Tyler v. Carter
Ted Frank
I've corrected some of the spelling errors from the original repost of
the decision, but some surely remain. Much thanks to Evan Corcoran for
posting this.
From: e...@m-net.arbornet.org (Evan M Corcoran)
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
Subject: Proteus, Death-hunting, and Sexual Slavery
Followup-To: alt.conspiracy
Date: 24 Jan 1994 00:22:14 GMT
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Teri Smith Tyler, Plaintiff,
v.
James Carter, William Clinton, Ross Perot, American Cyanamid, Iron
Mountain Security Corporation, Defense Intelligence Agency, IBM, David
Rockerfeller, Rockerfeller Fund, BCCI, Nasa, Defendants.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
92 Civ. 8658 (CSH)
Filed & Decided November 5, 1993
Counsel: Teri Smith Tyler, Pro Se.
Mary Jo White, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, 100 Church Street, New York, NY 10007.
Attorneys for Defendants President Clinton, Defense Intelligence Agency
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, William J. Hoffman,
Esq., Assistant United States Attorney.
Before District Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.
Memorandum Opinion & Order
This case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss by defendants
President Clinton, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (the "Federal defendants"). Plaintiff
has also filed an order to show cause why the World Trade Center Bombing
Trial should not be enjoined. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's
order to show cause is denied, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to
dismiss the complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Teri Smith Tyler, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in
December 1992 alleging a bizarre conspiracy involving the defendants to
enslave and oppress certain segments of our society. Plaintiff contends
she is a cyborg, and that she received most of the information which forms
the basis for her complaint, through "proteus", which I read to be some
silent, telepathic form of communication. See complaint, at 1, and
Affidavit accompanying November 1993 Order to Show Cause, at P g. She
asserts that the defendants are involved in the "Iron Mountain Plan",
which provides for the reinstitutionalization of slavery and "bloodsports"
(which she identifies as death-hunting [n1] and witch-hunting), and the
oppression of political dissidents, herself included. Plaintiff's
complaint alleges a number of personal indignities visited upon her by
defendants: "strafing of my dormitory room by planes and helicopters, the
electronic bugging of my student rooms and apartments, deliberate noise
harassment, blasting of loud rock music with lyrics designed for
witch-hunts (music about social pariahs) . . . students following me
around to prevent me from studying, whispering campaigns and social
ostrification . . ." Complaint, at 1-2. Plaintiff also makes the following
allegations against the defendants. Former President Jimmy Carter was the
secret head of the Ku Klux Klan; Bill Clinton is the biological son of
Jimmy Carter; President Clinton and Ross Perot have made fortunes in the
death-hunting industry, and are responsible for the murder of at least 10
million black women in concentration camps, their bodies sold for meat and
their skin turned into leather products. The defendants are also
responsible for breeding farms, which turn out 2,000 black girls a year,
who are then sold for recreational murder or as human pets. Additionally,
the defendants utilize weather control and earthquake technology to
threaten other countries that object to the Iron Mountain plan.
Plaintiff asks the Court to grant her the following relief:
1. $ 5.6 billion in compensatory and punitive damages;
2. A physical accounting of all black women born since 1940, including
their present whereabouts, and for those who have died, an investigation
into how they died;
3. The purchase of land in Africa for the emigration of abused black
women;
4. The bringing to justice of those responsible for the American
holocaust;
5. An investigation into the foster care system, and a physical
accounting of all black children placed into foster care;
6. An end to slavery in the United States;
7. The end of the cyborg program run by NASA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, American Cyanimid and IBM;
8. An end to the organ-donor program.
While plaintiff was trying to effect proper service of the summons and
complaint on the defendants, she made a number of appeals to the Court for
interim relief in the form of Orders to Show Cause. On January 20, 1993,
she asked the Court to enjoin the inauguration of President Clinton. The
Court denied her request as moot. In August, 1993, she moved to enjoin the
installation of Louis Freeh as Director of the FBI on the ground that
Clinton appointed Freeh only so Freeh could cover up evidence of Clinton's
wrongdoing. That motion was denied, as it lacked a sufficient evidentiary
basis.
Presently before the Court is an Order to Show Cause why the Court should
not enjoin the trial in the World Trade Center bombing case, now
proceeding in this Court before Judge Duffy. Plaintiff alleges that
President Clinton ordered the bombing of the World Trade Center in order
to justify war with Iraq. In support of her application, plaintiff
describes certain "proteus" communications she had with other individuals.
Plaintiff alleges that the United States invaded Panama and arrested
General Noriega because Noriega objected to United States soldiers raiding
Indian tribes in Central America for child sex slaves to torture in
American cocaine based thrill-killing rackets. Plaintiff contends she
wrote to Noriega asking him to join in her lawsuit, but that United States
soldiers holding Noriega beat him when he asked for his mail.
Plaintiff asserts that in 1988, Rajiv Ghandi spoke to her through
"proteus" and informed her that he was being held prisoner and sexually
abused by a man whom he had caught stealing from the funds generated by
the Bhopal disaster settlement. According to plaintiff, Yasser Arafat
tried to confirm Ghandi's tale of abuse on behalf of the plaintiff, to no
avail.
Plaintiff additionally contends that Gulf War against Iraq was undertaken
so that America could restock its sexual slavery camps, which had been
depleted. According to plaintiff, 40,000 Iraqi soldiers captured by the
United States, selected for their physical attractiveness, have been
brought to this country where they were "being beaten, forced to run
gauntlets and homosexually gang-raped by American soldiers." Plaintiff
claims to have confronted Secretary of Defense Cheney with evidence of
this allegation. Cheney, through "proteus", purportedly told the
plaintiff, "Well, we were so sick and tired of killing black girls. We
just had to put some variety back into our death-hunting industry. And
they (Persians) are incredibly beautiful. The beauty of the face heightens
the pleasure of the kill. I know of no higher pleasure than the gang-rape
of exceedingly beautiful people."
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the Serbian government, the "Nazi
Bund", the Bank of Commerce and Credit International ("BCCI") are also
involved in the conspiracy.
Attached to plaintiff's papers, and apparently offered to support her
claim, are a number of exhibits. Most prominent among the exhibits is a
book by Robert Ellis Smith entitled Privacy: How to Protect What's Left of
It (1979), and a four page illustrated pamphlet advertising pornographic
movies starring young men. Plaintiff has circled a number of photos of
naked men who appear to be of Mediterranean or Latin American descent,
which I interpret as her evidence that Iraqi and Central American men are
enslaved in pornographic "rackets".
Plaintiff appears to have effected service on few of the named defendants.
Although IBM and BCCI each made an appearance (and successfully moved to
have the claims against them dismissed), plaintiff never filed proof of
service against either defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(g). Service
was eventually made against the Federal Defendants, but it may have been
effected more than 120 days after filing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j).
IBM's motion to dismiss the complaint against it was granted by Order
dated September 29, 1993. That same order dismissed the claims against
BCCI, to the extent they could be asserted against the Superintendent who
was supervising the dissolution of BCCI. Currently pending before the
Court is a motion to dismiss by the remaining defendants, and the Order to
Show Cause to enjoin the World Trade Center bombing trial.
DISCUSSION
In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(1989), a state prisoner commenced a federal action by filing a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 charging
prison officials with violating his constitutional rights. The in forma
pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. s 1915(d), authorizes courts to dismiss an in
forma pauperis claim if, inter alia, the action is "frivolous." The
district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous under s
1915(d) on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals. It held that "a complaint filed in forma pauperis is not
automatically frivolous within the meaning of s 1915(d) because it fails
to state a claim." Id. at 331.
The Court in Neitzke contrasted the judicial screening process available
under the in forma pauperis statute with cases where the plaintiff pays
the filing fees. Section 1915(d) screening reflects, the Court stated,
congressional recognition "that a litigant whose filing fees and court
costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or
repetitive lawsuits." Id. at 324. A complaint filed by a fee-paying
litigant subject to economic incentives can be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6), but in such a case, the Court stated, Rule 12(b)(6) "does not
countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's
factual allegations. District judges looking to dismiss claims on such
grounds must look elsewhere for legal support." Id. at 327 (footnote
omitted). But the Court left open the question whether a district judge
could ever dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 329
n.8 ("We have no occasion to pass judgment, however, on the permissible
scope, if any, of sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).").
Among the factual claims subject to s 1915(d) dismissal as frivolous "are
claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which
federal district judges are all too familiar." Id. at 328. The claims of
plaintiff at bar may be so characterized. The question is whether such
claims asserted by a fee-paying plaintiff are subject to sua sponte
dismissal by a district court under Rule 12(b)(6). I hold that they are.
A plaintiff asserting fantastic or delusional claims should not, by
payment of a filing fee, obtain a license to consume limited judicial
resources and put defendants to effort and expense. The policies arguing
against sua sponte Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals do not apply in these
circumstances. The author of claims as irrational as these cannot be
regarded as subject to the economic incentive to refrain from frivolous
actions imposed by filing fees and court costs upon rational paying
litigants. Similarly, a sua sponte dismissal of a complaint such as this
cannot reasonably be said to deprive such a plaintiff of the opportunity
of "clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the
requirements of a valid legal cause of action." Neitzke at 329-30. If this
Court cannot order sua sponte dismissal of this complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), no district court can ever dismiss sua sponte any complaint
under the Rule.[ n2] I do not think that is the law.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss the complaint as to all
defendants with prejudice and without costs. The Clerk is directed to
refund to plaintiff her filing fee. Plaintiff's motion by Order to Show
Cause to enjoin the World Trade Center bombing trial is denied.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
November 5, 1993
Charkes S, Haight, Jr., U.S.D.J.
FOOTNOTES
[n1] Death-hunting is described by plaintiff as follows: "In
death-hunting, teams of pimps and harriers (women working for pimps)
follow a black woman they want to force into sexual slavery and snuff
rackets, try to wreck her employment prospects, isolate her socially,
break her up with friends and family, often they try to force her onto
welfare because it often circumscribes her choice of places to live.
Sometimes members of a woman's family or her mate will be cooperative or
part of death-hunting teams because participants get paid." Complaint, at
4.
[n2] Although the Federal defendants have moved to dismiss citing Rule
12(b)(6), I am dismissing this case sua sponte. Granting the Federal
defendants' motion to dismiss would affect claims against only those
defendants. Because I am acting sua sponte, the dismissal is effective as
to all of the defendants.
--
ted frank | Reason #273 not to trust out-of-context court quotes:
the u of c | "Jimmy Carter was the secret head of the Ku Klux Klan; Bill
law school | Clinton is the biological son of Jimmy Carter."
kibo#=0.5 | -- Tyler v. Carter, 1993 WL 454256 (S.D.N.Y.)