science and objective reality
JPL Verhey
experience of seeing a tree out there and others nearby report seeing
that tree as well (while none of us is drunk or on lsd hallucinating)..
it is agreed upon instantly and implicitly that there really is an
object out there, that via our senses and after a lot of complex brain
process results in the visual experience of seeing a tree.
Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that can
corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar enough
way (visually or otherwise). If we agree that we look at the same thing
out there (or just look in the same direction) and one reports clearly
seeing a tree, but another reports seeing nothing at all and a third
sees only an elephant with chocolate ears.. then there would be not much
to do science on. But with organising more "witnesses" such as also
photo cameras and other detection devices.. we might in the end come to
some conclude about what is out there, if anything at all. It would
then, in principle, also be possible to try find out why some see a
tree, while others don't and just see elephants.. and perhaps some
others only see chocolate midgets. Science therefor builds first of all
on common experience and from *there* infers and constructs the percept
of an objective reality, included finding explanations of how it can be
that most have *similar* experiences (needed for any science to be
possible) whilst some have deviating experiences - from color-blindness
to complete hallucinations.
One mistake is, as said many times and by many people, to eliminate the
experiential "interface" from which, in fact, objective reality is
inferred (in a common project). That naive form of realism called
eliminativism, is scientific suicide. The naive scientist believes he
has a "god-view" that sees an objective reality as-is. (a side track:
interestingly enough such "god-view" scientists have a particular
allergy towards religion, gods and "minds") This is as suicidal as it is
unscientific.
Another mistake is to take "what is observed" as the objective source
material that generates experiences in brains at *later* moment. There
surely is an objective source material that at one point generates
experiences in brains, but the mistake is to place "what is observed"
(brains, neurons etc) at moment t(1) and try to make experience happen
at t(2). The causal arrow is simply reversed here, with hard-problems /
"explanation-gaps" as a result. When the brain is engaged in the
activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees, brains..) is
1) an internal representation of what is seen, ie a percept that occurs
in someones brain, and 2) it represents the thing seen as it was *a
short time ago* (50 milliseconds I believe). This means for instance
that when my brain is engaged in seeing itself.. of course I don't see
the activity engaged in the seeing because the internal representation
represents past events.
The above means that to figure out how objective source material
generates experiences in/by human brains (source material both in the
environment and bodybrain) you should not take what is observed as step
one and then try to arrive at experience at step 100 (forward causality)
.. but take experience as step 100 and then "back-track" via step 99,
98... the sources at step 1. That is an abtract journey because of
course we can't really do backward time travel, but it is the right
direction as opposed to abstracting "forward" which is what most
philosophers and scientists do trying to get experience out of observed
materials.
JPL Verhey
Where I wrote:
" When the brain is engaged in the activity of seeing, "what is seen"
(whatever it is..trees, brains..) is 1) an internal representation of
what is seen, ie a percept that occurs in someones brain, and 2) it
represents the thing seen as it was *a short time ago* (50 milliseconds
I believe). This means for instance
that when my brain is engaged in seeing itself.. of course I don't see
the activity engaged in the seeing because the internal representation
represents past events."
.. those (rather obvious) reasons of why we don't observe experiences in
our own or other peoples brain's.. don't negate (on the contrary) the
fact that experiential brain activity is as objectively real and
"available" to science as any other percept.
Neil W Rickert
>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences.
I think that's a misuse of "infer".
>Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that can
>corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar enough
>way (visually or otherwise).
No, it doesn't work that way. It couldn't work that way.
Suppose that whenever I saw a tree, you would see a zebra (if you were
in the same place and looking in the same direction). Maybe your
brain just worked that way, so that whatever visual input caused me
to see a tree would actually cause you to see a zebra.
Suppose, furthermore, that it has always been that way.
During my early youth, I heard people using the word "tree" whenever
I saw that tree. Similarly, during your early youth, you might have
heard people use the word "tree" whenever you saw that zebra.
So we would both describe our experience as seeing a tree, even
though I saw a tree but you saw a zebra.
We cannot compare our experiences. We can compare what we say about
them. In particular, science does not require that two or more
witnesses experience the same thing in a similar enough way. It
depends only on their agreement on how to give a public description
of what was experienced.
>One mistake is, as said many times and by many people, to eliminate the
>experiential "interface" from which, in fact, objective reality is
>inferred (in a common project). That naive form of realism called
>eliminativism, is scientific suicide.
Maybe this is a language dispute.
It seems to me that the position you have been advocating above is
that of eliminativism. And the position you have been criticising
would appear to be naive realism or direct realism.
> The naive scientist believes he
>has a "god-view" that sees an objective reality as-is. (a side track:
>interestingly enough such "god-view" scientists have a particular
>allergy towards religion, gods and "minds") This is as suicidal as it is
>unscientific.
That's naive realism or direct realism. It actually works pretty well
for much of science.
>.... When the brain is engaged in the
>activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees, brains..) is
>1) an internal representation of what is seen, ...
You have created an infinite regress problem for yourself right
there.
JPL Verhey
"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
news:d0vchc$dt9$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>
>>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences.
>
> I think that's a misuse of "infer".
Why?
>
>>Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that
>>can
>>corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar enough
>>way (visually or otherwise).
>
> No, it doesn't work that way. It couldn't work that way.
Yet it does.
>
> Suppose that whenever I saw a tree, you would see a zebra (if you were
> in the same place and looking in the same direction). Maybe your
> brain just worked that way, so that whatever visual input caused me
> to see a tree would actually cause you to see a zebra.
>
> Suppose, furthermore, that it has always been that way.
>
> During my early youth, I heard people using the word "tree" whenever
> I saw that tree. Similarly, during your early youth, you might have
> heard people use the word "tree" whenever you saw that zebra.
>
> So we would both describe our experience as seeing a tree, even
> though I saw a tree but you saw a zebra.
Well, here you bring in the fact of different languages.. how is that
really relevant? There are more tools to corroborate experiences between
individuals than language. Although communities of course usually speak
the same language. And languages are to a great deal translatable into
each other. It is possible for an english speaking person to say "I see
a lamp" and translate it into chinese which enables a native chinese to
understand the basics of what is meant.
>
> We cannot compare our experiences. We can compare what we say about
> them.
We compare experiences by communicating them.
> In particular, science does not require that two or more
> witnesses experience the same thing in a similar enough way. It
> depends only on their agreement on how to give a public description
> of what was experienced.
There would be no publicly accepted (deviating or not deviating)
discription possible if that description does not at least contain
publicely corroborated elements that at one point in the past arised due
to similar enough experiences among individuals. A person who claims "I
saw a living zebra that read from a book to it's calve.." can only be
considered seriously as true or false by others thanks to agreed upon
terms like "living", "zebra", "read", "book" and "calve". Those terms
exist because they arose to a commonly accepted status thanks to similar
experiences, compared and corroborated through communication.
>
>>One mistake is, as said many times and by many people, to eliminate
>>the
>>experiential "interface" from which, in fact, objective reality is
>>inferred (in a common project). That naive form of realism called
>>eliminativism, is scientific suicide.
>
> Maybe this is a language dispute.
>
> It seems to me that the position you have been advocating above is
> that of eliminativism.
As far as I understand eliminativism, it stands for eliminating not only
"folk psychological" terms like desire, goal, intention but the entire
concept of consciousness altogether. It is the opposite of my position.
> And the position you have been criticising
> would appear to be naive realism or direct realism.
I would think eliminativism is an extreme form of naive realism.
>
>> The naive scientist believes he
>>has a "god-view" that sees an objective reality as-is. (a side track:
>>interestingly enough such "god-view" scientists have a particular
>>allergy towards religion, gods and "minds") This is as suicidal as it
>>is
>>unscientific.
>
> That's naive realism or direct realism. It actually works pretty well
> for much of science.
Sure. It works fine because our senses and brains generate quite
accurate representations. A naive realist just is not aware of the fact
that it is an internal representation, because it is such a good and
convincing one. And it is not that weird to be a naive realist: it is
our modus operandi to function sanely in the world. And the sense that
we "look out of our eyes into the world" is very compelling. It just
happens not to be case.
>
>>.... When the brain is engaged in the
>>activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees, brains..)
>>is
>>1) an internal representation of what is seen, ...
>
> You have created an infinite regress problem for yourself right
> there.
It seems you have not grocked the basics, otherwise you wouldn't
misread.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences.
>> I think that's a misuse of "infer".
>Why?
Usually "infer" is used when there is a conscious reasoning process.
But most of the time we just see a tree and don't do any reasoning
about it.
>>>Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that
>>>can
>>>corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar enough
>>>way (visually or otherwise).
>> No, it doesn't work that way. It couldn't work that way.
>Yet it does.
>> Suppose that whenever I saw a tree, you would see a zebra (if you were
>> in the same place and looking in the same direction). Maybe your
>> brain just worked that way, so that whatever visual input caused me
>> to see a tree would actually cause you to see a zebra.
>> Suppose, furthermore, that it has always been that way.
>> During my early youth, I heard people using the word "tree" whenever
>> I saw that tree. Similarly, during your early youth, you might have
>> heard people use the word "tree" whenever you saw that zebra.
>> So we would both describe our experience as seeing a tree, even
>> though I saw a tree but you saw a zebra.
>Well, here you bring in the fact of different languages.. how is that
>really relevant?
No, I wasn't talking about languages.
> There are more tools to corroborate experiences between
>individuals than language.
I don't know of any. I don't know of any way to corroborate
experiences, only of ways to corroborate the accounts we give of our
experiences.
My experience of red might be the same as your experience of green.
There is no way to tell otherwise.
> Although communities of course usually speak
>the same language. And languages are to a great deal translatable into
>each other. It is possible for an english speaking person to say "I see
>a lamp" and translate it into chinese which enables a native chinese to
>understand the basics of what is meant.
Again, I am not talking about translation problems.
>> We cannot compare our experiences. We can compare what we say about
>> them.
>We compare experiences by communicating them.
We don't communicate the experiences. We only communicate our
descriptions of the experiences.
>> In particular, science does not require that two or more
>> witnesses experience the same thing in a similar enough way. It
>> depends only on their agreement on how to give a public description
>> of what was experienced.
>There would be no publicly accepted (deviating or not deviating)
>discription possible if that description does not at least contain
>publicely corroborated elements that at one point in the past arised due
>to similar enough experiences among individuals.
You are going in circles. It isn't possible to compare experiences,
for they are inherently subjective.
>...
>>>One mistake is, as said many times and by many people, to eliminate
>>>the
>>>experiential "interface" from which, in fact, objective reality is
>>>inferred (in a common project). That naive form of realism called
>>>eliminativism, is scientific suicide.
>> Maybe this is a language dispute.
>> It seems to me that the position you have been advocating above is
>> that of eliminativism.
>As far as I understand eliminativism, it stands for eliminating not only
>"folk psychological" terms like desire, goal, intention but the entire
>concept of consciousness altogether. It is the opposite of my position.
I suppose that there are degrees of eliminativism. The view that
what we see are internal representations is one commonly held
by eliminativists.
>> And the position you have been criticising
>> would appear to be naive realism or direct realism.
>I would think eliminativism is an extreme form of naive realism.
Not at all.
>>> The naive scientist believes he
>>>has a "god-view" that sees an objective reality as-is. (a side track:
>>>interestingly enough such "god-view" scientists have a particular
>>>allergy towards religion, gods and "minds") This is as suicidal as it
>>>is
>>>unscientific.
>> That's naive realism or direct realism. It actually works pretty well
>> for much of science.
>Sure. It works fine because our senses and brains generate quite
>accurate representations.
Do you have a definition of "accurate" and a way of testing your
hypothesis that we have accurate representations?
>accurate representations. A naive realist just is not aware of the fact
>that it is an internal representation, because it is such a good and
>convincing one. And it is not that weird to be a naive realist: it is
>our modus operandi to function sanely in the world. And the sense that
>we "look out of our eyes into the world" is very compelling. It just
>happens not to be case.
>>>.... When the brain is engaged in the
>>>activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees, brains..)
>>>is
>>>1) an internal representation of what is seen, ...
>> You have created an infinite regress problem for yourself right
>> there.
>It seems you have not grocked the basics, otherwise you wouldn't
>misread.
According to you
what is seen is an internal representation of what is seen
thus
what is seen is an internal representation of an internal
representation of what is seen
and so on, leading to infinite regression.
Wolf Kirchmeir
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
[...]
>
>> There are more tools to corroborate experiences between
>>individuals than language.
>
>
> I don't know of any. I don't know of any way to corroborate
> experiences, only of ways to corroborate the accounts we give of our
> experiences.
>
> My experience of red might be the same as your experience of green.
> There is no way to tell otherwise.
True, but I can tell if you do or do not notice the same differences
between reds and greens as I do. If you don't, then you're colour blind
and I'm not...
Oliver Sacks' The Island of the Colorblind has some interesting passage
in which the colour blind people attempt to communicate their visual
experience. He's an acute observer, and his comments on the behaviour of
the colourblind are worth reading.
JGCASEY
>> My experience of red might be the same as your
>> experience of green. There is no way to tell
>> otherwise.
[...]
Wolf Kirchmeir wrote:
> True, but I can tell if you do or do not notice
> the same differences between reds and greens as
> I do. If you don't, then you're colour blind
> and I'm not...
More importantly is how the colour blind person
can prove to themselves that you can indeed see
something they cannot.
This was one of the problems in the first book
I read on the philosophical arguments for the
existence of God. Are atheists God-blind?
Cognitive blindness is also an issue when people
find themselves with different world views. How
can you determine if your inability to see things
the way another person does is due to your cognitive
blindness or theirs?
John Casey
JPL Verhey
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>
>>>>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences.
>
>>> I think that's a misuse of "infer".
>
>>Why?
>
> Usually "infer" is used when there is a conscious reasoning process.
> But most of the time we just see a tree and don't do any reasoning
> about it.
The subject matter was science and objective reality. Science is the
"art" of inferring an objective reality from our experiences. Science is
a very consciously reasoned process.
>
>>>>Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that
>>>>can
>>>>corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar
>>>>enough
>>>>way (visually or otherwise).
>
>>> No, it doesn't work that way. It couldn't work that way.
>
>>Yet it does.
>
>>> Suppose that whenever I saw a tree, you would see a zebra (if you
>>> were
>>> in the same place and looking in the same direction). Maybe your
>>> brain just worked that way, so that whatever visual input caused me
>>> to see a tree would actually cause you to see a zebra.
>
>>> Suppose, furthermore, that it has always been that way.
>
>>> During my early youth, I heard people using the word "tree" whenever
>>> I saw that tree. Similarly, during your early youth, you might have
>>> heard people use the word "tree" whenever you saw that zebra.
>
>>> So we would both describe our experience as seeing a tree, even
>>> though I saw a tree but you saw a zebra.
>
>>Well, here you bring in the fact of different languages.. how is that
>>really relevant?
>
> No, I wasn't talking about languages.
I assumed you actually talked about languages, for the alternative is
too idiotic to contemplate. Sure it is theoretically possible that when
I see a cup of tea, you see Santa in a sledge riding on the clouds. But
when most of us agree to see a cup of tea there on the table, we may
safely infer that there really is something like a tea cup out there,
whilst we may consider you to be hallucinating.
>
>> There are more tools to corroborate experiences
>> between
>>individuals than language.
>
> I don't know of any. I don't know of any way to corroborate
> experiences, only of ways to corroborate the accounts we give of our
> experiences.
People can paint what they saw if they don't speak the same language. We
communicate our emotions with body language etc etc. We can point to the
direction from where we heard a sound coming. With mimicing and gestures
we can compensate if language for whatever reason is not available.
Think of deaf people using sign language.
>
> My experience of red might be the same as your experience of green.
> There is no way to tell otherwise.
It just aint very likely that human beings with their sensory apparatus
and brains in tact have very different visual or other experiences. So
why bring in the least obvious to make a point? Theoretically anything
os possible. It is even possible that I am the only non-zombie in the
universe. But is it likely?
>
>> Although communities of course usually
>> speak
>>the same language. And languages are to a great deal translatable into
>>each other. It is possible for an english speaking person to say "I
>>see
>>a lamp" and translate it into chinese which enables a native chinese
>>to
>>understand the basics of what is meant.
>
> Again, I am not talking about translation problems.
>
>>> We cannot compare our experiences. We can compare what we say about
>>> them.
>
>>We compare experiences by communicating them.
>
> We don't communicate the experiences. We only communicate our
> descriptions of the experiences.
If descriptions were the only way we communicate our experiences it
would just be very limited communication.
>
>>> In particular, science does not require that two or more
>>> witnesses experience the same thing in a similar enough way. It
>>> depends only on their agreement on how to give a public description
>>> of what was experienced.
>
>>There would be no publicly accepted (deviating or not deviating)
>>discription possible if that description does not at least contain
>>publicely corroborated elements that at one point in the past arised
>>due
>>to similar enough experiences among individuals.
>
> You are going in circles. It isn't possible to compare experiences,
> for they are inherently subjective.
I just restate a reality that you seem to have a problem with. The fact
is that all science is the business of communicating experiences and
infer, in a common effort, a model of objective truth. It begins with
simple assertions that when we all see there is a moon out there, that
we agree that there is really is a round object out there orbiting earth
ie that the moon is not some nation wide hallucination. To assess if we
all see a moon out there means comparing experiences. You see a moon out
there, you too and you too etc.. ok then.. the moon is given objective
status. In experimental science the same thing: can the experiment be
repeated under same controlled conditions with the same outcome? The
results and analysis of the results are on their way of becoming
corroborated experiences yielding objective information.
All science is inherently subjective and inter-subjective. It is where
objective knowledge is generated.
>
>>...
>
>>>>One mistake is, as said many times and by many people, to eliminate
>>>>the
>>>>experiential "interface" from which, in fact, objective reality is
>>>>inferred (in a common project). That naive form of realism called
>>>>eliminativism, is scientific suicide.
>
>>> Maybe this is a language dispute.
>
>>> It seems to me that the position you have been advocating above is
>>> that of eliminativism.
>
>>As far as I understand eliminativism, it stands for eliminating not
>>only
>>"folk psychological" terms like desire, goal, intention but the entire
>>concept of consciousness altogether. It is the opposite of my
>>position.
>
> I suppose that there are degrees of eliminativism. The view that
> what we see are internal representations is one commonly held
> by eliminativists.
Could be. It is not what I understand what eliminativism is about.
>
>>> And the position you have been criticising
>>> would appear to be naive realism or direct realism.
>
>>I would think eliminativism is an extreme form of naive realism.
>
> Not at all.
>
>>>> The naive scientist believes
>>>> he
>>>>has a "god-view" that sees an objective reality as-is. (a side
>>>>track:
>>>>interestingly enough such "god-view" scientists have a particular
>>>>allergy towards religion, gods and "minds") This is as suicidal as
>>>>it
>>>>is
>>>>unscientific.
>
>>> That's naive realism or direct realism. It actually works pretty
>>> well
>>> for much of science.
>
>>Sure. It works fine because our senses and brains generate quite
>>accurate representations.
>
> Do you have a definition of "accurate" and a way of testing your
> hypothesis that we have accurate representations?
My days are filled with myriad events that tell me that my senses and
brain mostly generate a truthful and accurate account of the world I
function in. With too much alcohol or sleep deprivation performance can
go down quickly as we all know.
Drugs like LSD may distort your perceptions to such a degree that you
may think you could jump out of the window and fly away - it turns out
the system lost it's accuracy completely as you might end up dead on the
pavement.
>
>>accurate representations. A naive realist just is not aware of the
>>fact
>>that it is an internal representation, because it is such a good and
>>convincing one. And it is not that weird to be a naive realist: it is
>>our modus operandi to function sanely in the world. And the sense that
>>we "look out of our eyes into the world" is very compelling. It just
>>happens not to be case.
>
>
>>>>.... When the brain is engaged in the
>>>>activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees, brains..)
>>>>is
>>>>1) an internal representation of what is seen, ...
>
>>> You have created an infinite regress problem for yourself right
>>> there.
>
>>It seems you have not grocked the basics, otherwise you wouldn't
>>misread.
>
> According to you
>
> what is seen is an internal representation of what is seen
No. What is seen is an internal representation of "what is seen". Take
notice of the quotation marks. The "what is seen" is in fact not seen at
all: it is inferred from our sensory experiences as discussed in the
aboves. What is seen, is "superimposed" as it where on the "what is
seen".
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>>>>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences.
>>>> I think that's a misuse of "infer".
>>>Why?
>> Usually "infer" is used when there is a conscious reasoning process.
>> But most of the time we just see a tree and don't do any reasoning
>> about it.
>The subject matter was science and objective reality. Science is the
>"art" of inferring an objective reality from our experiences. Science is
>a very consciously reasoned process.
What you wrote, in full was:
Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences. If I have a
visual experience of seeing a tree out there and others nearby
report seeing that tree as well (while none of us is drunk or on
lsd hallucinating).. it is agreed upon instantly and implicitly
that there really is an object out there, that via our senses and
after a lot of complex brain process results in the visual
experience of seeing a tree.
That was about "we" -- people, not science as an institution. Your
example was of a tree. That isn't the kind of thing that science
does.
Science does at times make inferences from objective observation
reports. It avoids making inferences from subjective experience.
>...
>>>> During my early youth, I heard people using the word "tree" whenever
>>>> I saw that tree. Similarly, during your early youth, you might have
>>>> heard people use the word "tree" whenever you saw that zebra.
>>>> So we would both describe our experience as seeing a tree, even
>>>> though I saw a tree but you saw a zebra.
>>>Well, here you bring in the fact of different languages.. how is that
>>>really relevant?
>> No, I wasn't talking about languages.
>I assumed you actually talked about languages, for the alternative is
>too idiotic to contemplate.
No, it isn't idiotic at all. Apparently you don't grasp the
problem.
> Sure it is theoretically possible that when
>I see a cup of tea, you see Santa in a sledge riding on the clouds.
No, that is not the issue.
The possibility is that what I experience, when there is a cup of tea
on the table, is identical to what you would experience if Santa rode
past in a sledge riding on the clouds.
> But
>when most of us agree to see a cup of tea there on the table, we may
>safely infer that there really is something like a tea cup out there,
>whilst we may consider you to be hallucinating.
I too, would have agreed that there was something like a cup of tea
on the table. For "cup of tea" would be the words I used to describe
the circumstances where my experience was identical to what you would
have if Santa rode past.
My point is that two people cannot compare their actual experiences,
because those are personal and subjective.
>>> There are more tools to corroborate experiences
>>> between
>>>individuals than language.
>> I don't know of any. I don't know of any way to corroborate
>> experiences, only of ways to corroborate the accounts we give of our
>> experiences.
>People can paint what they saw if they don't speak the same language.
It is not a language problem.
If I were painting to illustrate the experience I had that was
identical to what you would have if Santa rode past, then of course I
would paint a cup of tea, for that is what would provide the
stimulation needed for me to have that experience.
I don't paint the content of my experience. I paint in such a way
as to regenerate the experience.
>> My experience of red might be the same as your experience of green.
>> There is no way to tell otherwise.
>It just aint very likely that human beings with their sensory apparatus
>and brains in tact have very different visual or other experiences.
And all you can say is "It just aint very likely". But you can not
offer any proof. The fact is, we are unable to compare experiences.
>>>We compare experiences by communicating them.
>> We don't communicate the experiences. We only communicate our
>> descriptions of the experiences.
>If descriptions were the only way we communicate our experiences it
>would just be very limited communication.
We can make paintings, as you suggested. A painting is a form
of description. Gestures we might use are a form of description.
We can compare such descriptions, but we cannot compare experiences,
for those are private.
>> You are going in circles. It isn't possible to compare experiences,
>> for they are inherently subjective.
>I just restate a reality that you seem to have a problem with. The fact
>is that all science is the business of communicating experiences and
>infer, in a common effort, a model of objective truth.
Science is very careful to avoid dependence on subjective
experience. This is why double blind experiments are used.
> It begins with
>simple assertions that when we all see there is a moon out there, that
>we agree that there is really is a round object out there orbiting earth
>ie that the moon is not some nation wide hallucination. To assess if we
>all see a moon out there means comparing experiences.
No, it does not mean comparing experiences. It requires only
comparing the descriptive reports that we give.
>>>...
>>>Sure. It works fine because our senses and brains generate quite
>>>accurate representations.
>> Do you have a definition of "accurate" and a way of testing your
>> hypothesis that we have accurate representations?
>My days are filled with myriad events that tell me that my senses and
>brain mostly generate a truthful and accurate account of the world I
>function in. With too much alcohol or sleep deprivation performance can
>go down quickly as we all know.
Okay. I will take that evasion as an admission that you do not have
a definition of "accurate" that works here.
>...
>>>>>.... When the brain is engaged in the
>>>>>activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees, brains..)
>>>>>is
>>>>>1) an internal representation of what is seen, ...
>>>> You have created an infinite regress problem for yourself right
>>>> there.
>>>It seems you have not grocked the basics, otherwise you wouldn't
>>>misread.
>> According to you
>> what is seen is an internal representation of what is seen
>No. What is seen is an internal representation of "what is seen".
Ah. Then the brain representation always consists of that string
"what is seen" of 12 ascii characters. By some unexplained magic,
when I think I am seeing a tree, I am actually seeing a
representation of those characters. Truly astonishing.
I took your quotes as being for emphasis (scare quotes, not real
quotes). At least it made sense that way. Now that you insist they
are real quotes, I agree that there is no infinite regression --
there is just infinite stupidity in the whole idea.
R-matrix
>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences. If I have a visual
>experience of seeing a tree out there and others nearby report seeing
>that tree as well (while none of us is drunk or on lsd hallucinating)..
>it is agreed upon instantly and implicitly that there really is an
>object out there, that via our senses and after a lot of complex brain
>process results in the visual experience of seeing a tree.
Hay, I don't only see a tree out there, I see water flowing up, holes
in space leading to other universes filled with myriad beings, "Hi
guys!," and all my pink-elephant friends agree that they see it too!
>Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that can
>corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar enough
>way (visually or otherwise).
With all those witnesses, what I see passes the "science test." ;^)
>If we agree that we look at the same thing
>out there (or just look in the same direction) and one reports clearly
>seeing a tree, but another reports seeing nothing at all and a third
>sees only an elephant with chocolate ears.. then there would be not much
>to do science on. But with organising more "witnesses" such as also
>photo cameras and other detection devices.. we might in the end come to
>some conclude about what is out there, if anything at all.
Of course my point is that IF we doubt what's "out there," then we
have to doubt other witnesses too since they're just part of what's
"out there" and as such are as suspect as anything "out there."
So we don't use science to prove that there is or is not something
out there (that's a question of metaphysics); science rests on a
perhaps unprovable assumption that there is something out there.
JPL Verhey
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>news:d0vmd5$hij$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>
>>>>>>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences.
>
>>>>> I think that's a misuse of "infer".
>
>>>>Why?
>
>>> Usually "infer" is used when there is a conscious reasoning process.
>>> But most of the time we just see a tree and don't do any reasoning
>>> about it.
>
>>The subject matter was science and objective reality. Science is the
>>"art" of inferring an objective reality from our experiences. Science
>>is
>>a very consciously reasoned process.
>
> What you wrote, in full was:
>
> Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences. If I have a
> visual experience of seeing a tree out there and others nearby
> report seeing that tree as well (while none of us is drunk or on
> lsd hallucinating).. it is agreed upon instantly and implicitly
> that there really is an object out there, that via our senses and
> after a lot of complex brain process results in the visual
> experience of seeing a tree.
>
> That was about "we" -- people, not science as an institution. Your
> example was of a tree. That isn't the kind of thing that science
> does.
Well, botanists may disagree with you. Their work on trees begins with
an agreement that there is a tree to study.
>
> Science does at times make inferences from objective observation
> reports. It avoids making inferences from subjective experience.
Are you suggesting that communicating observation reports are not
subjective experiences??? Is what you are saying that if two botanists
discuss their visual observations of a tree in a field is subjective and
non-scientific, whilst communicating their reports (lets say it was
published later in some botany magazine) suddenly has left subjective
space and magically entered a non-experiential objective space where
science operates, like a god in heaven?
...
>
>>>>> During my early youth, I heard people using the word "tree"
>>>>> whenever
>>>>> I saw that tree. Similarly, during your early youth, you might
>>>>> have
>>>>> heard people use the word "tree" whenever you saw that zebra.
>
>>>>> So we would both describe our experience as seeing a tree, even
>>>>> though I saw a tree but you saw a zebra.
>
>>>>Well, here you bring in the fact of different languages.. how is
>>>>that
>>>>really relevant?
>
>>> No, I wasn't talking about languages.
>
>>I assumed you actually talked about languages, for the alternative is
>>too idiotic to contemplate.
>
> No, it isn't idiotic at all. Apparently you don't grasp the
> problem.
I assume you mean the problem and claim that 1st person subjective
experiences are not available to science. I am aware of that claim but
it is fundamentally crippled. First of and most importantly, scientific
facts are experiential facts ie experiences that are communicated
between people.
What is (or should) be meant, is that imaginative trees like in dreams
or fantasies don't represent a real tree we can both look at (although
one obviously needs to have seen real trees in the past to be able to
imagine any or dream about trees, *and* to be able recognize something
as a tree when you do see a real one). In all cases though, we do in
fact communicate *experiential trees*.
So there are experiential trees that refer to trees that we infer
(indeed we do this almost automatically and usually not aware of the
fact that we do it, but still) to exist really out there like when you
walk together on a sunday afternoon in a forest, and experiential
imagined trees for instance while closing your eyes laying on bed in the
dark and just visualize a tree in your mind. The idea that there is a
categorical difference between "objective trees" (those botanists work
on) and "subjective trees" is a categorical error. And the wonderfull
thing is that it is discovered scientifically. And this discovery means
that not only we can still do the same good old science on real trees
(albeit that real trees are only known and inferred experientially), but
also on how real trees become internally represented in the brain. Those
scientists that study the brain even come to understand how/why it is
possible that we can imagine (like remember..fantasise, or dream of)
trees even when there is no tree out there or when the senses are shut
down. It turns out that not only are we able to imagine trees.. but that
this function of imagination is needed also to see a real tree.
Sure it is theoretically possible that when
>>I see a cup of tea, you see Santa in a sledge riding on the clouds.
>
> No, that is not the issue.
>
> The possibility is that what I experience, when there is a cup of tea
> on the table, is identical to what you would experience if Santa rode
> past in a sledge riding on the clouds.
How is that different from what I said? The roles are just reversed.
Maybe I don't understand what you are trying to say.
>
>>
>> But
>>when most of us agree to see a cup of tea there on the table, we may
>>safely infer that there really is something like a tea cup out there,
>>whilst we may consider you to be hallucinating.
>
> I too, would have agreed that there was something like a cup of tea
> on the table. For "cup of tea" would be the words I used to describe
> the circumstances where my experience was identical to what you would
> have if Santa rode past.
>
> My point is that two people cannot compare their actual experiences,
> because those are personal and subjective.
If true, science would be bancrupt instantly. And the scientific fact of
the matter *is* that all science is subjective and inter-subjecive
cummunication of human experiences. It appears that some just don't
realize some of the consequences if what that means!
>
>>>> There are more tools to corroborate experiences
>>>> between
>>>>individuals than language.
>
>>> I don't know of any. I don't know of any way to corroborate
>>> experiences, only of ways to corroborate the accounts we give of our
>>> experiences.
>
>>People can paint what they saw if they don't speak the same language.
>
> It is not a language problem.
>
> If I were painting to illustrate the experience I had that was
> identical to what you would have if Santa rode past, then of course I
> would paint a cup of tea, for that is what would provide the
> stimulation needed for me to have that experience.
>
> I don't paint the content of my experience. I paint in such a way
> as to regenerate the experience.
Either way, there is no sane reason to assume that we have very
different experiences re cups of tea, santas or other. Why speculate on
things improbable? Why would I speculate that when I see something blue,
your brain would generate a visual green, or when I see you behave
angrily assume "the possibility" that you exprrience the greatest joy?
And if there are differences, such as with color-blindness.. the reasons
for those differences can alsos be uncovered usually.
If your sole point is that subjective experiences are "closed" ie
unavailable to science then it appears you missed the fact that all
science is a business of human experience, and that scientific discovery
re human cognition and brainfunction necessitates serious revision of
the ol' subjective-versus-objective dichotomy.
>
>>> My experience of red might be the same as your experience of green.
>>> There is no way to tell otherwise.
>
>>It just aint very likely that human beings with their sensory
>>apparatus
>>and brains in tact have very different visual or other experiences.
>
> And all you can say is "It just aint very likely". But you can not
> offer any proof. The fact is, we are unable to compare experiences.
Well, many consider science to be a business of generating probabilities
and nothing more. Even in coart high probability ie "beyond reasonable
doubt" is used to create objective truth value.
That aside: you just seem to stuck in a self-created paradox. For the
fact is that we *are* communicating experiences (aside: I'd think there
would be no much experiences without public communication and vice
versa), and that the content of those experiences can be anything. It
does not exclude the activity called science nor the contents of that
activity called science.
You might get the impression I'm trying to say that "science is just a
subjective as anything" in order to devaluate it, but that is not my
goal. I'm not into any spiritualisms or fansy new age stuff. I'm just
trying to explain what I think is the case and how we should understand
in 2005 the subjective and the (or "versus") the objective and what
"science and objective reality" really entails functionally and
organically and that some old ideas on it, included the "we cannot do
science of subjective experience" needs revision, or rather more
precision given the finds modern of science. Both solipsism and on the
other end of the spectrum naive realism and (radical) eliminativism
(where I'd also locate radical behaviorism) are IMHO radically proven
false scientifically.
>
>>>>We compare experiences by communicating them.
>
>>> We don't communicate the experiences. We only communicate our
>>> descriptions of the experiences.
>
>>If descriptions were the only way we communicate our experiences it
>>would just be very limited communication.
>
> We can make paintings, as you suggested. A painting is a form
> of description. Gestures we might use are a form of description.
> We can compare such descriptions, but we cannot compare experiences,
> for those are private.
I cannot walk in your shoes, be you and have your private experiences.
But that is true also if we were two scientists and nobel laureats doing
science on cancer. Yet you accept the possibility of science, or do you?
>
>>> You are going in circles. It isn't possible to compare experiences,
>>> for they are inherently subjective.
>
>>I just restate a reality that you seem to have a problem with. The
>>fact
>>is that all science is the business of communicating experiences and
>>infer, in a common effort, a model of objective truth.
>
> Science is very careful to avoid dependence on subjective
> experience. This is why double blind experiments are used.
Science is not avoiding depending on subjective experience.. hows can
that be done?? Subjective experience is the context and ecology in which
science occurs, grows and flourishes.
What science, ie scientists do do.. is agreeing that when we all see a
moon out there that there really is moon out there, also independently
from our experiences and that is not some nation wide hallucanation.
What they do can after that.. is finding out more about the moon,
planets, stars..the physics of the universe etc. That's what scientists
doing physics or cosmology may do. Other scienists may want to try
unravel what happens in the human brain that enables us to see the moon,
ie how that experience is generated in human neurophysiology. They are
called neuroscientists, or neuropsychologists whatever. (Maybe there
even exists a brand of enlightened behaviorisms that just wants to be
complementary to brain research and find out how, or when what behavior
of the human organism and interaction with the environment generates
experiences of sorts in the human (body-)brain physiology.) Other
scientists are focussing on more deviating (dysfunctional) forms of
human experience as with neural disorders like schizophrenia or leasures
in the brain after accidents. (see Ramachandran.. quite interesting!)
>
>> It begins with
>>simple assertions that when we all see there is a moon out there, that
>>we agree that there is really is a round object out there orbiting
>>earth
>>ie that the moon is not some nation wide hallucination. To assess if
>>we
>>all see a moon out there means comparing experiences.
>
> No, it does not mean comparing experiences. It requires only
> comparing the descriptive reports that we give.
Comparing descriptive reports (written, spoken, visualised..) that we
give *is* an experience.. what else can it be, Neil? If you are a
neuroscientist and read an important article in the magazine Nature.. it
suddenly stopped being an experience? How can "comparing discriptive
reports" not be comparing experiences through communication?
>
>>>>...
>
>>>>Sure. It works fine because our senses and brains generate quite
>>>>accurate representations.
>
>>> Do you have a definition of "accurate" and a way of testing your
>>> hypothesis that we have accurate representations?
>
>>My days are filled with myriad events that tell me that my senses and
>>brain mostly generate a truthful and accurate account of the world I
>>function in. With too much alcohol or sleep deprivation performance
>>can
>>go down quickly as we all know.
>
> Okay. I will take that evasion as an admission that you do not have
> a definition of "accurate" that works here.
You asked what I meant with "accurate". I gave it to you. When you
swallow LSD pills your system loses all accuracy. Try it, you'll maybe
find out.
>>...
>
>
>>>>>>.... When the brain is engaged in the
>>>>>>activity of seeing, "what is seen" (whatever it is..trees,
>>>>>>brains..)
>>>>>>is
>>>>>>1) an internal representation of what is seen, ...
>
>>>>> You have created an infinite regress problem for yourself right
>>>>> there.
>
>>>>It seems you have not grocked the basics, otherwise you wouldn't
>>>>misread.
>
>>> According to you
>
>>> what is seen is an internal representation of what is seen
>
>>No. What is seen is an internal representation of "what is seen".
>
> Ah. Then the brain representation always consists of that string
> "what is seen" of 12 ascii characters. By some unexplained magic,
> when I think I am seeing a tree, I am actually seeing a
> representation of those characters. Truly astonishing.
It's really amazing howe something so simple and obvious cannot be
communicated. Must be my disability then.
Do you agree, given the finds of science and just a normal dose of
common sense andt taking into account that you do have a brain, that
when you see a tree that this visual experience and the tree you see are
not the original tree that is really out there in the garden? It could
be of course.. that you even don't agree to those commonly and
scientifically accepted basics. I would be interested to hear from you
what you think happens when you walk in your garden and you see a tree.
>
> I took your quotes as being for emphasis (scare quotes, not real
> quotes). At least it made sense that way. Now that you insist they
> are real quotes, I agree that there is no infinite regression --
> there is just infinite stupidity in the whole idea.
Whatever the legitimate use of quotes, I used them to emphasise that it
is important to distinguish between the tree you see as it resides "in"
the visual experience generated in the brain (the unquoted what-is-seen)
, and the original and real tree that is out there in the garden from
which lighwaves are deflection direction our eyes, ie the quoted
"what-is-seen". I put the quotes there just to enlighten you that there
are hence two different locations and types of events: the visual
experience if seeing a tree which occurs in your brain lets call it the
'brain-tree', and the orginal real tree that is out there in the garden,
lets call it the 'garden-tree'.
Unless you have very novel idea about what the visual experience of
seeing a tree means and where it happens (I belong to majority that
considers visual experience to occur within the brain), it is clear that
the only tree we directly know of, is the 'brain-tree', the visual
experience. It means we don't see the 'garden-tree' directly, or
unmediated by the senses and brain process. The 'garden-tree' is in fact
hidden - there only is the visual experience, called here the
'brain-tree' that is directly known. It is the 'brain-tree' that is our
source material from which we can infer and deduce things about the
'garden-tree', ie do science on the 'garden-tree'. As well as do science
on our senses and brains where the 'brain-tree' (and any other
experiential content) is generated.
JPL Verhey
"R-matrix" <ran...@matrix.mx> wrote in message
news:fco7319keq5l0g7oj...@4ax.com...
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>>Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences. If I have a visual
>>experience of seeing a tree out there and others nearby report seeing
>>that tree as well (while none of us is drunk or on lsd
>>hallucinating)..
>>it is agreed upon instantly and implicitly that there really is an
>>object out there, that via our senses and after a lot of complex brain
>>process results in the visual experience of seeing a tree.
>
> Hay, I don't only see a tree out there, I see water flowing up, holes
> in space leading to other universes filled with myriad beings, "Hi
> guys!," and all my pink-elephant friends agree that they see it too!
I'm happy for you! Can I get it too?!
>
>
>>Science therefor begins when there are two or more "witnesses" that
>>can
>>corroborate whether they experience the same thing in a similar enough
>>way (visually or otherwise).
>
> With all those witnesses, what I see passes the "science test." ;^)
Sure! Those bloody scientists may find out all ye guys consume
hallucinogenous mushrooms... maybe pot or other candy? The sci-test only
may reveal the reality of your hallucinations.. real ones! But don't
worry.. even "normal" experiences have a major hallucinogeous origin:
the brain as an active database generating all kinds of daily life
phantasms. Just some lightwaves hit the retina's and a bit
later..voila..! There she is.. my MOM! ;d}
>
>>If we agree that we look at the same thing
>>out there (or just look in the same direction) and one reports clearly
>>seeing a tree, but another reports seeing nothing at all and a third
>>sees only an elephant with chocolate ears.. then there would be not
>>much
>>to do science on. But with organising more "witnesses" such as also
>>photo cameras and other detection devices.. we might in the end come
>>to
>>some conclude about what is out there, if anything at all.
>
>
> Of course my point is that IF we doubt what's "out there," then we
> have to doubt other witnesses too since they're just part of what's
> "out there" and as such are as suspect as anything "out there."
Indeed the fact is that others are also part of the "out there". And
even most of what I perceive as not out there, like my legs or arms -
what I sense "inside my limbs" is as much out there as any visual sense
of things somewhere located "in" the out there. Even my thoughts..I
locate them out there namely in the brain, that is in my skull, that is
also out there among other skulls. In fact, I can locate *everything* in
here if I want, or out there if I want. But it doesn't change the fact
that some common (similar) experiences relate to the same thing like a
certain tree "out there" (or for each of us "in here"). And my own brain
(perveived of as "ot there") is as commonly available to everyone to
take a look at, as any tree out there.
>
> So we don't use science to prove that there is or is not something
> out there (that's a question of metaphysics); science rests on a
> perhaps unprovable assumption that there is something out there.
Indeed. Science is doing magic with magic and it works.
Sir Frederick
It is amazing how even the posters here live in a medieval culture of
ignoring their own brain. They must like the magic of 'selfhood' . This
is a common medieval religious practice.
We primate folk share a nominally common genetic produced brain
structure and associated brain functions. This includes subjective experiences.
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill/
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"For every complex problem there is a
solution that is simple, neat and wrong."
"Every normal man must be tempted at times
to spit on his hands, hoist the black flag,
and begin slitting throats." -H. L. Mencken
:-))))Snort!)
*************************
JPL Verhey
"Sir Frederick" <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:25m8311gg5pedrsm9...@4ax.com...
> Brain structure and function see, brain structure and function do.
>
> It is amazing how even the posters here live in a medieval culture of
> ignoring their own brain. They must like the magic of 'selfhood' .
> This
> is a common medieval religious practice.
>
> We primate folk share a nominally common genetic produced brain
> structure and associated brain functions. This includes subjective
> experiences.
Quite true, Sir Fred!
There are some very sophisticated philosophical thinkers among our
fellow human primates that have the urge to exorcise (eliminate) that
function of their brains ie their subjective experience, concluding in
the end that that function does not exist! To escape the paradox a lot
of sophistry is needed, but it keeps biting them in their own tail.
Neil W Rickert
large snips, and commenting briefly on only a few parts.
It is clear that we are miscommunicating quite seriously. You
apparently have some sort of theory about how vision works, a theory
that involves forming images in the brain and then "seeing" those
images. You are evidently quite strongly committed to that theory,
and your committment colors what you write. You make inferences,
based on your theory, and call them facts.
For myself, I have seen no conclusive evidence that would support
such a theory, and there is a lot of evidence against it. So I do
not share your committment to theory, I do not accept as factual much
of what you assert as fact. I have been attempting to discuss this
in ordinary everyday language, untainted by your theory. Apparently
such discussion is doomed to result in miscommunication and
misunderstanding.
"JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:d10hdb$rrk$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>> What you wrote, in full was:
>> Objective reality we *infer* from our experiences. If I have a
>> visual experience of seeing a tree out there and others nearby
>> report seeing that tree as well (while none of us is drunk or on
>> lsd hallucinating).. it is agreed upon instantly and implicitly
>> that there really is an object out there, that via our senses and
>> after a lot of complex brain process results in the visual
>> experience of seeing a tree.
>> That was about "we" -- people, not science as an institution. Your
>> example was of a tree. That isn't the kind of thing that science
>> does.
>Well, botanists may disagree with you. Their work on trees begins with
>an agreement that there is a tree to study.
Whether or not that is an accurate description of what botanists do,
they do not have a visual experience of seeing a tree and then infer
the existence of the tree from that experience.
But evidenty your *infer* comes from your theory, and is something
you assert without any evidence beyond your convictions about your
theory.
>> Science does at times make inferences from objective observation
>> reports. It avoids making inferences from subjective experience.
>Are you suggesting that communicating observation reports are not
>subjective experiences??? Is what you are saying that if two botanists
>discuss their visual observations of a tree in a field is subjective and
>non-scientific, whilst communicating their reports (lets say it was
>published later in some botany magazine) suddenly has left subjective
>space and magically entered a non-experiential objective space where
>science operates, like a god in heaven?
I don't know how to make sense out of that. It is word salad.
Presumably it means something in your theory, but it is hard to make
sense of it in terms of ordinary word usage.
>>>I assumed you actually talked about languages, for the alternative is
>>>too idiotic to contemplate.
>> No, it isn't idiotic at all. Apparently you don't grasp the
>> problem.
>I assume you mean the problem and claim that 1st person subjective
>experiences are not available to science. I am aware of that claim but
>it is fundamentally crippled. First of and most importantly, scientific
>facts are experiential facts ie experiences that are communicated
>between people.
Apparently we don't agree on the word "experience". For you,
"experience" seems to mean the internal image whose existence
apparently is derived from your theory. Being skeptical of your
theory, I most certainly do not mean that when I use the word.
>...
>So there are experiential trees that refer to trees that we infer
Whatever "experiential trees" are, I would not expect them to be
trees that I infer. Something that I infer is one or more steps
removed from experience.
I must assume that "experiential trees" is a technical term in
your theory, and therefore is not something that could be used
in effective communication with me, a skeptic of your theory.
>...
> Sure it is theoretically possible that when
>>>I see a cup of tea, you see Santa in a sledge riding on the clouds.
>> No, that is not the issue.
>> The possibility is that what I experience, when there is a cup of tea
>> on the table, is identical to what you would experience if Santa rode
>> past in a sledge riding on the clouds.
>How is that different from what I said? The roles are just reversed.
>Maybe I don't understand what you are trying to say.
Clearly you don't understand what I was trying to say.
>> My point is that two people cannot compare their actual experiences,
>> because those are personal and subjective.
>If true, science would be bancrupt instantly. And the scientific fact of
>the matter *is* that all science is subjective and inter-subjecive
>cummunication of human experiences. It appears that some just don't
>realize some of the consequences if what that means!
Evidently we don't even agree on what constitutes science.
>...
>If your sole point is that subjective experiences are "closed" ie
>unavailable to science then it appears you missed the fact that all
>science is a business of human experience, and that scientific discovery
>re human cognition and brainfunction necessitates serious revision of
>the ol' subjective-versus-objective dichotomy.
Most scientists would disagree with that.
>...
>> And all you can say is "It just aint very likely". But you can not
>> offer any proof. The fact is, we are unable to compare experiences.
>Well, many consider science to be a business of generating probabilities
>and nothing more.
I would count them among the many people who do not understand
science.
>...
>> We can make paintings, as you suggested. A painting is a form
>> of description. Gestures we might use are a form of description.
>> We can compare such descriptions, but we cannot compare experiences,
>> for those are private.
>I cannot walk in your shoes, be you and have your private experiences.
>But that is true also if we were two scientists and nobel laureats doing
>science on cancer. Yet you accept the possibility of science, or do you?
Of course I accept the possibility of science. I am glad that
you, at least for one sentence, seem to agree that it does not
require comparing experiences.
>> Science is very careful to avoid dependence on subjective
>> experience. This is why double blind experiments are used.
>Science is not avoiding depending on subjective experience.. hows can
>that be done?? Subjective experience is the context and ecology in which
>science occurs, grows and flourishes.
>What science, ie scientists do do.. is agreeing that when we all see a
>moon out there that there really is moon out there, also independently
>from our experiences and that is not some nation wide hallucanation.
That doesn't require science.
>...
>> No, it does not mean comparing experiences. It requires only
>> comparing the descriptive reports that we give.
>Comparing descriptive reports (written, spoken, visualised..) that we
>give *is* an experience.. what else can it be, Neil?
It is an experience in its own right. But it is not a comparison
of experiences.
> If you are a
>neuroscientist and read an important article in the magazine Nature.. it
>suddenly stopped being an experience? How can "comparing discriptive
>reports" not be comparing experiences through communication?
I can't answer the "how not" question. To me, that is a silly
question. Presumably the question arises out of the theory to which
you are committed.
>>>>>Sure. It works fine because our senses and brains generate quite
>>>>>accurate representations.
>>>> Do you have a definition of "accurate" and a way of testing your
>>>> hypothesis that we have accurate representations?
>>>My days are filled with myriad events that tell me that my senses and
>>>brain mostly generate a truthful and accurate account of the world I
>>>function in. With too much alcohol or sleep deprivation performance
>>>can
>>>go down quickly as we all know.
>> Okay. I will take that evasion as an admission that you do not have
>> a definition of "accurate" that works here.
>You asked what I meant with "accurate". I gave it to you. When you
>swallow LSD pills your system loses all accuracy. Try it, you'll maybe
>find out.
It is still an evasion. That a drug interferes with normal behavior
does not demonstrate that there are representations, and even less
that such representations are accurate in some undefined sense.
Usually when we talk of the accuracy of representations, we have some
sort of standard as to how representation should be formed. And then
accuracy is determined based on conformance with this standard.
Whatever you mean by "accuracy", it seems to be something quite
different
>>>> According to you
>>>> what is seen is an internal representation of what is seen
>>>No. What is seen is an internal representation of "what is seen".
>> Ah. Then the brain representation always consists of that string
>> "what is seen" of 12 ascii characters. By some unexplained magic,
>> when I think I am seeing a tree, I am actually seeing a
>> representation of those characters. Truly astonishing.
>It's really amazing howe something so simple and obvious cannot be
>communicated. Must be my disability then.
I think you should have taken my suggestion from several posts back,
and use different verbs. Use "see" to apply to things external (such
as the tree), and use some other word such as "analyze" for what is
done to the internal image or representation that you are assuming.
By using the same verb for both you introduce confusion and an
appearance of infinite regression.
>Do you agree, given the finds of science and just a normal dose of
>common sense andt taking into account that you do have a brain, that
>when you see a tree that this visual experience and the tree you see are
>not the original tree that is really out there in the garden?
No, I don't agree with that.
Of course, I agree that the brain and the eyes are all involved in
vision. But the idea that we are seeing something other than the
tree in the garden seems to be an idea forced by a dubious theory.
> It could
>be of course.. that you even don't agree to those commonly and
>scientifically accepted basics.
What you are asserting are neither commonly nor scientifically
accepted. They are part of some speculative hypotheses, but nothing
more than that.
> I would be interested to hear from you
>what you think happens when you walk in your garden and you see a tree.
That's a long story, and hard to explain. It is perhaps impossible
to explain to you, given the assumptions you appear to be making. To
oversimplify, the visual system is busy getting information from the
environment. As a first approximation, you might say that it is busy
making measurements. Now in order to be useful, those measurements
have to be represented. But I would not say that those represented
measurements constitute an image.
JPL Verhey
>I don't really know how to comment on this. So I will be making
> large snips, and commenting briefly on only a few parts.
>
> It is clear that we are miscommunicating quite seriously.
Agreed. Maybe we can clear up at least some of the miscommunication.
> You
> apparently have some sort of theory about how vision works, a theory
> that involves forming images in the brain and then "seeing" those
> images.
I think now it is a pitty this discussion had a prior discussion on
seeing, representations, images, infinite regression, humunculi etc. It
leads to a quigmire of semantic hairsplitting, and miscommunications
probably. I suggest that we give that part a rest. What I try to say can
also do without it so I'll try to avoid using any of those terms.
> You are evidently quite strongly committed to that theory,
> and your committment colors what you write. You make inferences,
> based on your theory, and call them facts.
What I try to say is not much different from what you will find in any
101 high school text book really, and it goes from there. I haven't
scanned all text books to find out what terminology is used when it
concerns those issues of "brain and mind", how/when experience is
generated in the (body)brain via the senses, the role of the environment
etc., but it appears we need to find terminology and definition of some
basics where the meaning is clear to all.
So I suggest we start from scratch, I won't go into your responses
below, for probably it will only generate more miscommunication.
I assume though that this much is clear, that those discussions
basically evolve around the question of conscious experience: what
happens, what is involved when we experience things, or say/think we
experience things. Already for millenia people, layman as well as
philosophers and scientists up to this day have put their teeth in this
issue without there being any common resolve - the discussions and no
doubt vast amounts of miscommunication seem to go on forever. Just take
a bite at Chalmer's website and you find a true mushrooming ecology of
thought on those issues! So I don't think anyone here needs to be
"ashamed" or feel personally responsible for the miscommunication, or
perhaps the fact that the issue IS complex and a real hard nut to crack.
Anyways I leave it up to you or others to continue this discussion and
hope you are able to present your thesis or whatever thoughts you may
have in a more concise, clear and less ambiguous way than apparently I
am able to do.
[..]