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burden of proof

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James Kiefer

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May 17, 1993, 3:38:37 AM5/17/93
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Don Roberts writes that disbelief in God is no less an act of faith
than belief in God, and that one cannot reasonably say that the
burden of proof is on the theist. Theist and atheist are logically
on the same level.

I disagree.

Suppose that you are married, and someone asks you for evidence. You
can present your marriage certificate. But suppose that someone asks
you to prove that you are NOT married. The county court-house does
not issue certificates of non-marriage.

Once a friend of mine said that medieval theologians sat around
debating how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. I
promptly replied:

I will pay you twenty dollars if you can show me a reference to
that question in any medieval theologian. Let us define the
middle ages as lasting from 500 to 1500. Okay?

He said,

Why should I have to prove that there is such a reference? Why
shouldn't I challenge you to prove that there isn't?

I said,

First, because I am the one offering the twenty dollars. But
second, because in order to prove to me that the statement is
there, all you have to do is open the book to the correct page,
point the statement out to me, and say, Behold! If I undertake
to prove to you that the question is not found in any medieval
theologian, I have to open the Summa to page one, put it in
front of you, and say, 'Are you satisfied that it is not on
this page?' We then go on to page two, and page three, and so
on through the Summa. We then go through everything else
written by Thomas Aquinas, and then through everything else
written by every other medieval theologian. It is going to be a
long weekend. And when we are done, how do I satisfy you that
there are no books out there that I have overlooked? Don't you
see that asking for a proof that there are no references to the
angels-on-a-pin problem in any medieval theologian is simply
meaningless?"

My point is that belief in the existence of something, in the
absence of evidence that it exists, and disbelief, in the absence of
evidence that it does not exist, are not really symmetrical cases.

Yours,
James Kiefer

John Baskette

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May 19, 1993, 6:32:22 PM5/19/93
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br...@liv.ac.uk (Bruce Stephens) writes:

>And here's the crunch! Why can't any atheistic view be a reasonable
>and adequate interpretation? Remember, we're comparing believing in X
>without evidence and not believing in X without evidence. If you're
>going to say that not believing in X doesn't work, then presumably
>there's evidence for X. If there is no evidence either way, then not
>believing is surely the rational course; if there _is_ evidence, (and
>there surely is) then let's discuss it.

So many points, so little time...

First note that I spoke of proof, not evidence. No amount of evidence
is sufficient to prove a universal explanatory theory. This does not
mean that there is no evidence. Every observation that is consistent
with and readily understood using a particular universal explanatory
theory is evidence in favor of that theory or other theories that do the
same. There are a great many things that we all believe without proof and
in many cases with not very much evidence either.

Second note that my post was not trying to make an argument for the existence
of God. It was talking about the falsifiability or verifiability of
statements in general and of the statement "These is a God" in particular.
I was in part trying to show that to require absolute proof for the
existence of God as the minimum standard to rationally justify a belief
in the existence of God is not a reasonable requirement.

Why do I believe that Theistic world views and Christianity in particular
is a better interpretation of the world than atheistic world views?

In short I do not believe that any atheistic world view can adequately
account for the existence of a contingent world, the existence of
consciousness or of mind, the justification of any kind of moral order,
the uniformity and order of the natural realm, or give an answer as to
why we can rely upon the laws of logic as a method of testing for truth.

Any one of these issues can be the subject of long discussion and debate.
You may have noticed the thread regarding C.S. Lewis and moral law talks
about one of these issues.

Right now, I will give you a couple arguments.

First concerns the observed contingency of the universe. This argument
has as its starting point the Aquinas "cosmological argument".

1.) The existence of the universe is contingent. This says the
current universe is only one of many possible universes. A
merely possible universe can also not exist. The question is,
"Why is the universe what it is and not something else? Or
nothing at all? For the universe to be what it is, there must be
something external to itself that determines that it is this and
not something else or that it exists at all.

2.) This external something must be non-contingent or necessary.
A necessary being is a being that is itself the cause of its
own existence and of what it is. The alternative is an infinite
regression of contingent causes that cannot be the cause of any other
beings continued existence. That would be analogous to continuously
adding zeros in an attempt to get one. The action of contingent
things that we observe can cause other things to be changed or to
cease to exist, but they cannot be a sufficient or sustaining cause
of any other things continued existence. Only a necessary being can
do this.

(Another analogy to the problem of infinite regress is as follows:
Mr. A received $10,000. Now Mr. A cannot print money so were did He
get it? Why from Mr. B. But where did Mr. B get the $10,000 to give
to Mr. A? Why from Mr. C. But where did Mr. C get the $10,000 to
give to Mr. B? Why from Mr. D..... Now, no one in the chain up
to now can print money so we have to ask, how did the money ever
get printed? In order to answer the question, we have to posit
that the chain is broken at some point by someone who first had the
ability to print money. I.e., there must be a giver of money who
is unlike the others in that the giver is also a printer of money.
If we posit an infinite regression then we still have the problem
of how the money got printed at all. In like manner, if we see that
the universe is contingent on something beyond itself to determine
that it would exist (and in what form), then we could posit that
this cause is itself contingent. But on what is this cause
contingent? Why on the cause's cause ... etc. At some point we
either must break the chain by positing a necessary being or we
must admit that no answer to the universe's contingency has been put
forth at all.)

3.) The universe, therefore, must have a cause of its continued existence
that is external to itself and that is a necessary being. This being
we identify with God.

Mortimer J. Adler's book, "How to Think About God" has much to say about
the cosmological argument that is worth while.

Note that the argument says nothing about a regression in time. Arguments
about whether or not time and space are finite or infinite are irrelevant.

[I posted the above argument to soc.religion.christian not long ago. It was
re-posted by someone else to several other usenet newsgroups. Most the of
responses indicated that few understood the argument.]

I am not sure if the above argument really proves that God exists.
If the argument is correct all we get is some kind of necessary being. This
being, however, would have many characteristics in common with the Christian
God.

Some attempt to attribute the contigency to chance. "Chance" does not seem to
me to be any kind of answer at all. It is a non-answer that says that there
is no explanation -- it just happens -- or it is a way of saying "I don't
know". Belief in the existence of God is a much better understanding.

In my perspective it is a good argument that ways in favor of the belief that
God exists over any possible atheistic system.

Another argument is similar to the so-called teological argument, but it is
not the same. The argument asks a question like the following, "Is the
universe that we see the kind of universe that we would expect if it is
the product of a divine intelligence?"

Einstein (who did not believe in a personal God or any religion) had this
to say regarding this question:

This is taken from "The Road of Science and the Ways to God" by Stanley
Jaki, pp. 192-193.

"You find it surprising," he wrote to Solovine on March 30, 1952,
"that I think of the comprehensibility of the world (insofar as we
are entitled to speak of such world) as a miracle or an eternal
mystery. But surely, a priori, one should expect the world to be
chaotic, not to be grasped by thought in any way. One might
(indeed one should) expect that the world evidenced itself as
lawful only so far as we grasp it in an orderly fashion. This
would be a sort of order like the alphabetical order of words.
On the other hand, the kind of order created, for example, by
Newton's gravitational theory is of a very different character.
Even if the axioms of the theory are posited by man, the success
of such a procedure supposed in the objective world a high degree
of order, which we are in no way entitled to expect a priori.
Therein lies the 'miracle' which becomes more and more evident as
our knowledge develops." To this Einstein added the even more
revealing remark: "And here is the weak point of positivists and
of professional atheists, who feel happy because they think that
they have preempted not only the world of the divine but also of
the miraculous. Curiously, we have to be resigned to recognizing
the 'miracle" without having any legitimate way of getting any
further. I have to add the last point explicitly, lest you think
that weakened by age I have fallen into the hands of the priests."

The point is that the universe has the nature that one would expect if it
was the product of a creator. Paul Davies has written some books in this
vein, a recent one being _The Cosmic Blueprint_ published by Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1988, ISBN 0-671-60233-0. I just got this book myself.

In my view both of these arguments along with a number of others are all
good reasons -- good evidence to believe in a personal creator God that is
much like the God of Christianity.

Belief in a personal God will in turn greatly impact how one evaluates the
historical evidence and claims of Christianity. In short, the probability
of the truth of Christian claims is greater with regard to theism and the
facts than it is with regard to atheism and the facts.

God Bless!

John Baskette j...@macsch.com

kil...@gboro.rowan.edu

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May 20, 1993, 12:11:41 AM5/20/93
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[ Yes, this is about obvious invisible butterflies. Trust me. ]


John Baskette writes:

> [T]he current universe is only one of many possible universes. [...]

How do you know? Maybe it HAD to be this way.


> For the universe to be what it is, there must be something external to
> itself that determines that it is this and not something else or that it
> exists at all.

Why?


> This external something must be non-contingent or necessary. A necessary
> being is a being that is itself the cause of its own existence and of what
> it is.

What does it mean that a being "is itself the cause of its own existence"?


> Some attempt to attribute the contigency to chance. "Chance" does not
> seem to me to be any kind of answer at all. It is a non-answer that says
> that there is no explanation -- it just happens -- or it is a way of saying
> "I don't know". Belief in the existence of God is a much better
> understanding.

In what ways? "God did it" is just "I don't know" dressed up in theology.
(Besides which, what if God doesn't exist? That would make such belief a
much WORSE understanding.)

> Another argument is similar to the so-called teological argument, but it is
> not the same. The argument asks a question like the following, "Is the
> universe that we see the kind of universe that we would expect if it is
> the product of a divine intelligence?"

The only way I can think of to answer this question is to perform induction
over all the universes that I have observed being created by deities. Since
the number of such acts of creation that I have observed is Zero, there is
no data on which to base an answer.

> The point is that the universe has the nature that one would expect if it
> was the product of a creator. Paul Davies has written some books in this
> vein, a recent one being _The Cosmic Blueprint_ published by Simon and
> Schuster, New York, 1988, ISBN 0-671-60233-0. I just got this book myself.

And how many universes has Mr Davies observed being created by deities, so
that he can compare what we have with those others?

*

> Belief in a personal God will in turn greatly impact how one evaluates the
> historical evidence and claims of Christianity. In short, the probability
> of the truth of Christian claims is greater with regard to theism and the
> facts than it is with regard to atheism and the facts.

Maybe, but maybe not. There are people who believe in a personal God but
who reject Christianity and who dispute the value of the historical evidence.
One need not be an atheist to notice that most of the arguments for religion
stink. (I'm not an atheist, and I noticed it. 8-)

***

I'm getting a little ragged out on the atheism thread, largely because I
prefer to talk about Christianity than play "Unbeliever's Advocate". But
the atheists are few in number, and I always take up for the underdog.

Last week I hijacked one of James Kiefer's analogies as a way to illustrate
how some atheists see religious people. We say that there's someone who loves
them, who knows of their desire to meet him, who can easily make the trip or
communicate directly, but who prefers to remain silent and in hiding. On top
of all that, we can't get our stories straight, we don't agree on which
book(s) he wrote, and we can't explain why he stopped writing just when his
career was taking off.

So far, I have never seen anything that even resembles a sensible proof for
the existence of God. The arguments like "Where did the Universe come from?"
all have parallels like "Where did God come from?" I have never understood
what `necessary' and `contingent' were supposed to mean when it came to
talking about people. I understand the basis in Aristotle's "Four Causes",
but I don't understand why anybody thinks that has anything to do with
reality.


Several years ago, we had a very enlightening discussion in the Usenet group
talk.religion.misc about belief in God. I'll try to summarise one of the
main points.

There are pictures painted with `hidden' things in them. Sometimes, say,
a bunch of flowers will be cleverly drawn so that the flower petals make up
the wings of a butterfly. Ed Turner, who thought of this example, referred
to this as an `obvious invisible butterfly'. Some people, he said, could
look at such a picture and spot all of the hidden objects in it. He has
never been any good at that. He can look at the flower petals, and have
someone say "This is one wing, and this is the other wing, and this here is
the body", and he still can't see the butterfly.

Is the butterfly really there? Only the artist knows for sure whether he
intended to hide a butterfly in the picture.


Many Christians `see God' around them; it's obvious that someone created all
of this. Many atheists do not see any God at all. We're both looking at the
same painting, but some of us see the butterfly and some do not.

I see some value in talking about where and how we see God -- pointing out the
butterfly, to parallel the example. But it's useless to try and prove that
the butterfly is in the picture. How could you prove to Mr Turner that there
was a butterfly hidden in a painting? Even if you can point to a definite
outline, he might call that a simple coincidence of light and shadow -- not a
painting of a butterfly. And he'd be right to do this: the only one who can
say definitively whether that's a butterfly or a coincidence is the painter.


The best way to show someone that God exists is to show them Christ living
through you. (I was going to say "BE the butterfly", but that's sounds too
much like New Age stuff. 8-)

Trying to show that God exists by argument seems to me a waste of time; people
have been writing proofs of all kinds for thousands of years, and I've yet to
encounter one that was worth the recyclable phosphor it takes to display.


Darren F Provine / kil...@gboro.rowan.edu
"The most difficult stage of the work is when the artists' clay is within
a nail's breadth of completion." -- Polycleitus

Usenet/Netnews Moderator

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May 21, 1993, 1:38:13 PM5/21/93
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----------------------------Original message----------------------------
>Newsgroups: bit.listserv.christia
>From: tra...@cwis.unomaha.edu (Stephen McIntyre)
>Subject: Re: burden of proof
>Organization: University of Nebraska at Omaha
>Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 19:46:09 GMT

Here are a couple of points I'd wished addressed:

John Baskette writes:

> This is also one reason why I do not think that the burden of proof for
> proving the existence of God is on the Christian. What we actually have
> are competing ways of viewing and interpreting the world. These can be
> logically viewed on the same level. A Christian or theistic world view
> can be compared with an atheistic world view (note that I said "an
> atheistic" - not "the atheist") in order to see which view is the better
> interpretation. Perhaps proof of theism is possible using certain
> arguments, perhaps not. It can argued that a Christian view is a better
> or superior interpretation without the requirement that the Christian or
> theistic view must be given absolute proof. It is not proper to accept
> an atheistic view as being the default reasonable position with
> theistic views requiring a greater burden of proof.

I would like to know what an "atheistic" world view is. When
I think of world view, it means to me a viewpoint taken
with a certain belief in mind. But what belief does the
atheist hold that gives him an "atheistic" world view?

This leads into this next paragraph below...

> In a sense then, Don Roberts original contention, "Prove to me that God
> does not exist", does have a point to make. To Don, Christianity is an
> entirely reasonable and adequate interpretation of the world whereas
> any atheistic view inherently cannot be so. He recognizes that absolute
> empirical proof for God is not possible, but there are approaches that can
> be taken (and in fact many atheists do take) to try to disprove or falsify
> the Christian concept of God.

For myself, I do not try to disprove the Christian concept of God,
though I do point out apparent inconsistencies in trying to
pinpoint what the Christian concept is. Also, since I have
nothing tangible to have belief in, why must I try to prove
its non-existence?

> To him, Christianity is the reasonable
> "default" and properly basic interpretation of the world. To him, the
> burden of proof is on those reject the existence of God to offer proof for
> their world view.

Is Christianity the properly basic interpretation of the world?
From my reading of history, present-day Christianity only
came by its views because of non-theistic elements.
Additionally, there is a population larger than that of
the Christians that do believe in God but don't believe in
the Christian concept of God. How is Don so sure about
what he believes?

> The only common denominator for atheists is a lack of
> belief in God so Don asks for proof that God does not exist. It is a
> way of asserting something like the following, "You demand proof of my
> world view and presume that your view is reasonable and correct in the
> absence of such proof. Well I say that my world view is reasonable and
> correct and ask you to present proof for your view."

Please define what you mean by "world view" before I go into this.

> I do not view Don's demand as a reasonable requirement to justify
> atheism. An atheist may have good reasons to be an atheist without
> providing proof of God's non-existence. Neither is it a reasonable
> requirement to demand absolute proof of God's existence or of
> Christianity in order to have adequate grounds for believing that
> God exists or that Christianity is true.

I would agree with this to a point *if* the Christian tended to
his or her own business. But is this requirement unreasonable
when the particular theist (not necessarily the Christian)
acts to limit others because his or her belief requires it?
For example, is it unreasonable to ask the theist to prove
God exists when he demands, say, homosexuality be outlawed
because his God says it must be outlawed?

> John Baskette j...@macsch.com

Stephen

_/_/_/_/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ * Atheist
_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ * Libertarian
_/_/_/_/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ * Pro-individuality
_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ * Pro-responsibility
_/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ Jr. * and all that jazz...

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