Did you misunderstand the questions? If so, why
did you not ask for clarification? Reliable discussion is a two way street
requiring the integrity of all participants as well as a shared purpose of
determining the true nature of the topic at hand.
David Longley
In article <35116E43...@clickshop.com>
seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
>
> Reliable discussion entails responding directly to the author's intended
> intensions as best one can parse them. Failures can happen at any point
> in the channel. I seem to remember a number of direct questions asked of
> you which were never answered directly. Did you misunderstand the questions?
> If so, why did you not ask for clarification? Reliable discussion is a two
> way street requiring the integrity of all participants as well as a shared
> purpose of determining the true nature of the topic at hand.
>
Has it occured to you that people often (most often probably) do
not bother checking whether they have "understood" correctly.
In general, the consequences of failure of quantification are not
obvious. In science they are - hence the value of such languages
in my view.
Seth Russell
David Longley wrote:
> In article <35116E43...@clickshop.com>
> seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
> >
> > Reliable discussion entails responding directly to the author's intended
> > intensions as best one can parse them. Failures can happen at any point
> > in the channel. I seem to remember a number of direct questions asked of
> > you which were never answered directly. Did you misunderstand the questions?
>
> > If so, why did you not ask for clarification? Reliable discussion is a two
> > way street requiring the integrity of all participants as well as a shared
> > purpose of determining the true nature of the topic at hand.
> >
>
> Has it occured to you that people often (most often probably) do
> not bother checking whether they have "understood" correctly.
> In general, the consequences of failure of quantification are not
> obvious. In science they are - hence the value of such languages
> in my view.
Yes it has occurred to me, which is why I included the requirement of "integrity
of all participants" as a prerequisite of reliable discussion. One can and
should check not only whether one has understood, but also whether one has been
understood. For example: I can determine that you have not acknowledged
understanding of the thrust of my meanings by the way you have responded.
Now, if I am to assume that you have integrity and share the common purpose of
determining the true nature of the topic at hand, I must remain miffed*. Which
has always been the case where we have discussed topics in the past (:-(
*
http://work.ucsd.edu:5141/cgi-bin/http_webster?method=exact&isindex=Muffed&db=web1913
(however I prefer my spelling)
David Longley
In article <3511AB70...@clickshop.com>
seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
> David Longley wrote:
>
> > In article <35116E43...@clickshop.com>
> > seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
> > >
> > > Reliable discussion entails responding directly to the author's intended
> > > intensions as best one can parse them. Failures can happen at any point
> > > in the channel. I seem to remember a number of direct questions asked of
> > > you which were never answered directly. Did you misunderstand the questions?> >
> > > If so, why did you not ask for clarification? Reliable discussion is a two
> > > way street requiring the integrity of all participants as well as a shared
> > > purpose of determining the true nature of the topic at hand.
> > >
> >
> > Has it occured to you that people often (most often probably) do
> > not bother checking whether they have "understood" correctly.
> > In general, the consequences of failure of quantification are not
> > obvious. In science they are - hence the value of such languages
> > in my view.
>
> Yes it has occurred to me, which is why I included the requirement of "integrity
> of all participants" as a prerequisite of reliable discussion. One can and
> should check not only whether one has understood, but also whether one has been
> understood. For example: I can determine that you have not acknowledged
> understanding of the thrust of my meanings by the way you have responded.
> Now, if I am to assume that you have integrity and share the common purpose of
> determining the true nature of the topic at hand, I must remain miffed*. Which
> has always been the case where we have discussed topics in the past (:-(
>
But *I* don't believe we *have* discussed much. *I* don't think
you understand much of what I have posted at all. I reckon you
(like so many others) keep translating it into what you already
find familiar rather than re-thinking, reading and learning. The
latter requires you to do some of the work that I had to do.
Bill Taylor
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
|> Dr. Mikey:
|> Excuze me, but I'm truly confused here (it's old age, don't
|> worry) - is it that ice has a desire to be cold?
True. That's the material cause.
|> or is it that
|> water wishes to become cold so that it can be ice?
Yes, and that's the final cause!
|> purpose in the water, in the ice, or in the cube?
In the cube! That's the formal cause.
|> > > > A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
|> > > > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
|> > > > their drinks to cool the drink.
Aha! The efficient cause! I knew we'd get to that...
|> Jorgenson:
|> I presented a simple, limited description and did
|> not attempt to present the ultimate, infinite, description
That was your chief mistake, Jorgo. You shoulda gone straight for the big one!
|> I am suggesting that for research and
|> discussion it is advantageous to select a simple,
|> limited, specific topic of inquiry
No no no no no. That's just not how we do things around here.
|> Ice cubes do exist
That was before El Nino.
|> they can put in drinks such that ice cubes
|> exist in drinks with the purpose of cooling the drink.
Sounds cool.
|> Control your imagination for a few seconds
|> and grasp the simplicity of my suggestion.
If only it had been too simple to tell us about...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Luke: you don't know the power of the dark side of the farce.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
David Longley
In article <6erpdt$2ig2$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>
LSV...@prodigy.com "Lewis Jorgenson" writes:
>
> With regard to your fragments, I used to reply line by
> line or paragraph by paragraph to those thoughtful
> documents and you have no desire to honestly discuss
> them. That is why you fail to provide summaries for
> folks and fail to acknowledge the flaws of your approach.
>
> I do not wish to browbeat you yet again into retreating
> from my thread and if you have a creative perspective
> regarding frag.html then I would be pleased to see your
> contribution.
If you have any line by line questions apropos directly quoted
material, I'll be pleased to clarify (if indeed I can).
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and active retrieval
The purpose and nature of trial and error
analysis could include another aspect in
the nature of trial and error namely attempts.
The purpose and nature of serendipity analysis
led me to announce that:
>My next post might address the purpose and nature
>of managing inputs that lack a context or active
>data retrieval mechanisms.
I thus have two reasons to investigate the
purpose and nature of active data retrieval.
As a information science graduate and reference
librarian and database searcher I now know how
other folks must feel when I present glib, short
statements encompassing their field of knowledge.
I will try to perform the same level of service
or disservice in this topic area.
The purpose of active data retrieval is obtain
more data to resolve a problem. The nature of
active data retrieval involves recognizing saliency
combined with physical actions to approach sources
of data.
The technology currently exists to permit computers
to use physical actions to approach sources of data.
Currently computers can be equipped with any analog
to digital transducer. Computers can use microscopes,
telescopes, x-ray, infrared detectors, ocr readers,
and/or be connected to devices that view anything that
can be viewed. Computers can be provided the technology
to measure anything that can be measured. Computers
can hear anything that can be heard. The physical
activity required to approach sources is not
a difficulty for computers just as they have
infinite persistence and memory and fine logic.
The purpose and nature of physical actions is
beyond the current range of this discussion as
is the purpose and nature of sources of data.
The purpose of recognizing saliency is to obtain
the necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
problem. The nature of recognizing saliency is
a jigsaw puzzle type of affair where the pieces
of various puzzles have been mixed together.
A piece could be a duplicate of a piece already
set in place and so it is irrelevant as redundant.
A piece from a different puzzle is irrelevant.
A piece could be from a different area of
the puzzle that one is not currently working
on and so it will be ignored as irrelevant
or considered salient if one recalls that
they know where that piece fits.
Given a complete theory or the cover of the
box containing the picture, then any piece
can be chosen, compared to the cover and
placed in the correct position. Some
folks group pieces by color or texture
or even use the underlying shape of the
piece such as extra large knobs and
extra large knob holes to match pieces.
I think I will re-approach that last paragraph
by stating that recognizing salience involves
a focus upon limited and specific aspects of
the problem and locating data that addresses
those limited and specific aspects. If,
however, one encounters obvious data that
fits the overall problem or another limited
and specific aspect then that data is also
considered salient. Data encountered can
allow changes in emphasis of the limited
and specific aspects and of their interactions.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
JES
On 17 Mar 1998 17:12:25 GMT, LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson)
wrote:
>
>A philosophical discussion of Purpose and Nature appears
>to be entirely appropriate to address the stumbling blocks
>of AI research. Plus I am having fun.
>
It raises the obvious question of what the purpose of buidilng
an "autonomous" AI might be.
Here's an idea -- perhaps the lack of purpose in doing such a
thing is part of what makes it unlikely. I can think of many things
which are not physically impossible, but are exceedingly unlikely to
happen for lack of any good reason to make them happen. In fact, it
would seem that we have little real ability to explain what exists (as
opposed to what could but does not exist) w/o reference to purpose.
JES
JES
>> Sometimes, when I think back to some of the teachers
>> I encountered in my childhood I wonder at how my
>> brain survived their incompetence. Maybe it didn't.
>
If only all your teachers had all been superadvanced AIs instead of
mere humans, imagine whwere you might be today.
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> > > A simple example would be an ice cube where a basic
> > > analysis reveals that the nature of an ice cube is
> > > to be cold and one purpose of an ice cube is to cool
> > > drinks. A knowledge of that nature and that purpose
> > > leads individuals to reasonably put ice cubes in
> > > their drinks to cool the drink.
>
> Seth:
> So would you say that knowing the scenario and purpose and
>
> nature and intentions of ice cubes will certainly help
> with
> our "artificial understanding" of their intensions in
> natural language sentences ?
>
> Jorgenson:
> I gave a specific definition of purpose and have no
> desire to confuse purpose and intent here. My approach
> emphasizes 'use' rather than 'intent' where a specific
> action acts towards a specific goal regardless of opinion.
Well yes, when inanimate objects are concerned, thinking of
them as having "intent" is certainly confusing. So, I
agree, that the "use" of the object relative to the minds
that are communicating about it, is far more tangible of a
thing to talk about. But when discussing actions of
another intelligent agent (especially with that agent),
knowing the intent of that agent is almost indispensable to
understanding the context of its utterances. I believe it
was Dennett that first pointed that out so that I could
understand it. Anyway, I can't distinguish between the
word "intent" and the word "purpose" in this regard. Can
you?
On another topic under this topic ... I wonder if I might
lay on your couch a moment, Doctor. My question is have I
been muffed or cuffed by the venerated Longley? Should I
be miffed or tiffed? Why does he ignore my interlinear with
him and Quine, then come to you and ask for interlinear?
... not that I am jealous or anything. I must confess I
have a theory ... may i share it with you Doctor? ... now
it's just you and me here, right? ... total confidence,
right? ... you would not tell a soul, right? I think
Longley is a chaterbot ... an somewhat sophisticated
automatic responder that does not parse very well. It's the
only way i can grok its behavior ... ya know ... nobody home
upstairs .... Crazy huh?
Lewis Jorgenson
Seth Russell <seth...@clickshop.com> wrote:
> Jorgenson:
> I gave a specific definition of purpose and have no
> desire to confuse purpose and intent here. My approach
> emphasizes 'use' rather than 'intent' where a specific
> action acts towards a specific goal regardless of opinion.
Seth:
Well yes, when inanimate objects are concerned, thinking of
them as having "intent" is certainly confusing. So, I
agree, that the "use" of the object relative to the minds
that are communicating about it, is far more tangible of a
thing to talk about. But when discussing actions of
another intelligent agent (especially with that agent),
knowing the intent of that agent is almost indispensable to
understanding the context of its utterances. I believe it
was Dennett that first pointed that out so that I could
understand it. Anyway, I can't distinguish between the
word "intent" and the word "purpose" in this regard. Can
you?
Jorgenson:
The ice cube is cold, cold, cold. The drink is warmer, warmer,
warmer. That is the nature of ice cubes and drinks. The
difference in temperature causes heat to flow from the drink
to the ice cube. That is the nature of temperature differences
lacking insulation. My intent is to have a cool drink and
the purpose of the ice cubes to attain that goal for me.
I have intent and I have provided a use for the nature of
ice cubes and the nature of drinks and the nature of the
laws of heat transfer.
The ice cube has no choice in the matter at hand as to
whether or not to cool the drink. It has no intent.
It has been assigned a purpose for being in the drink
and other rational beings can determine and share an
understanding of the purpose of the ice cubes in the
drink. Similarly an agent has no choice in the matter
except to act according to its limited nature. Dennett is
brain-candy to use Longley's expression and folks
will soon discover that Denet has no nutritional value.
I can choose whether I want a cooler drink or not as
a matter of intent. My intent need not have any purpose
whatsoever and indeed uncovering intentions is a
difficult matter.
Seth:
On another topic under this topic ... I wonder if I might
lay on your couch a moment, Doctor. My question is have I
been muffed or cuffed by the venerated Longley? Should I
be miffed or tiffed? Why does he ignore my interlinear with
him and Quine, then come to you and ask for interlinear?
Jorgenson:
My note made clear that he also ignored my interlinear
and if I were to respond to his request for interlinear
I would respond "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me
twice, shame on me". He has no desire to discuss the
matter. His correct yet limited approach is his message.
Seth:
... not that I am jealous or anything. I must confess I
have a theory ... may i share it with you Doctor? ... now
it's just you and me here, right? ... total confidence,
right? ... you would not tell a soul, right? I think
Longley is a chaterbot ... an somewhat sophisticated
automatic responder that does not parse very well. It's the
only way i can grok its behavior ... ya know ... nobody home
upstairs .... Crazy huh?
Jorgenson:
I do not care what color your skin is, Seth or what gender
you hold or if you are silicon or carbon based or if you
are mentally fit or mentally unstable or mentally out there
somewhere. Mr. Longley is no way as near as obsessed or
controlled or unaccessible as some actual humans I have
known and I do not question his sanity. His reasonableness
or rather his unreasonableness is a matter of fact and
probably not a matter of machine design.
Gruffness is taught to some folks as an attribute of
intelligence with an illusion of superiority. I use it
sometimes generally when I think the questioner did
not think too hard before announcing what they thought.
Ask Longley if he is a computer and see what he says.
I do not think computers can lie if you ask them the
right question properly.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
gm...@incom.net (JES) wrote:
JES:
It raises the obvious question of what the purpose of buidilng
an "autonomous" AI might be.
Jorgenson:
How about something that can think for us and does not need
sleep or vacations or raises or a parking place? Something
that can think up new things that we may not have thought of
otherwise? Just as we can trust with our lives a bridge
designed by an engineer, so too shall we (and we now do)
trust our lives to output of a computer designed by hardware
and software engineers.
JES:
In fact, it would seem that we have little real ability to explain
what exists (as opposed to what could but does not exist)
w/o reference to purpose.
Jorgenson:
Actually, the words explain, articulate, expound, explicate,
interpret and construe are all verbs which mean to make
the nature or meaning of something clear. Certainly one
can make descriptions about things that exist without
mentioning purpose with regard to the properties or
the things. There are an infinite number of such descriptions
regarding any thing. There are a much less number of
reasonable statements that include a reference to purpose.
Descriptions w/o reference to purpose--infinite
Descriptions with reference to purpose--finite
(if we are reasonable)
I am using the word 'exist' in reference to specific
situations such as the matter at hand or the point of issue
rather than the word 'exist' with reference to some
philosophical definition of existence. My use of the
word demands reference to a purpose and nature.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Jason Wortham
In article <6ev5ll$1i4c$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
LSV...@prodigy.com says...
*Jorgenson:
*How about something that can think for us and does not need
*sleep or vacations or raises or a parking place? Something
*that can think up new things that we may not have thought of
*otherwise? Just as we can trust with our lives a bridge
*designed by an engineer, so too shall we (and we now do)
*trust our lives to output of a computer designed by hardware
*and software engineers.
Handing down responsibility means handing down power. Especially when it
is something that we would like to do the thinking for us. Deciding not
to think is a lot like giving away faith.
We want machines which are smart, so they can enhance our own thinking.
Not so smart that they lose us or "stop making sense". We do not want
them to be stupider than us, because that's not good enough.
AI is perhaps our final thought to finish thinking. Then as humans we
are done. It's back to watching TV and building a much larger
entertainment industry to satisfy the more idiosynchratic human desires.
After all, thinking is basically about laziness. Work to end work, and
thought to end thought.
But I feel the purpose to create AI. Mainly it's just that something in
my brain tells me that it's fascinating. It certainly is twisted.
*Jorgenson:
*Actually, the words explain, articulate, expound, explicate,
*interpret and construe are all verbs which mean to make
*the nature or meaning of something clear. Certainly one
*can make descriptions about things that exist without
*mentioning purpose with regard to the properties or
*the things. There are an infinite number of such descriptions
*regarding any thing. There are a much less number of
*reasonable statements that include a reference to purpose.
I can completely comprehend a mathematical proof given to me, but until I
ask "why?" it has no meaning to me.
*Descriptions w/o reference to purpose--infinite
*Descriptions with reference to purpose--finite
* (if we are reasonable)
Why? :)
Perhaps this would explain why I would often observe a professor
continuously elaborating to a confused student about a rather simple
concept, making the description larger and larger (while the student only
gets successively more confused) and I will eventually sum it up to the
student in a brief phrase which explains why, and suddenly the more
'finite' description becomes understood.
Thinking is about taking big thoughts and making them small thoughts.
Not the other way around. It's maybe somewhat about data compression.
David Longley
In article <3512F91B...@clickshop.com>
seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
>
> On another topic under this topic ... I wonder if I might
> lay on your couch a moment, Doctor. My question is have I
> been muffed or cuffed by the venerated Longley? Should I
> be miffed or tiffed? Why does he ignore my interlinear with
> him and Quine, then come to you and ask for interlinear?
> have a theory ... may i share it with you Doctor? ... now
> it's just you and me here, right? ... total confidence,
> right? ... you would not tell a soul, right? I think
> Longley is a chaterbot ... an somewhat sophisticated
> automatic responder that does not parse very well. It's the
> only way i can grok its behavior ... ya know ... nobody home
> upstairs .... Crazy huh?
Because little diatribes such as the above strongly suggest to me
that your questions are rhetorical if not nefarious. Why should I
spend time trying to answer your questions when it is quite clear
that they arise through either not carefully reading what I have
already writtem and referenced?
Are newsgroups supposed to be just elaborate chatlines?
Ken Ewell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote in message
<6eu1au$h9q$2...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>...
>Purpose and nature and active retrieval
>
>The purpose and nature of trial and error
>snipped...>
>As a information science graduate and reference
>librarian and database searcher I now know how
>other folks must feel when I present glib, short
>statements encompassing their field of knowledge.
>I will try to perform the same level of service
>or disservice in this topic area.
>
Ken:
Lewis, I have only been listening until now - I even
excused that one abrupt rant you asked us not to
read.
I would not expect the topic of data-retrieval to be
off-topic for an information science graduate. What
do you do at information science school?
>The purpose of active data retrieval is obtain
>more data to resolve a problem. The nature of
>active data retrieval involves recognizing saliency
>combined with physical actions to approach sources
>of data.
>
Ken:
I do so like the term saliency for this purpose of what
object might we find ourselves motivated to so-strive.
>The technology currently exists to permit computers
>to use physical actions to approach sources of data.
>Currently computers can be equipped with any analog
>to digital transducer. Computers can use microscopes,
>telescopes, x-ray, infrared detectors, ocr readers,
>and/or be connected to devices that view anything that
>can be viewed. Computers can be provided the technology
>to measure anything that can be measured. Computers
>can hear anything that can be heard. The physical
>activity required to approach sources is not
>a difficulty for computers just as they have
>infinite persistence and memory and fine logic.
>The purpose and nature of physical actions is
>beyond the current range of this discussion as
>is the purpose and nature of sources of data.
>
Ken:
Well-stated and so-waived.
>The purpose of recognizing saliency is to obtain
>the necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
>problem. The nature of recognizing saliency is
>a jigsaw puzzle type of affair where the pieces
>of various puzzles have been mixed together.
Ken:
No Lewis. Here is where your mind may have
been filled with information science clutter cause
there is no puzzle to the nature of the recognition
of saliency. That is the point. It is only salient if
it is plain and clear if it is not a puzzle. It has to
stand out to be called salient.
So that makes this:
>A piece could be a duplicate of a piece already
>set in place and so it is irrelevant as redundant.
meaningless.
This also:
>A piece from a different puzzle is irrelevant.
>A piece could be from a different area of
>the puzzle that one is not currently working
>on and so it will be ignored as irrelevant
>or considered salient if one recalls that
>they know where that piece fits.
Ken:
Salience is not something that takes any
consideration. That is the nature of salience and
as its purpose is to be satisfied, regardless of
what people say, it will be prominent, sticking out
or otherwise well-marked off. You see. It is or
it is not salient. Get it. If it is not a protrusion or
mark, readily noticeable all by its self --it is not
salient.
<<snip>>
Lews:
>I think I will re-approach that last paragraph
>by stating that recognizing salience involves
>a focus upon limited and specific aspects of
>the problem and locating data that addresses
>those limited and specific aspects.
Ken:
I am glad you re-approached that last paragraph
but I advise that you should go back again and try
yet another approach. You are still quite confused.
Recognizing salience implies having already focused
in a field of 'data' and found the protrusion in question.
If what you found does not stick out all by itself, then
it is a pretty sure bet that it is not salient to the field of
vision or focus. The fact that you would find something
salient that does appear, in all other respects, to be
salient, would be cause for consideration, and probably
examination, by competent professionals with white
coats.
>If,
>however, one encounters obvious data that
>fits the overall problem or another limited
>and specific aspect then that data is also
>considered salient. Data encountered can
>allow changes in emphasis of the limited
>and specific aspects and of their interactions.
>
Ken:
Lewis, Dear Lewis --I fear some salience has
penetrated your noggin.
You may be interacting with your data too much
because it is beginning to ooze from your orifices.
If anyone can relate oozing to protruding than that
might become salient.
Ken Ewell
Ken Ewell
JES wrote in message <3512ed34...@news.incom.net>...
>On 17 Mar 1998 17:12:25 GMT, LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson)
>wrote:
>
>
>>
>>A philosophical discussion of Purpose and Nature appears
>>to be entirely appropriate to address the stumbling blocks
>>of AI research. Plus I am having fun.
>>
>
> It raises the obvious question of what the purpose of buidilng
>an "autonomous" AI might be.
>
> Here's an idea -- perhaps the lack of purpose in doing such a
>thing is part of what makes it unlikely. I can think of many things
>which are not physically impossible, but are exceedingly unlikely to
>happen for lack of any good reason to make them happen.
Lewis, I hope you do not mind me replying to JES in your thread.
JES, The benefits and reason for 'autonomy' should stand with question
or farther explanation. I think you are confused about purpose because
you seem to imply that purpose need reason when purpose needs no
reason at all. Purpose gets it power directly from nature and desire.
>In fact, it
>would seem that we have little real ability to explain what exists (as
>opposed to what could but does not exist) w/o reference to purpose.
We have every ability to explain what exists they are called faculty,
intelligence and knowledge production, and language. Each and all
these abilities may be accessed without regard as to purpose.
For example: I have no desire to explain to anyone that purpose is
driven by one's own desire not by any rational or reason, but I just
did.
Ken Ewell
Seth Russell
David Longley wrote:
> In article <3512F91B...@clickshop.com>
> seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
> [In private analysis with Dr Jorgenson] ***********
David, you are intruding on my private psychoanalysis with
Dr Jorgensen - please respect my privacy.
However, If you will answer direct questions about your
stance, I will be gland to provide a list of unanswered
non-rhetorical questions - you might start with the one
refereed to below*. Almost always when I place a question
mark on the page it is a request for the reader's
response. I tend to value question marks and use them with
care - though the good doctor thinks I use them too
frequently. This little "diatribe" is a attempt to
communication as are all of my posts - it is an attempt to
transmit ideas to other minds and to learn new ideas and to
correct misconceptions. Sometimes, when one approach does
not work and always gets the same result ... one tries more
creative approaches ... this was one of them.
Also, please note, I am only interested in substantive
adult/adult discussion about topics that are of mutual
interest where the assumed purpose is to arrive at a better
understanding of the topics at hand. I will be ignoring any
further authoritative or parent/child communications as I
believe they have no place in professional dialogue. If you
detect that my questions are too far beneath comprehension
of the intricate maze that is inside your head, then if you
ignore my posts, you will find that I will also ignore yours
and any problems will disappear.
* Unanswered question (challenge)
http://search.dejanews.com/dnquery.xp?QRY=Glasser+AND++Intensional+Contexts+are+Non+Computable
David Longley
In article <35145A89...@clickshop.com>
seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
>
> David, you are intruding on my private psychoanalysis with
> Dr Jorgensen - please respect my privacy.
You evidently have a problem with the use of the terms "private"
and "public" too <g>. Put simply, newsgroup postings are public,
and e-mail postings are (relatively) private. More generally
still ;-)
'While "the skin IS an anatomical definition of a space,"
it is not the "boundary" Skinner uses in the distinction
between public and private. By "private" he does not
mean "events within the organism" that are accessible
to "the individual himself", but events within the
organism that are not, or are very inadequately,
accessible to the "reinforcing community".'
Skinner
'Behaviourism at Fifty'
Behaviorism and Phenomenology (1966)
'In analysing traditional psychological terms, we need
to know their stimulus conditions ("finding the
referent"), and why each response is controlled by that
condition. Consistent reinforcement of verbal responses
in the presence of stimuli presupposes stimuli acting
upon both the speaker and the reinforcing community, but
subjective terms, which apparently are responses to
private stimuli, lack this characteristic. Private
stimuli are physical, but we cannot account for these
verbal responses by pointing to controlling stimuli,
and we have not shown how verbal communities can
establish and maintain the necessary consistency of
reinforcement contingencies.
Verbal responses to private stimuli may be maintained
through appropriate reinforcement based on public
accompaniments, or through reinforcements accorded
responses made to public stimuli, with private cases
then occurring by generalisation. These contingencies
help us understand why private terms have never
formed a stable and uniform vocabulary: It is impossible
to establish rigorous vocabularies of private stimuli
for public use, because differential reinforcement
cannot be made contingent upon the property of privacy.
The language of private events is anchored in the
public practices of the verbal community, which make
individuals aware only by differentially reinforcing
their verbal responses with respect to their own bodies.
The treatment of verbal behavior in terms of such
functional relations between verbal responses and
stimuli provides a radical behaviorist alternative to
the operationism of methodological behaviorists.
B. F. SKINNER
The Operational analysis of psychological terms.
BBS (1984),7 547-81
(originally 1945 psych. rev 32: 270-77,291-94).
'A similar division of control between internal and
external stimuli appears to operate in the domain of
attitude statements. Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957)
theorize that a pattern of internal responses elicited
by a word or an object comprises the connotative or
'emotional' meaning of the stimulus for an individual,
including his attitude towards it. Using the Semantic
Differential technique, these investigators report that
an individual's verbal descriptions of these
hypothesized internal responses can be factor analysed
into a very small number of factors, factors which
appear to have extensive cross-cultural generality as
well (Osgood et al. 1957). These findings, too, are
consistent with the view that an individual is unable to
make more than a small number of independent
discriminations among stimuli that have never been
publicly available to a socializing community, and it is
suggested that the many subtle discriminations which
individuals do make when describing their attitudes are
based, rather, on the kinds of cues that are potentially
available to an outside observer. In particular, it is
suggested that self-descriptive attitude statements can
be based on the individual's observations of his own
overt behavior and the external stimulus conditions
under which it occurs. A number of recent experimental
studies provide support for this proposition.'
Daryl Bem (1967)
Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of
Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena
Psych rev. 74, 1967, 188-200.
<g>.....
David Longley
Not that it really matters - but the author was Sloman....
Lewis Jorgenson
mit...@readware.com wrote in part:
Jorgenson:
>As a information science graduate and reference
>librarian and database searcher I now know how
>other folks must feel when I present glib, short
>statements encompassing their field of knowledge.
>I will try to perform the same level of service
>or disservice in this topic area.
>
Ken:
I would not expect the topic of data-retrieval to be
off-topic for an information science graduate. What
do you do at information science school?
Jorgenson:
You are correct that data-retrieval is on-topic for
information science. I apologize if I did not
make my intent clear. I had hope to state
that I am creating short summaries and my words
were in that context.
>The purpose of recognizing saliency is to obtain
>the necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
>problem. The nature of recognizing saliency is
>a jigsaw puzzle type of affair where the pieces
>of various puzzles have been mixed together.
Ken:
No Lewis. Here is where your mind may have
been filled with information science clutter cause
there is no puzzle to the nature of the recognition
of saliency. That is the point. It is only salient if
it is plain and clear if it is not a puzzle. It has to
stand out to be called salient.
Jorgenson:
You are mistaken. Saliency depends upon the puzzle that
is to be solved and the approach that is being used.
Blood type is not salient to academic achievement and
blood type has been found to be salient for tissue
transplants procedures. Certainly one must have a blood
type to have academic achievement or tissue transplants.
Perhaps you have confused saliency with saliently.
The former is a relevant highlight while the latter
is an unavoidably discernable highlight.
A theory and/or the nature of the data causes emphasis to
be placed upon certain data than upon other data. See
the blood type example for clarity.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
jawo...@bigfoot.com wrote:
Jorgenson:
*Descriptions w/o reference to purpose--infinite
*Descriptions with reference to purpose--finite
* (if we are reasonable)
Wortham:
Why? :)
Jorgenson:
My response to your why shall require an explanation.
To show there is nothing up my sleeve, I shall
let you choose the object or event to be described.
You and I have never met before and I do not know you.
There has been no collusion and I have no idea what
topic you shall present.
Wortham:
Thinking is about taking big thoughts and making them small thoughts.
Not the other way around. It's maybe somewhat about data compression.
Jorgenson:
Oh? I am not sure I follow you. Could you condense your
meaning even further so that I might follow you?
There is considerable difference between limiting and
compressing though both are reductions kinda sorta.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
> Seth:
> > David, you are intruding on my private psychoanalysis with
> > Dr Jorgensen - please respect my privacy.
David:
> You evidently have a problem with the use of the terms "private"
> and "public" too <g>. Put simply, newsgroup postings are public,
> and e-mail postings are (relatively) private. More generally
> still ;-)
> Skinner:
> 'While "the skin IS an anatomical definition of a space,"
> it is not the "boundary" Skinner uses in the distinction
> between public and private. By "private" he does not
> mean "events within the organism" that are accessible
> to "the individual himself", but events within the
> organism that are not, or are very inadequately,
> accessible to the "reinforcing community".'
Seth:
Good day Mr Skinner ... it's getting a little crowded on the couch ...
scoot over David. So you say I keep private what cannot be accessed
from outside. But can't we just agree to give each other privacy ...
we could follow a rule not to affect each other in certain ways at
certain times. So there are you and I, and David, and of course the
Doctor ... maybe we could make a rule to keep Quine out ... I don't
like his guttural Latin. Our privacy, our rules, so our skin ends
with just us four. ((shhh there be a fallacy ... but if no one breaks
the rule, it will go away)) We could shape (define) our own skin and
the privacy inside it by a consensus of shared purpose.
So, Mr Skinner ... gotta ask a question ... Why is David mute ... why
do you guys always talk for him ... how did you constrain him to think
or talk only in your words? Not that I don't like you words ... it's
just that now David has to use your words in response to our words;
and what happens is that is seems like David doesn't understand our
words because your words aren't really responses to our words but
responses to other people's words spoken maybe 50 years ago who are
certainly not on the couch with us today. Lately it seems that David
has gone to sleep upstairs and left his computer throwing your words
at us and they never seem to answer our questions but do answer other
questions in other rooms. There is a case in point above. David
wanted to talk about my lack of privacy in this news group and the
best he could find was where you were talking about defining the
inside and outside of your test subjects. Now, I know you don't know
about our news group, and I know sometimes I get a bit confused as the
good Doctor will attest, but take my word it's not the same thing.
Now I have a theory: There is a serious transference pathology
involved here ... David thinks he needs your authority: the lever of
the power of your name.
Watch, I'll show you ....
David, so you've found some serious problems with quantifying in
natural language, why can't these problems be overcome so that we can
use natural language to retrieve answers from vast databases of
knowledge? And if they can be overcome, How?
<g>....
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Privacy is not an issue, since we all share a web of beliefs in which
the intersections are more or less correspondent. Maybe my green is
different from yours, but where I see it is probably where you are
going to see whatever you have ascertained as green within your own
web of belief, just as tables and chairs and circles and squares,
etc. etc.
I have blasted this whole privacy issue to smithereens. Even
Skinner realized he didn't have a leg to stand on, at
least in his later years. Why else do you suppose he had to fall
back to an undischarged homunculus argument, which mysteriously
surfaced after Ryle brought it up. Here is a summary of my
argument against the privacy argument, as well as my solution
for solving _the_real_problem_ assocated with introspection. I
have also included Mark Line's critique of my views on a
reliable introspective methodology and my
rejoinder to that critique:
**************************************************************
Is a Science of
the Mind Possible? A Critique of Empirical Methodology,
Synopsis: The
belief that mental events are unsuitable as data because they
can't be empirically (i.e., publicly) observed is rendered vacuous
by the realization that many observations and experiments in the
physical sciences are conducted by isolated individuals working
in total privacy. Verification is obviously more a manifestation
of a collective faith in inter-subjective reproducibility
(facilitated by the intra-taxonomic order heretofore apparent in
natural kinds) than a matter of public demonstration. As such,
there would seem
little reason in principle for treating first hand introspective
observations of mental events as methodologically inferior to
so-called empirical observations of physical events, so long as
they can pass the muster of reproducibility. Ah! But there's the
rub.
Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans
there is a considerable amount of individualization, no doubt
resulting from nature's increased reliance on imagination and
judgement (reasoning). But since this is an order problem rather
than a privacy problem, the solution is, not to banish introspection,
but to differentiate (stratify)
between the more evolved individualized features (specific reasoning,
specific higher emotional behavior, etc.) and the more mechanical,
isomorphic processes lower in the evolutionary scheme of things
(perception, fear, anger, etc.). Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram
I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying
corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to
those features (both thought and behavior) where
individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram
II). For example, individualized conclusions for why one selected
product A over product B could not serve as a data base, whereas
feelings of anger, worthlessness, etc. (enduring structures)
could.
Quote:
I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by
an uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications of
my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward demeanour.
Experience (with intra-taxonomic order throughout the rest of
nature), therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an
intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in
myself, or a different one; By supposing the link to be of the
same nature (see my diagrams)....I conform to
the legitimate rules of experimental enquiry (John Stuart Mill).
Diagram I
Phylogeny of Psychical Function
Organic Kingdom
Cognitive Functions (phylum) Conative Functions (phylum)
Reasoning (class) Higher Emotion (class)
(homo sapiens) (homo sapiens)
Categorical and causal assoc- Self-worth (ego) related need and
iations employing individual disorder(depression, suicide, etc
imagination and judgement. serving no obvious biological
Highly individualized. purpose. Specific objectives and
behavior highly individualized and
frequently involved with abstract
notions(love, honor, purpose, etc).
Conditioning (class) Lower Emotion (class)
Contiguity associations. Some Short term motivational states
degree of individualization (fear, anger, sexual arousal, etc)
resulting from variations in serving obvious biological purpose.
environmental experience. Non-volitional psychical states
evoked by singular relatively well
^ more evolved functions ^ defined events (stimuli), with
^ more individualization ^ some degree of individualization
v less evolved functions v superimposed on stereotyped
v less individualization v evoking events and responses.
(more isomorphism)
Perception (class) Pain and Pleasure (class)
Stereo-typical associations Short term stereotypd motivational
of stable low level states resulting from biologically
information significant tactile experience.
^ observed functions (introspection) ^
v inferred functions v
Instinctive Functions (phylum)
Likely progenator of cognitive and conative functions found in the
human psyche. Highest probability of psychical isomorphism inferred
from isomorphic behavior within classifications of lower animals.
Inorganic Kingdom
Postulated pan-psychism as proto-mental origin of observed
functions. Extreme isomorphism likely and inferred from
isomorphic behavior within classifications of inorganic matter.
Diagram II
The Domains of Credibility
pertaining to the kinematics
(thought and behavior)
of systems at the holistic
level of description
^
^ | n
more evolved | o
functions c | n
(individual- r | c
ization) e | r
physical events d | e psychical events
less evolved (behavior) i | d (thought)
functions b | i
(isomorphism) l | b
v e | l
v | e
IIa. Behaviorist/Positivist Conception
highest degrees of generalization in descriptions
statements, theories, etc. about member of a class
^
^ least credible (gradient)
more evolved - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
functions
(individual- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ization) physical events psychical events
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
less evolved (behavior) (thought)
functions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(isomorphism)
v - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
v most credible (gradient)
highest degrees of specificity in descriptions
statements, theories, etc. about members of a class
IIb. Revised Conception
--
**********************************************************************
Mark P. Line wrote:
>
> I doubt there's a physical scientist alive on the planet who thinks that
> 150# teenager necessarily exhibit more individual variation than 1000#
> rocks. That's a lot more than 6 people.
>
As employed in my paper, individualization refers to an _entropy_ in
lateral order in systems which exhibit organized complexity and are
laterally ordered at the holistic level of description. Since rocks are a
classification which exhibits lateral noise at this level, they may exhibit
lots of variation but they can't, by definition, exhibit individuality.
Nor would most scientist in the language community I hang out in be likely
to use that term to refer to their rocks. 'Individuality'
is most commonly (but not exclusively) associated with living organisms
which exhibit some degree of personality, e.g., teenagers.
Here we go round in circles. (Billy Preston)
> > > > > How about the individualization among spiral galaxies?
> > > >
> > > > In these particular cases, the correct term is not individual-
> > > > ization, but lateral noise (lateral order = taxonomic order, vertical =
> > > > dynamic order). Individualization refers to lateral variation
> > > > superimposed on an underlying isomorphism.
> > >
> > > And how is it that you _know_ that this does not obtain for spiral
> > > galaxies?
> > >
I don't. Its just that living organisms and their products
are the only systems I am aware of which appear to violate the
second law of thermodynamics at the macroscopic level. As such,
I merely assume that classifications of inanimate objects, e.g.,
rocks, weather systems, galaxies, etc., exhibit lateral noise
and therefore can not, by my definition, exhibit individuality.
Variation yes, individuality, no.
>
> > > But your methodology presupposes that you have already
> > > objectively observed the mind,
> >
> > No, introspectively observed the mind, restricting my scientific claims
> > to only those features it is reasonable to suppose we have in common.
>
> Then let me rephrase my comment:
>
> Your methodology is supposed to provide the means to employ
> intersubjective reproducibility in introspectively observing the mind.
> But your methodology presupposes that you have _already_ introspectively
> observed the mind.
>
Its actually based on a wide range of considerations, but I believe
I have expressed it about as succinctly as possible in my synopsis.
Once again:
Is a Science of
the Mind Possible? A Critique of Empirical Methodology,
Synopsis: ......
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Feelings of Worthlessness and So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476
David Longley
In article <35154A...@ix.netcom.com>
Yes it is, and there's no way round it...
Re-read the extracts from Skinner and Bem.
-
Daryl Bem (1967)
Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of
Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena
Psych rev. 74, 1967, 188-200.
-
and Skinner (1945,84)
-
While "the skin IS an anatomical definition of a space,"
it is not the "boundary" Skinner uses in the distinction
between public and private. By "private" he does not
mean "events within the organism" that are accessible
to "the individual himself", but events within the
organism that are not, or are very inadequately,
accessible to the "reinforcing community".
-
Skinner
'Behaviourism at Fifty'
Behaviorism and Phenomenology (1966)
-
'In analysing traditional psychological terms, we need
to know their stimulus conditions ("finding the
referent"), and why each response is controlled by that
condition. Consistent reinforcement of verbal responses
in the presence of stimuli presupposes stimuli acting
upon both the speaker and the reinforcing community, but
subjective terms, which apparently are responses to
private stimuli, lack this characteristic. Private
stimuli are physical, but we cannot account for these
verbal responses by pointing to controlling stimuli,
and we have not shown how verbal communities can
establish and maintain the necessary consistency of
reinforcement contingencies.
-
Verbal responses to private stimuli may be maintained
through appropriate reinforcement based on public
accompaniments, or through reinforcements accorded
responses made to public stimuli, with private cases
then occurring by generalisation. These contingencies
help us understand why private terms have never
formed a stable and uniform vocabulary: It is impossible
to establish rigorous vocabularies of private stimuli
for public use, because differential reinforcement
cannot be made contingent upon the property of privacy.
The language of private events is anchored in the
public practices of the verbal community, which make
individuals aware only by differentially reinforcing
their verbal responses with respect to their own bodies.
The treatment of verbal behavior in terms of such
functional relations between verbal responses and
stimuli provides a radical behaviorist alternative to
the operationism of methodological behaviorists.
-
B. F. SKINNER
The Operational analysis of psychological terms.
BBS (1984),7 547-81
(originally 1945 psych. rev 32: 270-77,291-94).
The problem is the lack of access of the reinforcing or
corroborating community to subjective experience. This has
nothing to do with doing science in isolation. In the latter
circumstances the *external* observations and terms are still
available to the reading or hearing public.
After all that has been said about the problems of quantification
in, it's clear that S.R has understood very little of the merits
of direct quotation over indirect discourse.
My advice is to stay off they keyboard for a while, and do some
disciplined reading.
Ken Ewell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote in message
<6f38v3$e8u$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>...
>mit...@readware.com wrote in part:
Ken:
Some approach to data collection is necessary to solve
any problem for which sufficient data exists.
Approach does not come from a vacuum it derives from
the combination of purpose and intelligence. If either
is missing the 'approach' is nullified or wasteful.
Where is the missing purpose of deriving this fact.
The fact derived from the presumed investigation into
purpose and nature and the resulting information
presented by Lewis:
>Certainly one must have a blood type to have
>academic achievement or tissue transplants.
For academic achievement one's blood type is not
salient at all --any old type will do. For tissue transfer
it is salient. What is puzzleing about that?
I have trouble trying to imagine a purpose for which it
would be significant, i.e., salient, to know that one must
have a blood type to have academic achievement _or_ a
tissue transplant that has anyhting whatsoever to do with
that achievement. In what imaginable situation would
one find themselevs with a necessity to know their, or a,
blood type for acadmeic achievement.
In this case imagination is more important that knowledge.
Name one reasonable situation where acadamic
achievement has salience to tissue transplants AND
where blood type would be under contention.
Choose another example if you have one.
I charge that you cannot and suggest that you
might re-examine your assumptions and re-think
your approach.
Lewis:
>Perhaps you have confused saliency with saliently.
>The former is a relevant highlight while the latter
>is an unavoidably discernable highlight.
Ken:
Any saliently informative topic has saliency. I find
what you have said on this topic has little or no
salience. Anything being deemed salient is either
verified as unavoidably discernable or it is not salient.
That last sentence is full of salience while blood
type has no salience whatsoever to academic
achievement. I am not confusing anything.
You are trying to create a puzzzle where none exist.
That! I would call confusing. You are attempting to
create a puzzle by saying that two fields that have
little or nothing to do with one another would find a
salient point of contention between them when, in
fact, the situation is highly improbable.
To enumerate further:
The two fields at hand are academic achievement
and tissue transplants.
The potetnially salient point you raise to promanence
(blood type) by assigning the property or condition of
being a point, thus giving it 'salience,' is prima facia and
in fact, not salient to both fields at once. Even a
cursory analysis may expose this information.
Lewis:
>A theory and/or the nature of the data causes emphasis to
>be placed upon certain data than upon other data.
Ken:
Yes, but it is no mystery and no puzzle. Natural causes are
preferable to theoretcial ones. Either will do. There are
salient (aka apparent) reasons to include or exclude data
from any analysis. If not, you study everything until you
spot salience, otherwise you will have no result at all. If
you mix up things that do not go togehther you have a lot
of work ahead of you just sorting them out later.
Lewis:
>See the blood type example for clarity.
Ken:
The blood type example shows how scientists should be
taken to task for awarding salience to something that can
be easily shown not to be salient at all.
Ken Ewell
>
Seth Russell
David Longley wrote:
> The problem is the lack of access of the reinforcing
> or corroborating community to subjective experience.
What may be our problem is the fact that we have not defined any
problem. My use of the word "private" was to setup the rules of a
game of therapy. Your use and Skinner's use is to analyze "treatment
of verbal behavior". My problem is understanding your insistence of
parsing in Skinners meaning where it does not apply to what I am
talking about.
Which brings me to the substance of my communication: Understanding
each other's meanings requires some measure of shared purpose. You
could almost quantify that as U = k * P / CN where U is
understanding (semantic matches) and P is a measure of common purpose
and CN is the product of complexity times the novelty of the
communication, k being the obligatory constant. Based upon this
model we can pretty much explain why we are talking past each other
and predict that unless we choose a mutual purpose we will not be
experiencing much understanding in the future.
> This has nothing to do with
> doing science in isolation. In the latter
> circumstances the *external* observations and terms
> are still available to the reading or hearing public.
Well I understood Phil Roberts point and I understand your rebuttal
point too (I prefer Phil's view because .... even though it .... ).
There is a way to prove understanding: provide a statement that could
only be made if a deep semantic knowledge has been achieved. I can do
that for Phil and I can also do that for your rebuttal too, can
you? However, I will not unless we can establish some common purpose
... else all I would be doing is more pissing in the wind.
> After all that has been said about the problems of quantification
> in, it's clear that S.R has understood very little of the merits
> of direct quotation over indirect discourse.
I have proposed ways to establish who is and who is not
understanding. When misunderstandings arise, and they usually do,
they can usually be cleared up if the participants have sufficient
common purpose and sufficient integrity. For my part, I tire of
getting a different kind of ball tossed into my court than I sent over
the net. To be direct: I never get *my* questions answered.
Anyway ... I feel better now, I have emerged from therapy ... thanks
Doctor ...
Lewis Jorgenson
mit...@readware.com wrote in part:
<snip>
Hey Ken,
Let us start over.
Forget everything and let us start from scratch.
If you have not put together jigsaw puzzles then
I am wasting my time as you have no idea what I
am trying to convey. Please state whether or
not you are familiar with solving jigsaw puzzles
and then I shall know how to continue.
Remember to forget everything else and start
new right now by telling me if you are familiar
with solving jigsaw puzzles.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
David Longley
In article <3515B228...@clickshop.com>
seth...@clickshop.com "Seth Russell" writes:
> David Longley wrote:
>
> > The problem is the lack of access of the reinforcing
> > or corroborating community to subjective experience.
>
> What may be our problem is the fact that we have not defined any
> problem. My use of the word "private" was to setup the rules of a
> game of therapy. Your use and Skinner's use is to analyze "treatment
> of verbal behavior". My problem is understanding your insistence of
> parsing in Skinners meaning where it does not apply to what I am
> talking about.
>
> Which brings me to the substance of my communication: Understanding
> each other's meanings requires some measure of shared purpose. You
> could almost quantify that as U = k * P / CN where U is
> understanding (semantic matches) and P is a measure of common purpose
> and CN is the product of complexity times the novelty of the
> communication, k being the obligatory constant. Based upon this
> model we can pretty much explain why we are talking past each other
> and predict that unless we choose a mutual purpose we will not be
> experiencing much understanding in the future.
>
> > This has nothing to do with
> > doing science in isolation. In the latter
> > circumstances the *external* observations and terms
> > are still available to the reading or hearing public.
>
> Well I understood Phil Roberts point and I understand your rebuttal
> point too (I prefer Phil's view because .... even though it .... ).
> There is a way to prove understanding: provide a statement that could
> only be made if a deep semantic knowledge has been achieved. I can do
> that for Phil and I can also do that for your rebuttal too, can
> you? However, I will not unless we can establish some common purpose
> ... else all I would be doing is more pissing in the wind.
>
> > After all that has been said about the problems of quantification
> > in, it's clear that S.R has understood very little of the merits
> > of direct quotation over indirect discourse.
>
> I have proposed ways to establish who is and who is not
> understanding. When misunderstandings arise, and they usually do,
> they can usually be cleared up if the participants have sufficient
> common purpose and sufficient integrity. For my part, I tire of
> getting a different kind of ball tossed into my court than I sent over
> the net. To be direct: I never get *my* questions answered.
>
> Anyway ... I feel better now, I have emerged from therapy ... thanks
> Doctor ...
>
> Seth
> See "Bozo's Conjecture" at http://www.clickshop.com/ai/conjecture.htm
> And then on to the AI Jump List ...
>
The efficiacy of therapy is greatly over-stated.
It seems pretty clear to me that you do not appreciate the
empirical basis for what I have drawn attention to. You are
setting store far to much by the apparent efficacy of human
rationality. The evidence is that is is largely context
constrained.
I think you are asking the wrong questions.
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and purpose and nature
Previously:
>There are several acceptable definitions of
>the word purpose. The main definition that
>I shall use involves the object towards which
>something exists. An associated definition
>is the matter at hand or the point of issue.
>The definition of the word nature that I
>am using are the intrinsic characteristics
>and qualities of a thing.
What is the purpose and nature of purpose?
I am of course assuming that purpose is a
thing and as such the point of issue of
purpose and the intrinsic characteristics
and qualities of purpose can be discussed.
The question: "What is the purpose and nature of
purpose?" is curious where the question involves
knowing the answer before one can ask the question.
It is a nasty little circle where by rephrasing the
question we shall be answering the question where
the equivalent words for purpose shall replace the
word "purpose".
I might as well complete the circle by asking:
What is the object towards which the word purpose
exists? What does the word purpose mean? What
is the matter at hand or the point of issue
involved in the word 'purpose'. What are the
intrinsic characteristics and qualities of
the word 'purpose'.
I propose that I am only purporting to perpend
upon purpose and actually I am being mean by
indicating that meaning is meaning.
I can certainly avoid this cosmology of existence
by announcing that 'purpose' is not a thing where
it is not allowed or reasonable to investigate
'purpose' as a thing. However, if purpose is
not a thing then what is it? Things can be
investigated by examining the purpose and the
nature of the thing except we have already
concluded that purpose is not a thing. How
shall we go about investigating something that
is not a thing and yet enjoys some sort of
existence and meaning in this particular cosmology
we have chosen?
The premier solution of such quandaries is to
provide examples where the 'missing' topic
of investigation is revealed in action as it
were. The purpose of a period at the end of
a sentence is to indicated that a statement
of thought has been completed. A capital
letter at the start of a sentence as the
purpose of announcing that a novel state
of thought is commencing. The purpose of
a raincoat is to prevent the wet rain
from wetting the clothes and person of
the wearer of the raincoat. Those examples
are all manmade purposes. Humans and other
animals have different sorts of teeth where
the design of the teeth matches the physics
involved for efficient chewing and tearing
and biting and crushing and what have you
of the type of foods that the animal consumes
according to historical information passed
on by genetic archives. Each tooth has a
purpose designed in concert by genetics
and physics and the environment. The
teeth of humans indicate that we are
omnivorous as we can bite and tear meat
and crush nuts and chew anything. Yum.
Maybe it is time for lunch which is why
shifted from the purpose of purpose to food.
I am not quite sure if I am comforted by knowing
that meaning exists and purpose exists as I
might not be using my free will properly.
It is an awesome responsibility to always try
and do your best. Luckily it is also meaningless
and I am just pulling your leg with all my nonsense.
Imagine questioning the purpose of purpose.
One might as well ask "What is a question?".
Ok....
What is a question?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
David Longley wrote:
> The efficiacy of therapy is greatly over-stated.
Agree.
> It seems pretty clear to me that you do not appreciate the
> empirical basis for what I have drawn attention to. You are
> setting store far to much by the apparent efficacy of human
> rationality. The evidence is that is is largely context
> constrained.
I grant that human rationality is largely context constrained. After
examining the empirical evidence you have presented which
corroborates a large body of evidence from my own experience, I am
absolutely convinced of this. However, the context sensitivity of
human rationality does not imply that knowledge cannot be transmitted
under certain circumstances from human to human using natural
language. Does it? If so, why does it? If not, then what are those
circumstances? What special circumstances would be necessary for
knowledge to be transmitted between human and artificial intelligence
using natural language?
> I think you are asking the wrong questions.
Quite possibly so. What questions should I be asking? Bear in mind,
I do have my own purposes and contexts in which I am asking my
questions. I do not expect that you necessarily share those contexts
and purposes. However, the expectation is that the questions are
phrased with sufficient accuracy such that they can be understood by
you (or anyone who chooses to answer them) in the context in which
they were asked. If the questions do not contain sufficient matches
with your understanding, then the expectation is that the
misunderstandings can be clarified with dialogue. As this is a lot of
work, I would totally understand if you would decline to answer. You
could do that by simply ignoring me.
I trust you will understand the necessity, if not any humor, in my
long winded responses to your stimuli.
Ken Ewell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote in message
<6f4g86$24ic$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>...
>mit...@readware.com wrote in part:
>
><snip>
>
>Hey Ken,
>
>Let us start over.
>
>Forget everything and let us start from scratch.
>
>If you have not put together jigsaw puzzles then
>I am wasting my time as you have no idea what I
>am trying to convey. Please state whether or
>not you are familiar with solving jigsaw puzzles
>and then I shall know how to continue.
>
I am familiar with jigsaw puzzles.
>Remember to forget everything else and start
>new right now by telling me if you are familiar
>with solving jigsaw puzzles.
>
Yes, I have solved a few. Please continue.
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and specifics
Previously:
>What is a question?
Those of you who have enough sense to pay
attention will have noticed that anyone who
knows what they mean with they ask a question
already knows what a question is. If they
are unable to grasp the purpose and nature
of questions then they less intelligenter.
The ability to question is a curious development
in evolution. One can trace back this emergence
to any imbalance where the participants attempt
to re-establish an equilibrium. This supposes
that an equilibrium is possible and I find that to
be highly unlikely. I think there has always
been an imbalance and there shall always be
an imbalance. It is precisely the existence
of imbalances that achieves the depth of
reality where various levels attempt balance
and upset the balance of other levels and
new levels appear or emerge containing novel
approaches to re-establish an equilibrium.
Certainly there will be local equilibriums
involved with systems of local equilibriums
while the overall system is out of skew.
I am deaf in one ear and the other ear is about
shot. I have difficulty hearing a conversation
in a crowded room. Most folks input a single
merged sound wave of information and can use
incredibly sophisticated wave analysis techniques
to unweave the various sounds and focus only
upon the person they are talking to. I had
only a brief introduction into mathematical
transformations and I am impressed with
the capabilities of the brain in this
respect. It is essentially like having
a thousand keyboards connected by one serial
line to a computer and all the different
keystrokes are merged together in one fell swoop.
The computer can discern between keyboards by knowing
the location and context of each keyboard as it were.
Rocks ask no questions and refuse to answer
questions. Dogs will cock their heads to
one side in curious amusement as they question
what they have encountered. Humans advanced
to figuring out how to force humans to answer
questions and answer those questions correctly by
using carrots and sticks. A proper education
teaches folks to question and answer without
the need for carrots and sticks. Compare
the income of mathematicians and physicists
with the income of crackheads and with the
income of CEOs. Crackheads neither question
or answer properly and CEOs organize folks
to properly question and answer.
Humans are bombarded with input from all
sorts of internal and external sensors and
yet we want more input. We want more data.
It is simply a matter of taste and thus interest
of what kind of more data we want.
Folks in America are presumed innocent until
proven guilty in a remarkably similar manner
to the way scientific theories are presumed
false until proven true. It is better that
9 guilty men go free than for 1 innocent man
to be unfairly punished. It is also better
that 9 good theories are rejected rather than
1 bad theory be accepted as an axiom. The
9 guilty men will either become good or do
something bad and get caught the next time
with proof. The 9 good theories will also
stand the test of time as proof will be
forthcoming if they are indeed good theories.
Ask yourself silently: "Who is asking this question?".
Now disconnect your phone and put it in a paper bag.
Go outside and swing the paper bag over your head
until you hear the phone ring. Answer that phone
and all your questions will be answered.
My triple your money back guarantee is still in
effect if you are unsatisfied with my postings.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> >What is a question?
> The ability to question is a curious development
> in evolution. One can trace back this emergence
> to any imbalance where the participants attempt
> to re-establish an equilibrium.
I object to modeling questions as the attempt to establish equilibrium
even though it might be true in some cases and I do not understand the
thrust of your thesis at all.
To me a question is a request for knowledge to be transmitted to the
asker. It is an essential element of communication. It establishes a
symmetry between the participants. There are certain media in our
culture which cannot be questioned ... TV's, newspapers, textbooks ...
and there are certain people in our culture who cannot be questioned
... because they do not answer questions. I view those media and
those people as having diminished communication capabilities relative
to those media and people who can be questioned. As such, one could
say they are less intelligent because of this.
> Ask yourself silently: "Who is asking this question?".
> Now disconnect your phone and put it in a paper bag.
> Go outside and swing the paper bag over your head
> until you hear the phone ring. Answer that phone
> and all your questions will be answered.
I have tried this and can attest that it works :)) What is
fascinating to ponder is who actually answered the question.
Shucks, I don't have any questions. Thanks for our group therapy, I
enjoyed it immensely, though it's weird that you left the door open
and everyone just wandered in off the highway ... anyway it was fun
and I hope not too tiring .... and since I don't have any real
questions ... guess i'll just choose one from a song ....
Do you like what life is showing you?
Lewis Jorgenson
mit...@readware.com wrote:
Ken:
I am familiar with jigsaw puzzles.
Yes, I have solved a few. Please continue.
Jorgenson:
Right. If you have one jigsaw puzzle then
all the pieces are salient in that all those
pieces are necessary to complete the puzzle.
There is no starting point if all the pieces
are salient and so you momentarily focus on
one area of the puzzle which gives emphasis
to certain pieces so that a smaller number of
pieces are salient and perhaps manageable.
I used to start by finding the edge pieces if
the puzzle had a discernable edge.
If you use the picture on the cover then one
can pick up any piece, as all are salient,
examine the picture and find the matching
attributes and place the piece where it belongs.
Here again, the entire picture is salient and
yet you search for that limited sub-portion of
the picture that matches the piece in your hand.
Perhaps you collect all the pieces of a certain
color and attempt to fit them together. This
approach uses the birds of a feather flock
together approach to assign saliency.
These examples should display to you that
saliency is determined by the approach and the
task at hand and is not contained in the piece
itself except with regard to attributes fitting
the search.
If you use your eyes and fingers to examine a
glass surface one may assert that the salient
features of glass is the surface is flat and smooth.
If you use a microscope to examine a glass surface
one may assert that the salient features of glass
is that the surface is mountainous and uneven.
The glass has not changed and only the approach
had changed. My memory is that glass is a liquid
with an extremely high viscosity. So high that
humans can treat it as a solid for all practical
purposes just as humans can consider glass to
be flat and smooth for all practical purposes.
The task at hand shall determine whether the
knowledge that glass is flat or that glass
is uneven is held as the salient feature.
This explanation matches my previous proposal
that the same surface can appear to be different
colors depending on the angle between the viewer
and the light source. Scientific examination of
colors is performed under strict conditions of
lighting and viewing unlike normal folks who
see whatever they happen to see. We have the
extremes of day and night due to how light is
being cast upon the Earth by the Sun.
A molehill is a salient mountain to an ant
and we should not make mountains out of molehills
by forgetting the word salient involves the puzzle
at hand.
God is a salient feature to some folks and others
use approaches that do not readily display God.
Folks who announce that their way is the only way
must prove their approach can meet all contingencies.
That is a big mountain to climb.
My statements regarding saliency versus saliently
were bogus which is one main reason I wanted to
start from scratch to clear this up.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
"Seth Russell" <seth...@clickshop.com> wrote in part:
>Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
Jorgenson
>What is a question?
> The ability to question is a curious development
> in evolution. One can trace back this emergence
> to any imbalance where the participants attempt
> to re-establish an equilibrium.
Seth:
I object to modeling questions as the attempt to establish equilibrium
even though it might be true in some cases and I do not understand the
thrust of your thesis at all.
Jorgenson:
The effort to 'restore' equilibrium involves a search of sorts
for the proper stuff and using that proper stuff. Hence lifted
objects fall unless supported, current goes to ground, oxidation
oxidizes, valence electrons permit stable compounds, radiation
sources emit various sorts of radiation all in that endless search
for balance.
Seth:
To me a question is a request for knowledge to be transmitted to the
asker. It is an essential element of communication. It establishes a
symmetry between the participants. There are certain media in our
culture which cannot be questioned ... TV's, newspapers, textbooks ...
and there are certain people in our culture who cannot be questioned
.. because they do not answer questions. I view those media and
those people as having diminished communication capabilities relative
to those media and people who can be questioned. As such, one could
say they are less intelligent because of this.
Jorgenson:
I applaud your attempt to articulate what a question is even though
no such exposition shall ever be clear enough if a person does not
already know what a question is.
Seth:
Do you like what life is showing you?
Jorgenson quotes John Prine:
Pretty good. Not bad. I can't complain.
Jorgenson quotes the Beatles:
It's getting better all the time.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and strange inputs
Human beings encounter many strange things
and many stranger inputs where the data
arriving is bizarre and new and the existing
system must account for the presented environment.
Suppose someone was to smear jelly onto the
input tape of a turing machine. Grape jelly
to be precise that caused the input device
to become sticky and not input data at the
same rate as the identical turing machine
next door who got no jelly.
The actual machines and inputs are identical
and yet the jelly eating machine shall operate
at a slower rate where it appears to enjoy the
taste of the grape jelly.
Now if a third machine had peanut butter on
its input tape then it might go slower and
it might read strange symbols that alter
the input. Some of the input would be
nonsense and some of it might be readable
albeit random peanut butter created symbols.
The basic turing machine discussion ignores the
problem of novel inputs to which a machine might
be subject as that would take us into the eerie,
individualist, realm of the subjective. The jelly
eating machine might create sensors adapted to
handling jelly while the peanut butter eating
machine would account for peanut butter inputs
and the poor turning machine that got none would
not adapt to reality as it was spoon fed whatever
data it was fed.
Now one might assert that all possible inputs
can be accounted for and that is wishful thinking
at odds with reality and the experience of humans.
Explain to me again how this post which is input
to your brain could have been predicted and
expected and bound to occur sometime as a matter
of all possible inputs being accounted for.
Determinism schmerterminism.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Ken Ewell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote in message
<6f98i3$1c84$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>...
>mit...@readware.com wrote:
>
>Ken:
>I am familiar with jigsaw puzzles.
>Yes, I have solved a few. Please continue.
>
>Jorgenson:
>Right. If you have one jigsaw puzzle then
>all the pieces are salient in that all those
>pieces are necessary to complete the puzzle.
<...all acceptable examples snipped...>
>These examples should display to you that
>saliency is determined by the approach and the
>task at hand and is not contained in the piece
>itself except with regard to attributes fitting
>the search.
>
Ken:
No they don't. They merely confirm my
previous understanding that salience is a
quality that may be assigned to anything that
*appears* sailent (to whatever is at hand,) i.e.
to any piece or puzzle, or a piece of a specific
puzzle, that has salient attributes or properties.
My point is that whether saliency (or salience)
may be determined by judgement or by
appearance is not vey significant or
even the least bit interesting. The fact
is saliency may be readily validated and
verified, because that is its nature, and that
is also the nature of recognizing it.
Someone's determination of salience, or
saliency as you prefer, is always subject to
the actual (physical) recognizable and
verfiable appearance of saliency. The nature
of this is neither puzzling nor confusing no
matter how many puzzles are lumped
together.
Salience is an apparent property (or attribute)
that may be easily recognized --that is *how*
children are able to readily and easily learn to
put puzzles together.
Lewis:
>If you use your eyes and fingers to examine a
>glass surface one may assert that the salient
>features of glass is the surface is flat and smooth.
>If you use a microscope to examine a glass surface
>one may assert that the salient features of glass
>is that the surface is mountainous and uneven.
<more examples of saliencey for every purpose
under heaven... snipped>
Ken:
The salient point is that saliency may be readily
recognized by a common man or woman wherever
necessary no matter whether instuments or tools
are used or not. No matter whether you are doing
the viewing without assistance or whether you are
using an instrument for the viewing; by whatever
senses you involve.
What is taken for granted is that all sailent features
(at whatever perspective) are purely a matter for
that perspective. What makes salience a
knowledge is the fact that it may be recognized by
any perspective. What makes saliency debatable
is the fact that we have differing perspectives.
Lewis said in the earlier post that promped me to
respond to this thread:
>The purpose of recognizing saliency is to obtain
>the necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
>problem. The nature of recognizing saliency is
>a jigsaw puzzle type of affair where the pieces
>of various puzzles have been mixed together.
This is disturbing whether bogus or not, because
it implies total confusion and chaos in the nature
of recognizing salience.
In my opinion 'saliency' is one of the faculties of
the common sense.
As I have tried to clarify, there should be nothing
confusing or puzzling about the nature of saliency.
Salience is a direct 'knowing' that may be readily
verified or validated.
However debatable its appearence may be,
the 'purpose' of saliency (in my opinion) is to
'be apparent' and its nature is to 'stick out' so
that it may be readily recognized. I like to
think that this is so that the common man or
woman may not be fooled or deluded by an
assertion of saliency where there is none.
Thus: The purpose of recognizing saliency
can be, as Lewis suggests, to obtain the
necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
problem. The nature of recognizing saliency
involves recognizing the apparently salient
attributes and features of a thing.
Ken Ewell/MITi
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> Suppose someone was to smear jelly onto the
> input tape of a turing machine. Grape jelly
> to be precise that caused the input device
> to become sticky and not input data at the
> same rate as the identical turing machine
> next door who got no jelly.
Brilliant, Doctor ... you got me stumped. Only
thing i can think of it that the turning machine
would need to produce an output tape that would
spiral around and lick off the jelly, but i don't
know if they are allowed to do that. Are they?
Lewis Jorgenson
mit...@readware.com wrote in part:
Ken:
The salient point is that saliency may be readily
recognized by a common man or woman wherever
necessary no matter whether instuments or tools
are used or not. No matter whether you are doing
the viewing without assistance or whether you are
using an instrument for the viewing; by whatever
senses you involve.
Jorgenson:
Ok. I think you are asserting that saliency is
a highlight by definition and I do not refute that
understanding.
Ken:
What is taken for granted is that all sailent features
(at whatever perspective) are purely a matter for
that perspective. What makes salience a
knowledge is the fact that it may be recognized by
any perspective. What makes saliency debatable
is the fact that we have differing perspectives.
Jorgenson:
Quite. We could inputting the exact same data and
putting emphasis on different portions of that data.
Also there is a field of depth where we can be using
different focal lengths that set what we focus upon.
Ken:
Lewis said in the earlier post that promped me to
respond to this thread:
Jorgenson:
>The purpose of recognizing saliency is to obtain
>the necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
>problem. The nature of recognizing saliency is
>a jigsaw puzzle type of affair where the pieces
>of various puzzles have been mixed together.
Ken:
This is disturbing whether bogus or not, because
it implies total confusion and chaos in the nature
of recognizing salience.
Jorgenson:
Not total confusion and chaos as we are provided
a platform of senses and some ingrained ordering
that serve as a foundation for approaches towards
recognizing salience. Hunger and loud noises
are unavoidable highlights of our existence
that show order and patterns do exist.
Ken:
In my opinion 'saliency' is one of the faculties of
the common sense.
As I have tried to clarify, there should be nothing
confusing or puzzling about the nature of saliency.
Salience is a direct 'knowing' that may be readily
verified or validated.
Jorgenson:
Ok. However, of what use is such knowing unless it
becomes used in solving some puzzles or problems?
Hence my discussion regarding the purpose of saliency.
Ken:
However debatable its appearence may be,
the 'purpose' of saliency (in my opinion) is to
'be apparent' and its nature is to 'stick out' so
that it may be readily recognized. I like to
think that this is so that the common man or
woman may not be fooled or deluded by an
assertion of saliency where there is none.
Jorgenson:
It is not a matter of being fooled or deluded.
Saliency found by a certain approach retains saliency
regardless of alternate approaches that minimize
or remove that saliency.
Ken:
Thus: The purpose of recognizing saliency
can be, as Lewis suggests, to obtain the
necessary and sufficient data to resolve a
problem. The nature of recognizing saliency
involves recognizing the apparently salient
attributes and features of a thing.
Jorgenson:
By George, Ah theenk ee's got at.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
seth...@clickshop.com wrote:
Seth:
Brilliant, Doctor ... you got me stumped.
Jorgenson:
Oops. I only have a Masters degree and not a
Doctorate. Call me Master. As a kid I used to
get mail addressed to Master Lewis Jorgenson
and I don't know if such salutations are still
allowed. I digress.
Seth:
Only thing i can think of it that the turning machine
would need to produce an output tape that would
spiral around and lick off the jelly, but i don't
know if they are allowed to do that. Are they?
Jorgenson:
Please refer to my previous post announcing that
the design and manufacture of artificial tongues
should be the number 1 priority to achieve artificial
intelligence. (as well as to provide myself with
the necessary accoutrements).
It is currently considered in bad taste for turing
machines to lick themselves in a manner resembling
dogs. I did hear about a young man from Nantucket.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
JES
On 22 Mar 1998 14:58:43 GMT, LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson)
wrote:
>A theory and/or the nature of the data causes emphasis to
>be placed upon certain data than upon other data. See
>the blood type example for clarity.
>
Saliency is of course a function of purpose. If your purpose is
to transplant tissue, then you are concerned with behaviors of related
systems that affect that purpose. Blood type is a recognizable pattern
identifying certain systems with certain behaviors.
There is no such thing as the recognition of a pattern which is
not connected to the purpose of some recognizing system. If you build
a system that recognizes patterns for no conceivable purpose, one can
easily surmise that you are doing so cunningly.
JES
>Do you like what life is showing you?
>
Next we'll start talking about God.
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and Nature and cat colors
previously:
The definition of the word nature that I
am using are the intrinsic characteristics
and qualities of a thing.
What color is something in the dark? If the
material is not absorbing certain wavelengths
of light and thus reflecting other wavelengths
of light then the object has no color. One
could posit that a cat in a light sealed box
has no color until we open the box and allow
light to interact with the surface of the cat.
What hardness is something in the dark? An
object retains hardness regardless of the
environment or investigative method generally.
This approach invites the understanding that
we might as well admit that some examination
steps saliently interact with some natures
we physically examine and some do not. Inputs
to the system are sometimes relevant and
sometimes they are not.
The topic of intelligence demands a discernment
as to whether inputs to the system are relevant
or not. Just as light input is essential
for physical examination of colors, so too it
appears that data input is essential to the
evaluation of intelligence. Thus any replication
of intelligence will probably have to include
input/output considerations and not posit a closed
system of processing. The algorithm approach
to intelligence shall fail on its face due to
a lack of including pertinent components.
A surface absorbs and reflects providing a color.
An entity absorbs data and emits data providing
evidence of what is called intelligence.
My recent posts proposed that the choosing of which
data to absorb is a matter of saliency that involves
the task at hand. Intelligence thus involves, as
suggested by Longley, the ability to ask the right
questions and not just provide the right answers.
Choosing a proper task at hand is a matter of
setting priorities amidst a wealth of data and
possible tasks. The evoking of proper interests
allows the existence of avocations. It is interesting
that the archaic definition of an avocation is of
one's work or profession. The modern definition has
avocation as one's chosen tasks 'apart' from one's
regular work or profession. The social forces that
required a split between vocation and avocation are
no longer necessary except as a matter of convenience
to corporate administrators. Given the objectively
limited life spans of humans and the current state of
science it is inexcusable that folks must choose between
a vocation and an avocation due to monetary requirements.
Folks who do not enjoy what they are doing are less likely
to do that task well. Some previous physicians did not
demand large reimbursements for easing suffering and some
leaders did not demand rewards above the honor of leading.
It is not communism for the consumers to announce that
certain portions of the market are gouging and having
the government authorities to stop that gouging. If
there was not a cap on medical school graduates then
there would be more physicians and the salaries of
physicians would be more competitive. How does one
customer increase the number of medical school graduates
so that health care costs will decrease? Such missions
are luckily not part of my avocation.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
gm...@incom.net wrote in part:
Gmind:
There is no such thing as the recognition of a pattern
which is not connected to the purpose of some
recognizing system.
Jorgenson:
Oh, so recognizing and recognition requires a recognizer?
One might posit that thinking and thoughts require a
thinker. I thought data dredging, or the more respectable
data mining, involved searching for patterns and then seeing
if those patterns made any sense. Those approaches usually
locate the already known obvious or locate relationships
that are nonsensical artifacts which only contrivance can
transform into useful appearing knowledge. Confounding
variables are certainly confounding.
Gmind:
If you build a system that recognizes patterns for no
conceivable purpose, one can easily surmise that you
are doing so cunningly.
Jorgenson:
If we replace the unassailable 'no conceivable purpose'
with the ordinary 'no purpose' one can see that:
If you build a system that recognizes patterns for no
purpose then I wonder what the initial purpose in
building the system had been as we have a system without
a purpose that recognizes patterns.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
gm...@incom.net
In article <890324...@longley.demon.co.uk>,
Da...@longley.demon.co.uk# wrote:
[snip]
> I suspect it's because it's all far too much hard work..and what
> all most people really want from newsgroups is just entertaining
> "brain-candy".
In other words, we should be more purposeful.
-----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==-----
http://www.dejanews.com/ Now offering spam-free web-based newsreading
David Longley
More empirically answerable.... in my field, auditable.
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and brass tacks
A discussion of intimate hardware considerations is
beyond my knowledge. Apparently, all we need
do is plan the software and then we can cobble together
a hardware components platform for that software.
So we are using the old black box approach under the
names of a turing machine or a room or a brain or a
computer where input is related to output and we are
trying to articulate that relation.
One problem regarding hardware design that I can
approach is the question of whether memories should
be treated as input from outside the box or as inside
the box as part of the algorithm. Another way to
phrase this involves whether memories are variables
or coefficients of the processing equation(s). It
should be obvious that memories can serve in both
capacities where some memory coefficient can act upon
an input variable and some memory can be recalled as
an actual input. The subtle distinction between a
variable and a coefficient demands attention.
A coefficient remains constant for a given context
while a variable is variable. Integration and
differentiation open or lock in a given context
for a coefficient by stretching out or taking a
snapshot of the activity as it were.
It would appear that the human brain performs
similar openings and locking ins upon presented
natural language input. Any statement can be
taken literally or figuratively. Any statement
can be construed as applying only to a specific
case or construed as applying to a set of specific
cases or construed as being generically applicable.
Or construed as nonsense and ignored.
This would explain the extraordinary ability of
youngsters to display extrapolation upon learning
single ideas into a multitude of ideas. Higher
and lower dimensional equations are presented as
the result of the successful input of some given
equation.
Unlike humans, the designers of computer intelligence
can assign which data shall be variables and which
data shall be coefficients and those basic assignments
shall set the tone of computer with regard to its
ability to learn and to process inputs in a manner
called intelligently.
Trial and error approaches permit certain variables
to become coefficients. Subsequent inputs aggregate
towards some limits and formal systems have difficulty
with discontinuous functions. Instructions to "Look
before you leap" directly conflict with instructions
providing the information that "He who hesitates is
lost". The details of a specific task at hand shall
indicate which contextual coefficients are used.
Those details include the timing or context around
the task at hand.
The interaction between coefficients and variables
mimics the interaction between calculation and look
up tables. Sometimes just the result is required
and other times the data in the journey to the result
is required. We return full circle to the problem
of data selection where a chosen approach to a
task at hand determines saliency.
The ground hog in my front yard is active again
after some months of hibernation. Is that useless
input to my brain or is that a presentation
regarding rebirth and life and diversity and
order and things happening outside my mental
considerations? Both as are my posts.
I hope the basic math vocabulary is appreciated
by those who take comfort in the dubious
specificity of mathematical terms.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and yet more brass tacks
Another problem regarding hardware design that I can
approach is the question of whether emotions should
be treated as input from outside the box or as inside
the box as part of the algorithm. Another way to
phrase this involves whether emotions are variables
or coefficients of the processing equation(s). It
should be obvious that emotions can serve in both
capacities where some emotion coefficient can act upon
an input variable and some emotion can be recalled as
an actual input. The subtle distinction between a
variable and a coefficient demands attention.
A coefficient remains constant for a given context
while a variable is variable. Integration and
differentiation open or lock in a given context
for a coefficient by stretching out or taking a
snapshot of the activity as it were.
Unlike humans, the designers of computer intelligence
can assign which data shall be variables and which
data shall be coefficients and those basic assignments
shall set the tone of computer with regard to its
ability to learn and to process inputs in a manner
called intelligently.
Trial and error approaches permit certain variables
to become coefficients. Subsequent inputs aggregate
towards some limits and formal systems have difficulty
with discontinuous functions. Instructions to "Like
sweets" directly conflict with instructions providing
the information that "Sweets can harm your health".
The details of a specific task at hand shall indicate
which contextual coefficients are used. Those details
include the timing or context around the task at hand.
The interaction between coefficients and variables
mimics the interaction between calculation and look
up tables. Sometimes just the result is required
and other times the data in the journey to the result
is required. We return full circle to the problem
of data selection where a chosen approach to a
task at hand determines saliency.
Interruptions can occur due to internal logic
events or some introduction of input from outside
the logical system itself. A phone line can disconnect
or contain unacceptable noise or contain an intended
or unintended instruction directing the communication
to be interrupted.
The power of persuasion displays the complexity of
determining whether a logic flow relied upon
internal coefficients or external input variables
for the solving of some equation. All folks have
their own internal coefficients created by their
learning experiences and personal physiology upon
which objective input must act. One must present
the proper inputs and they must be assimilated
prior to a change of the internal coefficients.
The concept of cognitive maps is similar to the
equation approach where graphical imagery of
the coefficients and variables replaces algorithms.
It also more closely mimics the 3 dimensional
real world in which folks see and locate and
identify objects and relationships for standard
conceptual purposes. Not too many folks juggle
multi-dimensional equations as equations in
their conscious deliberations.
What is considered essential for some folks
is considered harmful clutter to others. How
many years of mathematics must one study in order
to appreciate love? What branch of physics had
to be researched before one could eat or scratch
an itch? What language must be learned before
one can recognize beauty? How do trees and plants
earn sunlight and rain? Quite a few big brains and
successful sorts look with disdain upon normal
folks and that is a pity.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> Another problem regarding hardware design that I can
> approach is the question of whether emotions should
> be treated as input from outside the box or as inside
> the box as part of the algorithm [?].
I love this question. My choice is that for RAI (Robust
AI), emotions should be inputs from outside the box.
Whether that is what happens with humans is quite another
matter. Of course this leads to the next question: if not
internally generated, then from whence should these
emotional variables come? My choice of answer to that
question is: US, the Users.
> The power of persuasion displays the complexity of
> determining whether a logic flow relied upon
> internal coefficients or external input variables
> for the solving of some equation. All folks have
> their own internal coefficients created by their
> learning experiences and personal physiology upon
> which objective input must act. One must present
> the proper inputs and they must be assimilated
> prior to a change of the internal coefficients.
Yes I agree. But great care must be taken here. I, for
one, do not share the choice that RAI should attempt to
duplicate the problems and short comings of human cognition
which we all experience. It is all to easy in discussions
such as this to get bogged down by confusing our plans and
choices for RAI with our understanding of the human
perdicament.
> Quite a few big brains and successful sorts
> look with disdain upon normal folks and
> that is a pity.
Well put, Mistro. I believe that your have brought up one
of the biggest possible errors which can befall us in our
pursuit of RAI. If we put the attitude of "unquestionable
superiority of absolute knowledge" into computers running
on binary logic, we will be not only will coding a fallacy,
but also crippling our creations in their dealings with the
real world.
Lewis Jorgenson
seth...@clickshop.com wrote in part:
>Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
Jorgenson
> Another problem regarding hardware design that I can
> approach is the question of whether emotions should
> be treated as input from outside the box or as inside
> the box as part of the algorithm [?].
Seth:
I love this question. My choice is that for RAI (Robust
AI), emotions should be inputs from outside the box.
Whether that is what happens with humans is quite another
matter. Of course this leads to the next question: if not
internally generated, then from whence should these
emotional variables come? My choice of answer to that
question is: US, the Users.
Jorgenson:
Now, if the designer puts emotions in the box by
designing the contents of the box then some folks
will say that the emotions were placed there rather
than internally generated. This is quibbling as
long as those emotions serve the box in the manner
necessary for the box to be intelligent.
Seth:
Yes I agree. But great care must be taken here. I, for
one, do not share the choice that RAI should attempt to
duplicate the problems and short comings of human cognition
which we all experience. It is all to easy in discussions
such as this to get bogged down by confusing our plans and
choices for RAI with our understanding of the human
perdicament.
Jorgenson:
I disagree. Unconfusing a computer would demand that
the humans have achieved a clear understanding of the
situation such that the computer could be de-confused.
The process of de-confusing is a major part of teaching
where most of the pieces have been presented and it
becomes a matter of allowing the brain to properly
organize those pieces in accordance with critical
thinking skills.
> Quite a few big brains and successful sorts
> look with disdain upon normal folks and
> that is a pity.
Seth:
Well put, Mistro. I believe that your have brought up one
of the biggest possible errors which can befall us in our
pursuit of RAI. If we put the attitude of "unquestionable
superiority of absolute knowledge" into computers running
on binary logic, we will be not only will coding a fallacy,
but also crippling our creations in their dealings with the
real world.
Jorgenson:
Quite. Does Dennett and his ilk provide their offspring with
the knowledge that free will is a myth and love is an illusion
and their beds and teddy bears are mostly empty space consisting
of a probability cloud of quanta? At what age should everyone
be informed that this is just one of many multiple realities
and what happens here is of no more importance than what
happens in the alternate realities? It is becoming apparent
that there is a limit to the contribution that cleverness
provides us.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and bourbon
Bourbonism invokes the proposal of W. C. Fields
that one never gives a sucker an even break.
The logic of bourbonism and Mr. Fields is flawless
where valuable resources are retain by folks who
appreciate the value of those resources and have
the necessary cleverness and drive to use those
resources logically.
Money can be squandered where there are no readily
apparent tangible results or money can be targeted
towards the creation of massive items such as
pyramids, mansions, empires, institutions and the
like. Boil a little orange juice and sugar and
coffee into a syrup and then add water and carbonation
and you have created a soft drink. One can sell the
soft drinks at an amazing profit margin and
become a major economic and political power
because you have plenty of money to distribute and
sell your product anywhere in the world. You can
use lemon juice and lime juice and leave out the
coffee and use a sugar replacement and decaffeinated
coffee and whatever combination you want to create
a line of soft drinks. All made for about nothing
and have a profit margin that other companies can
only dream about.
The other companies shall try ploys to increase
their profit margin and thus retain market power.
One can use the same size box and bag and reduce
the amount of product and raise the price as folks
who are accustomed to using your product shall
continue to use your product. One can nickel
and dime the customer by charging for standard
actions such as fees for writing a check or
verifying the balance of a checking account.
One opens a checking account to write checks
and the banks floating procedures for deposits
and checks requires individuals to investigate
to determine whether deposits and checks have
yet cleared. The federal government had to
step in and assign limits on how long a bank
can use your money as if it was its own money
when your money is brought into play through a
deposit or withdrawal activity.
All these shenanigans are in accordance with the
bourbon dictum of never giving a sucker an even break.
Difficulties arise from two areas. First, the lower
intelligence of the suckers permits them to use
violence as a means of expression when they find
they have been unfairly treated. This problem
is addressed by having an intangible corporation
with no identifiable target for violence. The
bank teller or customer service person or even
the branch manager is not responsible for the
policy decisions. The president and boards
can be replaced immediately by the shareholders
and the shareholders do not personally set policy
except by their choice of the corporate leaders.
The use of physical violence is fruitless against
a corporation.
Other corporations can attack purposely to get and
maintain profits through a variety of means. There
are limits of these attacks where one does not
want to get impaled on one's own blade. Pepsi
could not announce and complain that coke
charges 75 cents for a product that costs a penny
as Pepsi does the same thing. Product loyalty
is pursued using well funded teams of lawyers to
protect trademarks and patents so that established
and fledgling competitors have an uphill battle.
Pizza Hut searched out Mom and Pop pizza restaurants
that had similar names for their pizza and sued them
to make them change the name of the pizzas that they
served. This works both ways as it turns out one
tiny shop had used the name for years before Pizza
Hut used the name and ended up getting paid by
Pizza Hut for the use of that unregistered yet
established trademark.
The suckers have one institution that can address
powerful interests and that is the government.
The government can step in and control monopolies
and regulate utilities and generally prevent gross
uneven breaks for the citizens. Bourbon legislatures
focus upon giving business more leeway to exploit
the suckers and let corporations achieve the highest
possible profit margins. This is the mushroom theory
of social advancement where one keeps the suckers
in the dark and shits on them to make them grow.
Corporations now donate a lot of money to charities
and do so in a very public manner as a matter of
advertizing. I do not view such corporations as
being civic minded. If the corporations had charged less
for the product or service then the individual
citizens could have given money to the charities
of their own choice. If the corporation had kept
the money as actual profit then my government
taxes might be lessened because corporate tax revenues
would have been increased. Donations reveal that
excessive profit margins are being realized which
brings delight to bourbon legislators as proof
of the validity of their approach. Unelected,
unaccountable individuals set social priorities
instead of the folks or the elected folks.
How many folks chose a product based on corporate
activities rather than personal likes and dislikes
of a product? Would you drink soft drink A because
that company gave money for the environment or
drink soft drink B because that company gave
money for computers at some school? You shall
drink the soft drink that you like most as a
matter of personal taste rather than intellectual
analysis. It is the corporations and bourbon
legislators who are the blood suckers and many
are becoming bloated.
The scientific community is becoming bloated where
certain members are also nickel and diming the
resources of regular folks. Dennett has absconded
love by declaring that love does not exist as love
is just an illusion. Apparently no one really loves
anybody and they just think they love their spouse
or child or lover. Similarly, Minsky announces that
individuals do not have free will and really do not
know anything for certain. We just think we have
free will and just think that we know something.
These pickpockets have made us all bankrupt and
most folks did not even know that their pockets have
been picked. That is is proper implementation of
the algorithm of never giving a sucker an even break.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> Jorgenson:
> Now, if the designer puts emotions in the box by
> designing the contents of the box then some folks
> will say that the emotions were placed there rather
> than internally generated. This is quibbling as
> long as those emotions serve the box in the manner
> necessary for the box to be intelligent.
I am not suggesting the *designer* puts emotions in the box. I am
suggesting the *user* does. In other words, rewards like "nice doggie"
are the emotions our AI would feel, and they would come from us in real
time interactions rather than at design time.
> Jorgenson:
> I disagree. Unconfusing a computer would demand that
> the humans have achieved a clear understanding of the
> situation such that the computer could be de-confused.
> The process of de-confusing is a major part of teaching
> where most of the pieces have been presented and it
> becomes a matter of allowing the brain to properly
> organize those pieces in accordance with critical
> thinking skills.
[Hmmm, you disagree with my agreement with you...]
I was just saying that AI should not attempt to duplicate NI, and
certainly not its short comings. Then the lure of my other point was
that perhaps we do understand the human predicament sufficiently to put
an artificial creature inside of it. If not, then perhaps all the
philosophers from Kant to Roberts have been wasting their time. But then
we should not attempt to make this AI like ourselves, but rather make it
better where we know how to do that, and make it irrelevant to that in us
we do not understand at all.
> Jorgenson:
> Quite. Does Dennett and his ilk provide their offspring with
> the knowledge that free will is a myth and love is an illusion
> and their beds and teddy bears are mostly empty space consisting
> of a probability cloud of quanta? At what age should everyone
> be informed that this is just one of many multiple realities
> and what happens here is of no more importance than what
> happens in the alternate realities? It is becoming apparent
> that there is a limit to the contribution that cleverness
> provides us.
Yes there is this limit, but since this "cleverness" is King to our
culture, he reigns as sovereign and cannot be challenged. I say our King
has no clothes. He says a thing either "is" or "is not." Who amongst
you have tested this royal edict in the streets of our real life and
found it actually works that way?
Lewis Jorgenson
"Seth Russell" <seth...@clickshop.com> wrote:
Seth:
I am not suggesting the *designer* puts emotions in the box. I am
suggesting the *user* does. In other words, rewards like "nice doggie"
are the emotions our AI would feel, and they would come from us in real
time interactions rather than at design time.
Jorgenson:
That is perfectly clear and perfectly understandable and
perfectly correct.
Seth:
I was just saying that AI should not attempt to duplicate NI, and
certainly not its short comings. Then the lure of my other point was
that perhaps we do understand the human predicament sufficiently to put
an artificial creature inside of it. If not, then perhaps all the
philosophers from Kant to Roberts have been wasting their time. But
then
we should not attempt to make this AI like ourselves, but rather make it
better where we know how to do that, and make it irrelevant to that in
us
we do not understand at all.
Jorgenson:
Quite.
Seth:
Yes there is this limit, but since this "cleverness" is King to our
culture, he reigns as sovereign and cannot be challenged. I say our
King
has no clothes. He says a thing either "is" or "is not." Who amongst
you have tested this royal edict in the streets of our real life and
found it actually works that way?
Jorgenson:
Go Seth! Go Seth! Go Seth!
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
David Longley
In article <6ftk1l$3tmc$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>
LSV...@prodigy.com "Lewis Jorgenson" writes:
>
> Seth:
> I was just saying that AI should not attempt to duplicate NI, and
> certainly not its short comings. Then the lure of my other point was
> that perhaps we do understand the human predicament sufficiently to put
> an artificial creature inside of it. If not, then perhaps all the
> philosophers from Kant to Roberts have been wasting their time. But
> then
> we should not attempt to make this AI like ourselves, but rather make it
> better where we know how to do that, and make it irrelevant to that in
> us
> we do not understand at all.
>
A point I have made for some time as you know. - All too many are
persuaded, by nothing more than folk psychological dogma and
familiarity that the model must be Natural Human Intelligence.
They prize familiar folk psychology over and above what we now
know from empirical research in behaviour science.
I have proposed that what we have learned, and, perhaps more
significantly, what we *can* learn from behaviour science
research, ultimately renders the research and development
ambitions of those belonging to the above AI camp - both
logically and physically impossible. The basic ideas are grounded
on the unexamined dogma of 'theory-theory' or folk psychology. If
& when this dogma is analysed, AI research & development reduces
technological advances in normative behaviour technology.
Cf. http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm
Seth Russell
> Seth:
> I was just saying that AI should not attempt to duplicate NI, and
> certainly not its short comings. Then the lure of my other point was
> that perhaps we do understand the human predicament sufficiently to put
> an artificial creature inside of it. If not, then perhaps all the
> philosophers
> from Kant to Roberts have been wasting their time. But then
> we should not attempt to make this AI like ourselves, but rather make it
> better where we know how to do that, and make it irrelevant to that in
> us we do not understand at all.
David Longley wrote:
> A point I have made for some time as you know. - All too many are
> persuaded, by nothing more than folk psychological dogma and
> familiarity that the model must be Natural Human Intelligence.
> They prize familiar folk psychology over and above what we now
> know from empirical research in behaviour science.
There are many things that you have been saying that match the facts as I
perceive them. It is the conclusions you state based on the available facts
that I find problematic. It seems to me that you choose words that contain
obvious biases to express facts, then draw conclusions from those biases as
if they applied in all instances. I wonder if a detailed objective
analysis of your paragraph above would heighten an awareness of that
possibility.
> I have proposed that what we have learned, and, perhaps more
> significantly, what we *can* learn from behaviour science
> research, ultimately renders the research and development
> ambitions of those belonging to the above AI camp - both
> logically and physically impossible.
A bit of a sweeping conclusion there, huh?
> The basic ideas are grounded on the unexamined
> dogma of 'theory-theory' or folk psychology.
I am familiar with the two dogmas analyzed in Frag: "1) that past behaviour
is the best predictor of future behaviour; and 2) that there is practical
merit in treating 'cognition' as an independent variable when working to
effect behavioural change." However, I must confess that I cannot map
either of those to the words "theory-theory." Is this a new dogma that we
should be aware of?
> If & when this dogma is analysed, AI research & development reduces
> [to?] technological advances in normative behaviour technology.
Well obviously I don't know the predicate (see above), but even granting its
possible truth and extent, and then editing your sentence so that a
reasonable parse could obtain, the assertion would still contain a shift in
context that would not be permissible in my mind.
Perhaps we could bury the hatchet ... but in any case, thanks for the
dialogue ...
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and selfhood
The decision of scientists to jettison the
concept of souls while performing scientific
investigations does not announce that souls
do not exist. It simply announces that some
scientists have determined that the concept
of souls is not salient to their professional
endeavors.
Scientists agree and act with respect
towards choosing a proper frame of
reference to address any given task at
hand. This permits an examination of
the proper resolution and thus the proper
focus upon an area of interest.
Thus physicists do not announce that chemists
are mistaken and misguided and chemists do
not assert that physiologists are wrongheaded.
Biologists do not demean geologists and
hardware designers do not ridicule software
designers as unnecessary.
Some scientists do abuse theology and religion
as mistaken and misguided and wrongheaded and
demeaning and worthy of ridicule. Such scientists
wish to install their chosen frame of reference
as the proper frame of reference which is the same
complaint that they make against theology and religion.
The proper frame of reference is set by the task at
hand. One does not pray for boiling water for coffee
and neither should one use a telescope or microscope
to do so. Praying for weather is the only means
available as there are no scientific means of
controlling the weather. All sufficiently complex
events that preclude formalization are outside
science. It is unreasonable to label anything
that cannot be determined as determined. Certainly
the weather is "determined" by various and sundry
influences and yet those influences and the
resulting interactions of those influences are
indeterminable. Predictive approaches to weather
improve with historical analysis and pattern
recognition in the later portions of the weather
process. The micro indeterminacy gives way to
macro determinacy where the effect of butterfly
wing movements provides discernable barometric
fronts.
The American Declaration of Independence
begins with that marvelous phrase:
"When in the course of human events".
A frame of reference has been chosen and
announced. Human level components and
relationships are presented as the stage
upon which the subsequent assertions are
made. The discussion shall included
feelings and individuals and emotions
and logic and law and religion and
literature and art and beauty and justice
and groups and history and culture and society
and other human level components of reality.
The human level is messy and complex as each
individual is an individual. Suppose the
chemistry periodic table had over 2 trillion
chemicals. They all have properties and
some groups share properties and the one
thing they all have in common is that they
have selfhood associated with a soul.
Please note that logic is only one facet
of the components at the human level and
so it is extremely unlikely that human
level intelligence can be replicated by
by focusing only on logic.
Examine the power and intimacy and sharing
relationships between a husband and a wife.
This is not a given hydrogen plus oxygen
event. As each husband and each wife
is a distinct chemical the specific relationship
will depend upon the properties of each.
Some pal around together constantly and others
live supportive adjacent lives. Some argue
on a regular basis without fear of divorce
and others refrain from open confrontation.
Individuals must have the freedom to find
slaves or find masters or find partners or
what have you that fit their valence needs.
The attempt to equate intelligence with
calculation is valid and yet it shall achieve
limited results. Calculation requires
determinism through actual quantification
and/or proper control of indeterminate influences.
It is precisely the ability of humans using
non-logical approaches to ad hoc deal with all
indeterminate influences that is the hallmark
of human level intelligence.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Purpose and nature and ethics
One sub-branch of any formal philosophy involves
ethics. Science ignores ethics as irrelevant
as formal systems by observation and definition
cannot behave improperly. The concepts of good
and bad are foreign to current scientific theories.
The question becomes whether good and bad exist
and were discovered or whether good and bad
are arbitrarily assigned attributes. My previous
examples explained that memory and emotions are
found both inside the box acting as coefficients
and outside the box acting as inputs. Similarly,
good and bad are found as existing as part of
reality and good and bad can be assigned by
the individual.
Most folks regard pain as a bad thing though some
folks such as athletes and repentants view pain as
a good thing displaying that muscles and character
are being strengthened respectfully. One can
go too far in either direction where some drug
addicts misuse painkillers and some athletes
damage their body through over exertion.
Apparently the designer shall have control over
the ethical standards of an AI entity. Asimov
has already broached this field is great detail.
The complexity of situations that may be
encountered generally preclude simple resolutions
and yet un-manageable complexity can be addressed
by being simple and straight forward. The ability
of regular folks to find solutions without having
all the details is a matter of public record.
Water was boiled and plant and animal breeding
was performed and bronze was created with no
understanding of thermodynamics or genetics or
DNA or chemical material science. You are
able to direct your attention towards reading
this post or direct your attention elsewhere
at any moment even though the mechanism of
that free will is unknown to you.
Ethics is precisely a human level arena dealing
with indeterminacy. Values and priorities must
be assigned rather than discovered until they
can be discovered through diligence and honesty.
One does not interact with a bully in the same
manner that one interacts with reasonable persons.
Limited time and other limited resources require
the setting of personal priorities and group
priorities where institutions have longer lives
than individuals and so they will have different
priorities.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> Apparently the designer shall have control over
> the ethical standards of an AI entity.
Yes, perhaps, and between you and I, that scares the shit out of me. Now
if you accept for the sake of argument that Robust (even a Super Robust) AI
is possible and even inevitable, then certainly its ethical standards will
have a dramatic impact on our culture. And as you know there are stances
which imply ethical choices which are unacceptable to us normal folk. If
the designers choose to program to these specifications, then will we have
any choice but to bow to the will of these monstrous ethics ?
> Ethics is precisely a human level arena dealing
> with indeterminacy. Values and priorities must
> be assigned rather than discovered until they
> can be discovered through diligence and honesty.
> One does not interact with a bully in the same
> manner that one interacts with reasonable persons.
> Limited time and other limited resources require
> the setting of personal priorities and group
> priorities where institutions have longer lives
> than individuals and so they will have different
> priorities.
Well put Mistro!
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>Purpose and nature and ethics
>One sub-branch of any formal philosophy involves
>ethics. Science ignores ethics as irrelevant
>as formal systems by observation and definition
>cannot behave improperly. The concepts of good
>and bad are foreign to current scientific theories.
Science ignores ethics, because science is concerned with causal
mechanisms. However, scientists do not all ignore ethics, and some
scientists have ended up in the doghouse for their insistence that
ethics be a consideration in how we exploit those mechanisms.
>The question becomes whether good and bad exist
>and were discovered or whether good and bad
>are arbitrarily assigned attributes.
I think you miss an important point. Namely, what is discovered by
scientists is nearly orthogonal to the questions handled by ethics.
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>Jorgenson:
>Hmmm. I suppose one can only speak about something that one
>knows something about and so who except the scientists involved
>with the discovered mechanisms could make ethical statements
>about those mechanisms? The initial DNA research prompted
>serious and extended discussions regarding safety back in
>the 1970s and the scientific community chose to set its
>own guidelines to avert non-scientists from setting guidelines.
>Cloning and AI and other adventures shall redefine the meaning
>and limits of many concepts. When does a cell become an
>embryo become a fetus become an infant become a toddler
>become a child become an adolescent become an adult become
>a corpse become a fossil? It is all the same 'thing' and
>yet they are all not the same 'thing' at all. Something
>became something else and an entirely new range of components
>and relationships arise. Is ethics orthogonal to how a
>scientist can perform research upon each of the above things?
You are really not saying anything that disagrees with what I wrote.
Ethics is not applicable to science, but it might be a question for
the procedures used by some scientists. But in that case it is not
the science (the knowledge) that is unethical. It is the scientist
whose ethics need to be evaluated.
>Jorgenson:
>You missed my point. Value assignment in yet undetermined
>circumstances might be an important part of intelligence.
That might be. But that value assignment is not itself part of
science, and scientists are not necessarily the most appropriate
people to make that assignment.
>Ethics is that part of philosophy associated with value
>assignments.
I haven't much studied the writings of philosophers on ethics. But,
given that they make such a mess of everything else they study, my
expectations would be low. Questions of ethics should be the concern
of the community as a whole, rather than of some smaller subgroup
(whether scientists, philosophers, or devotees of a particular
religion).
> I guess we could argue about whether scientists
>are working to create or discover artificial intelligence just
>as someone 'discovered' plastics and 'discovered' transistors
>if you want to look at it that way. Any AI as created or
>discovered that employs 'ethics' displays that ethics is not
>orthogonal to that mechanism.
The science is the investigation of the nature of intelligence. Any
actual construction of an artificial intelligence goes beyond the
science, and so might raise ethical questions.
> The proposal that ethics is
>orthogonal to science is a fantasy. Choosing to perform
>'science' instead of teaching or being a cook or being
>a lawyer or being a jewel thief involves ethical
>decision making.
One does not perform science. One may perform research, and of
course there could be ethical question about how that research is
performed. But the questions should be about the methods followed,
rather than about the knowledge sought.
>I agree that ethics is considered irrelevant within causal
>mechanisms by scientists. Science, I am sure you agree, is not
>a causal mechanism and instead is a haphazard human
>endeavor and it does require and does involve ethics.
We disagree on the meanings of the words involved. You are using
'science' where I would use 'the practices of scientists'.
>How can researchers rely so heavily upon ethics in their
>endeavors to act intelligently and then blithely assume that
>they can simply ignore ethics when it comes to designing AI?
At the current state of knowledge, there are no ethical questions in
designing an AI system other than those which apply to computer
programming in general.
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Jorgenson:
>Purpose and nature and ethics
>One sub-branch of any formal philosophy involves
>ethics. Science ignores ethics as irrelevant
>as formal systems by observation and definition
>cannot behave improperly. The concepts of good
>and bad are foreign to current scientific theories.
Rickert:
Science ignores ethics, because science is concerned with causal
mechanisms.
Jorgenson:
I accept your rephrasing as totally accurate though Longley
would complain about making unsubstantiated interpretations.
I warn you that I was vaccinated with a phonograph needle
recently and so my responses will go on and on.
Rickert:
However, scientists do not all ignore ethics, and some
scientists have ended up in the doghouse for their insistence
that ethics be a consideration in how we exploit those mechanisms.
Jorgenson:
Hmmm. I suppose one can only speak about something that one
knows something about and so who except the scientists involved
with the discovered mechanisms could make ethical statements
about those mechanisms? The initial DNA research prompted
serious and extended discussions regarding safety back in
the 1970s and the scientific community chose to set its
own guidelines to avert non-scientists from setting guidelines.
Cloning and AI and other adventures shall redefine the meaning
and limits of many concepts. When does a cell become an
embryo become a fetus become an infant become a toddler
become a child become an adolescent become an adult become
a corpse become a fossil? It is all the same 'thing' and
yet they are all not the same 'thing' at all. Something
became something else and an entirely new range of components
and relationships arise. Is ethics orthogonal to how a
scientist can perform research upon each of the above things?
Baloney.
>The question becomes whether good and bad exist
>and were discovered or whether good and bad
>are arbitrarily assigned attributes.
Rickert:
I think you miss an important point. Namely, what is discovered by
scientists is nearly orthogonal to the questions handled by ethics.
Jorgenson:
You missed my point. Value assignment in yet undetermined
circumstances might be an important part of intelligence.
Ethics is that part of philosophy associated with value
assignments. I guess we could argue about whether scientists
are working to create or discover artificial intelligence just
as someone 'discovered' plastics and 'discovered' transistors
if you want to look at it that way. Any AI as created or
discovered that employs 'ethics' displays that ethics is not
orthogonal to that mechanism.
Also, scientists may certainly play pretend that they are
not humans doing science and that they are scientists and
yet you and I and they and everyone else knows that they
are just play pretending and that they are just humans
like the rest of us. The proposal that ethics is
orthogonal to science is a fantasy. Choosing to perform
'science' instead of teaching or being a cook or being
a lawyer or being a jewel thief involves ethical
decision making. How could some scientists become
businessmen or politicians or public spokesmen or
administrators if they had actually avoided ethics
as orthogonal for their entire professional career?
I agree that ethics is considered irrelevant within causal
mechanisms by scientists. Science, I am sure you agree, is not
a causal mechanism and instead is a haphazard human
endeavor and it does require and does involve ethics.
How can researchers rely so heavily upon ethics in their
endeavors to act intelligently and then blithely assume that
they can simply ignore ethics when it comes to designing AI?
We have a nasty little circle here where one could posit
the scientists are being unethical by creating AI without
ethics so to speak. One must keep the different levels
distinct as I fully support the attempt to create/discover
AI. I think any AI entity shall include ethical evaluation
as a component of its cognitive capabilities anyway
as it apparently a large aspect of intelligence.
Some folks would rather use the phrase 'value assignment'
instead of 'ethics' and they do a disservice where the
word 'ethics' provides a clearer insight into the
complexity and difficulty of designing mechanisms that
can perform 'value assignment'. Also, ethics is
human level value assignment and I suggest that AI
entities should included human level value assignments
or the results could be unintelligible to humans and/or
at odds with the held values of humans.
So there!
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Rickert:
You are really not saying anything that disagrees with what I wrote.
Ethics is not applicable to science, but it might be a question for
the procedures used by some scientists. But in that case it is not
the science (the knowledge) that is unethical. It is the scientist
whose ethics need to be evaluated.
>Jorgenson:
>You missed my point. Value assignment in yet undetermined
>circumstances might be an important part of intelligence.
Rickert:
That might be. But that value assignment is not itself part of
science, and scientists are not necessarily the most appropriate
people to make that assignment.
Jorgenson:
I see where we are going past each other. The assignment of
value is unavoidably a human level event. Any value assignment
and not just that value assignment. Presumably this includes
values assigned by choice that can be articulated to others
where otherwise the value is discovered and not assigned.
I wrote previously:
>Ethics is that part of philosophy associated with value
>assignments.
Rickert:
I haven't much studied the writings of philosophers on ethics. But,
given that they make such a mess of everything else they study, my
expectations would be low. Questions of ethics should be the concern
of the community as a whole, rather than of some smaller subgroup
(whether scientists, philosophers, or devotees of a particular
religion).
Jorgenson:
I am discussing the assignment of value to data or evidence
or theories or experiments as being ethics. Previously it
was unethical to dismiss the concept of God when discussing
astronomy as God had placed us at the center of the Universe.
Subsequently it is now unethical for scientists to use the
concept of God in that area of research. Similarly it was
ethical to discuss and experiment upon the aether and now
it is unethical to proceed as if the aether exists. Slavery
is considered ethical according to many sacred texts including
the Bible and yet now slavery is considered unethical. Dennett
and Minksy and others are suggesting that the concepts of
love and free will are illusions and so it would be unethical
to proceed as if love and free will actually existed. The
suggestion that scientific statements are objective and
offered to the subjective folks is a lie. Any statement
made by an individual is a subjective statement that
incorporates intimately the ethics held by the speaker.
>I guess we could argue about whether scientists
>are working to create or discover artificial intelligence just
>as someone 'discovered' plastics and 'discovered' transistors
>if you want to look at it that way. Any AI as created or
>discovered that employs 'ethics' displays that ethics is not
>orthogonal to that mechanism.
Rickert:
The science is the investigation of the nature of intelligence. Any
actual construction of an artificial intelligence goes beyond the
science, and so might raise ethical questions.
Jorgenson:
Right. In the creation a new arena arises that is a discovery.
> The proposal that ethics is
>orthogonal to science is a fantasy. Choosing to perform
>'science' instead of teaching or being a cook or being
>a lawyer or being a jewel thief involves ethical
>decision making.
Rickert:
One does not perform science. One may perform research, and of
course there could be ethical question about how that research is
performed. But the questions should be about the methods followed,
rather than about the knowledge sought.
Jorgenson:
So, the scientific method is a technique that any ethical or
unethical person can pursue? Why not accept tainted or
skewed data and offer it as the proper state of affairs?
That would be unethical as it would not reveal an accurate
accounting of the state of affairs. Why not fudge the data
to make it fit the model of rational choice? I see the
wide line that separates ethics from actual research and
yet I do not think that any humans could make any choices
lacking the power to assign values and that is ethics.
>I agree that ethics is considered irrelevant within causal
>mechanisms by scientists. Science, I am sure you agree, is not
>a causal mechanism and instead is a haphazard human
>endeavor and it does require and does involve ethics.
Rickert:
We disagree on the meanings of the words involved. You are using
'science' where I would use 'the practices of scientists'.
Jorgenson:
Ok. Then what is your definition of science if it is not the
researching and investigative actions of folks using
scientific methods?
>How can researchers rely so heavily upon ethics in their
>endeavors to act intelligently and then blithely assume that
>they can simply ignore ethics when it comes to designing AI?
Rickert:
At the current state of knowledge, there are no ethical questions in
designing an AI system other than those which apply to computer
programming in general.
Jorgenson:
Ok. If we had a good value assignment mechanism say like
a good search engine weighting software program for the
description of articles to aide searches then scientists could
use that value assignment mechanism to evaluate data for
theories and pertinence.
The problem of ethics and value assignment is the same problem,
the exact same problem. Ethics is Value Assignment.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>Jorgenson:
>I am discussing the assignment of value to data or evidence
>or theories or experiments as being ethics.
That is surely wrong. Most large businesses pay employees to regularly
backup their computers. This is evidence that they place value on
the data. But this assignment of value to the data has nothing to
do with ethics.
> Previously it
>was unethical to dismiss the concept of God when discussing
>astronomy as God had placed us at the center of the Universe.
I don't believe that was ever unethical. It may have been heresy,
but that is not the same as ethics.
> Similarly it was
>ethical to discuss and experiment upon the aether and now
>it is unethical to proceed as if the aether exists.
Sorry, but there is nothing unethical about assuming the aether
exists, although it might be unscientific.
> Dennett
>and Minksy and others are suggesting that the concepts of
>love and free will are illusions and so it would be unethical
>to proceed as if love and free will actually existed.
On my reading of "Elbow Room," I don't see Dennett claiming that free
will is an illusion. Neither Dennett nor Minsky would claim that
there are ethical problems in acting as if free will actually
existed.
>Jorgenson:
>So, the scientific method is a technique that any ethical or
>unethical person can pursue?
Right.
> Why not accept tainted or
>skewed data and offer it as the proper state of affairs?
To accept bad skewed data would be unscientific. To misrepresent
such data to other scientists would constitute an ethical problem.
The ethical problem is not in the data, nor in the science, but in
the misrepresentation of that data.
> Why not fudge the data
>to make it fit the model of rational choice?
That happens regularly. There is a whole discipline, namely the
philosophy of science, based on this practice. But if their doing
this is a matter of self delusion, rather than of deliberate
misrepresentation, I don't believe there is an ethical problem.
>The problem of ethics and value assignment is the same problem,
>the exact same problem. Ethics is Value Assignment.
Clearly not.
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote in part:
>Previously it
>was unethical to dismiss the concept of God when discussing
>astronomy as God had placed us at the center of the Universe.
Rickert:
I don't believe that was ever unethical. It may have been heresy,
but that is not the same as ethics.
Jorgenson:
You are quibbling to enhance your approach at the expense
of viewing the matter from my approach.
>Similarly it was
>ethical to discuss and experiment upon the aether and now
>it is unethical to proceed as if the aether exists.
Rickert:
Sorry, but there is nothing unethical about assuming the aether
exists, although it might be unscientific.
Jorgenson:
Try this. You assert that in religion unethical behavior
is called heresy and that in science unethical behavior
is called unscientific behavior. In both situations the
established values are being ignored and novel value
assignments are in play. Why do you resist the use
of the word ethics for such circumstances?
>Dennett
>and Minksy and others are suggesting that the concepts of
>love and free will are illusions and so it would be unethical
>to proceed as if love and free will actually existed.
Rickert:
On my reading of "Elbow Room," I don't see Dennett claiming
that free will is an illusion.
Jorgenson:
You are correct and my statement was a generalization.
I should have made two separate statements where Dennett informed
us that love is an illusion and Minsky informs us that free will
is a myth.
Rickert:
Neither Dennett nor Minsky would claim that there are ethical
problems in acting as if free will actually existed.
Jorgenson:
You are leading away from our discussion of science. To use
your approach: Is it scientific to do scientific research
of cognition acting as if free will and love actually existed?
To use my language: Is it ethical to hold the fact that love
and free will are imaginary and then ignore that fact during
the course of research?
>So, the scientific method is a technique that any ethical or
>unethical person can pursue?
Rickert:
Right.
Jorgenson:
I disagree. Unless the actor holds and is using the values
of science then they are not doing science.
> Why not accept tainted or
>skewed data and offer it as the proper state of affairs?
Rickert:
To accept bad skewed data would be unscientific. To misrepresent
such data to other scientists would constitute an ethical problem.
The ethical problem is not in the data, nor in the science, but in
the misrepresentation of that data.
Jorgenson:
The word unscientific has no foundation by itself and implicitly
holds that science has values and those values have been
assigned by humans and that it unacceptable to ignore those
values as a matter of ethics.
>The problem of ethics and value assignment is the same problem,
>the exact same problem. Ethics is Value Assignment.
Rickert:
Clearly not.
Jorgenson:
Ok. Fine. There is no ethical problem in acting as if
free will and love exist despite the statements of
experts to the contrary.
And so there is no ethical problem in you and I acting
as if Ethics is Value Assignment despite your statement
to the contrary.
What are the implications for creating an AI entity
that can make intelligent value assignments if value
assignment is indeed a matter of ethics where
personal choices are being made?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote in part:
>Jorgenson:
>Try this. You assert that in religion unethical behavior
>is called heresy and that in science unethical behavior
>is called unscientific behavior.
No, I don't assert that at all.
There would be nothing unethical in a science teacher discussing the
phlogiston theory in class, even though that theory is considered
unscientific. It would be unethical for the science teacher to
present the phlogiston theory as accepted science, for that would be
deception.
There would be nothing unethical with a theologian presenting a
heresy to her students, perhaps playing devils advocate to encourage
analysis. It would be unethical to present that heresy as accepted
theology, for that would be deception.
>Rickert:
>Neither Dennett nor Minsky would claim that there are ethical
>problems in acting as if free will actually existed.
>Jorgenson:
>You are leading away from our discussion of science. To use
>your approach: Is it scientific to do scientific research
>of cognition acting as if free will and love actually existed?
I would have thought it impossible to do scientific research at all
without acting as if free will existed.
>Rickert:
>To accept bad skewed data would be unscientific. To misrepresent
>such data to other scientists would constitute an ethical problem.
>The ethical problem is not in the data, nor in the science, but in
>the misrepresentation of that data.
>Jorgenson:
>The word unscientific has no foundation by itself and implicitly
>holds that science has values and those values have been
>assigned by humans and that it unacceptable to ignore those
>values as a matter of ethics.
I guess a thermodynamicist is somebody who calls length
'temperature', while an economist is somebody who calls length
'assets.' But surely this is silly. We can assign values on the
length axis, on the temperature axis or on the assets axis. We
assign values in multi-dimensional ways, and the 'scientific' axis is
not the same as the 'ethics' axis.
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> Jorgenson:
> What are the implications for creating an AI entity
> that can make intelligent value assignments if value
> assignment is indeed a matter of ethics where
> personal choices are being made?
I wonder if this is the same as a question I have been
asking myself: What are the implications of creating an AI
entity that *makes* intelligent value assignments? But
maybe we should return to your question because once
stripped of the entertainment value of the Jorgenson/Reikert
semantic shuffle, it is too frightening (at least to me)
especially if you believe that it is possible.
Ken Ewell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote in message
<6g9p44$4kh4$1...@newssvr04-int.news.prodigy.com
>The problem of ethics and value assignment is the same problem,
>the exact same problem. Ethics is Value Assignment.
>
This is really confusing. These are not the same things. Ethics
are principles or rules of conduct: manners. Principles or rules
are sometimes, but not always, deemed to be values by which
we measure. That does make value assignment the definition
of ethics. Any ethical topic is the reflection of a succession of
value assignments as I shall hope to show you.
I assume that we are talking about computers and in properly
representing things as they are. It really does not help to confuse
things so. In this case, 'manners' is enough definition for ethics as
'ethics' are the manner and condition of one's own conduct. (As
may be deemed acceptable conduct by the current laws and
trends of a society.) This is sometimes equated with morals and
right conduct. In any case, these 'ethics' do not stand alone but
they are held as common sense and standards to live by, among
communities -- that is what makes them standards or also values
by which to measure. In short: social manners and behavior.
What comes between the ethical and unethical is a matter of the
eternal balance and should not be the subject of concern.
Principles make good measures so people who measure hold
a few. Living in a community with others means one must be
prepared to accept a few more. Principles are wonderful things
because one can see how principled things have longer lives,
and better hold up to life's pressures, over those things that are
unprincipled. You do not need a textbook to verify this for
yourself. As ethics are not more than principles of conduct, it
follows that the unethical, like the unprincipled, will eventually
be discovered and exposed as fraudulent, corrupt, deficient,
degenerate, or otherwise unwanted.
Now who among you are without any manners? So we all
must admit to having them. Upon due consideration you will
find that those that you have are founded in some principle or
principles but you will probably also surmise that it is quite a
difficult and complex task to try and figure out the diverse
rules and standards one applies in their own behavior. Once
you try this you should come to recognize the power of the
sublime.
Rickert has already cleared up some of the confusion between
science and the scientist so I won't add more to that here. It
might be interesting to note at this juncture, however, that
modern, western, science was delayed several centuries by
the failure of Greek scientists to recognize and incorporate the
significance of the zero. The initial dismissal of the theoretical
zero may be forgiven as oversight and weakness of mind, or
blamed on arrogance, but the questions can arise: Was it
ethical for later researchers and scientists to continue to
refuse the zero? Or: Was it unethical for researchers and
scientists of the day to blindly rely on the opinion of the
expert of the day?
It might have also been a religious or political issue of the
time as adoption of the zero meant adopting the Arabic
numeral system. In either case:
What can be done about it now?
One cannot easily deny the existence of ethics.
Unethical and/or fraudulent behavior or practice is
outlawed almost universally. Yet it exists. Questions
of ethics continue to arise in all circles. It is a part
of life in all modern societies. Communities also
have courts and peer review and judges that
determine such issues.
Hence, I do not think this is an argument relevant to
computer intelligence, AI, or whatever you want to call it.
If only for the simple facts: There are already computer
programs in regular use that make "ethical-questionable"
value assignments and judgements; It is not peculiar to
AI or computer intelligence; Science is not exempt nor
immune to ethics; there are governing rules, bodies and
judges in every community.
Unethical or even fraudulent behavior can be programmed
into any system. Such systems may be very clever in
making judgements based upon combinations of answers
that you give. Credit evaluation systems come to mind.
How they are applied may raise ethical questions or not.
These are practical matters. If it comes to light that an
automatic credit evaluation system discriminates against
a class of people where such discrimination is against
the law then that system will soon be trashed.
We can take some comfort in knowing that whatever
is held to be "unethical" can only continue its existence
through secrecy or deception. Deception is not a difficult
art, it is just difficult to maintain. Many community
members consider it their responsibility to attend to and
protect the principles of their community. These people
will uncover and reveal deception wherever and whenever
it occurs. Unethical behavior will thereby be exposed.
A happy researcher would be satisfied when there would
be no secrets left to expose.
It might be enough to know that what is found to be
unethical will always succumb to the balance of what
is held to be ethical in any society. This without having
to know all the possible descriptions, definitions,
specifications and practices that might apply either way.
This, only because Ethic is indeed another name for a
principle, a principle dealing usually with manner,
conduct or practice.
Just as western science finally accepted the zero, any
unethical practice will be exposed as an unprincipled one
and will be eventually discontinued or terminated.
As for ethics in systems design, programming, or artificial
intelligence (AI):
If ever any "strong or weak AI" emerge, it will certainly not
be in a vacuum. It will participate, presumably, in society.
Ethical principles may be entirely dispensed with as a
matter of programming an autonomous AI because it can
be presumed that the AI must interact with and be accepted
by members of a community. I.e. it must have manners and
behave in an acceptable manner.
It is accepted, by the way, that the making of value
assignments is a fundamental aspect of intelligence. What
is at issue perhaps is at what level these assignments are
made. I am not sure 'level' is the right word here.
I am sure that the human mind cannot deal with complex
issues, at best, we can only deal with a few logical
positions in a short sequence and only two or three
operations at a time.
It is not possible that a human mind can deal with all
questions of ethics, or of free-will, or of love, at once.
As mostly feelings and opinion they do not make
good anchors as concepts. In fact, I believe, most
people are so confused about these things that they
would not be considered as values on which to place
any reliable measure, after little more than cursory
analysis.
On the other hand:
It is possible that the necessary assignments are made
at such a deep cognitive level that by the time you realize
that you have a question or concept of ethics, all the "value
assignments" have been made and the term ethics is only
the mark and the memory of all that came to be or occur
under its title and reign.
The nature of these assignments need not be based upon
nor equated with the subjective and more ephemeral ideas
of ethics or love or free will. This does not deny existence
of these ideas at all. Indeed, that we sum up these
principles of manner and behavior as 'ethics' is supposed
to be indicative of them, is it not?
I propose to you that what is called Ethics is the result of
many fine value assignments collectively reflected in
personal and social manner.
That is to say that there are much finer and far more
concrete properties and qualities to value that do not
depend on whatever emerges from them or whatever
that might be called. This is the stuff that is reflected
in the mirror of manner.
Ken Ewell/MITi
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>Jorgenson:
>Try this. You assert that in religion unethical behavior
>is called heresy and that in science unethical behavior
>is called unscientific behavior.
Rickert:
No, I don't assert that at all.
There would be nothing unethical in a science teacher discussing the
phlogiston theory in class, even though that theory is considered
unscientific. It would be unethical for the science teacher to
present the phlogiston theory as accepted science, for that would be
deception.
Jorgenson:
Forget teaching and suppose that scientist is performing
experiments as a matter of research that hold the phlogiston
theory. Is that science? Is that unethical? Is that
unscientific? Is it heresy?
Rickert:
There would be nothing unethical with a theologian presenting a
heresy to her students, perhaps playing devils advocate to encourage
analysis. It would be unethical to present that heresy as accepted
theology, for that would be deception.
Jorgenson:
Ok. Forget teaching again and consider praxis. Suppose a member
of a religion that forbids stealing steals. Was that behavior
unethical? Was it heresy? Is it unscientific? In both cases
assume you have individuals going against the established values
as a matter of actual behavior and not as an academic exercise.
Rickert:
>Neither Dennett nor Minsky would claim that there are ethical
>problems in acting as if free will actually existed.
Jorgenson:
>You are leading away from our discussion of science. To use
>your approach: Is it scientific to do scientific research
>of cognition acting as if free will and love actually existed?
Rickert:
I would have thought it impossible to do scientific research at all
without acting as if free will existed.
Jorgenson:
Oh you! Fine. Ok. I will refocus solely upon love and ask using
your approach whether it is scientific to do scientific research
upon cognition acting as if love actually existed now that Dennett
has formally proved that love is an illusion?
Rickert:
>To accept bad skewed data would be unscientific. To misrepresent
>such data to other scientists would constitute an ethical problem.
>The ethical problem is not in the data, nor in the science, but in
>the misrepresentation of that data.
Jorgenson:
>The word unscientific has no foundation by itself and implicitly
>holds that science has values and those values have been
>assigned by humans and that it unacceptable to ignore those
>values as a matter of ethics.
Rickert:
I guess a thermodynamicist is somebody who calls length
'temperature', while an economist is somebody who calls length
'assets.' But surely this is silly. We can assign values on the
length axis, on the temperature axis or on the assets axis. We
assign values in multi-dimensional ways, and the 'scientific' axis is
not the same as the 'ethics' axis.
Jorgenson:
I am not concerned with details of dimensionality or quantification
or area of interest. I am focused upon that area called evaluation
where evaluations are made. Science has existing evaluations
that current scientists use to direct their actions. Both
astronomy and astrology rely upon mathematical calculations
involving the actual position and movement of celestial
bodies over the course of an assumed standard flow of time.
That is quite a few shared values. Current scientists find
it unethical or unscientific to correlate those values with
expected implications for individuals. The position of
the Planet Mars is not a salient topic except for folks
that wish to view or land upon Mars or use Mars as a
gravity point to slingshot some space device. The position
of Mars could make two or more astronomers fight over the
use of the telescope and thus an astrology implication
does arise as matter of scientific fact.
Let us take your assertion that the scientific axis is
not the same as the ethics axis. You take that as a
scientific statement. I see that clearly as an ethical
announcement.
You say large corporations buy data storage facilities
as a matter of logic and not as a matter of ethics. I
say that choosing to buy data storage facilities instead
of choosing say to buy medicine for poor sick folks is a
matter of ethics. A response that in the long run
the data storage facilities will allow the purchase
of medicine for poor folks does not assist the current
sick poor folks at all. It is certainly an ethical
decision to plan for future assistance or denying of
assistance to other humans.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
"Seth Russell" <seth...@clickshop.com> wrote:
> Jorgenson:
> What are the implications for creating an AI entity
> that can make intelligent value assignments if value
> assignment is indeed a matter of ethics where
> personal choices are being made?
Seth:
I wonder if this is the same as a question I have been
asking myself: What are the implications of creating an AI
entity that *makes* intelligent value assignments? But
maybe we should return to your question because once
stripped of the entertainment value of the Jorgenson/Rickert
semantic shuffle, it is too frightening (at least to me)
especially if you believe that it is possible.
Jorgenson:
Given the examples of diversity and cleverness that I
encounter in my life I certainly think it is possible
for such an AI entity to be created. The word 'boon'
is probably too strong a word as values are funny
things. The idea of gender equity has been around
for 100 years and most folks have still not warmed
to the idea. The same with race equity and honest
resource distribution. Any value insights provided
by a computer shall likewise not be accepted directly
at face value and shall be incorporated over time
if they are indeed applicable.
Businesses and individuals junk cars and machinery
when they have outlived their usefulness as a matter
of economy and necessity where useful cars and machinery
are needed. That is probably the logical and reasonable
and sensible thing to do with many old folks and any
computer must realize that money and resources are not
the bottom line. Ethics involves acknowledging that
the bottom line is an abstract arena rather than
a concrete foundation.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
mit...@readware.com wrote in part:
Jorgenson:
>The problem of ethics and value assignment is the same problem,
>the exact same problem. Ethics is Value Assignment.
>
Ken:
This is really confusing. These are not the same things. Ethics
are principles or rules of conduct: manners. Principles or rules
are sometimes, but not always, deemed to be values by which
we measure. That does make value assignment the definition
of ethics. Any ethical topic is the reflection of a succession of
value assignments as I shall hope to show you.
Jorgenson:
Science is a human area of endeavor marked by having specific
principles or rules of conduct. The suggestion that science
somehow is isolated from and does not involve ethics is
silly. Scientists are humans engaged in actions and you and
Rickert wish to assure me that those actions are not governed
or include ethics. That is preposterous.
Ken:
I assume that we are talking about computers and in properly
representing things as they are. It really does not help to confuse
things so. In this case, 'manners' is enough definition for ethics as
'ethics' are the manner and condition of one's own conduct. (As
may be deemed acceptable conduct by the current laws and
trends of a society.) This is sometimes equated with morals and
right conduct. In any case, these 'ethics' do not stand alone but
they are held as common sense and standards to live by, among
communities -- that is what makes them standards or also values
by which to measure. In short: social manners and behavior.
Jorgenson:
It is certainly bad manners for computers to halt when offended
and there is a concerted attempt to find out how to give
computers good manners or at least make them less thin skinned.
Ken:
What comes between the ethical and unethical is a matter of the
eternal balance and should not be the subject of concern.
Jorgenson:
Ok. I agree let us not discuss the eternal balance at this
juncture.
Ken:
Principles make good measures so people who measure hold
a few. Living in a community with others means one must be
prepared to accept a few more. Principles are wonderful things
because one can see how principled things have longer lives,
and better hold up to life's pressures, over those things that are
unprincipled. You do not need a textbook to verify this for
yourself. As ethics are not more than principles of conduct, it
follows that the unethical, like the unprincipled, will eventually
be discovered and exposed as fraudulent, corrupt, deficient,
degenerate, or otherwise unwanted.
Jorgenson:
What name shall we use for Newton and his deficient theory
of physics?
Ken:
Now who among you are without any manners? So we all
must admit to having them. Upon due consideration you will
find that those that you have are founded in some principle or
principles but you will probably also surmise that it is quite a
difficult and complex task to try and figure out the diverse
rules and standards one applies in their own behavior. Once
you try this you should come to recognize the power of the
sublime.
Jorgenson:
Now, we agreed not to discuss the eternal balance and let us
keep to our agreement as a matter of principle.
Ken:
Rickert has already cleared up some of the confusion between
science and the scientist so I won't add more to that here.
Jorgenson:
Certainly not to my satisfaction. He has scientists
floating in the objective arena with no ethical
subjective foundation to tether the scientist to
the rest of humanity.
Try this:
> What are the implications for creating an AI entity
> that can make intelligent value assignments if value
> assignment is indeed a matter of ethics where
> personal choices are being made?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>Rickert:
>There would be nothing unethical in a science teacher discussing the
>phlogiston theory in class, even though that theory is considered
>unscientific. It would be unethical for the science teacher to
>present the phlogiston theory as accepted science, for that would be
>deception.
>Jorgenson:
>Forget teaching and suppose that scientist is performing
>experiments as a matter of research that hold the phlogiston
>theory. Is that science? Is that unethical? Is that
>unscientific? Is it heresy?
It is not science; it is not unethical; it is not heresy.
>Rickert:
>There would be nothing unethical with a theologian presenting a
>heresy to her students, perhaps playing devils advocate to encourage
>analysis. It would be unethical to present that heresy as accepted
>theology, for that would be deception.
>Jorgenson:
>Ok. Forget teaching again and consider praxis. Suppose a member
>of a religion that forbids stealing steals. Was that behavior
>unethical? Was it heresy? Is it unscientific? In both cases
>assume you have individuals going against the established values
>as a matter of actual behavior and not as an academic exercise.
It is unethical; it is not heresy; it is neither scientific nor
unscientific.
>Rickert:
>I would have thought it impossible to do scientific research at all
>without acting as if free will existed.
>Jorgenson:
>Oh you! Fine. Ok. I will refocus solely upon love and ask using
>your approach whether it is scientific to do scientific research
>upon cognition acting as if love actually existed now that Dennett
>has formally proved that love is an illusion?
I'm not familiar with Dennett's position on love. However, if
Dennett has formally proved that love is an illusion, then his proof
must be about some formal concept of 'love'. Since the concept of
'love' that I use is not formal, Dennett's proof would seem to have
little relevance to real life.
>Jorgenson:
>I am not concerned with details of dimensionality or quantification
>or area of interest. I am focused upon that area called evaluation
>where evaluations are made.
Evaluations are being made all the time, and most of those
evaluations have nothing to do with ethics.
>Let us take your assertion that the scientific axis is
>not the same as the ethics axis. You take that as a
>scientific statement. I see that clearly as an ethical
>announcement.
You are free to take it either way.
>You say large corporations buy data storage facilities
>as a matter of logic and not as a matter of ethics. I
No. I say that they do it as a matter of economics and not as a
matter of ethics.
> I
>say that choosing to buy data storage facilities instead
>of choosing say to buy medicine for poor sick folks is a
>matter of ethics.
You are quite right. It would be highly unethical (and illegal) for
the bank to use its assets to buy medicine at the cost of failing to
maintain the records of the account balances of its account holders.
This could be considered a case of embezzlement.
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>Ken:
>Rickert has already cleared up some of the confusion between
>science and the scientist so I won't add more to that here.
>Jorgenson:
>Certainly not to my satisfaction. He has scientists
>floating in the objective arena with no ethical
>subjective foundation to tether the scientist to
>the rest of humanity.
Not so. Most scientists have their feet firmly on the ground. It is
Jorgenson who is floating around in never never land without a
tether.
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>Jorgenson:
>Forget teaching and suppose that scientist is performing
>experiments as a matter of research that hold the phlogiston
>theory. Is that science? Is that unethical? Is that
>unscientific? Is it heresy?
Rickert:
It is not science; it is not unethical; it is not heresy.
Jorgenson:
Who are the folks that are allowed to announce something
is science or is not science? They are the same kind
of folks in a religion who announce that something is
a heresy or not a heresy. They are the same kind of
folks who make announcements whether something is
ethical or unethical. We are talking about making
judgments based on established values and in that
sense we have judges, actual judges implementing ethics.
>You say large corporations buy data storage facilities
>as a matter of economics and not as a matter of ethics. I
>say that choosing to buy data storage facilities instead
>of choosing say to buy medicine for poor sick folks is a
>matter of ethics.
Rickert:
You are quite right. It would be highly unethical (and illegal) for
the bank to use its assets to buy medicine at the cost of failing to
maintain the records of the account balances of its account holders.
This could be considered a case of embezzlement.
Jorgenson:
Should the bank purchase a minimum device and give the rest
of the available money to charity or buy the super-duper
top of the line bells and whistles device to meet their
fiduciary responsibilities? I bet the first option is
not even considered and that is an ethical decision on
the part of the corporation policy makers.
I fail to see you resistance to my insistence that
making judgement calls is a matter of ethics where
values are assigned. Whether something is science or
not science is never an objective determination.
How could a scientist choose to perform an experiment
that is known to be unscientific unless that scientist
had chosen to be unethical?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>Ken:
>Rickert has already cleared up some of the confusion between
>science and the scientist so I won't add more to that here.
>Jorgenson:
>Certainly not to my satisfaction. He has scientists
>floating in the objective arena with no ethical
>subjective foundation to tether the scientist to
>the rest of humanity.
Rickert:
Not so. Most scientists have their feet firmly on the ground.
It is Jorgenson who is floating around in never never land
without a tether.
Jorgenson:
The guy who discovered germs was considered a quack who
was not performing science. Subsequent developments revealed
who was the quack. Your inability to recognize that science
intimately involves ethics shall reveal you to be a quack.
Ethics involves the assignment of value where something is
either acceptable or unacceptable. The phrases acceptable
and unacceptable can be translated respectfully into
specific communities where the science community label
them as scientific or unscientific and in an ethical
community as ethical or unethical and in a religious
community as valid or heresy and in the logical community
as logical or illogical.
Your resistance to my proposal that folks make judgement
calls based on established values is ludicrous and at
odds with simple observation. Ethics is an intimate
part of science.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
sfri...@americasttv.com wrote:
Jorgenson:
>Forget teaching and suppose that scientist is performing
>experiments as a matter of research that hold the phlogiston
>theory. Is that science?
Friesen:
Probably not, at least not in this century.
Jorgenson:
>Is that unethical?
Friesen:
No.
Jorgenson:
Suppose I had submitted a request for monies to a group
to perform that experiment and I knew the group did
not have scientists vetting the requests?
>I am not concerned with details of dimensionality or quantification
>or area of interest. I am focused upon that area called evaluation
>where evaluations are made. Science has existing evaluations
>that current scientists use to direct their actions. Both
>astronomy and astrology rely upon mathematical calculations
>involving the actual position and movement of celestial
>bodies over the course of an assumed standard flow of time.
>That is quite a few shared values. Current scientists find
>it unethical or unscientific to correlate those values with
>expected implications for individuals.
Friesen:
It is unscientific because science works on the asusmption that
reality is as it is, regardless of human desires.
Jorgenson:
I concur that believing something so does not make it so.
The gravity of the moon obviously effects the tides and
so there is precedent for celestial bodies to have direct
effects upon objects on Earth. Astronomers minimize that
impact while astrologers maximize that impact in a manner
of speaking.
> The position of
>the Planet Mars is not a salient topic except for folks
>that wish to view or land upon Mars or use Mars as a
>gravity point to slingshot some space device. The position
>of Mars could make two or more astronomers fight over the
>use of the telescope and thus an astrology implication
>does arise as matter of scientific fact.
Friesen:
How does this become astrological? A personal conflict over
resource utilization is NOT what astrology is about!
Jorgenson:
I was being facetious where an astrologer predicting
interpersonal conflict due to the position of Mars would
be correct for that limited, exceptional circumstance.
>Let us take your assertion that the scientific axis is
>not the same as the ethics axis. You take that as a
>scientific statement. I see that clearly as an ethical
>announcement.
Friesen:
I take it as neither. It is a statement about *definitions*.
One might almost call it a "mathematical" statement (well, not
quite).
Jorgenson:
You lost me. I have no idea what you intended to say other
than the statement was neither a scientific nor ethical
announcement.
Friesen:
The *definition* of science is one thing, the *definition* of
ethics is something else. So, *by* *definition*, the two
represent different axes.
You are about the only person I have ever seen who seems to think
they are equivalent.
Jorgenson:
Science directly involves making value assignments and ethics
is that portion of philosophy involving making value assignments.
1+1=2 is acceptable. 1+1=3 is unacceptable. Your early teachers
taught you that 1+1=2 is good and 1+1=3 is bad.
>You say large corporations buy data storage facilities
>as a matter of logic and not as a matter of ethics.
Friesen:
Actually, I would say they do it as a matter of self-interest -
to make money. I am not sure that really counts as logic, except
in so far as they use logic to determine what behaviors promote
profit.
Jorgenson:
Ok. Is self-interest a matter of ethics or science?
> I
>say that choosing to buy data storage facilities instead
>of choosing say to buy medicine for poor sick folks is a
>matter of ethics.
Friesen:
Ah, but that is at a different level of description. That
decision has already been made when the corporation is formed. A
corporation is created for a specific purpose. Some are created
to make money by selling widgets, others to make money by selling
qizmos, and others to buy medicine for the poor. A corporation
whose business is selling widgets has no business buying medicine
for the poor unless doing so helps sell widgets.
Jorgenson:
You are correct. Ethical decisions underlie and are an intimate
component of all decisions makings. That is my point.
Friesen:
The ethical decision comes in more at the level of deciding which
corporations to invest in, or which ones to work for, or which
ones to buy from.
Jorgenson:
Right. Scientists accept the notion of good science and
then proceed without questioning those notions again and
that is an ethics founded situation.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>>Jorgenson:
>>Forget teaching and suppose that scientist is performing
>>experiments as a matter of research that hold the phlogiston
>>theory. Is that science? Is that unethical? Is that
>>unscientific? Is it heresy?
>Rickert:
>It is not science; it is not unethical; it is not heresy.
>Jorgenson:
>Who are the folks that are allowed to announce something
>is science or is not science? They are the same kind
>of folks in a religion who announce that something is
>a heresy or not a heresy.
No, it's not the same kind of thing at all. When J.B. Priestley was
working on phlogiston, he was doing science. It is just that we know
more today, and would not value that kind of work. But if a somebody
decided to work on phlogiston, they would not be burned at the stake
or suffer other reprisals. They would be unlikely to get any
publication past peer review, however, unless they come up with some
pretty solid evidence.
> They are the same kind of
>folks who make announcements whether something is
>ethical or unethical.
No, it is not the same thing at all.
> We are talking about making
>judgments based on established values and in that
>sense we have judges, actual judges implementing ethics.
You are very confused about the meaning of "ethics."
>>You say large corporations buy data storage facilities
>>as a matter of economics and not as a matter of ethics. I
>>say that choosing to buy data storage facilities instead
>>of choosing say to buy medicine for poor sick folks is a
>>matter of ethics.
>Rickert:
>You are quite right. It would be highly unethical (and illegal) for
>the bank to use its assets to buy medicine at the cost of failing to
>maintain the records of the account balances of its account holders.
>This could be considered a case of embezzlement.
>Jorgenson:
>Should the bank purchase a minimum device and give the rest
>of the available money to charity or buy the super-duper
>top of the line bells and whistles device to meet their
>fiduciary responsibilities? I bet the first option is
>not even considered and that is an ethical decision on
>the part of the corporation policy makers.
No, it is not an ethical decision. It is a business decision. If a
business does decide to donate to charity, that too is a business
decision, perhaps an investment in a better public image.
>I fail to see you resistance to my insistence that
>making judgement calls is a matter of ethics where
>values are assigned.
I resist because you are wrong.
> Whether something is science or
>not science is never an objective determination.
Perhaps that is right.
>How could a scientist choose to perform an experiment
>that is known to be unscientific unless that scientist
>had chosen to be unethical?
I can't think of any example where performing an experiment would be
unscientific.
Neil Rickert
LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>Jorgenson:
>The guy who discovered germs was considered a quack who
>was not performing science. Subsequent developments revealed
>who was the quack. Your inability to recognize that science
>intimately involves ethics shall reveal you to be a quack.
That some scientists are considered quacks does not make their work
unscientific or unethical. The peer review process is imperfect.
But that does not make the peer reviewers unscientific or unethical.
Your perspective on science is too limited.
>Ethics involves the assignment of value where something is
>either acceptable or unacceptable.
There are many cases of acceptable or unacceptable where no
ethical questions are involved.
>Your resistance to my proposal that folks make judgement
>calls based on established values is ludicrous and at
>odds with simple observation.
I haven't objected to that. I have simply pointed out that most of
these judgements are not matters of ethics.