Re: understanding the children of realizable_entity
Smith, Barry
>Dear Alan
>
>On 3/1/07, Alan Ruttenberg <alanrut...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>Is there a paper that gives some more formal (like some axioms)
>>about the subtypes of realizable_entity more so than the cornucopia
>>paper? I'm still trying to clarify the distinctions between role,
>>disposition, function, power, etc.
>
>There is nothing to my knowledge. It is possible however that some
>elements have been given in work on functions, maybe papers authored
>or co-authored by Ingvar Johansson. I will ask him. Maybe Barry will
>have better suggestions.
There is nothing, as yet, except for Ingvar's and Ludger's work on tendencies:
http://home.arcor.de/metaphysicus/Texte/tendencies%20WSPI2006%20proc.pdf
http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/ontology2.htm
We have been holding back until other matters solidify, but if you
have proposals I would be eager to hear them. First ideas
(counterexamples welcome):
function = disposition that is beneficial to the bearer
role = socially assigned function (or more likely: constellation of functions)
power = disposition whose realization gives rise to the release of energy
liability = disposition whose realization involves the absorption of energy
tendency =
propensity = disposition with a statistically determinate likelihood
of being realized
BFO probably should not include all of these
>But to my knowledge, we have no worked on any of the specificities of
>each sort of 'realizable entities'. I.e. we have not worked on the
>specificity of each sort of realization (processes and relations).
>
>>What make sense to me:
>>
>>"Realization involves in every case three entities: (1) a substance,
>>(2) a SNAP dependent entity, and (3) a correlated process. (2) then
>>inheres in (1) in virtue of the fact that (1) participates in (3)"
>>(however "correlated" is a bit fuzzy)
Dispositions would then involve (3) a correlated process universal
(of which the realization of the disposition would be an instance)
BS
>Is this from the 'manual', maybe the file? The second sentence doesn't
>seem quite right actually. It seems to be more explanatory than
>descriptive, it more or less tells you when you need to summon a
>realizable entity. I.e. in those cases in which there ius a process
>that has to be explained by the presence of such a thing and which is
>distinct from the life of an inhering entity. Otherwise, (3) could be
>the life of (1) and it seems what is said here would be true of any
>inhering entity...
>
>(2) inheres in (1) is true since realizable entities are inhering ones
>
>I think the intuition is more that (3) occurs which is such that (1)
>participates in (3) in virtue of (2) inhering in (1), but it is hard
>to cash out the fact that processes like (3) occur in certain
>circumstances. Describing the conditions in which a realization occurs
>might be a key to describing each type of realizable entities.
>
>>What's not clear (at least) are to what extent the distinctions are
>>due to the mode of participation/involvement(function~agentive?
>>disposition~passive?), and which are due to the type of the
>>participants(role~people?), and whether there are other determinants.
>
>Tricky. The idea of realization is that there is a process which
>wouldn't be there if the realizable was not there _and_ was not
>realized. I.e. the realizable could be inhering in a substance but not
>necessarily be realized, however there would be no realization of
>power, function and so on without the inhering entity which is this
>power, function, etc.
>
>Given this, you can probably come up with some classification based on
>the type of entity to which belong each of the entities involved in
>this picture. It is a bit hard to do it in the general case.
>
>In practice, we found that clarifying the distinction between roles
>and function say was not worth the time and we didn't try to rely on
>more than intuitions. Here is partly a problem with OWL and protege
>ontologies in which we can not easily express temporal constraints and
>the complexity that might be required. But it has to be admitted that
>even the intuitions are hard to give informally.
>
>Finally, there is no clear big plan to adress this, although it's been
>nagging for some time now, as work on these issues is dependent on
>project contingencies at ifomis.
>
>pierre
>
>>-Alan
>>
>
Robert Hoehndorf
Hi,
BS> We have been holding back until other matters solidify, but if
BS> you have proposals I would be eager to hear them. First ideas
BS> (counterexamples welcome):
BS> function = disposition that is beneficial to the bearer role =
I have a disposition to eat. Eating is beneficial for me. My function
is to eat. Seems counter-intuitive to me. I believe you would like to
reduce "function" to purely realistic terms without human
ascription. The best work I know of that tries to do this is Ruth
Millikans "Language, Thought and other biological categories".
The problem is that "beneficial" depends on values of some observer,
something you probably do not want. The basic idea of the realist
accounts on saying what "beneficial" means is:
A can cause X. A is there now because it caused X in the past.
With a number of counter-examples (see Searle).
BS> socially assigned function (or more likely: constellation of
I can put my glas of beer on a rock that is formed like a table. This
rock has no socially assigned function. However, the rock plays the
role of a table.
There are a number of different types of roles. You appear to be
referring to social roles only. Social roles are something like
"student" or "employee". In processes, some entity may play the role
of a "transporter", even if no society exists. In 2 < 4, "2" may play
the role of the smaller argument. Maybe you find
http://www.onto-med.de/en/publications/refereed-papers-in-proceedings/loebe-f-2005-93-a.pdf interesting.
Rob.