Pre-law reading lists
Daniel W. Linna Jr.
I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
these lists?
I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50 pages a
day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
just try to read for enjoyment?
Thanks,
Dan Linna
Jonathan Mallin
Dan,
I thinking having the law school dictate three years of reading
materials and an entire way of life is enough for me. I doubt many
people allow themselves to begin homework BEFORE law school begins.
---
_ __ __ _ _ _
_ | |___ _ _ | \/ |__ _| | (_)_ _ <*> Jonathan Scott Mallin
| |_| / _ \ ' \ | |\/| / _` | | | | ' \ <*> <jma...@umich.edu>
\___/\___/_||_| |_| |_\__,_|_|_|_|_||_| <*> Email for PGP key
> This entire message is Copyright 1996 by Jonathan Mallin. <
> All rights reserved. URL: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jmallin <
Armand
In article <5929oq$p...@lastactionhero.rs.itd.umich.edu>
Daniel W. Linna Jr. <danl...@umich.edu> writes:
>I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50 pages a
>day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
>Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
>just try to read for enjoyment?
It depends thoroughly on what you want to achieve.
If you want to harden yourself for the Bataan Death March model of legal
education, then read 1) huge quantities of material, of whatever kind,
just to keep yourself in practice to read comprehensively quickly; 2)
law-based stuff that teaches you how to play hide-the-ball with appellate
judges; and 3) those best-selling 'law school is hellish but rewarding'
books.
If you're convinced you need to hit the ground running, and maintain a
focus on why this intentionally-daunting experience is worth it, this is
the drill.
I, of course, think it's all crap.
I think the biggest challenge of jumping through the law school hoop is
convincing yourself it's worthwhile. If you go in expecting it to be
a meaningful experience in and of itself, you're going to hit a rough
point during your studies, when you can least afford it, at which
disillusionment hits. You have to figure out, for you, why legal education
is a useful instrumentality.
I'd say do that ahead of enrollment, and even better, ahead of picking a
law school. Read some biographical stuff on Christopher Columbus
Langdell. Read about the historical virtues of Socratically-applied case-
based education. Then read some of the plentiful and accurate 'decline and
fall of American legal education' law review articles. Become postmodern.
Realize that this whole ball of wax is only going to have the meaning
you find for it. Pick your educational opportunity accordingly, and
channel your educational efforts accordingly.
Essentially, prepare yourself to first be kicked around, and then when
that distraction fades, to be let down.
-----------------------------------------------------------v---------v-----\
"I think that whatever anyone does behind closed doors is |amendola@|hv502|
his or her own business, unless the kangaroo's bleating |students.|@po. |
keeps the neighbors up at night." --Acker Bilk, Systems |wisc.edu |cwru |
Analyst, _The Onion_, October 1996. | |.edu |
Glenn Kurtzrock
Daniel W. Linna Jr. wrote:
>
> I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
> recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
> these lists?
>
> day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
> Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
> just try to read for enjoyment?
>
Just read whatever you enjoy most, because it'll be your last
opportunity for some time. I can tell you what I read in my "off-time",
but of course your mileage may vary. I used to try to read as much Kurt
Vonnegut as possible, although I've now read everything he's written and
I'm just waiting for his new book. If you like cynical science fiction
try Stanislaw Lem or especially Philip K. Dick. I just got 8 of his
books in the mail I bought via Usenet and they've been keeping me sane
during finals (10 hours of corporations, then 20 minutes for a short
story).
I read a lot of Kafka last summer, but he's not for everyone. I'd say
go with some Douglas Adams and Dave Barry for comic relief and you'll be
fine.
Screw the classics, you may have an opportunity to read them anyway (I
took a GREAT class called Law and Humanities and got to read Brothers
Karamazov, Notes From Underground, Macbeth, Native Son, and about 8 or 9
other excellent books).
--
Glenn Kurtzrock gle...@pegasus.rutgers.edu
Rutgers School of Law 2L http://www.cascade.net/~sunspot
SPE GC#197,507 CR#659 cDc '87
"The issue is, what is chicken?" -Judge Friendly, 190 F.Supp. 116
Roger J. Buffington, W6VZV
Daniel W. Linna Jr. wrote:
>
> I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
> recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
> these lists?
>
> I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50 pages a
> day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
> Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
> just try to read for enjoyment?
>
>
> Dan Linna
A lot of different opinions on this one. A lot of law schools
recommend a dusty old tome called "The Bramble Bush" by a dried-up
old dead lawyer named Lewellyn, if memory serves. This book
and others like it usually do not translate well into the
modern world, and if they serve any value, it escaped me, anyway.
Drink beer, relax, have fun while you can. You'll still have time
for fun in law school, but not as much. Do not bother trying to
do anything in advance, is my advice.
--
Roger J. Buffington
W6VZV
USC Law, Class of '97
------------------------------------------------------------
"I want to die peacefully, in my sleep, like my Grandfather.
Not screaming, and in terror, like his passengers..."
------------------------------------------------------------
Warping with OS/2 Warp 4.0 and Netscape for OS/2
Neelav Hajra
> A lot of different opinions on this one. A lot of law schools
> recommend a dusty old tome called "The Bramble Bush" by a dried-up
> old dead lawyer named Lewellyn, if memory serves. This book
> and others like it usually do not translate well into the
> modern world, and if they serve any value, it escaped me, anyway.
>[snip]
We had to read Bramble Bush as an occasional supplement in first-year
torts. Believe it or not (I still don't!), of the two questions on our
final exam, one dealt SOLELY with the Bramble Bush. YIKES! I
wholeheartedly agree that this book does not "translate well into the
modern world." It was kind of like reading Shakespeare before you knew
HOW to read Shakespeare, if you know what I mean.
Whoops, I've scared all of the prospective law students (they're a
volatile bunch, aren't they?). Well, here are my infallible
recommendations:
1)HAVE FUN before law school starts... preparation won't do you much
good. The key is to WORK HARD ONCE YOU'RE A 1L! You won't "learn" to be
a good law student without experiencing the trials and tribulations of law
school. HAVE AN UNFORGETTABLY FANTASTIC SUMMER!
2)Ignore me and the rest of the 'wise' law students... there are a million
answers to each questions, and all of us 1/2/3L's just like to hear
ourselves talk. "Blah blah blah. I'm smart. Blah blah blah."
3)If your LSAT score isn't in the 98th or 99th percentile, you can't get
into a top-40 school, and your future as an attorney is doomed (oh yeah:
If you don't go to Harvard, you'll be a failure anyway!). The minimum
cutoff for all of the good law schools is the 97th percentile, and that's
only if you've done something amazing, like serving as a congressional
aid, or giving 10 gallons of blood over your lifetime. If you don't meet
these strict LSAT qualifications, give up and try something more
constructive than law school. Like barber school. See #2.
--
Neelav Hajra
Law student, University of Michigan
Joseph Telezinski
Neelav Hajra wrote:
>
> 3)If your LSAT score isn't in the 98th or 99th percentile, you can't get
> into a top-40 school, and your future as an attorney is doomed (oh yeah:
> If you don't go to Harvard, you'll be a failure anyway!). The minimum
> cutoff for all of the good law schools is the 97th percentile, and that's
> only if you've done something amazing, like serving as a congressional
> aid, or giving 10 gallons of blood over your lifetime. If you don't meet
> these strict LSAT qualifications, give up and try something more
> constructive than law school. Like barber school. See #2.
>
How serious are you about those scores? Only the top 2-3%? I hope that
was meant to be tongue in cheek. I'm considering a career in law but I'm
not sure how I would feel if I believed you on this. Especially since
some of the lawyers that I've met don't seem to be _that_ bright
(Nothing personal). Or, am I just hanging out with the wrong crowd?
Joseph Telezinski
Todd Kornfeld
On Mon, 16 Dec 1996, Roger J. Buffington, W6VZV wrote:
> Daniel W. Linna Jr. wrote:
> >
> > I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
> > recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
> > these lists?
> >
> > I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50 pages a
> > day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
> > Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
> > just try to read for enjoyment?
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Dan Linna
>
> A lot of different opinions on this one. A lot of law schools
> recommend a dusty old tome called "The Bramble Bush" by a dried-up
> old dead lawyer named Lewellyn, if memory serves. This book
> and others like it usually do not translate well into the
> modern world, and if they serve any value, it escaped me, anyway.
Lewellyn (he was a rather well known law professor by the way) has
not been dead that many years and he basically wrote the UCC. Once you
understand where Lewellyn is coming from the UCC makes more sense. That
being said, pre-law school reading seems to have little value. Most of
the material read by 1Ls is self-contained; upper-class elective courses
are where the deep social policy concerns and the ilk arise. There is
always the possibility that your first year property prof may go off
on crazy theory of property origan tangents but even then the vast
majority of the course and the exam will be conventional property.
Professors want to be fair and they try to avoid awarding outside
knowledge; thus first year courses are self-contained.
The only outside knowledge that is really useful to a
1L is some basic economics. This is true even if none of your
profs are the law and economics type. Most law school courses
revolve around money disputes. Understanding the costs of a tort
or of a contract or property dispute helps.
The shear volume of law school reading, at least in
terms of the number of pages, is not that large. Not counting law
review articles, I think my first year reading assignments were always
under 200 pages combined a week for all courses. However, there are
pages and there are pages. My property prof assigned 300 pages for the
year and those 300 pages took longer than all of my other reading
assignments combined. If you have time to work on your reading, improve
your reading comprehension. I think reading comp is by far the most
useful skill to have for law school. I suspect that is why the LSAT
tracks fairly well with law school grades. While I didn't like
the LSAT either, it is mostly a reading comp test. I did notice that
most of my friends with high LSATs and poor undergrad grades did well
in law school while people with low LSATs and high undergrad grades
often did not do well in law school.
> Drink beer, relax, have fun while you can. You'll still have time
> for fun in law school, but not as much. Do not bother trying to
> do anything in advance, is my advice.
Don't drink too much beer; gotta save room for later. Law
school is an endurance test. You don't want to burn out by over-preping.
P.S. A good and light easy read is "The Buffalo Creek Diaster." That
may put you in a law school mindset.
Hayden
On Mon, 16 Dec 1996, Glenn Kurtzrock wrote:
> I read a lot of Kafka last summer, but he's not for everyone. I'd say
> go with some Douglas Adams and Dave Barry for comic relief and you'll be
> fine.
Along the lines of comedy, there are two magazines that I recommend to
everybody who likes cartoons, political cartoons, news of the weird, Dave
Barry, etc. They are _Funny Stuff_ and _Comic Relief_; both are
published by the same people and are similar except that the latter has a
political focus in a lot of its material. They're great to keep around
for a laugh or a quick study break, and the old issues are still funny.
David A. Ellis
My absolute best recommendation for a book about lawyers and the law is "A
Civil Action" by Jonathan Harr (I think it came out in paperback fairly
recently). It follows the true story of a lawsuit against a company that
had been dumping toxic waste in a small town in Massachusetts. This book
is easy reading and should appeal to law students and anyone who is
interested in law. It also presents the very best and worst aspects of
lawyers and the legal system.
David Ellis
Neelav Hajra
In article <32B590...@pacbell.net>, Joseph Telezinski
<jct...@pacbell.net> wrote:
> Neelav Hajra wrote:
> >
> >[tongue in cheek stuff]
>
> How serious are you about those scores? Only the top 2-3%? I hope that
> was meant to be tongue in cheek. I'm considering a career in law but I'm
> not sure how I would feel if I believed you on this. Especially since
> some of the lawyers that I've met don't seem to be _that_ bright
> (Nothing personal). Or, am I just hanging out with the wrong crowd?
Wasn't. No. Yes. Don't feel bad. No, some are not. No, you're not.
Tim Chase
On Mon, 16 Dec 1996, Daniel W. Linna Jr. wrote:
> I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
> recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
> these lists?
>
> I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50 pages a
> day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
> Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
> just try to read for enjoyment?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Dan Linna
>
"Just relax and read something you'll enjoy" is good advice you'll hear
from the list. But, the type of people preparing to begin law school won't
take this advice anyway. If you want to do something useful but not law
related, hone your PC or Mac skills. Make sure you really know your word
processor, file system, and email. Time you spend now organizing your
computer and developing your skills will translate into better notes,
briefs and outlines.
For something a little more law related (and fun), I cast my vote for
biographies. They puts a perspective on the law that you can't get just
from reading cases.
Tim Chase, 1E
CH...@IAC.NET
Salmon P. Chase College of Law
Northern Kentucky University
sku...@cobra.law.miami.edu
On Mon, 16 Dec 1996, Glenn Kurtzrock wrote:
> Daniel W. Linna Jr. wrote:
> >
> > I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
> > recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
> > these lists?
> >
> > I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50 pages a
> > day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off reading
> > Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or should I
> > just try to read for enjoyment?
If you go to U of CHicago or U of Miami, read the Bramble Bush. Take notes
and prepare them for your Elements final. Otherwise, its all bull.
>
> Screw the classics, you may have an opportunity to read them anyway (I
> took a GREAT class called Law and Humanities and got to read Brothers
> Karamazov, Notes From Underground, Macbeth, Native Son, and about 8 or 9
> other excellent books).
Im reading Chief Justice Warren Burger's "A Constitution Unfolds.."
> --
> Glenn Kurtzrock gle...@pegasus.rutgers.edu
-> Rutgers School of Law 2L
http://www.cascade.net/~sunspot
> SPE GC#197,507 CR#659 cDc '87
> "The issue is, what is chicken?" -Judge Friendly, 190 F.Supp. 116
>
>
Frigalement!
martin
>I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
>recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings
>are on
>these lists?
>I've been reading a lot, conditioning myself to read at least 50
>pages a
>day. What should I be reading? I mean, would I be better off
>reading
>Shakespeare or Dickens and other classics, law related books, or
>should I
>just try to read for enjoyment?
I thought Shakespeare and Dickens was reading for fun...
Eric
>Thanks,
>Dan Linna
Eric B. Milstein
>Drink beer, relax, have fun while you can. You'll still have time
>for fun in law school, but not as much. Do not bother trying to
>do anything in advance, is my advice.
I concur, and invest in a good optometrist and buy aspirin by the case! (Just
finished my last midterm last night. . . )
Two books I read before starting were Introduction to Law Study and Law
Examinations by Kinyon & Introduction to the Study and Practice of Law by
Hegland. If you don't know anyone in law school , they give you a basic idea of
what's ahead. (The Kinyon book is rather dated.) Both are part of the West
Nutshell series which you will probably become intimately familiar! Best
advice, however is to relax and get ready for the work ahead.
Eric Milstein
McGeorge School of Law 1E
December 18, 1996
Neil Rifkind
>Daniel W. Linna Jr. <danl...@umich.edu> wrote:
>
>>I recently read that some (many?) law schools release lists of
>>recommended readings for entering students. What kind of readings are on
>>these lists?
My reccomendations are:
A Nation Under Lawyers by Mary Ann Glendon (mentioned by others, good
discussion of law school pedagogy)
History of American Law by Lawrence Friedman (legal history, big but
an easy read with some useful tidbits and good overview)
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning by Edward Levi (short, to the
point, view of this difficult subject)
An Economic Analysis of Law by Richard Posner (into to Law & econ plus
some intro to the substance of first year subjects of torts, property,
contract etc)
How to Do Your Best on Law School Exams by Delaney (This may be out of
print, but it is the best "how to scceed in law school" book I've
read. Written by a former NYU prof. Includes many actual exam
questions and answers and why they are good or bad)
After Magritte by Tom Stoppard (a one act play that is the closest
thing in literature to a law school exam)
Tombstones: A lawyer's Tales From the Takeover Decade by Lawrence
Lederman (good intro to the practice of corp law & wall street
generally. If that's your interest also read Barbarians at the Gate by
Burrough & Helyar and Den of Thieves by James Stewart)
Movies to Watch:
Anatomy of a Murder with Jimmy Stewart (and a cameo by Joseph welch,
the lawyer who brought down McCarthy)
Twelve Angry Men with Henry Fonda
Books *not* to read (even if someone tells you to):
The Common Law by Holmes (long, boring, and hopelessly outdated. If
you want a shot of Holmes before school find some of his speeches and
law reviews in an anthology).
One-L by Turrow (just isn't like that anymore)
Neil Rifkind
Boston University '98
Dylan Alexander
In article <32b9666c.103973@news>, nrif...@acs.bu.edu (Neil Rifkind) wrote:
}An Economic Analysis of Law by Richard Posner (into to Law & econ plus
}some intro to the substance of first year subjects of torts, property,
}contract etc)
I'm currently a third of the way through this. Unfortunately, it's the
first edition. Our school library only has the first two, and the second
is checked out.
Do you (or Jake, or anyone else who has read it) have any idea what
significant changes/additions have been made between the first and
fouth editions? I'd guess the chapter on price controls (Carter era,
remember) is radically different.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
Alison Rosenstengel
In article <dylan-19129...@news.tamu.edu>,
I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
*cough*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@@@@@ @@@ @@@ @@@@@@@ @@@@@@ @@@@@@
!!@ @!@ !@@ !!@ @!@ ! @!@ ! Alison Rosenstengel
!!! !!!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!! !!!!
:!: ::! :!: !:: : :!: : :!: ch...@widomaker.com
. : :. : .: . : :. .: :.: .: :.:
Alex S. Katz
In article <59cavv$p...@wilma.widomaker.com>,
Alison Rosenstengel <ch...@widomaker.com> wrote:
>I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
>Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
>that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
>asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
If it's any consolation, Posner also argues that
paying judges more would make them work less.
Alex
--
- And if a finger is cut off, three grivnas for the offense.
- For the moustache twelve grivnas, and for the beard twelve grivnas.
_Russkaya Pravda_ (Russian code, XI century)
Dylan Alexander
In article <59cavv$p...@wilma.widomaker.com>, ch...@widomaker.com (Alison
Rosenstengel) wrote:
}I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
}Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
}that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
}asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
What was his argument? Just off the top of my head I can think of a couple
of reasons one might believe this.
For example, one can reasonably assume that women in general impose costs
on the hiring firm in the form of time off or other accomidations for
childbirth. This is obviously a handicap that men do not suffer, so their
wages should be higher because they offer more value to employers. An equal
wage susidizes childbearing at the expense of males. The ability to bear
children is a non-pecuniary benefit that should be compensated for through
lower wages for women. Individual women might be allowed to negotiate
contracts giving them higher wages in return for giving up childbearing
rights during employment.
Was there anything else Judge Posner's article focused on? The above seems
the most obvious point he might have made, but I've already discovered he's
quite a bit brighter than I am.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
Dylan Alexander
}In article <59cavv$p...@wilma.widomaker.com>,
}Alison Rosenstengel <ch...@widomaker.com> wrote:
}>I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
}>Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
}>that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
}>asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
}
}If it's any consolation, Posner also argues that
}paying judges more would make them work less.
One of my econ professors, who believes he should be on the Supreme Court,
mentioned he's advocated free market purchases of children in place of
the current adoption system.
It's a shame so many people are caught up in their emotional reactions
to his conclusions rather than considering the strength of his argument
and/or analysis of a problem.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
Alex S. Katz
[re: R. Posner]
>It's a shame so many people are caught up in their emotional reactions
>to his conclusions rather than considering the strength of his argument
>and/or analysis of a problem.
True, although we have to keep in mind that the strength of his
argument depends on the validity of his assumptions, and it's
mostly the latter that evoke strong reactions. We all should
know by now that an unregulated free market is not necessarily
very stable and definitely not very humane, so many disagreements
with Posner may be reduced to questioning the exact level of
absolutely necessary regulation.
>Dylan Alexander
Robert S. Hahn
I find Dan's question a very interesting one right now for personal
reasons. As a third year struggling to finish the penultimate final exam
in law school, in a class taught by one of the very best teachers I've ever
had (Larry Kramer, who will be at Harvard as a visiting professor next year
for those of you at HLS -- I cannot recommend him higher), I realized that
my legal education would have been much enriched and more meaningful had I
done some reading in legal history and legal theory.
Prof. Kramer has a keen sense of history and how it affects the law (for
example, his interpretation of 28 USC 1983 actions) and it taught me a
great deal. Among them is the fact that I know next to nothing about legal
history. I don't know how many law students are past history majors or had
significant studies in history, but I have to envious of those who have had
exposure to the history (for example) of the Reconstruction or the Great
Depression to see how historical forces have affected the law.
As a philosophy major, I find it incredibly useful that I had some exposure
to legal theory as an undergraduate. Maybe it's meaningless for a law
school exam, but if one wants to get something of value out of law school
besides a degree and a job, I do think there are interesting questions.
Furthermore, a lot of decisions make a great deal more sense when you
understand the prevailing legal theory of the time. For example, in
studying federal common law, it was illuminating to understand that when
Erie was decided, the general understanding was that there was some
transcendental "common law" that was neither state law nor federal law, and
that all courts were competent to adjudicate issues which arose in "common
law".
I was wondering if others shared any of these experiences. If so, and this
is a roundabout way of recommending stuff for a reading list, I would
advise reading some stuff on legal history and legal theory -- at least the
big ones, like Hart, Dworkin, CLS, feminist legal theory, black legal
scholarship, legal realism, law and economics... maybe I'm missing some....
-rsh
--
Robert S. Hahn rsh...@is.nyu.edu
NYU Law School, '97 http://pages.nyu.edu/~rsh9395/index.html
"Politics is a gun. Finance is knowing when to pull the trigger."
-- The Godfather, Part III
Jake Minas
> As a philosophy major, I find it incredibly useful that I had some exposure
> to legal theory as an undergraduate. Maybe it's meaningless for a law
> school exam, but if one wants to get something of value out of law school
> besides a degree and a job, I do think there are interesting questions.
I somewhat disagree. Philosophy is not my strong point, but I've usually
found "legal theory" to be sort of lightweight. It strikes me as often as
being just a sort of normative "policy analysis" (which is, mostly, the
only thing anyone thinks there is above blackletter). At best, it offers
normative methodologies of how to make rules. Honestly, I've found stuff
written about law by philosophy or political science profs to be more
illuminating in that regard.
--
Jake Minas
Columbia Law School
ja...@columbia.edu
Bob Stock
amen...@students.wisc.edu (Armand) wrote:
[Variations on a theme of cynicism]
And now the coda:
>Essentially, prepare yourself to first be kicked around, and then when
>that distraction fades, to be let down.
I hope all you wannabes are paying attention. Armand, of course, is
just trying to prevent future competition. :)
Bob Stock
email: bst...@ucla.edu
2L - UCLA School of Law
Dylan Alexander
}In article <dylan-19129...@news.tamu.edu>,
}Dylan Alexander <dy...@tamu.edu> wrote:
}
}[re: R. Posner]
}>It's a shame so many people are caught up in their emotional reactions
}>to his conclusions rather than considering the strength of his argument
}>and/or analysis of a problem.
}
}True, although we have to keep in mind that the strength of his
}argument depends on the validity of his assumptions, and it's
}mostly the latter that evoke strong reactions. We all should
}know by now that an unregulated free market is not necessarily
}very stable and definitely not very humane, so many disagreements
}with Posner may be reduced to questioning the exact level of
}absolutely necessary regulation.
I'd argue that they can be reduced to questioning whether stability
and "humane" conduct are worth the price or are worthy social goals.
Clearly many do, but I wish they'd consider the costs involved more
often.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
Jake Minas
}In article <dylan-19129...@news.tamu.edu>,
}Dylan Alexander <dy...@tamu.edu> wrote:
}
}[re: R. Posner]
}>It's a shame so many people are caught up in their emotional reactions
}>to his conclusions rather than considering the strength of his argument
}>and/or analysis of a problem.
}
}True, although we have to keep in mind that the strength of his
}argument depends on the validity of his assumptions, and it's
}mostly the latter that evoke strong reactions. We all should
}know by now that an unregulated free market is not necessarily
}very stable and definitely not very humane, so many disagreements
}with Posner may be reduced to questioning the exact level of
}absolutely necessary regulation.
But what I don't quite understand what you mean, since Posner is not
terribly hostile to welfare in the first place, not, at least, like many
conservative politicians. What he questions, most often, are the means of
welfare disbursion, not inherent first-principles kinds of tradeoffs
between aggregate wealth and equitable distribution of wealth. Let's take
a classic example of Posner's pseudo anti-welfare position. Let's take an
article from Bell Journal of Economics (can't find cite right now, its not
on Westlaw). Posner was arguing against certain kind of utility regulation
which mandated that utilities provide service to ethically-favored groups,
e.g. charities, hospitals, the poor, at seriously reduced or free rates.
His argument was not anti-welfarist per se. It was this: providing these
favored groups with below cost rates would influence them to overconsume
the electricity. If one wanted to favor these groups, one could simply
directly transfer money to them, which would create the same distributional
outcome without causing the overconsumption.
This should illustrate something. Economics-types aren't natively hostile
to welfare considerations. In fact, the classic ploy when proposing a
regulatory change which has distributional consequences one might find
unjust, is to show how you can use transfers to get a pareto-superior
outcome (i.e. one person is made better off without anyone being made worse
off). Usually this takes the form of showing that some efficiency gain is
greater than the deadweight loss from a tax on the winners to compensate
losers under the policy. The only ethical objection that doesn't take care
of is a "punitive" one, i.e. where someone shouldn't be allowed to be
better off, even if no one is worse off. I've noticed this objection
(strange I think), to some law & economics reforms like using "bubble" or
tradable permits in pollution regulation (along the lines that even if
tradable pollution permits could create the same standard of air quality,
compliance is supposed to be expensive).
Also, the problem is, you're using the word "assumptions" in a strange way.
Usually, when economists attack each other on their assumptions, they mean
their factual assumptions for being unrealistic (often, for free market
economists, stuff like perfect information). You're attacking alleged
assumptions about goals. But that's not what people object to, in general,
about free-market economics. Because economics is generally presented
positivistically. I would be happy to argue, for example, that present
clean-air regulation primarily functions to benefit the rich and satisfy
esthetic standards, not to satisfy any health or safety concern, and I have
some ok economic arguments to back it up. I didn't make an ethical
assertion there (although my ethical intent is obvious), so you can't
attack my assumptions about goals. You can, however, attack factual
assertions I made. Most free-market economics is considered "loony" for
such factual assertions, not for ethical claims (which, if you accept the
facts and counterfactuals, are rather uncontroversial).
Alison Rosenstengel
>mentioned he's advocated free market purchases of children in place of
>the current adoption system.
>
>to his conclusions rather than considering the strength of his argument
>and/or analysis of a problem.
Au contraire, I posit that it's a shame that so many people are so caught
up in attempting to make everything an academic or economic issue that
they fail to see that their conclusions are irrational, inhumane, and/or
stupid. There is so much more to life than how much something will
*cost*.
Alison
3L, W&M
Alison Rosenstengel
>}I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
>}Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
>}that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
>}asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
>
>of reasons one might believe this.
Both in terms of pregnancy/maternity leave and the fact that women, in
general, tend to live longer, therefore companies have to pay longer
benefits to women.
>For example, one can reasonably assume that women in general impose costs
>on the hiring firm in the form of time off or other accomidations for
>childbirth. This is obviously a handicap that men do not suffer, so their
>wages should be higher because they offer more value to employers. An equal
>wage susidizes childbearing at the expense of males. The ability to bear
>children is a non-pecuniary benefit that should be compensated for through
The theory fails to take into account several factors:
(1) Not all women have children, by choice or by nature.
(2) The right to have children is fundamental.
(3) Perhaps family leave should be extended to new fathers as well.
(4) Males are generally perceived as participating in riskier behaviour,
leading to more injury-based leaves.
(5) Women also have higher ranks on job-safety scales, which save the
company money.
(6) A normal pregnancy need not affect job performance.
(7) Companies which are disrespectful of families risk the loyalty of
their employees, therefore raising costs.
>lower wages for women. Individual women might be allowed to negotiate
>contracts giving them higher wages in return for giving up childbearing
>rights during employment.
But the right to bear children is fundamental and it is absolutely
discriminatory to base employment on this kind of a quid pro quo.
>Was there anything else Judge Posner's article focused on? The above seems
>the most obvious point he might have made, but I've already discovered he's
>quite a bit brighter than I am.
The only point he made with me was that he's a creep.
Stephen R. Diamond
In article <59ee8r$2...@wilma.widomaker.com>, ch...@widomaker.com (Alison
Rosenstengel) wrote:
> >lower wages for women. Individual women might be allowed to negotiate
> >contracts giving them higher wages in return for giving up childbearing
> >rights during employment.
>
> But the right to bear children is fundamental and it is absolutely
> discriminatory to base employment on this kind of a quid pro quo.^
To me it would be an unsavory practice, but not because it is
discriminatory - which it is not. I assume Allison means this as a moral
rather than legal judgment, since these are not state actors. Private
respect for fundamental rights has never required that those who don't
choose to exercise those rights subsidise their exercise. A subsidy does
result where workers are paid the same, despite employing some being more
costly.
I would probably avoid working in a firm that made such contractual
demands, because I would find them unreasonably intrusive into people's
private lives. To me it is an issue rather like private mandatory drug
testing by an employer. Although it is not without economic sense, working
for Big Brother can, at least for some people, impose a cost in and of
itself.
Still, the point remains that avoiding contracts of the kind Dylan
mentions does 'discriminate' against women who choose not to bear
children. They are being denied the full value of their employment, by
being precluded from negotiating with their employer the value of
eschewing the bearing of children. One ought not feel compelled to distort
reality, because one chooses to tolerate some undesirable outcomes to
avoid others even more undesirable.
Stephen R. Diamond
Dylan Alexander
In article <59eef1$2...@wilma.widomaker.com>, ch...@widomaker.com (Alison
Rosenstengel) wrote:
}In article <dylan-19129...@news.tamu.edu>,
}Dylan Alexander <dy...@tamu.edu> wrote:
}>One of my econ professors, who believes he should be on the Supreme Court,
}>mentioned he's advocated free market purchases of children in place of
}>the current adoption system.
}>
}>It's a shame so many people are caught up in their emotional reactions
}>to his conclusions rather than considering the strength of his argument
}>and/or analysis of a problem.
}
}Au contraire, I posit that it's a shame that so many people are so caught
}up in attempting to make everything an academic or economic issue that
}they fail to see that their conclusions are irrational, inhumane, and/or
}stupid.
Irrational in what way? Most economic arguments are supported by at
least some corraborating evidence, intuitively obvious theory, and
solid logic. What you're really saying here is that your values are
superior to someone who wants economic efficiency, therefore their
behavior is "irrational" because it doesn't conform to what you want.
You assertion that such conclusions are "stupid" is another sign
you're simply trying to impose your values on others.
Inhumane? So what? There are plenty of things that are inhumane that
we make no effort to fix, and only a very few people think we should.
Why? It's not efficient when considered in cost-benefit terms. True,
most won't think of it that way, but that's what the reasoning is,
whether people realize it or not.
Do you seriously suggest we expend huge amounts of resources to fix
every problem in the world? If your answer is no, I guarantee you
it's based on an unwillingness to pay the costs. Even the most
callous person, or one who thinks the people of Africa and former
communist countries are all very happy, would have no objection to
economic or military help if it didn't cost him or his country
anything in monetary terms or lives lost.
}There is so much more to life than how much something will *cost*.
_Everything_ is about cost. Time expended, happiness forgone for
another, opporunites given up, or money expended, _everything_ in
life can be viewed in terms of what it costs.
What's inhumane is refusing to consider the best ways to maximize
and distribute social benefits for humanity, whether in terms of
good, services, leisure, or freedom.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
Glenn Nunes
Dylan Alexander (dy...@tamu.edu) wrote:
:
: One of my econ professors, who believes he should be on the Supreme Court,
: mentioned he's advocated free market purchases of children in place of
: the current adoption system.
Technically, he advocated transfer of parental rights by sale.
Unfortunately, he does sometimes refer to this colloquially as "baby
selling." Such statements just make it easier for people to attack him.
I personally would vote for anyone would put him on the Supreme Court. He
was widely considered the runner-up to Bork, but after that Reagan wanted
someone a wee-bit less controversial. After his book _Sex and Reason_
(where he seems to be pro-choice) and his criticisms of originalism, I
can't see who would ever nominate him. He is too conservative to be
nominated by a Democrat. And his attacks on pro-life and originalist
arguments will make him unpalatable to Republicans.
--
Glenn Nunes
Jake Minas
In article <59ee8r$2...@wilma.widomaker.com>, ch...@widomaker.com (Alison
Rosenstengel) wrote:
> In article <dylan-19129...@news.tamu.edu>,
> Dylan Alexander <dy...@tamu.edu> wrote:
> >In article <59cavv$p...@wilma.widomaker.com>, ch...@widomaker.com (Alison
> >Rosenstengel) wrote:
> >}I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
> >}Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
> >}that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
> >}asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
> >
> >What was his argument? Just off the top of my head I can think of a couple
> >of reasons one might believe this.
>
> Both in terms of pregnancy/maternity leave and the fact that women, in
> general, tend to live longer, therefore companies have to pay longer
> benefits to women.
Before everyone starts screaming and moaning, let's get Posner's usual
definition of "discrimination" in the first place.
"To avoid building a normative assessment into the word "discrimination," I
shall follow the lead of Title VII and define sex discrimination as
treating a woman differently from a man because she is a woman, without
worrying at the definitional stage about whether the discrimination is
invidious on the one hand, or justified or even beneficent on the other."
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1317
> >For example, one can reasonably assume that women in general impose costs
> >on the hiring firm in the form of time off or other accomidations for
> >childbirth. This is obviously a handicap that men do not suffer, so their
> >wages should be higher because they offer more value to employers. An equal
> >wage susidizes childbearing at the expense of males. The ability to bear
> >children is a non-pecuniary benefit that should be compensated for through
>
> The theory fails to take into account several factors:
> (1) Not all women have children, by choice or by nature.
So what? Not all smokers get cancer, by choice or by nature, yet mandating
that heavy smokers pay the same health insurance costs as nonsmokers
effects a cross-subsidy between smokers and nonsmokers. Just on a
probabilistic basis women have an *expected* (not necessarily actual)
higher health costs associated with pregnancy. I take it if an employer
only hired people with straight hair, it would also be nondiscriminatory,
since some blacks have naturally straight or chemically straightened hair?
> (2) The right to have children is fundamental.
So? What does he fail to take into account? Again, taking Posner's above
quote, "discrimination," doesn't mean that the policy is uncalled for. In
Posner's words, that whatever nebulous fundamental rights interest you
proclaim (wait, there's a fundamental right to employer-mandated family
benefits), justifies discrimination in its favor.
> (3) Perhaps family leave should be extended to new fathers as well.
So what? Various Federal laws mandate that *women* be allowed to enjoy
certain benefits (health insurance coverage for pregnancy), without any
corresponding mandate of benefit to men. That seems pretty plainly
discriminatory. Your response, basically, is that there is the option of
non-discriminatory treatment so there is no discrimination. Would your
response be the same if, say, full employer mandated health care reform
passed Congress, the substance of which mandated that employers provide
women with benefits, but not men?
What I also find weird about this is the way you bristle at the fungibility
of benefits. Its, apparently, ok to extend family leave benefits to men.
Its not ok, apparently, for men (or women) to cash in those benefits in the
form of higher compensation. What is it that bars fungibility, especially
since what you are doing is mandating that employers discriminate in favor
people who plan to have children. I plan to raise kids nowhere in the near
future, so the value of any such benefit approaches zero. So, such a
benefit is worth pretty near zip for me, yet I am barred from trading it in
for increased vacation time or salary hikes. I'd be even inclined to say
that males get would get less value out of equal benefits, though I'll just
say its an "opinion" so I can make it bulletproof.
> (4) Males are generally perceived as participating in riskier behaviour,
> leading to more injury-based leaves.
> (5) Women also have higher ranks on job-safety scales, which save the
> company money.
These are just about the only claims you do make which counteract Posner's
claims. They are on-point. That doesn't make you right, per se. It just
means that it boils down to an empirical question of which outweighs the
other.
> (6) A normal pregnancy need not affect job performance.
Really? At the very least one misses a few days of work.
> (7) Companies which are disrespectful of families risk the loyalty of
> their employees, therefore raising costs.
Again, so what? That doesn't show that its not discriminatory.
> >lower wages for women. Individual women might be allowed to negotiate
> >contracts giving them higher wages in return for giving up childbearing
> >rights during employment.
>
> But the right to bear children is fundamental and it is absolutely
> discriminatory to base employment on this kind of a quid pro quo.
Fine. We'll have employment laws that permit no family leave whatsoever.
Women can bear children at work, and be at there desks as soon as delivery
is over. That doesn't discriminate at all, so ok?
What I find weird about this is your saying the words "fundamental rights"
means that its ok for the employer to mandate benefits, but its not ok for
people to voluntary cash in benefits. Dylan's suggestion was not that
women making this deal be barred from having children, but only that women
who make such a deal and decide to have children return the economic
benefit they received in exchange.
> >Was there anything else Judge Posner's article focused on? The above seems
> >the most obvious point he might have made, but I've already discovered he's
> >quite a bit brighter than I am.
>
> The only point he made with me was that he's a creep.
Oh, quit nitpicking on Posner. Some of us have better things to do than
just wave our willies, you know. Namecalling and prejudicial dismissal is
what's required of enlightened rational debate, right?
Dylan Alexander
}In article <dylan-19129...@news.tamu.edu>,
}Dylan Alexander <dy...@tamu.edu> wrote:
}>In article <59cavv$p...@wilma.widomaker.com>, ch...@widomaker.com (Alison
}>Rosenstengel) wrote:
}>}I haven't read it and I will purposely avoid reading anything else by
}>}Pig^H^Hosner for the rest of my natural life after reading the abomination
}>}that is "Conservative Feminism," 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, in which he
}>}asserts that paying women and men equal wages is discriminatory to men!
}>
}>What was his argument? Just off the top of my head I can think of a couple
}>of reasons one might believe this.
}
}Both in terms of pregnancy/maternity leave and the fact that women, in
}general, tend to live longer, therefore companies have to pay longer
}benefits to women.
Ah, yes. The life span argument is also a good one.
}>For example, one can reasonably assume that women in general impose costs
}>on the hiring firm in the form of time off or other accomidations for
}>childbirth. This is obviously a handicap that men do not suffer, so their
}>wages should be higher because they offer more value to employers. An equal
}>wage susidizes childbearing at the expense of males. The ability to bear
}>children is a non-pecuniary benefit that should be compensated for through
}
}The theory fails to take into account several factors:
}(1) Not all women have children, by choice or by nature.
This is irrelevant from an efficiency maximizing perspective. The
results are the same whether all women recieve the same discounted
wages based on the total costs of childbirth to employers or whether
women who actually bear children are forced to bear their own costs,
unsubsidized by women who choose not to.
The latter solution may strike some as more fair (especially those
women who don't plan on having children) but may be less socially
efficient due to higher transaction costs necessary to implement it.
}(2) The right to have children is fundamental.
Why? I could argue that the right to be paid a fair wage based on
my benefits and costs to my employer is fundamental. Why should
I subsidize women who impose greater costs on my employer?
}(3) Perhaps family leave should be extended to new fathers as well.
This evens the playing field at the expense of social efficiency.
Those without children are still subsidizing those who have them.
If society wants to subsidize having children there are better
ways to go about it, such as direct transfer payments or changes
in the tax code.
Parents of either sex who choose to forego work for children have
made the choice that their children are more important than their
job, and should be rewarded accordingly. Indeed, a woman who decides
to have a child an earn $20,000 is better off than if she chose
not to have a child and earn $40,000. Clearly, she valued the child
more than the $20,000 in lost income and her overall utility (or
happiness, if you prefer) has been increased.
}(4) Males are generally perceived as participating in riskier behaviour,
} leading to more injury-based leaves.
This is a valid point. It's not offsetting, however. The efficiency
maximizing solution to this one is fairly complex and I'm not sure
what combination of discounted wages, insurance, or legal requirements
for bearing the costs of injuries is best.
It's not, however, an argument that the two factors "even out." Each
should be approached individually.
}(5) Women also have higher ranks on job-safety scales, which save the
} company money.
As above.
}(6) A normal pregnancy need not affect job performance.
It depends on the job. Lost time and disruption to the employer
from maternity leave _does_ effect the average marginal product
of labor from a female worker.
}(7) Companies which are disrespectful of families risk the loyalty of
} their employees, therefore raising costs.
This is easily cured through market mechanisms. If the costs exceed
the benefits, you'll see employers offering maternity leave policies
to women. Since we haven't seen this happen on a wide scale as a
result of the markets, we can reasonably assume that the costs of
such a policy exceed the benefits to businesses. A vague and uncertain
"loyalty" loss is outweighed by a measurable productivity loss if
childbearing costs are borne by the company.
Admittedly, this is oversimplified. No rational person would claim
the labor markets approach the perfect markets of classical economics.
The analysis is still mostly valid, however.
}>lower wages for women. Individual women might be allowed to negotiate
}>contracts giving them higher wages in return for giving up childbearing
}>rights during employment.
}
}But the right to bear children is fundamental and it is absolutely
}discriminatory to base employment on this kind of a quid pro quo.
I disagree that _any_ right is "fundamental." If such rights exist,
however, I'd argue that receiving a fair wage for my work is also
a fundamental right. Why should I subsidize other people's children?
I'll pay for my own through sharing my income with my wife (who should
recieve a lower wage if she chooses to have children and impose costs
on her employer).
}>Was there anything else Judge Posner's article focused on? The above seems
}>the most obvious point he might have made, but I've already discovered he's
}>quite a bit brighter than I am.
}
}The only point he made with me was that he's a creep.
Heh.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
Jake Minas
In article <dylan-20129...@news.tamu.edu>, dy...@tamu.edu (Dylan
Alexander) wrote:
> Irrational in what way? Most economic arguments are supported by at
> least some corraborating evidence, intuitively obvious theory, and
> solid logic. What you're really saying here is that your values are
> superior to someone who wants economic efficiency, therefore their
> behavior is "irrational" because it doesn't conform to what you want.
> You assertion that such conclusions are "stupid" is another sign
> you're simply trying to impose your values on others.
This is not really an issue of "values." Most often its not the
fundamental tradeoffs between objections that are at issue, but rather of
means chosen or other mechanics. Consider a classically inflammatory
article, Lawrence Summer's leaked World Bank memo, which appeared in the
Economist, Feb. 8 1992, at 66. Here's the excerpt:
------------------------------------------------
Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more
migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [lesser developed countries]?
I can think of three reasons:
(1) The measurement of the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on
the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this
point of view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done
in the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and
we should face up to that.
(2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial
increments of pollution probably have very low cost. I've always thought
of the under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their
air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low [he means high] compared
to Los Angeles or Mexico City. [Asides on tradability issues deleted].
(3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is
likely to have very high income-elasticity. The concern over an agent that
causes a one-in-a-million change in the odds of prostate cancer is
obviously going to be much higher in a country where people who survive
prostate cancer than in a country where under-5 mortality is 200 per
thousand. Also much of the concern over industrial atmospheric discharge
is about visibility-impairing particulates. These discharges may have very
little direct health impact. Clearly trade in goods that embody aesthetic
pollution concerns could be welfare-enhancing. While production is mobile
the consumption of pretty air is a non-tradable.
---------------------------------------------------
This, of course, provoked a huge furor, almost exclusively, tellingly, from
environmentalists in the West. But note, most of the issue is not over
values. (1) doesn't even make any controversial value choices. It says,
even if health is the only criteria, migration of dirty industry in poor
countries makes sense, since the marginal health gains per dollar spent in
those countries on other, cheaper programs (e.g. water treatment programs)
are much greater than those from air quality regulation. This is
essentially, the "richer is safer" argument, which is undeservedly given
short shrift most of the time. Which is part of the general discussion of
"health-health tradeoffs," i.e. that regulatory health improvements in one
area often cause increased dangers in the other which more than offset the
gain. For example, bans on asbestos gain in lower incidences of respitory
illness and lose in decreased auto safety (asbestos is currently the best
material for brakepads). Cass Sunstein has a forthcoming article called
"Health-Health Tradeoffs," discussing the matter in depth -- lemme know if
you want to get the working paper.
(2) does, however, make a controversial value choice. It says that we
should, in deciding on permissible pollution levels, look at the marginal
cost of pollution at various levels. Summer is asserting that the marginal
cost is non-linear and increasing (i.e. each marginal unit of pollution
costs more than the last one). Therefore, the costs of permitting an
additional unit of pollution on L.A. is higher than in Wyoming. The law,
as it stands, however, treats them the same, though I don't understand why.
However, I don't see a valid criticism of it except if one asserts that the
appropriate target level of pollution is zero and no marginal costs are
acceptable. That is fine, if you don't mind living in the Stone Age, that
is.
(3) also makes a controversial value claim, which is basically utilitarian,
that the poor should be able to choose which goods they value. While we
might have a moral problem with allowing the poor to choose to cheapen life
(which they will often do if given the chance -- how many poor people drive
Volvos?), is it really that controversial say that the poor should be
allowed to choose other things over aesthetic interests? The Clean Air
Act, after all, sets its standards off of visibility, not health, so its
essentially an aesthetically directed piece of legislation. What's wrong
with not caring about blue skies if you can't eat?
Glenn Nunes
Dylan Alexander (dy...@tamu.edu) wrote:
:
: This is irrelevant from an efficiency maximizing perspective.
:
: This is easily cured through market mechanisms.
Dylan, since when have you been so cool?! I was reading your post trying
to figure out if it was written by Jake or Stephen. I agree with
everything in it.
You're no bonehead.
--
Glenn Nunes
Dylan Alexander
In article <59f19g$1...@mark.ucdavis.edu>, ez05...@bullwinkle.ucdavis.edu
(Glenn Nunes) wrote:
}Dylan Alexander (dy...@tamu.edu) wrote:
}:
}: This is irrelevant from an efficiency maximizing perspective.
}: This is easily cured through market mechanisms.
}
}Dylan, since when have you been so cool?! I was reading your post trying
}to figure out if it was written by Jake or Stephen. I agree with
}everything in it.
When I came to school I was an ignorant moderately strong Democrat. Now
I'm a somewhat more educated weak Libertarian. I can still like the idea
of welfare, but now I realize why it may not be worth the costs. Every
new class period in my Comparative Economics class and every new chapter
in _Economic Analysis of Law_ simply reinforces this view.
[The rest of this post is mostly an expansion and clarification of my
earlier comments.]
I probably came across as more anti-birth "rights" than I intended. I
don't think subsidies for children are desirable in this nation (what
national goal is served by a population increase?); the current birth
rate strikes me as fairly desirable overall, although I would prefer
to see it shifted from poorer to more wealthy families.
Nonetheless, I'm not as strongly opposed to some weak subsidies for
childbirth as I might be to others. My main complaint is the form.
Requiring equal pay regardless of benefits to the employer has too
many unintended side-effects. It harms men and women who don't bear
children, companies who hire women (and benefits male-dominated industries
like contruction and other heavy labor), and consumers of those
company's products. A better solution is a kid tax and transfer payments
to women who bear children.
My main point is that my objection to equal wages is two fold: First,
I don't believe subsidies for childbirth are necessary or desirable
as a matter of public policy. Second, if we are going to have such
subsidies, they should be done in a more efficient manner.
The second point is the most important. I don't presume that my opinions
are of any more import than anothers, I just ask that if I'm compelled
to support something I don't believe in "for the public good" it be
done in the least wasteful manner.
--
Dylan Alexander
dy...@tamu.edu
ekiernan
>
> For example, one can reasonably assume that women in general impose costs
> on the hiring firm in the form of time off or other accomidations for
> childbirth. This is obviously a handicap that men do not suffer, so their wages should be higher because they offer more value to employers.
Of course in countries, or US companies for that matter, that offer both
parents the option to take leave (paid or otherwise) to care for
children, men do suffer from this "handicap." Obviously women have to
take time off for childbirth itself, but if the employer is uncertain
whether the father or mother, or both, will take time off to care for
children, then how does Posner justify paying higher wages to the "more
dependable" male?
Jake Minas
On the basis that men, in general, take parental leave less than women, and
when they do, they take less time off. That's even true in Sweden, which
has made generous parental leave and gender-neutrality a centerpiece of
public policy, so you can't exactly attribute it to biases in the policies.
If female employees disproportionately take family leave, are you saying
because the employer is uncertain which particular employees of which
gender will take leave means that the policy is neutral? Would you say the
same thing if the employer offered nonwage benefits that disproportionately
appealed to men (say, football tickets, outings to strip clubs)?
Stephen R. Diamond
In article <jam81-ya02318000...@news.cc.columbia.edu>,
ja...@columbia.edu (Jake Minas) wrote:
> This is not really an issue of "values." Most often its not the
> fundamental tradeoffs between objections that are at issue, but rather of
> means chosen or other mechanics....
>
> (1) doesn't even make any controversial value choices. It says,
> even if health is the only criteria, migration of dirty industry in poor
> countries makes sense, since the marginal health gains per dollar spent in
> those countries on other, cheaper programs (e.g. water treatment programs)
> are much greater than those from air quality regulation. This is
> essentially, the "richer is safer" argument, which is undeservedly given
> short shrift most of the time.
Requoting (1)
**(1) The measurement of the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on
the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this
point of view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done
in the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and
we should face up to that.**
If the disagreement I'd anticipate from environmentalists doesn't stem
from "values" I'm not sure what to call what it does stem from. True there
is agreement on (some of) the ends. But the disagreement on the means
seems value-driven. It is not as though the environmentalists are by and
large likely to counterpose a an argument based on differerent
economics-based predictions, or even based on different predictions of any
sort.
I'd anticipate the expression of horror at both the injury to the
environment, and the use of "Third World" countries as dumping grounds.
I'd anticipate the charge that this policy recommendation is racist.
To link this up with some other ongoing and past threads, the argument
would probably come down to the assertion that dumping toxic waste on the
Third World violates those people's rights, regardless of what their
government might allow, because those countries environments are "theirs,
theirs, theirs," and are so _inalienably_, this being a self-evident moral
postulate available to all right-thinking persons.
I suppose some would put forward a consequentialist critique. I'd guess
they would say allowing such an approach - nay, even just mentioning it -
threatens to break down our proper sense of horror at such ideas, and
leads to a slippery slope, and ultimately to the destruction of the
environment as well as to Third World genocide. If the First World doesn't
have to suffer the consequences itself, the dumping of wastes, they will
predict, will be vastly accelerated. Probably the first group will accept
this argument, since the first one is awfully dunderheaded.
So, the argument will be as regards means to an agreed end, but it is an
argument of a special sort. It is an argument which holds the retaining of
particular blind moral valuations as essential to society, and believes
intellectuals should enlist themselves in the service of maintaing those
valuations. It thus expresses what to me is the ultimate value choice,
that between the good and the true.
Stephen R. Diamond
Todd Kornfeld
On Fri, 20 Dec 1996, Robert S. Hahn wrote:
> I find Dan's question a very interesting one right now for personal
> reasons. As a third year struggling to finish the penultimate final exam
> in law school, in a class taught by one of the very best teachers I've ever
> had (Larry Kramer, who will be at Harvard as a visiting professor next year
> for those of you at HLS -- I cannot recommend him higher), I realized that
> my legal education would have been much enriched and more meaningful had I
> done some reading in legal history and legal theory.
>
> Prof. Kramer has a keen sense of history and how it affects the law (for
> example, his interpretation of 28 USC 1983 actions) and it taught me a
> great deal. Among them is the fact that I know next to nothing about legal
> history. I don't know how many law students are past history majors or had
> significant studies in history, but I have to envious of those who have had
> exposure to the history (for example) of the Reconstruction or the Great
> Depression to see how historical forces have affected the law.
I dunno about other people's background but I learned a fair
amount of that material in high school, where it was a required subject.
Most of what would be really useful history to a law student is not
widely taught. In my opinion, while 1983 is interesting, it is
not a cornerstone of why the legal system looks the way it does. To
know that I think you would need to know much more English History and
earlier material as well. As my contract law prof liked to point out
once a week, most of our basic contract law concepts were lifted
straight from Roman Law. And if you read Magna Carta, the
Constitution makes much more sense. In fact, I think the
resemblence between that document and the Constitution is so strong
I sometimes wonder just how much post-Renaissance philosphy is really
in the Constitution. And I found that property law made much more
sense when I understood knight's service and the like from England.
I suppose some college could offer "bizzare history useful to the
law student." The only problem is that your requirements would
vary from law professor to law professor. I was lucky, most of
my professors tossed in a fair amount of legal history. For anyone
in Boston, BU offers a really neat lecture series on legal history.
Once in a while the speaker is a BU prof or a prof from the Boston
area. More often, the speaker is someone BU flew in from a law school
somewhere else. The lectures are free and open to the public. You
could contact professors Betsy Clark or David Siepp for more info.
Last time I heard they headed BU's legal history group. The
lectures are around every 2-3 weeks; the law school's main number
is (617) 353-3115. I am sure other schools have similar programs
and I bet either Columbia or NYU run one in NYC.
>
> As a philosophy major, I find it incredibly useful that I had some exposure
> to legal theory as an undergraduate. Maybe it's meaningless for a law
> school exam, but if one wants to get something of value out of law school
> besides a degree and a job, I do think there are interesting questions.
> Furthermore, a lot of decisions make a great deal more sense when you
> understand the prevailing legal theory of the time. For example, in
> studying federal common law, it was illuminating to understand that when
> Erie was decided, the general understanding was that there was some
> transcendental "common law" that was neither state law nor federal law, and
> that all courts were competent to adjudicate issues which arose in "common
> law".
They taught you Erie? All I got was the five minute lecture.
I kid not. To toss another thread in, Erie has interesting implications
for federalism. But I have a caution; see below.
>
> I was wondering if others shared any of these experiences. If so, and this
> is a roundabout way of recommending stuff for a reading list, I would
> advise reading some stuff on legal history and legal theory -- at least the
> big ones, like Hart, Dworkin, CLS, feminist legal theory, black legal
> scholarship, legal realism, law and economics... maybe I'm missing some....
I actually took a law school course on American Jurisprudence.
It was interesting. But. It is possible I think to overvalue that
area. First thing is that pre-Langdell people didn't really
publish Jurisprudence as such. I don't think we can say that in
say 1820 vintage America there was any formal understanding of a common
legal theory or jurisprudence. Sure there may have been some fairly
commonly held opinions about what we would now call legal theory but
I think they were far from universal and I don't think many people
spent much time thinking about them or their implications.
And when people like Langdell started to publish much of what
they did publish was junk. In the case of Langdell, almost all of it was
junk (yes, I read the stuff). The ball really didn't get rolling until
the 1930's when people started to publish stuff that made some sense and
that was defensible. And remember that most of what was published came
from one of three law schools (Harvard, Yale, and Columbia). It wasn't
that they turned out the best stuff, at some points they turned out the
only stuff. As far as I know, the only major and highly influential piece
of legislation that exists that was formulated using a formal legal
philosophy is the UCC. That may be less due to the impact of formal legal
philosophy and more to the fact that Karl Llewellyn wrote the UCC and
stuck his formal legal philosophy in. Of course I know modern, say
post 1950, legislation often has elements selected from formal legal
philosophy but even then I don't think the formal legal philosophy
is the driving factor. Much of our modern criminal law does have
a background from philosophy but not formal legal philosophy; Bentham
was not a legal philosopher.
This may be why Jake is always stating that he finds
legal philosophy unsatisfying and lightweight. I think legal
philiosophy is descriptive: we try to use it to explain why we just
did that, not why we should do that. Of course that means any
different numbers of descriptions are equally plausable. That
is why we have so many different competeting systems of legal philosophy;
in particular crit systems right now.
Yes I know some systems like Law and Econ try to make decisions but
as even Posner has started to admit Law and Econ breaks down since
it is impossible right now to value social issues and concerns.
All this stuff is neat. On the other hand, after reading
Dworkin's Law's Empire cover to cover a few times (not fun let
me tell you) I have my doubts that anyone will be reading it in 200
years. It isn't Plato by any means. I'll give a buck to anyone
who can explain how "principled decision making" works and how
it reaches the (only) "correct and just result." Much of the
material I have read on legal philosophy seems to be like that;
the author's view is so subtle I can't find it and I suspect the
author can't either. This is plain old not good stuff.
I guess my basic point is that while this stuff is neat,
Congressional Staffers, Judges, and the like do not read it. It
influences mostly itself (probably because most of it isn't very good).
Now back to that warning. All of these systems share one problem; they
act as rose colored glasses. I am sure your prof put one spin on Erie.
I have my own theory and I suspect it is what was going on in 1938 when
the Court barfed Erie upon us. In Erie a switchman lost his arm
in a railyard accident. Under Pennsylvania law, the switchman had
a hard time proving a prima facia case. Under then federal law, the
switchman had an easy time proving a prima facia case. The Court
got upset when it noticed that people were forum shopping between
federal and state courts for the best law; shades of federalism
(back to DOMA. What do you know...). The Court got even more upset
when it noticed that different federal jurisdictions had slightly
different rules for this sort of tort. So there was shopping among
the federal forums as well. This was not good. The Court wanted to
get rid of forum shopping for this sort of thing (at least federal-state
and federa-federal forum shopping). There were two obvious solutions.
One was to create a common federal law. But then there would be no
state law on the issue and that would mean a problem with state
soverignty. The other solution was to get rid of the federal law
and leave the problem to the states. That is what the Court did. Of
course they really solved the problem by creating a very large precedent.
Now depending on what gloss you want to use, you can analyze why the
Court did what it did. But I suspect it would be only gloss. We don't
really know what was going on in the minds of the Justices; I
strongly suspect none of them were thinking about a formal legal
philosophy...
Comment to the side. I stole some of my comments from
my jurisprudence prof. In his opinion, a large part of the
problem is that most people who write legal philosophy are
not very well read and also lack training in plain old
philosophy. To him, they are amaturs.
Josh Perlman
Emerging from 1L finals...
I heartily concur with Robert's own thoughts about law and history.
I was a history major as an undergraduate, who knew for quite a while he
wanted to go to law school, but began to question it as his love of
history grew. I strongly considered graduate school in history before
choosing law school, and while I did so more out of practicality, I vowed
to never give up my love of history.
Legal history has always interested me, for I discovered in an early
internship how alike studying and researching law in a common law
tradition resembled studying Western history for me.
I specialized in Western Civilization, and Renaissance intellectual history
in my studies. The former tends to include an assumption of progress in
history. Each successive age builds on the ideas that came before, and
hopes to advance. The common law works off of precedents the same way,
with each new opinion in a line refining ideas about that area of law.
And neither ever forgets its own history. Judges are not afraid to
reverse or change course when times change, just as many philosophers
refuse to accept the work of their predecessors. Historians also are
taught not to take this presumption of progress too lightly. All sources
and times are to be assessed critically, looking carefully at the
author's prejudices, always keeping in mind what side he may represent.
Both law and history study human behavior not with idea of figuring out
objectively how it really is and ought to be, but learning and dealing
with how it was and is: how to structure a well-ordered society/how
others that were stable may have been structured in the past.
This is very simplistic, and masks distinctions, but the similarities go
beyond the subject matter.
One of the things I did not always like about history was the haphazard
search for the perfect source. I loved digging through the archives,
but I am a classicist at heart, and view them more favorable then other
sources. Furthermore, the perfect first-hand account was rarely
avaiable. Second-hand, or farther removed, only scraps, and always with
biases were the norm. It seemed that no source was any better than
another, and the answer to one persons view being different than another
was their primary sources, or the lack of to substantiate a new thesis.
Law is quite different, as the study provides its own hierarchy of
authorities. Precedents are to be used, or distinguished. They cannot
just be ignored, and if non-existent, related areas can provide a
starting point, with no worries as to success in the search. Law
materials are available. Our legal system demands that the records be kept.
My interest in the Classics was also nurtured by my love of law. What
marks many of these is a dual nature, both connected to their times,
and also quite universal in their understanding of humanity. It seems to
me that judges write their opiniong in the same way: with a deep
understanding not just of how their case will affect the parties
involved, but also the society around them, and that society's future.
Furthermore, they seem cognizant of the effect their writings have on how
we value the past, and how precedent should be observed.
I guess this doesn't speak very well to recommendations towards pre-law
students. I think some legal philosophy may be useful, but not overly.
What I would recomend is picking up a judicial opinion before law school,
and trying to read one. Don't be scaured if you can't understand it,
because law school will teach you. But be ready for the challenge, and
know hoefully that you enjoy it, at least somewhat. Cases are our
lifeblood as lawyers, and the way judges write is really quite unique.
I love the opinions, no matter what they're about, but that's just part of
my love of law and history. I honestly think I can follow an awful lot
of the forces weighing on a judge's mind as he/she composes an opinion.
To see that train of thought, for me, is the ultimate historical
experience: understanding how a person consciously tries to affect their
own times, and the future, all with an understanding of the past.
Josh Perlman
perl...@acs.bu.edu
BUSL '99
Glenn Nunes
Todd Kornfeld (korn...@SEA.NTPLX.NET) wrote:
: earlier material as well. As my contract law prof liked to point out
: once a week, most of our basic contract law concepts were lifted
: straight from Roman Law. And if you read Magna Carta, the
: Constitution makes much more sense. In fact, I think the
: resemblence between that document and the Constitution is so strong
: I sometimes wonder just how much post-Renaissance philosphy is really
: in the Constitution.
The standard story is that America was founded upon classical
liberal ideas that came out of the Renaissance. And where the founders
were not influenced by Renaissance thinkers, it is claimed they were
influenced by the Greeks. Now, of course, we here that the founding was a
republican founding or a communitarian one.
There have been some other theories put out there as well.
Russell Kirk wrote a book callled _The Roots of American Order_ where he
argues that most of the so-called Renaissance ideas were actually put
first during the Middle Ages. And the founders were more bothered by
the lack of order in Greek civilization than impressed by it. By his
argument, the founders were more influenced by Thomas Aquinas and Edmund
Burke than John Locke or Plato. As such, it was more conservative
revolution than a liberal one. Evans (?) Novak (not the guy on TV,
another Novak) and George Carey have argued similarly.
Along slightly different lines Barry Alan Shain has argued that we
actually had a Protestant revolution. He says, sure, the Declaration of
Independence looks like it was authored by John Locke, but it was only
written that way to impress the French. And, while he concedes that the
historical figures we all know about were not always Protestant, the
vast bulk of the people were Protestant. And the ideas of the revolution
were really Protestant ones. Admittedly, I am not very impressed with his
version of the founding.
--
Glenn Nunes
Todd Kornfeld
On Sat, 21 Dec 1996, Joseph G. Adams wrote:
> You got the five minute lecture? We (well my civ pro class, at least)
> didn't even get that. At the beginning of the course, the prof explained
> that she thought that questions of personal jurisdiction weren't as
> important in practice as other issues, so we spent time doing pleading,
> rule 11, summary judgment, discovery, and notice. After spending a summer
> in court and another summer doing some litigation stuff in a law firm, I
> have to agree with her. Somewhere along the way, I picked up the general
> principle (apply state law), and that seems to be all I've needed.
So the prof didn't even mention that Erie existed? My prof's
mini-lecture was basically "There is this thing called Erie. It
more or less says there is no such thing as federal common law.
It says that federal courts usually apply local state law when there
is no federal law on point. This is a complicated and messy area of the
law. Take Federal Courts if you want to know more." He actually spent
more time on the introduction "This is my five minute lecture on Erie,
an infamous area of the law..."
>
> --
> Joseph G. Adams
> Stanford Law School, 3L
> http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~jgadams/
>
Jake Minas
> }Both in terms of pregnancy/maternity leave and the fact that women, in
> }general, tend to live longer, therefore companies have to pay longer
> }benefits to women.
>
> Ah, yes. The life span argument is also a good one.
I accidentally came across some studies which show that this is not as
simple as it first looks. True, women have longer lifespans (and more
importantly, longer retirement lifespans) than men. But that women thereby
receive more pension benefits is not always true. Many plans pay, to
paraphrase Stalin, by one's contribution to the plan, as opposed to one's
needs for money over a retirement lifespan. This is one of the typical
differences between a "defined contribution" and a "defined benefits" plan
(although it not need be the case). In cases "nondiscriminatory" according
to Posner, women frequently get lower benefits by rate per year, and
equivalent ones in terms of total payout. Sometimes even moreso, since
women tend to invest much more conservatively than men, putting pension
assets into low risk "widows and orphans" securities that have lower
expected returns than higher risk alternatives. Therefore, the gender
pension gap is wider than the gender earnings gap.
These findings, and others related to gender, investing, and pension
benefits, are summarized in Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, "Why Do Women Invest
Differently Than Men," a working paper, which you can access off of the
downloads page at www.ssrn.com if you want to see it.
Brian W. Crist
Erie is alive and well at Harvard. My Civ Pro class spent a few weeks
on Erie and its progeny. It is a tricky area of law and I am not sure
how useful much of it will be in actual legal practice. However, the
same thing could be said about much of what is taught in law school.
My classes tend to focus on the most complicated issues in law, not
necessarily the most common.
Brian Crist HLS '99
Eric Lambert
On 17 Dec 1996 18:30:57 GMT, "David A. Ellis" <dqe...@is4.nyu.edu>
wrote:
>My absolute best recommendation for a book about lawyers and the law is "A
>Civil Action" by Jonathan Harr (I think it came out in paperback fairly
>recently). It follows the true story of a lawsuit against a company that
>had been dumping toxic waste in a small town in Massachusetts. This book
>is easy reading and should appeal to law students and anyone who is
>interested in law. It also presents the very best and worst aspects of
>lawyers and the legal system.
>
>David Ellis
You might also want to get a copy of "Some Thoughts on the First Year
of Law School," available free from Emanuel Law Outlines, one of the
leading publishers of legal study aids. It discusses what you'll
encounter during your first year. You can request a free copy by
calling 1-800-EMANUEL.
Also, I'd recommend reading "One-L" by Scott Turow...it's a little
dated, but I found it to be a pretty accurate description of what my
first year at Cornell ended up being like.
-- Eric Lambert
Cornell Law '95
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc.